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PREFACE

This collection of cases is the result of several years' work in

the class-room by both of the editors. It is obvious that there

are difficulties in the teaching of a subject based entirely on a

statute, especially in the years immediately following the adop-

tion of the statute, when its provisions have not yet been passed

on by the courts; now, however, a considerable body of authorita-

tive judicial interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 has

grown up, and it is hoped that the cases contained in this volume

will serve to show the effective structure that has been con-

structed on the foundation of the Act.

Omissions from the opinions reprinted are indicated by the

use of asterisks.

EVANS HOLBROOK,

PREFACE

RALPH W. AIGLER.
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Ann Arbor, January, 1915.

•

This collection of -cases is the result of several years' work in
the class-room by both of the editors. It is obvious that there
are difficulties in the teaching of a subject based entirely on a
statute, especially in the years immediately following the adoption of the statute, when its provisions have not yet been passed
on by the courts; now, however, a considerable body of authoritative judicial interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 has
grown up, and it is hoped that the cases contained in this volume
will serve to show the effective structure that has been constructed on the foundation of the Act.
Omissions from the opinions reprinted are indicated by the
use of asterisks.
EVANS HOLBROOK~
RALPH W. AIGLER.
Ann Arbor, January, 1915.
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HOLBROOK & AIGLER'S

CASES ON BANKRUPTCY

CHAPTER I

JURISDICTION

SECTION I

OF THE SUBJECT MATTER

A. Federal Legislation

1. CONSTITUTIONAL POWER

Constitution of the United States—Article I., Section 8

The Congress shall have power * * * to establish

HOLBROOK & AIGLER'S

• • * uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies through-

out the United States.

2. CONSTITUTIONALITY OP BANKRUPTCY ACT

HANOVER NATIONAL BANK v. MOYSES

CASES ON BANKRUPTCY

186 U. S. 181, 46 L. ed. 1113, 22 Sup. Ct. 857

(United States Supreme Court. June 2, 1902)

Statement by Mr. Chief Justice FULLER:

This was an action brought by the Hanover National Bank

OBAPTD I

of New York against Max Moyses in the circuit court of the

United States for the eastern district of Tennessee, November

JURISDICTION

20, 1899, on a judgment recovered against him in the circuit

court of Washington county, Mississippi, December 12, 1892.

The amended declaration averred the execution of a certain

SECTION I

promissory note by defendant payable to the bank of Greenville,

OF THE SUBJECT MATTER
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H. A A. Bankruptcy—1

A.

1.

FEDERAL LEGISLATION
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER

tJonstitutio-n of the United States-Article I., Section 8
The Congress shall have power • • • to establish
• • • uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.

2.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BANKRUPTCY A.CT

HANOVER NATIONAL BANK v. MOYSES
186 U. S. 181, 46 L. ed. 1113, 22 Sup. Ct. 857
(United States Supreme Court. June 2, 1902)
Statement by Mr. Chief Justice FULLER:
This was an action brought by the Hanover National Bank
of New York against Max Moyses in the circuit court of the
United States for the eastern district of Tennessee, November
20, 1899, on a judgment recovered against him in the circuit
court of Washington county, Mississippi, December 12, 1892.
The amended declaration averred the execution of a certain
promissory note by defendant payable to the bank of Greenville,
B. Is A. Bankruptcy- 1

1

2

2

JURISDICTION

JURISDICTION

Mississippi; the indorsement thereof to plaintiff in New York;

default in payment, suit in the state court of Mississippi having

jurisdiction in personam against defendant, who was then a

citizen and resident thereof; recovery of judgment; and that the

judgment "still remains in full force and effect, unappealed

from, unreversed, or otherwise vacated, and the plaintiff hath

not obtained any execution or satisfaction thereof." It was

also averred that after the rendition of the judgment in

Mississippi, defendant changed his domicil and residence to the

state of Tennessee, and thereafter, "not being a merchant or a

trader, nor engaged in business or in any commercial pursuits,

nor using the trade of merchandise, and being without mercan-

tile business of any kind, filed his voluntary petition in bank-

ruptcy in the district court of the United States for the southern

division of said eastern district of Tennessee, under the act of

Congress of the United States of America, approved July 1st,

1898, entitled 'An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bank-

ruptcy Throughout the United States,'" and was adjudged

bankrupt, and '' since August 1st, 1898," "granted an adjudica-

tion of his discharge in bankruptcy from all his debts, including

that herein sued for."

It was admitted that the discharge was '' good and effectual if
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said act of Congress and the proceedings thereunder are valid,''

but charged that the act was void because in violation of the

Federal Constitution in many particulars set forth.

Plaintiff also stated that it was and had continued to be

domiciled in and resident in New York; that it was not a party

to said proceedings in bankruptcy, nor did it enter its appear-

ance therein for any purpose, nor did it prove its claim, nor did

it in any way subject itself to the jurisdiction of the district

court in said proceedings; that plaintiff was not served with

process of any kind on said petition for adjudication, and had

no notice, personal or otherwise, of the said proceeding by

voluntary petition for adjudication; nor was any notice of the

proceeding to adjudicate defendant a bankrupt given plaintiff,

or anyone else, "nor is any notice of any kind of such pro-

ceeding to adjudicate a person a bankrupt upon his voluntary

petition required by said act of Congress, and in this said act

of Congress violates the Fifth Amendment," as does the "adju-

dication of defendant as a bankrupt;" that the situs of the

promissory note, on which the judgment was rendered, was

never within the jurisdiction of the district court; and that

Mississippi; the indorsement thereof to plaintiff in New York;
default in payment, suit in the state court of Mississippi having
jurisdiction fo personam against defendant, who was then a
citizen and resident thereof; recovery of judgment; and that the
judgment ''still remains in full force &nd effect, unappealed
from, unreversed, or otherwise vacated, and the plaintiff hath
not obtained any execution or satisfaction thereof.'' It was
also averred that after the rendition of the judgment in
Mississippi, defendant changed his domicil and residence to the
state of Tennessee, and thereafter, ''not being a merchant or a
trader, nor engaged in business or in any commercial pursuits,
nor using the trade of merchandise, and being without mercantile business of any kind, filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy in the district court of the United States for the southern
division of said eastern district of Tennessee, under the act of
Congress of the United States of America, approved July 1st,
1898, entitled 'An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United States,' " and was adjudged
bankrupt, and "since August 1st, 1898," "granted an adjudication of his discharge in bankruptcy from all his debts, including
that herein sued for."
It was admitted that the discharge was ''good and effectual if
said act of Congress and the proceedings thereunder are valid,''
but charged that the act was void because in violation of the
Federal Constitution in many particulars set forth.
Plaintiff also stated that it was and had continued to be
domiciled in and resident in New York; that it was not a party
to said proceedings in bankruptcy, nor did it enter its appearance therein for any purpose, nor did it prove its claim, nor did
it in any way subject itself to the jurisdiction of the die1trict
court in said proceedings; that plaintiff was not served with
process of any kind on said petition for adjudication, and had
no notice, personal or otherwise, of the said proceeding by
voluntary petition for adjudication; nor was any notice of the
proceeding to adjudicate defendant a bankrupt given plaintiff,
or anyone else, ''nor is any notice of any kind of such proceeding to adjudicate a person a bankrupt upon his voluntary
petition required by said act of Congress, and in this said act
of Congress violates the Fifth Amendment," as does the "adjudication of defendant as a bankrupt;" that the situs of the
promissory note, on which tl!e judgment was rendered, was
never within the jurisdiction of the district court; and that

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BANKRUPTCY ACT 3

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BANKRUPTCY ACT

3

the court never acquired jurisdiction of plaintiff, nor of the debt

sued on.

Demurrer was filed to the amended declaration, the demurrer

sustained, and final judgment entered dismissing the suit. The

circuit court stated that it took this action on the authority of

Leidigh Carriage Co. v. Stengel, 37 C. C. A. 210, 95 Fed. 637.

Thereupon the bank brought this writ of error.

Errors were, specified as follows: That the discharge under

the act of Congress of July 1, 1898, was a nullity, because:

"1. Said act violates the 5th Amendment to the Constitu-

tion of the United States in this:

"(a) It does not provide for notice as required by due process

of law to the creditor in voluntary proceedings for adjudica-

tion of bankruptcy and for the discharge of the debt of the

creditor.

"(b) Ten days' notice by mail to oreditors to oppose dis-

charge is so unreasonably short as to be a denial of notice.

"(c) The grounds of opposition to a discharge are so un-

reasonably limited as, substantially,, to deny the right of opposi-

tion to a discharge. Thereby the act is also practically a legis-

lative promulgation of a discharge contrary to art. 3, § 1, of

the Federal Constitution.

"2. Said act violates art. 1, §8, ff4, of the Constitution in
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this:

"(a) It does not establish uniform laws on the subject of

bankruptcies throughout the United States.

"(b) It delegates certain legislative powers to the several

states in respect to bankruptcy proceedings.

"(c) It provides that others than traders may be adjudged

bankrupts, and that this may be done on voluntary petitions.''

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER delivered the opinion of the

court:

By the 4th clause of § 8 of art. 1 of the Constitution the power

is vested in Congress "to establish • • • uniform laws on

the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.'' This

power was first exercised in 1800. 2 Stat. at L. 19, c. 19. In

1803 that law was repealed. 2 Stat. at L. 248, c. 6. In 1841 it

was again exercised by an act which was repealed in 1843.

5 Stat. at L. 440, c. 9; 5 Stat. at L. 614, c. 82. It was again

exercised in 1867 by an act which, after being several times

amended, was finally repealed in 1878. 14 Stat. at L. 517,

the court never acquired jurisdiction of plaintiff, nor of the debt
sued on.
Demurrer was filed to the amended declaration, the delllurrer
sustained, and final judgment entered dismissing the suit. The
circuit court stated that it took this action on the authority of
Leidigh Carriage Co. v. Stengel, 37 C. C. A. 210, 95 Fed. 637.
Thereupon the bank brought this writ of error.
Errors were. specified as follows: That the discharge under
the act of Congress of July 1, 1898, was a nullity, because:
'' 1. Said act violates the 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in this:
"(a) It does not provide for notice as required hy due process
of law to the creditor in voluntary proceedings f'or adjudication of bankruptcy and for the discharge of the debt of the
creditor.
"(b) Ten days' notice by mail to creditors to oppose uischarge is so unreasonably short as to be a denial of notice.
'' ( c) The grounds of opposition to a discharge are so unreasonably limited as, substantially,. to deny the right of opposition to a discharge. Thereby the act is also practically a legislative promulgation of a discharge contrary to art. 3, § 1, of
the Federal Coutitution.
'' 2. Said act violates art. 1, § 8, U4, of the Constitution in
this:
"(a) It does not establish uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies throughout the United States.
"(b) It delegates certain legislative powers to the several
states in respect to bankruptcy proceedings.
" ( c) It provides that others than traders may be adjudged
bankrupt.s, and that this may be done on voluntary petitions.''

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER delivered the opinion of the
court:
By the 4th clause of § 8 of art. 1 of the Constitution the power
is vested in Congress "to establish • • • uniform laws on
the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.'' This
power was first exercised in 1800. 2 Stat. at L. 19, c. 19. In
1803 that law was repealed. 2 Stat. at L. 248, c. 6. In 1841 it
was again exercised by an act which was repealed in 1843.
5 Stat. at L. 440. c. 9; 5 Stat. at L. 614, c. 82. It was again
exercised in 1867 by an act which, after being several times
amended, was finally repealed in 1878. 14 Stat. at L. 517,

4

4

JURISDICTION

JUEISDICTION

c. 1 76; 20 Stat. at L. 99, c. 160. And on July 1,1898, the present

act was approved.

The act of 1800 applied to "any merchant, or other person,

residing within the United States, actually using the trade of

merchandise, by buying or selling in gross, or by retail, or

dealing in exchange, or as a banker, broker, factor, underwriter,

or marine insurer," and to involuntary bankruptcy.

In Adams v. Storey, 1 Paine, 79, Fed. Cas. No. 66, Mr.

Justice Livingston said on circuit: "So exclusively have bank-

rupt laws operated on traders, that it may well be doubted

whether an act of Congress subjecting to such a law every

description of persons within the United States would comport

with the spirit of the powers vested in them in relation to this

subject." But this doubt was resolved otherwise, and the acts

of 1841 and 1867 extended to persons other than merchants or

traders, and provided for voluntary proceedings on the part of

the debtor, as does the act of 1898.

It is true that from the first bankrupt act passed in England,

34 & 35 Sen. VIII. c. 4, to the days of Queen Victoria, the

English bankrupt acts applied only to traders, but, as Mr. Justice

Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, pointed out,

"this is a mere matter of policy, and by no means enters into
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the nature of such laws. There is nothing in the nature or

reason of such laws to prevent their being applied to any other

class of unfortunate and meritorious debtors." § 1113.

The whole subject is reviewed by that learned commentator

in c. XVI. §§ 1102 to 1115 of his work, and he says (§ 1111)

in respect of '' what laws are to be deemed bankrupt laws within

the meaning of the Constitution:" "Attempts have been made

to distinguish between bankrupt laws and insolvent laws. For

example, it has been said that laws which merely liberate the

person of the debtor are insolvent laws, and those which dis-

charge the contract are bankrupt laws. But it would be very

difficult to sustain this distinction by any uniformity of laws

at home or abroad. * * * Again, it has been said that in-

solvent laws act on imprisoned debtors only at their own

instance, and bankrupt laws only at the instance of creditors.

But, however true this may have been in past times, as the

actual course of English legislation, it is not true, and never

was true, as a distinction in colonial legislation. In England

it was an accident in the system, and not a material ground to

discriminate, who were to be deemed in a legal sense insolvents,

c. 176; 20 Stat. at L. 99, c. 160. And on July 1, 1898, the present
act was approved.
The act of 1800 applied to ''any merchant, or other person,
residing within the United States, actually using the trade of
merchandise, by buying or selling in groes, or by retail, or
dea.ling in exchange, or as a banker, broker, factor, underwriter,
or marine insurer," and to involuntary bankruptcy.
In Adams v. Storey, 1 Paine, 79, Fed. Cas. No. 66, Mr.
J usticc Livingston said on circuit: "So exclusively have bankrupt laws operated on traders, that it may well be doubted
whether an act of Congress subjecting to such a law every
tlt>scription of persons within the United States would comport
with the spirit of the powers vested in them in relation to this
subject." But this doubt was resolved otherwise, and the acts
of 1841 and 1867 extended to persons other than merchants or
traders, and provided for voluntary proceedings on the part of
the debtor, as does the act of 1898.
It is true that from the first bankrupt act passed in England,
34 & 35 lien. VIII. c. 4, to the days of Queen Victoria, the
English bankrupt acts applied only to traders, but, as Mr. Justice
Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, pointed out,
"this is a mere matter of policy, and by no means enters into
the nature of ~uch laws. There is nothing in the nature or
reason of such laws to prevent their being applied to any other
class of uhfortunate and meritorious debtors." § 1113.
The whole subject is reviewed by that learned commentator
in c. XVI. §§ 1102 to 1115 of his work, and he says (§ 1111)
in respect of ''what laws are to be deemed bankrupt laws within
the meaning of the Constitution:'' ''Attempts have been made
to distinguish between bankrupt laws and insolvent laws. For
example, it has been said that laws which merely liberate the
person of the debtor are insolvent laws, and those which discharge the contract are bankrupt laws. But it would be very
difficult to sustain this distinction by any uniformity of laws
at home or abroad. • • • Again, it has been said that insolvent laws act on imprisoned debtors only at their own
instance, and bankrupt laws only at the inAtance of creditors.
But, however true this may have been in past times, as the
actual course of English legislation, it is not true, and never
was true, as a distinction in colonial legislation. In England
it was an accident in the system, and not a material ground to
discriminate, who were to be deemed in a legal sense insolvents,

CONSTITUTIONALITY OP BANKRUPTCY ACT 5

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BANKRUPTCY ACT
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or bankrupts. And if an act of Congress should be passed,

which should authorize a commission of bankruptcy to issue at

the instance of the debtor, no court would on this account be

warranted in saying that the act was unconstitutional, and the

commission a nullity. It is believed that no laws ever were passed

in America by the colonies or states, which had the technical

denomination of 'bankrupt laws.' But insolvent laws, quite

coextensive with the English bankrupt system in their opera-

tions and objects, have not been unfrequent in colonial and state

legislation. No distinction was ever practically, or even theo-

retically, attempted to be made between bankruptcies and insol-

vencies. And a historical review of the colonial and state legis-

lation will abundantly show that a bankrupt law may contain

those regulations which are generally found in insolvent laws,

and that an insolvent law may contain those which are common

to bankrupt laws."

Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 195, 4 L. ed. 529, 548,

was cited, where Chief Justice Marshall said: "The bankrupt

law is said to grow out of the exigencies of commerce, and to be

applicable solely to traders; but it is not easy to say who must

be excluded from, or may be included within, this description.

It is, like every other part of the subject, one on which the

legislature may exercise an extensive discretion. This difficulty
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of discriminating with any accuracy between insolvent and

bankrupt laws would lead to the opinion that a bankrupt law

may contain those regulations which are generally found in

insolvent laws; and that an insolvent law may contain those

which are common to a bankrupt law."

In the case, Re Klein, Fed. Cas. No. 7,865, decided in the

circuit court for the district of Missouri, and reported in a note

to Nelson v. Carland, 1 How. 265, 277, 11 L. ed. 126, 130, Mr.

Justice Catron held the bankrupt act of 1841 to be constitu-

tional, although it was not restricted to traders, and allowed the

debtor to avail himself of the act on his own petition, differing

in these particulars from the English acts. He said, among other

things: "In considering the question before me, I have not pre-

tended to give a definition, (but purposely avoided any attempt

to define) the mere word 'bankruptcy.' It is employed in the

Constitution in the plural, and as part of an expression, 'the

subject of bankruptcies.' The ideas attached to the word in

this connection are numerous and complicated; they form a

subject of extensive and complicated legislation; of this sub-

or bankrupts. And if an act of Congress should be passed,
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ject, Congress has general jurisdiction; and the true inquiry

is,—To what limits is that jurisdiction restricted? I hold, it

extends to all cases where the law causes to be distributed the

property of the debtor among his creditors; this is its least

limit. Its greatest is the discharge of a debtor from his con-

tracts. And all intermediate legislation, affecting substance and

form, but tending to further the great end of the subject,—

distribution and discharge,—are in the competency and discre-

tion of Congress. With the policy of a law letting in all classes,

—others as well as traders,—and permitting the bankrupt to

come in voluntarily, and be discharged without the consent of

his creditors, the courts have no concern; it belongs to the law-

makers."

Similar views were expressed under the act of 1867, by Mr.

Justice Blatchford, then District Judge, in Re Reiman, 7 Ben.

455, Fed. Cas. No. 11,673; by Deady, J., in Re Silverman, 1

Sawy. 410, Fed. Cas. No. 12,855; by Hoffman, J., in Re Cali-

fornia P. R. Co., 3 Sawy. 240, Fed. Cas. No. 2,315; and in

Kunzler v. Kohaus, 5 Hill, 317, by Cowen, J., in respect of the

act of 1841, in which Mr. Justice Nelson, then Chief Justice of

New York, concurred. The conclusion that an act of Congress

establishing a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the
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United States is constitutional, although providing that others

than traders may be adjudged bankrupts, and that this may

be done on voluntary petitions, is really not open to discussion.

The framers of the Constitution were familiar with Black-

stone's Commentaries, and with the bankrupt laws of England,

yet they granted plenary power to Congress over the whole sub-

ject of "bankruptcy," and did not limit it by the language

used. This is illustrated by Mr. Sherman's observation in the

Convention, that "bankruptcies were, in some cases, punishable

with death by the laws of England, and he did not choose to

grant a power by which that might be done here;" and the

rejoinder of Gouverneur Morris, that "this was an extensive

and delicate subject. He would agree to it, because he saw no

danger of abuse of the power by the legislature of the United

States." Madison Papers, 5 Elliot, 504; 2 Bancroft, 204. And

also to some extent by the amendment proposed by New York,

"that the power of Congress to pass uniform laws concern-

ing bankruptcy shall only extend to merchants and other traders;

and the states, respectively, may pass laws for the relief of

other insolvent debtors." 1 Elliot, 330. See also Mr. Pinkney's

ject, Congress has general jurisdiction ; and the true inquiry
is,-To what limits is that jurisdiction restricted f I hold, it
extends to all cases where the law causes to be distributed the
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grant a power by which that might be done here;" and the
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original proposition, 5 Elliot, 488; the report of the committee

thereon, 5 Elliot, 503; and The Federalist, No. 42, Ford's ed. 279.

As the states, in surrendering the power, did so only if Con-

gress chose to exercise it, hut in the absence of congressional

legislation retained it, the limitation was imposed on the states

that they should pass no "law impairing the obligation of

contracts.''

In Brown v. Smart, 145 U. S. 454, 457, 36 L. ed. 773, 775,

12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 958, 959, Mr. Justice Gray said: "So long as

there is no national bankrupt act, each state has full authority

to pass insolvent laws binding persons and property within its

jurisdiction, provided it does not impair the obligation of exist-

ing contracts; but a state cannot by such a law discharge one

of its own citizens from his contracts with citizens of other

states, though made after the passage of the law, unless they

voluntarily become parties to the proceedings in insolvency.

• • * Yet each state, so long as it does not impair the

obligation of any contract, has the power by general laws to

regulate the conveyance and disposition of all property, personal

or real, within its limits and jurisdiction." Many cases were

cited, and, among others, Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 498,

32 L. ed. 494, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 134, where Mr. Justice Miller

observed: '' The objection to the extraterritorial operation of a
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state insolvent law is that it cannot, like the bankruptcy law

passed by Congress Under its constitutional grant of power,

release all debtors from the obligation of the debt. The authority

to deal with the property of the debtor within the state, so far

as it does not impair the obligation of contracts, is conceded."

Counsel justly says that "the relation of debtor and creditor

has a dual aspect, and contains two separate elements. The

one is the right of -the creditor to resort to present property

of the debtor through the courts to satisfy the debt; the other

is the personal obligation of the debtor to pay the debt, and that

he will devote his energies and labor to discharge it" (4 Wheat.

198, 4 L. ed. 549); and, "in the absence of property, the per-

sonal obligation to pay constitutes the only value of the debt."

Hence the importance of the distinction between the power of

Congress and the power of the states. The subject of "bank-

ruptcies" includes the power to discharge the debtor from his

contracts and legal liabilities, as well as to distribute his prop-

erty. The grant to Congress involves the power to impair the

obligation of contracts, and this the states were forbidden to do.

original proposition, 5 Elliot, 488; the report of the committee
thereon, 5 Elliot, 503; and The Federalist, No. 42, Ford's ed. 279.
As the states, in surrendering the power, did so only if Congress chose to exercise it, but in the absence of congressional
legislation retained it, the limitation was imposed on the states
that they should pass no ''law impairing the obligation of
contracts.''
In Brown v. Slll(lrt, 145 U. S. 454, 457, 36 L. ed. 773, 775,
12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 958, 959, Mr. Justice Gray said: "So long as
there is no national bankrupt act, each state has full authori't,y
to pass insolvent laws binding persons and property within its
jurisdiction, provided it does not impair the obligation of existing contracts; but a state eannot by such a law discharge one
of its own citizens from his contracts with citizens of other
states, though made after the passage of the law, unless they
voluntarily become parties to the proceedings in insolvency.
• • • Yet eac,h state, so long as it does not impair the
obligation of any contract, has the power by general laws to
regulate the conveyance and disposition of all property, personal
or real, within its limits and jurisdiction.'' Many cases were
cited, and, among others, Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 498,
32 L. ed. 494, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 134, where l\Ir. Justice Miller
observed: ''The objection to the extraterritorial operation of a
state insolvent law is that it cannot, like the bankruptcy law
passed by Congress under its constitutional grant of power,
release all debtors from the obligation of the dpbt. The authority
to deal with the property of the debtor withm the state, so far
as it does not impair the obligation of contracts, is conceded."
Counsel justly says that ''the relation of debtor and creditor
hu a dual aspect, and contains two separate elements. The
one is the right of .the creditor to resort to present property
o.f the debtor through the courts to satisfy the debt; the other
is the personal obligation of the debtor to pay the debt, and that
he will devote his energies and labor to discharge it'' ( 4 \Vheat.
198, 4 L. ed. 549) ; and, "in the absence of property, the personal obligation to pay constitutes the only value of the debt."
Hence the importance of the distinction between the power of
Congress and the power of the states. The subject of ''bankruptcies" includes the power to discharge the debtor from his
contracts and legal liabilities, as well as to distribute his property. The grant to Congress involves the power to impair the
obligation of contracts, and this the states were forbidden to do.
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The laws passed on the subject must, however, be uniform

throughout the United States, but that uniformity is geo-

graphical, and not personal, and we do not think that the pro-

vision of the act of 1898 as to exemptions is incompatible with

the rule.

Section 6 reads: "This act shall not affect the allowance to

bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the state

laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the state

wherein they have had their domicil for the six months, or the

greater portion thereof, immediately preceding the filing of the

petition." [30 Stat. at L. 544, c. 541.]

Section 14 of the act of 1867 prescribed certain exemptions,

and then added: '' And such other property not included in the

foregoing exceptions as is exempted from levy and sale upon

execution or other process or order of any court by the laws

of the state in which the bankrupt has his domicil at the time

of the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, to an

amount not exceeding that allowed by such state exemption laws

in force in the year eighteen hundred and sixty-four." [14

Stat. at L. 517, c. 176.] This was subsequently amended, and

controversies arose under the act as amended which we need not

discuss in this case. Lowell, Bankruptcy, § 4.
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It was many times ruled that this provision was not in deroga-

tion of the limitation of uniformity because all contracts were

made with reference to existing laws, and no creditor could

recover more from his debtor than the unexempted part of his

assets. Mr. Justice Miller concurred in an opinion to that effect

in the Case of Beckerford, 1 Dill. 45, Fed. Cas. No. 1,209.

Mr. Chief Justice Waite expressed the same opinion in Re

Deckert, 2 Hughes, 183, Fed. Cas. No. 3,728. The Chief Justice

there said: "The power to except from the operation of the

law property liable to execution under the exemption laws of

the several states, as they were actually enforced, was at one

time questioned, upon the ground that it was a violation of the

constitutional requirement of uniformity, but it has thus far

been sustained, for the reason that it was made a rule of the

law to subject to the payment of debts under its operation only

such property as could by judicial process be made available for

the same purpose. This is not unjust, as every debt is con-

tracted with reference to the rights of the parties thereto under

existing exemption laws, and no creditor can reasonably com-

plain if he gets his full share of all that the law, for the time

The laws passed on the subject must, however, be uniform
throughout the United States, but that uniformity is geographical, and not personal, and we do not think that the provision of the act of 1898 as to exemptions is incompatible with
the rule.
Section 6 reads: ''This act shall not affect the allowance to
bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the state
laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the state
wherein they have had their domicil for the six months, or the
greater portion thereof, immediately preceding the filing of the
petition." (30 Stat. at L. 544, c. 541.]
Section 14 of the act of 1867 prescribed certain exemptions,
and then added: ~'And such other property not included in the
foregoing exceptions as is exempted from levy and sale upon
execution or other process or order of any court by the laws
of the state in which the bankrupt has his domicil at the time
of the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, to an
amount not exceeding that allowed by such state exemption laws
in force in the year eighteen hundred and sixty-four." [14
Stat. at L. 517, c. 176.] This was subsequently amended, and
controversies arose under the act as amended which we need not
discuss in this case. Lowell, Bankruptcy, § 4.
It was many times ruled that this provision was not in derogation of the limitation of uniformity because all contracts were
made with reference to existing laws, and no creditor could
recover more from his debtor than the unexempted part of bis
assets. Mr. Justice Miller concurred in an opinion to that effect
in the Case of Beckerford, 1 Dill. 45, Fed. Cas. No. 1,209.
Mr. Chief Justice Waite expressed the same opinion in Re
Deckert, 2 Hughes, 183, Fed. Cas. No. 3,728. The Chief Justice
there said: ''The power to except from the operation of the
law property liable to execution under the exemption laws of
the several states, as they were actually enforced, was at one
time questioned, upon the ground that it was a violation of the
constitutional requirement of uniformity, but it has thus far
been sustained, for the reason that it was made a rule of the
law to subject to the payment of debts under its operation only
such property as could by judicial process be made available for
the same purpose. This is not unjust, as every debt is contracted with reference to the rights of the parties thereto under
existing exemption laws, and no creditor can reasonably complain if he gets his full share of all that the law, for the tir!le
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being, places at the disposal of creditors. One of the effects

of a bankrupt law is that of a general execution issued in favor

of all the creditors of the bankrupt, reaching all his property

subject to levy, and applying it to the payment of all his debts

according to their respective priorities. It is quite proper,

therefore, to confine its operation to such property as other legal

process could reach. A rule which operates to this effect

throughout the United States is uniform within the meaning

of that term, as used in the Constitution.''

We concur in this view, and hold that the system is, in the

constitutional sense, uniform throughout the United States,

when the trustee takes in each state whatever would have been

available to the creditor if the bankrupt law had not been passed.

The general operation of the law is uniform although it may

result in certain particulars differently in different states.

Nor can we perceive in the recognition of the local law in the

matter of exemptions, dower, priority of payments, and the like,

any attempt by Congress to unlawfully delegate its legislative

power. Re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 560, sub nam. Wilkerson v.

Rahrer, 35 L. ed. 572, 576, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865.

But it is contended that as to voluntary proceedings the act

is in violation of the 5th Amendment in that it deprives creditors

of their property without due process of law in failing to pro-
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vide for notice.

The act provides that "any person who owes debts, except a

corporation, shall be entitled to the benefits of this act as a

voluntary bankrupt" (§4a), and that "upon the filing of a

voluntary petition the judge shall hear the petition and make

the adjudication or dismiss the petition." § 18g. With the

petition he must file schedules of his property, and "of his

creditors, showing their residences, if known, if unknown, that

fact to be stated." § 7, subd. 8. The schedules must be verified,

and the petition must state that "petitioner owes debts which

he is unable to pay in full," and "that he is willing to sur-

render all his property for the benefit of his creditors, except

such as is exempt by law.'' This establishes those facts so far as

a decree of bankruptcy is concerned, and he has committed an

act of bankruptcy in filing the petition. These are not issuable

facts, and notice is unnecessary, unless dismissal is sought, when

notice is required. § 59g.

As Judge Lowell said: "He may be, in fact, fraudulent,

and able and unwilling to pay his debts; but the law takes

being, places at the disposal of creditors. One of the effects
of a bankrupt law is that of a general execution issued in favor
of all the creditors of the bankrupt, reaching all his property
subject to levy, and applying it to the payment of all his debts
according to their respective priorities. It is quite proper,
therefore, to confine its operation to such property as other legal
process could reach. A rule which operates to this effect
ttiroughout the United States is uniform within the meaning
of that term, as used in the Constitution.''
We concur in this view, and hold that the system is, in the
constitutional sense, uniform throughout the United States,
when the trustee takes in each state whatever would have been
aYailable to the creditor if the bankrupt law had not been passed.
The general operation of the law is uniform although it may
result in certain particulars differently in different states.
Nor can we perceive in the recognition of the local law in the
matter of exemptions, dower, priority of payments, and the like,
any attempt by Congress to unlawfully delegate its legislative
power. Re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 560, sub nom. Wilkerson v.
Rahrer, 35 L. ed. 572, 576, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865.
But it is contended that as to voluntary proceedings the act
is in violation of the 5th Amendment in that it deprives creditors
of their property without due process of law in failing to provide for notice.
The act provides that "any person who owes debts, except a
corporation, shall be entitled to the benefits of this act as a
voluntary bankrupt" (§ 4a), and that "upon the filing of a
voluntary petition the judge shall hear the petition and make
the adjudication or dismiss the petition.'' § 18g. With the
petition he must file schedules of his property, and ''of his
creditors, showing their residences, if known, if unknown, that
fact to be stated." § 7, subd. 8. The schedules must be verified,
and the petition must state that "petitioner owes debts which
he is unable to pay in full,'' and ''that he is willing to surrender all his property for the benefit of his creditors, except
such as is exempt by law." This establishes those facts so far BB
a decree of bankruptcy is concerned, and he has committed an
act of bankruptcy in filing the petition. These are not issuable
facts, and notice is umweessary, unless dismissal is sought, when
notice is required. § 59g.
As Judge Lowell said: ''He may be, in fact, fraudulent,
and able and unwilling to pay his debts; but the law takes
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him at his word, and makes effectual provision, not only by

civil, but even by criminal, process to effectuate his alleged

intent of giving up all hia property." Re Fowler, 1 Low. Dee.

161, Fed. Cas. No. 4,998.

Adjudication follows as matter of course, and brings the

bankrupt's property into the custody of the court for distribu-

tion among all his creditors. After adjudication the creditors

are given at least ten days' notice by publication and by mail

of the first meeting of creditors, and of each of the various sub-

sequent steps in administration. § 58. Application for a dis-

charge cannot be made until after the expiration of one month

from adjudication. § 14.

Form No. 57 gives the form of petition for discharge and the

order for hearing to be entered thereon, requiring notice to be

published in a designated newspaper printed in the district,

and "that the clerk shall send by mail to all known creditors

copies of said petition and this order, addressed to them at their

places of residence as stated."

Section 14b provides for the granting of discharge unless the

applicant has " (1) committed an offense punishable by imprison-

ment as herein provided; or (2) with fraudulent intent to

conceal his true financial condition, and, in contemplation of
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bankruptcy, destroyed, concealed, or failed to keep books of

account or records from which his true condition might be ascer-

tained. ''

The offenses referred to are enumerated in § 29, and em-

brace misappropriation of property; concealing property belong-

ing to the estate; making false oaths or accounts; presenting

false claims; receiving property from a bankrupt with intent to

defeat the act; extorting money for acting or forbearing to act

in bankruptcy proceedings.

It is also provided by § 15 that a discharge may be revoked,

on application within a year, if procured by fraud and not

warranted by the facts.

Notwithstanding these provisions, it is insisted that the want

of notice of filing the petition is fatal because the adjudication

per se entitles the bankrupt to a discharge, and that the pro-

ceedings in respect of discharge are in personam, and require

personal service of notice. The adjudication does not in itself

have that effect, and the first of these objections really rests on

the ground that the notice provided for is unreasonably short,

and the right to oppose discharge unreasonably restricted. Con-

him at his word, and makes effectual provision, not only by
civil, but even by criminal, process to effectuate his alleged
intent of· giving up all his. property." Re Fowler, 1 Low. Dec.
161, Fed. Cas. No. 4,998.
Adjudication follows as matter of course, and brings the
bankrupt's property into the custody of the court for distribution among all his creditors. After adjudication the creditors
are given at least ten days' notice by publication and by mqil
of the first meeting of creditors, and of each of the various subsequent steps in administration. § 58. Application for a discharge cannot be made until after the expiration of one month
from adjudication. § 14.
Form No. 57 gives the form of petition for discharge and the
order for hearing to be entered thereon, requiring notice to be
published in a designated newspaper printed in the district,
and ''that the clerk shall send by mail to all known creditors
copies of said petition and this order, addressed to them at their
places of residence as stated.''
Section 14b provides for the granting of discharge unless the
applicant has" (1) committed an offense punishable by imprisonment as herein provided; or (2) with fraudulent intent to
conceal his true financial condition, and, in contemplation of
bankruptcy, destroyed, concealed, or failed to keep books of
account or records from which his true condition might be ascertained.''
The offenses referred to are enumerated in § 29, and embrace misappropriation of property; concealing property belonging to the estate; making false oaths or accounts; presenting
false claims; receiving property from a bankrupt with intent to
defeat the act; extorting money for acting or for bearing to act
in bankruptcy proceedings.
It is also provided by § 15 that a discharge may be revoked,
on application within a year, if procured by fraud and not
warranted by the facts.
Notwithstanding these provisions, it Ui insisted that the want
of notice of filing the petition is fatal because the adjudication
per se entitles the bankrupt to a discharge, and that the proceedings in respect of discharge are in personam, and require
personal service of notice. The adjudication does not in itself
have that effect, and the first of these objections really rests on
the ground that the notice provided for is unreasonably short,
and the right to oppose discharge unreasonably restricted. Con-
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sidering the plenary power of Congress, the subject-matter of

the suit, and the common rights and interests of the creditors,

we regard the contention as untenable.

Congress may prescribe any regulations concerning discharge

in bankruptcy that are not so grossly unreasonable as to be

incompatible with fundamental law, and we cannot find any-

thing in this act on that subject which would justify us in over-

throwing its action.

Nor is it possible to concede that personal service of notice

of the application for a discharge is required.

Proceedings in bankruptcy are, generally speaking, in the

nature of proceedings in rem, as Mr. Justice Grier remarked in

Shawhan v. Wherritt, 7 How. 643, 12 L. ed. 854. And in

New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 91

U. S. 662, 23 L. ed. 339, it was ruled that a decree adjudging

a corporation bankrupt is in the nature of a decree in rem as

respects the status of the corporation. Creditors are bound by

the proceedings in distribution on notice by publication and

mail, and when jurisdiction has attached and been exercised to

that extent, the court has jurisdiction to decree discharge, if

sufficient opportunity to show cause to the contrary is afforded,

on notice given in the same way. The determination of the
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status of the honest and unfortunate debtor by his liberation

from encumbrance on future exertion is matter of public con-

cern, and Congress has power to accomplish it throughout the

United States by proceedings at the debtor's domicil. If such

notice to those who may be interested in opposing discharge,

as the nature of the proceeding admits, is provided to be given,

that is sufficient. Service of process or personal notice is not

essential to the binding force of the decree.

Judgment affirmed.

B. State Legislation

1. EFFECT OF NATIONAL ACT

Note.—In the absence of a national bankruptcy statute it is

within the power of the several states to enact such legisla-

tion. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122. State bank-

ruptcy laws, however, in so far as they purport to affect con-

tracts made before the adoption of the statutes are void as

impairing the obligation of contracts. Sturges v. Crowninshield,

supra. As to contracts made after the enactment of the state

sidering the pleuary power of Congress, the subject-matter of
the suit, and the common rights and interests of the creditors,
we regard the contention as untenable.
Cougress may prescribe any regulations concerning discharge
in bankruptcy that are not so grossly unreasonable as to be
incompatible with fundamental law, and we cannot find anything in this act on that subject which would justify us in overthrowing its action.
Nor is it possible to concede that personal service of notice
of the application for a discharge is required.
Proceedings in bankruptcy are, generally speaking, in the
nature of proceedings in rem, as Mr. Justice Grier remarked in
Shawhan v. \Vherritt, 7 How. 643, 12 L. ed. 854. And in
New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 91
F S. 662, 23 L. ed. 339, it was ruled that a decree adjudging
a corporation bankrupt is in the nature of a decree £11 rem as
respects the status of the corporation. Creditors arc bound by
the proceedings in distribution on notice by publication and
mail, and when jurisdiction has attached and been exercised to
that extent, the court has jurisdiction to decree discharg<', if
sufficient opportunity to show cause to the contrary is affo!'ded,
on notice given in the same way. The determination of the
status of the honest and unfortunate debtor by his liberatim1
from encumbrance on future exertion is matter of public concern, and Congress has power to accomplish it throughout the
United States by proceedings at the debtor's domicil. If such
notice to those who may be interested in opposing discharge,
as the nature of the proceeding admits, is provided to be given,
that is sufficient. Service of process or pei:sonal notice is not
essential to the binding force of the decree.
Judgment affirmed.
B.

1.

STATE LEGISLATION

EFFECT OF NATIONAL ACT

NOTE.-ln the absence of a national bankruptcy statute it is
within the power of the several states to enact such legislation. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122. State bankruptcy laws, however, in so far as they purport to affect contracts made before the adoption of the statutes are void as
impairing the obligation of contracts. Sturges v. Crowninshield,
11upra. As to contracts made after the enactment of the state
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bankruptcy statute there is no constitutional objection to the

state law providing for a full and complete discharge. Ogden

v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213. During the times when there

was no national bankruptcy law, when the several states had

covered the ground more or less fully, many interesting and

difficult problems confronted the courts as to the proper law

applicable to given cases. The problem usually presented was

the effect of a discharge by a state court under the state statute

upon contracts made in other states or held by creditors who

were non-residents or citizens of, other states. For a discussion

of this very interesting though now comparatively unimportant

problem see 6 Harv. L. Rev. 349.

Upon the national act taking effect, state statutes covering

the same or part of the same ground (see infra, 12-41) are ipso

facto suspended; and upon the repeal of the national act they

are ipso facto revived. Lothrop v. Highland Foundry Co.,

128 Mass. 120; Oil Co. v. Morse & Co., 97 Ark. 513. In Maine

an insolvency act was passed before the repeal of the national

act of 1867, and it was held that upon the repeal of the federal

statute the state law became operative and covered things done

during the time that the state and federal laws overlapped.

Palmer v. Hixon, 74 Me. 447. See also Lothrop v. Highland
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Foundry Co., supra.

2. WHAT STATE LtAWS ARE SUSPENDED

MAYER v. HELLMAN

91 U. S. 496, 23 L. ed. 377

(United States Supreme Court. January 31, 1876)

Hellman, as assignee in bankruptcy of Bogen and others,

sued Mayer and Evans, assignees of the same parties under the

assignment laws of the State of Ohio, to obtain property which

passed to defendants under the assignment to them. The de-

fendants answered, setting up their title under the assignment;

bankruptcy statute there is no constitutional objection to the
state law providing for a full and complete discharge. Ogden
v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213. During the times when there
was no national bankruptcy law, when the several states had
covered the ground more or less fully, many interesting and
difficult problems confronted the courts as to the proper law
applicable to given cases. The problem usually presented was
the effect of a discharge by a state court under the state statute
upon contracts made in other states or held by creditors who
were non-residents or citizens of. other states. For a discussion
of this very interesting though now comparatively unimportant
problem see 6 Harv. L. Rev. 349.
Upon the national act taking effect, state statutes covering
the same or part of the same ground (see infra., 12-41) are ipso
facto suspended; and upon the repeal of the national act they
are ipso facto revived. Lothrop v. Highland Foundrt Co.,
128 Mass. 120; Oil Co. v. Morse & Co., 97 Ark. 513. In Maine
an insolvency act was passed before the repeal of the national
act of 1867, and it was held that upon the repeal o.f the federal
statute the state law became operative and covered things done
during the time that the state and federal laws overlapped.
Palmer v. Hixon, 74 Me. 447. See also Lothrop v. Highland
Foundry Co., supra.

and the plaintiffs demurred to the answer. The Court below

sustained the demurrer, and the defendants sue out their writ

2.

WHAT STATE L.\WS ARE SUSPENDED

of error.

The facts as disclosed by the record, so far as they are material

MAYER v. HELLMAN

for the disposition of the case, are briefly these: On the 3rd of

December, 1873, at Cincinnati, Ohio, George Bogen and Jacob

91 U. S. 496, 23 L. ed. 377

Bogen, composing the firm of G. & J. Bogen, and the same

(United States Supreme Court. January 31, 1876)
Hellman, as assignee in bankruptcy of Bogen and others,
sued Mayer and Evans, assignees of the same parties under the
assignment laws of the State of Ohio, to obtain property which
passed to defendants under the assignment to them. The defendants answered, setting up their title under the assignment;
and the plaintiffs demurred to the answer. The Court below
sustained the demurrer, and the defendants sue out their writ
of error.
The facts as disclosed by the record, so far as they are material
for the disposition of the case, are briefly these : On the 3rd of
December, 1873, at Cincinnati, Ohio, George Bogen and Jacob
Bogen, composing the firm of G. & J. Bogen, and the same
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parties with Henry Muller, composing the firm of Bogen

& Son, by deed executed of that date, individually and as part-

ners, assigned certain property held by them, including that

in controversy, to three trustees, in trust for the equal and

common benefit of all their creditors. The deed was delivered

upon its execution, and the property taken possession of by the

assignees.

By the law of Ohio, in force at the time, when an assignment

of property is made to trustees for the benefit of creditors,

it is the duty of the trustees, within ten days after the de-

livery of the assignment to them, and before disposing of any

of the property, to appear before the probate judge of the

county in which the assignors reside, produce the original assign-

ment, or a copy thereof, and file the same in the Probate Court,

and enter into an undertaking payable to the State, in such

sum and with such sureties as may be approved by the judge,

conditioned for the faithful performance of their duties.

In conformity with this law, the trustees, on the 13th of

December, 1873, within the prescribed ten days, appeared before

the probate judge of the proper county in Ohio, produced the

original assignment, and filed the same in the Probate Court.

One of the trustees having declined to act, another one was
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named in his place by the creditors, and appointed by the Court.

Subsequently the three gave an undertaking with sureties ap-

proved by the judge, in the sum of $500,000, for the per-

formance of their duties, and then proceeded with the adminis-

tration of the trust under the direction of the Court.

On the 22nd of June of the following year, more than six

months after the execution of the assignment, the petition in

bankruptcy against the insolvents was filed in the District

Court of the United States, initiating the proceedings in which

the plaintiff was appointed their assignee in bankruptcy. As

such officer, he claims a right to the possession of the prop-

erty in the hands of the defendants under the assignment to

them. Judgment having been rendered against them, they

sued out this writ of error.

Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.

The validity of the claim of the assignee in bankruptcy de-

pends, as a matter of course, upon the legality of the assign-

ment made under the laws of Ohio. Independently of the Bank-

rupt Act, there could be no serious question raised as to its

parties v.;th Henry .Muller, composing the firm of .Bogen
& Son, by deed executed of that date, individually and as part-

ners, assigned certain property held by them, including that
in controversy, to three trustees, in trust for the equal and
common benefit of all their creditors. The deed was delivered
~pon its execution, and the property taken possession of by the
assignees.
By the law of Ohio, in force at the time, when an assignment
of property is made to trustees for the benefit of creditors,
it is the duty of the trustees, within ten days after the delivery of the assignment to them, and before disposing of any
of the property, to appear before the probate judge of the
county in which the assignors reside, produce the original assignment, or a copy thereof, and file the same in the Probate Court,
and enter into an undertaking payable to the State, in such
sum and with such sureties as may be approved by the judge,
conditioned for the faithful performance of their duties.
In conformity with this law, the trustees, on the 13th of
December, 1873, within the prescribed ten days, appeared before
the probate judge of the proper county in Ohio, produced the
original assignment, and filed the same in the Probate Court.
One of the trustees having declined to act, another one was
named in his place by the creditors, and appointed by the Court.
Subsequently the three gave an undertaking with sureties approved by the judge, in the sum of $500,000, for the performance of their duties, and then proceeded with the administration of the trust under the direction of the Court.
On the 22nd ·of June of the following year, more than six
months after the execution of the assignment, the petition in
bankruptcy against the insolvents was filed in the District
CoUl't of the United States, initiating the proceedings in which
the plaintiff was appointed their assignee in bankruptcy. As
such officer, he claims a right to the possession of the property in the hands of the defendants under the assignment to
them. Judgment having been rendered against them, they
sued out this writ of error.
l\lr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the Cou~.
The validity of the claim of the assignee in bankruptcy de.
pends, as a matter of course, upon the legality of the assignment made under the laws of Ohio. Independently of the Bankrupt Aot, there could be no serious question raised as to its
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legality. The power which every one possesses over his own

property would justify any such disposition as did not interfere

with the existing rights of others; and an equal distribution

by a debtor of his property among his creditors, when unable

to meet the demands of all in full, would be deemed not only a

legal proceeding, but one entitled to commendation. Creditors

have a right to call for the application of the property of their

debtor to the satisfaction of their just demands; but, unless there

are special circumstances giving priority of right to the demands

of one creditor over another, the rule of equity would require

the equal and ratable distribution of the debtor's property for

the benefit of all of them. And so, whenever such a disposi-

tion has been voluntarily made by the debtor, the courts in this

country have uniformly expressed their approbation of the

proceeding. The hindrance and delay to particular creditors,

in their efforts to reach before others the property of the debtor,

that may follow such a conveyance, are regarded as unavoidable

incidents to a just and lawful act, which in no respect impair

the validity of the transaction.

The great object of the Bankrupt Act, so far as creditors

are concerned, is to secure equality of distribution among them
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of the property of the bankrupt. For that purpose, it sets aside

all transactions had within a prescribed period previous to the

petition in bankruptcy, defeating, or tending to defeat, such

distribution. It reaches to proceedings of every form and kind

undertaken or executed within that period by which a preference

can be secured to one creditor over another, or the, purpose

of the act evaded. That period is four months for some transac-

tions, and six months for others. Those periods constitute the

limitation within which the transactions will be examined and

annulled, if conflicting with the provisions of the Bankrupt

Act.

Transactions anterior to these periods are presumed to have

been acquiesced in by the creditors. There is sound policy in

prescribing a limitation of this kind. It would be in the highest

degree injurious to the community to have the validity of busi-

ness transactions with debtors, in which it is interested, subject

to the contingency of being assailed by subsequent proceed-

ings in bankruptcy. Unless, therefore, a transaction is void

against creditors independently of the provisions of the Bank-

rupt Act, its validity is not open to contestation by the assignee,

where it took place at the period prescribed by the statute an-

legalitY.. The power which every one possesses over his own
property would justify any such disposition as did not interfere
with the existing rights of others; and an equal distribution
by a debtor of his property among his creditors, when unable
to meet the demands of all in full, would be deemed not only a
legal proceeding, but one entitled to commendation. Creditors
have a right to call for the application of the property of their
debtor to the satisfaction of their just demands; but, unless there
are special circumstances giving priority of right to the demands
of one creditor over another, the rule of equity would require
the equal and ratable distribution of the debtor's property for
the benefit of all of them. And so, whenever such a disposition has been voluntarily made by the debtor, the courts i:n this
country have uniformly expressed their approbation of the
proceeding. The hindrance and delay to particular creditors,
in their efforts to reach before others the property of the debtor,
that may follow such a conveyance, are regarded as unavoidable
incidents to a just and lawful act, which in no respect impair
the validity of the transaction.
The great object of the Bankrupt Act, so far as creditors
are concerned, is to secure equality of distribution among them
of the property of the bankrupt. For that purpose, it sets aside
all transactions had within a prescribed period previous to the
petition in bankruptcy, defea.ting, or tending to defeat, such
distribution. It reaches to proceedings of every form and kind
undertaken or executed within that period by which a preference
can be secured to one creditor over another, or the , purpose
of the act evaded. That period is four months for some transactions, and six months for others. Those periods constitute the
limitation within which the transactions will be examined and
annulled, if conflicting with the provisions of the Bankrupt
Act.
Transactions anterior to these periods are presumed to have
been acquiesced in by the creditors. There is sound policy in
prescribing a limitation of this kind. It would be in the highest
degree injurious to the community to have the validity of business transactions with debtors, in which it is interested, subject
to the contingency of being assailed by subsequent proceedings in bankruptcy. Unless, therefore, a transaction is void
against creditors independently of the provisions of the Bankrupt Act, its validity is not open to contestation by the assignee,
where it took place at the period prescribed by the statute an-

WHAT STATE LAWS ARE SUSPENDED 15

terior to the proceedings in bankruptcy. The assignment in

WHAT STATE LAWS ARE SUSPENDED

15

this case was not a proceeding, as already said, in hostility to

the creditors, but for their benefit. It was not, therefore, void

as against them, or even voidable. Executed six months before

the petition in bankruptcy was filed, it is, to the assignee in

bankruptcy, a closed proceeding.

The counsel of the plaintiffs in error have filed an elaborate

argument to show that assignments for the benefit of creditors

generally are not opposed to the Bankrupt Act, though made

within six months previous to the filing of the petition. Their

argument is, that such an assignment is only a voluntary execu-

tion of what the Bankrupt Court would compel; and as it is

not a proceeding in itself fraudulent as against creditors, and

does not give a preference to one creditor over another, it con-.

flicts with no positive inhibition of the statute. There is much

force in the position of counsel, and it has the support of a

decision of the late Mr. Justice Nelson, in the Circuit Court of

New York, in Sedgwick v. Place, First Nat. Bank. Reg. 204,

and of Mr. Justice Swayne in the Circuit Court of Ohio, in

Langley v. Perry, 2 Nat. Bank. Reg. 180. Certain it is that

such an assignment is not absolutely void; and, if voidable, it

must be because it may be deemed, perhaps, necessary for the

efficiency of the Bankrupt Act that the administration of an
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insolvent's estate shall be intrusted to the direction of the

District Court, and not left under the control of the appointee

of the insolvent. It is unnecessary, however, to express any

decided opinion upon this head; for the decision of the question

is not required for the disposition of the case.

In the argument of the counsel of the defendant in error, the

position is taken that the Bankrupt Act suspends the opera-

tion of the act of Ohio regulating the mode of administering

assignments for the benefit of creditors, treating the latter as

an insolvent law of the State. The answer is, that the statute

of Ohio is not an insolvent law in any proper sense of the term.

It does not compel, or in terms even authorize, assignments:

it assumes that such instruments were conveyances previously

known, and only prescribes a mode by which the trust created

shall be enforced. It provides for the security of the creditors

by exacting a bond from the trustees for the discharge of their

duties; it requires them to file statements showing what they

have done with the property; and affords in various ways the

means of compelling them to carry out the purposes of the con-

terior to the proceedings in bankruptcy. The assignment rn
this case was not a proceeding, as already said, in hostility to
the creditors, but for their benefit. It was not, therefore, void
as against them, or even voidable. Executed six months before
the petition in bankruptcy was filed, it is, to the assignee in
bankruptcy, a closed proceeding.
The counsel of the plaintiffs in error have filed an elaborate
argument to show that assignments for the benefit of creditors
generally are not opposed to the Bankrupt Act, though made
within six months previous to the filing of the petition. Their
argument is, that such an assignment is only a voluntary execution of what the Bankrupt Court would compel; and as it is
not a proceeding in itself fraudulent as against creditors, and
does not give a preference to one creditor over another, it con- .
flicts with no positive inhibition of the statute. There is much
force in the position of counsel, and it has the support of a
decision of the late Mr. Justice Nelson, in the Circuit Court of
Xew York, in Sedgwick v. Place, First Nat. Bank. Reg. 204,
and of Mr. Justice Swayne in the Circuit Court of Ohio, in
Langley v. Perry, 2 Nat. Bank. Reg. 180. Certain it is that
such an assignment is not absolutely void; and, if voidable, it
must be because it may be deemed, perhaps, necessary for the
efficiency of the Bankrupt Act that the administration of an
insolvent's estate shall be in trusted to the direction of the
District Court, and not left under the control of the appointee
of the insolvent. It is unnecessary, however, to express any
decided opinion upon this head_; for the decision of the question
is not required for the disposi.tion of the case.
In the argument of the counsel of the defendant in error, the
position is taken that the Bankrupt Act suspends the operation of the act of Ohio regulating the mode of administering
assignments for the benefit of creditors, treating the latter as
an insolvent law of the State. The answer is, that the statute
of Ohio is not an insolvent law in any proper sense of the term.
It does not compel, or in terms even authorize, assignments:
it assumes that such instruments were conveyances previously
known, and only prescribes a mode by which the trust created
shall be enforced. It provides for the security of the creditors
by exacting a bond from the trustees for the discharge of their
duties; it requires them to file statements showing what they
have done with the property; and affords in various ways the
means ol compelling them to carry out the purposes of the con-
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veyance. There is nothing in the act resembling an insolvent

law. It does not discharge the insolvent from arrest or imprison-

ment: it leaves his after-acquired property liable to his creditors

precisely as though no assignment had been made. The pro-

visions for enforcing the trust are substantially such as a court

of chancery would apply in the absence of any statutory pro-

vision. The assignment in this case must, therefore, be regarded

as though the statute of Ohio, to which reference is made, had

no existence. There is an insolvent law in that State; but the

assignment in question was not made in pursuance of any of its

provisions. The position, therefore, of counsel, that the Bank-

rupt Law of Congress suspends all proceedings under the Insol-

vent Law of the State, has no application.

The assignment in this case being in our judgment valid and

binding, there was no property in the hands of the plaintiffs in

error which the assignee in bankruptcy could claim. The assign-

ment to them divested the insolvents of all proprietary rights

they held in the property described in the conveyance. They

could not have maintained any action either for the personalty

or realty. There did, indeed, remain to them an equitable right

to have paid over to them any remainder after the claims of all

of the creditors were satisfied. If a contingency should ever
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arise for the assertion of this right, the assignee in bankruptcy

may perhaps have a claim for such remainder, to be applied to

the payment of creditors not protected by the assignment, and

whose demands have been created subsequent to that instrument.

Of this possibility we have no occasion to speak now.

Our conclusion is, that the Court below erred in sustaining

the demurrer to the defendant's answer; and the judgment of

the Court must, therefore, be reversed, and the cause remanded

for further proceedings.1

BOBSE v. KING

108 U. S. 379, 27 L. ed. 760

(United States Supreme Court. April 30, 1883)

Suit by a receiver appointed by a State court in New York

on return of execution unsatisfied; brought in New York against

1—Aco. In re Farrell, 176 Fed.

505, 100 C. C. A. 63; Pogue v. Rowe,

236 Hi 157 (but see Harbaugh v.

Costello, 184 HI. 110).

See also Downer v. Porter, 116

Ky. 422, 76 S. W. 135; Louisville

Co. v. Lamman, 135 Ky. 163, 121

8. W. 1042.

veyance. There is nothing in the act resembling an insolvent
law. It does not discharge the insolvent from arrest or imprisonment: it leaves his after-acquired property liable to his creditors
precisely as though no assignment had been made. The proYisions for enforcing the trust are substantially such as a court
of chancery would apply in the absence of any statutory provision. The assignment in this case must, therefore, be regarded
as though the statute of Ohio, to which reference is made, had
no existence. There is an insolvent law in that State; but the
assignment in question was not ma.de in pursuance of any of its
provisions. The position, therefore, of counsel, that the Bankrupt Law of Congress suspends all proceedings under the Insolvent Law of the State, has no application.
The assignment in this case being in our judgment valid and
binding, there was no property in the hands of the plaintiffs in
error which the assignee in bankruptcy could claim. The assignment to them divested the insolvents of all proprietary rights
they held in the property described in the conveyance. They
could not have maintained any action either for the personalty
or realty. There did, indeed, remain to them an equitable right
to have paid over to them any remainder after the claims of all
of the creditors were satisfied. If a contingency should ever
arise for the assertion of this right, the assignee in bankruptcy
may perhaps have a claim for such remainder, to be applied to
the payment of creditors not protected by the assignment, and
whose demands have been created subsequent to that instrument.
Of this possibility we have no occasion to speak now.
Our conclusion is, that the Court below erred in sustaining
the demurrer to the defendant's answer ; and the judgment of
the Court must, therefore, be reversed, and the cause remanded
for further proceedings. 1
BOESE v. KING
108 U. S. 379, 27 L. ed. 760
(United States Supreme Court.

April 30, 1883)

Suit by a receiver appointed by a State court in New York
on return of execution unsatisfied; brought in New York against
1-Acc. In re Farrell, 176 Fed.
505, 100 C. C. A. 63; Pogue v. Rowe,
236 Ill. 157 (but see Harbaugh v.
Costello, 184 Ill. 110).

See also Downer v. Porter, 116
Ky. 422, 76 S. W. 135; Louisville
Co. v. Lamman1 135 Ky. 1631 121
1042.
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assignees of the property of the, judgment debtor under an

assignment for the benefit of creditors, made in accordance with

the laws of New Jersey (of which State the assignees and the

debtor are citizens), and to recover proceeds of the debtor's

property voluntarily brought within the State of New York by

the assignees for distribution under the assignment.

By deed of assignment executed and delivered September

25th, 1873, Wm. H. Locke, a citizen of New Jersey, transferred

and conveyed to Wm. King, John M. Goetchius, and Edward E.

Poor, and the survivor of them, and their and his heirs and

assigns, all his property of every kind and description—except

such as was exempt by law from execution—"in trust to take

possession of and collect and to sell and dispose of the same at

public or private sale in their discretion, and to distribute the

proceeds to and among the creditors of the said Wm. H. Locke,

in proportion to their several just demands, pursuant to the

statutes in such case made and provided, and on the further

trust to pay the surplus, if any there be, after fully satisfying

and paying the said creditors and all proper costs and charges,

to the said Wm. H. Locke."

The intention of Locke and the assignors [assignees] was to

have a distribution made among the creditors of the former in
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conformity with the requirements of an act of the legislature of

New Jersey, passed April 16th, 1846, entitled "An Act to

secure to creditors an equal and just division of the estates of

debtors who convey to assignees for the benefit of creditors."

That act provided, among other things, that every conveyance

or assignment by a debtor of his estate, real or personal or both,

in trust, to an assignee for the benefit of creditors, shall be

made for their equal benefit in proportion to their several de-

mands to the net amount that shall come to the hands of the

assignee for distribution; and all preferences of one creditor

over another, or whereby one shall be first paid or have a

greater proportion in respect to his claim than another, shall be

deemed fraudulent and void, excepting mortgage and judgment

creditors, when the judgment has not been by confession for

the purpose by preferring creditors (1); further, that the

debtor shall annex to his assignment an inventory, under oath

or affirmation, of all of his property, together with a list of

his creditors, and the amount of their respective claims, such

inventory not, however, to be conclusive as to the quantity of

the debtor's estate, and the assignee to be entitled to any other

H. & A. Bankruptcy—2

assignees of the property of the judgment debtor under an
assignment for the benefit of creditors, made in accordance with
the laws of New Jersey (of which State the assignees and the
debtor are citizens), and to recover proceeds of the debtor's
property voluntarily brought within the State of New York by
the assignees for distribution under the assignment.
By deed of assignment executed and delivered September
25th, 1873, Wm. H. Locke, a citizen of New Jersey, transferred
and conveyed to Wm. King, John M. Goetchius, and Edward E.
Poor, and the survivor of them, and their and his heirs and
assigns, all his property of every kind and description-except
such as was exempt by law from execution-'' in trust to take
possession of and collect and to sell and dispose of the same at
public or private sale in their discretion, and to distribute the
proceeds to and among the creditors of the said Wm. H. Locke,
in proportion to their several just demands, pursuant to the
statutea in such case made and provided, and on the further
trust to pay the surplus, if any there be, after fully satisfying
.and paying the said creditors and all proper costs and charges,
to the said ·wm. H. Locke."
The intention of Locke and the assignors [assignees] was to
have a distribution made among the creditors of the former in
conformity with the requirements of an act of the legislature of
New Jersey, passed April 16th, 1846, entitled "An Act to
secure to creditors an equal and just division of the estates of
debtors who convey to assignees for the benefit of creditors.''
That act provided, among other things, that every conveyance
or assignment by a debtor of his estate, real or personal or both,
in trust, to an assignee for the benefit of creditors, shall be
made for their equal benefit in proportion to their several demands to the net amount that shall come to the hands of the
assignee for distribution; and all preferences of one creditor
over another, or whereby one shall be first paid or have a
greater proportion in respect to his claim than another, shall be
deemed fraudulent and void, excepting mortgage and judgment
creditors, when the judgment bas not been by eonfession for
the purpose by preferring creditors (1); further, that the
debtor shall annex to his assignment an inventory, under oath
or affirmation, of all of his property, together with a list of
his creditors, and the amount of their respective claims, such
inventory not, however, to be conclusive as to the quantity of
the debtor's estate, and the assignee to be entitled to any other
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property belonging to the debtor at the time of the assign-

ment, and comprehended within its general terms (2). Other

sections provided for public notice by the assignee of the assign-

ment; for the presentation of claims of creditors; for filing by

the assignee under oath of a true inventory and valuation of

the estate; for the execution by him of a bond in double the

amount of such inventory or valuation; for the recording of such

bond; for the filing with the clerk of the Court of Common Pleas

of the county of the debtor's residence, within three months

after the date of the assignment, of a list of all such creditors

as claim to be such, and the amount of their demands, first mak-

ing it known by advertisement that all claims against the estate

must be made as prescribed in the statute, or be forever barred

from coming in for a dividend of said estate, otherwise than as

provided; for the right of the assignee or any creditor or person

interested to except to the allowance of any claim presented; for

. the adjudication of such exceptions for fair and equal dividends

from time to time among the creditors of the assets in pro-

portion to their respective claims; and for a final accounting

by the assignee in the Orphans' Court of the county—such set-

tlement and adjudication to be conclusive on all parties, except

for assets which may afterward come to hand, or for frauds or
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apparent error (3, 4, 5, 6 and 7).

The act further provided

"11. If any creditor shall not exhibit his, her or their claims

within the term of three months as aforesaid, such claim shall

be barred of a dividend unless the estate shall prove sufficient

after the debts exhibited and allowed are fully satisfied, or

such creditors shall find some other estate not accounted for

by the assignee or assignees before distribution, in which ease

such barred creditors shall be entitled to a ratable proportion

therefrom.

"12. Whenever any assignee or assignees, as aforesaid, shall

sell any real estate of such debtor or debtors as is conveyed in

trust as aforesaid, he or they shall proceed to advertise and sell

the same in manner as is now or may hereafter be prescribed

in the case of an executor or administrator directed to sell

lands by an order of the Orphans' Court for the payment of the

debts of the testator or intestate.

"13. Every assignee, as aforesaid, shall have as full power

and authority to dispose of all estate, real and personal, as-

signed, as the said debtor or debtors had at the time of the

property belonging to the debtor at the time of the assignment, aud comprehended within its general terms (2). Other
sections provided for public notice by the assignee of the assignment; fQr the presentation of claims of creditors; for filing by
the assignee under oach of a true inventory and valuation of
the estate; for the execution by him of a bond in double the
amount of such inventory or valuation; for the recording of such
bond; for the filing with the clerk of the Court of Common Pleas
of the county of the debtor's residence, within three months
after the date of the assignment, of a list of all such creditors
as claim to be such, and the amount of their demands, first making it known by advertisement that all claims against the estate
must be made as prescribed in the statute, or be forever barred
from coming in for a dividend of Said estate, otherwise than as
provided; for the right of the assignee or auy creditor or person
interested to except to the allowance of any claim presented; for
the adjudication of such exceptions for fair and equal dividends
from time to time among the creditors of the assets in proportion to their respective claims; and for a final accounting
by the assignee in the Orphans' Court of the county-such settlement and adjudication to be conclusive on all parties, except
for assets which may afterward come to hand, or for frauds or
apparent error (3, 4, 5, 6 and 7).
The act further provided
"11. If any creditor shall not exhibit his, her or their claims
within the term of three months as aforesaid, such claim shall
be barred of a dividend unless the estate shall prove sufficient
after the debts exhibited and allowed are fully satisfied, or
such creditors shall find some other estate not accounted for
by the assignee or assignees before distribution, in which case
such barred creditors shall be entitled to a ratable proportion
therefrom.
'' 12. Whenever any assignee or assignees, as aforesaid, shall
sell any real estate of such debtor or debtors as is conveyed in
trust as af&esaid, he or they shall proceed to advertise and sell
the same in manner as is now or may hereafter be prescribed
in the case of an executor or administrator directed to sell
lands by an order of the Orphans' Court for the payment of the
debts of the testator or intestate.
"13. Every assignee, as aforesaid, shall have as full power
and authority to dispose of all estate, real and personal, assigned, as the said debtor or debtors had at the time of the
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assignment, and to sue for and recover in the proper name of

such assignee or assignees everything belonging or appertain-

ing to said estate, real or personal, of said debtor or debtors,

and shall have full power and authority to refer to arbitration,

settle and compound, and to agree with any person concerning

the same, and to redeem all mortgages and conditional contracts,

and generally to act and do whatever the said debtor or debtors

might have lawfully done in the premises.

'' 14. Nothing in this act shall be taken or understood as dis-

charging said debtor or debtors from liabilities to their creditors

who may not choose to exhibit their claims either in regard to

the persons of such debtors or to any estate, real or personal,

not assigned as aforesaid, but with respect to the creditors who

shall come in under said assignment and exhibit their demands

as aforesaid for a dividend, they shall be wholly barred from

having afterward any action or suit at law or equity against

such debtors or their representatives, unless on the trial of such

action or hearing in equity the said creditor shall prove fraud

in the said debtor or debtors with respect to the said assign-

ment, or concealing his estate, real or personal, whether in

possession, held in trust, or otherwise."

The estate which came into the hands of the assignees was
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converted into money in New Jersey—the amount being nearly

$200,000—and the proceeds, for the convenience of the assign-

ees, were deposited in a bank in the city of New York. No

proceedings in bankruptcy were ever taken against Locke.

On the 3rd day of February, 1876, William Pickhardt and

Adolph Kutroff recovered a judgment against Locke in the

Supreme Court of the city and county of New York for

$3,086.85. Upon that judgment execution was issued and re-

turned unsatisfied. Subsequently, May 27th, 1876, in certain

proceedings, before one of the judges of that court, supple-

mentary to the return of execution, Thomas Boese, plaintiff in

error, was appointed receiver of the property of Locke, and hav-

ing executed a bond for the faithful discharge of the duties of

his trust, he obtained an order from the same court giving him

authority, as receiver, to bring an action against the assignees

of Locke. Thereupon, June 9th, 1876, he commenced this action.

It proceeds upon these grounds: 1. That the indebtedness from

Locke to Pickhardt and Kutroff arose in New York, where they

reside, before the making of said assignment; 2. That the

statute of New Jersey with reference to or under which said

assignment, and to sue for and recover in the proper name of
such assignee or assignees everything belonging or appertaining to said estate, real or personal, of said debtor or debtors,
and shall have full power and authority to refer to arbitration,
settle and compound, and to agree with any person concerning
the same, and to redeem all mortgages and conditional contracts,
and generally to act and do whatever the said debtor or debtors
might have lawfully done in the premises.
"14. Nothing in this act shall be taken or understood as discharging said debtor or debtors from liabilities to their ·creditors
who may not ch006e to exhibit their claims either in regard to
the persons of such debtors or to any estate, real or personal,
not aasigned as aforesaid, but with respect to the creditors who
shall come in under said assignment and exhibit their demands
as aforesaid for a dividend, they shall be wholly barred from
having afterward any action or suit at law or equity against
such debtors or their representatives, unless on the trial of such
action or hearing in equity the said creditor shall prove fraud
in the said debtor or debtors with respect to the said assignment, or concealing his estate, real or personal, whether in
possession, held in trust, or otherwise.''
The estate which came into the hands of the assignees was
converted into money in New Jersey-the amount being nearly
$200,000-and the proceeds, for the convenience of the assignees, were deposited in a bank in the city of New York. No
proceedings in bankruptcy were ever taken against Locke.
On the 3rd day of February, 1876, "William Pickhardt and
Adolph Kutroff recovered a judgment against J;ocke in the
Supreme Court of the city and county of New York for
$3,086.85. Upon that judgment execution was issued and re~
turned unsatisfied. Subsequently, May 27th, 1876, in certain
proceedings, before one of the judges of that court, supplementary to the return of execution, Thomas Boese, plaintiff in
error, was appointed receiver of the property of Locke, and having executed a bond for the faithful discharge of the duties of
his trust, he obtained an order from the same court giving him
authority, as receiver, to bring an action against the assignees
of Locke. Thereupon, June 9th, 1876, he commenced this action.
It proceeds upon these grounds: 1. That the indebtedness from
Locke to Pickhardt and Kutroff arose in New York, where they
reside, before the making of said assignment; 2. That the
statute of New Jersey with reference to or under which said
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assignment was made was, by force of the Bankruptcy Act of

1867, suspended and of no effect; 3. That the assignment was

fraudulent and void by the laws of New Jersey, in that it was

made with the intent upon the part of Locke to hinder, delay

and defraud his creditors, and in that he had a large amount of

money and other property which he fraudulently retained to

his own use and did not surrender to the assignees.

The prayer of the complaint—the allegations of which were

fully met by answer—was for judgment against the defendants;

that the assignments be adjudged fraudulent and void; and that

the defendants be required to account to plaintiff for all the

property and money received or to which they are entitled un-

der and by virtue of the assignment. It was conceded at the

hearing that defendants had in their hands, of the proceeds of

the sale of the assigned property, an amount sufficient to pay

the judgment of Pickhardt and Kutroff.

The Supreme Court of New York, both in general and spe-

cial terms, sustained the action and gave judgment against the

assignees in favor of Boese, as receiver, for the amount of the

demand of Pickhardt and Kutroff. But in the Court of Appeals

that judgment was reversed, with directions to enter judgment

for the defendants.

The receiver brought the suit here in error asking to have
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this decision reversed.

Mr. Justice HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

After reciting the facts in the foregoing language he continued:

We are to consider in this case whether the final judgment of

the Court of Appeals of New York has deprived the plaintiff in

error of any right, title, or privilege under the Constitution or

laws of the United States.

We dismiss from consideration all suggestions in the plead-

ings of actual fraud upon the part either of Locke or of his

assignees. The court of original jurisdiction found as a fact—

and upon that basis the case was considered by the Court of

aBSignment was made was, by force of the Bankruptcy Ad of
1867, suspended and of no effect; 3. That the assignrne11t was
fraudulent and void by the laws of New Jersey, in thnt it was
made with the intent upon the part of Locke to hinder, delay
and defraud his creditors, and in that he had a large amount of
money and other property which he fraudulently retained to
his own use and did not surrender to the assignees.
The prayer of the complaint-the allegations of which were
fully met by answer-was for judgment against the defendants;
that the assignments be adjudged fraudulent and void; and that
the defendants be required to account to plaintiff for all the
property and money received or to which they are entitled under and by virtue of the assignment. It was conceded at the
hearing that defendants had in their hands, of the proceeds of
the sale of the assigned property, an amount sufficient to pay
the judgment of Pickhardt and Kutroff.
The Supreme Court of New York, both in general and special terms, sustained the action and gave judgment against the
assignees in favor of Boese, as receiver, for the amount of the
demand of Pickhardt and Kutroff. But in the Court of Appeals
that judgment was reversed, with directions to enter judgment
for the defendants.
The receiver brought the suit here in error asking to have
this decision reversed.

Appeals—that the assignment was executed and delivered by

the former and accepted by the latter in good faith and without

any purpose to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of Locke.

It is further found as a fact that the assignment was made

with the intent, bona fide, to make an equal distribution of the

proceeds of the trust estate among creditors, in conformity with

the local statute. The Supreme Court of New York ruled that

Mr. Justice HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
After reciting the facts in the foregoing language he continued:
\Ve are to consider in this case whether the final judgment of
the Court of Appeals of New York has deprived the plaintiff in
error of any right, title, or privilege under the Constitution or
laws of the United States.
We dismiss from consideration all suggestions in the pleadings of actual fraud upon the part either of Locke or of his
assigners. The court of original jurisdiction found as a factand upon that basis the case was considered by the Court of
Appeals-that the assignment was executed and delivPred by
the former and accepted by the latter in good faith and without
any purpose to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of Locke.
It is further found as a fact that the assignmrnt was made
with the intent, bona fide, to make an equal distribution of tlw
proceeds of the trust estate among creditors, in eonformity with
the local statute. The Supreme Court of New York rnk'd that
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the statute of New Jersey was, in its nature and effect, a bank-

rupt law, and the power conferred upon Congress to establish

a uniform system of bankruptcy, having been exercised by the

passage of the act of 1867, the latter act wholly suspended the

operation of the local statute as to all cases within its purview;

consequently, it was held, the assignment was not valid for any

purpose. The Court of Appeals, recognizing the paramount

nature of the Bankrupt Act of Congress, and assuming that

the 14th section of the New Jersey statute, relating to the effect

upon the claims of creditors who exhibit their demands for a divi-

dend, was inconsistent with that act and therefore inoperative,

adjudged that other portions of the local statute providing for

the equal distribution of the debtor's property among his cred-

itors, and regulating the general conduct of the assignee, were

not inconsistent with nor were they necessarily suspended by

the act of 1867; further, that the New Jersey statute did not

create the right to make voluntary assignments for the equal

benefit of creditors, but was only restrictive of a previously

existing right, and imposed, for the benefit of creditors, salutary

safeguards around its exercise; consequently, had the whole of

the New Jersey statute been superseded, the right of a debtor

to make a voluntary assignment would still have existed. The

assignment, as a transfer of the debtor's property, was, there-
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fore, upheld as in harmony with the general object and pur-

poses of the Bankrupt Act, unassailable by reason merely of

the fact that some of the provisions of the local statute may

have been suspended by the act of 1867.

In the view which we take of the case it is unnecessary to

consider all of the questions covered by the opinion of the

state court and discussed here by counsel. Especially it is not

necessary to determine whether the Bankrupt Act of 1867 sus-

pended or superseded all of the provisions of the New Jersey

statute. Undoubtedly the local statute was, from the date of

the passage of the Bankrupt Act, inoperative in so far as it

provided for the discharge of the debtor from future liability

to creditors who came in under the assignment and claimed to

participate in the distribution of the proceeds of the assigned

property. It is equally clear, we think, that the assignment by

Locke of his entire property to be disposed of as prescribed by

the statute of New Jersey, and therefore independently of the

bankruptcy court, constituted, itself, an act of bankruptcy, for

which, upon the petition of a creditor filed in proper time,

the statute of New Jnsey was, in its nature and effect, a bankrupt law, and the power conferred upon Congress to establish
a uniform system of bankruptcy, having been exercised by the
passage of the act of 1867, the latter act wholly suspended the
operation of the local statute as to all cases within its purview;
consequently, it was held, the assignment was not valid for any
purpose. The Court of AppealB, recognizing the paramount
nature of the Bankrupt Act of Congress, and assuming that
the 14th section of the New Jersey statute, relating to the effect
upon the claims of ei'editors who exhibit their demands for a dividend, was inconsistent with that act and therefore inoperative,
adjudged that other portions of the local statute providing for
the equal distribution of the debtor's property among his creditors, and regulating the general conduct of the assignee, were
not inconsistent with nor were they necessarily suspended by
the act of 1867; further, that the New Jersey statute did not
create the right to make voluntary assignments for the equal
benefit of creditors, but was only restrictive of a previously
existing right, and imposed, for the benefit of creditors, salutary
safeguards around its exercise; consequently, had the whole of
the New Jersey statute been superseded, the right of a dehtor
to make a voluntary assignment would still have existed. The
assignment, as a transfer of the debtor's property, was, therefore, upheld as in harmony with the general object and pnrpose,g of the Bankrupt Act, unassailable by reason merely of
the fact that some of the provisions of the local statute may
have been suspended by the act of 1867.
In the view which we take of the case it is unnecessary to
consider all of the questions covered by the opinion of the
state court and discussed here by counsel. Especially it is not
necessary to determine whether the Bankrupt Act of 1867 suspended or superseded all of the provisions of the New Jersey
statute. Undoubtedly the local statute was, from the date of
the passage of the Bankrupt Act, inoperative in so far as it
provided for the discharge of the debtor from future liability
to creditors who came in under the assignment and claimed to
participate in the distribution of the proceeds of the assigned
property. It is equally clear, we think, that the assignment by
Locke of his entire property to be disposed of as prescribed hy
the statute of New Jersey, and therefore independently of the
bankruptcy court, constituted, itself, an act of bankruptcy, for
which, upon the petition of a creditor filed in proper time,
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Locke could have been adjudged a bankrupt, and the property

wrested from his assignees for administration in the bankruptcy

court. In Re Burt, 1 Dillon, 439, 440; in Re Goldschmidt, 3

Bank. Reg. 164; In matter of Seymour T. Smith, 4 Bank. Reg.

377. The claim of Pickhardt and Kutroff existed at the time

of the assignment. The way was, therefore, open for them by

timely action, to secure the control and management of the as-

signed property by that court for the equal benefit of all the

creditors of Locke. But they elected to lie by until after the

expiration of the time within which the assignment could be

attacked under the provisions of the Bankrupt Act; and now

seek, by this suit in the name of the plaintiff in error, to secure

an advantage or preference over all others; this, notwithstand-

ing the assignment was made without any intent to hinder,

delay, or defraud creditors. In order to obtain that advantage

or preference, the plaintiff in error relies on the paramount

force of the Bankrupt Act, the primary object of which, as this

Court has frequently announced, was to secure equality among

the creditors of a bankrupt. Mayer v. Hellman, 91 U. S. 496-

501; Reed v. Mclntyre, 98 U. S. 507-509; Buchanan v. Smith,

16 Wall. 277. It can hardly be that the Court is qbliged to

lend its aid to those who, neglecting or refusing to avail them-
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selves of the provisions of the act of Congress, seek to accom-

plish ends inconsistent with that equality among creditors which

those provisions were designed to secure. If it be assumed, for

the purposes of this case, that the statute of New Jersey was,

as to each and all of its provisions, suspended when the Bank-

rupt Act of 1867 was passed, it does not follow that the assign-

ment by Locke was ineffectual for every purpose. Certainly,

that instrument was sufficient to pass the title from Locke to

his assignees. It was good as between them, at least until Locke,

in some appropriate mode, or by some proper proceedings, mani-

fested a right to have it set aside or canceled upon the ground

of a mutual mistake in supposing that the local statute of 1846

was operative. And in the absence of proceedings in the bank-

ruptcy court impeaching the assignment, and so long as Locke

did not object, the assignees had authority to sell the property

and distribute the proceeds among al the creditors, disregard-

ing so much of the deed of assignment as required the assignees,

in the distribution of the proceeds, to conform to the local

statute. The assignment was not void as between the debtor and

the assignees simply because it provided for the distribution

Locke could have been adjudged a bankmpt, and the property
wrested from his assignees for administration in the bankruptcy
court. In Re Burt, 1 Dillon, 439, 440; in Re Goldschmidt, 3
Bank. Reg. 164; In matter of Seymour T. Smith, 4 Bank. Reg.
377. The claim of Pickhardt and Kutroff existed at the time
of the assignment. The way was, the refore, open for them by
timely action, to secure the control and management of the assigned property by that court for the equal benefit of all the
creditors of Locke. But they elected to lie by until after the
expiration of the time within which the assignment could be
attacked under the provisions of the Bankrupt Act; and now
seek, by this suit in the name of the plaintiff in error, to secure
an advantage or preference over all others; this, notwithstanding the assignment was made without any intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud creditors. In order to obtain that advantage
or preference, the plaintiff in error relies on the paramount
force of the Bankrupt Act, the primary object .of which, as this
Court ·has frequently announced, was to secure equality among
the creditors of a bankrupt. Mayer v. Hellman, 91 U. S. 496501; Reed v. Mcintyre, 98 U. S. 507-509; Buchanan v. Smith,
16 Wall. 277. It can hardly be that the Court is qbliged to
lend its aid to those who, neglecting or refusing to avail themselves of the provisions of the act of Congress, seek to accomplish ends inconsistent with that equality among creditors which
those provisions were designed to secure. If it he assumed, for
the purposes of this case, that the statute of New Jersey was,
as to each and all of its provisions, suspended when the Bankrupt Act of 1867 was passed, it does not follow that the assignment by Locke was ineffectual for every purpose. Certainly,
that instrument was sufficient to pass the title from Locke to
his assignees. It was good as between them, at least until Locke,
in some appropriate mode, or by some proper proceedings, manifested a right to have it set aside or canceled upon the ground
of a mutual mistake in supposing that the local statute of 1846
was operative. And in the absence of proceedings in the bankruptcy court impeaching the assignment, and so long as Locke
did not object, the assignees had authority to sell the property
and distribute the proceeds among am. the creditors, disregarding so much of the deed of assignment as required the assignees,
in the distribution of the proceeds, to conform to the local
statute. The assignment was not void as between the debtor and
the assignees simply because it provided for the distribution
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of the proceeds of the property in pursuance of a statute, none

of the provisions of which, it is claimed, were then in force.

Had this suit been framed for the purpose of compelling the

assignees to account to all the creditors for the proceeds of the

sale of the property committed to their hands, without discrim-

ination against those who did not recognize the assignment and

exhibit their demands within the time and mode prescribed

by the New Jersey statute, a wholly different question would

have been presented for determination. It has been framed

mainly upon the idea that by reason of the mistake of Locke

and his assignees in supposing that the property could be ad-

ministered under the provisions of the local statute of 1846,

even while the Bankrupt Act was in force, the title did not

pass for the benefit of creditors according to their respective

legal rights. In this view, as has been indicated, we do not

concur.

"We are of opinion that, except as against proceedings insti-

tuted under the Bankrupt Act for the purpose of securing the

administration of the property in the bankruptcy court, the

assignment, having been made without intent to hinder, delay,

or defraud creditors, was valid, for at least the purpose of se-

curing an equal distribution of the estate among all the cred-
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itors of Locke, in proportion to their several demands, Reed v.

Mclntyre, 98 U. S. 507-509; and, consequently, we adjudge only

that the plaintiff in error is not entitled, by reason of any con-

flict between the local statute and the Bankrupt Act of 1877

[1867] or by force of the before-mentioned judgment and the

proceedings thereunder, to the possession of the assigned prop-

erty or of its proceeds, as against the assignees, or to a priority of

claim for the benefit of Pickhardt and Kutroff upon such pro-

ceeds. The judgment is affirmed.

Mr. Justice MATTHEWS (with whom concurred MILLER,

GRAY, and BLATCHFORD, JJ.), dissenting

Mr. Justice MILLER, Mr. Justice GRAY, Mr. Justice

BLATCHFORD, and myself, are unable to agree with the

opinion and judgment of the court in this case. The grounds

of our dissent may be very generally and concisely stated as

follows:

The New Jersey statute of April 16th, 1846, the validity and

effect of which are in question, is an insolvent or bankrupt law,

of the proceeds of the property in pursmrnce of a statute, none
of the provisions of which, it is claimed, were then iu force.
Had this suit been framed for the purpose of compt·lliug the
assignees to account to all the creditors for the proceeds of the
sale of the property committed to their hands, without discrimination against those who did not recognize the assignment and
exhibit their demands within the time and mode prescribed
by the New Jersey statute, a, wholly different question would
have been presented for determination. It has been framed
mainly upon the idea that by reason of the mistake of Locke
and his assignees in supposing that the property could be administered under the provisions of the local statute of 1846,
even while the Bankrupt Act was in force, the title did not
pass for the benefit of creditors according to their respective
legal rights. In this view, as has been indicated, we do not
concur.
We are of opinion that, except as against proceedings instituted under the Bankrupt Act for the purpose of securing the
administration of the prop<'rty in the bankruptcy court, the
BJISignment, having been made without intent to hinder, delay,
o~ defraud creditors, was valid, for at least the purpose of se 7
curing an equal distribution of the estate among all the creditors of Locke, in proportion to their several demands, Reed v.
Mcintyre, 98 U. S. 507-509; and, consequently, we adjudge only
that the plaintiff in error is not entitled, by reason of any conflict between the local statute and the Bankrupt Act of 1877
(1867) or by force of the before-mentioned judgment and the
proceedings thereunder, to the possession of the assigned property or of its proceeds, as against the assignees, or to a priority of
claim for the benefit of Pickhardt and Kutroff upon such pro..
ceeds. The judgment i.s affirmed.
Mr. Justice MATTHEWS (with whom concurred MILLER,
GRAY, and BLATCHFORD, JJ.), dissenting.
Mr. Justice MILLER, Mr. Justice GRAY, Mr. .Justice
BLATCHFORD, and myself, are unable to agree with the
opinion and judgment of the court in this case. The grounds
of our dissent may be ve-ry generalJy and concisely stated as
follows:
The New Jersey statute of April 16th, 1846, the validity and
effect of which are in question, is an insolvent or bankrupt la~,
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which provides for the administration of the assets of debtors

who make assignments of all their assets to trustees for cred-

itors, and for their discharge from liabilities to creditors shar-

ing in the distribution. It was accordingly in conflict with the

National Bankrupt Act of 1867 when the latter took effect, and

from that time became suspended and without force until the

repeal of the act by Congress. It is conceded that the 14th

section, which provides for the discharge of the debtor, is void

by reason of this conflict, and, in our opinion, this carries with

it the entire statute. For the statute is an entirety, and, to

take away the distinctive feature contained in the 14th section,

destroys the system. It is not an independent provision, but

an inseparable part of the scheme contained in the law.

This being so, the assignment in the present case must be

regarded as unlawful and void as to creditors. For it was made

in view of this statute and to be administered under it. Such

is the express recital of the instrument and the finding of the

fact by the court. It is as if the provisions of the act had been

embodied in it and it had declared expressly that it was exe-

cuted with the proviso that no distribution should be made of

any part of the debtor's estate to any creditor except on condi-

tion of the release of the unpaid portion of his claim.
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It is not possible, we think, to treat the assignment as though

the law of the state in view of which it was made, and subject

to the provisions of which it was intended to operate, had never

existed, or had been repealed before its execution. Because

there is no reason to believe that, in that state of the case, the

debtor would have made an assignment on such terms. To do

so is to construct for him a contract which he did not make and

which there is no evidence that he intended to make. It must

be regarded, then, as a proceeding under the statute of New

Jersey, and as such, with that statute, made void, as to creditors,

by the National Bankrupt Act of 1867. Otherwise that uni-

form rule as to bankruptcies, which it was the policy of the

Constitution and of the act of Congress pursuant to it, to pro-

vide, would be defeated. No title under it, therefore, could pass

to the defendants in error, and the judgment creditors who

acquired a lien upon the fund in their hands were by law entitled

to appropriate it, as the property of their debtor, to the payment

of their claims.

For these reasons we are of opinion that the judgment of the

Court of Appeals of New York should be reversed.

which provides for the a~miuistration of the assets of debtors
who make assignments of all their assets to trustees for creditors, and for their discharge from liabilitie.s to creditors sharing in the distribution. It was accordingly in conflict with the
National Bankrupt Act of 1867 when the latter took effect, and
from that time became suspended and without force until the
repeal of the act by Congress. It is conceded that the 14th
section, which provides for the discharge of the debtor, is void
by reason of this conflict, and, in our opinion, this carries with
it the entire statute. For the statute is an entirety, and, to
take away the distinctive feature contained in the 14th section,
destroys the system. It is not an independent provision, but
an inseparable part of the scheme contained in the law.
This being so, the assignment in the present case must be
regarded as unlawful and void as to creditors. For it was made
in view of this statute and to be administered under it. Such
is the express recital of the instrument and the finding of the
fact by the court. It is as if the provisions of the act had been
embodied in it and it had declared expressly that it was executed with the proviso that no distribution should be made of
any part of the debtor's estate to any creditor except on condition of the release of the unpaid portion of his claim.
It is not possible, we think, to treat the assignment as though
the law of the state in view of which it was made, and subject
to the provisions of which it was intended to operate, had never
existed, or had been repealed before its execution. Because
there is no reason to believe that, in that state of the case, the
debtor would have made an assignment on such terms. To do
so is to construct for him a contract which he did not make and
which there is no evidence that he intended to make. It must
be regarded, then, as a proceeding under the statute of New
Jersey, and as such, with that statute, made void, as to creditors,
by the National Bankrupt Act of 1867. Otherwise that uniform rule as to bankruptcies, which it was the policy of the
Constitution and of the act of Congress pursuant to it, to provide, would be defeated. No title under it, therefore, could pass
to the defendants in error, and the judgment creditors who
acquired a lien upon the fund in their hands were by law entitled
to appropriate it, as the property of their debtor, to the payment
of their claims.
For these reasons we are of opinion that the judgment of the
Court of Appeals of New York should be reversed.
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54 N. H. 333

(Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire. June, 1874)

HAWKINS & CO. v. LEARNED

Assumpsit, by L. B. Hawkins & Co. against Lewis M. Learned,

to recover the amount of a promissory note, and for goods sold

54 N. H. 333

and delivered. Writ dated October 24, 1873. December 23,

1873, the defendant was duly decreed to be an insane person

(Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire. Junet 1874)

by the probate court for Merrimack county, and John C. Smith

was appointed his guardian. March 24, 1874, upon the repre-

sentation of said guardian, said probate court decreed said estate

insolvent, and appointed John M. Shirley commissioner of in-

solvency.

At the April term, 1874, said guardian appeared specially

by his attorney, E. B. S. Sanborn, Esq., and moved that this

action be dismissed by reason of said proceedings in the probate

court; and the questions arising on said motion were reserved

for the consideration of the whole court.

SARGENT, C. J. The motion to dismiss in this case is

founded upon Gen. Stats., c. 167, §10, as follows: "When,,

upon representation of the guardian of any insane person or

spendthrift, the judge is satisfied that estate of the ward is not

sufficient to discharge the just debts due therefrom, he may

decree that said estate be settled as insolvent, and thereupon

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

such proceedings shall be had, decrees made, appeals allowed,

suits disposed of, and the accounts of the guardian adjusted,

as in the case of insolvent estates of deceased persons."

In this case, it is agreed that the defendant was duly decreed

to be an insane person by the probate court, and a guardian

Assumpsit, by L. B. Hawkins & Co. against Lewis M. Learned,
to recover the amount of a promissory note, and for goods sold
and delivered. Writ dated October 24, 1873. December 23,
1873, the defendant was duly decreed to be an insane person
by the probate court for Merrimack county, and John C. Smith
was appointed his guardian. March 24, 1874, upon the representation of said guardian, said probate court decreed said estate
insolvent, and appointed John M. Shirley commissioner of insolvency.
At the April term, 1874, said guardian appeared specially
by his attorney, E. B. S. Sanbornt Esq., and moved that this
action be dismissed by reason of said proceedings in the probate
court ; and the questions arising on said motion were reserved
for the consideration of the whole court.

was appointed. The guardian made the proper representation

to the probate court, and the defendant's estate was thereupon

decreed to be administered as insolvent; and after this, at this

term, the guardian appears and moves that this action, which

was commenced October 24, 1873, be dismissed in consequence

of such proceedings in the probate court.

This is the same way a suit would be disposed of in case of

a deceased person whose estate was decreed to be administered

as insolvent. No action shall be commenced or prosecuted

against an administrator after the estate is decreed to be ad-

ministered as insolvent, but the cause of action may be pre-

SARGENT, C. J. The motion to dismiss in this case is
founded upon Gen. Stats., c. 167, § 10, as follows: "When,•
upon representation of the guardian of any insane person or
spendthrift, the judge is satisfied that estate of the ward is not
sufficient to discharge the just debts due therefrom, he may
decree that said estate be settled as insolvent, and thereupon
such proceedings shall be had, decrees made, appeals allowed,
suits disposed of, and the accounts · of the guardian adjusted,
as in the case of insolvent estates of deceased persons.''
In this case, it is agreed that the defendant was duly decreed
to be an insane person by the probate court, and a guardian
was appointed. The guardian made the proper representation
to the probate court, and the defendant's estate was thereupon
decreed to be administered as insolvent; and after this, at this
term, the guardian appears and moves that this action, which
was commenced October 24, 1873, be dismissed in consequence
of such proceedings in the probate court.
This is the same way a suit would be disposed of in case of
a deceased person whose estate was decreed to be administered
as insolvent. No action shall be commenced or prosecuted
against an administrator after the estate is decreed to be administered as insolvent, but the cause of action may be pre-
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sented to the commissioner and allowed, with the costs of any

action pending at the time of such decree—Gen. Stats., c. 179,

§ 8; and in such cases no plea is necessary setting forth the de-

cease or the insolvency. When the facts are suggested, and the

court is satisfied that such decrees have heen made in the court

of probate, the actions are discontinued in this court at once.

It is urged in argument that the plaintiffs should be heard

upon the question whether the party is insane, etc.; but that

could not be in this court. The probate court is the tribunal

selected by law to settle that question; and, when once settled

there, it is settled for all other places and all other courts. This

must be so from the nature of the case. If it were not so, the

same man might be held both sane and insane at the same time.

The case of Jones v. Jones, 45 N. H. 123, is directly in point,

under provisions of the statute precisely like the present, and

must control this case.

The authorities cited, that the general bankrupt law of the

United States supersedes all state insolvent laws, do not apply.

The laws for the settlement of the estates of deceased persons

though they may provide for settling estates in the insolvent

course, yet are not regarded as general insolvent laws. It would

not be claimed, probably, that the statute for the settlement of

the estates of deceased persons in the insolvent course was super-
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seded by the general bankrupt law; and if not, then this would

not be, because this statute provides for settling the estates of

insane persons in all respects like the settling of the estates of

persons deceased.

The motion to dismiss must be granted.

JOHNSON v. CRAWFORD et al.

154 Fed. 761

(United States Circuit Court, Middle District, Pennsylvania.

March 15, 1907)

ARCHBALD, District Judge. On January 11, 1906, the

plaintiff recovered a judgment of $27,710.60 against the defend-

ants in an action of assumpsit for timber sold; and. having

failed to obtain satisfaction by execution, on December 20, 1906,

filed an affidavit charging, in substance, that the defendants

had money and property which they fraudulently concealed

and refused to apply to the payment of the judgment, and there-

sented to the commissioner and allowed, with the costs of any
action pending at the time of such decree-Gen. Stats., c. 179,
§ 8; and in such cases no plea is necessary setting forth the decease or the insolvency. When the facts are suggested, and the
court is satisfied that such decrees have been made in the court
of probate, the actions are discontinued in this court at once.
It is urged in argument that the plaintiffs should be heard
upon the question whether the party is insane, etc.; but that
could not be in this court. The probate court is the tribunal
selected by law to settle that question; and, when once settled
there, it is settled for all other places and all other courts. This
must be ~ from the nature of the case. If it were not so, the
same man might be held both sane and insane at the same time.
The case of Jones v. Jones, 45 N. H. 123, is directly in point,
under provisions of the statute precisely like the present, and
must control this case.
The authorities cited, that the general bankrupt law of the
United States supersedes all state insolvent laws, do not apply.
The laws for the settlement of the estates of deceased persons
though they may provide for settling estates in the insolvent
course, yet are not regarded as general insolvent laws. It would
not be claimed, probably, that the statute for the settlement of
the estates of deceased persons in the insolvent course was superseded by the general bankrupt law; and if not, then this would
not be, because this statute provides for settling the estates of
insane persons in all respects like the settling of the estates of
persons deceased.
·
The motion to dismiss must be granted.
JOHNSON v. CRAWFORD et al.
· 154 Fed. 761
(United States Circuit Court, Middle District, Pennsylvania.
March 15, 1907)
ARCHBALD, District Judge. On January 11, 1906, the
plaintiff recovered a judgment of $27,710.60 against the defendants in an action of assumpsit for timber sold; and, having
failed to obtain satisfaction by execution, on December 20, 1906,
filed au affidavit charging, in substance, that the defendants
bad money and property which they fraudulently concealed
and refused to apply to the payment of the judgment, and there-
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upon secured a warrant of arrest under the act of assembly of

July 12, 1842 (P. L. Pa. 339). Upon this, one of the defend-

ants, Crawford, was apprehended, and, having been brought

into court, has moved to quash the writ upon the ground that

in the present state of the law it is not authorized; the right to

file a bond to take the benefit of the insolvent laws of the state

being an essential part of the proceedings, and, having been

suspended by the passage by Congress of the bankruptcy act

of 1898, the right to the writ falls with it. The motion is justi-

fied by the case of Commonwealth v. 0 'Hara, 6 Phila. 402, where

it was held that a warrant of arrest under the act of 1842 could

not be prosecuted in the face of the existing bankruptcy law,

the insolvent laws of the state being thereby made inoperative.

But it was held, on the other hand, in Gregg v. Hilsen, 12

Phila. 348, by a court of equal authority, just the contrary of

this, that nothing short of actual proceedings in bankruptcy

would prevent a recourse to the writ; and the question may

therefore be regarded as an open one. The further position

taken in the O'Hara Case, that the writ was obnoxious to the

bankruptcy law and so not allowable, because it would enable

the execution creditor to obtain a preference, is an objection

which would equally apply to a fi. fa. or other process to enforce
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the collection of a judgment, and is, of course, not tenable.

Chandler v. Siddle, 3 Dill. 479, Fed. Cas. No. 2594; Berthelen

v. Betts, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 572; In re Hoskins, Crabbe, 466; Ex

parte Winternitz, 18 Pittsb. Leg. J. (N. S.) 61. And in Scully

v. Kirkpatrick, 79 Pa. 324, and Hubert v. Horter, 81 Pa. 39,

the writ was sustained notwithstanding bankruptcy, which neg-

atives any such idea; the fact that the debts there were not

discharged being immaterial. This is a federal question, how-

ever, and must be decided on principle; state decisions at the

best being merely advisory.

The act of the Legislature by which the warrant of arrest is

given, in substance, provides that in all civil cases, where a

party cannot be arrested or imprisoned, it shall be lawful for

the plaintiff, having begun suit or obtained judgment, to apply

for a warrant to arrest the defendant, upon proof by affidavit

that he is about to remove any of his property out of the juris-

diction of the court with intent to defraud his creditors; or

that he has property which he fraudulently conceals, or money

or property which he unjustly refuses to apply to the payment

of the judgment rendered against him; or that he has assigned,

upon secured a warrant of arrest under the act of assembly of
July 12, 18·12 ( P. L. Pa. 339). Upon this, one of the defendn:1ts, Crawford, was apprehended, and, having been brought
into court, has moved to quash the writ upon the ground that
in the present state of the law it is not authorized; the right to
file a bond to take the benefit of the insolvent laws of the state
heing an essential part of the proceedings, and, having been
suspended by the passage by Congress of the bankruptcy act
of 1898, the right to the writ falls with it. The motion is justified by the case of Commonwealth v. O'Hara, 6 Phila. 402, where
it was held that a warrant of arrest under the act of 1842 could
not be prosecuted in the face of the existing bankruptcy law,
the insolvent laws of the state being thereby made inoperative.
But it was held, on the other hand, in Gregg v. Hilsen, 12
Phila. 348, by a court of equal authority, just the contrary of
this, that nothing short of actual proceedings in bankruptcy
would prevent a recourse to the writ; and the question may
therefore be regarded as an open one. The further position
taken in the 0 'Hara Case, that the writ was obnoxious to the
bankruptcy law and so not allowable, because it would enable
the execution creditor to obtain a preference, is an objection
which would equally apply to a fi. fa. or other process to enforce
the collection of a judgment, and is, of course, not ten~ble.
Chandler v. Siddle, 3 Dill. 479, Fed. Cas. No. 2594; Berthelen
v. Betts, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 572; In re Hoskins, Crabbe, 466; Ex
parte Winternitz, 18 Pittsb. Leg. J. (N. S.) 61. And in Scully
v. Kirkpatrick, 79 Pa. 324, and Hubert v. Horter, 81 Pa. 39,
the writ was sustained notwithstanding bankruptcy, which negatives any such idea; the fact that the debts there were not
discharged being immaterial. This is a federal question, however, and must be decided on principle; state decisions at the
best being merely advisory.
The act of the Legislature by which the warrant of arrest is
given, in substance, provides that in all civil cases, where a
party cannot be arrested or imprisoned, it shall be lawful for
the plaintiff, having begun suit or obtained judgment, to apply
for a warrant to arrest the defendant, upon proof by affidavit
that he is about to remove any of his property out of the jurisdiction of the court with intent to defraud his creditors; or
that he has property which he fraudulently concPals, or money
or property which he unjustly refuses to apply to the payment
of the judgment .rendered against him ; or that he bas assigned,
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removed, or disposed, or is about to assign, remove, or dispose,

of his property with like fraudulent intent; or that the debt in

suit was fraudulently contracted. And, the defendant having

been thereupon brought in, if the judge by whom the writ was

allowed is satisfied that the charges made in the affidavit are

substantiated, and that the defendant has done or is about to

do any of the acts complained of, he shall commit him to the

jail of the county in which the hearing is had, to be there de-

tained until he shall be discharged by law: provided that he

shall not be committed, if he pays the debt or demand with

costs, or gives satisfactory security to pay the same with inter-

est, within 60 days, if the demand is in judgment and the time

allowed for a stay has expired; or gives bond, with sufficient

sureties, that he will not assign or remove his property, where

that is the fraudulent design charged; or gives like bond to

apply within 30 days to the common pleas of the county for the

benefit of the insolvent laws of the state, and to comply with

the requirements of such laws, and, failing to obtain a discharge,

shall surrender himself to the jail again. After having been

committed, he may also be relieved from custody upon judg-

ment being rendered in his favor in the pending suit, or upon

assigning his property and obtaining a discharge in due course,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

or by paying or securing the demand with costs, or upon giving

either of the bonds mentioned as aforesaid. In taking the ben-

efit of the insolvent laws, either before or after commitment,

the defendant is required, as to the matters set forth in his

petition, the notice to be given to creditors, the oath to be ad-

ministered to him, and all things touching his property, to pro-

ceed agreeably to the provisions of the act of June 16, 1836

(P. L. 729), entitled "An act relating to insolvent debtors;"

the trustee to whom the assignment is made being given the

same powers and duties, creditors the same rights and remedies,

a discharge the same effect, and the defendant made liable civilly

and criminally the same as if the provisions relating thereto

were in the warrant of arrest act fully and at length enacted.

Turning to the act of 1836 for a better understanding of these

provisions, it appears that in his petition to the court for the

benefit of the insolvent laws the debtor is to make a statement

under oath of all his property and effects and of the debts he'

owes, giving the names of his creditors, the amounts due to

each of them, the nature of the indebtedness, and the causes of

his insolvency. And a time for a hearing thereon having been

removed, or disposed, or is about to assign, remove, or dispose,
of his property with like fraudulent intent; or that the debt in
suit was fraudulently contracted. And, the defendant havi:1g
been thereupon brought in, if the judge by whom the writ was
allowed is satisfied that the charges made in the affidavit arc
substantiated, and that the defendant has done or is about to
do any of the acts complained of, he shall commit him to the
jail of the county in which the hearing is bad, to be there detained until he shall be discharged by law: provided that he
shall not be committed, if he pays the debt or demand with
costs, or gives satisfactory security to pay the same with interest, within 60 days, if the demand is in judgment and the time
allowed for a stay has expired; or gives bond, with sufficient
sureties, that he will not assign or remove his property, where
that is the fraudulent design charged; or gives like bond to
apply within 30 days to the common pleas of the county for the
benefit of the insolvent laws of the state, and to comply with
the requirements of such laws, and, failing to obtain a discharge,
shall surrender himself to the jail again. After having been
committed, he may also be relieved from custody upon judgment being rendered in his favor in the pending suit, or upon
assigning his property and obtaining a discharge in due course,
or by paying or securing the demand with costs, or upon giving
either of the bonds mentioned as aforesaid. In taking the benefit of the insolvent laws, either before or after commitment,
the defendant is required, as to the matters set forth in his
petition, the notice to be given to creditors, the oath to be administered to him, and all things touching his property, to proceed agreeably to the provisions of the act of June 16, 1836
( P. L. 729), entitled "An act relating to insolvent debtors;"
the trustee to whom the assignment is made being given the
same powers and duties, creditors the same rights and remedies,
a discharge the same effect, and the defendant made liable civilly
and criminally the same as if the provisions relating thereto
were in the warrant of arrest act fully and at length enacted.
Turning to the act of 1836 for a better understanding of thesa
provisions, it appears that in his petition to the court for the
benefit of the insolvent laws the debtor is to make a statement
under oath of all his property and effects and of the debts he owes, giving the names of his creditors, the amounts due to
each of them, the nature of the indebtedness, and the causes of
his insolvency. And a time for a hearing thereon having been
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fixed, and due notice given to creditors, he is thereupon to ex-

hibit to the court a just and true account of his debts, credits,

and estate, producing, if required, his books and papers relating

thereto, and answering all questions that may be put to him

touching the same; and having taken an oath to deliver up all

his possessions, and ^denying any transfer or conveyance in

fraud of creditors, he is to execute an assignment thereof to a

trustee for the benefit of creditors, being thereafter relieved

and discharged from liability to imprisonment by reason of any

judgment or decree for the payment of money or for any debt'

or damages before that contracted, occasioned, or accrued, but

property subsequently acquired is still to be liable, although

after obtaining a discharge it may, by order of court, on con-

sent of a majority in number and value of creditors, be made

exempt from execution for seven years as to any previously

existing debt or cause of action. It is further made the duty

of the trustee to collect and convert the property so turned

over to him, and, having accounted therefor, to distribute the

same to creditors, under the direction of the court, upon due

proof made of their respective claims. This in a general way

was the system of insolvency prevailing at the time the act of

1842, authorizing a warrant of arrest was passed. More recently

by act of June 4, 1901 (P. L. 406), there has been a revision
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and amplification of the law, modifying in some respects the

provisions of the act of 1836 which is in terms repealed; but,

being in the main the same, the most important difference being

that voluntary assignments for the benefit of creditors, as well

as those made after arrest upon civil process are provided for,

and that creditors, upon accepting a dividend from the insolvent

estate, are required to execute releases. So stood the law at the

time the warrant of arrest in the case in hand was issued.

That, under the circumstances and subject to the condi-

tions named in the statute, the right to such a warrant exists in

the federal, the same as in the state courts, there can be no

serious question. As a remedy by execution to reach the prop-

erty of the debtor given by the state law, it either is carried

into the federal law, as provided by § 916 of the Revised Statutes

[U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 684] ; or, being sanctioned by the state

statute and so being agreeable to the usages and principles of

law, it is to be regarded as a writ, which, although not specifically

provided for by act of Congress, is capable of being adopted as

necessary for the full and complete exercise of the jurisdiction

fixe<l, and due 11otiee givc11 to creditors, he is thercupo11 to exhibit to the court a just and true account of his debts, eredits,
and estate, producing, if required, his books and papers relating
thereto, and answering all questions that may lie put to him
touching the same; and having taken an oath to deliver up all
his possessions, and ~denying any transfer or conveyanee in
fraud of creditors, be is to execute an assignment thereof to a
trustee for the benefit of creditors, beiug thereafter relieved
and discharged from liability to imprisonment by reason of any
judgment or decree for the payment of money or for any debt
or damages before that contracted, occasioned, or accrued, but
property subsequently acquired is still to be liable, although
after obtaining a discharge it may, by order of court, on consent of a majority in number and value of creditors, be made
exempt from execution for seven years as to any previously
existing debt or cause of action. It is further made the duty
of the trustee to collect and convert the property so turned
over to him, and, having accounted therefor, to distribute the
same to creditors, under the direction of the court, upon due
proof made of their respective claims. This in a general way
was the system of insolvency prevailing at the time the act of
1842, authorizing a warrant of arrest was passed. More recently
by act of June 4, 1901 (P. L. 406), there has been a revision
and amplification of the law, modifying in some respects the
provisions of the act of 1836 which is in terms repealed; but,
being in the main the same, the most important differene,e being
that voluntary assignments for the benefit of 'Creditors, as well
as those made after arrest upon civil process are provided for,
and that creditors, upon accepting a dividend from the insolvent
estate, are required to execute releases. So stood the law at the
time the warrant of arrest in the case in hand was issued..
That, under the circumstances and subject to the conditions named in the statute, the right to such a warrant exists in
the federal, the same as in the state courts, there can be no
serious question. As a remedy by execution to reach the property of the debtor given by the state law, it either is carried
into the federal law, as provided by§ 916 of the Revised Statutes
[U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p . 684] ; or, being sanctioned by the state
statute and so being agreeable to the usages and principles of
law, it is to be regarded as a writ, which, although not specifically
provided for by act of Congress, is capable of being adopted as
necessary for the full and complete exercise of the jurisdiction
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of the federal courts, within the meaning of section 716. It

stands in fact much the same as a capias ad satisfaciendum, of

which it may be considered as only another form. Wayman v.

Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 253; Bank v. Halstead, 10

Wheat. 51, 6 L. ed. 264; Ex parte Boyd, 105 U. S. 647, 26 L. ed.

1200; Lamaster v. Keeler, 123 U. S. 376, 8 Sup. Ct. 197, 31 L. ed.

238; U. S. v. Arnold, 69 Fed. 987, 16 C. C. A. 575; Stroheim

v. Deimel, 77 Fed. 802, 23 C. C. A. 467. Of course, it goes into

the federal law, if at all, with all its essential incidents, and

the method of procedure marked out with regard to it by the

state statute has therefore to be substantially followed. And

the defendant, after having been taken into custody, and being

about to be committed, having the right, as a part of it, to be

released upon giving bond to take the benefit of the insolvent

laws, or at least agreeably to the provisions of these laws, if this

right is to be regarded as inhering in the remedy, and has been

taken away by the passage of the bankruptcy act, as argued,

without anything else being supplied, the right to the writ itself

is also therewith necessarily abrogated.

That the right to relief agreeably to the insolvent laws of the

state, either before or after commitment, inheres in the remedy,

can hardly be doubted. This alternative is expressly given
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by the statute; it being declared that the defendant, upon the

facts on which the writ is predicated having been found against

him, shall not be committed, if he shall enter into a bond to the

plaintiff to apply within 30 days for the benefit of these laws,

and .shall comply in all respects with their requirements; or,

in default thereof and failing to obtain a discharge, shall sur-

render himself into custody again. It must be assumed that the

Legislature, in allowing the writ, would not have sanctioned it

upon any other terms; and the measure of relief which is so

afforded being thus in contemplation, as an essential part of the

proceedings, they are left incomplete and dismembered without

it. In this respect, it differs from the case of a ca. sa. the right

to be discharged from custody, which is there given by resort

to the insolvent laws, being a separate and independent statutory

provision, as to which, if it is taken away or suspended by the

passage of a bankruptcy act, the defendant is simply left with-

out the opportunity to be released which would otherwise be

afforded him. Steelman v. Mattix, 36 N. J. Law, 344; In re

Rank, Crabbe, 493, Fed. Cas. No. 11,566. It is to be noted, how-

ever, that these observations do not apply where the fraudulent

of the federal courts, within the meaning of section 716. It
stands in fact much the same as a capias ad satisfacie·nd11m, of
which it may be considered as only another form. Wayman v.
Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 253; Bank v. Hal.Btead, 10
Wheat. 51, 6 L. ed. 264; Ex parte Boyd, 105 U. S. 647, 26 L. ed.
1200; Lamaster v. Keeler, 123 U. S. 376, 8 Sup. Ct. 197, 31 L. eJ.
238; U. S. v. Arnold, 69 Fed. 987, 16 C. C. A. 575; Stroheim
v. Deimel, 77 Fed. 802, 23 C. C. A. 467. Of course, it goes into
the federal law, if at all, with all its essential incidents, and
the method of procedure marked out with regard to it by the
state statute has therefore to be substantially followed . And
the defendant, after having been taken into custody, and being
about to be committed, having the right, as a part of it, to be
released upon giving bond to take the benefit of the insolvent
laws, or at least agreeably to the provisions of these laws, if this
right is to be regarded as inhering in the remedy, and has been
taken away by the passage of the bankruptcy act, as argued,
without anything else being supplied, the right to the writ itself
is also therewith necessarily abrogated.
That the right to relief agreeably to the insolvent laws of the
state, either before or a.fter commitment, inheres in the remedy,
can hardly be doubted. This alternative is expressly given
by the statute; it being declal"ed that the defendant, upon the
facts on which the writ is predicated having been found against
him, shall not be committed, if he shall enter into a bond to the
plaintiff to apply within 30 days for the benefit of these laws,
and ,shall comply in all respects with their requirements; or,
in default thereof and failing to obtain a discharge, shall surrender himself into custody again. It must be assumed that the
Legislature, in allowing the writ, would not have sanctioned it
upon any other terms ; and the measure of relief which is so
afforded being thus in contemplation, as an essential part of the
proceedings, they are left incomplete and dismembered without
it. In this respect, it differs from the case of a ca. sa. the right
to be discharged from custody, which is there given by resort
to the insolvent laws, being a separate and independent statutory
provision, as to which, if it is taken away or suspended by the
passage of a bankruptcy act, the defendant is simply left without the opportunity to be released which would otherwise be
afforded him. Steelman v. Mattix, 36 N .•J. Law, 344; In re
Rank, Crabbe, 493, Fed. Cas. No. 11,566. It is to be noted, however, that these observations do not apply where the fraudulent
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design charged, upon which the warrant of arrest is allowed, is

that the defendant is about to remove his property out of the

jurisdiction of the court with intent to defraud his creditors;

the alternative, in order to escape commitment, where that is

the fact, being simply that he shall give bond not to remove it

nor to prefer other creditors. Neither are they applicable where

the defendant gives security to pay the debt or demand with

interest and costs, within 60 days if it is in judgment and the

time for a stay has expired, or, if not in judgment, within a

like period after it shall have been recovered, in either of which

cases the superseding of the insolvent laws by a bankruptcy law

is of no consequence, and the right to the writ therefore as to

them is beyond controversy.

It is also, of course, unquestioned that state insolvency laws,

whether a discharge of the debtor from his liabilities is thereby

provided for or not, are superseded and suspended by the pas-

sage of a federal bankruptcy law; the authority of Congress on

the subject being paramount. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4

Wheat. 122, 4 L. ed. 529; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213,

6 L. ed. 606; Tua v. Carriere, 117 U. S. 201, 6 Sup. Ct. 565, 29

L. ed. 855; In re Salmon (D. C.) 143 Fed. 395; In re Interna-

tional Coal Mining Co., 143 Fed. 665; Harbaugh v. Costello,

184 Ill. 110, 56 N. E. 363, 75 Am. St. Rep. 147; Parmenter Mfg.
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Co. v. Hamilton, 172 Mass. 178, 51 N. E. 529, 70 Am. St. Rep.

258; In re Reynolds, 8 R. I. 485, 5 Am. Rep. 615; Potts v.

Smith Mfg. Co., 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 206. Only, however, as the

two conflict, is this true, and it is only, .therefore, where the

bankruptcy law covers and supplies that which is undertaken

to be disposed of by the state law, that the latter must give way.

It does not apply, for instance, to voluntary assignments for

the benefit of creditors, although forming a part of the general

insolvency system of the state and regulated to a certain extent

by statute; it being held that, as these are good at common law,

they are to be carried out and given effect unless they are

directly called in question by a petition in bankruptcy. Mayer

v. Hellman, 91 U. S. 496, 23 L. ed. 377; Boese v. King, 108

U. S. 379, 2 Sup. Ct. 765, 27 L. ed. 760; Beck v. Parker, 85 Pa.

262, 3 Am. Rep. 625; Reed v. Taylor, 32 Iowa, 209, 7 Am. Rep.

180; In re Sievers (D. C.) 91 Fed. 366. The same is true, also,

of proceedings given by statute to wind up the affairs of an

insolvent corporation by the appointment of a receiver (In re

Watts & Sachs, 190 II. S. 1, 23 Sup. Ct . 718, 47 L. ed. 933; In

design charged, upon which the warrant of arrest is ~lowed, is
that the defendant is about to remove his property out of the
jurisdiction of the court with intent to defraud his creditors;
the alternative, in order to escape commitment, where that is
the fact, beipg simply that he shall give bond uot to remove it
nor to prefer other creditors. Neither are they applicable where
the defendant gives security to pay the debt or demand with
interest and costs, within 60 days if it is in judgment and the
time for a stay has expired, or, if not in judgment, within a
like period after it shall have been recovered, in either of which
cases the superseding of the insolvent laws by a bankruptcy law
is of no consequence, and the right to the writ therefore as to
them is beyood controversy.
It is also, of course, unquestioned that state insolvency laws,
whether a discharge of the debtor from his liabilities is thereby
provided for or not, are superseded and suspended by the passage of a federal bankruptcy law; the authority of Congress on
the subject being paramount. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4
'Vheat. 122, 4 L. ed. 529; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213,
6 L. ed. 606; Tua. v. Carriere, 117 U. S. 201, 6 Sup. Ct. 565, 29
L. ed. 855; In re Salmon (D. C.) 143 Fed. 395; In re International Coal Mining Co., 143 Fed. 665; Harbaugh v. Costello,
184 Ill. 110, 56 N. E. 363, 75 Am. St. Rep. 147; Parmenter Mfg.
Co. v. Hamilton, 172 Mass. 178, 51 N. E. 529, 70 Am. St. Rep.
258; In re Reynolds, 8 R. I. 485, 5 Am. Rep. 615; Potts v.
Smith Mfg. Co., 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 206. Only, however, as the
two conflict, is this true, and it is only, .therefore, where the
bankruptcy law covers and supplies that which is und('rtaken
to be disposed of by the state law, that the latter must give way.
It does not apply, for instance, to voluntary assignments for
the benefit of creditors, although forming a part of the general
insolvency system of the state and regulated to a certain extent
by statute; it being held that, as these are good at common law,
they are to be carried out and given effect unless they are
directly called in question by a petition in bankruptcy. Mayer
v. Hellman, 91 U. S. 496, 23 L. ed. 377; Boese v. King, 108
U. S. 379, 2 Sup. Ct. 765, 27 L. ed. 760; Beck v. Parker, 85 Pa.
262, 3 Am. Rep. 625; Reed v. Taylor, 32 Iowa, 209, 7 Am. Rep.
180; In re Sievers (D. C.) 91 Fed. 366. The same is true, also,
of proceedings given by statute to wind up the affairs of an
insolvent corporation by the appointment of a receiver (In re
Watts & Sachs, 190 U. S. 1, 23 Sup. Ct. 718, 47 L. ed. 933; In
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re Wilmington Hosiery Co. [D. C] 120 Fed. 180); and so is it

as to debts and claims which are not discharged by bankruptcy

(Scully v. Kirkpatrick, 79 Pa. 324, 21 Am. Rep. 62; Hubert v.

Horter, 81 Pa. 39; Ex parte Winternitz, 18 Pittsb. Leg. J.

[N. S.] 61); as well as to those persons whose debts do not ag-

gregate the requisite amount (Shepardson's App., 36 Conn.

23) ; or who are not subject to proceedings, such as wage-earners,

farmers, and corporations not made specifically liable (Ritten-

house's Estate, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 468). Neither, as it has been

held, does the existing bankruptcy law meet the case of an ab-

sconding debtor, so as to prevent the issuing of a domestic

attachment. McCullough v. Goodhart, 8 Dist. (Pa.) 378. Poor

debtor laws, and those which provide for the release of insolvent

convicts, would seem to be in the same situation; the bankruptcy

law having no provision adapted to these cases, and the parties

to whom they apply being, otherwise, left without remedy. Jor-

dan v. Hall, 9 R. I. 219, 11 Am. Rep. 245. And, notwithstand-

ing the concession made above, not a little could also be said in

favor of those insolvent laws, such as the act of 1836, which

merely provide means for relieving from custody a debtor who

has been arrested upon civil process without undertaking to

discharge him from his liabilities. Steelman v. Mattix, 36 N. J.
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Law, 344; In re Rank, Crabbe, 493, Fed. Cas. No. 11,566; Sulli-

van v. Hieskell, Crabbe, 525, Fed. Cas. No. 13,594. Subject to

these exceptions, however, but without losing sight of their sig-

nificance, the insolvent laws of a state being rendered inopera-

tive by an existing federal bankruptcy law, those of Pennsyl-

vania must be regarded as no longer in force, with all the at-

tendant consequences, whether the act of 1836 or that of 1901

be taken to represent them.

But it by no means follows that the right to a warrant of

arrest such as is now in controversy is thereby disposed of. The

state insolvency system which is superseded by the enactment

by Congress of a bankruptcy law is one thing, and the relief

accorded to a debtor in custody under a warrant of arrest,

agreeably to its provisions, is another, and the two are not to

be confounded. The debtor, in other words, secures a release,

not by virtue of the insolvent laws, but simply in conformity

with them; that is to say, by following the course which is there

marked out, the one statute, so far as it is applicable, being

written into the other. How far in this respect the act of 1901

takes the place of the act of 1836, which has been repealed by

re Wilmington Hosiery Co. [D. C.] 120 Fed. 180) ; and so is it
as to debts and claims which are not discharged by bankruptcy
(Scully v. Kirkpatrick, 79 Pa. 324, 21 Am. Rep. 62; Hubert v.
Horter, 81 Pa. 39; Ex parte Winternitz, 18 Pittsb. Leg. J.
[N. S.] 61); as well as to those persons whose debts do not aggregate the requisite amount (Shepardson's App., 36 Conn.
23); or who are not subject to proceedings, such as wage-earners,
farmers, and corporations not made specifically liable (Rittenhouse 's Estate, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 468). Neither, as it has been
held, does the existing bankruptcy law meet the case of an absconding debtor, so as to prevent the issuing of a domestic
attachment. 1\IcCullough v. Goodhart, 8 Dist. (Pa.) 378. Poor
debtor laws, and those which provide for the release of insolvent
convicts, would seem to be in the same situation; the bankruptcy
law having no provision adapted to these cases, and the parties
to whom they apply being, otherwise, left without remedy. Jordan v. Hall, 9 R. I. 219, 11 Am. Rep. 245. And, notwithstanding the concession made above, not a little could also be said in
favor of those insolvent laws, such as the act of 1836, which
·merely provide means for relieving from custody a debtor who
has been arrested upon civil process without undertaking to
discharge him from his liabilities. Steelman v. Mattix, 36 N. J .
Law, 344; In re Rank, Crabbe, 493, Fed. Cas. No. 11,566; Sullivan v. Hieskell, Crabbe, 525, Fed. Cas. No. 13,594. Subject to
these exceptions, however, but without losing sight of their significance, the insolvent laws of a state being rendered inoperative by an existing federal bankruptcy law, those of Pennsylvania must be regarded as no longer in force, with all the attendant consequences, whether the act of 1836 or that of 1901
be taken to represent them.
But it by no means follows that the right to a warrant of
arrest such as is now in controversy is thereby disposed of. The
state insolvency system which is superseded by the enactment
by Congress of a bankruptcy law is one thing, and the relief
accorded to a debtor in custody under a warrant of arrest,
agreeably to its provisions, is another, and the two are not to
be confounded. The debtor, in other words, secures a release,
not by virtue of the insolvent laws, but simply in conformity
with them; that is to say, by following the course which is there
marked out, the one statute, so far as it is applicable, being
written into the other. How far in this respect the act of 1901
takes the place of the act of 1836, which has been repealed by
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it, it is not important to inquire. Whichever be taken, having

been made a constituent part of the act of 1842, the right

thereby secured to a debtor in custody under a warrant of ar-

rest, either before or after commitment, is preserved and re-

tained and made available to him without regard to the fate of

the insolvent laws as such, whether suspended or repealed, being

in effect independent of them. I do not lose sight of the fact

that the bond, which the defendant is to give, is in terms to take

the benefit of these laws and to comply with their requirements,

and that the petition which he is to present to the court for leave

to do so is to set forth what is directed by the act of 1836, and to

he verified in accordance with it. But a careful reading of the

act of 1842 (§§ 14, 15, 16) will disclose that this amounts to no

more than an adoption of the course to be pursued and the steps

to be taken by the act referred to; the reference over being

made for the sake of convenience merely and to avoid unneces-

sary repetition.. Suppose, for example, that the provisions of

the act of 1836 had been written into the act of 1842 at length

—as by express declaration is in effect the case—and it was

there enacted, as now, that upon complaint being made of any

of the several matters, upon which the writ is allowable, a war-

rant should go out, and upon the defendant being brought in

and the facts found against him, he should be committed, to be
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released, however, upon giving bond that within 30 days he

would petition the court for leave to assign his property for the

benefit of creditors to be administered and distributed under

the direction of the court; and so on, according to all that is

provided for. Can there be any serious question that the war-

rant as so authorized could issue, regardless of whether or not

the state insolvent laws from which these provisions had been

taken had been superseded by an act on the subject of bank-

ruptcy? And yet that in effect is the situation here. Or, to

put it in another form, the act of 1842, in adopting and incor-

porating into itself, as an alternative of the proceedings upon

the warrant, the course marked out by the insolvent laws for

the relief of a failing debtor, is not thereby made a part of the

insolvency system of the state, nor so tied up to it as to be ob-

noxious to an existing bankruptcy law and be nullified thereby.

A petition in bankruptcy, duly prosecuted, is no doubt effective

to avoid the proceedings. Barber v. Rogers, 71 Pa. 362. But

the statute by which the warrant is given is no more affected

by the bankruptcy law itself, and is no more incompatible with

H. & A. Bankruptcy—3

it, it is not important to inquire. Whichever be taken, having
been made a constituent part of the act of 1842, the right
thereby secured to a debtor in custody under a warrant of arrest, either before or after commitment, is preserved and retained and made available to him without regard to the fate of
the insolvent laws as such, whether suspended or repealed, being
in effect independent of them. I do not lose sight of the fact
that the bond, which the defendant is to give, is in terms to take
the benefit of these laws and to comply with their requirements,
and that the petition which he is to present to the court for leave
to do so is to set forth what is directed by the act of 1836, and to
he Yerified in accordance with it. But a careful reading of the
act of 1842 ( §§ 14, 15, 16) will disclose that this amounts to no
more than an adoption of the course to be pursued and the steps
to be taken by the act referred to; the refere nee over being
made for the sake of convenience merely and to a.void unnecessary repetition. _ Suppose, for example, that the provisions of
the act of 1836 had been written into the act of 1842 at length
-as by express declaration is in effect the case-and it was
there enacted, as now, that upon complaint being made of any
of the several matters, upon which the writ is allowable, a warrant should go out, and upon the defendant being brought in
and the facts found against him, he should be committed, to be
released, however, upon giving bond that within 30 days he
would petition the court for leave to assign his property for the
benefit of creditors to be administered and distributed under
the direction of the court; and so on, according to all that is
provided for. Can there be any serious question that the warrant as so authorized could issue, regardless of whether or not
the state insolvent laws from which these provisions had been
taken had been superseded by an act on the subject of bankruptcy T And yet that in eft'ect is the situation here. Or, to
put it in another form, the act of 1842, in adopting and incorporating into itself, as an alternative of the proceedings upon
the warrant, the course marked out by the insolvent laws for
the relief of a failing debtor, is not thereby made a part of the
insolvency system of the state, nor so tied up to it as to he obnoxious to an existing bankruptcy law and be nullified thereby.
A p<'tition in bankruptcy, duly prosecuted, is no doubt effective
to avoid the proceedings. Barber v. Rogers, ·71 Pa. 362. Rut
the statute by which the warrant is given is no more affected
by the bankruptcy law itself, and is no more incompatible with
H. A A. Bankruptcy-a
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it—aside from the question of getting a preference—than is that

which sanctions a capias or any other execution process to reach

the person or property of the debtor of which it is only an addi-

tional and special form.

This disposes of the case; but there is another ground upon

which the right to the writ may be sustained. As pointed out

above, a warrant of arrest, being authorized by the statutes of

the state, must be regarded as agreeable to the usages of law;

and, being necessary to a complete exercise of the court's juris-

diction, is capable of being adopted, although not specifically

provided for by any federal statute. Eev. St. § 716 [U. S. Comp.

St. 1901, p. 580]. But in incorporating it into the federal law

the court is only called upon to preserve the substance; and if,

as argued, notwithstanding the views expressed above, the insol-

vent laws of the state are superseded and the defendant thereby

deprived of the right to resort to them which he would other-

wise have as a means of being relieved from custody, the bank-

ruptcy law by which this is brought about may well be looked

to, to supply what is lacking. It is equally effective and entirely

appropriate, the commitment of the defendant being merely

until he shall be discharged .by law; and is even more readily

available, no bond being required nor anything in fact but the
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filing of a proper petition. Proceedings in bankruptcy also

undoubtedly do away with the necessity for taking the benefit

of the insolvent laws, although a bond may have been given

by the defendant to do so. Nesbit v. Greaves, 6 Watts & S.

(Pa.) 120; Barber v. Rogers, 71 Pa. 362. And why, then, may

not a complete substitute be found in them? The writ is to

be saved, if possible; and, if it can be done by falling back

upon the bankruptcy law in this way, there is no reason why

the practice should not to that extent be modified, not only in

the federal, but in the state courts as well, it being desirable,

of course, if not indeed necessary, that the two should be in

harmony. It is true that a resort to bankruptcy would not

release the defendant where the debt or demand upon which

the warrant of arrest was predicated was not dischargeable.

Scully v. Kirkpatrick, 79 Pa. 324, 21 Am. Rep. 62; Hubert v.

Horter, 81 Pa. 39; In re Winternitz, 18 Pittsb. Leg. J. (N. S.)

61. But in that case the right to the benefit of the insolvent

laws would not be interfered with, and there is no occasion there-

fore to consider it. * • *

The rule to show cause why the warrant of arrest should not

it-aside from the question of getting a preference-than is that
which sanctions a capias or any other execution process to reach
the person or property of the debtor of which it is only an additional and special form.
This disposes of the case ; but there is another ground upon
which the right to the writ may be sustained. As pointed out
above, a warrant of arrest, being authorized by the statutes of
the state, must be regarded as agreeable to the usages of law ;
and, being necessary to a complete exercise of the court's jurisdiction, is capable of being adopted, although not specifically
provided for by any federal statute. Rev. St. § 716 [U. S. Comp.
St. 1901, p. 580]. But in incorporating it into the federal law
the court is only called upon to preserve the substance ; and jf,
as argued, notwithstanding the views expressed above, the insolvent laws of the state are superseded and the defendant thereby
deprived of the right to resort to them which he would otherwise have as a means of being relieved from custody, the bankruptcy law by which this is brought about may well be looked
to, to supply what is lacking. It is equally effective and entirely
appropriate, the commitment of the defendant being merely
until he shall be discharged .by law; and is even more readily
available, no bond being required nor anything in fact but the
filing of a proper petition. Proceedings in bankruptcy also
undoubtedly do away with the necessity for taking the benefit
of the insolvent laws, although a bond may have been given
by the defendant to do so. Nesbit v. Greaves, 6 Watts & S.
(Pa.) 120; Barber v. Rogers, 71 Pa. 362. And why, then, may
not a complete substitute be found in them T The writ is to
be saved, if possible; and, if it can be done by falling back
upon the be.nkruptcy law in this way, there is no reason why
the practice should not to that extent be modified, not only in
the federal, but in the state courts as well, it being desirable,
of course, if not indeed necessary, that the two should be in
harmony. It is true that a resort to bankruptcy would not
release the defendant where the debt or demand upon which
the warrant of arrest was predicated was not dischargeable.
Scully v. Kirkpatrick, 79 Pa. 324, 21 Am. Rep. 62; Hubert v.
Horter, 81 Pa. 39; In re Winternitz, 18 Pittsb. Leg. J. (N. S.)
61. But in that case the right to the benefit of the insolvent
laws would not be interfered with, and there is no occasion therefore to consider it. • • •
The rule to show cause why the warrant of arrest should not
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be quashed is discharged; and thereupon the defendant is com-

mitted to the common jail of Lycoming county, at Williamsport,

Pa., to be there detained until he shall be discharged by law.

I

OLD TOWN BANK OF BALTIMORE v. McCORMICK et al.

be quashed is discharged; and thereupon the defendant is committed to the common jail of Lycoming county, at Williamsport,
Pa.., to be there detained until he shall be discharged by law.

96 Md. 341, 53 Atl. 934

(Court of Appeals of Maryland. January 21, 1903)

FOWLER, J. This is an appeal from the circuit court for

OLD TOWN BANK OF BALTIMORE v. McCORMICK et al.

Harford county. On the 22d May, 1901, the Old Town Bank of

Baltimore filed a petition in insolvency against J. Lawrence

96 Md. 341, 53 Atl. 934

McCormick and others under the provisions of article 47, § § 22,

23, of our Code, relating to insolvents, as amended by the Act

(Court of Appeals of Maryland. January 21, 1903)

of 1896, c. 446. The defendants each pleaded to the jurisdiction

of the court. Their pleas are identical. The plea is as follows:

"(1) That this court has no jurisdiction in these proceedings,

because the insolvency laws of the state of Maryland have been

suspended, superseded, or rendered inoperative by the passage

of a national bankrupt law by the congress of the United States,

and this defendant pleads the said bankrupt law in bar of the

jurisdiction of this court in the premises." The plaintiff bank

demurred to these pleas, but the learned judge below over-

ruled the demurrers, and his certificate states the question raised

and decided on the demurrers as follows: "That the enactment
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of the act of congress approved July 1, 1893 [U. S. Comp. St.

1901, p. 3418], entitled 'An act to establish a uniform system ef

bankruptcy throughout the United States,' and supplements

and additions thereto, suspended the operation of article 47 of

the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland of 1888, entitled

'Insolvents,' and all amendments thereof, and especially sus-

pended the operation of § 22, (as repealed and amended by the

act of 1896, c. 446), and § 23 thereof, including the operation of

said article on persons 'engaged chiefly in farming and tillage of

the soil,' and the class of persons to which the defendant J.

Lawrence McCormick is alleged in the petition to belong, and

that this court is without jurisdiction to grant any of the relief

prayed for in said petition." From the order dismissing its

petition, the plaintiff has appealed. The issue thus presented

is clear and well defined. The defendants contend that the

enactment of the national bankrupt act suspended the operation

of the whole insolvent law of this state, while the plaintiff

FOWLER, J. This is an appeal from the circuit court for
Harford county. On the 22d May, 1901, the Old Town Bank of
Baltimore filed a petition in insolvency against J. Lawrence
McCormick and others under the provisions of article 47, § § 22,
23, of our Code, relating to insolvents, as amended by the Act
of 1896, c. 446. The defendants each pleaded to the jurisdiction
of the court. Their pleas are identical. The plea is as follows:
"(1) That this court bas no jurisdiction in these proceedings,
because the insolvency laws of the state of Maryland have been
suspended, superseded, or rendered inoperative by the passage
of a national bankrupt law by the congress of the United States,
and this defendant pleads the said bankrupt law in bar of the
jurisdiction of this court in the premises.'' The plaintiff bank
demurred to these pleas, but the learned judge below overruled the demurrers, and bis certificate states the question raised
and decided on the demurrers as follows: ''That the enactment
of the act of congress approved July 1, 1898 [U. S. Comp. St.
1901, p. 3418], entitled 'An act to establish a uniform system of
bankruptcy throughout the United States,' and supplements
and additions thereto, suspended the operation of article 47 of
the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland of 1888, entitled
'Insolvents,' and all amendments thereof, and especially suspended the operation of § 22, (as repealed and amended by the
act of 1896, c. 446), a\ld § 23 thereof, including the operation of
said article on persons 'engaged chiefly in farming and tillage of
the soil, 1 and the class of persons to which the defenclant J.
Lawrence McCormick is alleged in the petition to belong, and
that this court is without jurisdiction to grant any o.f the relief
prayed for in said petition.'' From the order dismissing its
petition, the plaintiff bas appealed. T.he issue thus presented
is clear and well defined. The defendants contend that the
enactment of the national bankrupt act suspended the operation
of the whole insolvent law of this state, while the plaintiff
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maintains the position that the passage of this national law by

congress suspends the operation of our insolvent law only so far

as our law conflicts with the national law, and that, inasmuch

as the present bankrupt law (act of congress of 1898 [U. S. Comp.

St. 1901, p. 3418]) contains no provision for involuntary bank-

ruptcy of persons engaged chiefly in the tillage of the soil, the

provisions of our state insolvent law, so far as they apply to that

excepted class, remain in full force and effect. The question

presented must depend, in the first place, upon the provisions

of the bankrupt law applicable here. § 4, "Who may become

bankrupts," subsection (a), provides that "any person who

owes debts, except a corporation, shall be entitled to the benefits

of this act as a voluntary bankrupt." And by subsection (b)

it is enacted that "any natural person, except a wage earner or a

person engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of the soil

* * * may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt upon de-

fault or an impartial trial, and shall be subject to the provi-

sions and entitled to the benefits of this act. • * •"

1. From the year 1819, when Chief Justice Marshall delivered

the opinion of the supreme court of the United States in the

leading case of Sturges v. Crowninshield, reported in 4 Wheat.

122, 4 L. ed. 529, it has been held that the provision of the con-
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stitution of the United States (article 1, § 8, subd. 4) providing

that "congress shall have power to establish uniform laws on the

subject of bankruptcy," does not in itself inhibit the states from

passing valid insolvent laws. In the case just cited it was said:

"It is not the mere existence of the power, but its exercise, which

is incompatible with the exercise of the same power by the

states.'' And so, also, there has been a uniform line of decisions

to the effect that, so far as congress has failed to legislate with

reference to insolvents, state laws relating to them are operative.

Thus, in Sturges v. Crowninshield, supra, it is said that "if it

is not the mere existence of the power, but its actual exercise by

the congress of the United States, which prevents the operation

of state insolvent laws, it is obvious that much inconvenience

would result from that construction of the constitution which

should deny to the legislatures of the states the power of acting

on this subject in consequence of the grant to congress." "It

may be thought more convenient," continued the court, "that

much of it should be regulated by state legislation, and congress

may purposely omit to provide for many cases to which its power

extends. It does not appear to be a violent construction of the

maintains the position that the passage of this national law by
congress suspends the operation of our insolvent law only so far
as our law conflicts with the national law, and that, inasmuch
as the present bankrupt law (act of congress of 1898 [U.S. Comp.
St. 1901, p. 3418]) contains no provision for involuntary bankruptcy of persons engaged chiefly in the tillage of the soil, the
provisions of our state insolvent law, so far as they apply to that
excepted class, remain in full force aud effect. The question
presented must depend, in the first place, upon the provisions
of the bankrupt law applicable here. § 4, "Who may become
bankrupts," subsection (a), provides that "any person who
owes debts, except a corporation, shall be entitled to the benefits
of this act as a voluntary bankrupt." And by subsection (b)
it is enacted that ''any natural person, except a wage earner or a
person engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of the soil
• • • may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt upon default or an impartial trial, and shall be subject to the provisions and entitled to the benefits of this act. • • • ''
1. From the year 1819, when Chief Justice Marshall delivered
the opinion of the supreme court of the United States in the
le~ding case of Sturges v. Crowninshield, reported in 4 Wheat.
l 22, 4 L. ed. 529, it has been held that the provision of the constitution of the United States (article 1, § 8, subd. 4) providing
that" congress shall have power to establish uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcy," does not in itself inhibit the states from
passing valid insolvent laws. In the case just cited it was said:
"It is not the mere existence of the power, but its exercise, which
is incompatible with the exercise of the same power by the
states." And so, also, there has been a uniform line of decisions
to the effect that, so far as congress has failed to legislate with
reference to insolvents, state laws relating to them are operative.
Thus, in Sturges v. Crowninshield, supra, it is said that "if it
is not the mere existence of the power, but its actual exercise by
the congress of the United States, which prevents the operation
of state insolvent laws, it is obvious that much inconvenience
would result from that construction of the constitution which
should deny to the legislatures of the states the power of acting
on this subject in consequence of the grant to congress." "It
may be thought more convenient,'' continued the court, ''that
much of it should be regulated by state legislation, and congress
may purposely omit to provide for many cases to which its power
extends. It does not appear to be a violent construction of the
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constitution, and certainly a most convenient one, to consider

the power of the states as existing over such cases as the laws

of the land may not reach." But in Ogden v. Saunders, 12

Wheat. 213, 6 L. ed. 606, the rule is explicitly laid down that

"the power of congress to establish uniform laws on the subject

of bankruptcy does not exclude the rights of the states to legis-

late on the same subject, except when the power has been actually

exercised, and the state laws conflict with those of congress."

And to the same effect are Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 229, 17

L. ed. 531; Tua v. Carriere, 117 U. S. 210, 6 Sup. Ct. 565, 29 L.

ed. 855; Ex parte Eames, 2 Story, 322, Fed. Cas. No. 4,237. In

the recent case of R. H. Herron Co. v. Superior Court of City

and County of San Francisco, decided in April of last year by

the supreme court of California, and reported in 68 Pac. 814,

136 Cal. 279, it was held that, "though the federal bankrupt

acts suspend operation of any state laws of insolvency where

there is any conflict between the two, the state laws remain in

full force in so far as there is no conflict; and as the bankruptcy

act of 1898 expressly exempts all corporations from voluntary

bankruptcy, and only makes subject to involuntary bankruptcy

'corporations engaged principally in manufacturing, trading,

printing, publishing, or mercantile pursuits,' the provisions of

the state law applicable to a corporation engaged principally in
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mining [as was the California corporation] are not suspended."

In the course of its opinion the court said: "If the bankruptcy

act excepts a class of cases from its operation, either in express

terms or by necessary implication, it must be considered that it

was the intention of congress not to interfere in that class of

cases with the laws of the several states in reference thereto.'' A

number of cases are cited by Justice Harrison, who delivered the

opinion of the court, and among them is that of Clarke v. Ray, 1

Har. & J. 318; Chief Justice Chase delivering the opinion of the

court. He said: "The legislatures of the several states have com-

petent authority to pass laws for the relief of all persons who are

not comprehended within the act of congress." See, also, Van

Nostrand v. Carr, 30 Md. 131. It should be remarked, however,

that the situation in the California case just cited somewhat

differs from the one here presented. For there the insolvent

proceeded against under the California insolvent law was ex-,

pressly excepted from the provisions relating to the voluntary

system, and was not included within, and therefore excepted by

implication from the class of corporations made subject to the

constitution, and certainly a u10st convenil•11t one, to consider
the power of the states as existing over such cases as the laws
of the land may not reach." But iu Ogden v. Saunders, 12
Wheat. 213, 6 L. ed. 606, the rule is explicitly laid down that
"the power of congress to establish uniform laws on the subject
of bankruptcy does not exclude the rights of the states to legislate on the same subject, except when the power has been actually
exercised, and the state laws conflict with those of congress.''
And to the same effect are Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 229, 17
L. ed. 531; Tua v. Carriere, 117 U. S. 210, 6 Sup. Ct. 565, 29 L.
ed. 855; Ex parte Eames, 2 Story, 322, Fed. Cas. No. 4,237. In
the recent case of R. H. Herron Co. v. Superior Court of City
and County of San Francisco, decided in April of last year by
the supreme court of California, and reported in 68 Pac. 814,
136 Cal. 279, it was held that, ''though the federal bankrupt
acts suspend operation of any state laws of insolvency where
there is any conflict between the two, the state laws remain in
full force in so far as there is no conflict; and as the bankruptcy
act of 1898 expressly exempts all corporations from voluntary
bankruptcy, and only makes subject to involuntary bankruptcy
'corporations engaged principally in manufacturing, trading,
printing, publishing, or mercantile pursuits,' the provisions of
the state law applicable to a corporation engaged principally in
mining [as was the California corporation] are not suspended.''
In the course of its opinion the court said : "If the bankruptey
act excepts a class of cases from its operation., either in express
terms or by necessary implication, it must be considered that it
was the intention of congress not to interfere in that class of
cases with the laws of the several states in reference thereto.'' A
number of cases are cited by Justice Harrison, who delivered the
opinion of the court, and among them is that of Clarke v. Ray, 1
Har. & J. 318; Chief Justice Chase delivering the opinion of the
court. He said: "The legislatures of the several states have competent authority to pass laws for the relief of all persons who are
not comprehended within the act of congress. '' See, also, Van
Nostrand v. Carr, 30 l\Id. 131. It should be remarked, however,
that the situation iu the California case just cited somewhat
differs from the one· here presented. For there the insolvent
proceeded against under the California insolvent law was ex-.
pressly excepted from the provisions relating to the voluntary
system, and was not included within, and therefore excepted by
implication from the class of corporations made subject to the
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involuntary system, while here the defendant who is sought to

be declared an insolvent under our insolvent law is included

under the general terms of the voluntary system, and expressly

excepted from the involuntary system. See, also, Shepardson's

Appeal, 36 Conn. 23; Geery's Appeal, 43 Conn. 289, 21 Am.

Rep. 653; Steelman v. Mattix, 36 N. J. Law, 344; 16 Am. &

Eng. Enc. Law, 642.

2. This brings us to the real question in the case, namely, is

there any conflict between our insolvent law and the federal

bankrupt law? We have already transcribed the provisions of

§ 4, by which it appears that the defendant is expressly

excepted from the provisions of the act relating to involuntary

bankruptcy, and therefore as to this class to which the defendant

belongs (i. e., farmers or tillers of the soil) the federal power

has not been exercised. And it therefore follows that, if this

class is not within the state law, there is no existing provision

under which those embraced within it can be compelled to dis-

tribute their assets fairly and equally among their creditors.

In Geery's Appeal, supra, it was said: '' The benefit of this

principle [the equal distribution of a debtor's property without

preference] cannot be denied to a creditor without doing him

injustice. It is a remedy which he relied on in giving credit,

and to which he is fairly entitled. If that remedy is not to be
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found in the bankrupt act, it will not be presumed that congress

intended to take away the remedy provided by the state. Con-

gress having limited and restricted the operation of the bank-

rupt act, leaving a number of cases to which it does not apply,

it will not be presumed that it was thereby intended to leave

creditors in such cases entirely without remedy, as must be the

case if the state law is entirely inoperative." But can it be

properly or correctly said that any conflict can exist between

the state and the federal law so long as the latter by express

terms excludes from its operation the subject or class of persons

expressly provided for by the state law? The power to enact

insolvent or bankrupt laws is vested in the states, and it cannot

be extinguished except by the establishment of a federal system

in conflict with the state law. And this federal system of bank-

ruptcy must be a genuine bankrupt law (Sturges v. Crownin-

shield, supra), or, in other words, as expressed in Ogden v.

Saunders, supra, the power to pass a uniform system of bank-

ruptcy must be actually exercised, and the state law must be in

conflict with it in order to render the latter inoperative. The ques-

involuntary system, while here the defendant who is sought to
be declared an insolvent under our insolvent law is included
under the general terms of the voluntary system, and expressly
excepted from the involuntary system. See, also, Shepardson 's
Appeal, 36 Conn. 23; Geery's Appeal, 43 Conn. 289, 21 Am.
Rep. 653; Steelman v. Mattix, 36 N. J. Law, 344; 16 Am. &
Eng. Enc. Law, 642.
2. This brings us to the real question in the case, namely, is
there any conflict between our insolvent law and the federal
bankrupt lawT We have already transcribed the provisions of
§ 4, by which it appears that the defendant is expressly
excepted from the provisions of the act relating to involuntary
bankruptcy, and therefore as to this class to which the defendant
belongs (i. e., farmers or tillers of the soil) the federal power
. has not been exercised. And it therefore follows that, if this
.class is not within the state law, there is no existing provision
under which those embraced within it can be compelled to distribute their assets fairly and equally among their creditors.
In Geery's Appeal, supra, it was said: "The benefit of this
principle [the equal distribution of a debtor's property without
preference] cannot be denied to a creditor without doing him
injustice. It i.s a remedy which he relied on in giving credit,
and to which he is fairly entitled. If that remedy is not to be
found in the bankrupt act, it will not be presumed that congress
intended to take away the remedy provided by the state. Congress having limited and restricted the operation of the bankrupt act, leaving a number of cases to which it does not apply,
it will not be presumed that it was thereby intended to leave
creditors in such cases entirely without remedy, as must be the
case if the state law is entirely inoperative." But can it be
properly Or COITectly said that any conflict can exist between
the state and the federal law so long as the latter by express
terms excludes from its operation the subject or class of persons
expressly provided for by the state law f The power to enact
insolvent or bankrupt laws is vested in the states, and it cannot
be extinguished except by the establishment of a federal system
in conflict with the state law. And this federal system of bankruptcy must be a genuine bankrupt law (Sturges v. Crowninshield, supra) , or, in other words, as expressed in Ogden v.
Saunders, supra, the power to pass a uniform system of bankruptcy must be actually exercised, and the state law must be in
conflict with it in order to render the latter inoperative. The ques-
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tion, therefore, logically arises, does the present federal bankrupt

law actually provide for involuntary proceedings against farm-

ers? And the answer must be that it does not, but the answer of

the defendant goes further and necessarily must do so in order to

save his ease. He says it is true that while this class is not included

in, and is expressly excepted from, the involuntary feature of the

system, yet it is included in the voluntary feature, and therefore

it is within the scope of the national system. We cannot approve

of this method of reasoning, not only because it would seem to

be"a "contradiction in terms to say that cases excepted from the

operation of the most important part of the act are included in

its scope," but because it would seem to involve the proposition

that the federal power can render inoperative the state insolvent

lawft> applicable to involuntary insolvency, without establishing

a genuine bankrupt law to take the place of the state law. As

we have already seen, it has been held from early day that it is

only to the extent that congress has actually legislated upon the

subject that the statutes of the several states are suspended by

its legislation. How, then, can it be said that a failure to legis-

late—in other words, an express exclusion—raises a conflict?

But without pursuing this question further, it seems to us that

the position taken by the defendant must necessarily lead to

the conclusion that if the congress of the United States can, by
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including this class in the voluntary part of the system, and

excepting it from the involuntary part, withdraw it from the

operation of our state insolvent law, it can do the same in regard

to any two or more classes (as, for instance, merchants, traders,

and corporations) ; and the result would be that, in spite of the

failure on the part of congress to establish a bankrupt law (that

is, to actually exercise the power conferred by the constitution

to pass a genuine bankrupt law), state legislation would become

inoperative, and creditors would be deprived of a remedy to

which, as was said in Geery's Appeal, supra, they are fairly

entitled.

But it was forcibly argued on the part of the defendants that

§ 70, subsec. "b," of the bankrupt act of 1898 [U. S. Comp.

St. 1901, p. 3452], shows that it was the intention of congress

to substitute that act for every provision of every insolvent law

of the several states. It provides as follows: "Proceedings

commenced under state insolvent laws before the passage of this

act shall not be affected by it." To sustain their view, the case

of Manufacturing Co. v. Hamilton, 172 Mass. 178, 51 N. E. 529,

tion, therefore, logically arises, does the present federal bankrupt
law actually provide for involuntary proceedings against farmers T And the answer must be that it does not, but the answer of
the defendant goes further and necessarily must do so in order to
save his case. He says it is true that while this class is not included
in, and is expressly excepted from, the involuntary feature of the
system, yet it is included in the voluntary feature, and therefore
it is within the scope of the national system. We cannot approve
of this method of reasoning, not only because it would seem to
be· a ''contradiction in terms to say that cases excepted from the
operation of the most important part of the act are included in
its scope,'' but because it would seem to involve the proposition
that the federal power can render inoperative the state insolvent
laws- applicable to involuntary insolvency, without establishing
a genuine bankrupt law to take the place of the state law. As
we have already seen, it has been held from early day that it is
only to the extent that congress has actually legislated upon the
subject that the statutes of the several states are suspended by
its legislation. How, then, can it be said that a failure to legislate--in other words, an express exclusion-raises a conflict T
But without pursuing this question further, it seems to us that
the position taken by the defendant must necessarily lead to
the conclusion that if the congress of the United States can, by
including this class in the voluntary part of the system, and
excepting it from the involuntary part, withdraw it from the
operation of our state insolvent law, it can do the same in regard
to any two or more classes (as, for instance, merchants, traders,
and corporations) ; and the result would be that, in spite of the
failure on the part of congress to establish a bankrupt law (that
is, to actually exercise the power conferred by the constitution
to pass a genuine bankrupt law), state legislation would become
inoperative, and creditors would be deprived of a remedy to
which, as was said in Geery 's Appeal, supra, they are fairly
entitled.
But it was forcibly argued on the part of the defendants that
§ 70, subsec. "b," of the bankrupt act of 1898 [U. S. Comp.
St. 1901, p. 3452], shows that it was the intention of congress
to substitute that act for every provision of every insolvent law
of the several states. It provides as follows: "Proceedings
commenced under state insolvent laws before the passage of this
act shall not be affected by it.'' To sustain their view, the case
of Manufacturing Co. v. Hamilton, 172 Mass. 178, 51 N. E. 529,
I
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70 Am. St. Rep. 278, decided in 1898, was relied on. But all

this case decides is that the federal act deprives the state court

of jurisdiction to entertain jurisdiction in insolvency proceed-

ings filed after 1st July, 1898, when the federal act went into

force. Or as the court said: "The act is to go into full force

and effect upon its passage. That is to say, the rights of all

persons, in the particulars to which the act refers, are to be

determined by the act from the time of its passage." After

mentioning,a number of the rights which are determined by the

act, the opinion continues: "These various provisions affecting

the rights and conduct of debtors and creditors are different from

those previously existing in most of the states, and perhaps

different from those found in the laws of any state, and they

supersede all con dieting provisions." In the concluding part

of the opinion the distinguished judge who has recently been

appointed chief justice of the supreme judicial court of Massa-

chusetts said that the language of .§ 70, subsee. "b," "was

chosen to make clear the purpose of congress that the new

system of bankruptcy should supersede all state laws in regard

to insolvency from the date of the passage of the act"; but

necessarily this language means only that all conflicting provi-

sions of the state law were thus superseded, for this is the
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well-settled proposition which he had just announced in a

preceding sentence, and which we have quoted above. If, there-

fore, we are correct in the conclusion already reached, that there

is no conflict between the provisions of our insolvent law and

the present bankrupt law, it follows that the language of § 70

relied on by the defendant can have no influence upon our

conclusion in this case.

But again, it was urged that there is a distinction between this

case and cases which arose under laws which did not include the

class within its scope—as, for instance, where the bankrupt act

applied only to debtors whose debts exceeded $300. It was held

in Shepardson's Appeal, supra, that in cases where the debts

were less than $300 the state law was not suspended, and debtors

of that class could be proceeded against under state laws. But

the true rule was laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in Sturges

v. Crowninshield, supra, that the power of the state continues to

exist over such cases as the federal law does not reach. And

therefore, if cases involving involuntary proceedings against a

class are not provided for by the federal law, such cases are

within the reach of the state law, in spite of the fact that the

70 Am. St. Rep. 278, decided in 1898, WJ1S relied on. But all
this case decides is that the federal act deprives the state court
of jurisdiction to entertain jurisdiction in insolvency proceedings filed after 1st July, 1898, when the federal act went into
force. Or as the court said: "The act is to go into full force
and effect upon its passage. That is to say, the rights of all
persons, in the particulars to which tlie act refers, are to be
determined by the act from the time of its passage.'' After
mentioning,a number of the rights which are determined by the
act, the opinion continues: ''These various provisions affecting
the rights and conduct of debtors and creditors are different from
those previously existing in most of the states, and perhaps
different from those found in the laws of any state, and they
supersede all conflicting provisions.'' In the concluding part
of the opinion the distinguished judge who has recently been
appointed chief justice of the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts said that the language of .§ 70, subsec. "b," "was
chosen to make clear the purpose of congress that the new
system of bankruptcy should supersede all state laws in regard
to insolvency from the date of the passage of the act'' ; but
necessarily this language means only that all conflicting provi-sions of the state law were thus superseded, for this is the
well-settled proposition which he had just aunounced in a
preceding sentence, aud which we have quoted above. If, ther<'fore, we are correct in the conclusion already reached, that there
is no conflict between the provisions of our insolvent law and
the present bankrupt law, it follows that the language of § 70
relied on by the defendant can have no influence upon our
conclusion in this case.
But again, it was urged that there is a distinction between this
case and cases which arose under laws which did not include the
class within its scope-as, for instance, where the bankrupt act
applied only to debtors whose debts exceeded $300. It was held
in Shepardson 's Appeal, supra, that in cases where the debts
were less than $300 the state law was not suspended, and debtors
of that class could be proceeded against under state laws. But
the true rule was laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in Sturges
v. Crowninsbield, supra, that the power of the state continues to
exist over such cases as the federal law does not reach. And
th<>refore, if cases involving involuntary proceedings against a
class are not provided for by the federal law, such cases are
within the reach of the state law, in spite of the fact that the
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members of this same class may avail themselves of the voluntary

feature; otherwise the rule laid down by Chief Justice Marshall

would have to be changed so as to read that the power of the

state exists only over such cases as are against natural persons

or corporations not within any class provided for by any provi-

sion of the federal law. If this were the rule, then, of course,

it would follow, as contended, that the defendant being of the

class called "farmers," and the bankrupt act having provided

that he may avail himself of the voluntary feature, no case

against him could be reached by the state law. l But in our

opinion, this is not the proper view, for, as we have already said,

it is not within the power of congress to render inoperative the

involuntary feature of state insolvent laws as to any particular

class by excepting that class from the involuntary part of the

national law. Otherwise the result would be that the state laws

as to involuntary insolvency would become inoperative by the

mere existence of the power of the United States to establish

a system of involuntary bankruptcy. We have seen, however,

that it is not the mere existence, but the exercise of the power

to establish a genuine bankrupt law in conflict with the state

laws, which renders the latter inoperative. Sturges v. Crownin-

sbield, supra.

In conclusion, it may be proper to say that if it is the policy
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of our state to render farmers and tillers of the soil like other

persons subject to the involuntary system of our insolvent law-s,

as it is declared to be by the provisions of our Code (article 47,

§§ 22, 23), we should not by any strained construction of an act

of congress, or by a course of ingenious reasoning, attempt to

thwart this purpose.

From what we have said, it will be seen that we are of opinion

• that the order appealed from should be reversed. Order re-

versed and new trial awarded.2

2—Acc. Burk'a Estate, 34 Pa.

Co. Ct. Bep. 642; Lace v. Smith, 34

R. I. 1, 82 Atl. 268. See, also, note

in 11 Mich. Law Rev. 60.

See, as to the effect of the Fed-

eral Act upon state statutes, in the

cases of:

Persons Owing Less Than $1,000.

—Littlefield v. Gray, 96 Me. 422,

62 Atl. 925.

Corporations (before 1903 amend-

ment of §4b).—Herron & Co. v.

Superior Court, 136 Cal. 279, 68

members of this same class iuay a vuil tht:il•sli V..:s of the voluutary
feature; otherwise the rule laid down by Chief Justice .Marshall
would have to be changed so as to read that tlle power of the
state exists only over such cases as are against natural pcrso11s
or corporations not within auy class provided for by aJJy provision of the federal law. If this were the rule, then, of course,
it would follow, as contended, that the defendant being of the
class called "farmers," and the bankrupt act having provided
that he may avail himself of the voluntary feature, no case
against him could be reached by the state law. 1 But in our
opinion, this is not the proper view, for, as we have already said,
it is not within the power of congress to render inoperative the
involuntary feature of state insolvent laws as to any particular
class by excepting that class from the involuntary part of the
national law. Otherwise the result would be that the state Jaws
as to involuntary insolvency would become inoperative by the
mere existence of the power of the United States to establish
a system of involuntary bankruptcy. We have seen, however,
that it is not the mere existence, but the exercise of the power
to establish a genuine bankrupt law in conflict with the state
laws, which renders the latter inoperative. Sturges v. Crowninshield, supra.
In conclusion, it may be proper to say that if it is the policy
of our state to render farmers and t~llers of the soil like other
persons subject to the involuntary system of our insolvent laws,
as it is declared to be by the provisions of our Code (artiole 47,
§§ 22, 23), we should not by any strained construction of an act
of congress, or by a course of ingenious reasoning, attempt to
thwart this purpose.
From what we have said, it will be seen that we are of opinion
.that the order appealed from should be reversed. Order reversed and new trial awarded. 2

Pac. 814, 89 A. S. R. 124; Key-

stone Co. v. Superior Court, 138 Cal.

738, 72 Pac. 398; In re Hall Co., 121

Fed. 992: (after 1910 amendment of

§ 4b); In re Weedman Stave Co.,

199 Fed. 948.

Building and Loan Associations.

—Kurtz v. Bubeck, 39 Pa. Super.

Ct. Rep. 370; Continental B. & L.
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A. Territorial Jurisdiction

1. NATURAL PERSONS

OF PERSONS

In re PLOTKE

104 Fed. 964, 44 C. C. A. 282

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. November 22,

, 1900)

A.

TERRITORI.AL JURISDICTION

SEAMAN, District Judge. The alleged bankrupt, Emily

Plotke, appeals from an order of the district court whereby she

1.

NATURAL PERSONS

is adjudicated a bankrupt upon a creditors' petition filed May

3, 1899. The petition states that "Emily Plotke has for the

In re PLOTKE

greater portion of six months next preceding the date of filing

this petition had her principal place of business and her domi-

104 Fed. 964, 44 C. C. A. 282

cile at Chicago,'' in said district, and '' owes debts to the amount

of $1,000 and over"; that she is insolvent, and within four

months next preceding "committed an act of bankruptcy," and

on January 3, 1899, made "a general assignment for the benefit

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
1900)

November 22,

of her creditors to one John Poppowitz," which was duly filed

and recorded. The subpoena issued thereupon was returned by

the marshal as served within the district on Emily Plotke, "by

leaving a true copy thereof at her usual place of abode, with

Charles Plotke, an adult person, who is a member of the family.''
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On May 29, 1899, the appellant filed a verified plea, which

reads as follows:

"And the said Emily Plotke, specially limiting her appear-

ance for the purposes of this plea, in her own proper person

comes and defends against the foregoing proceeding, and says

that she has not had her domicile within the territorial limits

and jurisdiction of this court for the six months next preced-

ing the filing of the petition herein, to wit, six months next

preceding May 3, A. D. 1899, nor has she had her domicile

within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of this court as

aforesaid during any part of said period of six months, nor has

Assn. v. Superior Court, 163 Calif. Educational Corporations.—Dille

579, 126 Pae. 476; In re New York v. People, 118 I1L App. 426.

B. & L. Bank, 127 Fed. 471.

SEAMAN, District Judge. The alleged bankrupt, Emily
Plotke, appeals from an order of the district court whereby she
is ad.indicated a bankrupt upon a creditors' petition filed l\lay
3, '1899. The petition states that "Emily Plotke has for the
greater portion of six months next preceding the date of filing
this petition had her principal place of business and her domicile at Chicago,'' in said district, and ''owes debts to the amount
of $1,000 and over'' ; that she is insolvent, and within four
months next preceding "committed an act of bankruptcy," and
on January 3, 1899, made "a general assignment for the benefit
of her creditors to one John Poppowitz, '' which was duly filed
and recorded. The subprena issued thereupon was returned by
the marshal as served within the district on Emily Plotke, ''by
leaving a true copy thereof at her usual place of abode, with
Charles Plotke, an adult person, who is a member of the family. "
On May 29, 1899, the appellant filed a verified plea, which
reads as follows :
''And the said Emily Plotke, specially limiting her appearance for the purposes of this plea, in her own proper person
comes and defends against the foregoing proceeding, and says
that she has not had her domicile within the territorial limits
and jurisdiction of this court for the six months next preceding the filing of the petition herein, to wit, six months next
preceding May 3, A. D. 1899, nor has she had her domicile
within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of this court as
aforesaid during any part of said period of six months, nor has
Assn. v. Superior Court, 163 Calif.
5i9, 126 Pae. 476; In re New York
B. & L. Bank, 127 Fed. 471.

Educational Corporat«ms.-Dille
"· People, 118 Ill App. 426.
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she now her domicile therein, nor has she had her principal

place of business within the territorial limits and jurisdiction of

this court for the greater part of the six months next preced-

ing the filing of the petition herein, to wit, six months next

preceding May 3, A. D. 1899, but that before and at the time of

the riling of the petition herein as aforesaid, on, to wit, May 3,

A. D. 1899, and for more than five years prior thereto, she, the

said Emily Plotke, was, and from thence hitherto has been, and

still is, residing in the city of St. Louis, and the state of Missouri,

and not in the said Northern district of Illinois, and state of

Illinois, and that she, the said Emily Plotke, was not found

or served with process in this said proceeding in said Northern

district of Illinois, or in said state of Illinois. "Wherefore she

says this court is wholly without jurisdiction in the premises,

and this she is ready to verify. Wherefore she prays judgment,

if this court here shall take jurisdiction and cognizance of the

proceedings aforesaid."

The petitioning creditors filed a replication, and the issues

thereupon were referred for hearing to a referee, who reported

the testimony taken, with findings sustaining the plea and recom-

mending that the petition be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The finding was overruled by the district court, and an adjudi-

cation of bankruptcy entered, from which this appeal is brought.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

The record presents two questions, only, under the several

assignments of error: (1) Whether, upon the undisputed facts

shown, the case is within the bankruptcy jurisdiction of the

district court; and (2) whether jurisdiction appears over the

person of the alleged bankrupt.

The first issue challenges the jurisdiction of the district court

over the estate of the bankrupt, the subject-matter of the pro-

ceeding, irrespective of the question of jurisdiction in personam.

The facts are undisputed that the bankrupt has neither resided

nor had her domicile within the district for any period during

the 6 months preceding the filing of the petition, and has re-

sided continuously in the state of Missouri for the past 12 years;

that she carried on business in Chicago, within the district

(conducted by one Charles Plotke), from April 30, 1897, up to

January 3, 1899 (the petition being filed May 3, 1899) ; and that

she executed a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors,

under the statute of Illinois, on January 3, 1899 (the assignee

taking possession forthwith, and subsequently disposing of the

assets and closing out the business under orders of the county

she now her domirilc therein, nor has she had her principal
p]ace of business within the territorial limits and jurisdiction of
this court for the greater part of the six months next preceding the filing of the petition herein, to wit, six months next
preceding l\lay 3, A. D. 1899, but that before and at the time of
the filing of the petition herein as aforesaid, on, to wit, May 3,
A. D. 1899, and for more than five years prior thereto, she, the
said Emily Plotke, was, and from thence hitherto has been, and
still is, residing in the city of St. Louis, and the state of Missouri,
and not in the said Northern district of Illinois, and state of
Illinois, and that she, the said Emily P1otke, was not found
or served with process in this said proceeding in said Northern
district of Illinois, or in said state of Illinois. Wherefore she
says this court is wholly without jurisdiction in the premises,
and this she is ready to verify. Wherefore she prays judgment,
if this court here shall take jurisdiction and cognizance of the
proceedings aforesaid.''
The petitioning creditors filed a replication, and the issues
thereupon were referred for hearing to a referee, who reported
the testimony taken, with findings sustaining the plea and recommending that the petition be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The finding was overruled by the district court, and an adjudication of bankruptcy ente~ed, from which this appeal is brought.
'The record presents two questions, only, under the several
assignments of error: (1) Whether, upon the undisputed facts
shown, the case is within the bankruptcy jurisdiction of the
district court; and (2) whether jurisdiction appears over the
person of the alleged bankrupt.
The first issue challenges the jurisdiction of the district court
over the estate of the bankrupt, the subject-matter of the proeeeding, irrespective of the question of jurisdiction in personam.
The facts are undisputed that the bankrupt has neither resided
nor had her domicile within the district for any period during
the 6 months preceding the filing of the petition, and has resided continuously in the state of Missouri for the past 12 years;
that she carried on business in Chicago, within the district
(conducted by one Charles Plotke), from April 30, 1897, up to
January 3, 1899 (the petition being filed May 3, 1899) ; and that
she executed a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors,
under the statute of Illinois, on January 3, 1899 (the assignee
taking possession forthwith, and subsequently disposing of the
issets an<l closing out the business under orders of the county
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court). The question is thus narrowed to an interpretation of

the provisions of the statute. § 2, subd. 1, of the bank-

ruptcy act (30 Stat. 545) invests district courts with juris-

diction to "adjudge persons bankrupt who have had their prin-

cipal place of business, resided or had their domicile within

their respective territorial jurisdictions for the preceding six

months, or the greater portion thereof, or who do not have

their principal place of business, reside or have their domicile

within the United States, but have property within their juris-

diction, or who have been adjudged bankrupts by courts of

competent jurisdiction without the United States and have prop-

erty within their jurisdiction.'' As both residence and domicile

of the bankrupt were beyond the territorial jurisdiction, the

adjudication of bankruptcy rests alone upon the provision re-

specting the "principal place of business." The appellees con-

tend, in effect, (1) that the proof of a principal place of busi-

ness in the district for two months, and of no place of business

for the remaining period of limitation, establishes a case within

the meaning of the words "greater portion thereof," in the

section above quoted; and, if not so construed, (2) that the

voluntary assignment was void under the law of the forum, and

business was carried on thereunder for the requisite period, and
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was constructively the business of the bankrupt. We are of

opinion that neither of these contentions is tenable. The first

calls for a departure from the plain meaning of the language

used in the statute to make it applicable to conditions which

may have been overlooked in framing the provision, but are

not within the terms which were adopted; and however desirable

it may seem to have such conditions brought within its scope,

to carry out the general intent of the act, the correction can be

made by legislative amendment only, and not by way of judicial

construction. So far as applicable here, the provision confers

jurisdiction over bankrupts '' who have had their principal place

of business" within the territorial jurisdiction "for the pre-

ceding six months, or the greater portion thereof." Whether

thus considered apart from the provision as to residence and

domicile, or as an entirety, the language is unambiguous, if not

aptly chosen. The expression "greater portion" of a month or

other stated period is frequently used as an approximate measure

of time, and its meaning is well understood as the major part

or more than half of the period named. No justification appears

for construing like terms in this provision otherwise than in

court). The question is thus narrowed to an interpretation of
the provisions of the statute. § 2, subd. 1, of the bankruptcy act ( 30 Stat. 545) invests district courts with jurisdiction to ''adjudge persons bankrupt who have had their principal place of business, resided or had their domicile within
· their respective territorial jurisdictions for the preceding six
months, or the greater portion thereof, or who do not have
their principal place of business, reside or have their domicile
within the United States, but have property within their jurisdiction, or who have been adjudged bankrupts by courts of
competent jurisdiction without the United States and have property within their jurisdiction.'' As both residence and domicile
of the bankrupt were beyond the territorial jurisdiction, the
adjudication of bankruptcy rests alone upon the provision respecting the ''principal place of business.'' The appellees contend, in effect, (1) that the proof of a principal place of business in the district for two months, and of no place of business
for the remaining period of limitation, establishes a case within
the meaning of the words "greater portion thereof," in the
section above quoted; and, if not so construed, (2) that the
voluntary assignment was void under the law of the forum, and
busineBS was carried on thereunder for the requisite period, and
was constructively the business of the bankrupt. We are of
opinion that neither of these contentions is tenable. The first
calls for a departure from the plain meaning of the language
used in the statute to make it applicable to conditions which
may have been overlooked in framing the provision, but are
not within the terms which were adopted ; and however desirable
it may seem to have such conditions brought within its scope,
to carry out the general intent of the act, the correction can be
made by legislative amendment only, and not by way of judicial
construction. So far as applicable here, the provision confers
jurisdiction over bankrupts ''who have had their principal place
of business" within the territorial jurisdiction "for the preceding aix months, or the greater portion thereof.'' Whether
thus considered apart from the provision as to residence and
domicile, or as an entirecy, the language is unambiguous, if not
aptly chosen. The expression ''greater portion'' of a month or
other stated perfod is frequently used as an approximate measure
of time, and its meaning is well understood as the major part
or more than half of the period named. No justification appears
for construing like terms in this provision otherwise than # in
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I

the ordinary sense. With jurisdiction dependent upon the single

fact of having the principal place of business within the district,

the statute then imposes the further prerequisite that such

business shall have been there carried on for more than half

of the preceding six months. In other words, the limitation is

made with reference alone to the duration of the business in

the district, and regardless of the fact that its location may be

changed short of that period, and thus be carried on in different

districts without exceeding the three months in either, or that it

may be discontinued entirely without reaching the time limited

in any one; and the provisions in reference to domicile and resi-

dence are equally restricted, except for the distinction as to

residence, that it may be retained in one district after domicile

is changed to another. With this meaning clearly conveyed by

the language of the statute, the policy of so restricting jurisdic-

tion is not open to judicial inquiry. In support of the construc-

tion for which the appellees contend, two decisions are cited

whereby §11 of the bankrupt act of 1867 (§5014, Rev. St.)

is so construed,—one by Judge Blatchford (In re Foster, 3

Ben. 386, Fed. Cas. No. 4,962), and the other by Judge Lowell

(In re Goodfellow, 1 Low. 510, Fed. Cas. No. 5,536). However

instructive these cases may be in interpreting the present statute,
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they are not applicable by way of precedent, because of the

clear diversity in the respective provisions. § 11 of the former

act gave jurisdiction over petitions filed by voluntary bank-

rupts to "the judge of the judicial district in which such

debtor has resided or carried" on business for the six months

preceding the time of filing such petition, or for the longest

period during such six months"; and the limitation thus stated

was held to mean "the longest space of time that the bankrupt

has resided or carried on business in any district during the

six months." In re Foster, supra. It may well be conceded

that the language of that provision was susceptible of no other

fair interpretation; that "the longest period" of business "dur-

ing such six months" was clearly implied, and, as remarked

by Judge Blatchford, "not the period which, mathematically

considered, is the greatest part of the six months." But §2,

subd. 1, of the act of 1898 states the jurisdictional requirements

in terms clearly distinguishable from those which were thus

construed, namely, that a principal place of business shall have

existed within the district "for the preceding six months or the

greater portion thereof," thereby establishing as the test

the ordinary sense. With jurisdiction dependent upon the single
fact of having the principal place of business within the district,
the statute then imposes the further prerequisite that such
business shall have been there carried on for more thau half
of the preceding six months. In other words, the limitation is
made with reference atone to the duration of the business in
the district, and regardless of the fact that its location may be
changed short of that period, and thus be carried on in different
districts without exceeding the three months in either, or that it
may be discontinued entirely without reaching the time limited
in any one ; and the provisions in reference to domicile and residence are equally restricted, except for the distinction as to
residence, that it may be retained in one district after domicile
is changed to another. With this meaning clearly conveyed by
the language of the statute, the policy of so restricting jurisdic~
tion is not open to judicial inquiry. In support of the construction for which the appellees contend, two decisions are cited
whereby § 11 of the bankrupt act of 1867 (§ 5014, Rev. St.)
is so construed,-one by Judge Blatchford (In re Foster, 3
Ben. 386, Fed. Cas. No. 4,962), and the other by Judge Lowell
(In re Goodfellow, 1 Low. 510, Fed. Cas. No. 5,536). However
instructive these cases may be in interpreting the present statute,
they are not applicable by way of precedent, because of the
clear diversity in the res~ctive provisions. § 11 of the former
act gave jurisdiction over petitions filed by voluntary bankrupts to ''the judge of the judicial district in which such
debtor has resided or carried· on business for the six months
preceding the time of filing such petition, or for the longest
period during such six months''; and the limitation thus stated
was heJd to mean ''the longest space of time that the bankrupt
has resided or carried on business in any district during the
six months." In re Foster, supra.. It may \~ell be conceded
that the language of that provision. WBB susceptible of no other
fair interpretation; that "the longest period" of business "during such six months'' was clearly implied, and, as remarked
by Judge Blatchford, "not the period which, mathematically
considered, is the greatest part of the six months." But § 2,
subd. 1, of the act of 1898 states the jurisdictional requirements
in terms clearly distinguishable from those which were thus
construed, namely, that a principal place of business shall have
existed within the district "for the preceding six months or the
greater portion thereof," thereby establishing as the test
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continuance of the business in the district for the "greater por-

tion" of the six months, and not "the longest period" of busi-

ness "in any district during the six months." This departure

from the provisions of the prior act is marked both in the

change of words and in their collocation, and is not a mere

substitution of synonymous words, as argued by counsel.

The further contention that the requisite period of carry-

ing on business appears in the conceded facts of the voluntary

assignment made January 3, 1899, and the transactions there-

under, is not well founded. The question discussed on the

argument, whether the bankrupt act made the assignment void

ab initio, or voidable only in the event of an adjudication of

bankruptcy, as affecting the subsequent possession, however im-

portant in one phase, is not material in the absence of a distinct

showing that the business was continued under the assignment

for more than one month. Where jurisdiction of the federal

courts is made dependent upon citizenship or other specific

fact, "the presumption in every stage of the cause is that it is

without their jurisdiction, unless the contrary appears from

the record." Bors v. Preston, 111 U. S. 252, 255, 4 Sup. Ct.

407, 28 L. ed. 419; Railway Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 383,

4 Sup. Ct. 510, 28 L. ed. 462. The essential fact must appear
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affirmatively and distinctly, and "it is not sufficient that juris-

diction may be inferred argumentatively." Wolfe v. Insur-

ance Co., 148 U. S. 389, 13 Sup. Ct. 602, 37 L. ed. 493; Parker

v. Ormsby, 141 U. S. 81, 83, 11 Sup. Ct. 912, 35 L. ed. 654.

In the case at bar the record fails to show that the business was

carried on by the assignee for any definite period, and the

proof is insufficient to confer jurisdiction, within the rule stated,

even on the assumption that the transactions of the assignee

were, in legal effect, the carrying on of business by the assignor.

It is true that a sale of the assigned property (a stock of goods)

appears to have been made by the assignee as an entirety, thus

closing out the business; but the time is not stated, and it may

well be inferred from the testimony that such sale occurred

soon after the assignment was made. The mere fact that pro-

ceeds of such sale are retained in the hands of the assignee for

distribution is not carrying on bxisiness, in the sense of the

statute. The active business then ceased, and the liability to

account for the proceeds is no more operative to save the limi-

tation than would be the case if the business were closed out

directly by the bankrupt, either with or without subsequent

continuance of the business in the district for the ''greater portion" of the six months, and not "the longest period" of business ''in any district during the six months.'' This departure
from the provisions of the prior act is marked both in the
change of words and in their collocation, and is not a mere
substitution of synonymous words, as argued by counsel.
The further contention that the requisite period of carrying on business appears in the conceded facts of the voluntary
assignment made January 3, 1899, and the transactions thereunder, is not well founded. The question discussed on the
argument, whether the bankrupt act made the assignment void
ab initio, or voidable only in the event of an adjudication of
bankruptcy, as affecting the subsequent possession, however important in one phase, is not material in the absence of a distinct
showing that the business was continued under the assignment
for more than one month. \Vhere jurisdiction of the federal
courts is made dependent upon citizenship or other specific
fact, "the presumption in every stage of the cause is that it is
without their jurisdiction, unless the contrary appears from
the record.'' Bors v. Preston, 111 U. S. 252, 255, 4 Sup. Ct.
407, 28 L. ed. 419; Railway Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 383,
4 Sup. Ct. 510, 28 _!J. ed. 462. The essential fact must appear
affirmatively and distinctly, and ''it is not sufficient that jurisdiction may be inferred argumentatively." Wolfe v. Insurance Co., 148 U. S. 389, 13 Sup. Ct. 602, 37 L. ed. 493; Parker
v. Ormsby, 141 U. S. 81, 83, 11 Sup. Ct. 912, 35 L. ed. 654.
In the case at bar the record fails to show that the business was
carried on by the assignee for any definite period, and the
proof is insufficient to confer jurisdiction, within the rule stated,
even on the assumption that the transactions of the assignee
were, in legal effect, the carrying on of business by the assignor.
It is true that a sale of the assigned property (a stock of goods)
appears to have been made by the assignee as an entirety, thus
closing out the business; but the time is not stated, and it may
well he inferred from the testimony that such sale occurred
soon after the assignment was made. The mere fact that proceeds of such sale are rdained in the hands of the assignee for
distribution is not carrying on business, in the sense of the
statute. The active business then ceased, and the liability to
account for the proceeds is no more operative to save the limitation than would be the case if the business were closed out
directly by the bankrupt, either with or without subsequent
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payment of debts out of the proceeds. No evidence being pro-

duced to overcome the presumption of fact against jurisdiction,

the question of the legal status of the assignment does not

require consideration. It may be remarked, however, that the

validity of the assignment is not questioned under the state

statute, and its status depends upon a construction of the pro-

visions of the national bankruptcy act in that regard, and the

inquiry is not one which is governed by any rule of decision in

the state. In so far, therefore, as Harbaugh v. Costello, 184

HI. 110, 56 N. E. 363, passes upon the effect of such act on

voluntary assignments made after its passage, the decision is

not necessarily controlling, as contended by counsel; but that

question, when presented, will call for independent judgment,

in the light of all the authorities. In Mayer v. Hellman, 91 U. S.

496, 500, 23 L. ed. 377, a different construction appears to have

been placed , upon the bankrupt act of 1867; and in Simonson v.

Sinscheimer, 95 Fed. 948, 952, 37 C. C. A. 337, 342, that ruling

is cited as equally applicable under the present act. See, also,

Davis v. Bohle, 92 Fed. 325, 34 C. C. A. 372; In re Gutwillig,

92 Fed. 337, 34 C. C. A. 377; In re Gutwillig (D. C.) 90 Fed.

475, 478, cited-with approval in West Co. v. Lea, 174 U. S.

590, 596, 19 Sup. Ct. 836, 43 L. ed. 1098.
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"We are of opinion, therefore, that the district court was with-

out jurisdiction of the cause alleged in the petition, and the

Question whether the want of personal service was waived by

appearance does not call for solution. The order of the district

court is reversed, accordingly, with direction to dismiss the peti-

tion for want of jurisdiction.

In re GARNEAU

127 Fed. 677, 62 C. C A. 403

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. January 5, 1904)

The bankrupt, a young man 26 years of age, was born in the

city of St. Louis, and, with the exception of occasional absences,

lived there all his life. Up to March, 1900, he resided with his

brother in the city of St. Louis, and was employed by him in a

stockyard in that city upon a salary of $50 a month. In March

or April, 1900, he removed his residence, as he claims, to the

city of East St. Louis, directly across the river from St. Louis,

retaining his employment in the business of his brother in the

payment of debts out of the proceerls. No evidence being produced to overcome the presumption of fact against juris<lictio11,
the question of the lt•gal status of the assignment docs uot
require consideration. It may be remarked, however, that the
validity of the assignment is not questioned under the state
statute, and its status depends upon a construction of the provisions of the national bankruptcy act in that regard, and the
inquiry is not one which is governed by any rule of decision in
the state. In so far, therefore, as Harbaugh v. Costello, 184
Ill. 110, 56 N. E. 363, passes upon the effect of such act on
voluntary assignments made after its passage, the decision is
not necessarily controlling, as contended by counsel; but that
question, when presented, will call for independent judgment,
in the light of all the authorities. In Mayer v. Hellman, 91 U. S.
496, 500, 23 L. ed. 377, a different constrnction appears to have
been placed,upon the bankrupt act of 1867; and in Simonson v.
Sinscheimer, 95 Fed. 948, 952, 37 C. C. A. 337, 342, that ruling
is cited as equally applicable under the present act. See, also,
Davis v. Bohle, 92 Fed. 325, 34 C. C. A. 372; In re Gutwillig,
92 Fed. 337, 34 C. C. A. 377; In re Gutwillig (D. C.) 90 Fed.
475, 478, cited· with approval in West Co. v. Lea, 174 U. S.
590, 596, 19 Sup. Ct. 836, 43 L. ed. 1098.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the district court was without jurisdiction of the cause alleged in the petition, and the
nnestion whether the want of personal service was waived by
appearance does not call for solution. The order of the district
court is reversed, accordingly, with direction to dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction.
In re GARNEAU
127 Fed. 677, 62 C. C. A. 403
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. January 5, 1904)
The bankrnpt, a young man 26 years of age, was born in the
city of St. Louis, and, with the exception of occasional absences,
lived there all his life. Up to March, 1900, he resided with his
brother in the city of St. Louis, and was employed by him in a
stockyard in that city upon a salary of $50 a month. In March
or April, 1900, he removed his residence, as he claims, to the
city of East St. Louis, directly across the river from St. Louis,
retaining his employment in the business of his brother in the
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city of St. Louis. As his sister states: "East St. Louis is not a

place any one is apt to go to unless for business. You don't go

there for pleasure. It is all stockyards." He rented by the

month a room in the house of one Broughan at $10 a month.

His effects which he moved into the house were contained in one

trunk. In August of that year he removed his trunk, keeping

in the room his toilet articles and his nightshirt. The trunk

was not returned to the room for over a year, and not until after

the proceeding by creditors hereinafter stated. He thus re-

moved, as he claims, to East St. Louis, for the purpose of gain-

ing a residence to file an application in bankruptcy in the

Southern District of Illinois, and to secure his discharge, and

with the intention of going west immediately thereafter. He

did not eat at his lodging, and the record does not show where

he was accustomed to take his meals, further than for a while

he obtained his breakfast at some restaurant in East St. Louis.

He occupied the room at night at first quite regularly, after-

wards not for several weeks at a time, and then for four or five

nights in a week; but he paid rent for the room up to the

present time. On July 13, 1900, he filed his petition in bank-

ruptcy in the District Court for the Southern District of Illi-

nois, praying to be discharged of his debts, and on that day
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was adjudged a bankrupt, and the matter referred to a referee.

At the first meeting of creditors on the 14th of August, 1900,

three debts were proven, amounting to $14,700, and the referee

reports that there were no assets according to the schedules in

the bankrupt's petition, and that the three creditors proving

their debts were all the creditors scheduled. On November 21st,

upon the petition of the creditors, a citation was issued requir-

ing the bankrupt to appear for examination on December 4th,

which was had on that date; the facts concerning his alleged

change of residence then appearing and being first known to

the creditors. On that date, also, the bankrupt filed his peti-

tion for a discharge, and on December 22d, the creditors, who

were respectively residents of the states of Nevada and of

Utah, filed their petitions moving the court to dismiss the pro-

ceeding for want of jurisdiction upon the grounds that the bank-

rupt did not have his domicile within the district for the greater

portion of six months before the filing of the petition, and did

not have a bona fide residence or domicile within the district

at any time; and subsequently, on February 15th, the three

creditors filed their separate specific objections to the discharge

city of St. Louis. AB bis sister states: "East St. Louis is not a
place any one is apt to go to unless for business. You don't go
there for pleasure. It is all stockyards." He rented hy the
month a room in the house of one Broughau at $10 a mouth.
His effects which he moved into the house were contained in ont>
trunk. In August of that year be removed his trunk, keepi11g
in the room his toilet articles and his nightshirt. The trunk
was not returned to the room for over a year, and not until after
the proceeding by creditors hereinafter stated. He thus removed, as he claims, to East St. Louis, for the purpose of gaining a residence to file an application in bankruptcy in the
Southern District of Illinois, and to secure his discharge, and
with the intention of going we~ immediately thereafter. He
did not eat at his lodging, and the record does not show where
he was accustomed to take his meals, further than for a while
he obtained his breakfast at some restaurant in East St. Louis.
He occupied the room at night at first quite regularly, afterwards not for several weeks at a time, and then for four or five
nights in a week; but he paid rent for the room up to the
present time. On July 13, 1900, he filed his petition in bankruptcy in the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, praying to be discharged of his debts, and on that day
was adjudged a bankrupt, and the matter ref erred to a referee.
At the first meeting of creditors on the 14th of August, 1900,
three debts were proven, amounting to $14,700, and the referee
reports that there were no assets according to the schedules in
the bankrupt's petition, and that the three creditors proving
their debts were all the creditors scheduled. On November 21st,
upon the petition of the creditors, a citation was issuE>d re<]uiring the bankrupt to appear for examinatfon on December 4th,
which was had on that date; the facts concerning his alleged
change of residence then appearing and being first known to
the creditors. On that date, also, the bankrupt filed his petition for a discharge, and on December 22d, the creditors, who
were respectively residents of the states of Nevada and of
Utah, filed their petitions moving the court to dismiss the proceeding for want of jurisdiction upou the grounds that the bankrupt did not have his domicile within the district for the greater
portion of six months before the filing of the petition, and did
not have a bona fide residence or domicile within the district
at any time; and subsequently, on February 15th, the three
creditors filed their separate specific objections to the discharge
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of the bankrupt. The two matters—the motion to dismiss the

proceeding and the objections to the discharge—were referred

to a referee, who returned the testimony taken, and recom-

mended that the petition in bankruptcy be dismissed for waul

of jurisdiction. Exceptions were filed to the report, and the

court below on June 29,1903, overruled the exceptions, sustained

the report, and dismissed the proceeding. The correctness of

that ruling is brought up for consideration by a direct appeal

and also by an original petition to review.

JENKINS, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

By the terms of the bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541,

§2, 30 Stat. 545, 546 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3421]), the

courts of bankruptcy are invested with jurisdiction to adjudge

of the bankrupt. 'l'he two matters--the motion to dismiss the
proceeding and the objections to the discharge-were rl't't·rred
to a rt•feree, who returned the testimony taken, and rec'O'llmended that the petition in bankruptcy be dismissed for wa 11t
of jurisdiction. Exceptions were filed to the report, and the
court below on June 29, 1903, overruled the exceptious, sustained
the report, and dismissed the proceeding. The correctness of
that ruling is brought up for consideration by a direct appeal
and also by an original petition to i:eview.

persons bankrupt "who have had their principal place of busi-

ness, resided or had their domicile within their respective terri-

torial jurisdictions for the preceding six months or the greater

portion thereof.'' There is, of course, a legal distinction between

"domicile" and "residence," although the terms are generally

used as synonymous, the distinction depending upon the con-

nection in which and the purpose for which the terms are used.

"Domicile" is the place where one has his true, fixed, perma-

nent home, and principal establishment, and to which, when-
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ever he is absent, he has the intention of returning, and where

he exercises his political rights. There must exist in combina-

tion the fact of residence and the animus manendi. "Resi-

dence" indicates permanency of occupation as distinguished

from temporary occupation, but does not include so much as

"domicile," which requires an intention continued with resi-

dence. 2 Kent, 576. Residence has been defined to be a place

where a person's habitation is fixed without any present inten-

tion of removing therefrom. It is lost by leaving the place where

one has acquired a permanent home and removing to another

place animo nan revertendi, and is gained by remaining in such

new place animo manendi. Tracy v. Tracy, 62 N. J. Eq. 807,

48 Atl. 533. In Shaeffer v. Gilbert, 73 Md. 66, 20 Atl. 434, the,

word is thus defined:

"It does not mean * • * one's permanent place of abode

where he intends to live all his days, or for an indefinite or

unlimited time; nor does it mean one's residence for a temporary

purpose, with the intention of returning to his former residence

when that purpose shall have been accomplished, but means, as

H. & A. Bankruptcy—4

JENKINS, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).
By the terms of the bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541,
§ 2, 30 Stat. 545, 546 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3421]), the.~
courts of bankruptcy are invested with jurisdiction to adjudge
persons bankrupt ''who have had their principal place of business, resided or had their domicile within their respective territorial jurisdictions for the preceding six months or the greater
portion thereof.'' There is, of course, a legal distinction between
"domicile" and "residence," although the terms are generally
used as synonymous, the distinction depending upon the connection in which and 'the purpose for which the terms are used.
"Domicile" is the place where one has his true, fixed, permanent home, and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning, and where
he exercises his political rights. There must exist in combination the fact of residence and the animus manendi. '' Residence'' indicates permanency of occupation ~ distinguished
from temporary occupation, but does not include so much as
''domicile,'' which requires an intention coi1tinued with residence. 2 Kent, 576. Residence has been defined to be a place
where a person's habitation is fixed without any present intention of removing therefrom. It is lost by leaving the place where
one has acquired a permanent home and removing to another
place animo ?Wn revertendi, and is gained by remaining in such
new place animo manendi. Tracy v. Tracy, 62 N. J. Eq. 807,
48 Atl. 533. In Shaeffer v. Gilbert, 73 Md. 66, 20 Atl. 434, th~
word is thus defined:
"It does not mean • • • one's permanent place of abod1~
where he intends to live all his days, or for an indefinite or
unlimited time; nor does it mean one's residence for a temporary
purpose, with the intention of returning to his former residence
when that purpose shall have been accomplished, but means, as
H. & A. Bankruptcy-4
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we understand it, one's actual home, in the sense of having no

other home, whether he intends to reside there permanently or

for a definite or indefinite length of time."

The term is an elastic one, and difficult of precise definition.

The sense in which it should be used is controlled by reference

to the object. Its meaning is dependent upon the circumstances

then surrounding the person, upon the character of the work to

be performed, upon whether he has a family or a home in an-

other place, and largely upon his present intention. Rindge

v. Green, 52 Vt. 208.

There is some looseness and some conflict in the opinions in

the definition given to the term "residence." We need not

stop to discuss these, because all agree that a residence, whether

it must be accompanied animo manendi or may exist with a

present intention at some time to remove therefrom, must be

bona fide, not pretentious. Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 329,

9 Sup. Ct. 293, 32 L. ed. 690. We are constrained to believe

that the purported change of residence of the bankrupt from

St. Louis to East St. Louis was pretentious only, not real; and

was merely for the purpose of pretending to acquire a residence

solely for the purpose of filing his petition in bankruptcy in a

district in which he did not reside. Indeed, the bankrupt
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frankly avowed that to be his only purpose, and that he went

to East St. Louis with the then intention of leaving the place

so soon as he had accomplished his purpose. There was uo

bona fide change of residence. There was no bona fide assump-

tion of residence in East St. Louis. He necessarily must spend

the hours of business in St. Louis. He left his home in St.

Louis, where he resided with relatives, and where he had passed

his life, crossed the river, and at much inconvenience to his

business assumed a home in a city of stockyards, to which, as

his sister remarked, one is not apt "to go to unless for business;

don't go there for pleasure," carrying such of his effects as he

thought necessary in a single trunk, which he soon removed

from the lodging he had engaged, and which was not returned

for over a year, retaining at his lodging only articles of toilet

and a nightshirt. He was a sojourner merely, and not a resi-

dent, of East St. Louis. We look upon -this transaction as an

imposition upon the jurisdiction of the court. The Congress

did not intend that one may select any court of bankruptcy

which he pleases in these broad United States, and be enabled,

through a pretentious removal to the district of that court, to

we understand it, one's actual home, in the sense of having no
other home, whether he intends to reside there permanently or
for a qefinite or indefinite length of time.''
The term is an elastic one, and difficult of precise definition.
The sense in which it should be used is controlled by reference
to the object. Its meaning is dependent upon the circumstan('cs
then surrounding the person, upon the character of the work to
be performed, upon whether he has a family or a home in another place, and fargely upon his present intention. Rindge
v. Green, 52 Vt. 208.
.There is some looseness and some conflict in the opinions in
the definition given to the term "residence." We need not
stop to discuss these, because all agree that a residence, whether
it must be accompanied animq manendi or may exist with a
present intention at some time to remove therefrom, must be
bona fide, not pr,etentious. Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 329,
9 Sup. Ct. 293, 32 L. ed. 690. We are constrained to believe
that the purported change of residence of the ·bankrupt from
St. Louis to East St. Louis was pretentious only, not real; and
was merely for the purpose of pretending to acquire a residence
solely for the purpose of filing his petition in bankruptcy in a
district in which he did not reside. Indeed, the bankrupt
frankly avowe.d that to be his only purpose, and that he went
to East St. Louis with the then intention of leaving the place
so soon as he had accomplished his purpose. There was uo
bona fide change of residence. There was no bona fide assumption of residence in East St. Louis. He necessarily must spend
the hours of business in St. Louis. He left his home in St.
· Louis, where he resided with relatives, and where he had passed
his life, crossed the river, and at much inconvenience to his
business assumed a home in a city of stockyards, to which, as
his sister remarked, one is not apt ''to go to unless for business ;
don't go there for pleasure,'' carrying such of his effects as he
thought necessary in a single trunk, which he soon removed
from the lodging he had engaged, and which was not returned
for over a year, retaining at his lodging only articles of toilet
and a nightshirt. He was a sojourner merely, and not a resident, of East St. Louis. We look upon ·this transaction as an
imposition upon the jurisdiction of the- court. The Congress
did· not intend that one may select any court of bankruptcy
which he pleases in these broad United States, and be enabled,
through a pretentious removal to the district of that court, to

'

PARTNERSHIPS

PARTNERSHIPS

51

51

obtain his discharge from his debts. To allow that to be done

would open the door to grave frauds upon creditors, which we

are not disposed to countenance. * * *

The petition for review is denied, and upon the appeal the

decree of the court below dismissing the proceeding is affirmed.3

2. OF PARTNERSHIPS

In re BLAIR et al.

obtain his discharge from his debts. To allow that to be done
would open the door to grave frauds upon creditors, which we
are not disposed to countenance. • • •
The petition for review is denied, and upon the appeal the
decree of the court below dismissing the proceeding is affirmed. 3

99 Fed. 76

(District Court, S. D. New York. January-25, 1900)

2.

OF PARTNERSHIPS

In Bankruptcy. On motion to dismiss petition in involuntary

bankruptcy against the firm of Blair, Stem, Passano & Rosston.

BROWN, District Judge. The petition in the above case was

filed on November 20, 1899, against the four defendants above

In re BLAIR et al.
99 Fed. 76

named. It states that they composed the co-partnership doing

business under the name and style of the Anglaise-Americaine

(District Court, S. D. New York.

January--25, 1900)

Soap Company; that during the greater part of the six months

next preceding the defendants had their respective domiciles

in the county of New York within this district and also had

In Bankruptcy. On motion to dismiss petition in involuntary
bankruptcy against the firm of Blair, Stem, Passano & Rosston.

property therein; that the co-partnership being insolvent on

October 5, 1899, suffered a judgment to be recovered against it,

under which a portion of its property was sold by the sheriff

under execution, whereby the judgment creditors would obtain
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a preference; and the petition asks that said "co-partnership

may be adjudged to be a bankrupt."

The subpoena was served personally on Stem in this district;

the other defendants were served by order in Baltimore and

Richmond. On January 9th the defendant Passano appeared

specially for the purpose of moving to dismiss the petition for

want of jurisdiction, and upon an affidavit obtained an order

to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed. The

affidavit states in brief that none of the defendants had their

residence or domicile at any time within this district; that

Blair during all the period referred to had his domicile and

resided at Richmond, Va., and the other three defendants at

Baltimore, Md.; that Passano had left the firm from three to

four months before the petition was filed, and Rosston a month

3—Cf. In re Williams, 120 Fed.

34; In re Oldstein, 182 Fed. 409.

BROWN, District Judge. The petition in the above case was
filed on November 20, 1899, against the four defendants above
named. It states that they composed the co-partnership doing
business under the name and style of the Anglaise-Americaine
Soa.p Company; that during the greater part of the six months
next preceding the defendants had their respective domiciles
in the county of New York within this district and also had
property therein; that the co-partnership being insolvent on
October 5, 1899, suffered a judgment to be recovered against it,
under which a portion of its property was sold by the sheriff
under execution, whereby the judgment creditors would obtain
a preference; and the petition asks that said "co-partnership
may be adjudged to he a bankrupt.''
The suhprena was served personally on Stem in this district;
the other defend ants were served by order in Baltimore and
Richmond. On January 9th the defendant Passano appeared
specially for the purpose of moving to dismiss the petition for
want of jurisdiction, and upon an affidavit obtained an order
to show cause why the petition should not he dismissed. Th~
affidavit states in brief that none of the defendants bad their
residence or domicile at any time within this district; that
Blair during all the period referred to had his domicile and
resided at Richmond, Va., and the other three dcfeudru1ts at
Baltimore, l\ld.; that Passano had left the firm from three to
four months before the petition was filed, and Rosston a month
3-Cf. In re Williams, 120 Fed.
34; In re OJdstein, 182 Fed. 409.
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later; and that at the time of the preference alleged, the firm

consisted of Blair and Stem only.

Upon the return of the order to show cause and on hearing,

a reference to a commissioner was ordered to take proof and

report the facts as to the place of business as well as the residence

or domicile of all the parties.

From the report of the commissioner, it appears that the

business of the Anglaise-Americaine Soap Company was started

at Baltimore, where it was continued until about August 11th

or 12th, when it was removed to this district; that on July

22, 1899, Passano withdrew from the firm, transferring his

interest to the other three partners, who by agreement assumed

all the co-partnership liabilities; that on August 11, 1899, Ross-

ton also retired from the firm, whereupon the business was

removed to this district by Blair and Stem, the remaining

partners, as above stated; that Blair and Stem, from that time,

continued the business under the same name and under the

name and style of "Blair-Stem Company, Selling Agents for

Anglaise-Americaine Soap Company"; that they continued the

business in this district until on or about November 1, 1899, after

which date and until the petition was filed November 9th, they

were engaged in winding up the affairs of said company; and
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that they had no other place of business subsequent to August

12, 1899; that Blair, between the 12th and 18th of August,

removed to New York from Baltimore, where he continued to

reside until the 1st day of November, when he went to Rich-

mond to reside; that Stem did not reside or have his domicile

here, at any time prior to November 7, 1899.

These findings are supported by the evidence. They show,

therefore, that the petition cannot be sustained upon its aver-

ment of domicile within this district, since neither of the four

partners had his domicile or resided bore long enough to sup-

port the jurisdiction of the court.

Further inquiry concerning the place of business of the sev-

eral partners was had in view of the possible allowance of an

amendment to the petition, setting up a place of business within

the district for the requisite period. § 5c of the act provides

that in cases of partnership "the court which has jurisdiction

of one of the partners may have jurisdiction of all"; and by'

? 2, snbd. 1, the court is authorized to adjudge bankrupt persons

'"who have bad their principal place of business, resided, or

bad their domicile within its jurisdiction" for the greater por-

later; and that at the time of the preference alleged, the, firm
consisted of Blair and Stem only.
Upon the return of the order to show cause and on bearing,
a reference to a ~mmissioner was ordered to take proof and
report the facts as to the place of business as well as the residence
or domicile of all the parties.
From the report of the commissioner, it appears that the
business of the Anglaise-Americaine Soap Company was started
at Baltimore, where it was continued until about August 11th
or 12th, when it was removed to this district; that on July
22, 1899, Passano withdrew from the firm, transferring his
interest to the other three partners, who by agreement assumed
all the co-partnership liabilities; that on August 11, 1899, Rosston also retired from the firm, whereupon the business was
removed to this district by Blair and Stem, the remaining
partners, as above stated; that Blair and Stem, from that time,
continued the business under the same name and under the
name and style of "Blair-Stem Company, Selling Agents for
Anglaise-Americaine Soap Company''; that they continued the
business in this district until on or about November 1, 1899, after
which date and until the petition was filed November 9th, they
were engaged in wiuding up the affairs of said company; and
that they had no other place of business subsequent to August
12, 1899; that Blair, between the 12th and 18th of August,
removed to New York from Baltimore, where he continued to
reside until the 1st day of November, when be went to Richmond to reside; that Stem did not reside or have his domicile
here, at any time prior to November 7, 1899.
These findings are supported by the evidence. They show,
therefore, that the petition cannot be sustained upon its averment of domicile within this district, since neither of the four
partners had his domicile or resided here long enough to support the jurisdiction of the court.
Further inquiry concerning the plaec of business of the several partners was had in view of the possible allowance of an
amendment to the petition, setting up a place of business within
the district for the requisite period. § 5c of the act provides
that in cases of partnrrship "the court which has jurisdiction
of one of the partners may have jurisdiction of all''; and by '
~ 2, snhd. 1, the court is authorized to adjudge bankrupt persons
''who have had their principal place of business, resided, or
haJ their domicile within its jurisdiction'' for the greater por-
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tion of the six months preceding the petition. The above facts

show that two of the partners, Blair and Stem, had their only

place of business within this district for a little over three

months prior to the petition, if the period from November 1st to

November 20th be deemed a period of doing business, during

which the firm of Blair and Stem was in liquidation, in charge

of Mr. Stem; otherwise not. Under the circumstances above

stated, I think the period from November 1st to November 20th

cannot be excluded from the period during which Stem at least

had his principal place of business in New York. The circum-

stances are altogether different from those in the case of In re

Little, 2 N. B. R. 294, Fed. Cas. No. 8,391.

It is urged that the business conducted by Blair and Stem

in New York, was not the original partnership business of the

four partners above named, but the business of a new firm;

and that the provision of § 5c should be held applicable only

to cases where the partner is transacting the same firm's busi-

ness within the particular jurisdiction, and not where he is -

simply transacting an independent business of his own. But

in this case Stem and Blair were in fact liquidating the old

firm's business during this time. Nor do I perceive any sound

reason for limiting, as suggested, the ordinary meaning of the
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language used in §§ 5c and 2, subd. 1. Whatever doubts may

have been raised under the act of 1867 (Cameron v. Canieo,

9 N. B. R. 527, 4 Fed. Cas. 1,128), the proceeding may certainly

now be commenced in any district in which either partner

resides; the present act leaves no doubt on this point (Lowell,

Bankr. 360; Loveland, Bankr. 191; In re Murray [D. C] 96

Fed. 600); and the same was held by Story, J., under the act of

1841. The reasons for the broad option given by the present act

were probably reasons of convenience, and to authorize the pro-

ceedings to be had in any district wherein a partner was ordi-

narily to be found, whether by residence, domicile, or place of

business.

If the petition were amended, therefore, by averring that

Stem's place of business was here during the requisite period,

the jurisdiction of the court should be sustained. The petition

must, however, further show" whether any of the individual

partners are solvent. As it stands, it is ambiguous in this

regard. It avers that the "partnership is insolvent"; but other

statements seem to intimate that by that averment it is intended

only to state that the joint assets are not sufficient to pay the

tion of the six months preceding the petition. The above facts
show that two of the partners, Blair and Stem, had their only
place of business within this district for a little over three
months prior to the petition, if the period from 1\ovember 1st to
November 20th be deemed a period of doing business, during
\vhich the firm of Blair and Stem was in liquidation, in charge
of Mr. Stem; otherwise not. Under the circumstances above
stated, I think the period from November 1st to November 20th
cannot be excluded from the period during which Stem at least
had his principal place of business in New York. The circumstances are altogether different fr.om those in the case of In re
Little~ 2 N. 13. R. 294, Fed. Cas. No. 8,391.
It is urged that the business conducted by Blair and Stem
in New York, was not the original partnership business of the
four partners above named, but the business of a new firm ;
and that the provision of § 5c should be held applicable only
to cases where the partner is transacting the same firm's business within the particular jurisdiction, and not where be is .
simply transacting an independent business of his own. But
in this case Stem and Blair were in fact liquidating the old
firm's business <luring this time. Nor do I perceive any sound
reason for limiting, as suggested, the ordinary meaning of the
language used in §§ 5c and 2, subd. 1. Whatever doubts may
have been raised under tl1e act of 1867 (Cameron v. Canieo,
9 N. B. R. 527, 4 Fed. Cas. 1,128), the proceeding may certainly
now be commenced in any district in which either partner
resides; the present act leaves no doubt on this point (Lowell,
Bankr. 360; Loveland, Bankr. 191; In re Murray [D. C.] 96
Fed. 600); and the same was held by Story, J., under the act of
1841. The reasons for the broad option given by the presen.t act
were probably reasons of convenience, and to authorize the proceedings to be had in any district wherein a partner was ordinarily to be found, whether by residence, domicile, or place of
business.
If the petition were amended, therefore, by averring that
Stem's place of business was h~re during the requisite period,
the jurisdiction of the court should be sustained. The petition
must, however, further show· whether any of the individual
partners are solvent. As it stauds, it is ambiguous in this
regard. It avers that the "partnership is iusolvent"; hut other
statements seem to intimate that by that averment it is intended
only to state that the joint assets are not sufficient to pay the
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joint obligations. No doubt a firm is sometimes said to be

insolvent when only a deficiency of joint assets is meant. But

as each partner is liable in solido for the debts of the company,

so that they are debts of each individual member as much and

as truly as they are debts of the firm, a partnership cannot

with strictness be said to be insolvent while any one of the

partners is able to pay all the firm's liabilities. Lowell, Bankr.

359; Hanson v. Paige, 3 Gray, 239, 242; In re Bennett, 2 Low.

400, 3 Fed. Cas. 209. By the express provision of § 5h, more-

over, the firm assets cannot be administered in bankruptcy if

one of the partners is not adjudged bankrupt, unless by his

consent. Bank v. Meyer (D. C.) 92 Fed. 896; In re Meyer (C.

C. A.) 98 Fed. 976. It is therefore required by rule 1 of this

court that the petition shall state whether any partner, not

joining in the petition, is solvent or insolvent. Form 2, more-

over, prescribed by the supreme court (18 Sup. Ct. xviii.),

requires for an adjudication of "the firm" as bankrupts, a

statement in the petition that "the partners owe debts which

they are unable to pay in full." This necessarily includes the

individual responsibility of each, as well as their joint responsi-

bility; and that form evidently contemplates that an adjudica-

tion of the firm imports an adjudication of all its members
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as well. To avoid any ambiguity, and any delay or complica-

tion in the subsequent proceedings, the insolvency of each

member of the firm should be alleged in the petition if an

adjudication against the firm and an administration of the

firm assets in bankruptcy are sought, in order that issue on that

point, if disputed, may be at once taken and heard along with

any other issues, and the scope of the proceeding determined

without further delay.

The petition may be amended, if desired, within 10 days; if

not so amended it will be dismissed.

3. OF CORPORATIONS

In re MATHEWS CONSOLIDATED SLATE CO.

144 Fed. 724

(United States District Court, District of Massachusetts.

November 24, 1905)

An involuntary petition was filed in the District Court for

the District of Massachusetts against the Mathews Consolidated

joint obligations. No doubt a firm is sometimes said to be
insolvent when only a deficiency of joint assets is meant. But
as each p11rtner is liable in solido for the debts of the company,
so that they are debts of each individual member as much and
as truly as they are debts of the firm, a partnership cannot
with strictness be said to be insolvent while any one of the
partners is able to pay all the firm's liabilities. Lowell, Bankr.
359; Hanson v. Paige, 3 Gray, 239, 242; In re Bennett, 2 Low.
400, 3 Fed. Cas. 209. By the express provision of § 5h, moreover, the firm assets cannot he administered in bankruptcy if
one of the partners is not adjudged bankrupt, unless by his
consent. Bank v. :Meyer (D. C.) 92 Fed. 896; In re Meyer (C.
C. A.) 98 Fed. 976. It is therefore required by rule 1 of this
court that the petition shall state whether any partner, not
joining in the petition, is solvent or insolvent. Form 2, moreover, prescribed by the supreme court (18 Sup. Ct. xviii.),
requires for an adjudication of ''the firm'' as bankrupts, a
statement in the petition that ''the partners owe debts which
they are unable to pay in full.'' This necessarily includes the
individual responsibility of each, as well as their joint responsibility; and that form evidently contemplates that an adjudication of the firm imports an adjudication of all its members
as well. To avoid any ambiguity, and any delay or complication in the subsequent proceedings, the insolvency of each
member of the firm should be alleged in the petition if an
adjudication against the firm and an administration of the
firm assets in bankruptcy are sought, in order that issue on that
point, if disputed, may be at once taken and heard along with
any other issues, and the scope of the proceeding determined
.
without further delay.
The petition may be amended, if desired, within 10 days; if
not so amended it will be dismissed.
3.

OF CORPORATIONS

In re MATHEWS CONSOLIDATED SLATE CO.
144 Fed. 724
(United States District Court, District of Massachusetts.
November 24, 1905)
An involuntary petition was filed in the District Court for
the District of Massachusetts against the Mathews Consolidated
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Slate Co. (a corporation organized under the laws of New

Slate Co. (a corporation organized under the laws of New
Jersey) ; the company did not object to au adjudication, but
objections were file<l by a creditor who had obtained a judgment
in New York against the company. One objection was based on
his contention that the District Court for the District of Massachusetts was without jurisdiction because the alleged bankrupt
did not have its principal place of business, reside, or have its
domicile within that district. The issues were referred to a
referee, who found that the court had jurisdiction, and recommended an adjudicatioll.

Jersey); the company did not object to an adjudication, but

objections were filed by a creditor who had obtained a judgment

in New York against the company. One objection was based on

his contention that the District Court for the District of Massa-

chusetts was without jurisdiction because the alleged bankrupt

did not have its principal place of business, reside, or have its

domicile within that district. The issues were referred to a

referee, who found that the court had jurisdiction, and recom-

mended an adjudication.

DODGE, District Judge. • • • There is no dispute that

the bankrupt was a corporation organized under the laws of

New Jersey, as found in the report. Its domicile therefore was

not in Massachusetts. In this jurisdiction it was a foreign

corporation. Within the meaning of the acts giving jurisdiction

to federal courts of suits between citizens of different states,

such a corporation could have no residence in Massachusetts.

Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444, 12 Sup. Ct. 935,

36 L. ed. 768. In my opinion such a corporation cannot be said

to have "resided" here within the meaning of § 2 (1) of the

bankruptcy act. It cannot therefore be adjudged a bankrupt

here, unless it had its principal place of business in Massa-
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chusetts for the six months preceding June 22, 1905, or for the

greater part of that period.

First. The referee has found it to be a fact that the bank-

rupt's principal place of business and its headquarters were at

Boston, within the District of Massachusetts, and the respondent

contends that the finding was not warranted by the evidence.

Whatever may be the correct description, for the purposes

of the question which is raised under § 4b of the bankruptcy

act, and which is considered below, of the business in which

the bankrupt was principally engaged, there is no dispute that

its business consisted in the operation of slate quarries and

slate mills and in selling the slate thus obtained or produced.

Upon the evidence which accompanies the report, I find the

facts below stated as follows:

(1) The quarries operated were situated either in Vermont

or New York, all near the line between those states, and all

within about 12 miles of Poultney, Vt. The principal slate mill

was at Middle Granville, N. Y. This produced structural slate.

•

DODGE, District Judge. • • • There is no dispute that
the bankrupt was a corporation organized under the laws of
New Jersey, as found in the report. Its domicile therefore was
not in Massachusetts. ·In this jurisdiction it was a foreign
corporation. Within the meaning of the acts giving jurisdiction
to federal courts of suits between citizens of different states,
such a corporation could have no residence in Massachusetts.
Shaw v. Quincy ~fining Co., 145 U. S. 444, 12 Sup. Ct. 935,
36 L. ed. 768. In my opinion such a corporation cannot be said
to have ''resided'' here within the meaning of § 2 ( 1) of the
bankruptcy act. It cannot therefore be adjudged a bankrupt
here, unless it had its principal place of business in Massachusetts for the six months preceding June 22, 1905, or for the
greater part of that period.
First. The referee bas found it to be a fact that the bankrupt's principal place of business and its headquarters were at
Boston, within the Distric.t of Massachusetts, and the respondent
contends that the finding was not warranted by the evidence.
Whatever may be the correct description. for the purposes
of the question which is raised under § 4b of the bankruptcy
act. and which is considered below, of the business in which
the bankrupt was principally engaged, there is no dispute that
its business consisted in the operation of slate quarries and
slate mills and in selling the slate thus obtained or produced.
Upon the evidence which accompanies the report, l find the
facts below stated as follows:
( 1) The quarries operated were situated either in Vermont
or New York, all near the line between those states, and all
within about 12 miles of Poultney, Vt. The principal slate mill
was at Middle Granville, N. Y. This produced structural slate.
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At several of the quarries were also mills producing roofing

slate, as is hereinafter more fully explained.

(2) The company was organized in May, 1902. Its officers

were, and had been since its organization, a president, vice presi-

dent, treasurer, secretary, and general manager. From 1902

until the filing of the petition it maintained offices in the Sears

Building in Boston. These were at least its .executive offices anil

selling agency. In them the officers above mentioned, who all,

during the six months before the filing of the petition, resided in

Boston, were regularly to be found and all their official busi-

ness was there regularly carried on, except that the general

manager spent part of his time and performed part of his

duties in Poultney, as below stated. In the same offices the

directors, a majority of whom resided in Boston during the

same period, held all their meetings during that period. The

stockbook was kept there. The minutes of the directors and the

corporation books of account were kept there. Its correspondence

was conducted from there. The great bulk of sales of the

product of the quarries and mills was negotiated there or from

there; about 1 per cent. only of the total sales being made from

Poultney. All bills for produce sold were sent out from there,

being there made up from shipping slips forwarded there from
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Poultney. The prices of goods sold were fixed there, and the

payments for goods sold received there. One regular salesman

was employed, who was to be found there, except when on the

road, and who was never to be found at the quarries or at

Poultney. When on the road his reports were all made to

the Boston office, and all orders from him were received there,

but only a small proportion of the sales was made by him.

From one to three clerks or stenographers were employed there

in the transaction of the company's business.

(3) The principal banking of the company was done in

Boston. All money received for goods sold was deposited either

in the City Trust Company or the Webster & Atlas Bank, both

of Boston. These were the principal bank deposits kept by

the company. All notes, accounts, and bills payable were ren-

dered to the Boston office, after being approved when necessary

at other places, as below, and were paid, as a rule, by checks

drawn on the above bank deposits. Such checks were drawn

at the Boston office, and were there signed by the treasurer and

countersigned by the president. This did not apply to the pay

At several of the quarries were also mills producing roofing
slate, as is hereinafter more fully explained.
(2) The company was organized in May, 1902. Its officers
were, and had been since its organization, a president, vice president, treasurer, secretary, and general manager. From 1902
until the filing of the petition it maintained offices in the Sears
Building in Boston. These were at least its ,executive offiees and
selling agency. In them the officers above mentioned, who all,
during the six months before the filing of the petition, resided i11
Boston, were regularly to be found and all their official lmsiness was there regularly carried on, except that the genera I
manager spent part of his time and performed part of hi8
duties in Poultney, as below stated. In the same offices the
directors, a majority of whom resided in Boston during the
same period, held all their meetings during that period. The
stockbook was kept there. The minutes of the directors and the
corporation books of account were kept there. Its correspondence
was conducted from there. The great bulk of sales of the
product of the quarries and mills was negotiated there or from
there; about 1 per cent. only of the total sales being made from
Poultney. All bills for produce sold were sent out from there,
being there made up from shipping slips forwarded there from
Poultney. The prices of goods sold were fixed there, and the
payments for goods sold received there. One regular salesman
was employed, who was to be found there, except when on the
road, and who was never to be found at the quarries or at
Poultney. When on the road his reports were all made to
the Boston office, and all orders from him were received there,
but only a small proportion of the sales was made by him.
From one to three clerks or stenographers were employed there
in the transaction of the company's business.
(3) The principal banking of the company was done in
Boston. All money received for goods sold was deposited either
in the City Trust Company or the 'Vebster & Atlas Bank, both
of Boston. These were the principal bank deposits kept ~y
the company. All notes, accountB, and bills payable were rendered to the Boston office, after being approved when necessary
at other places, as below, and were paid, as a rule, by checks
drawn on the above bank deposits. Such checks were drawn
at the Boston office, and were there signed by the treasurer and
countersigned by the president. This did not apply to the pay
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roll checks, further spoken of below, which were signed by

the treasurer only.

(4) The company also maintained offices during the six

mouths prior to the filing of the petition at Poultney. From

there the operations carried on at its quarries and mills were

directed, as below stated, subject to the supervision of the

Boston office. At each quarry the company had a superin-

tendent. Under each quarry superintendent there was a boss

over each gang of men employed, whether in the quarries or ,

mills. Weekly reports were sent from the quarries and mills

to the Poultney office, from which reports of product and

shipments were there made up and sent to the Boston office.

All shipments were made from the Poultney office, as required

to fill orders, which were ordinarily sent from the Boston office.

Stock sheets showing product on hand were kept at the Poult-

ney office. These were compared usually every month with stock

sheets kept at the Boston office. - For about eight months pre-

ceding the filing of the petition, in addition to the general

manager above referred to, a quarry manager had been employed,

who lived at Poultney and had all the active and immediate

direction of all the quarries and mills, always, however, sub-

ject to the supervision and instructions of the general manager
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above referred to, who ordered the increase or decrease of

laborers employed at the various quarries, or the making of

new openings, as occasion required. The general manager made

frequent visits to Poultney, at least as often as once in each

month. Prior to the employment of the quarry manager, the

then general manager had resided at Poultney, and there per-

formed the duties of the quarry manager, receiving his direc-

tions regarding them from the president, at Boston. Such

supplies in general as were required in operating the quarries

or mills were as a rule purchased by the quarry manager acting

from the Poultney office. These purchases were made in New

York and Vermont and to a small extent in Boston. Bills for

goods so purchased were approved by the quarry manager and

sent to Boston for'payment.

(5) In banks at Poultney and Granville, N. Y., funds were

deposited by the company just sufficient to cover its pay roll

each month. The pay rolls were made up and approved by the

quarry manager at Poultney, and were then forwarded to the

Boston office, where the treasurer signed the necessary checks

and forwarded the required money to the Poultney and Gran-

roll checks, further spoken of below, which were signed by
the treasurer only.
( 4) The company also maintained C?ffices during the six
mouths prior to the filing of the petition at Poultney. From
there the operations carried on at its quarries and mills were
directed, as below stated, subject to the supervision of the
Boston office. At each quarry the company had a superintendent. Under each quarry superintendent there was a bos's
over each gang of men employed, whether in the quarries or ,.
mills. \Veekly reports were sent from the quarries and mills
to the Poultney office, from which reports of product and
shipments were there made up and sent to the Boston office.
All shipments were made from the Poultney office, as required
to fill orders, which were ordinarily sent from the Boston office.
Stock sheets showing product on hand were kept at the Poultney office. These were compared usually every month with stock
sheets- kept at the Boston office. ·For about eight months preceding the filing of the petition, in addition to the general
manager above referred io, a quarry manager had been employed,
who lived at Poultney and had all the active and immediate
direction of all the quarries and mills, always, however, subject to the supervision and instructions of the general manager
above referred· to, who ordered the increase or decrease of
laborers employed at the various quarries, or the making of
new openings, as occasion required. The general manager made
frequent visits to Poultney, at least as often as once in each
month. Prior to the employment of the quarry manager, the
then general manager had resided at Poultney, and there performed the duties of the quarry manager, receiving his directions regarding them from the president, at Boston. Such
supplies in general as were required in operating the quarries
or mills were as a rule purchased by the quarry manager acting
from the ·Poultney office. These purchases were made in New
York and Vermont and to a small extent in Boston. Bills for
goods so purchased were approved by the quarry manager and
sent to Boston for'Payment.
(5) In banks at Poultney and Granville, N. Y., funds were
d1..·posited by the company just sufficient to cover its pay roll
ea12h month. The pay rolls were made up and approved by the
quarry manager at Poultney, and were then forwarded to the
Boston office, where the treasurer signed the necessary checks
and forwarded the required money to the Poultney and Gran-
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ville banks above mentioned, to be used to cash the pay roll

cheeks. The general method was as above until about a year

before the filing of the petition, when it was changed so far as

the Poultney banks were concerned. Objection having been

made by them to paying the checks referred to because the

aecount maintained was so small, currency to the required

amount had been, during the year referred to, forwarded from

the Boston to the Poultney office and the Poultney pay roll

checks cashed at that office. The deposits in the Poultney and

Granville banks were chiefly, if not entirely, used for meeting

the pay roll checks as stated, and the average amount allowed

i to remain on deposit there was at all times small in comparison

with that allowed to remain in the Boston institutions.

(6) The mill and most of the quarries referred to were owned

by the Mathews Slate Company, a corporation organized under

the laws of Maine. Only two of the quarries operated did not

belong to that company, both of them situated in New York.

One of them was owned and one leased by the bankrupt. The

properties of the Mathews Slate Company were subject to a

mortgage given by that company to the American Loan & Trust

Company of Boston, as trustee, to secure an issue of bonds

amounting to $500,000. The bankrupt owned all the stock of
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the Mathews Slate Company, except five shares held by its

directors in order to qualify them, and also owned $366,000

of the bonds issued by it, as above. All the properties of the

bankrupt, including said stock and bonds, were subject to a

mortgage given by it to the City Trust Company of Boston, as

trustee, to secure an issue of its own bonds, amounting to

$600,000. The coupons on these bonds, due semiannually, were

payable in Boston. The money to pay them was regularly

deposited as they became due with the City Trust Company, by

the treasurer of the bankrupt company, at Boston. Since the

organization of the bankrupt company in 1902, and the giving

of the mortgage by it as above, the Mathews Slate Company

had maintained its organization under the direction of the bank-

rupt company, but had done no other business and had ceased

altogether to operate the quarries or mills belonging to it;

such operation being from that time conducted wholly by the

bankrupt company.

(7) The product of the different quarries and mill was stored

at or near them until shipped by direction from the Poultney

office as above. None of it appears to have been stored in

ville banks above mentioned, to be used to cash the pay roll
checks. The general method was as above until about a year
before the filing of the petition, when it was changed so far as
the Poultney banks were concerned. Objection having been
made by them to paying the checks referred to because the
aecount maintained was so small. currency to the required
amount had been, during the year referred to, forwarded from
the Boston to the Poultney office and the Poultney pay roll
checks cashed at that office. The deposits in the Poultney and
Granville banks were chiefly, if not entirely, used for meeting
the pay roll checks as stated, and the average amount allowed
to remain on deposit there was at all times small in comparison
with that allowed to remain in the Boston institutions.
(6) The mill and most of the quarries referred to were owned
by the Mathews Slate Company, a corporation organized under
the laws of Maine. Only two of the quarries operated did not
belong to that company, both of them situated in New York.
One of them was owned and one leased by the bankrupt. The
properties of the Mathews Slate Company were subject to a.
mortgage given by that company to the American Loan & Trust
Company of Boston, as trustee, to secure an issue of bonds
amounting to $500,000. The bankrupt owned all the stock of
the Mathews Slate Company, except five shares held by its
directors in order to qualify them, and also owned $366,000
of the bonds issued by it, as above. All the properties of the
bankrupt. including said stock and bonds, were subject to a
mortgage given by it to the City Trust Company of Boston, as
trustee, to secure an issue of its own bonds, amounting to
· $600,000. The coupons on these bonds, due semiannually, were
payable in Boston. The money to pay them was regularly
deposited as they became due with the City Trust Company, by
the treasurer of the barikrupt company, at Boston. Since the
organization of the bankrupt company in 1902, and the giving
of the mortgage by it as above, the Mathews Slate Company
had maintained its organization under the direction of the bankrupt company, but had done no other business and had ceased
altogether to operat~ the quarries or mills belonging to it;
such operation being from that time conducted wholly by the
bankrupt company.
(7) The product of the different quarries and mill was stored
at or near them until shipped by direction from the Poultney
office as above. None of it appears to have been stored in
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Massachusetts. The property of the company in Massachusetts

not already referred to consisted of the office furniture in the

Boston office only, and some samples of slate there kept. Just

what property was kept at the Poultney office docs not appear.

(8) From 100 to 150 men were employed at the quarries

and mills referred to, not including the mill at Middle Granville,

where about 10 men were usually employed.

(9) By the bankrupt's certificate of incorporation, dated

May 1, 1902, it is declared that its principal office in the state

of New Jersey is in Jersey City in that state. It is also pro-

vided that the corporation is to have one or more offices. It had

an office in Jersey City from the time of its incorporation, at

which office all stockholders' meetings were held. The stock-

book was kept at the Boston office as above found. No stock

transfer records appear to have been kept at the New Jersey

office. It was contended by the respondent, and apparently not

denied, that the New Jersey corporation laws required the keep-

ing of all the books at that office.

The above being all the facts which seem to me material upon

the question, as I find them established by the evidence, I agree

with the referee that they show the bankrupt's principal place

of business to have been at Boston and within this district.

The bankrupt had many places of business. Besides its New
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Jersey office, its Boston office, and its Poultney office, each of the

quarries operated and the structural mill as well was a place

at which it regularly did business. It does not seem to me that

the determination of the question, which of these various places

of business was the principal one, can depend upon the amount

of property kept or the amount or value of product turned out

or the number of men employed at each of them. It might

appear that some particular quarry or the mill was principal in

this sense; yet to call that particular quarry or the mill the

bankrupt's principal place of business would not be in accord-

ance with what is usually understood by that expression. Cer-

tainly, any one who desired to have business dealings with the

corporation through its representatives would be more likely

to go to the Poultney or to the Boston office, even though fewer

employees and less property were to be found there, and no

production was actually done there. If he went to the Poultney

office he would do so because he would be more likely to find

there some one authorized to act for the corporation regarding

its quarrying and milling operations. These however, though

:\Iassachusetts. The property of the company in Massachusetts
not already referred to consisted of the office furuiture in the
Boston office only, and some samples of slate there kept. Just
what property was kept at the Poultney office dot>s not appear.
(8) From 100 to 150 men were employed at the quarries
and mills referred to, not including the mill at Middle Gra11ville.
where about 10 men were usually employed.
(9) By the bankrupt's certificate of incorporation, dated
May 1, 1902, it is declared that its principal office in the state
of New Jersey is in Jersey City in that state. It is also provided that the corporation is to have one or more offices. It had
an office in Jersey City from the time of its incorporation, at
which office all stockholders' meetings were held. The stockbook was kept at the Boston office as above found. No stock
transfer records appear to have been kept at the New Jersey
office. It was contended by the respondent, and apparently not
denied, that the New Jersey corporation laws required the keeping of all the books at that office.
The above being all the facts which seem to me material upon
the question, as I find them established by the evidence, I agree
with the referee that they show the bankrupt's principal place
of business to have been at Boston and within this district.
The bankrupt bad many places of business. Besides its New
Jersey office, its Boston office, and its Poultney office, each of the
quarries operated and the structural mill as well was a place
at which it regularly did business. It does not seem to me that
the determination of the question, which of these various places
of business was the principal one, can depend upon the amount
of property kept or the amount or value of product turned oµt
or the number of men employed at each of them. It might
appear that some particular quarry or the mill was principal in
this sense; yet to call that particular quarry or the mill the
bankrupt's principal place of business would not be in accordance with what is usually understood by that expression. Certainly, any one who desired to have business dealings with the
corporation through its representatives would be more likely
to go to the Poultney or to the Boston office, even though fewer
employees and less property were to be found there, and no
production was actually done there. If he went to the Poultney
office he would do so because he would be more likely to find
there some one authorized to act for the corporation regarding
its quarrying and milling operations. These however, though
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immediately directed from Poultney, were ultimately controlled

from Boston, and at Boston was also transacted a large part

of the company's business with which the Poultney office had

no concern, a part not less important in its relation to the

business of the company as a whole than the part which was

done at the quarries, the mills, or the Poultney office. The fact

that the supreme direction and control over all the company's

operations and dealings, and over its entire plant and prop-

erty, was exercised from the Boston office, and the fact that

in order to the exercise of such supreme direction and control

all its operations and dealings, whether relating to production,

or to sale, or to the company's finances, if not done at the Boston

office, were reported to that office and there passed upon by the

appropriate officers, who were regularly there for the purpose

of exercising such supreme direction and control, in my opinion

*makes the Boston office the headquarters of the company, and

prevents that office from being regarded as a "mere executive

office and selling agency" according to the respondent's conten-

tion. If it be said that the supreme authority lay with the

stockholders, and that they met only in Jersey City, in the

business of the company, their authority could only be exer-

cised through the officers whom they elected. When elected,
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those officers must have been understood to be regularly per-

forming their duties at Boston

The facts in this case differ materially from those in the case

relied on by the respondent, in Re Elmira Steel Company

(D. C.) 109 Fed. 456. The headquarters of the bankrupt in

that case could not be said to have been in Philadelphia. On

the contrary, as is said in the opinion in Re Magid-Hope Silk

Mfg. Co. (D. C.) 110 Fed. 352, "Its office in Pennsylvania

seems to have been merely a branch office." The referee found

that the business done in that office was less the business of the

Elmira Steel Company than the business of its selling agents

(109 Fed. 468), and that everything done in Pennsylvania was

incidental to what was done at Elmira, N. Y. No similar

finding seems to be possible in this case. It may be added

that the Elmira Steel Company, organized under the laws of

New York, expressly located its principal business office at

Elmira by its certificate of incorporation. 109 Fed. 466. If a

manufacturing company, under the circumstances shown in that

case, does its manufacturing and selling in one state and its

banking in another, it may well be considered, as was there

immediately directed from Poultney, were ultimately controlled
from Boston, and at Boston was also transacted a large part
of the company's business with which the Poultney office hacl
no concern, a part not less important in its relation to the
business of the company as a whole than the part which was
done at the quarries, the mills, or the Poultney office. The fact
that the supreme direction and control over all the company's
operations and dealings, and over its entire plant and property, was exercised from the Boston office, and the fact that
in order to the exercise of such supreme direction and control
all its operations and dealings, whether relating to production,
or to sale, or to the company's finances, if not done at the Boston
office, were reported to that office and there passed upon by the
appropriate officers, who were regularly there for the purpose
of exercising such supreme direction and control, in my opinion
'makes the Boston office the headquarters of the company, and
prevents that office from being regarded as a ''mere executive
office and selling agency'' according to the respondent's contention. If it be said that the suprenie authority lay with the
stockholders, and that they met only in Jersey City, in the
business of the company, their auth<>rity could only be exercised through the officers whom they elected. When elected,
those officers must have been understood to be regularly performing their duties at Boston
The facts in this case differ materially from those in the case
relied on by the respondent, in Re Elmira Steel Company
(D. C.) 109 Fed. 456. The headquarters of the bankrupt in
that case could not be said to have been in Philadelphia. On
the contrary, as is said in the opinion in Re Magid-Hope Silk
Mfg. Co. (D. C.) 110 Fed. 352, "Its office in Pennsylvania
seems to have been merely a branch office.'' The referee found
that the bus:iness done in that office was less the business of the
Elmira Steel Company than the busine.ss of. its selling agents
( 109 Fed. 468), and that everything done in Pennsylvania was
incidental to what was done at Elmira, N. Y. No similar
finding seems to be possible in this case. It may be added
that the Elmira Steel Company, organized under the laws of
New York, expressly located its principal business office at
Elmira by its certificate of incorporation. 109 Fed. 466. If a
manufacturing company, under the circumstances shown in that
case, does its manufacturing and selling in one state and its
banking in another, it may well be considered, as was there
1
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held (109 Fed. 471), that it is the principal place of its prin-

cipal business that must govern. I do not regard the fact that

the present bankrupt did the greater part of its bauking in

Boston as of itself enough to make Boston the headquarters of

the company. The banking done was only one of the component

parts of the bankrupt's business. I consider the Boston office

to have been the bankrupt's principal place of business, because

all the component parts of its business were so far done at or

directed from that office, as to make it proper to regard both the

other offices, and each quarry, and the mill, as subordinate

places of business. * * * [The referee's] report is there-

fore confirmed and adjudication ordered.4

B. Who Mat Become Bankrupts

1. NATURAL PERSONS—EXCEPTION (AS TO INVOLUNTARY BANK-

RUPTCY) IN THE CASES OF:

a. Wage-earners

FIRST NAT. BANK OF WILKES-BARRE v. BARNUM

160 Fed. 245

held ( 109 Fed: 471), that it is the principal place of its principal business that must govern. I do not regard the fact that
the present bankrupt did the greater part of its bauking in
Boston as of itself enough to make Boston the headquarters of
the company. The banking done was only one of the component
parts of the bankrupt's business. I consider the Boston office
to have been the bankrupt's principal place of busim·ss, because
all the component parts of its business were so far done at or
directed from that office, as to make it proper to regard both the
other offices, and each quarry, and the mill, as subordinate
places of business. • • • [The referee's] report is therefore confirmed and adjudication ordered;'

(District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania. March 9,

B. WHO MAY BECOME BANKRUPTS

1908)

ARCHBALD, District Judge. These are involuntary pro-

ceedings, and are resisted by the respondent on the grounds:

1.

NATURAL PERSONS-EXCEPTION (AS TO INVOLUNTARY BANK-

(1) That he is a wage-earner; and (2) that the petitioners are
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not creditors. It appears, as to the first, that the respondent

RUPTCY) IN THE CASES OF :

is a music teacher, giving lessons on the piano, organ, violin,

and mandolin, at 50 cents an hour, earning from $35 to $40 a

a. Wage-earners

month, or a little less than $500 a year, some pupils coming to

his house for instruction, and others being taught at their own

FIRST NAT. BANK OF WILKES-BARRE v. BARNUM

homes. This constitutes his livelihood, in addition to which,

however, he has a summer cottage at Harvey's Lake, which he

160 Fed. 245

4—The decision of the District

Court was affirmed by the Circuit

Court of Appeals for the First Cir-

cuit in 144 Fed. 737, 75 C. C. A.

(Di.strict Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania.
1908)

March 9,

603. The Supreme Court denied an

application for a writ of certiorari

in 50 L. ed. 1176, 26 Sup. Ct. 764.

Acc. In re Penna. Consol. Coal

Co., 163 Fed. 579. See also as to

whether it is necessary that a for-

eign corporation obtain a certificate

to do business in the state where the

bankruptcy proceeding is brought,

In re Duplex Radiator Co., 142 Fed.

906.

ARCHBALD, District Judge. These are involuntary proceedings, and are resisted by the respondent on the grounds:
(1) That he is a wage-earner; and· (2) that the petitioners are
not creditors. It appears, as to the first, that the respondent
is a music teacher, giving lessons on the piano, organ, violin,
and mandolin, at 50 cents an hour, earning from $35 to $40 a
month, or a little less than $500 a year, some pupils coming to
his house for instruction, and others being taught at their own
aomes. This constitutes his livelihood, in addition to which,
however, he has a summer cottage at Harvey's Lake, which he
4-Tbe Jecision of the District
Court was affir~ed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the First Cir·
cuit in 144 Fed. 737, 75 C. C. A.
60~. Thi- Supreme Court denied an
application for a writ of certiorari
in 50 L. ed. 1176, 26 Sup. Ct." 764.
A.cc. In re Penna. Consol. Coal

Co., 163 Fed. 5i9. Sec also as to
whether it is necessary that a fr.r.
eign corporation obtain a ce~eato
to do business in the state where the
bankruptcy proceeding is brought,
In re Duplex Radiator Co., 142 Fed.
906.
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rents for $175 a season, and another property from which he

gets $150, besides which he has divided up certain land that he

owns, and is selling it off in lots. The question is whether under

these circumstances he is a wage-earner within the meaning of

the law, so as not to be subject to involuntary bankruptcy.

A wage-earner is denned by the bankruptcy act as one "who

works for wages, salary, or hire, at a rate of compensation not

exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars per year." By

this it is evidently intended to relieve from adverse proceed-

ings those who, not being engaged in business or trade, depend

for a living upon the result of individual labor or effort, with-

out the aid of property or capital. But not all of this class

are exempt, as is shown by the limit of $1,500. And the work

done must be such as is compensated by wages, salary, or hire,

other earnings not being put in the same category. These

terms mean much the same thing, and are no doubt collectively

used in order to cover the different possible kinds of employ-

ment comprehended within the general idea. Wages, as dis-

tinguished from salary, are commonly understood to apply to

the compensation for manual labor, skilled or unskilled, paid

at stated times, and measured by the day, week, month, or

season. Commonwealth v. Butler, 99 Pa. 535; Lang v. Simmons,

64 Wis. 525, 25 N. W. 650; Campfield v. Lang (C. C.) 25 Fed.
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128; Henry v. Fisher, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 7; Louisville, etc., R. R. v.

Barnes, 16 Ind. App. 312, 44 N. E. 1113; Fidelity Ins. Co. v.

Shenandoah Valley R. R., 86 Va. 1, 9 S. E. 759, 19 Am. St. Rep.

858; State v. Haun, 7 Kan. App. 509, 54 Pac. 130. And also

by the piece. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Costello, 33 Pa. 241;

Swift Mfg. Co. v. Henderson, 99 Ga. 136, 25 S. E. 27; Ford v.

St. Louis R. R., 54 Iowa, 728, 7 N. W. 126; Seider's Appeal, 46

Pa. 57; Adcock v. Smith, 97 Tenn. 373, 37 S. W. 91, 56 Am.

St. Rep. 810. But not by the job. Heebner v. Chave, 5 Pa. 115;

Berkson v. Cox, 73 Miss. 339, 18 South. 934, 55 Am. St. Rep.

539; Morse v. Robertson, 9 Hawaii, 195; Henry v. Fisher, 2 Pa.

Dist. R. 7. Nor including profits on the services of others.

Smith v. Brooke, 49 Pa. 147; Sleeman v. Barrett, 2 H. & C 934;

Riley v. Warden, 2 Exch. 59. Neither is it so broad a term as

"earnings," which comprehend the returns from skill and labor

in whatever way acquired. People v. Remington, 45 Hun

(N. Y.) 338; Matter of Stryker, 73 Hun, 327, 26 N. Y. Supp.

209; Id., 158 N. Y. 526, 53 N. E. 525, 70 Am. St. Rep. 489;

Jenks v. Dyer, 102 Mass. 236; Nuding v. Urich, 169 Pa. 289,

rents for $175 a season, and another property from which he
gets $150, besides which he has divided up certain land that he
owns, and is selling it off in lots. The question is whether under
these circumstances he is a wage-earner within the meaning of
the law, so· as not to be subject to involuntary bankruptcy.
A wage-earner is defined by the bankruptcy act as one "who
works for wages, salary, or hire, at a rate of compens·ation not
exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars per year.'' By
this it is evidently intended to relieve from adverse proceedings those who, not being engaged in business or trade, depend
for a living upon the result of individual labor or effort, without the aid of property or capital. But not all of this class
are exempt, as is shown by the limit of $1,500. And the work
done must be such as is compensated by wages, salary, or hire,
other earnings not being put in the same category. These
terms mean much the same thing, and are no doubt collectively
used in order to cover the different possible kinds of employment comprehended within the general idea. Wages, as distinguished from salary, are commonly understood to apply to
the compensation for manual labor, skilled or unskilled, paid
at stated times, and measured by the day, week, month, or
season. Commonwealth v. Butler, 99 Pa. 535; Lang v. Simmons,
64 Wis. 525, 25 N. W. 650; Campfield v. Lang (C. C.) 25 Fed.
128; Henry v. Fisher, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 7; Louisville, etc., R. R. v.
Barnes, 16 Ind. App. 312, 44 N. E. 1113; Fidelity Ins. Co. v.
Shenandoah Valley R. R., 86 Va. 1, 9 S. E. 759, 19 Am. St. Rep.
858; State v. Haun, 7 Kan. App. 509, 54 Pac. 130. And also
by the piece. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Costello, 33 Pa. 241;
Swift l\ffg. Co. v. Henderson, 99 Ga. 136, 25 S. E. 27; Ford v.
St. Louis R. R., 54 Iowa, 728, 7 N. W. 126; Seider's Appeal, 46
Pa. 57; Adcock v. Smith, 97 Tenn. 373, 37 S. W. 91, 56 Am.
St. Rep. 810. But not by the job. Heebner v. Chave, 5 Pa. 115;
Berkson v. Cox, 73 Miss. 339, 18 South. 934, 55 Am. St. Rep.
539; Morse v. Robertson, 9 Hawaii, 195; Henry v. Fisher, 2 Pa.
Dist. R. 7. Nor including profits on the services of others.
Smith v. Brooke, 49 Pa. 147; Sleeman v. Barrett, 2 H. & C. 934;
Riley v. Warden, 2 Exch. 59. Neither is it so broad a term as
''earnings,'' which comprehend the returns from skill and labor
in whatever way acquired. People v. Remington, 45 Hun
(N. Y.) 338; l\Iatter of Stryker, 73 Hun, 327, 26 N. Y. Supp.
209; Id., 158 N. Y. 526, 53 N. E. 525, 70 Am. St. Rep. 489;
Jenks v. Dyer, 102 Mass. 236; Nuding v. Urich, 169 Pa. 289,
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32 Atl . 409; Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R. R, 177 Pa. 1, 35 Atl.

191, 55 Am. St. Rep. 705; Hoyt v. White, 46 N. H. 45. Indeed

the act itself in exempting wage-earners recognizes that there

are other kinds. Salary, on the other hand, has reference to

a superior grade of services. Hartman v. Nitzel, 8 Pa. Super.

Ct. 22. And implies a position or office. Bell v. Indian Live

Stock Co. (Tex.) 11 S. W. 346. By contrast, therefore, "wages"

indicate inconsiderable pay for a lower and less responsible

character of employment. South Alabama R. R. v. Palkner,

49 Ala. 115; Gordon v. Jennings, 9 Q. B. Div. 45. Where salary

is suggestive of something higher, larger, and more permanent.

Meyers v. N. Y., 69 Hun, 29, 23 N. Y. Supp. 484; White v.

Koehler, 70 N. J. Law, 526, 57 Atl. 124; State v. Duncan, 1 Tenn.

Ch. App. 334; Palmer v. Marquette Rolling Mill, 32 Mich. 274.

The word "hire" is rather associated with the act of employ-

ment than the reward for services done; and in the latter con-

nection is more on the plane of wages than of salary, although

in a sense it comprehends both; and is also applied to engag-

ing the use of property. We hire a coachman, a gardener, or

a cook; or a carriage to take a ride. And may also be said

to hire a superintendent, a bookkeeper, or a clerk, although

it would seem more correct, in the latter instances, to say engage

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

or employ. In some communities, a farm hand is called a

hireling, without intending any reflection, although in general

speech the term is one of reproach. As further defining its

use, a laborer, according to Sacred Writ, is said to be worthy

of his hire. And coming up from the people, as the word thus

does, it is sometimes applied, out of place, to the securing of

professional services, as where one is said to hire a lawyer,

a doctor, or a person of that class.

The cases directly decided under the bankruptcy act confirm

these views. Thus, it is held that a person doing hauling with

his team by the day—which affords a good example of what

may in strictness be termed a hiring—is a wage-earner. In re

Yoder (D. C.) 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 445, 127 Fed. 894. Although

it is said that, in allowing the priority given to wages by the

act, the amount due for the use of the team must be distinguished

from that for the services of the person himself. In re Winton

Lumber Co., 17 Am. Bankr. Rep. 117. So money due for piece

work, paid weekly, is held to be wages. In re Gurewitz, 10 Am.

Bankr. Rep. 350, 121 Fed. 982, 58 C. C. A. 320. And a book-

keeper, in the employ of others, receiving a salary of $65 or

32 A tl. 409; Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R. R., 177 Pa. 1, 35 Atl.
191, 55 Am. St. Rep. 705; Hoyt v. White, 46 N. H. 45. Indeed
the act itself in exempting wage-earners recognizes that there
are other kinds. Salary, on the other hand, has reference to
a superior grade of services. Hartman v. Nitzel, 8 Pa. Super.
Ct. 22. And implies a position or office. Bell v. Indian Live
Stock Co. (Tex.) 11 S. W. 346. By contrast, therefore, "wages"
indicate inconsiderable pay for a lower and less responsible
character of employment. South Alabama R. R. v. Falkner,
49 Ala. 115; Gordon v. Jennings, 9 Q. B. Div. 45. Where salary
is suggestive of something higher, larger, and more permanent.
Meyers v. N. Y., 69 Hun, 29, 23 N. Y. Supp. 484; White v.
Koehler, 70 N. J. Law, 526, 57 Atl. 124; State v. Duncan, 1 Tenn.
Ch. App. 334; Palmer v. Marquette Rolling Mill, 32 Mich. 274.
The word "hire" is rather associated with the act of employment than the reward for services done; and in the latter connection is more on the plane of wages than of salary, although
in a sense it comprehends both; and is also applied to engaging the use of property. We hire a coachman, a g~rdener, or
a cook ; or a carriage to take a ride. And may also be said
to hire a superintendent, a bookkeeper, or a clerk, although
it would seem more correct, in the latter instances, to say engage
or employ. In some communities, a farm hand is called a
hireling, without intending any reflection, although in general
speech the term is one of reproach. As further defining its
use, a laborer, according to Sacred Writ, is said to be worthy
of bis hire. And coming up from the people, as the word thus
does, it is sometimes applied, out of place, to the securing of
professional services, as where one is said to hire a lawyer,
a doctor, or a person of that class.
The cases directly decided under the bankruptcy act confirm
these views. Thus, it is held that a person doing hauling with
his team by the day-which affords a good example of what
may in strictness be termed a hiring-is a wage-earner. In re
Yoder (D. C.) 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 445, 127 Fed. 894. Although
it is said that, in allowing the priority given to wages by the
act, the amount due for the use of the team must be distinguished
from that for the services of the person himself. In re Winton
Lumber Co., 17 Am. Bankr. Rep. 117. So money due for piece
work. paid weekly, is held to be wages. In re Gurewitz, 10 Am.
Bankr. Rep. 350, 121 Fed. 982, 58 C. C. A. 320. And a bookkeeper, in the employ of others, receiving a salary of $65 or

64

JURISDICTION

64

JURISDICTION

$70 a month, is a wage-earner within the meaning of the

law. In re Pilger (D. C.) 9 Am;. Bankr. Rep. 244, 118 Fed. 206.

And so, as we may assume—applying the same principle—

would be the chorister of a church, paid a specified yearly sum

for his services. Catlin v. Ensign, 29 Pa. 264. Or a traveling

salesman receiving a percentage commission on the amount of

his sales. Hamberger v. Marcus, 157 Pa. 133, 27 Atl. 681,

37 Am. St. Rep. 719. But not a factor or broker, engaged in

the business of selling goods on commission. Id. Nor a mill-

owner, who saws lumber for others at so much a thousand.

Campfield v. Lang (C. C.) 25 Fed. 128. Nor one who builds

a house or other structure, by contract, even though he does

a part of the work himself. Berkson v. Cox, 73 Miss. 339, 18

South. 934, 55 Am. St. Rep. 539; Henry v. Fisher, 2 Pa. Dist.

R. 7; Morse v. Robertson, 9 Hawaii, 195. Nor one who ;tows a

canal boat. Ryan v. Hook, 34 Hun, 191. Or threshes out grain

by the job. Johnston v. Barrills, 27 Or. 251, 41 Pac. 656, 50

Am. St. Rep. 717. Nor are the fees of lawyers, physicians, and

the like to be classed as wages. Vane v. Newcombe, 132 U. S.

220, 10 Sup. Of 60, 33 L. ed. 310; People v. Myers (Sup.)

11 N. Y. Supp. 217. Nor the debts due to a blacksmith from his

customers for his services. Tatum v. Zachry, 86 Ga. 573,
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12 S. E. 940. Nor is a school teacher a laborer or servant;

however, we may speak of one, at times, as being hired. School

District v. Gautier, 13 Okl. 194, 73 Pac. 954.

From these considerations, as it seems to me, but one con-

clusion can be drawn. A person, like the respondent, giving

music lessons at so much an hour, is not a wage-earner within

the meaning of the act. Teaching is a profession, denoting a

nicer relation and involving a finer character of work, and

entitled, like that of the lawyer, doctor, the engineer, the archi-

tect, or the minister, to be regarded as upon a higher plane.

His work is mental, not physical. He labors with his head,

not his hands. And while that may not be distinctly conclusive,

it has its weight. He is the tutor, or instructor, of his pupil,

not his servant; his, of the two, being the master mind. This

is not to say that one who works for a salary, like the teachers

in our public schools, may not be wage-earners, within the mean-

ing of the bankruptcy law. The fact of being under a salary

makes a difference, and brings the case squarely within the act,

although it may be noticed in passing that, in the school laws

of the state, teachers are said to be appointed, not employed or

$70 a month, is a wage-earner within the· meaning of the
law. In re Pilger (D. C.) 9 A~. Bankr. Rep. 244, 118 Fed. 206.
And so, as we may assume--applying the same principle-would be the chorister of a church, paid a specified yearly sum
for his services. Catlin v. Ensign, 29 Pa. 264. Or a traveling
salesman receiving a percentage commission on the amount of
his sales. Hamberger v. :Marcus, 157 Pa. 133, 27 Atl. 681,
37 Am. St. Rep. 719. But not a factor or broker, engaged in
the business of selling goods on commission. Id. Nor a millowner, who saws lumber for others at so much a thousand.
Campfield v. Lang (C. C.) 25 Fed. 128. Nor one who builds
a house or other structure, by contract, even though he does
a part of the work himself. Berkson v. Cox, 73 Miss. 339, 18
South. 934, 55 Am. St. Rep. 539; Henry v. Fisher, 2 Pa. Dist.
R. 7; Morse v. Robertson, 9 Hawaii, 195. Nor one who tows a
canal boat. Ryan v. Hook, 34 Hun, 191. Or threshes out grain
by the job. Johnston v. Barrills, 27 Or. 251., 41 Pac. 656, 50
Am. St. Rep. 717. Nor are the fees of lawyers, physicians, and
the like to be classed as wages. Vane v. Newcombe, 132 U. S.
220, 10 Sup. Ct. ' 60, 33 L. ed. 310; People v. Myers (Sup.)
11 N. Y. Supp. 217. Nor the debts due to a blacksmith from his
customers for his services. Tatum v. Zachry, 86 Ga. 573,
12 S. E. 940. Nor is a school teacher a laborer or servant;
however, we may speak of one, at times, as being hired. School
District v. Gautier, 13 Oki. 194, 73 Pac. 954.
From these considerations, as it seems to me, but one conclusion can be drawn. A person, like the respondent, giving
music lessons at so much an hour, is not a wage-earner within
the meaning of the act. Teaching is a profession, denoting a
nicer relation and involving a finer character of work, and
entitled, like that of the lawyer, doctor, the engineer, the architect, or the minister, to be regarded a8 upon a higher plane.
His work is mental, not physical. He labors with his head,
not bis hands. And while that may not be distinctly conclusive,
it bas its weight. He is the tutor, or instructor, of his pupil.
not his servant ; his, of the two, being the master mind. This
is not to say that one who works for a salary, like tbe teachers
in our public schools, may not be wage-earners, within the meaning of the bankmptey law. The fact of being under a salary
makes a difference, and brings the ease squarely within the act,
although it may be noticed in passing that, in the school laws
of the state, teachers are said to be appointed, not employed or
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hired. But the compensation received by the respondent, in

the present instance, is certainly not a salary. Neither is it

wages. And notwithstanding the misuse of the term, alluded

to above, neither can he be said to work for hire. He is simply

paid a stipulated sum or stipend in return for the instruction

which he gives, which he holds himself out as competent to

impart, being engaged so to do by his pupils or their parents,

but not hired, any more than the lawyer, doctor, or others in

professional life. The returns from his teachings may be earn-

ings, which as we have seen is a comprehensive term, but not

wage-earnings, and so not effective to exempt him from liability

here. * • • [On the second ground of objection, that the

petitioners were not creditors, the petition was dismissed.] 5

b. Farmers

BANK OF DEARBORN et al. v. MATNEY

132 Fed. 75

(District Court, W. D. Missouri. April 16, 1904)

hired. But the compensation received by the respondent, in
the present instance, is certainly not a salary. Neither is it
wages. And notwithstanding the misuse of the term, alluded
to abo\·e, neither can he be said to work for hire. He is simply
paid a stipulated sum or stipend in return for the instruction
which he gives, which he holds himself out as competent to
impart, being eugaged so to do by his pupils or their parents,
but not hired, any more than the lawyer, doctor, or others i11
professional life. The returns from his teachings may be earnings, which as we have seen is a comprehensive term, but not
wage-earnings, and so not effective to exempt him from liability
here. • • • [On the second ground of objection, that the
petitioners were not creditors, the petition was dismissed.] ~

PHILIPS, District Judge. This is a petition in involuntary

bankruptcy. There is no question made, if the defendant is

subject to the operation of the bankrupt act (Act July 1, 1898,

b. Farmers

c. 541, § 1, 30 Stat. 544 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3419]), that

he had not committed acts of bankruptcy at the time of the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

filing of the petition against him. The question of fact and

BANK OF DEARBORN et al. v. MATNEY

law raised by his answer is as to whether he was chiefly engaged

132 Fed. 75

in farming or the tillage of the soil. * * * The controlling

facts will appear in the following discussion:

Ii is not every person engaged in farming or the tillage of

(District Court, W. D. Missouri.

April 16, 1904)

the soil who is exempt from the operation of the bankrupt act,

but it is a person "engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of

the soil." The courts are generally agreed that the term "farm-

ing" is not synonymous with a tiller of the soil. To constitute

one a farmer it is not essential that he in person should till

the soil, or that his operations should be limited to agricultural

planting, sowing, and cultivation of the soil. Yet the context

indicates that the terms "farming" and "tilling of the soil"

5—Cf. In re Yoder, 127 Fed.

894; In re Pilger, 118 Fed. 206;

In re Hurley, 204 Fed. 126.

H. St A. Bankruptcy—B

PHILIPS, District Judge. This is a petition in involuntary
bankruptcy. There is no question made, if the defendant is
subject to the operation of the bankrupt act (Act July 1, 1898,
c. 541, § 1, 30 Stat. 544 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3419]), that
he had not committed acts of bankruptcy at the time of the
tiling of the petition against him. The question of fact and
law raised by his answer is as to whether he was chiefly engllged
in farming or the tillage of the soil. • • • The controlling;
facts will appear in the following discussion :
H is not every person engaged in farming or · the tillllge of
the soil who is exempt from the operation of the bankmpt ad,
but it is a person "engaged chiefly in farming or the tillngc of
the soil." The courts are generally agreed that the term "farming" is not synonymous with a tiller of the soil. To constitute
one a farmer it is not essential that he in person should till
the soil, or that his operations should be limited to agricultural
planting, sowing, and cultivation of the soil. Yet the context
indicates that the terms "farming" and "tilling of the soil"
~-: f, In re Yod&, 127 Fed.
894; In re Pilger, 118 Fed. 206;

In re Hurley, 204 Fed. 126.
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are more or less closely allied. The word "farming" was doubt-

less employed in the act as a generic term, in a comprehensive

sense. The lawmakers, coming from the wide extent of the

Republic, with its diversified agricultural adaptability, are to

be presumed to have had in mind their knowledge of the methods

in different localities of conducting the business of farming. It

is therefore reasonable to conclude that the term was not limited

merely to the production of grains and grasses and the like.

The farmer may cultivate all or a part of his lands. He may

be general or special. He may devote his cultivation to the

production of corn, or wheat, oats, or rye, or grasses, which-

ever, in his judgment, may be the more useful and profitable.

He may include also with these breeding, feeding, and rearing

of live stock, embracing cattle, horses, mules, sheep, and hogs,

for domestic use and for market. If he find it more profitable

to feed his agricultural products or his grasses to live stock

than to rely upon marketing the surplus, he may not be limited

to the quantity of live stock for such purposes to what he may

breed or rear on his farm. For this purpose he may rely entirely

upon the purchase of such live stock from his neighbors or on

the market, and utilize his farm products in feeding and fatten-

ing such "feeders" for market. Neither, in my opinion, should
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the act be so construed as to restrict the farmer entirely, under

all circumstances and conditions, to the corn and hay and

grasses he may produce for rearing such feeders and prepar-

ing them for market. In other words, where he relies largely

upon his pasture lands for grazing his cattle, and his crops of

corn may not be sufficient to carry them through the particular

winter and the feeding season, he may supplement these by

purchasing from without sufficient corn, and the like, to meet

the requirement. But certainly there should be apparent such

relation between his method of farming and the buying and

feeding of cattle, hogs, and the like, for market, as to reasonably

indicate that his farming is not made principally subsidiary

to the business of buying and selling cattle. So that, if his

chief business is that of thus trading in cattle, using his lands

as a mere feeding station, relying upon the purchased feed from

the market for preparing them for sale much more than on his

agricultural products, he may cross the dividing line between

farming as his chief business and trading in cattle as his chief

source of livelihood. No hard and fast rule can safely be laid

are more or less closely allied. The word "farming" was doubtless employed in the .act as a generic term, in a comprehensive
sense. The lawmakers, coming from the wide extent of the
Republic, with its diversified agricultural adaptability, are to
be presumed to have had in mind their knowledge of the methods
in different localities of conducting the business of farming. It
is therefore reasonable to conclude that the term was not limited
merely to the production of grains and grasses and the like.
The farmer may cultivate all or a part of his lands. He may
be general or special. He may devote his cultivation to the
production of corn, or wheat, oat.s, or rye, or grasses, whichever, in his judgment, may be the more useful and profitable.
He may include also with these breeding, feeding, and rearing
of live stock, embracing cattle, horses, mules, sheep, and hogs,
for domestic use and for market. If he find it more profitable
to feed his agricultural products or his grasses to live stock
than to rely upon marketing the surplus, he may not be limited
to the quantity of live stock for such purposes to what he may
breed or rear on his farm. For this purpose he may rely entirely
upon the purchase of such live stock from his neighbors or on
the market, and utilize his farm products in feeding and fattening such ''feeders'' for market. Neither, in my opinion, should
the act be so construed as to restrict the farmer entirely, under
all circumstances and conditions, to the corn and hay and
grasses he may produce for rearing such feeders and preparing them for market. In other words, where he relies largely
upon his pasture lands for grazing his cattle, and his crops of
corn may not be sufficient to carry them through the particular
winter and the feeding season, he may supplement these by
•
purchasing from without sufficient corn, and the like, to meet
the requirement. But certainly there should be apparent such
relation between his method of farming and the buying and
feeding of cattle, hogs, and the like, for market, as to reasonably
indicate that his farming is not made principally subsidiary
to the business of buying and selling cattle. So that, if his
chief business is that of thus trading in cattle, using his lands
as a mere feeding station,· relying upon the purchased feed from
the market for preparing them for sale much more than on his
agricultural products, he may cross the dividing line between
farming as his chief business and trading in cattle as his chief
source of livelihood. No hard and fast rule can safely be laid
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down by the courts indifferently applicable to all cases. Each

must depend more or less upon its own particular facts.

The case of In re Thompson (D. C.) 102 Fed. 287, principally

relied upon by the defendant, is in accord with the views enter-

tained by this court of the limit of indulgence to be accorded

to the farmer. It is observable that the learned judge made the

ease turn upon the fact that, taking into consideration the quan-

tity of land in cultivation and its product, and the quantity of

stock raised and bought, there was not such disproportion be-

tween the defendant's farming and cattle trading operations

as to exclude him from the protection of the bankrupt act.

In Re Mackey (D. C.) 110 Fed. 355, the court has furnished

a most sensible and just rule for determining whether the person

be engaged chiefly in farming or other business run in connec-

tion therewith. The court said:

"A person engaged chiefly in farming is one whose chief

occupation or business is farming. The chief occupation or

business of one, so far as worldly pursuits are concerned, is that

which is of principal concern to him, of some permanency in its

nature, and on which he chiefly relies for his livelihood, or as

the means of acquiring wealth, great or small. "That one may

principally devote his physical exertions or his time to a given
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pursuit, while one of the factors entitled to consideration, is not

in all cases determinative of the question whether that pursuit

is his chief occupation or business. * * * If such dealing

is of principal concern to him, and chiefly relied on by him for

his subsistence and financial advancement, and if he treats it

as of paramount importance to his welfare, he would not be

within the category of persons chiefly engaged in farming, even

were his farm to yield him some profit. * * * It is evi-

dent that it is impracticable, if not impossible, to define with

precision the facts which will in all cases determine whether

one is engaged chiefly in farming, and that each case must be

decided on its own circumstances. It may, however, legitimately

he stated, generally, that, if it appears in a given case that

one's occupation or business which is of principal concern to

him, not ephemeral, but of some degree of permanency, and on

which he mainly relies for his livelihood and financial welfare,

be other than farming, he is not 'a person engaged chiefly in

farming.' No one should be held exempt from the provisions

of the bankrupt act on this ground unless it satisfactorily ap-

pears that he comes within the exception."

down by the courts indifferently applicable to all cases. Each
must depeud more or less upon its own particular facts.
The case of In re Thompson (D. C.) 102 F'ed. 287, principally
relied upon by the defendant, is in accord with the views entertained by this court of the limit of indulgence to be accorded
to the farmer. It is observable that the learned judge made the
case turn upon the fact that, taking into consideration the quantity of land in cultivation and its product, and the quantity of
stock raised and bought, there was not such disproportion between the defendant's farming and cattle trading operations
as to exclude him from the protection of the bankrupt act.
In Re Mackey (D. C.) 110 Fed. 355, the court has furnished
a most sensible and just rule for determining whether the person
be engaged chiefly in farming or other business run in connection therewith. The court said :
''A person engaged chiefly in farming is one whose chief
occupation or business is farming. The chief occupation or
business of one, so far as worldly pursuits are concerned, is that
which is of principal concern to him, of some permanency in its
nature, and on which he chiefly relies for his livelihood, or as
the means of acquiring wealth, great or small. ·That one may
principally devote his physical exertions or his time to a given
pursuit, while one of the factors entitled to considez:ation, is not
in all cases determinative of the question whether that pursuit
is his chief occupation or business. • • • If such dealing
is of principal concern to him, and chiefly relied on by him for
his subsistence and financial advancement, and if he treats it
as of paramount importance to his welfare, he would not be
within the category of persons chiefly engaged in farming, even
were his farm to yield him some profit. • • • It is evident that it is impracticable, if not impossible, to define with
precision the facts which will in all cases determine whether
one is engaged chiefly in farming, and that each case must be
decided on its own circumstances. It may, however, legitimately
be stated, generally, that, if it appears in a given case that
one's occupation or business which is of principal concern to
him, not ephemeral, but of some degree of permanency, and on
which he mainly relies for his livelihood and financial welfare,
be other than farming, he is not 'a person engaged chiefly in
farming.' No one should be held exempt from the provisions
of the bankrupt act on this ground unless it satisfactorily appears that he comes within the exception.''
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The same test is applied by the court in Wulbern et al. v.

Drake, 120 Fed. 495, 56 C. C. A. 645, as follows:

"It does not matter if the person may have other business

or other interests, if his principal occupation is that of an

agriculturalist—if that is the business to which he devotes more

largely his time and attention—which he relies upon as a source

of income for the support of himself and family, or for the

accumulation of wealth."

In the case at bar it is true that the defendant grew to man-

hood on his father's farm. After he attained his majority and

began to work for himself, his father had a store on the home-

stead, and was postmaster there, and at one time ran a mill.

He gave his principal attention to his store and the post office.

The farm and homestead, consisting of about 385 acres, were

run by the defendant and his brother, accounting to the father

for one-half of the crops. The defendant from the outset mani-

fested a passion for dealing in cattle, buying arid selling, so

much so that it was conceded in argument that up to 1893 he

dealt in the buying and shipping of cattle to such an extent that

he became largely indebted for moneys borrowed to exploit this

business. Up to 1900 he and his brother continued to occupy

the farm as tenants under the father; so that during that
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period his farming operations, as such, consisted in the use of

192% acres of land of his father, on which he paid one-half

of the crop as rental.

*•••••••*

He bought some more land in the early part of 1903, which

made the amount of land he owned and the leased land, in

1903, something over 600 acres. The result of his business opera-

tions was that in August, 1903, when the petition in bank-

ruptcy was filed against him, he was indebted to the extent of

over $52,000. It is conceded that over $39,000 of this indebted-

ness is referable to his dealings in live stock and the purchase

of corn for their feeding. The land owned by him, 295 acres,

was valued at about $65 an acre, which would leave $5,000 or

$6,000 representing his land after taking out the purchase

money.

* * * It would appear that, while the defendant's total

crop and pasturage for 1901 amounted to about $1,770, an

examination of his checks at one bank shows that he spent

$8.-906 that season for corn, while his mortgages indicate that he

must have expended about $6,700 for stock to feed.

The same test is applied by the court in W ulbern et al. v.
Drake, 120 Fed. 495, 56 C. C. A. 645, as follows:
''It does not matter if the person may have other business
or other interests, if his principal occupat~on is that of an
agriculturalist-if that is the business to which he devotes more
largely his time and attention-which he relies upon as a source
of income for the support of himself and family, or for the
accumulation of wealth.''
In the case at bar it is true that the defendant grew to manhood on his father's farm. After he attained his majority and
began to work for himsel~, his father had a store on the homestead, and was postmaster there, and at one time ran a mill.
He gave his principal attention to his store and the post office.
The farm and homestead, consisting of about 385 acres, were
run by the defendant and his brother, accounting to the father
for one-half of the crops. The defendant from the outset manifested a passion for dealing in cattle, buying a11d selling, so
much so that it was conceded in argument that up to 1893 he
dealt in the buying and shipping of cattle to such an extent that
he became largely indebted for moneys borrowed to exploit this
business. Up to 1900 he and his brother continued to oceupy
the farm as tenants under the father; so that during that
period his farming operations, as such, consisted in the use of
192% acres of land of his father, on which he paid one-half
of the crop as rental.I

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

He bought some more land in the early part of 1903, which
made the' amount of land be owned and the leased land, in
1903, something over 600 acres. The result of his business operations was that in August, 1903, when the petition in bankruptcy was filed against him, he was indebted to the extent of
over $52,000. It is conceded that over $39,000 of this indebtedness is referable to his dealings in .live stock and the purchase
of corn for their feeding. The land owned by him, 295 acres,
was valued at about $65 an acre, which would leave $5,000 or
$6,000 representing his land aftPr taking out the purchase
money.
• • • It would appear that, while the defendant's total
crop and pasturage for 1901 amounted to about $1,770, an
l'Xamination of his checks at one bank shows that he spent
$8;906 that season for corn, while his mortgages indicate that he
must have expended about $6,700 for st~k to feed.
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There is some difficulty in arriving at the exact history of the

purchase of all cattle covered by his various mortgages. * * *

The evidence shows that under ordinary husbandry the annual

expense of conducting the defendant's farming operations would

not exceed $1,200. The evidence shows, from his accounts with

the banks, that during his operations he did business with the

banks aggregating $94,622.19, made up as follows: First

National, St. Joseph, $42,195.66; Bank of Dearborn, $44,426.53;

Tootle-Lemon Bank, $8,000. This extraordinary amount of

business done by such a farmer with the banks excites special

wonder as to how such extensive financial operations can con-

sist with the idea that the defendant was chiefly engaged in

farming on such a quantity of land. They can be traced in this

evidence to no other source than his specialty in dealing in live

stock.

The defendant claims in extenuation of his large indebtedness

at the banks that the bulk of it was created prior to 1893, and

that he has been carrying much of it since, paying interest

thereon. He seems to have kept books prior to that time, but

none since. He furnishes in his evidence no data from which

the approximate amount of his indebtedness can be ascertained

in 1893. * • •
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The state of the proofs is such, relying as it does largely upon

facts obtained from the defendant's testimony, when he kept

no books since 1893, as to render it impossible to ascertain from

the evidence exactly the times of his purchases and the number

and cost of live stock actually purchased by him on the market.

The following summary is gathered from his own statement:

During the period preceding 1900 of, say five years, he pur-

chased 6 car loads of cattle for immediate shipment, the car

loads averaging from 16 to 18 head of cattle. He also during

that time purchased, fed, and sold sheep to the extent of a car

load a year. In 1900 he purchased 10 mules, colts, which were

at once sold; price not stated. He also purchased between 50

and 60 calves, taken onto the farm. He shipped one car load

of cattle and hogs, three cars of hogs, three cars of cattle, two

other car loads of stock, not specially designated by the evi-

dence. In 1901 he bought 10 mule colts, $57 each, which he

kept from a year and a half to two years, and sold for from

$125 to $175 per head. He bought 55 or 57 calves at $14 per

head, which went onto the farm. He shipped one car load of

cattle and hogs, and one car load of cattle, hogs, and sheep.

There is some difficulty in arriving at the exact history of the
purchase of all cattle covered by his various mortgages. • • •
The evidence shows that under ordinary husbandry the annual
expense of conducting the defendant's farming operations would
11ot exceed $1,200. The evidence shows, from his accounts with
the banks, that during his operations he did business with the
banks agi:regating $94,622.19, made up as follows: First
~ational, St. Joseph, $42,195.66; Bank of Dearborn, $44,426.53;
Tootle-Lemon Bank, $8,000. This extraordinary amount of
business done by such a farmer with the banks excites special
won<ln as to how such extensive financial operations can consist with the idea that the defendant was chiefly engaged in
farming on such a quantity of land. They can be traced in this
evidence to no other source than his specialty in dealing in live
stock.
The defendant claims in extenuation of his lat"ge indebtedness
at the banks that the bulk of it was created prior to 1893, arnl
that he has been carrying much of it since, paying interest
thereon. He seems to have kept books prior to that time, but
none since. He furnishes in bis evidence no data from which
the approximate amount of his indebtedness can be ascertained
in 1893. • • •
The state of the proofs is such, relying as it does largely upon
facts obtained from the defendant's testimony, when he kept
no books since 1893, as to render it impossible to ascertain from
the evidence exactly the times of his purchases and the number
and cost of live stock actually purchased by him on the market.
The following summary is gathered from his own statement:
During the period preceding 1900 of, say five years, he purchased 6 car loads of cattle for immediate shipment, the car
loods averaging from 16 to 18 head of cattle. He also during
that time purchased, fed, and sold sheep to the extent of a car
load a year. In 1900 he purchased 10 mules, colts, which were
at once sold; price not stated. He also purchased between 50
and 60 calves, taken onto the farm. He shipped one car load
of cattle and hogs, three cars of hogs, three cars of cattle, two
other car loads of stock, not specially designated by the evidence. In 1901 he bought 10 mule colts, $57 each, which he
kept from a year and a half to two years, and sold for from
$125 to $175 per head. He bought 55 or 57 calves at $14 per
head, which went onto the farm. He shipped one car load of
cattle and hogs, and one car load of cattle, bogs, and sheep.
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In 1902 he bought 140 calves at an average price of $21.25,

out of which he at once sold 40 heifer calves; and shipped two

car loads of cattle and a car load of sheep, hogs, and cattle.

He also purchased 80 shoats (some of his hogs died of cholera);

3 mules of Guyton & Harrington, .3 from Jack Hahn, 1 from

Milt Gustin (one of which he traded to one Black for a pair,

paying $155 to boot), and 2 mules bought in Kansas City, for

the freight on which he drew his check on the Bank of Dear-

born, and which cost $400. The probable estimate of the cost

of the 10 mules would be in the neighborhood of $1,500. He

also had about 100 head of Hereford and Black yearling steers,

mortgaged October 31, 1902. These were probably calves in

1901, but he testifies that he only bought 55 or 57 calves that

year, leaving it inferable that he must have purchased some-

where about 40 or 43 not accounted for as yearlings in 1902;

and it is inferable that they were paid for with the proceeds

of the mortgage of $2,860 which covered them.

It does seem to me, in view of the conspicuous, controlling

facts in this record, that the defendant's case is brought within

the rule given by the court, supra, that where "one's occupa-

tion or business which is of principal concern to him, not

ephemeral, but of some degree of permanency, and on which
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he mainly relies for his livelihood and financial welfare, be other

than farming, he is not 'a person engaged chiefly in farming.'"

Beyond question the defendant's energies of body and mind

and his time were principally devoted to the matter of buying

and marketing live stock as the chief source of his livelihood,

and to which he chiefly looked for financial success. When he

rented lands, it was solely to get more pasture for the stock

he was buying-and preparing for market. His crops cultivated

bore comparatively little relation, in proportion, to the amount

he bought for his feeders. The great bulk of his indebtedness

was for moneys borrowed for his cattle speculation. That was

his permanent, specific business. His farming was merely

auxiliary—the incident, and not the principal thing. Banks

and others loaning him money gave him credit on his cattle,

and took mortgages thereon. His preferred creditors, whose

chattel mortgages are involved in this controversy, were secured

on the live stock he purchased. To hold such a debtor, with

his lands all covered by mortgages, owing $40,000 growing out

of buying and feeding live stock, is chiefly engaged in farm-

ing, it does seem to me would be to yield to a sentiment, rather

In 1902 he bought 140 calves at an average price of $21.25,
out of which he at once sold 40 heifer calves; and shipped two
car loads of cattle and a car load of sheep, hogs, and cattle.
He also purchased 80 shoats (some of his hogs died of cholera) ;
3 mules of Guyton & Harrington, 3 from Jack Hahn, 1 from
Milt Gustin (one of which he traded to one Black for a pair,
paying $155 to boot), and 2 mules bought in Kansas City, for
the freight on which be drew his check on the Bank of Dearborn, and which cost $400. The probable estimate of the cost
of the 10 mules would be in the neighborhood of $1,500. He
also had about 100 head of Hereford and Black yearling steers,
mortgaged October 31, 1902. These were probably calves in
1901, but he testifies that he only bought 55 or 57 calves that
year, leaving it inferable that he must have purchased somewhere about 40 or 43 not accounted for as yearlings in 1902;
and it is inferable that they were paid for with the proceeds
of the mortgage of $2,860 which covered them.
It does seem to me, in view of the conspicuous, controlling
facts in this record, that the defendant's case is brought within
the rule given by the court, supra, that where "one's occupation or business which is of principal concern to him, not
ephemeral, but of some degree of permanency, and on which
he mainly relies for his livelihood and financial welfare, be other
than farming, he is not 'a person engaged chiefly in farming.' ''
Beyond question the defendant's energies of body and mind
and his time were principally devoted to the matter of buying
and marketiug live stock as the chief source of his livelihood,
and to which he chiefly looked for financial success. When he
rented lands, it was solely to get more pasture for the stock
he was buying' and preparing for market. His crops cultivated
bore comparatively little relation, in proportion, to the amount
he bonght for his feeders. The great bulk of bis indebtedness
was for moneys borrowed for his cattle speculation. That was
his permanent, specific business. His farming was merely
auxiliary-the incident, and not the principal thing. Banks
and others loaning him money gave him credit on his cattle,
and took mortgages thereon. His preferred creditors, whose
chattel mortgages are involved in this controversy, were secured
on the live stock he purchased. To hold such a debtor, with
bis lands all covered by mortgages, owing $40,000 growing out
of buying and feeding live stock, is chiefly engaged in farming, it does seem to me would be to yield to a sentiment, rather

WHAT TIME GOVERNS AS TO CLASSIFICATION 71

WHAT Tll\IE GOVERNS AS TO CLASSIFICATTON

71

than the spirit of the bankrupt act, which is designed to secure

equality among creditors. Where such a debtor seeks protec-

tion under the exemption of the statute, he should present

tangible, reliable evidence to bring himself within the excep-

tion. This the defendant failed to do to the satisfaction of

the court.

It results that the petition to have the defendant adjudged

a bankrupt should be sustained.6 ^

c. What time governs as to classification.

PLICKINGER v. FIRST NAT. BANK

145 Fed. 162, 76 C. C. A. 132

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. May 1, 1906)

than the spirit of the bankrupt act, which is designed to S<'f'Urc
equality among creditors. Where such a debtor speks protection Ullder the exemption of the statute, he should preSPHt
tangible, reliable evidence to bring himself within the exception. This the defendant failed to do to the satisfaction of
the court.
It results that the petition to have the defendant adjudged
a bankrupt should be sustained.6

SEVERENS, Circuit Judge. This cause comes here on an

appeal from an order of the district court adjudging Flickinger

a bankrupt. • • •

c. What time governs as to classification.

Upon the merits, the first question arises upon the conten-

tion that Flickinger was exempt from bankruptcy proceedings

FLICKINGER v. FIRST NAT. BANK

under § 4b of the act of July 1, 1898 (c. 541, 30 Stat.

547 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3423]), because he was a person

145 Fed. 162, 76 C. C. A. 132

chiefly engaged in farming. The evidence shows that for some

years prior to August, 1903, Flickinger resided at Galion, Craw-

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. May 1, 1906)

ford Co., Ohio, and was actively engaged in the business of

the Flickinger Wheel Company, a manufacturing corporation
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employing a great number of men, and located at that place,

of which he was a stockholder, director, the president, and gen-

eral manager. He had also owned and cultivated a farm in

Logan county, which with the implements and stock upon it

was sold by the assignee for $21,000, and which was managed

by him, or under his direction, and on which he had a house,

which was occupied by him and frequently by his family when

he visited it for the purpose of giving direction to the cultiva-

tion and management of the farm. He went there once or twice

6—Cf. Tn re Taylor, Mattoon

Nat. Bk. v. First Nat. Bk., 102 Fed.

728, 42 C. C. A. 1; In re Hoy, 137

Fed. 175; Bisev. Bordner, 140 Fed.

566; Gregg v. Mitchell, 166 Fed.

725, 92 C. C. A. 415; In re Dwyer,

184 Fed. 880, 107 C. C. A. 204;

American Agricultural Chem. Co.

v. Brinkley, 194 Fed. 411, 114 C. C.

A. 373. As to a corporation engaged

in farming, see In re Sugar Co., 129

Fed. 640; as to a partnership, H.

D. Still's Sons v. Bank, 209 Fed.

749, 126 C. C. A. 473.

SEVERENS, Circuit Judge. This cause comes here on an
appeal from an order of the district court adjudging Flickinger
a bankrupt. • • •
Upon the merits, the first question arises upon the contention that Flickinger was exempt from bankruptcy procee~Hngs
under § 4b of the act of July 1, 1898 (c. 541, 30 Stat.
547 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3423] ), because he was a person
chiefly engaged in farming. The evidence shows that for some
years prior to August, 1903, Flickinger resided at Galion, Crawford Co., Ohio, and was actively engaged in the business of
the Flickinger Wheel Company, a manufacturing corporation
employing a great number of men, and located at that place,
of which he was a stockholder, director, the president, and general manager. He had also owned and cultivated a farm in
Logan county, which with tbe implements and stock upon it
was sold by the assignee for $21,000, and which was managed
by him, or under his direction, and on which he had a house,
which was occupied by him 11nd frequently by his family when
be visited it for the purpose of giving direction to the cultivation and management of the farm. He went there once or twice
6-Cf. Jn re Taylor, Mattoon
Nat. Rk. v. First Nat. Bk., 102 Fed.
i~S. 42 C. C. A. 1; In re Hoy, 137
'F'e<t. 175; Ri&e v. Bordner, 140 Fed.
566; Gregg v. Mitchell, 166 Fed.
725, 92 C. C. A. 415; In re Dwyer,
184 Fed. 880, 107 C. C. A. 204 ;

American Agricultural Chem. Co.
v. Brinkley, 194 Fed. 411, 114 C. C.
A. 373. As to a corporation engaged
in farming, ~ee In re Sugar Co., l 29
Fed. 640; as to a partnership, H.
D. Still 's Sons v. Bank, 209 Fed.
749, 126 C. C. A. 473.
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a week, and telephoned his orders when he was otherwise en-

gaged. He bought whatever was bought upon the farm, and

sold all its products. In August, 1903, the wheel company went

into the "Wheel Trust," so called, after which he was not

actively occupied in its affairs. In January, 1904, the wheel

company went into the hands of a receiver appointed by the

court of common pleas of Crawford county. On May 3, 1904,

he made a general assignment for the benefit of creditors. The

petition in bankruptcy was filed September 2, 1904. Down to

the time when he made his assignment, he had made occasional

visits to his farm in Logan county, and gave direction regard-

ing its management, much as he had done while managing the

business of the Flickinger Wheel Company. He says that he

had no other business than farming after his company went

into the hands of the receiver, and that he had the sole and

exclusive management of the farm thereafter. His statement

is not contradicted and is confirmed by other witnesses, and it

does not appear that he intended to engage in any other busi-

ness. It is difficult to see how, after he made a general assign-

ment on May 3, 1904, which, of course, conveyed his farm, he

could properly be said to be chiefly engaged in farming. Four

months passed before the petition in bankruptcy was filed. We
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think it could not be held that he was engaged in farming when

the petition was filed. The farm was sold on July 17, 1904, by

the assignee, who at that time was in control of it. We think

the fair conclusion from the facts shown would be that prior to

the time when the business of the wheel company went into the

hands of the receiver (January, 1904), Flickinger was engaged

in two kinds of business—manufacturing and farming—of

which the former was the chief; that after that time he was

not engaged in that business, and that farming became his chief,

in fact his only, occupation, and continued such until his as-

signment in May, 1904.

The decisive question would therefore seem to be whether

§ 4b refers to the time when an act of bankruptcy is com-

mitted for the purpose of determining the occupation, as some

of the courts in bankruptcy have held, or to the time of filing

the creditors' petition, which seems to be the natural meaning

of the words employed. It was held In re Luckhardt (D. C.)

101 Fed. 807, and In re Mackey (D. C.) 110 Fed. 355, that the

time referred to by this exception in the act is the time when

the act was done which was the ground of the adjudication.

a week, and telephoned his orders when he was otherwise engaged. He bought whatever was bought upon the farm, and
sold all its prorlucts. In August, 1903, the wheel company went
into the "Wheel Trust," so called, after which he was not
actively occupied in its affairs. In January, 1904, the wheel
company went into the hands of a receiver appointed by the
court of common pleas of Crawford county. On May 3, 1904,
he made a general assignment for the benefit of creditors. The
petition in bankruptcy was filed September 2, 1904. Down to
the time when he made his assignment, he had made occasional
visits to his farm in Logan county, and gave direction regarding its management, much as he had done while managing the
business of the Flickinger Wheel Company. He says that he
had no other business than farming after his company went
into the hands of the receiver, and that he had the sole and
exclusive management of the farm thereafter. His statement
is not contradicted and is confirmed by other witnesses, and it
does not appear that he intended to engage in any other business. It is difficult to see how, after he made a general assignment on May 3, 1904, which, of course, conveyed his farm, he
could properly be said to be chiefly engaged in farming. Four
months passed before the petition in bankruptcy was filed. We
think it could not be held that be was engaged in farming when
the petition was filed. The farm was sold on July 17, 1904, by
the assignee, who at that time was in control of it. We think
the fair conclusion from the facts shown would be that prior to
the time when the business of the wheel company went into the
hands of the receiver (January, 1904), Flickinger was engaged
in two kinds of business-manufacturing and farming--0f
which the former was the chief; that after that time he was
not engaged in that business, and that farming became his chief,
in fact his only, occupation, and continued such until his assignment in May, 1904.
The decisive question would therefore seem to be whether
§ 4b refers to the time when an act of bankruptcy is committed for the purpose of determining the occupation, as some
of the courts in bankruptcy have held, or to the time of filing
the creditors' petition, which seems to be the natural meaning
of the words employed. It was held In re Luckhardt (D. C.)
101 Fed. 807, and In re Mackey (D. C.) 110 Fed. 355, that the
time referred to by this exception in the act is the time when
the act was done which was the ground of the adjudication.
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This construction was adopted, because it was thought neces-

sary in order to defeat attempts which bankrupts might make

to escape the consequences of their acts by running under the

shelter of an excepted occupation. If the language used is fairly

susceptible of this interpretation, the argument from inconven-

ience would justify the proposed construction. This question was

presented in the case of In re Pilger (D. C.) 118 Fed. 206,

before Judge Seaman, who expressed doubt about it, but passed

it by, holding that it was unnecessary to decide it in that case.

In the case entitled In re Matson (D. C.) 123 Fed. 743, Judge

Arehbald, in deciding whether the respondent should be ad-

judged bankrupt, referred the question of occupation to the

time when he was passing upon it; but we do not know whether

the question was debated before him or not. Judge Brown, in

construing the words in § 4b, which include certain cor-

porations and exclude others from the operation of the law,

said:

"These words must be interpreted in the sense in which they

are commonly used and received, and not in any strained or

unnatural sense, for the purpose of including or of excluding

particular corporations.''

In re N. Y. & W. Water Co. (D. C.) 98 Fed. 711, 713.

A majority of the court is inclined to think that the statute
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should be regarded as having reference to the conditions exist-

ing at the time when the act of bankruptcy is committed. Upon

this construction, the facts would require a finding that the

respondent was within the exception.

There are no other questions which require consideration.

The order must be reversed, with costs to the appellant.7

TIFFANY v. LA PLUME CONDENSED MILK CO.

141 Fed. 444

(District Court, M. D. Pennsylvania. October 20, 1905)

ARCHBALD, District Judge. The controversy here is one

of jurisdiction. The respondent, a New Jersey corporation,

7—An application for a writ of

certiorari was denied by the United

States Supreme Court in 203 TJ. 8.

595, 51 L. ed. 332, 27 Sup. Ct. 783.

Acc. In re Leland, 185 Fed. 830;

In re Folkstad, 199 Fed. 363, and

This construction was adopted, because it was thought necessary in order to defeat attempts which bankrupts might mak,,
to escape the consequences of their acts by running under ~hr!
shelter of an excepted occupation. If the language used is fairly
susceptible of this interpretation, the argument from inconvenience would justify the proposed construction. This question was
presented in the case of In re Pilger (D. C.) 118 Fed. 206,
before Judge Seaman, who expressed doubt about it, but passed
it by, holding that it was unneceSMry to decide it in that case.
In the case entitled In re Matson (D. C.) 123 Fed. 743, Judge
Archbald, in deciding whether the respondent should be adjudged bankrupt, referred the question of occupation to the
time when he was passing upon it; but we do not know whether
the question was debated before him or not. Judge Brown, in
construing the words in § 4b, which include certain corporations and exclude others from the operation of the law,
said:
"These words must be interpreted in the sense in which they
are commonly used and received, and not in any strained or
unnatural sense, for the purpose of including or of excluding
particular corporations. ''
In re N. Y. & W. Water Co. (D. C.) 98 Fed. 711, 713.
A majority of the court is inclined to think that the statute
should be regarded as having reference to the conditions existing at the time when the act of bankruptcy is committed. Upon
this construction, the facts would require a finding that the
respondent was within the exception.
There are no other questions which require consideration.
The order must be reversed, with costs to the appellant. 7

see note in 11 Mich. Law Rev. 246.

But see In re Matson, 123 Fed.

743.

TIFF ANY v. LA PLUME CONDENSED MILK CO.

141 Fed. 444
(District Court, M. D. Pennsylvania. October 20, 1905)
ARCHBALD, District Judge. The controversy here is one
of jurisdiction. The respondent, a New Jersey corporation,
7-An application for a writ of
eertiorari was denied by the United
States Supreme Court in 203 U. S.
595, 51 L. ed. 332, 27 Sup. Ct. 783.
Aoc. In re Leland, 185 Fed. 830;

In re Folkl!tad, 199 Fed. 363, and
note in 11 MICH. LAW REV. 246.
But aee In re Matson, 123 Fed.
743.
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denies by its plea that it has had its principal place of business

within the district for the greater portion of six months pre-

ceding the institution of these proceedings, as averred in the

petition, and as is essential; there being no claim of residence

or domicile. Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 2 (1), 30 Stat.

545 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3420]. The evidence shows that

while" incorporated under the laws of New Jersey—and, in or-

der to comply with them, having a nominal office at Camden in

that state—the company was engaged in the business of manu-

facturing and selling condensed milk at La Plume and at Brook-

lyn, Pa., in this district, from the early part of 1903 up to

October 6, 1904, when its plant at the latter place was destroyed

by fire; that at the other having been sold the previous Jan-

uary. It also had during the same period a central office at

Scranton, from which the management of the company was

directed; the whole of its corporate business having been con-

ducted in these three places. The fire, however, broke up what

was left of its manufacturing business, which was not after-

wards resumed. But it still retained its central office at Scran-

ton, and from it, through its treasurer as its executive officer,

with the assistance of a regularly employed stenographer, pro-

ceeded to settle up its affairs. An adjustment of the insurance
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was secured, amounting to some $14,000, a considerable por-

tion of which was not paid until the latter part of November;

the relics of the fire were disposed of; accounts aggregating

about $5,000 were collected in, the money received from these

several sources being deposited in a local bank; and sundry

bills which were due were compromised and paid. The man-

ager of the burned condensary was also retained until the mid-

dle of November, and a man put in charge of what was left of

the property for some two months after that. This was the

situation on February 2, 1905, when the present petition was

filed; the debts due to the petitioning creditors having been

incurred in the course of its condensing business.

There can be no question upon this showing as to the prin-

cipal place of business of the company being within the district,

not only for the greater part, but the whole, of the six months

necessary to give jurisdiction. In re Marine Machine Co., 1

Am. Bankr. Rep. 421, 91 Fed. 630; In re Brice, 2 Am. Bankr.

Rep. 197, 93 Fed. 942; In re Elmira Steel Co., 5 Am. Bankr.

Rep. 484; Dressel v. North State Lumber Co., 5 Am. Bankr.

Rep. 744, 107 Fed. 255; In re Mackey, 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 577,

denies by its plea that it has had its principal place of business
within the district for the greater portion of six months preceding the i11stitution of these proceedings, as averred in the
petition, and as is essential; there being no claim of residence
or domicile. Dankr. Act July 1, 1B98, c. 541, § 2 ( 1), 30 Stat.
545 [U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3420]. The evidence shows that
while' incorporated under the laws of New Jersey-and, in order to comply with them, having a nominal office at Camden in
that state-the company was engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling condensed milk at La Plume and at Brooklyn, Pa., in this district, from the early part of 1903 up to
October 6, 1904, when its plant at the latter place was destroyed
by fire; that at the other having been sold the previous January. It also had during the same period a central office at
Scranton, from which the management of the company was
directed; the whole of its corporate business having been conducted in these three places. The fire, however, broke up what
was left of its manufacturing business, which was not afterwards resumed. But it still retained its central office at Scranton, and from it, through its treasurer as its executive officer,
with the assistance of a regularly employed stenographer, proceeded to settle up its affairs. An adjustment of the insurance
was secured, amounting to some $14,000, a considerable portion of which was not paid until the latter part of November;
the relics of the fire were disposed of; accounts aggregating
about $5,000 were collected in, the money received from these
several sources being deposited in a local bank ; a.nd sundry
bills which were due were compromised and paid. The manager of the burned condensary was also retained until the middle of N9vember, and a man put in charge of what was left of
the property for some two months after that. This was the
situation on February 2, 1905, when the present petition was
filed; the debts due to the petitioning creditors having been
incurred in the course of its condensing business.
There can be no question upon this showing as to the principal place of business of the company being within the district,
not only for the greater part, but the whole, of the six months
necessary to give jurisdiction. In re Marine Machine Co., 1
Am. Bankr. Rep. 421, 91 Fed. 630; In re Brice, 2 Am. Bankr.
Rep. 197, 93 Fed. 942; In re Elmira Steel Co., 5 Am. Bankr.
Rep. 484; Dressel v. North State Lumber Co., 5 Am. Bankr.
Rep. 744, 107 Fed. 255; In re Mackey, 6 Am. Ba.nkr. Rep. 577,

WHAT TIME GOVERNS AS TO CLASSIFICATION 75

WHAT TIME GOVERNS AS TO CLASSIPICATION

75

110 Fed. 355; In re Magid-Hope Silk Co., 6 Am. Bankr. Rep.

610, 110 Fed. 352. The fact is that (not counting the ncminnl

office at Camden, N. J.) pot only the principal part, hut sub-

stantially the whole, of its business was conducted here. It is

contended, however, that after October 6th, the date of the fire,

it was engaged in nothing hut liquidation, which is not the doing

of business within the meaning of the law, the business required

to be done, either by a corporation or an individual, in order

to give jurisdiction, being none other than that by which either

is made liable to bankruptcy, and that, the respondent here

having been out of such business for nearly four months of the

six next preceding the filing of the petition, the court has no

jurisdiction over it, and the proceedings cannot be maintained.

The question involved in this contention is not altogether a

new one, although the particular form which it assumes here

may be. "Fuit agree," as it is said in Heylor v. Hall, Palmer,

325 (1619-1629), "q si un exercise traffique, e donque devient

indebted, e apres desert son trade, e line in le pais sans ascu

trade, mes sur son ire, e luy conceale de ses Creditors, uncore

est Bankrupt quia vive p son trade, qnt le Debt grow." (It

was agreed that if one engages in traffic and thereby becomes

indebted, and afterwards abandons his trade and lives in the

country without any trade, but upon his gains, and conceals it
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from his creditors, yet is he a bankrupt, because he lives by

means of the trade out of which the debt grew). In line with

this, in Meggott v. Mills, 12 Mod. 159, s. c. Ld. Raym. 286, a

person exercising the trade of a victualer, in which he was liable

to bankruptcy, contracted a debt, and subsequently quit the

trade and became an innkeeper, after which he committed an

act of bankruptcy, and it was held that, though a man quit his

trade, he may be bankrupt for the debts that he owed before.

And in Ex parte Bamford, 15 Vesey, 449, Lord Eldon declared

that a commission in bankruptcy could be sustained beyond

doubt by an act of bankruptcy committed after retiring from

trade; the debts contracted during trade remaining unpaid. To

the same effect are Dawe v. Holsworth, Peake, 64, Doe ex dem.

v. Hayward, 2 Car. & Payne, 134, and Bailie v. Grant, 9 Bing.

121; it being stated in the latter case by Tindal, C. J., that the

point was settled. It seems to have been carried one step fur-

ther, or at least a new form given to it, in Ex parte Griffiths,

3 De G., M. & G. 174, where it was said by Knight Bruce, L. J.:

"A trader, who, after having become indebted, leaves off trade,

110 Fed. 355; In re Magid-Hope Silk Co., 6 Am. Bankr. Rep.
610, 110 Fed. 352. The fact is that (not counting the nc,.ninrl
office at Camden, N. J.) pot only the principal part, but suhstantially the whole, of its business was conducted here. It is
contended, however, that after October 6th, the date of the fire,
it was engaged in nothing but liquidation, which is not the doing
of business within the meaning of the law, the businrss required
to be done, either by a corporation or an individual, in or<ler
to give jurisdiction, being none other than that by which either
is made liable to bankruptcy, and that, the respondent hne
having been out of such business for nearly four months of the
!tlx next preceding the filing of the petition, the court has no
jurisdiction over it, and the proceedings cannot be maintained.
The question involved in this contention is not altogether a
new one, although the particular form which it assumes here
may be. "Fuit agree," as it is said in Heylor v. Hall, Palmer,
325 (1619-1629), "q si un exercise traffique, e donque devient
indebted, e apres desert son trade, e liue in le pais sans asc1t
tt-ade, mes su-r st>n tre, e luy conceale de ses Credito.rs, uncor~
est Bankn.ipt quia vive p son trade, qnt le Debt grow." (It
\Vas agreed that if one engages in traffic and thereby becomes
indebted, and afterwards abandons his trade and lives in the
~ountry without any trade, but upon his gains, and conceals it.
from his creditors, ye"t is he a bankrupt, because he lives by
means of the trade out of which the debt grew). Iu line with
this, in Meggott v. Mills, 12 Mod. 159, s. c. Ld. Raym. 286, a
person exercising the trade of a victualer, in which he was liable
to bankruptcy, contracted a debt, and subsequently quit the
trade and became an innkeeper, after which he committed an
act of bankruptcy, and it was held that, though a man <Juit his
trade, he may be bankrupt for the debts that he owed before.
And in Ex parte Bamford, 15 Vesey, 449, Lord Eldon declared
that a commission in bankruptcy could be sustained beyond
doubt by an act of bankruptcy committed after retiring from
trade; the debts contracted during trade remaining unpaid. To
the same effect are Dawe v. Holsworth, Peake, 64, Doe ex dem.
v. Hayward, 2 Car. & Payne, 134, and Bailie v. Grant, 9 Bing.
121; it being stated in the latter case by Tindal, C. J., that the
point was settled. It seems to have been carried one step further, or at least a new form given to it, in Ex parte Griffiths,
3 De G., :\I. & G. 174, where it was said by Knight Bruce, L. J.:
''A trader, who, after having become indebted, leaves off trade, ·
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is not to be heard to say to his creditor that the trading has

been left off, if a question arises whether the debtor can or can-

not be, as a trader, made bankrupt." And Lord Alverstone,

C. J., In re Worsley, 1 K. B. (1901) 309, similarly declares

that, so long as a debtor does not pay the debts which he con-

tracted while engaged in trade, he is to be regarded as still so

engaged. The doctrine of these cases was adopted and applied

in this country, in Everett v. Derby, 5 Law Rep. 225, Fed. Cas.

No. 4,576, a case arising under the bankruptcy act of 1841. Tt

was there objected that the respondent was not liable to bank-

ruptcy, not being at the time of the alleged acts, nor at the time

of the filing of the petition a merchant actually using the trade

of merchandise, nor yet a retailer, so as to bring him within the

law. But it was held by Judge Ware, on the authority of what

was said by Lord Eldon in Ex parte Bamford, supra, that the

proceedings should be sustained.

A case under the present act, more nearly approaching to the

one in hand, is to be found In re Luckhardt, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep.

307, 101 Fed. 807. The bankrupt there, who was engaged in the

retail boot and shoe trade, abandoned it and went to farming-;

and, a petition having been filed against him, it was claimed

that he was exempt. In holding him liable, however, it is said
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by Hook, J.:

"The exemption from involuntary proceedings in favor of

wage earners and persons engaged chiefly in farming or the

tillage of the soil is not intended as a means of escape for in-

solvents, whose property was acquired and whose debts were

incurred in other occupations recently engaged in. If the right

of the creditors to institute involuntary proceedings may be

thus defeated by the debtors within the period allowed for the

commencement of such proceedings, it could be defeated by a

change of occupation made coincidently with the commission

of an act of bankruptcy, and an insolvent debtor would thus be

permitted to dispose of a stock of merchandise or other prop-

erty, distribute the proceeds thereof in such manner as pleased

him, immediately become for the time being a tiller of the soil,

or a wage earner, • • * and so avoid the operation of the

bankruptcy act. Such a result is not in accord with the purpose

nor within the spirit of the law. A petition in an involuntary

proceeding must be filed within four months after the commis-

sion of the act of bankruptcy relied on, and, if an insolvent,

who is engaged in an occupation which is within the purview

is not to be beard to say to bis creditor that the trading has
been left off, if a question arises whether the debtor can or cannot be, as a trader, made bankrupt." And Lord Alverstone,
C. J., In re Worsley, 1 K. B. (1901) 309, similarly declares
that, so long as a debtor does not pay the debts which he contrac'tcd while engaged in trade, he is to be regarded as still so
engaged. The doctrine of these cases was adopted and applied
in this country, in Everett v. Derby, 5 Law Rep. 225, Fed. Cas.
No. 4,576, a case arising under the bankruptcy act of 1841. It
was there objected that the respondent was not liable to bankruptcy, not being at the time of the alleged acts, nor at the time
of the filing of the petition a merchant actually using the trade
of merchandise, nor yet a retailer, so as to bring him within the
law. But it was held by Judge Ware, on the authority of what
was said by Lord Eldon in Ex parte Bamford, supra, that the
proceedings should be sustained.
A case under the present act, more nearly approaching to the
one in hand, is to be found In re Luckhardt, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep.
307, 101 Fed. 807. The bankrupt there, who was engaged in the
retail boot and shoe trade, abandoned it and went to farming ;
and, a petition having been filed against him, it was claimed
that he was exempt. In holding him liable, however, it is said
by Hook, J.:
''The exemption from involuntary proceedings in favor of
wage earners and persons engaged chiefly in farming or the
tillage of the soil is not intended as a means of escape for insolvents, whose property was acquired and whose debts were
incurred in other occupations recently engaged in. If the right
of the cr;ditors to institute involuntary proceedings may be
thus defeated by the debtors within the period allowed for the
commencement of such proceedings, it could be defeated by a
change of occupation made coincidently with the commission
of an act of bankruptcy, and an insolvent debtor would thus be
permitted to dispose of a stock of merchandise or other property, distribute the proceeds thereof in such manner as pleased
him, immediately become for the time being a tiller of the soil,
or a wage earner, • • • and so avoid the operation of the
bankruptcy act. Such a result is not in accord with the purpose
nor within the spirit of the law. A petition in an involuntary
proceeding must be filed within four months after the commission of the act of bankruptcy relied on, and, if an insolvent,
who is engaged in an occupation which is within the purview
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of the law, has committed an act rendering him amenable to

its provisions, and desires within such period to adopt one of

the callings favored by the law and exempted from its operation

in respect of involuntary proceedings, he should not be per-

mitted to carry with him the property previously accumulated,

to the defrauding of pre-existing creditors. The excepted occu-

pations are not designed as a refuge for insolvent debtors, laden

with property and fleeing from other callings. The right of

the creditors to proceed within the period limited after the com-

mission of an act of bankruptcy cannot be thus defeated by the

debtor."

Closely in point is In re White Mountain Paper Co., 11 Am.

Bankr. Rep. 491, 127 Fed. 180, where a corporation, organized

under the laws of New Jersey for the purpose of manufactur-

ing pulp, acquired land and erected a plant in New Hampshire

for the purpose of engaging in that business, but became in-

volved before any direct manufacturing was done. In holding

it liable to proceedings in bankruptcy, notwithstanding the lat-

ter circumstance, it is said by Aldrich, J.:

"The question • • * does not depend upon * * *

whether the corporation was at the particular time of the peti-

tion actually engaged in * * * the process of manufactur-

ing. My impression would be that the language 'engaged prin-
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cipally in manufacturing • * * pursuits' was used for the

purpose of describing the kind of a corporation which may be

put into bankruptcy, and that it was not intended that the

operation of the bankrupt law upon a corporation of a kind

within the meaning of the statute should depend upon the ques-

tion whether it was actually engaged in manufacturing at the

particular time when the petition is filed."

This case was affirmed on appeal (11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 633,

127 Fed. 643, 62 C. C. A. 369) upon the somewhat narrower

ground that, in the opinion of the court, manufacturing, under

the evidence, had in fact begun, although only in its earlier

stages—a view which, while it may not adopt, does not detract

from, that expressed by the lower court. Finally, In re Moench

Co., 12 Am. Bankr. Rep. 240, 130 Fed. 685, 66 C. C. A. 37,

where the corporation at the time of filing the petition was in

the hands of receivers appointed by a state court, it was con-

tended, similarly to what it is here, that the company, having

ceased to do business when the receivers were appointed, was

not within the provisions of the act. But it was said by La-

of the law, bas committed an act rendering him amenable to
its provisions, and desires within such period to adopt qne of
the callings favored by the law and exempted from its operation
in respect of involuntary proceedings, be should not be permitted to carry with him the property previously accumulated,
to the defrauding of pre-existing creditors. The excepted occupations are not designed as a refuge for insolvent debtors, laden
with property and fleeing from other callings. The right of
the creditors to proceed within the period limited after the commission of an act of bankruptcy cannot be thus defeated by the
debtor."
Closely in point is In re White Mountain Paper Co., 11 Arn.
Bankr. Rep. 491, 127 Fed. 180, where a corporation, organized
under the laws of New Jersey for the purpose of manufacturing pulp, acquired land and erected a plant in New Hampshire
for the purpose of engaging in that business, but became involved before any direct manufacturing was done. In holding
it liable to proceedings in bankruptcy, notwithstanding the lat·
ter circumstance, it is said by Aldrich, J.:
"The question • • • does not depend upon • • •
whether the corporation was at the particular time of the petition actually engaged in • • • the process of manufacturing. My impression would be that the language 'engaged principally in manufacturing • • • pursuits' was used for the
purpose of describing the kind of a corporation which may he
put into bankruptcy, and that it was not intended that the
operation of the bankrupt law upon a corporation of a kind
within the meaning of the statute should depend upon the question whether it was actually engaged in manufacturing at the
particular time when the petition is filed.''
This case was affirmed on appeal. (11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 633,
127 Fed. 643, 62 C. C. A. 369) upon the somewhat narrower
ground that, in the opinion of the court, manufacturing, under
the evidence, had in fact begun, although only in its earlier
stages-a view which, while it may not adopt, does not detract
from, that expressed by the lower court. Finally, In re Moench
Co., 12 Am. Bankr. Rep. 240, 130 Fed. 685, 66 C. C. A. 37,
where the corporation at the time of filing the petition was in
the hands of receivers appointed by a state court, it was contended, similarly to what it is here, that the company, having
ceased to do business when the receivers were appointed, was
not within the provisions of the act. But it was said by La.-

78

78

JURISDICTION

JURISDICTION

combe, J., speaking for the Court of Appeals of the Second

Circuit:

"No case is cited in support of this proposition, and, in the

absence of authority, we shall be unwilling to hold that a cor-

poration could thus easily avoid the operation of the bank-

ruptcy act by making a general assignment, or by securing the

appointment of receivers, or by ceasing to do any business, be-

fore its creditors filed a petition against it.'!

While neither of the authorities so cited may be in exact cor-

respondence with the case in hand, the principle to be deduced

from them, applicable thereto, is clear. The liability of a per-

son, whether natural or artificial, to bankruptcy is to be judged

by the character of the pursuit in which such person was en-

gaged at the time the debts due the petitioning creditors were

incurred, with respect to which it may be conceded that, as to

a corporation, its actual business is to be considered, and not

that which it might possibly have undertaken by virtue of au-

thorized but unexercised powers. In re New York & W. Water

Co., 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 508, 98 Fed. 711; In re Tontine Surety

Co., 8 Am. Bankr. Rep. 421, 116 Fed. 401. As to such debts,

an individual does not lose his previous character by ceasing to

carry on the business in which they were contracted and turn-
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ing to another, in which he is not liable to bankruptcy, and

neither does a corporation, by stopping business altogether and

going into liquidation, voluntary or involuntary. In either case,

as to debts previously contracted, the business character of such

person, in the contemplation of the law, remains the same.

Wherever, therefore, the principal place of business of such

person has been established for the greater part of six months

preceding the filing of the petition, and without regard to the

business there carried on, as to debts previously contracted,

proceedings may be maintained.

This is not to deny the force of those cases which hold that,

where a person ceases to belong to one of the excepted classes,

he becomes liable according to the class in which he is found at

the time proceedings are instituted. In re Matson, 10 Am.

Bankr. Rep. 473, 123 Fed. 743; Hoffschlaeger v. Young Nap,

12 Am. Bankr. Rep. 521. It is simply that a different prin-

ciple applies. Nor does it seem to make any difference that the

debts due the petitioning creditors were incurred before the

change (Butler v. Easto, Doug. 295), provided only the act of

bankruptcy has been committed since. Bailie v. Grant, 9 Bing.

combe, J., speaking for the Court of Appeals of the Second
<Jircuit:
"No case is cited in support of this proposition, and, in the
absence of authority, we shall be unwilling to hold that a corporation could thus easi1y avoid the operation of the bankruptcy act by making a general assignment, or by securing the
appointment of receivers, or by ceasing to do any business, before its creditors filed a petition against it.'~
While neither of the authorities so cited may be in exact correspondence with the case in hand, the principle to be deduced
from them, applicable thereto, is clear. The liability of a person, whether natural or artificial, to bankruptcy is to be judged
by the character of the pursuit in which such person was engaged at the time the debts due the petitioning creditors were
incurred, with respect to which it may be conceded that, as to
a corporation, its actual business is to be considered, and not
that which it might possibly have undertaken by virtue of authorized but unexercised powers. In re New York & W. Water
Co., 3 Am. Bankr. Rep. 508, 98 Fed. 711; In re Tontine Surety
Co., 8 Am. Bankr. Rep. 421, 116 Fed. 401. As to such debts,
an individual does not lose his previous character by ceasing to
carry on the business in which they were contracted and turning to another, in which he is not liable to bankruptcy, and
neither does a corporation, by stopping business altogether and
going into liquidation, voluntary or involuntary. In either case,
as to debts previously contracted, the business character of such
person, in the contemplation of the law, remains the same.
Wherever, therefore, the principal place of business of such
person has been established for the greater part of six months
preceding the filing of the petition, and without regard to the
business there carried on, as to debts previously contracted,
proceedings may be maintained.
This is not to deny the force of those cases which hold that,
where a person ceases to belong to one of the excepted classes,
he becomes liable according to the class in which he is found at
the time proceedings are iDBtituted. In re Matson, 10 Am.
Bankr. RC'p. 473, 123 Fed. 743; Hoffschlaeger v. Young Nap,
12 Am. Baukr. Rep. 521. It is simply that a different principle applies. Nor does it seem to make any difference that the
debts due the petitioning creditors were incurred before the
change (Butler v. Easto, Doug. 295), provided only the act of
bankruptcy has been committed since. Bailie v. Grant, 9 Bing.
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121. As declared in the latter case, "a debt contracted before

trade, but remaining unpaid at and after the time the debtor

enters into trade," is "a subsisting debt for every purpose, and

subject to every consequence which belongs to a debt originally

contracted during trade." But without enlarging upon this,

which is somewhat obiter, whatever be the rule where a change

is made from an exempt to a nonexempt class, there can be no

question as to what is the rule here.

The exceptions to the report of the referee are overruled, the

issue raised by the plea is found in favor of the petitioners, and

the respondent is directed to answer over witiain 10 days.8

2. PERSONS OF ABNORMAL, LEGAL STATUS

a. Infants

In re WALRATH

175 Fed. 243

(District Court, N. D. New York. January 4, 1910)

121. As declared in the latter case, ''a debt contracted befon'
trade, but remaining unpaid at and after the time the debtor
enters into trade," is "a subsisting debt for every purpose, and
subject to every consequence which belongs to a debt origiually
contracted during trade." But without enlarging upon this,
which is somewhat obiter, whatever be the rule where a change
is made from an exempt to a nonexempt class, there can be no
question as to what is the rule here.
The exceptions to the report of the referee are overruled, the
issue raised by the plea is found in favor of the petitioners, and
the respondent is directed to answer over wifoin 10 days.8

RAY, District Judge. The above-named bankrupt is an in-

fant under the age of 21 years, and it is alleged that for such

reason this court has no jurisdiction to grant a discharge in

2.

PERSONS OF ABNORMAL LEGAL STATUS

this proceeding. Henry L. Walrath filed his voluntary petition

in bankruptcy on or about May 26, 1909. An adjudication was

a. Infants

made, and the matter referred to C. L. Stone, Esq., one of the
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referees in bankruptcy. The first meeting of creditors was held

In re WALRATH

July 19, 1909, and Frank E. Parsnow, a creditor, appeared and

filed his claim in the sum of $939.40, and same was duly proved

175 Fed. 243

and allowed. A. H. Sheldon was appointed trustee of the estate

of said bankrupt, and Parsnow participated in such appoint-

(District Court, N. D. New York. January 4, 1910)

ment. The trustee duly qualified and acted. Parsnow de-

manded an examination of such bankrupt, and such examina-

tion was had. It appears there were no assets. No other cred-

itor proved a claim. September 15, 1909, the bankrupt filed

his petition in due form, asking a discharge under the bank-

ruptcy law. The referee has filed his certificate of conformity

and recommends a discharge. On the return of the order to

show cause on such petition for a discharge, said Frank E.

8—Acc. In re Bnrgin, 173 Fed.

726; In re Wakefield, 182 Fed. 247;

see note in 23 Harv. Law Rev. 393.

RAY, District Judge. The above-named bankrupt is an infant under the age of 21 years, and it is alleged that for such
reason this court has no jurisdiction to grant a discharge in
this proceeding. Henry L. Walrath filed his voluntary petition
in bankruptcy on or about May 26, 1909. An adjudication was
made, and the matter referred to C. L. Stone, Esq., one of the
referees in bankruptcy. The first meeting of creditors was held
July 19, 1909, and Frank E. Parsnow, a creditor, appeared and
filed his claim in the sum of $939.40, and same was duly proved
and allowed. A. H. Sheldon wa~ appointed trustee of the estate
of said bankrupt, and Parsnow participated in such appointment. The trustee duly qualified and acted. Parsnow demanded an examination of such bankrupt, and such examination was had. It appears there were no assets. No other creditor proved a claim. September 15, 1909, the bankrupt filed
his petition in due form, asking a discharge under the bankruptcy law. The referee has filed his certificate of conformity
and recommends a discharge. On the return of the order to
show cause on such petition for a discharge, said Frank E.
8--~cc.
In re Burgin, 173 Fed.
726; In re Wakefield, 182 Fed. 247;
aee note in 23 HARV. LAW REV. 393.
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Parsnow, who had proved such claim, filed specifications of ob-

jection to the discharge of the bankrupt on the ground that, he

being an infant, the court has no jurisdiction to grant such

order.

The claim of Parsnow proved and allowed, and which gives

him standing in court, is the amount of a judgment in his favor

against Walrath in an action for negligence, from which no

appeal has been taken. The said objecting creditor has not at

any stage moved to open the adjudication or dismiss the peti-

tion instituting the bankruptcy proceedings. Infants are liable

for some debts, and they and their property may be bound in

judgment therefor. This claim of Parsnow is one of that class.

It has been so adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Walrath, the bankrupt, owes the debt. He owed the debt when

the proceeding in bankruptcy was instituted. The law has so

adjudged. The bankruptcy act, "An act to establish a uniform

system of bankruptcy throughout the United States," approved

July 1, 1898 (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 545 [U. S.

Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418]), as amended February 5, 1903 (32

Stat. 797, c. 487), and June 15, 1906 (34 Stat. 267, c. 3333),

provides in § 1 that "'debt' shall include any debt, de-

mand or claim provable in bankruptcy," and in § 2 that
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the courts of bankruptcy shall have power to "adjudge persons

bankrupt who,'' etc., and in § 4 that '' any person who

owes debts, except a corporation, shall be entitled to the benefits

of this act as a voluntary bankrupt," and in § 63 that

"debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his

estate which are (1) a fixed liability as evidenced by a judg-

ment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the time

of the filing of the petition against him," etc.

This was a provable debt, and was proved by this objecting

creditor, and duly allowed. The act nowhere excepts infants

from its provisions or benefits. The language is as broad as it

could have been made in general terms to include infants, and

there is nothing elsewhere in the act indicating that they are

not included in the language quoted. There is no ground of

public policy for excluding them, or so construing the act as to

exclude them, where they owe debts. This court therefore holds

that Henry L. Walrath was, although an infant, entitled to the

benefits of the act, and that he was properly adjudicated a

bankrupt. The proceedings had are neither void nor voidable.

Parsnow, who had proved such claim, filed specifications of objection to the discharge of the bankrupt on the ground that, he
being an infant, the court has no jurisdiction to grant such
order.
The claim of Parsnow proved and allowed, and which gives
him standing in court, is the amount of a judgment in his favor
against Walrath in an action for negligence, from which no
nppeal has been taken. The said objecting creditor has not at
any stage moved to open the adjudication or dismiss the petition instituting the bankruptcy proceedings. Infants are liable
for some debts, and they and their property may be bound in
judgment therefor. This claim of Parsnow is one of that class.
It has been so adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Walrath, the bankrupt, owes the debt. He owed the debt when
the proceeding in bankruptcy was instituted. The law has so
adjudged. The bankruptcy act, ''An act to establish a uniform
system of bankruptcy throughout the United States," approved
July 1, 1898 (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 545 [U. S.
Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418)), as amended February 5, 1903 (32
Stat. 797, c. 487), and June 15, 1906 (34 Stat. 267, c. 3333),
provides in § 1 that '· 'debt' shall include any debt, demand or claim provable in bankruptcy," and in § 2 that
the courts of bankruptcy shall have power to ''adjudge persons
bankrupt who," etc., and in § 4 that "any person who
owes debts. except a corporation, shall be entitled to the benefits
of this act as a voluntary bankrupt," and in § 63 that
''debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his
estate which are (1) a fixed liability as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the time
of the filing of the petition against him,'' etc.
This was a provable debt, and was proved by this objecting
creditor, and duly allowed. The act nowhere excepts infants
from its provisions or benefits. The language is as broad as it
could have been made in general terms to include infants, and
there is nothing elsewhere in the act indicating that they are
not included in the language quoted. There is no ground of
public policy for excluding them, or so construing the act as to
exclude them, where they owe debts. This court therefore holds
that Henry L. Walrath was, although an infant, entitled to the
benefits of the act, and that he was properly adjudicated a
bankrupt. The proceedings had are neither void nor voidable.
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In re Carl S. Brice, 2 Atn. Baiikr. Rep. 197, 93 Fed. 942; Collier

on Bankruptcy (7th ed.) 96, 97, where it is said:

'' An infant, either petitioning or petitioned against, must ap-

pear to have capacity to owe. It is yet a mooted question, how-

ever, whether an infant who has either held himself out and

traded as an adult, or who alleges only debts for necessaries,

cannot be adjudged bankrupt on his own petition. The better

opinion seems to be that he can."

This infant in respect to this debt was under no disability.

He owed the debt, and his property was liable for its payment.

Suppose he had owed ten debts of the same class and grade,

with only property sufficient to pay 50 cents on the dollar; is

there any good reason why he should not have been adjudged

a bankrupt, and his property applied in payment of all pro rata?

Or, should the first one to obtain judgment and execution be

allowed to sweep the deck, in the very face of the act and its

declared purpose? Under the act of 1841 (Act Aug. 19, 1841,

e. 9, 5 Stat. 440), where, as here, infants were not exempted

from its operation, it was held they were entitled to its benefits.

In re Book, 3 McLean, 317, Fed. Cas. No. 1,637. It is unques-

tionably true that an infant cannot be adjudicated a bankrupt,

unless it appears that he "owes" debts. The word "owe"
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means something: That he is now legally liable for its pay-

ment, and that it may be enforced. This being so, he is en-

titled to his discharge in this proceeding instituted for that

purpose; no other ground of objection appearing. "Any per-

son who owes debts" is entitled to the benefits of the act, and it

cannot be successfully contended that an infant is not a person.

But the validity of these proceedings cannot be challenged

here collaterally. The petitioner has been adjudicated, and

jurisdiction established. That judgment stands unimpeached.

This is an independent proceeding. In re Clisdell (D. C.) 4

Am. Bankr. Rep. 95, 101 Fed. 246; In re Mason, 3 Am. Bankr.

Rep. 599, 99 Fed. 256. §§14 and 29 state the objections

which may be interposed and litigated here. Jurisdiction and

the validity of the prior proceedings are not included. The

confusion in the cases has arisen over the attempt to show that

an infant who actually "owes" a debt for which he and his

property are liable, and which may be enforced against both,

is not entitled to the benefits of the act, for the reason that

infants who have made contracts not binding, and which may

not ever become binding, which the infant may ratify on be-

H. & A. Bankruptcy—0

In re Carl S. Brice, 2 Am. Baukr. Rep. 197, 93 Fed. 942; Collier
on Bankruptcy (7th ed.) 96, 97, where it is said:
''An infant, either petitioning or petitioned against, must appear to have capacity to owe. It is yet a mooted question, however, whether an infant who has either held himself out and
traded as an adult, or who alleges only debts for necessaries,
cannot be adjudged bankrupt on his own petition. The better
opinion seems to be that he can.''
This infant in respect to this debt was under no disability.
He owed the debt, and his property was liable for its payment.
Suppose he had owed ten debts of the same class and grade,
with only property sufficient to pay 50 cents on the dollar; is
there auy good reason why he should not have been adjudged
a bankrupt, and his property applied in payment of all pro ratat
Or, should the first one to obtain judgment and execution be
allowed to sweep the deck, in the very face of the act and its
declared purpose f Under the act of 1841 (Act Aug. 19, 1841,
c. 9, 5 Stat. 440), where, as here, infants were not exempted
from its operation, it was held they were entitled to its benefits.
In re Book, 3 McLean, 317, Fed. Cas. No. 1,637. It is unquestionably true that an infant cannot be adjudicated a bankrupt,
unless it appears that he "owes" debts. The word "owe"
means something: That he is now legally liable for its payment, and that it may be enforced. This being so, he is entitled to his discharge in this proceeding instituted for that
purpose; no other ground of objection appearing. ''Any person who owes debts" is entitled to the benefits of the act, and it
cannot be successfully contended that an infant is not a person.
But the validity of these proceedings cannot be challenged
here collaterally. The petitioner has been adjudicated, and
jurisdiction established. That judgment stands unimpeached.
This is an independent proceeding. In re Clisdell (D. C.) 4
,Am. Bankr. Rep. 95, 101 Fed. 246; In re Mason, 3 Am. Bankr.
&p. 599, 99 Fed. 256. §§ 14 and 29 state the objections
which may be interposed and litigated here. Jurisdiction and
the validity of the prior proceedings are not included. The
confusion in the cases has arisen over the attempt to show thnt
an infant who actually "owes" a debt for which he a11d liis
property are liable, and which may be enforced against horh.
i~ not entitled to the benefits of the act, for the reason that
infants who have made contracts not binding, and which may
not ever become binding, which the infant may ratify on beu.
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coming of age and then owe the debt incurred by such ratifica-

tion, but which they do not owe or cannot owe during infancy,

are not entitled to the benefits of the act; in other words, that

infants who do "owe" debts are not entitled to the benefits of

the act, for the reason infants who do not owe debts are not.

Infants with no liabilities except of the latter description

are not entitled to the benefits of the act, for the reason they

do not ""owe" debts, not for the reason they are infante. An

adult is not entitled to the benefits of the act unless he owes

debts. The disability of the infant goes to his power to incur

a debt, so that he cannot be said to owe it, not to his power to

pay or avoid a debt he actually owes, or take the benefit of a

law which releases him, or which may release him, from one he

actually "owes." The law does not say "any adult person who

owes debts, except a corporation, shall be entitled to the benefits

of this act as a voluntary bankrupt," but "any person;" and

until it can be demonstrated that an infant who owes a debt is

not a "person," such infant is within the law and entitled to

its benefits. Such infant is clearly included in the term "any

person who owes debts," etc. It would have been just as easy

for Congress to have said "Adult persons who owe debts," or

"Any adult person who owes debts," and thus have excluded
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infants who owe debts, as to have used the language it did. It

was not the purpose of Congress to secure an equal distribution

of the property of all insolvent adult persons amongst their

creditors, respectively, and give them the benefits of the act,

and leave the property of infants within the grasp of the first

creditor obtaining judgment, to the exclusion of all others, and

leave such infant liable for its unpaid debts or for the remain-

der of its unpaid debts. There is no reason why infants who

owe debts which may be enforced against them and their prop-

erty should not have the benefit of the act, and I can see no

legal obstacle to their having it.

By the adjudication it was settled that Walrath, the peti-

tioner, owed debts, and in that adjudication this objecting cred-

itor acquiesced. He made himself a party to the proceedings

in bankruptcy, when he appeared therein, and proved his claim,

and examined the bankrupt, and took part in the appointment

of the trustee of his estate. He comes here in this proceeding,

alleging that he is a creditor of this infant, and, in legal effect,

asserts that the petitioner owes to him an established and en-

forceable debt. On his own showing this infant is within and

coming of age and then owe the debt incurred by such ratification, but whid1 they do not owe or cannot owe during infancy,
are not entitled to the benefits of the act; in other words, that
infants who do "owe" debts are not entitled to the benefits of
the act, for the reason infants who do not owe debts are not.
Infants with no liabilities except of the latter description
are not entitled to the benefits of the act, for the reason they
do not "'owe'' debts, not for the reason they are infants. An
adult is not entitled to the benefits of the act unless he owes
debts. The disability of the infant goes to his power to incur
a debt, so that he cannot be said to owe it, not to his power to
pay or avoid a debt he actually owes, or take the benefit of a
law which releases him, or which may release him, from one he
actually ''owes.'' The law does not say ''any adult person who
owes debts, except a corporation, shall be entitled to the benefits
of this act as a voluntary bankrupt,' 1 but ''any person;'' and
until it can be demonstrated that an infant who owes a debt is
not a ''person,'' such infant is within the law and entitled to
its benefits. Such infant is clearly included in the term ''any
person who owes debts," etc. It would have been just as easy
for Congress to have said ''Adult persons who owe debts,'' or
"Any adult person who owes debts," and thus have excluded
infants who owe debts, as to have used the language it did. It
was not the purpose of Congress to secure an equal distribution
of the pro~rty of all insolvent adult persons amongst their
creditors, respectively, and give them the benefits of the act,
and leave the property of infants within the grasp of the first
creditor obtaining judgment, to the exclusion of all others, and
lea\·e such infant liable for its unpaid debts or for the remainder of its unpaid debts. There is no reason why infants who
owe debts which may be enforced against them and their property should not have the benefit of the act, and I can see no
legal obstacle to their having it.
By the adjudication it was settled that Walrath, the petitioner, owed debts, and in that adjudication this objecting creditor acquiesced. He made himself a party to the proceedings
in bankruptcy, when he appeared therein, and proved his claim,
and examined the bankrupt, and took part in the appointment
of the trustee of his estate. He comes here in this proceeding,
alleging that he is a creditor of this infant, and, in legal effect,
asserts that the petitioner owes to him an established and enforceable debt. On his own showing this infant is within and
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entitled to the benefits of the law. He sets up no objection

specified as a ground for refusing a discharge in §§14

and 29 of the act, and as the adjudication stands unreversed it.

must be assumed to be valid. As was said by Coxe, Circuit

Judge, In re Clisdell, supra:

"The petition for a discharge rests upon the fundamental

proposition that the petitioner has been adjudicated a bank-

rupt."

This court holds that the validity of that adjudication, not

appealed from, reversed, or set aside, cannot be questioned, on

application for a discharge, except by showing it was made by

a court having no jurisdiction to pronounce it.

Motion granted, and there will be a discharge according to

the prayer of the petition.9

b. Married Women

MAC DONALD v. TEFFT-WELLER CO. et al.

128 Fed. 381, 63 C. C. A. 123

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. March 1, 1904)

Involuntary proceedings in bankruptcy were begun in the

entitled to the benefits of the law. He sets up no objection
specitied as a ground for refusing a discharge in §§ 1 14
and 29 of the act, and as the adjudication stands unrcversed it
must be assumed to be valid. As was said by Coxe, Cireuit
Judge, In re Clisdell, supra:
••The petition for a discharge rests upon the fundamental
proposition that the petitioner has been adjudicated a bankrupt."
This court holds that the validity of that adjudication, not
appealed from, reversed, or set aside, cannot be questioned, ou
application for a discharge, except by showing it was made hy
a court having no jurisdiction to pronounce it.
l\fotion granted, and there will be a discharge according to
the prayer of the petition.9

District Court by the filing of a petition alleging, inter alia,

that "Ruth E. MacDonald is a married woman • * * and

has for several years * * * been engaged in the business

b. Married Women
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of buying, selling, and trading in dry goods • * • and has

conducted said business in her own name; • * * that the

MAC DQNALD v. TEFFT-WELLER CO. et al.

said business, and said goods, wares, and merchandise, store,

and office fixtures and furniture and store accounts are her

128 Fed. 381, 63 C. C. A. 123

separate personal property, and that the amounts due by said

Ruth E. MacDonald in the conduct of said business to peti-

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 1, 1904)

tioners, hereinafter referred to, were incurred by her for the

purchase price of the personal property, to wit, stock of goods

in the store and business of said Ruth E. MacDonald, and went

to the increase of her separate personal property, and that she

therefore charged her separate property with the payment of

the same;" that the petitioners have provable claims against the

alleged bankrupt for specified amounts, and that the alleged

9—Acc. In re Brice, 93 Fed. 942.

But see In re Eidemiller, 105 Fed.

595; In re Soltykoff. [1891] 1 Q. B.

413. As to firms in which infants

are partners, see In re Dunnigan,

95 Fed. 428, In re Duguid, 100 Fed.

274 and Jennings v. Stanmis & Son,

191 Fed. 347, 112 C. C. A. 191.

Involuntary proceedings in bankruptcy were begun in the
District Court by the filing of a petition alleging, inter alia,
that "Ruth E . .MacDonald is a married woman • • • and
has for several years • • • been engaged in the business
of buying, selling, and trading in dry goods • • • and has
conducted said business in her own name; • • • that thi>
said business, and said goods, wares, and merchandise, store,
and office fixtures and furniture and store accounts are her
separate personal property, and that the amounts due by said
Ruth E. MacDonald in the conduct of said business to petitioners, hereinafter referred to, were incurred by her for the
purchase price of the personal property, to wit, stock of goods
in the store and business of said Ruth E. MacDonald, and went
to the increase of her separate personal property, and that she
therefore charged her separate property with the payment of
the same;" that the petitioners have provable claims against the
alleged bankrupt for specified amounts, and that the alleged
9--.dcc. In re Brice, 93 Fed. 942.
But see In re Eidemiller, 105 Fed.
695; In re Soltylmff. [ 1891] 1 Q. B.
413. As to firms in which infant.a

are partners, see In re Dunnigan,
95 Fed. 428, In re Dugnid, 100 Fe<l.
274 an<l Jennings '" St.anons & Son,
191 Fed. 341, 11~ C. C. A. l!H.
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bankrupt had, within four months, made a conveyance which

was a preference of one of her creditors.

Mrs. MacDonald appeared by counsel, and filed demurrer to

the foregoing petition on the following grounds: * * *

"(5) That a married woman residing in Florida cannot be

adjudged a bankrupt; (6) that there is no personal liability for

her obligations resting upon a married woman residing and

doing business within the state of Florida, which obligations

would be enforceable against her, and that a married woman

cannot be adjudicated a bankrupt; (7) that in this court a mar-

ried woman not a free dealer cannot be adjudicated a bank-

rupt."

The court below overruled the demurrer, and this court is

asked to revise the proceedings on the grounds stated in the

demurrer.

PARDEE, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts • • •).

The question presented is whether, under the facts alleged in

the petition in this case, a married woman in the state of Florida,

having separate statutory property, and engaging in trade,

buying, and selling on her own account, but not a free dealer,

bankrupt had, within four months, made a conveyance which
was a preference of one of her creditors.
Mrs. MacDonald appeared by counsel, and filed demurrer to
the foregoing petition on the following grounds : • • •
'' ( 5) That a married woman residing in Florida cannot be
adjudged a bankrupt; (6) that there is no personal liability for
her obligations resting upon a married woman residing and
doing business within the state of Florida, which obligations
would be enforceable against her, and that a married woman
cannot be adjudicated a bankrupt; (7) that in this court a marri~d woman not a free dealer cannot be adjudicated a bankrupt.''
The court below overruled the demurrer, and this court is
asked to revise the proceedings on the grounds stated in the
demurrer.

can be adjudicated a bankrupt under the bankrupt law of 1898.

Under §§ 1505-1509, Rev. St. Fla. 1892, a married woman
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may have her disabilities removed, and she may have a license

as a free dealer authorized to contract, sue, and be sued, and in

all respects to bind herself as if she were unmarried. See Mar-

tinez v. Ward, 19 Fla. 175.

By article XI of the Constitution of the state of Florida of

1885 it is provided:

"§1. All property, real and personal, of a wife owned by

her before marriage, or lawfully acquired afterwards by gift,

devise, bequest, descent, or purchase, shall be her separate prop-

erty, and the same shall not be liable for the debts of her hus-

band without her consent given by some instrument in writing,

executed according to the law respecting conveyances by mar-

ried women.

"§ 2. A married woman's separate real or personal property

may be charged in equity and sold, or the uses, rents and profits

thereof sequestrated for the purchase money thereof; or for

money or thing due upon any agreement made by her in writ-

ing for the benefit of her separate property; or for the price of

any property purchased by her, or for labor and material used

PARDEE, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts • • •).
The question presented is whether, under the facts alleged in
the petition.in this case, a married woman in the state of Florida,
having separate statutory property, and engaging in trade,
buying, and selling on her own account, but not a free dealer,
can be adjudicated a bankrupt under the bankrupt law of 1898.
Under §§ 1505-1509, Rev. St. Fla. 1892, a married woman
may have her disabilities removed, and she may have a license
as a free dealer authorized to contract, sue, and be sued, and in
all respects to bind herself as if she were unmarried. See Martinez v. Ward, 19 Fla. 175.
By article XI of the Constitution of the state of Florida of
1885 it is provided:
"§ 1. All property, real and personal, of a wife owned by
her before marriage, or lawfully acquired afterwards by gift,
devise, bequest, descent, or purchase, shall be her separate property, and the same shall not be liable for the debts of her husband without her consent given by some instrument in writing,
executed according to the law respecting conveyances by married women.
'' § 2. A married woman's separate real or pel'Sonal property
may be charged in equity and sold, or the uses, rents and profits
thereof sequestrated for the purchase money thereof; or for
money or thing due upon any agreement made by her in writing for the benefit of her separate property; or for the price of
any property purchased by her, or for labor and material used
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with her knowledge or assent in the construction of buildings,

or repairs, or improvements upon her property, or for agricul-

tural or other labor bestowed thereon, with her knowledge and

consent.

"§ 3. The Legislature shall enact such laws as shall be neces-

sary to carry into effect this article."

It does not appear that there has been any legislation under

§ 3 of said article, but "it is well settled,'' says the Florida

Supreme Court in First National Bank of Pensacola v. Hirsch-

kowitz, 35 South. 22:

"In an unbroken line of decisions, beginning with Lewis v.

Yale, 4 Fla. 418, down to the present time, this court has held

that 'a feme covert is not competent to enter into contracts so

as to give a personal remedy against her.' As was said in Doll-

ner v. Snow, 16 Fla. 86: 'At common law the promissory note

of a married woman is void. The Constitution and statute of

this state make no change in this respect. Neither at law nor

in equity can she bind herself so as to authorize a personal judg-

ment against her.' Under the rule laid down in these decisions,

appellants could not have proceeded at law against the said

married woman, Dora Hirschkowitz, and hence could not have

reduced their claims to judgment; also see Crawford v. Feder,
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34 Fla. 397, 16 South. 287."

In the headnotes to this report, which in Florida are pre-

pared by the judges, No. 1 reads as follows:

"At common law the promissory note of a married woman

is void. The Constitution and statutes of this state make no

change in this respect, unless said married woman shall have

been made a free dealer. Neither at law nor in equity can she

bind herself so as to authorize a personal judgment against

her."

The court further says:

"It is also the settled law of this state that 'where a married

woman carries on business in her own name, having property

employed in such business, and purchases goods upon her sole

credit for the purpose of such business, her separate property

may be subjected in equity to the payment of claims for money

due for such purchases.' Blumer v. Pollak, 18 Fla. 707. Also

see Staley v. Hamilton, 19 Fla. 275; Garvin v. Watkins, 29 Fla.

151, 10 South. 818; Halle v. Einstein, 34 Fla. 589, 16 South.

554. In Crawford v. Gamble, 22 Fla. 487, it was held that

'merchandise purchased by a married woman who is conduct-

with her knowledge or assent in the construction of buildings,
or repairs, or improvements upon her property, or for agricultural or other labor bestowed thereon, with her knowledge and
consent.
"§ 3. The Legislature shall enact such laws as shall be necessary to carry into effect this article.''
It does not appear that there has been any legislation under
§ 3 of said article, but ''it is well settled,'' says the Florida
Supreme Court in First National Bank of Pensacola v. Hirschkowitz, 35 South. 22:
"In an unbroken line of decisions, beginning with Lewis v.
Yale, 4 Fla. 418, down to the pre.sent time, this court has he1d
that 'a feme covert is not competent to enter into contracts so
as to give a personal remedy against her.' As was said in Dollner v. Snow, 16 Fla. 86: 'At common law the promissory note
of a married woman is void. The Constitution and statute of
this state make no change in this respect. Neither at law nor
in equity can she bind herself so as to authorize a personal judgment against her.' Under the rule laid down in these decisions,
appellants could not have proceeded at law against the said
married woman, Dora Hirschkowitz, and hence could not have
reduced their claims to judgment; also see Crawford v. Feder,
34 Fla. 397, 16 South. 287."
In the headnotes to this report, which in Florida are prepared by the judges, No. 1 reads as follows:
''At common law the promissory note of a married woman
is void. The Constitution and statutes of this state make no
change in this respect, unless said married woman shall have
been made a free dealer. Neither at law nor in equity can she
bind herself so as to authorize a personal judgment against
her.''
The court further says:
"It is also the settled law of this state that 'where a married
woman carries on business in her own name, having property
('Illployed in such business, and purchases goods upon her sole
credit for the purpose of such business, her separate property
may be subjected in equity to the payment of claims for money
due for such purchases.' Blumer v. Pollak, 18 Fla. 707. Also
see Staley v. Hamilton, 19 Fla. 275; Garvin v. Watkins, 29 Fla.
151, 10 South. 818; Halle v. Einstein, 34 Fla. 589, 16 South.
554. In Crawford v. Gamble, 22 Fla. 487, it was held that
'merchandise purchased by a married woman who is conduct-
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ing a mercantile business in her own name is her separate stat-

utory property.'"

From these references to the law in Florida it appears that

a married woman having separate statutory property, although

not a free dealer, can lawfully carry on business, buy and sell

upon her sole credit, and thus contract obligations binding upon

her property in all respects as if she were a feme sole, except

that she cannot be held personally liable at law; the creditors'

legal remedy upon her contracts being in equity, under which

all her separate property may be taken. That is to say, that

such married woman may contract a debt which she morally

owes—owes in equity and good conscience, lawfully owes—but

which she cannot be personally adjudged to pay.

Is the limited obligation thus resulting a "debt," within the

meaning of the word as used in § 4 of the bankrupt law of 1898?

Clause "a," § 4, Bankr. Law, July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 547

[U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3423], provides that "any person who

owes debts, except a corporation, shall be entitled to the benefits

of this act as a voluntary bankrupt." Clause "b" provides

that "any natural person, except a wage earner, or a person

engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of the soil, any unin-

corporated company, and any corporation engaged principally

in manufacturing, trading, printing, publishing, mining, or mer-
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cantile pursuits, owing debts to the amount of one thousand

dollars or over, may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt upon

default, or an impartial trial, and shall be subject to the pro-

visions and entitled to the benefits of this act." Blackstone de-

fines a "debt" as follows: "A sum of money due by certain

and express agreement, as by bond for a determinate sum, bill

or note, a special bargain, or a rent reserved on a lease, where

the amount is fixed and specific, and does not depend upon any

subsequent valuation to settle it." 3 Bl. Com. 154. Again:

"Any contract, in short, whereby a determinate sum of money

becomes due to any person and is not paid, but remains in action

merely, is a contract of debt." 2 Bl. Com. 464. "The word

'debt' is of large import, including not only debts of record or

judgments and debts by specialty, but also obligations arising

under simple contract to a very wide extent, and in its popular

sense includes all that is due to a man under any form of obli-

gation or promise." Gray v. Bennett, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 522,

526; Shane v. Francis, 30 Ind. 93. "A 'debt' signifies what-

ever one owes. There is always some obligation that it shall be

ing a mercantile business in her own name is her separate statutory property.' ''
From these references to the law in Florida it appeal'S that
a married woman having separate statutory property, although
not a free dealer, can lawfully carry on business, buy and sell
upon her sole credit, and thus contract obligations binding upon
her property in all respects as if she were a feme sole, except
that she cannot be held personally liable at law; the creditors'
legal remedy upon her contracts being in equity, under which
all her separate property may be taken. That is to say, that
such married woman may contract a debt which she morally
owes-owes in equity and good conscience, lawfully owes--but
which she cannot be personally adjudged to pay.
Is the limited obligation thus resulting a ''debt,'' within the
meaning of the word as used in § 4 of the bankrupt law of 1898 T
Clause "a," § 4, Bankr. Law, July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 547
[U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3423], provides that "any person who
owes debts, except a corporation, shall be entitled to the benefits
of this act as a voluntary bankrupt." Clause "b" provides
that ''any natural person, except a wage earner, or a person
engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of the soil, any unincorporated company, and any corporation engag'('d principally
in manufacturing, trading, printing, publishing, mining, or mercantile pursuits, owing debts to the amount of one thousand
dollars or over, may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt upon
default, or an impartial trial, and shall be subject to the provisions and entitled to the benefits of this act. '' Blackstone defines a ''debt'' as follows: ''A sum of money due by certain
and express agreement, as by bond for a determinate sum, f bill
or note, a special bargain, or a rent reserved on a lease, where
the amount is fixed and specific, and does not depend upon any
subsequent valuation to settle it." 3 Bl. Com. 154. Again :
''Any contract, in short, whereby a determinate sum of money
becomes due to any person and is not paid, but remains in action
merely, is a contract of debt." 2 BI. Com. 464. "The word
'debt' is of large import, including not only debts of record or
judgments and debts by specialty, but also obligations arising
under simple contract to a very wide extent, and in its popular
sense includes all that is due to a man under any form of obligation or promise." Gray v. Bennett, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 522,
526; Shane v. Francis, 30 Ind. 93. "A 'debt' signifies whatever one owes. There is always some obligation that it shall be
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paid, but the manner in which, or the condition upon which, it

is to be paid, or the means of recovering payment, do not enter

into the definition." Rodman v. Munson, 13 Barb. 197. "A

debt is a sum of money due by contract, express or implied."

Perry v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 350. § 1 of the bankrupt law of

July 1, 1898, c. 541, which gives the meaning of words and

phrases used in the act, provides in paragraph 11 (30 Stat. 544

[U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3419]), "'debt' shall include any

debt, demand or claim provable in bankruptcy," and § 63 (30

Stat. 562 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3447]), relating to debts

which may be proved, provides as follows: "Debts of the

bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate which

are • • • (4) founded upon an open account or upon a

contract express, or implied.''

These broad definitions of "debt" from the text-books, ad-

judicated cases, and the bankrupt law all clearly include the

obligation lawfully contracted by a married woman, not a free

dealer, in the state of Florida, dealing with her separate estate.

We are referred to no adjudicated cases on the question as

to whether a married woman can be adjudicated a bankrupt

under the present law—all the cases cited are under other and

former laws.
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The English cases cited, and much relied on by counsel for

petitioner (Ex parte Jones, In re Grissel, 12 Chan. Div. 484,

and In re Gardiner, Ex parte Coulson, 20 Q. B. Div. 249), lose

much of their force here, because the married women's property

act, 45 & 46 Vict., provides: "Every married woman carrying

on a trade separately from her husband shall, in respect of her

separate property, be subject to the bankruptcy laws in the

same way as if she were a feme sole." And § 152 of the bank-

ruptcy act provides: "Nothing in this act shall affect the pro-

visions of the married women's property act 1882."

In re Kinkead, 3 Biss. 405, Fed. Cas. No. 7,824, a case

decided under the law of 1867, wherein it was held that a mar-

ried woman residing in Illinois could be adjudicated a bank-

rupt,, seems to have turned upon the laws of Illinois with regard

to the rights of married women. In the note by the learned

reporter in that case many of the current decisions in this coun-

try and in. England are reviewed, and the reporter sums up as

follows:

"Impossible as it may be to reconcile the decisions on the

general question of the rights and liabilities of married women,

paid, but the manner in which, or the condition upon which, it
is to be paid, or the ineans of recovering payment, do not euter
into the definition." Rodman v. Munson, 13 Barb. 197. "A
debt is a sum of money due by contract, express or implied.''
Perry v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 350. § 1 of the bankrupt law of
July 1, 1898, c. 541, which gives the meaning of words and
phrases used in the act, provides in paragraph 11 (30 Stat. 544
[U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3419]), "'debt' shall include any
debt, demand or claim provable in bankruptcy," and § 63 (30
Stat. 562 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3447]), relating to debts
which may be proved, provides as follows: ''Debts of the
bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate which
are • • • ( 4) founded upon an open account or upon a
contract express. or implied.''
These broad definitions of "debt" from the text-books, adjudicated cases, and the bankrupt law all clearly include the
obligation lawfully contracted by a married woman, not a free
dealer, in the state of Florida, dealing with her separate estate.
We are referred to no adjudicated cases on the question as
to whether a married woman can be adjudicated a bankrupt
under the present law-all the cases cited are under other and
former laws.
The English cases cited, and much relied on by counsel for
petitioner (Ex parte Jones, In re Grissel, 12 Chan. Div. 484,
and In re Gardiner, Ex parte Coulson, 20 Q. B. Div. 249), lose
much of their force here, because the married women's property
act, 45 & 46 Viet .. provides: "Every married woman carrying
on a trade separately from her husband shall, in respect of hrr
separate property, be subject to the bankruptcy laws in the
same way as if she were a feme sole. '' And § 152 of the bankruptcy act provides: ·.. Nothing in this act shall affect the provisions of the married women's property act 1882. ''
In re Kinkead, 3 Biss. 405, Fed. Cas. No. 7,824, a case
decided under the law of 1867, wherein it was held that a married woman residing in Illinois could be adjudicated a bankM.Ipt,. seems to have turned upon the laws of Illinois with regard
to the rights of married women. In the note by the learned
reporter in that case many of the current decisions in this country and in. England are reviewed, and the reporter sums up as
follows:
' 'Impossible as it may be to reconcile the decisions on the
general question of the rights and liabilities of married women,

•
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the duty of the federal courts in administeriug the bankrupt

act would seem to be simply to determine the status of a mar-

ried woman under the existing laws of the state where the juris-

prudence is to be exercised, and administer the act upon the

basis of the principles thus discovered. The foundation of

bankruptcy proceedings is indebtedness; but the bankrupt act

does not make any new standard of liability—it simply operates

upon those already existing. The application of the act to mar-

ried women depends, clearly, not upon their rights, but their

liabilities, and those liabilities are determined by the law of the

forum where the jurisdiction is invoked."

From what has been said, it follows that we do not agree with

the learned counsel, whose able oral argument and exhaustive

brief have received our close attention, that the test is whether

the contracts of an alleged bankrupt can be enforced by judg-

ment in personam, but rather is whether the said contracts con-

stitute an existing indebtedness.

The object of the bankrupt law is twofold—the benefit of the

creditors and the relief of the bankrupt. Mr. Justice Story de-

scribes a bankrupt law as "a law for the benefit and relief of

creditors and their debtors in cases in which the latter are un-

able or unwilling to pay their debts." 2 Story, Const. § 1113,
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note 2. Mr. Stephen speaks of it as "a system of law of a pe-

culiar and anomalous character, intended to afford to the cred-

itors of persons engaged in trade a greater security for the

collection of their debts than they enjoyed at common law un-

der the ordinary remedy by action." 2 Steph. Com. 189. It

cannot be necessary that both objects shall be attainable in or-

der to warrant proceedings in bankruptcy. In many, perhaps

a majority, of cases, the relief to the bankrupt is the only ques-

tion, for there are no assets to distribute, and in many other

cases the benefit and relief of creditors is the only object. A

bankrupt may through fraud have lost his right to a discharge.

An insolvent corporation whose property, including all fran-

chises, has been distributed to creditors in involuntary proceed-

ings in bankruptcy, takes little, if anything, by a discharge.

But this can be said for the petitioner that, if she is dis-

charged in bankruptcy, and thereafter she is sued at law or in

equity, she can plead the discharge in bankruptcy as well as

coverture, and with regard to after-acquired separate property

she will be relieved from all her present obligations. The legal

as well as the general trend of the day is towards emancipating

the duty of the federal courts iu a<lmiuisteriug the bankrupt
act would seem to be simply to determine the status of a married woman under the existing laws of the state where the jurisprudence is to be exercised, and administer the act upon the
basis of the principles thus discovered. The foundation of
bankruptcy proceedings is indebtedness; but the bankrupt act
does not make any new standard o! liability-it simply operates
upon those already existing. 'l'he application of the act to married women depends, clearly, not upon their rights, but their
liabilities, and those liabilities are determined by the law of the
f orurn where the jurisdiction is invoked.''
From what has been said, it follows that we do not agree with
the learned counsel, whose able oral argument and exhaustive
brief have received our close attention, that the test is whether
the contracts of an alleged bankrupt can be enforced by judgment in personam, but rather is whether the said contracts constitute an existing indebtedness.
The object of the bankrupt law is twofold-the benefit of the
creditors and the relief of the bankrupt. Mr. Justice Story describes a bankrupt law as ''a law for the benefit and relief of
creditors and their debtors in cases in which the latter are unable or unwilling to pay their debts." 2 Story, Const. § 1113,
note 2. Mr. Stephen speaks of it as ''a system of law of a peculiar and anomalous character, intended to afford to the ·creditors of persons engaged in trade a greater security for the
collection of their debts than they enjoyed at common law under the ordinary remedy by action." 2 Steph. Com. 189. It
cannot be necessary that both objects shall be attainable in order to warrant proceedings in bankruptcy. In many, perhaps
a majority, of cases, the relief to the bankrupt is the only quPStion, for there are no assets to distribute, and in many other
cases the benefit and relief of creditors is the only object. A
bankrupt may through fraud have lost his right to a discharge.
An insolvent corporation whose property, including all franchises, has been distributed to creditors in involuntary proceedings in bankruptcy, takes little, if anything, by a discharge.
But this can be said for the petitioner that, if she is discharged in bankruptcy, and thereafter she is sued at law or in
equity, she can plead the discharge in bankruptcy as well as
coverture, and with regard to after-acquired separate property
she will be relieved from all her present obligations. The legal
as well as the general trend of the day is towards emancipating
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women, married or single, from all legal and other disabilities

not bearing on the other sex, and particularly in all directions

wherein she is thought to be handicapped in earning a living,

taking care of her property, or carrying on business. And if a

married woman is encouraged and permitted to carry on busi-

ness, buy and sell—in short, be a trader, as she is in Florida—

why, when she is unfortunate in business and burdened with

debts, shall she not, like the married man, be entitled to claim

and have her debts wiped from the slate under the more or less

wise provisions of the bankrupt law?

On the whole matter, we conclude that neither the terms nor

the policy of the bankrupt law of 1898, nor any outside public

policy, preclude, because of coverture, a woman owning debts

exigible against her property from being adjudicated a bank-

rupt; and it follows that the question stated at the beginning

of this opinion must be answered in the affirmative, and that

this petition for revision be denied.

And it is so ordered.10

c. Lunatics

In re FUNK

101 Fed. 244

(District Court, N. D. Iowa. April 26, 1900)
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SHIRAS, District Judge. From the papers submitted to the

court it appears that on the 4th day of October, 1899, Jacob

A. Funk, then residing in Livingston county, Ill., was duly ad-

judged to be insane by the county court of the named county,

women, married or single, from all legal and other disabilities
not bearing on the other sex, and particularly in all directious
wherein she is thought to be handicapped in earning a living,
taking care of her property, or carrying on business. And if a
married woman is encouraged and permitted to carry on business, buy and sell-in short, be a trader, as she is in Floridawhy, when she is unfortunate in business and burdened with
debts, shall she not, like the married man, be entitled to claim
and have her debts wiped from the slate under the more or less
wise provisions of the bankrupt law Y
On the whole matter, we conclude that neither the terms nor
the policy of the bankrupt law of 1898, nor any outside public
policy, preclude, because of coverture, a woman owning debts
exigible against her property from being adjudicated a bankrupt; and it follows that the question stated at the beginning
this opinion must be answered in the affirmative, and that
this petition for revision be denied.
And it is so ordered.10

of

and F. L. Bieke was appointed the guardian of his person and

estate, and qualified as such guardian; and on the 12th day of

March, 1900, a duly-certified copy of the record of such pro-

c. Lunatics

ceedings was filed in the office of the clerk of the district court

in Wright county, Iowa; and thereupon, by order of that court,

In re FUNK

the said Rieke was appointed guardian of the property of said

Funk in the state of Iowa,—it appearing that he then had a

101 Fed. 244

stock of goods in Wright county in charge of an agent or clerk.

It further appears that on the 13th day of April, 1900, a peti-

(District Court, N. D. Iowa. April 26, 1900)

tion on behalf of certain creditors was filed in this court, aver-

10—See also In re Johnson, 149

Fed. 864.

SHIRAS, District Judge. From the papers submitted to the
court it appears that on the 4th day of October, 1899, Jacob
A. Funk, then residing in Livingston county, Ill., was duly adjudged to be insane by the county court of the named county,
and F. L. Rieke was appointed the guardian of his person and
estate, and qualified as such guardian; and on the 12th day of
March, 1900, a duly-certified copy of the record of such proceedings was filed in the office of the clerk of the district court
in Wright county, Iowa; and thereupon, by order of that court,
the said Rieke was appointed guardian of the property of said
Funk in the state· of lowa,-it appearing that he then had a
stock of goods in Wright county in charge of an agent or clerk.
It further appears that on the 13th day of April, 1900, a petition on behalf of certain creditors was filed in this court, aver10-See also In re Johnson, 149
Fed. 864.
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ring that Jacob A. Funk was insolvent, and had committed cer-

tain acts of bankruptcy in the months of March and April,

1900, by transferring property to secure debts due to certain

named creditors. To this petition an answer has been filed by

the guardian of the alleged bankrupt, in which is set forth the

adjudication of the court in Illinois, declaring Funk to be in-

sane, and the appointment of the guardian in Illinois, and also

in Iowa, and then, by proper averment, the answer presents

the question whether Funk can be adjudged a bankrupt for

acts done by him after the date of the adjudication of insanity,

and the appointment of a guardian for his person and property.

By § 8 of the bankrupt act, it is declared that "the death or

insanity of a bankrupt shall not abate the proceedings, but the

same shall be conducted and concluded in the same manner, so

far as possible, as though he had not died or become insane."

In this section provision is made for cases wherein the proceed-

ings in bankruptcy are commenced during the lifetime of the

party, or at a time preceding his becoming insane, and, in effect,

the meaning of the section is that, in cases wherein the juris-

diction of the court in bankruptcy has rightfully attached, the

proceedings shall not be abated by the subsequent death or

insanity of the bankrupt. In cases wherein the party, although
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giving evidence of insanity, has not been adjudged insane, but

remains in possession and control of his property, and his cred-

itors seek his adjudication as a bankrupt, it might be held that

the bankruptcy court could rightfully exercise jurisdiction, and

could hold the party responsible for his acts done before the

fact of his insanity had been ascertained and established; but,

however this may be, it cannot be so held in cases like that now

before the court, wherein it appears that, prior to the filing of

the petition in bankruptcy on behalf of creditors, the party pro-

ceeded against had been adjudged to be insane by a competent

court, and a guardian had been put in possession of his prop-

erty. By § 3227 of the Code of Iowa, it is provided that, if the

estate of an insane person "is insolvent, or will probably be

insolvent, the same shall be settled by the guardian in like man-

ner and like proceedings may be had, as are required by law for

the settlement of the insolvent estate of a deceased person."

Under the provisions of this section, it becomes the duty of the

guardian appointed by the district court of Wright county to

settle up the estate placed in his hands under the direction of

the court appointing him, and it will be the duty of that court

ring that Jacob A. Funk was insolvent, and bad committed certain acts of bankruptcy in the months of March and April,
1900, by transferring property to secure debts due to certain
named creditors. To this petition an answer bas been filed by
the guardian of the alleged bankrupt, in which is set forth the
adjudication of the court in Illinois, declaring Funk to be insane, and the appointment of the guardian in Illinois, and also
in Iowa, and then, by proper averment, the answer presents
the question whether Funk can be adjudged a bankrupt for
acts done by him after the date of the adjudication of insanity,
and the appointment of a guardian for his person and property.
By § 8 of the bankrupt act, it is declared that ''the death or
insanity of a bankrupt shall not abate the proceedings, but the
same shall be conducted and concluded in the same manner, so
far 88 possible, as though he had not died or become insane.' '
In this section provision is made for cases wherein the proceedings in bankruptcy are commenced during the lifetime of the
party, or at a time preceding his becoming insane, and, in effect,
the meaning of the section is that, in cases wherein the jurisdiction of the court in bankruptcy has rightfully attached, the
proceedings shall not be abated by the subsequent death or
insanity of the bankrupt. In cases wherein the party, although
giving evidence of insanity, has not been adjudged insane, but
remains in possession and control of his property, and his creditors seek his adjudication as a bankrupt, it might be held that
the bankruptcy court could rightfully exercise jurisdiction, and
could hold the party responsible for his acts done before the
fact of his insanity had been ascertained and established; but,
however this may be, it cannot be so held in eases like that now
before the court, wherein it appears that, prior to the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy on behalf of creditors, the party proceeded against had been adjudged to be insane by a competent
court, and a guardian had been put in possession of his property. By § 3227 of the Code of Iowa, it is provided that, if the
estate of an insane person ''is insolvent, or will probably be
insolvent, the same shall be settled by the guardian in like manner and like proceedings may be had, as are required by law for
the settlement of the insolvent estate of a deceased person.''
Under the provisions of this section, it becomes the duty of tho
guardian appointed by the district com:t of Wright county to
settle up the estate placed in his hands under the direction of
the court appointing him, and it will be the duty of that court
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to determine the question of the validity of the liens or convey-

ances executed since the date of the adjudication of the insanity

of the alleged bankrupt, and to make due and proper distribu-

tion of the assets belonging to the estate now in its charge. It

certainly cannot be held that the present bankrupt act confers

upon the courts of bankruptcy the right to settle the estates of

insolvent decedents unless jurisdiction in the court of bank-

ruptcy had attached during the lifetime of the bankrupt, and

the same rule must hold good in cases wherein, before the peti-

tion has been filed in the bankrupt court, the debtor has been

adjudged to be insane, and his property has been taken charge

of by a state court of competent jurisdiction.

It is further contended by the guardian in this case that the

acts of bankruptcy charged in the petition were committed after

Funk had been adjudged to be insane, and that he cannot be

held responsible therefor in such sense that these acts can be

held to be acts of bankruptcy; and in support of this conten-

tion the ruling of Judge Dillon in the case of In re Marvin, 1

Dill. 178, Fed. Cas. No. 9,178, is cited, wherein it was said that

"the court is of opinion that a person who is so unsound in

mind as to be wholly incapable of managing his affairs cannot

in that condition commit an act for which he can be forced into

bankruptcy by his creditors, against the objection of his guar-
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dian ;'' and it would seem clear that a person who, by reason

of insanity, is wholly incapable of managing his business affairs,

cannot be held to have intended to violate the provisions of the

bankrupt act by entering into transactions which, by reason of

his mental disability, would not be binding upon him under the

rules of the common law. Under the admitted facts in this

case, this court, as a court of bankruptcy, should not entertain

jurisdiction of the petition filed by the creditors, and the same

will therefore be dismissed, at the costs of petitioners.

In re WARD

161 Fed. 755

(District Court, D. New Jersey. April 10, 1908)

LANNING, District Judge. Three creditors of William R.

Ward have filed their petition to have him adjudged an invol-

untary bankrupt. The only act of bankruptcy charged is that:

"William R. Ward is insolvent, and that within four months

to determine the question of the validity of the liens or conveyances executed since the date of the adjudication of the insanity
of the alleged bankrupt, and to make due and proper distribution of the assets belonging to the estate now in its charge. It
certainly cannot be held that the present bankrupt act confers
upon the courts of bankruptcy the right to settle the estates of
insolvent decedents unless jurisdiction in the court of bankruptcy had attached during the lifetime of the bankrupt, and
the same rule must hold good in cases wherein, before the petition has been filed in the bankrupt court, the debtor has been
adjudged to be insane, and his property has been taken charge
of by a state court of competent jurisdiction.
It is further contended by the guardian in this case that the
acts of bankruptcy charged in the petition were committed aiter
Funk had been adjudged to be insane, and that he cannot be
held responsible therefor in such sense that these acts can be
held to be acts of bankruptcy; and in support of this contention the ruling of Judge Dillon in the case of In re Marvin, 1
Dill. 178, Fed. Cas. No. 9,178, is cited, wherein it was said that
''the court is of opinion that a person who is so unsound in
mind as to be wholly incapable of managing his affairs cannot
in that condition commit an act for which he can be forced into
bankruptcy by his creditors, against the objection of his guardian ; '' and it would seem clear that a person who, by reason
of insanity, is wholly incapable of managing his business affairs,
eannot be held to have intended to violate the provisions of the
bankrupt act by entering into transactions which, by reru:ion of
his mental disability, would not be binding upon him under the
rules of the common law. Under the admitted facts in this
case, this court, as a court of bankruptcy, should not entertain
jurisdiction of the petition filed by the creditors, and the same
will therefore be dismissed, at the costs of petitioners.
In re WARD
161 Fed. 755
(District Court, D. New Jersey. April 10, 1908)
LANNING, District Judge. Three creditors of William R.
Ward have filed their petitfon to have him adjudged an involuntary bankrupt. The only act of bankruptcy charged is that:
"William R. Ward is insolvent, and that within four months
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preceding the date of this petition the said William R. Ward

committed an act of bankruptcy, in that he did heretofore, while

insolvent, and on the 27th day of November, 1907, and the 5th

day of December, 1907, convey to one Benjamin Treacy, of the

city of Jersey City, county of Hudson, and state of New Jersey,

11 distinct and separate parcels of land, with the buildings

thereon, situated in the cities of Newark and East Orange,

county of Essex, and state of New Jersey, including the place

of residence of said William R. Ward, with intent to hinder,

delay, and defraud the creditors of said William R. Ward, in-

cluding your petitioners."

An answer was promptly filed by Ward's guardian ad litem,

appointed on ex parte proofs of his insanity, setting up, as de-

fenses: (1) That Ward, at the time of committing the alleged

act of bankruptcy mentioned in the petition, was so unsound

of mind as to be wholly incapable of managing his affairs or of

committing the act of bankruptcy charged; (2) that he did not

commit the act of bankruptcy charged; and (3) that he is not

insolvent. Later, another answer was filed, under an order of

leave granted by the court, by Anna Day Ward and Henry L.

Poinier, as guardians of the person and estate of Ward, setting

up that on December 28, 1907, which was 10 days after the pe-
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tition in bankruptcy was filed, proceedings under a writ de

lunatico inquirendo were instituted against Ward in the Court

of Chancery of New Jersey, which resulted in a decree of that

court, dated March 2, 1908, confirming the proceedings and the

finding of the jury "that the said William R. Ward of East

Orange, N. J., was, at the time of taking that inquisition a

lunatic of unsound mind and did not enjoy lucid intervals, so

that he was not sufficient or capable of the government of him-

self, his lands, tenements, goods, and chattels, and that he had

been in the same state of lunacy and unsoundness of mind from

at least the 1st day of May, 1904," and that on March 28, 1908,

the orphans' court of Essex county duly appointed Anna Day

Ward and Henry L. Poinier as guardians of Ward's person and

estate. In this answer there are also set up the same defenses

made by the answer of the guardian ad litem. In each of the

answers there is a demand that the issues be tried by a jury.

The motions are to strike out the defense of insanity, to limit

the issues to be tried by the jury to the second and third

defenses, and, if these motions be denied, for an order for the

examination of Ward by the petitioning creditors and their ex-

preceding the date of this petition the said William R. War1'1
committed an aet of bankruptcy, in that he did heretofore, while
insolvent, and on the 27th day of November, 1907, and the 5th
day of December, 1907, convey to one Benjamin Treacy, of the
city of Jersey City, county of Hudson, and state of New Jersey,
11 distinct and separate parcels of land, with the buildings
thereon, situated in the cities of Newark and East Orange,
county of Essex, and state of New Jersey, including the place
of residence of said William R. Ward, with intent to hinder,
delay, and defraud the creditors of said William R. Ward, including your petitioners.''
An answer was promptly filed by Ward's guardian ad litem,
appointed on ex parte proofs of his insanity, setting up, as defenses: (1) That Ward, at the time of committing the alleged
act of bankruptcy mentioned in the petition, was so unsound
of mind as to be wholly incapable of managing his affairs or of
committing the act of bankruptcy charged; (2) that he did not
commit the act of bankruptcy charged; and (3) that he is not
insolvent. Later, another answer was filed, under an order of
leave granted by the court, by Anna Day Ward and Henry L.
Poinier, as guardians of the person and estate of Ward, setting
up that on December 28, 1907, which was 10 days after the petition in bankruptcy was filed, proceedings under a writ de
lunatico inquirendo were instituted against Ward in the Court
of Chancery of New Jersey, which resulted in a decree of that
court, dated March 2, 1908, confirming the proceedings and the
finding of the jury "that the said William R. Ward of East
Orange, N. J., was, at the time of taking that inquisition a
lunatic of unsound mind and did not enjoy lucid intervals, so
that he was not sufficient or capable of the government of himself, his lands, tenements, goods, and chattels, and that he had
been in the same state of lunacy and unsoundness of mind from
at least the 1st day of May, 1904,'' and that on March 28, 1908,
the orphans' court of Essex county duly appointed Anna Day
Ward and Henry L. Poinier as guardians of Ward's person and
estate. In this answer there are also set up the same defenses
made by the answer of the guardian ad litem. In each of the
answers there is a demand that the issues be tried by a jury.
The motions are to strike out the defense of insanity, to limit
the issues to be tri.ed by the jury to the second and third
defenses, and, if these motions be denied, for an order for the
eKamination of Ward by the petitioning creditors and their ex-
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perts before trial. The first of these motions is based on thp

theory that the insanity of an alleged bankrupt is not a good

defense, where no adjudication of lunacy has been made prior

to\the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.

The federal Constitution confers upon Congress the power

to establish "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies,

throughout the United States." The extent to which Congress

has exercised that power determines the scope of the power of

the federal courts in bankruptcy cases. § 8 of the bankruptcy

act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 549 [U. S. Comp. St.

1901, p. 3425]) is as follows:

"The death or insanity of a bankrupt shall not abate the

proceedings, but the same shall be conducted and concluded

in the same manner, so far as possible, as though he had not

died or become insane; provided that in case of death the widow

and children shall be entitled to all rights of dower and allow-

ance fixed by the laws of the state of the bankrupt's residence."

This section clearly provides that, if the jurisdiction of the

bankruptcy court in a given case has once rightfully attached,

it cannot be defeated by the subsequent death of the alleged

bankrupt, or if he subsequently become insane. Whether juris-

diction exists to administer the estate of an insolvent debtor in
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bankruptcy, where the alleged bankrupt has been adjudged,

after the petition in bankruptcy has been filed, to have been,

from a time antedating the alleged act of bankruptcy, a lunatic

wholly incapable of managing himself or his estate, must be

determined by comparing other provisions of the bankruptcy

act with § 8. The creditors in the present case contend that

jurisdiction attaches in the present case because § 4b (30 Stat. >

547) declares that "any natural person, except a wage-earner,

or a person engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of the

soil," may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt. But no

natural person can be so adjudged, in an involuntary proceed-

ing, unless he committed one of the acts of bankruptcy described

in § 3a (30 Stat. 546) within four months next before the filing

of the petition in bankruptcy. The first subdivision of that

section declares that any person shall be held to have com-

mitted an act of bankruptcy if he has "conveyed, transferred,

concealed, or removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed,

any part of his property, with intent to hinder, delay or de-

fraud his creditors, or any of them." That is the act of bank-

ruptcy charged against Ward. But if he has been a lunatic and

perts before trial. The first of these motions is based on thP
that the insanity of an alleged bankrupt is not a good
d1,frnse, where no adjudication of lunacy has been made prior
to \.the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
The federal Constitution confers upon Congress the power
to establish "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies,
throughout the United States." The extent to which Congress
has exercised that power determines the scope of the power of
the federal courts in bankruptcy cases. § 8 of the bankruptcy
act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 549 [U. S. Comp. St.
1901, p. 3425]) is as follows:
"The death or insanity of a bankrupt shall not abate the
proceedings, but the same shall be conducted and concluded
in the same manner, so far as possible, as though he had not
died or become insane; provided that in case of death the widow
and children shall be entitled to all rights of dower and allowance fixed by the laws of the state of the bankrupt's residence.''
This section clearly provides that, if the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court in a given case has once rightfully attached,
it cannot be defeated by the subsequent death of the alleged
bankrupt, or if he subsequently become insane. Whether jurisdiction exists to administer the estat~ of an insolvent debtor in
bankruptcy, where the alleged bankrupt has been adjudged,
after the petition in bankruptcy has been filed, to have been,
from a time antedating the alleged act of bankruptcy, a lunatic
wholly incapable of managing himself or his estate, must be
determined by comparing other provisions of the bankruptcy
act with § 8. The creditors in the present case contend that
jurisdiction attaches in the present case because § 4b (30 Stat.
54 7) declares that ''any natural person, except a wage-earner,
or a person engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of the
soil," may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt. But no
natural person can be so adjudged, in an involuntary proceeding, unless he committed one of the acts of bankruptcy described
in § 3a (30 Stat. 546) within four months next before the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy. The first subdivision of that
8€ction declares that any person shall be held to have committed an act of bankruptcy if he has ''conveyed, transferred,
c0ncealed, or removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed,
any part of his property, with intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors, or any of them." That is the act of bank~1ptcy charged against Ward. But if he bas been a lunatic and
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so unsound of mind as to have been wholly incapable of manag-

ing himself or his estate ever since May 1, 1904, he could not

have conveyed his lands in November and December, 1907.

"with intent to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors." "An

intent to hinder or delay creditors," says Judge Bradford, in

the Wilmington Hosiery Company's Case (D. C.) 120 Fed.

185, "involves a purpose wrongfully and unjustifiably to pre-

vent, obstruct, embarrass, or postpone them (creditors) in the

collection or enforcement of their claims." Without under-

taking to determine the exact boundaries of the jurisdiction of

our bankruptcy courts in cases against lunatic bankrupts, it

is sufficient to say that, in the present case, the defense of in-

sanity cannot be stricken out of the answer.

B,ut is the adjudication in the Court of Chancery of New

Jersey conclusive on this court in this proceeding? It would

not be so in an action at law against the alleged bankrupt.

In such a case, "when an inquisition is admitted in evidence,

the party against whom it is used may introduce proof that

the alleged lunatic was of sound mind at any period of the time

covered by the inquisition." Den v. Clark, 10 N. J. Law, 217,

18 Am. Dec. 417. The same rule applies in equity. Hunt

v. Hunt, 13 N. J. Eq. 161; Yauger v. Skinner, 14 N. J. Eq.
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389; Hill's Ex'rs v. Day, 34 N. J. Eq. 150; 16 Am. & Eng.

Ency. Law, 606. I think it is equally applicable to a bank-

ruptcy case where the adjudication of lunacy is made upon

proceedings instituted after the petition in bankruptcy has been

filed. The Funk Case (D. C.) 101 Fed. 244, is distinguishable

from this because there the adjudication of lunacy was made,

and the property of the lunatic put into possession of his guar-

dian, before the petition in bankruptcy was filed. In the Kehler

Case (D. C.) 153 Fed. 235, where a petition in involuntary

proceedings was filed before the alleged bankrupt had been

adjudged a lunatic, Judge Hazel denied the motion to dismiss

the petition because the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court

attached before the alleged bankrupt was adjudged insane,

and because of the presumption of the alleged bankrupt's sanity

at the time the acts of bankruptcy were committed. It is not

necessary to decide, in the present case, what may be the effect

of an adjudication of lunacy and the appointment of a guardian

or committee for the lunatic under a writ de lunatico inquirendo

before a petition in bankruptcy is filed against the lunatic. It

may be that in such a case the bankruptcy court acquires no

so unsound of mind as to have been wholly incapable of managing himself or his estate ever since l\fay 1, 1904, he could not
have conveyed his lands in November and December, 1907.
''with intent to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors.'' ''An
intent to hinder or delay creditors," says Judge Bradford, in
the Wilmington Hosiery Company's Case (D. C.) 120 Fed.
185, "involves a purpose wrongfully and unjustifiably to prevent, obstruct, embarrass, or postpone them (creditors) in the
collection or enforcement of their claims." Without undertaking to determine the exact boundaries of the jurisdiction of
our bankruptcy courts in cases against lunatic bankrupts, it
is sufficient to say that, in the present case, the defense of insanity cannot be stricken out of the answer.
B,ut is the adjudication in the Court of Chancery of New
Jersey conclusive on this court in this proceeding? It would
not be so in an action at law against the alleged bankrupt.
In such a case, 11 when an inquisition is admitted in evidence,
the party against whom it is used may introduce proof that
the alleged lunatic was of sound mind at any period of the time
covered by the inquisition." Den v. Clark, 10 N. J. Law, 217,
18 Am. Dec. 417. The same rule applies in equity. Hunt
v. Hunt, 13 N. J. Eq. 161; Yauger v. Skinner, 14 N. J. Eq.
389; Hill's Ex'rs v. Day, 34 N. J. Eq. 150; 16 Am. & Eng.
Ency. Law, 606. I think it is equally applicable to a bankruptcy case where the adjudication of lunacy is made upon
proceedings instituted after ·the petition in bankruptcy has been
filed. The Funk Case (D. C.) 101 Fed. 244, is distinguishable
from this because there the adjudication of lunacy was made,
and the property of the lunatic put into possession of his guardian, before the petition in bankruptcy was filed. In the Kehler
Case (D. C.) 153 Fed. 235, where a petition in involuntary
proceedings was filed before the alleged bankrupt had been
adjudged a lunatic, Judge Hazel denied the motion to dismiss
the petition because the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court
attached before the alleged bankrupt was adjudged insane,
and because of the presumption of the alleged bankrupt's sanity
at the time the acts of bankruptcy were committed. It is not
necessary to decide, in the present case, what may be the effect
of an adjudication of lw1acy and the appointment of a guardian
or committee for the lunatic under a writ de lunatico inquirendo
before a petition in bankruptcy is filed against the lunatic. It
may be that in such a case the bankruptcy court acquires no
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jurisdiction; but, where a person is adjudged a lunatic under

proceedings instituted after a petition in bankruptcy has been

filed against him, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to

try the issues involved in the bankruptcy proceedings seems

to me clear. In such a case, its jurisdiction attaches upon the"

filing of the petition in bankruptcy. If the alleged bankrupt

was, at the time of committing the alleged act of bankruptcy

charged in the petition filed against him, so insane that he

did not understand the nature of the act, its commission should

be denied on the ground that, being insane, he could not com-

mit it. On the trial of such an issue, the adjudication of lunacy

may, perhaps, be offered as prima facie evidence of insanity,

provided it shows lunacy at the time of the commission of the

alleged act of bankruptcy.

It will be observed, from what has been said, that, in such a

case as the present one, the defense that the alleged bankrupt

did not commit the act of bankruptcy charged against him in-

volves the question of his insanity. As already stated, the only

act of bankruptcy charged here is that the alleged bankrupt

conveyed certain of his lands with intent to hinder, delay, or

defraud his creditors. Evil intent is an essential element of the

act charged. § 19 (30 Stat. 551) of the bankruptcy act gives
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to an alleged bankrupt the right to a trial by jury of the ques-

tion of his insolvency and of the question concerning his com-

mission of an act of bankruptcy, provided a written applica-

tion for such trial be made. Such application has been made.

The question of the alleged bankrupt's insanity will there-

fore be submitted to the jury as an essential part of the defense

that he did not commit the act of bankruptcy charged.

Although it is alleged in the petition that Ward was insolvent

at the time of executing the deeds of conveyance, that allegation

is immaterial, and will not be involved in the issues to be tried.

There is also an allegation that he was insolvent at the time of

the filing of the petition. That is a proper, if not a necessary,

allegation, since § 3c of the bankruptcy act makes the defense

of solvency at the time of filing the petition, in a case like

the present one, a good defense. West Company v. Lea, 174

U. S. 590, 19 Sup. Ct. 836, 43 L. ed. 1098; Elliott v. Toeppner,

187 U. S. 330, 23 Sup. Ct. 133, 47 L. ed. 200.

The issues to be tried by the jury are therefore: (1) Whether

the alleged bankrupt was insolvent at the time of the filing of

the petition in bankruptcy, and (2) whether the particular act

jurisdiction; but, where a person is adjudged a lunatic under
proceedings instituted after a petition in bankruptcy has been
filed against him, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to
try the issues involved in the bankruptcy proceedings seems
to me clear. In such a case, its jurisdiction attaches upon the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy. If the alleged bankrupt
was, at the time of committing the alleged act of bankruptcy
charged in the petition filed against him, so insane that he
did not understand the nature of the act, its commission should
be denied on the ground that, being insane, he could not commit it. On the trial of such an issue, the adjudication of lunacy
may, perhaps, be offered as prima facie evidence of insanity,
provided it shows lunacy at the time of the commission of the
alleged act of bankruptcy.
It will be observed, from what has been said, that, in such a
case as the present one, the defense that the alleged bankrupt
did not commit the act of bankruptcy charged against him in,·olves the question of his insanity. As already stated, the only
act of bankruptcy charged here is that the alleged bankrupt
conveyed certain of his lands with intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud his creditors. Evil intent is an essential element of the
act charged. § 19 (30 Stat. 551) of the bankruptcy act gives
to an alleged bankrupt the right to a trial by jury of the question of his insolvency and of the question concerning his commission of an act of bankruptcy, provided a written application for such trial be made. Such application has been made.
The question of the alleged bankrupt's insanity will therefore be submitted to the jury as an essential part of the defense
that he did not commit the act of bankruptcy charged .
.Although it is alleged in the petition that Ward was insolvent
at the time of executing the deeds of conveyance, that allegation
is immaterial, and will not be involved in the issues to be tried.
There is also an allegation that he was insolvent at the time of
the filing of the petition. That is a proper, if not a necessary,
allegation, since § 3c of the bankruptcy act makes the defense
of solvency at the time of filing the petition, in a case like
the present one, a good defense. West Company v. Lea, 174
U. S. 590, 19 Sup. Ct. 836, 43 L. ed. 1098; Elliott v. Toeppner,
187 U. S. 330, 23 Sup. Ct. 133, 47 L. ed. 200.
The issues to be tried by the jury are therefore: (1) Whether
the alleged \tankrupt was insolvent at the time of the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy, and (2) whether the particular act
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of bankruptcy charged was committed by him. The latter issuo

will necessarily involve the question of his insanity. • * *

[The third motion of petitioners was also denied.]

The motions of the petitioning creditors will all be denied.

They may file their replication and bring the case to trial in

the usual source of procedure.'1

3. PARTNERSHIPS

of bankruptcy charged was committed by him. The latter issu·~
will necessarily involve the question of his insanity. • • •
[The third motion of petitioners was also denied.]
The motions of the petitioning creditors will all be denied.
They may file their replication and bring the case to trial in
the UBual source of procedure. 1 1

STANLEY FRANCIS v. J. HECTOR McNEAL

228 U. S. 695, 57 L. ed. 1029, 33 Sup. Ct. 701

3.

P ABTNER.SHIPS

(United States Supreme Court. May 26, 1913)

Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a proceeding to review an order of the bankruptcy

court to the effect that the separate estate of Stanley Francis

should be turned over for administration to the respondent,

McNeal, trustee in bankruptcy of a firm of which Francis was a

member. ' The order was made on the petition of the trustee,

and was affirmed upon a petition for revision by the Circuit

Court of Appeals. 108 C. C. A. 459, 186 Fed. 481.

The facts are short. Creditors filed a petition against Lati-

mer, Francis, and Marrin, alleging that they were partners

trading as the Provident Investment Bureau, and that they

were bankrupt individually and as a firm. McNeal was ap-
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pointed receiver of the partnership and individual estates, but

Francis denied that he was a partner, and sought to have the

receiver discharged. Thereupon, on March 13, 1906, it was

agreed between the counsel for the receiver and for Francis

that McNeal should be discharged as receiver of the individual

estate of Francis; that the question whether Francis was a

partner should be referred to one of the regular referees; that

until the determination of that question, his counsel, Scott,

should collect the rents and retain possession of his estate;

and that thereafter Scott should account and turn over the

funds to such person as the court might direct. On April 17

an order was made embodying the agreement and naming a

referee. The referee found that Francis was a partner, and

that now stands admitted for the purposes of the present

decision. The firm was adjudicated bankrupt irt June, 1909.

McNeal was appointed trustee in July, and forthwith filed the

11—Cf. In re Eisenberg, 117 Fed. see In re Stein, 127 Fed. 547, 62 C.

786. As to insanity of a partner C. A. 272.

STANLEY FRANCIS v. J . HECTOR McNEAL
228 U. S. 695, 57 L. ed. 1029, 33 Sup. Ct. 701
(United States Supreme Court. May 26, 1913)
Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court:
This is a proceeding to review an order of the ba.nkruptcy
court to the effect that the separate estate of Stanley Francis
should be turned over for administration to the respondent,
McNeal, trustee in bankruptcy of a firm of which Francis was a
member. ' The order was made on the petition of the trustee,
and was affirmed upon a petition for revision by the Circuit
Court of Appeals. 108 C. C. A. 459, 186 Fed. 481.
The facts are short. Creditors filed a petition against Latimer, Francis, and Marrin, alleging that they were partners
trading as the Provident Investment Bureau, and that they
were bankrupt individually and as a firm. McNeal was appointed receiver of the partnership and individual estates, but
Francis denied that he was a partner, and sought to have the
receiver discharged. Thereupon, on March 13, 1906, it was
agreed between the counsel for the receiver and for Francis
that McNeal should be discharged as receiver of the individual
e.state of Francis; that the question whether Francis was a
partner should be referred to one of the regular referees; that
U)ltil the determination of that question, his counsel, Scott,
should collect the rents and retain possession of his estate;
and that thereafter Scott should account and turn over the
funds to such person as the court might direct. On April 17
an order was made embodying the agreement and naming a
referee. The referee found that Francis was a partner, and
that now stands admitted for the purposes of the present
decision. The firm was adjudicated bankrupt hi June, 1909.
1\IcNeal was appointed trustee in July, and forthwith filed the
11-Cf. In re Eisenberg, 117 Fed.
i86. As to insanity of a partner

see In re Stein, 127 Fed. 547, 62 C.
C. A. 272.

PARTNERSHIPS

97

PAETNERSHIPS

97

petition upon which the order in question was made. The

order declared that the separate estate of Francis was subject

to administration in bankruptcy, and ordered the real estate

turned over to McNeal, with leave to sell. The firm, even

with the separate estates of the partners, will not be able to

pay its debts in full.

Since Cory on Accounts was made more famous by Lindley

on Partnership, the notion that the firm is an entity distinct

from its members has grown in popularity, and the notion has

been confirmed by recent speculations as to the nature of cor-

porations and the oneness of any somewhat permanently com-

bined group without the aid of law. But the fact remains

as true as ever that partnership debts are debts of the mem-

bers of the firm, and that the individual liability of the mem-

bers is not collateral like that of a surety, but primary and

direct, whatever priorities there may be in the marshaling of

assets. The nature of the liability is determined by the com-

mon law, not by the possible intervention of the bankruptcy

act. Therefore ordinarily it would be impossible that a firm

should be insolvent while the members of it remained able

to pay its debts with money available for that end. A judgment

could be got and the partnership debt satisfied on execution
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out of the individual estates.

The question is whether the bankruptcy act has established

principles inconsistent with these fundamental rules, although

the business of such an act is, so far as may be, to preserve, not

to upset, existing relations. It is true that by § 1, the word

"person," as used in the act, includes partnerships; that

by the same section, a person shall be deemed insolvent when

his property, exclusive, etc., shall not be sufficient to pay his

debts; that by § 5a, a partnership may be adjudged a bank-

rapt, and that by § 14a, any person may file an application for

discharge. No doubt these causes, taken together, recognize the

firm as an entity for certain purposes, the most important of

which, after all, is the old rule as to the prior claim of partner-

ship debts on partnership assets, and that of individual debts

upon the individual estate. § 5g. But we see no reason for

supposing that it was intended to erect a commercial device

for expressing special relations into an absolute and universal

formula,—a guillotine for cutting off all the consequences ad-

mitted to attach to partnerships elsewhere than in the bank-

ruptcy courts. On the contrary, we should infer from § 5',

H. ft A. Bankruptcy—7

petition upon which the order in question was made. The
order declared that the separate estate of Francis was subject
to administration in bankruptcy, and ordered the real estate
turned over to .McNeal, with leave to sell. The firm, even
with the separate estates of the partners, will not be able to
pay its debts in full.
Since Cory on Accounts was made more famous by Lindley
on Partnership, the notion that the firm is an entity distinct
from its members has grown in popularity, and the notion bas
been confirmed by recent speculations as to the nature of corporations and the oneness of any somewhat permanently combined group without the aid of law. But the fact remains
as true as ever that partnership debts are debts of the members of the firm, and that the individual liability of the members is not collateral like that of a surety, but primary and
direct, whatever priorities there may be in the marshaling of
assets. The nature of the liability is determined by the common law, not by the possible intervention of the bankruptcy
act. Therefore ordinarily it would be impossible that a firm
should be insolvent while the members of it remained able
to pay its debts with money available for that end. A judgment
could be got and the partnership debt satisfied on execution
out of the individual estates.
The question is whether the bankruptcy act has established
principles inconsistent with these fundamental rules, although
the business of such an act is, so far as may be, to preserve, not
to upset, existing relations. It is true that by § 1, the word
"person," 88 used in the act, includes partnerships; that
by the same section, a person shall be deemed insolvent when
his property, exclusive, etc., shall not be sufficient to pay his
debts; that by § 5a, ·a partnership may be adjudged a bankrupt, and that by § 14a, any person may file an application for
discharge. No doubt these causes, taken together, recognize the
firm as an entity for certain purposes, the most important of
which, after all, is the old rule as to the prior claim of partnership debts on partnership assets, and that of individual debts
upon the individual estate. § 5g. But we see no reason for
supposing that it W88 intended to erect a commercial device
for expressing special relations into an absolute and universal
formula,-a guillotine for cutting off all the consequences admitted to attach to partnerships elsewhere than in the bankruptcy courts. On the contrary, we should infer from § 5,
H. Ir A. Ba.nkruptcy-T
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clauses c through g, that the assumption of the bankruptcy act

was that the partnership and individual estates both were to

be administered, and that the only exception was that in h,

"in the event of one or more, but not all, of the members of a

partnership being adjudged bankrupt." [30 Stat. at L. 548,

c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3424.]

In that case, naturally, the partnership property may be

administered by the partners not adjudged bankrupt, and does

not come into bankruptcy at all except by consent. But we do

not perceive that the clause imports that the partnership could

be in bankruptcy, and the partners not. The hypothesis is

that some of the partners are in, but that the firm has remained

out, and provision is made for its continuing out. The neces-

sary and natural meaning goes no further than that.

On the other hand, it would be an anomaly to allow pro-

ceedings in bankruptcy against joint debtors from some of

whom, at any time before, pending, or after the proceeding, the

debt could be collected in full. If such proceedings were allowed,

it would be a further anomaly not to distribute all the partner-

ship assets. Yet the individual estate, after paying private

dehts, is part of those assets, so far as needed. § 5f. Finally, it

would be a third incongruity to grant a discharge in such a
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case from the debt considered as joint, but to leave the same

persons liable for it considered as several. We say the same

persons, for however much the difference between firm and

member under the statute be dwelt upon, the firm remains at

common law a group of men, and will be dealt with as such in

the ordinary courts for use in which the discharge is granted.

If, as in the present case, the partnership and individual estates

together are not enough to pay the partnership debts, the rational

thing to do, and one certainly not forbidden by the act, is to

administer both in bankruptcy. If such a case is within § 5h,

it is enough that Francis never has objected to the firm prop-

erty being administered by the trustee.

If it be said that the logical result of our opinion is that

the partners ought to be put into bankruptcy whenever the firm

is, as held by the late Judge Lowell, in an able opinion (Re

Forbes, 128 Fed. 137), it is a sufficient answer that no such

objection has been taken, but, on the contrary, Francis has

consented and agreed to hand over his property according to the

order of the court. So far as Vaccaro v. Security Bank, 43

C C. A. 279, 103 Fed. 436, 442, is inconsistent with the opinion

clauses c through g, that the assumption of the bankruptcy act
was that the partnership .and individual estates both were to
be administered, and that the only exception was that in h,
''in the event of one or more, but not all, of the members of a
partnership being adjudged bankrupt.'' [30 Stat. at L. 548,
c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3424.]
In that case, naturally, the partnership· property may be
administered by the partners not adjudged bankrupt, and does
not come into bankruptcy at all except by consent. But we do
not perceive that the clause imports that the partnership could
be in bankruptcy, and the partners not. The hypothesis is
that some of the partners are in, but that t11e firm has remained
out, and provision is made for its continuing out. The necessary and natural meaning goes no further than that.
On the other hand, it would be an anomaly to allow proceedings in bankruptcy against joint debtors from some of
whom, at any time before, pending, or after the proceeding, the
debt could be collected in full. If such proceedings were allowed,
it would be a further anomaly not to distribute all the partnership assets. Yet the individual estate, after paying private
debts, is part of those assets, so far as needed. § 5f. Finally, it
would be a third incongruity to grant a discharge in such a
case from the debt considered as joint, but to leave the same
persons liable for it considered as several. 'Ve say the same
persons, for however much the difference between firm and
member under the statute he dwelt upon, the firm remains at
common law a group of men, and will be dealt with as such in
the ordinary courts for use in which the discharge is granted.
If, as in the present case, the partnership and individual estates
together are not enough to pay the partnership debts, the rational
thing to do, and one certainly not for bidden by the act, is to
administer both in bankruptcy. If such a case is within § 5h,
it is enough that Francis never has objected to the firm property being administered by the trustee.
If it be said that the logical result of our opinion is that
the partners ought to be put into bankruptcy whenever the firm
is, as held by the late Judge Lowell, in an able opinion (Re
Forbes, 128 Fed. 137), it is a sufficient answer that no such
objection has been taken, but, on the contrary, Francis has
consented and agreed to hand over his property according to the
order of the court. So far as Vaccaro v. Security Bank, 43
C. C. A. 279, 103 Fed. 436, 442, is inconsistent with the opinion

CORPORATIONS

CORPORATIONS 99

99

of the majority in Re Bertenshaw, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 886,

85 C. C. A. 61, 157 Fed. 363, 13 Ann. Cas. 986, we regard it as

sustained by the stronger reasons and as correct.

Decree affirmed.12

4. CORPORATIONS

Note: Before the amendment of 1910 a corporation was not

entitled to become a voluntary bankrupt, and only certain classes

of the majority in Re Bertenshaw, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 886,
85 C. C. A. 61, 157 F'ed. 363, 13 Ann. Cas. 986, we regard it as
sustained by the stronger reasons and as correct.
Decree affirmed.12

of corporations were liable to involuntary bankruptcy, their lia-

4.

bility depending on whether they were "engaged principally

CORPORA TIONS

in manufacturing, trading, printing, publishing, ('mining'

was added by the amendment of 1903) or mercantile pursuits."

Many interesting distinctions were made in determining whether

corporations were within the liable classes, but they are, of

course, not of great importance under the law as it now stands,

which has returned to the phraseology of § 37 of the Act of

186(7: "moneyed, business, or commercial corporations." The

decisions under that Act, which have been held to be authorita-

tive as to the interpretation of the 1910 amendment (In re R.

12—Before the decision in Francis

v. McNeaI the courts were hopelessly

divided on several questions arising

out of the provisions of § 5 of the

Act. It was pretty well agreed that
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5 5 (a) justified the treatment of

the firm itself as a distinct entity

apart from any or all of the part-

ners, and that this entity was ad-

Kote: Before the amendment of 1910 a corporation was not
entitled to become a voluntary bankrupt, and only certain classes
of corporations were liable to involuntary bankruptcy, their liability depending on whether they were ''engaged principally
in manufacturing, trading, printing, publishing, ('mining'
was added by the amendment of 1903) or mercantile pursuits.''
~Iany interesting distinctions were made in determining whether
corporations were withiil the liable classes, but they are, of
course, not of great importance under the law as it now stands,
which has returned to the phraseology of § 37 of the Act of
186'1 : ''moneyed, business, or commercial corporations.'' The
decisions under that Act, which have been held to be authoritative as to the interpretation of the 1910 amendment (In re R.

judicable as a bankrupt whether the

partners were adjudicated or not.

Chemical Nat. Bk. v. Meyer, 92 Fed.

896; In re Perlhefter, 177 Fed. 299.

But on the question of insolvency

it was uncertain whether the sol-

vency of the firm should be deter-

mined by balancing firm liabilities

against firm assets (In re Berten-

shaw, 157 Fed. 363, 85 C. C. A. 61;

In re Everybody's Market, 173 Fed.

492) or whether the individual assets

of the several partners should also

be included (In re Blair. 99 Fed. 76;

Vaccaro v. Bank, 103 Fed. 436, 43

C. C. A. 279; Francis v. McNeaI,

186 Fed. 481, 108 C. C. A. 459);

the weight of authority doubtless

inclining to the latter view. And on

the question as to whether the trus-

tee in bankruptcy of the bankrupt

firm should administer both the firm

estate and the estates of the non-

bankrupt partners the courts also

divided; one line of cases (of which

Francis v. McNeal, 186 Fed. 481,

108 C. C. A. 459; Dickas v. Barnes,

140 Fed. 849, 72 C. C. A. 261; and

In re Duke & Sons, 199 Fed. 199,

are representative) held that the

firm trustee had this power, and that

8 5 (h) referred only to cases in

which some of the partners, but not

the firm itself, were bankrupt; other

cases (In re Junck & Balthazard,

169 Fed. 481; In re Solomon &

Carvel, 163 Fed. 140) following tbe

doctrine of the Bertenshaw case,

held that the firm trustee had no

such power, and that § 5 (h) was

intended to govern the case of a

firm which had been adjudicated.

l 2--Before the decision in Francis
v. MeNeal the courts were hopelessly
divided on several questions arising
out of the provisions of § 5 of the
Act. It was pretty well agreed that
(a) justified the treatment of
the firm itself as a dii;tinct entity
apart from any or all of the partRers, and that this entity was adjudicable as a bankrupt whether the
partners were adjudicated or not.
Chemical Nat. Bk. v. Meyer, 92 Fed.
891): In re Perlheft~r, J 77 Fed. 299.
But on the question of insolvency
it was uncertain whether the sol·
vency of the firm should be deter·
mine(~ by balancing firm liabilities
against firm assets (In re Berten·
shaw, 157 Fed. 363, 85 C. C. A. 61;
In re Everybody's Market, 113 Fed.
492) or whether the individual assets
of the several partners sh011lcl also
he included (In re Blair, 99 Fed. 76;
Vaccaro v. Bank, 103 Fed. 436, 43
C. C. A. 279; Francis v. l\fcNeal,
186 Fed. 481, 108 C. C. A. 459);

'5

the weight of authority doubtless
inrlining to the latter view. And on
the question aa to whether the trustee in bankruptcy of the bankrupt
firm should administer both the firm
estate and the estates of the non·
bankrupt partners the courts also
di,·ided; one line of cases (of which
Francis v. MeNeal, 186 Fed. 481,
108 C. C. A. 459; Dickas v. Barnes,
140 Fed. 849, 72 C. C. A. 261; and
In re Duke & Sons, 199 Fed. 199,
are representative) held that the
firm trustee bad this power, and that
~ 5 (b) referred only to cases in
which some of the partners, but not
the firm itself, were bankrupt; other
cases (In re Junck & Baltha2ard,
l 69 Fed. 481 ; In re Solomon &
Can·el, 163 Fed. 140) following the
clortrine of the Bertenshaw case,
hrld that the firm trustee had no
~uch power, and that § 5 (h) was
intended to govern the case of a
firm which had been adjudicated.
See note in 10 MICH. LAW REV. 215.
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L. Radke Co., 193 Fed. 735), held generally that these words

included practically every corporation organized for pecuniary

profit. See Adams v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., Holmes 30, 1

Fed. Cas. No. 47; Sweatt v. id., 3 Cliff. 379, 23 Fed. Cas. No.

13684; Rankin v. Florida, etc., R. R. Co., 20 Fed. Cas. No.

11567; Winter v. Iowa, etc., Ry. Co., 2 Dill. 487, 30 Fed. Cas.

No. 17890; In re Independent Ins. Co., Holmes 103, 13 Fed.

Cas. No. 7017; In re Merchants Ins. Co., 3 Biss. 162, 17 Fed.

Cas. No\ 9441; In re Hercules, etc., Soc., 6 Benedict 38, 12 Fed.
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L. Radke Co., 193 Fed. 735), held generally that these words
included practically every corporation organized for pecuniary
profit. See Adams v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., Holmes 30, 1
Fed. Cas. No. 47; Sweatt v. id., 3 Cliff. 379, 23 Fed. Cas. No.
13684; Rankin v. Florida, etc., R. R. Co., 20 Fed. Ca.s. No.
11567; Winter v. Iowa, etc., Ry. Co., 2 Dill. 487, 30 Fed. Cas.
No. 17890; In re Independent Ins. Co., Holmes 103, 13 .Fed.
Cas. No. 7017; In re Merchants Ins. Co., 3 Biss. 162, 17 Fed.
Cas. Nrl. 9441; In re Hercules, etc., Soc., 6 Benedict 38, 12 Fed.
Cas. No. 6402.
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SECTION I

IN VOLUNTARY PROCEEDINGS

In re SCHWANINGER

144 Fed.555

(District Court, E. D. Wisconsin. March 2, 1906)

QUARLES, District Judge. This is a motion to discharge

a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and to set aside the adjudi-

CHAPTER II

cation made thereon. The schedules of the bankrupt show but

one debt, which is a judgment for $1,065.80. The schedule of

assets discloses that the entire property of the bankrupt con-

PREREQUISITES TO ADJUDICATION

sists of chattels amounting in value to $50, all of which is

claimed as exempt, and undoubtedly is exempt under the statutes

SECTION I

of Wisconsin.

The question raised by the motion is a novel one. The sole

IN VOLUNTARY PROCEEDINGS

creditor appears and raises the contention that a debtor having

but one debt and no assets to which the trustee can take title

In re SCHWANINGER

under the act, is not a person qualified to become a bankrupt

under the provisions of Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat.

144 Fed. 555

544 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418], and that the court has

acquired no jurisdiction over the case. As jurisdiction in bank-

(District Court, E. D. Wisconsin. March 2, 1906)

ruptcy springs wholly from the statute, the pending question

must hinge upon the construction of the provisions of the act
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of Congress. § 4 (30 Stat. 547 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3423]),

provides that "Any person who has [owes] debts, except a cor-

poration, shall be entitled to the benefits of this act as a volun-

tary bankrupt." It is contended that this language clearly

indicates the purpose of Congress to extend the benefits of the

act only to such debtors as have a plurality of debts; that the

language is so plain there is no room for construction. But

11, subd. 29, under the title "Definitions," provides that "words

importing the plural number may be applied to and mean only
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QUARLES, District Judge. This is a motion to discharge
a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and to set aside the adjudication made thereon. The schedules of the bankrupt show but
one debt, which is a judgment for $1,065.80. The schedule of
assets discloses that the entire property of the bankrupt consists of chattels amounting in value to $50, all of which is
claimed as exempt, and undoubtedly is exempt under the statutes
of Wisconsin.
The question raised by the motion is a novel one. The sole
creditor appears and raises the contention that a debtor having
but one debt and no assets to which the trustee can take title
under the act, is not a person qualified to become a bankrupt
under the provisions of Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat.
544 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418), and that the court has
acquired no jurisdiction over the case. As jurisdiction in bankruptcy springs wholly from the statute, the peuding question
must binge upon the construction of the provisions of the act
of Congress. § 4 (30 Stat. 547 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3423]),
provides that ''Any person who has [owes] debts, except a corporation, shall be entitled to the benefits of· this act as a voluntary bankrupt." It is contended that this language clearly
indicates the purpose of Congress to extend the benefits of the
act only to such debtors as have a plurality of debts; that the
language is so plain there is no room for construction. But
§ 1, subd. 29, under the title "Definitions,'' provides that "words
importing the plural number may be applied to and mean only
101
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a single person or thing." This provision, if applicable, would

make the text of § 4 read '' debts or debt,'' and would seem to

settle the question adversely to the present motion. No doubt"

has been expressed so far as we can find, in any text-book or

adjudicated ease, that § 4 ought to be construed with reference

to the definition provided in § 1.

Re Maples (D. C.) 105 Fed. 922, is a case where there was

but a single debt, and where there were no assets. If the

objection which we are now considering were sound, it was

clearly decisive of the Maples Case. But the court was at great

pains to point out that the solitary debt in that case was not a

provable debt within the purview of the bankruptcy act. The

court there held "the bankrupt in his petition, therefore, has

not presented any debt or claim from which this court can dis-

charge him." While the court did not expressly say that a

single provable debt would answer the purposes of jurisdic-

tion, we are left to infer as much from what the court did say.

Re Yates (D. C.) 114 Fed. 365, is another case where the only-

debt disclosed by the schedules was a judgment in tort, wherein

an appeal had been taken which suspended its mandate for the

time being. There is no suggestion in the opinion that the

judgment, if final, and of a nature to be proved as a debt,

would not sustain the jurisdiction. The reasoning of the court
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would certainly lead us to the opposite conclusion. I pass now

to consider the second proposition upon which this motion is

based.

It is contended that where there is no property to be dis-

tributed there is no function to be performed by any officer

known to the act, and that the machinery provided by the law

will be wholly inoperative, and that such a proceeding, culminat-

ing only in the discharge from a single obligation, was not

within the contemplation of Congress. While it is true that

the act of 1898 contemplates distribution as well as discharge,

the presence of assets has not been specifically recognized and laid

down as essential to jurisdiction, while the existence of indebted-

ness has been explicitly made a condition precedent. Cases are

cited holding that the absence of assets is fatal to the jurisdic-

tion of probate courts. Such cases are not in point here, because

the distribution of assets among creditors and legatees or heirs

at law, is the sole function of a court of probate. When the

bankruptcy act was passed, Congress had in mind the relief of

unfortunate debtors. That humane policy permeates the entire

a single person or thing." This provision, if applicable, would
make the text of § 4 read ' 'debts or debt, '' and would seem to
settle the question adversely to the present motion. No doubt"
has been expressed so far as we can find, in any text-book or
adjudicated case, that § 4 ought to be construed with reference
to the definition provided in § 1.
Re l\Iaples (D. C.) 105 Fed. 922, is a caae where there was
but a single debt, and where there were no assets. If the
objection which we are now considering were sound, it was
clearly decisive of the Maples Case. But the court was at great
pains to point out that the solitary debt in that case was not a
provable debt within the purview of the bankruptcy act. The
court there held ''the ba~krupt in his petition, therefore, has
not presented any debt or claim from which this court can discharge him.'' While the court did not expressly say that a
single provable debt would answer the purposes of jurisdiction, we are left to infer as much from what the court did say.
Re Yates (D. C.) 114 Fed. 365, is another case where the only
debt disclosed by the schedules was a judgment in tort, wherein
an appeal had been taken which suspended its mandate for the
time being. There is no suggestion in the opinion that the
judgment, if final, and of a nature to be proved as a debt7
would not suatain the jurisdiction. The reasoning of the court
would certainly lead us to the opposite conclUBion. I pass now
to consider the second proposition upon which this motion is
based.
It is contended that where there is no property to be distributed there is no function to be performed by any officer
known .to the act, and that the machinery provided by the law
will be wholly inoperative, and that such a proceeding, culminat- ·
ing only in the discharge from a single obligation, was not
within the contemplation of Congress. While it is true that
the act of 1898 contemplates distribution as well as discharge,
the presence of assets has not been specifically recognized and laid
down as essential to jurisdiction, while the existence of indebtedness has been explicitly made a condition precedent. Cases are
cited holding that the absence of assets is fatal to the jurisdic'."
tion of probate courts. Such cases are not in point here, because
the distribution of assets among creditors and legatees or heirs
at law, is the sole function of a court of probate. When the
bankruptcy act was passed, Congress had in mind the relief of
unfortunate debtors. That humane policy permeates the entire

VOLUNTARY PROCEEDINGS

103

VOLUNTARY PROCEEDINGS 103

act, and seems to have been made quite as important a function

as an equitable distribution of assets among the creditors. The

bankruptcy act of 1841 was the first act which provided for an

unqualified discharge of the debtor. Its constitutionality was

assailed, and the court, in Re Klien, 1 How. (42 U. S.) 277,

note, Fed. Cas. No. 7,865 say:

"Of this subject Congress has general jurisdiction; and the

true inquiry is, to what limits is that jurisdiction restricted?

I hold it extends to all cases where the law causes to be dis-

tributed the property of the debtor among his creditors; this is

its least limit. Its greatest is a discharge of the debtor from

his contracts. And all intermediate legislation, affecting sub-

stance and form, but tending to further the great end of the

subject—distribution and discharge—are in the competency and

discretion of Congress.''

In Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 188, 22

Sup. Ct. 857, 46 L. ed. 1113, which involved the constitutionality

of the act of 1898, the court say:

"The subject of 'bankruptcies' includes the power to dis-

charge the debtor from his contracts and legal liabilities as well

as to distribute his property. The grant to Congress involves

the power to impair the obligation of contracts, and this the

states were forbidden to do."
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Later on, on page 192 of 186 U. S., page 862 of 22 Sup. Ct.

(46 L. ed. 1113), the court say:

"The determination of the status of the honest and unfortu-

nate debtor by his liberation from encumbrance on future ex-

ertion is matter of public concern, and Congress has power to

accomplish it throughout the United States by proceedings at

the debtor's domicil."

It is difficult to understand why a debtor owing a single

obligation of $1,065, should not fall within the merciful policy

of the act. It is an accidental circumstance that the indebted-

ness was not distributed among two or more creditors. His case

is clearly within the spirit of the act, and no good reason has

been suggested why he should not be within its scope and opera-

tion. It is my belief that Congress had not in mind any pur-

pose to discriminate against an unfortunate debtor who is op-

pressed by a single obligation, and that the will of Congress

will be effectuated by making the definition above recited

act, and seems to have been made quite as important a function
as an equitable distribution of assets among the creditors. The
~ankruptcy act of 184:1 was the first act which provided for an
unqualified discharge of the debtor. Its constitutionality was
assailed, and the court, in Re Klien, 1 How. (42 U. S.) 277,
note, Fed. Cas. No. 7,865 say:
''Of this subject Congress has general jurisdiction; and the
true inquiry is, to what limits is that jurisdiction restricted?
I hold it extends to all cases where the law causes to be distributed the property of the debtor among his creditors; this is
its least limit. Its greatest is a discharge of the debtor from
his contracts. And all intermediate legislation, affecting substance and form, but tending to further the great end of the
subject-distribution and discharge-are in the competency and
discretion of Congress. ''
In Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 188, 22
Sup. Ct. 857, 46 L. ed. 1113, which involved the constitutionality
of the act of 1898, the court say :
''The subject of 'bankruptcies' includes the power to discharge the debtor from his contracts and legal liabilities as well
as to distribute his property. The grant to Congress involves
the power to impair the obligation of contracts, and this the
states were forbidden to do.''
Later on, on page 192 of 186 U. S., page 862 of 22 Sup. Ct.
(46 L. ed. 1113), the court say :
''The determination of the status of the honest and unfortunate debtor by his liberation from encumbrance on future exei:tion is matter of public concern, and Congress has power to
accomplish it throughout the United States by proceedings at
the debtor '.s domicil.''
It is difficult to understand why a debtor owing a single
obligation of $1,065, should no't fall within the merciful policy
of the act. It is an accidental circumstance that the indebtednC'ss was not distributed among two or more creditors. His case
is clearly within the spirit of the act, and no good reason has
been suggested why he should not be within its scope and operation. It is my belief that Congress had not in mind any purpose to discriminate against an unfortunate debtor who is oppressed by a single obligation, and that the will of Congress
will be effectuated by making the definition above recited
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applicable to § 4, and treating the term "debts" where it occurs

in such section as the equivalent of "debt."

For these reasons the motion will be denied.1

SECTION II

IN INVOLUNTARY PROCEEDINGS

applicable to § 4, and treatiug the term ''debts'' where it occurs
in such section as the equivalent of "debt."
For these reasons the motion
be denied. 1

will

A. Insolvency

GEORGE M. WEST CO. v. LEA et al.

SECTION II

174 U. S. 590, 43 L. ed. 1098, 19 Sup. Ct. 836

(United States Supreme Court. May 22, 1899)

IN INVOLUNTARY PROCEEDINGS

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

The facts stated in the certificate of the Circuit Court of

A.

Appeals are substantially as follows:

INSOLVENCY

Lea Bros. & Co. and two other firms filed on December 18,

GEORGE M. WEST CO. v. LEA et al.

1898, a petition in the District Court of the United States for

the Eastern district of Virginia, praying that an alleged debtor,

174 U. S. 590, 43 L. ed. 1098, 19 Sup. Ct. 836

the George M. West Company, a corporation located in Rich-

mond, Va., be adjudicated a bankrupt, because of the fact that

(United States Supreme Court.

it had, on the date of the filing of the petition, executed a deed

May 22, 1899)

of general assignment, conveying all its property and assets

to Joseph V. Bidgood, trustee. The George M. West Company

pleaded, denying that at the time of the filing of said petition

against it the corporation was insolvent, within the meaning of

the bankrupt act, and averring that its property, at a fair
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valuation, was more than sufficient in amount to pay its debts.

The prayer was that the petition be dismissed. The court re-

jected this plea, and adjudicated the West Company to be a

bankrupt. The cause was referred to a referee in bankruptcy,

and certain creditors secured in the deed of assignment, who had

instituted proceedings in the law and equity court of the city

of Richmond, under which that court had taken charge of the

administration of the estate and trust under the deed of assign-

ment, were enjoined from further prosecuting their proceedings

in the state court under said deed of assignment. 01 Fed. 237.

From this decree an appeal was allowed to the Circuit Court of

1—See also In re Lachenmaier, that creditors are not authorized by

203 Fed. 32. 121 C. C. A. 368. In the Act to file answers to a voluntary

re Jehu, 94 Fed. 638, it was held petition in bankruptcy.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.
The facts stated in the certificate of the Circuit Court of
Appeals are substantially as follows:
Lea Bros. & Co. and two other firms filed on December 18,
1898, a petition in the District Court of the United States for
the Eastern district of Virginia, praying that an alleged debtor,
the George M. West Company, a corporation located in Richmond, Va., be adjudicated a bankrupt, because of the fact that
it had, on the date of the filing of the petition, executed a deed
of general assignment, conveying all its property and assets
to Joseph V. Bidgood, trustee. The George l\L West Company
pleaded, denying that at the time of the filing of said petition
against it the corporation was insolvent, within the meaning of
the bankrupt act, and averring that its property, at a fair
valuation, was more than sufficient in amount to pay its debts.
The prayer was that the petition be dismissed. The court rejected this plea, and adjudicated the West Company to be a
bankrupt. The cause was referred to a referee in bankruptcy,
and certain creditors secured in the <leed of assignment, who had
instituted proceedings in the law and equity court of the city
of Richmond, under which that court had taken charge of the
administration of the estate and trust under the deed of assignment, were enjoined from further prosecuting tlwir proceedings
in the state court under said deed of assignment. 91 FPd. 237.
From this decree an appeal was allowed to the Cir<>nit Court of
1-8ee also In re Lacbenmaier,
Fed. 32. 121 C. C. A. 368. In
re Jehu, 94 Fed. 638, it was held
~03

that credit-0rs are not authorued by
the Act to file answers to a voluntary
petition in ban.krnptcy.
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in such section as the equivalent of "debt."

For these reasons the motion will be denied.1
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GEORGE M. WEST CO. v. LEA et al.
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the George M. West Company, a corporation located in Rich-

mond, Va., be adjudicated a bankrupt, because of the fact that
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of general assignment, conveying all its property and assets

to Joseph V. Bidgood, trustee. The George M. West Company
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against it the corporation was insolvent, within the meaning of
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Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

valuation, was more than sufficient in amount to pay its debts.

The prayer was that the petition be dismissed. The court re-

jected this plea, and adjudicated the West Company to be a

bankrupt. The cause was referred to a referee in bankruptcy,

and certain creditors secured in the deed of assignment, who had

instituted proceedings in the law and equity court of the city

of Richmond, under which that court had taken charge of the

administration of the estate and trust under the deed of assign-

ment, were enjoined from further prosecuting their proceedings

in the state court under said deed of assignment. 01 Fed. 237.

From this decree an appeal was allowed to the Circuit Court of

1—See also In re Lachenmaier, that creditors are not authorized by

203 Fed. 32. 121 C. C. A. 368. In the Act to file answers to a voluntary

re Jehu, 94 Fed. 638, it was held petition in bankruptcy.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.
The facts stated in the certificate of the Circuit Court of
Appeals are substantially as follows:
Lea Bros. & Co. and two other firms filed on December 18,
1898, a petition in the District Court of the United States for
the Eastern district of Virginia, praying that an alleged debtor,
the George M. West Company, a corporation located in Richmond, Va., be adjudicated a bankrupt, because of the fact that
it had, on the date of the filing of the petition, executed a deed
of general assignment, conveying all its property and assets
to Joseph V. Bidgood, trustee. The George l\L West Company
pleaded, denying that at the time of the filing of said petition
against it the corporation was insolvent, within the meaning of
the bankrupt act, and averring that its property, at a fair
valuation, was more than sufficient in amount to pay its debts.
The prayer was that the petition be dismissed. The court rejected this plea, and adjudicated the West Company to be a
bankrupt. The cause was referred to a referee in bankruptcy,
and certain creditors secured in the <leed of assignment, who had
instituted proceedings in the law and equity court of the city
of Richmond, under which that court had taken charge of the
administration of the estate and trust under the deed of assignment, were enjoined from further prosecuting tlwir proceedings
in the state court under said deed of assignment. 91 FPd. 237.
From this decree an appeal was allowed to the Cir<>nit Court of
1-8ee also In re Lacbenmaier,
Fed. 32. 121 C. C. A. 368. In
re Jehu, 94 Fed. 638, it was held
~03

that credit-0rs are not authorued by
the Act to file answers to a voluntary
petition in ban.krnptcy.
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Appeals for the Fourth circuit. On the hearing of said appeal

the court, desiring instructions, certified the case to this court.

The certificate recites the facts as above stated, and submits the

following question:

"Whether or not a plea that the party against whom the

petition was filed 'was not insolvent, as defined in the bank-

rupt act, at the time of the filing of the petition against him,'

is a valid plea in bar to a petition in bankruptcy filed against

a debtor who has made a general deed of assignment for the

benefit of his creditors."

The contentions of the parties are as follows: On behalf of

the debtor it is argued that under the bankrupt act of 1898 two

things must concur, to authorize an adjudication of involuntary

bankruptcy. First, insolvency in fact, and, second, the com-

mission of an act of bankruptcy. From this proposition the con-

clusion is deduced that a debtor against whom a proceeding in

involuntary bankruptcy is commenced is entitled, entirely irre-

spective of the particular act of bankruptcy alleged to have

been committed, to tender, as a complete bar to the action,

an issue of fact as to the existence of actual insolvency at the

time when the petition for adjudication in involuntary bank-

ruptcy was filed. On the other hand, for the creditors it is

argued that whilst solvency is a bar to proceedings in bankruptcy
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predicated upon certain acts done by a debtor, that as to other

acts of bankruptcy, among which is included a general assign-

ment for the benefit of creditors, solvency at the time of the filing

of a petition for adjudication is not a bar, because the bankrupt

act provides that such deed of general assignment shall, of

itself alone, be adequate cause for an adjudication in involuntary

bankruptcy, without reference to whether the debtor by whom

the deed of general assignment was made was in fact solvent

or insolvent.

A decision of these conflicting contentions involves a construc-

tion of § 3 of the act of 1898 (30 Stat. 546). • • •

It will be observed that the section is divided into several

paragraphs, denominated as a, b, c, d, and e. Paragraph a is

as follows:

"§3. Acts of Bankruptcy, (a) Acts of bankruptcy by a

person shall consist of his having (1) conveyed, transferred,

concealed, or removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed,

any part of his property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud

his creditors, or any of them; or (2) transferred, while insolvent,

Appeals for the Fourth circuit. On the hearing of said appeal
the court, desiring instructions, certified the case to this court.
The certificate recites the facts as above stated, and submits the
following question :
"Whether or not a plea that the party against whom the
petition was filed 'was not insolvent, as defined in the bankrupt act, at the time of the filing of the petition against him,'
is a valid plea in bar to a petition in bankruptcy filed against
a debtor who has made a general deed of assignment for the
benefit of his creditors.''
The contentions of the parties are as follows: On behalf of
the debtor it is argued that under the bankrupt act of 1898 two
things must concur, to authorize an adjudication of involuntary
bankruptcy. First, insolvency in fact, and, second, the commission of an act of bankruptcy. From this proposition the conclusion is deduced that a debtor against whom a proceeding in
involuntary bankruptcy is commenced is entitled, entirely irrespective of the particular act of bankruptcy alleged to have
been committed, to tender, as a complete bar to the action,
an issue of fact as to the existence of actual insolvency at the
.time when the petition for adjudication in involuntary bankruptcy was filed. On the other hand, for the creditoi:s it is
argued that whilst solvency is a bar to proceedings in bankruptcy
predicated upon certain acts done by a debtor, that as to other
acts of bankruptcy, among which is included a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, solvency at the time of the filing
of a petition for adjudication is not a bar, because the bankrupt
act provides that such deed of general· assignment shall, of
itself alone, be adequate cause for an adjudication in involuntary
bankrnptey, without reference to whether the debtor by whom
the deed of general assignment was made was in fact solvent
or insolvent.
A decision of these conflicting contentions involve,s a construction of § 3 of the act of 1898 ( 30 Stat. 546). • • •
It will be observed that the section is divided into several
paragraphs, denominated as a, b, c, d, and e. Paragraph a is
as follows:
"§ 3. Acts of Bankruptcy. (a) Acts of bankruptcy by a
person shall consist of his having ( 1) conveyed, transferred,
concealed, or removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed,
any part of his property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
his creditors, or any of them; or (2) transferred, while insolvent,
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any portion of his property to one or more of his creditors with

intent to prefer such creditors over his other creditors; or (3)

suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain

a preference through legal proceedings, and not having at least

five days before a sale or final disposition of any property

affected by such preference vacated or discharged such pref-

erence; or (4) made a general assignment for the benefit of his

creditors; or (5) admitted in writing his inability to pay his

debts and his willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt on that

ground."

It is patent on the face of this paragraph that it is divided

into five different headings, which are designated numerically

from 1 to 5. Now, the acts of bankruptcy embraced in divisions

numbered 2 and 3 clearly contemplate, not only the commission

of the acts provided against, but also cause the insolvency of

the debtor to be an essential concomitant. On the contrary, as

to the acts embraced in enumerations 1, 4, and 5, there is no

express requirement that the acts should have been committed

while insolvent. Considering alone the text of paragraph a, it

results that the nonexistence of insolvency at the time of the

filing of a petition for adjudication in involuntary bankruptcy

because of the acts enumerated in 1, 4, or 5 (which embrace the

making of a deed of general assignment), does not constitute a
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defense to the petition, unless provision to that effect be else-

where found in the statute. This last consideration we shall

hereafter notice.

The result arising from considering the paragraph in ques-

tion would not be different if it be granted arguendo that the

text is ambiguous, for then the cardinal rule requiring that we

look beneath the text for the purpose of ascertaining and enforc-

ing the intent of the lawmaker would govern. Applying this

rule to the enumerations contained in paragraph a, it follows

that the making of a deed of general assignment, referred to

in enumeration 4, constitutes in itself an act of bankruptcy,

which per se authorizes an adjudication of involuntary bank-

ruptcy entirely irrespective of insolvency. This is clearly

demonstrated from considering the present law in the light

afforded by previous legislation on the subject.

Under the English bankruptcy statutes (as well that of 1869

as those upon which our earlier acts were modeled), and

our own bankruptcy statutes down to and including the act

of 1867, the making of a deed of general assignment was

any portion of his property to one or more of his creditors with
intent to prefer such creditors over his other C'reditors; or ( 3)
suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain
a preference through legal proceedings, and not having at least
five days before a sale or final disposition of any property
affected by such preference vacated or discharged sueh preference; or ( 4) made a general assignment for the benefit of his
creditors; or ( 5) admitted in writing his inability to pay his
debts and his willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt on that
ground."
It. is patent on the face of this paragraph that it is divided
into five different headings, which are designated numerically
from 1 to 5. Now, the acts of bankruptcy embraced in divisions
numbered 2 and 3 clearly contemplate, not only the commission
of the aots provided against, but also cause the insolvency of
the debtor to be an essential concomit.ant. On the contrary, as
to the acts embraced in enumerations 1, 4, and 5, there is no
express requirement that the acts should have been committed
while insolvent. Considering alone the text of paragraph a, it
results that the nonexistence of insolvency at the time of the
filing of a petition for adjudication in involuntary bankruptcy
because of the .acts enumerated in 1, 4, or 5 (which embrace the
making of a deed of general assignment), does not constitute a
defense to the petition, unless provision to that effect be elsewhere found in the statute. This last consideration we shall
hereafter notice.
The result arising from considering the paragraph in question would not be difl'erent if it be granted arguendo that the
text is ambiguous, for then the cardinal rule requiring that we
look beneath the text for the purpose of ascertaining and enforcing the intent of the lawmaker would govern. Applying this
rule to the enumerations contained in paragraph a, it follows
that the making of a deed of general assignment, referred to
in enumeration 4, constitutes in itself an act of bankrnpt~y,
which per se authorizes an adjudication of involuntary bankruptcy entirely irrespective of insolvency. This is clearly
demonstrated from considering the present law in the light
afforded by previous legislation on the subject.
Under the English bankruptcy statutes (as well that of 1869
as those upon which our earlier acts were modeled), and
our own bankruptcy statutes down to and including the act
of 1867, the making of a deed of general assignment was
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deemed to be repugnant to the policy of the bankruptcy laws,

and, as a necessary consequence, constituted an act of bank-

ruptcy, per se. This is shown by an examination of the de-

cisions bearing upon the point, both English and American. In

Globe Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Ins. Co., 14 N. B. R. 311, 10 Fed.

Cas. 488, the subject was ably reviewed, and the authorities are

there copiously collected. The decision in that case was ex-

pressly relied upon In re Beisenthal, 14 Blatchf. 146, Fed. Cas.

No. 1,236, where it was held that a voluntary assignment, with-

out preferences, valid under the laws of the state of New York,

was void as against an assignee in bankruptcy; and this latter

ease was approvingly referred to in Reed v. Mclntyre, 98 U. S.

513. So, also, in Boese v. King, 108 U. S. 379, 385, 2 Sup. Ct.

765, it was held, citing (p. 387, 108 U. S., and p. 771, 2 Sup.

Ct.) Reed v. Mclntyre, that whatever might be the effect of a

deed of general assignment for the benefit of creditors, when

considered apart from the bankrupt act, such a deed was repug-

nant to the object of a bankruptcy statute, and therefore was,

in and of itself alone, an act of bankruptcy. The foregoing

decisions related to deeds of general assignment made during the

operation of the bankrupt act of 1867 (14 Stat. 536), or the

amendments thereto of 1874 and 1876 (18 Stat. 180; 19 Stat.

102). Neither, however, the act of 1867, nor the amendments to
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it. contained an express provision that a deed of general assign-

ment should be a conclusive act of bankruptcy. Such conse-

quence was held to arise, from a deed of that description, as a

legal result of the clause in the act of 1867 forbidding assign-

ments with "intent to delay, defraud or hinder" creditors, and

from the provision avoiding certair acts done to delay, defeat,

or hinder the execution of the act. Rev. St. 5021, pars. 4, 7.

Now, when it is considered that the present law, although it

only retained some of the provisions of the act of 1867, con-

tains an express declaration that a deed of general assignment

shall authorize the involuntary bankruptcy of the debtor making

such a deed, all doubt as to the scope and intent of the law is

removed. The conclusive result of a deed of general assign-

ment under all our previous bankruptcy acts, as well as under

the English bankrupt laws, and the significant import of the

incorporation of the previous rule, by an express statement, in

the present statute, have been lucidly expounded by Addison

Brown, J., In re Gutwillig, 90 Fed. 475, 478.

But it is argued that, whatever may have been the rule in

deeme<l to be rt·pngnant to the policy of the bankruptcy laws,
and, as a necessary consequence, constituted an act of bankruptcy, per se. This is shown by an examination of the d(•eisions bearing upon the point, both English and American. In
Globe Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Ins. Co., 14 N. B. R. 311, 10 Fed.
Cas. 488, the subject was ably reviewed, and the authorities are
there copiously collected. The decision in that case was expressly relied upon In re Beisenthal, 14 Blatchf. 146, Fed. Cas.
No. 1,236, where it was held that a voluntary assignment, without preferences, valid under the laws of the state of New York,
was void as against an assignee in bankruptcy; and this latter
case was approvingly referred to in Reed v. Mcintyre, 98 U. S.
513. So, also, in Boese v. King, 108 U. S. 379, 385, 2 Sup. Ct.
765, it was held, citing (p. 387, 108 U. S., and p. 771, 2 Sup.
Ct.) Reed v. Mcintyre, that whatever might be the effect of a
deed of general assignment for the benefit of creditors, when
c'onsidered apart from the bankrupt act, such a deed was repugnant to the object of a bankruptcy statute, and therefore was,
in and of itself alone, an act of bankruptcy. The foregoing
decisions related to deeds of general assignment made during the
operation of the bankrupt act of 1867 (14 Stat. 536), or the
amendments thereto of 1874 and 1876 (18 Stat. 180; 19 Stat.
102). Neither, however, the act of 1867, nor the amendments to
it, contained an expre&S provision that a deed of general assignment should be a conclusive act of bankruptcy. Such consequence was held to arise, from a deed of that description, as a
lt'gal result of the clause in the act of 1867 forbidding assignments with "intent to delay, defraud or hinder" creditors, and
from the provision avoiding certair :i.ct.s done to delay, defeat,
1.1r hinder the execution of the act.
Rev. St. 5021, pars. 4, 7.
Now, when it is considered that the present l~w, although it
only retained some of the provisions of the act of 1867, contains an express declaration that a deed of general assignment
shall authorize the involuntary bankruptcy of the debtor making
such a deed, all doubt as to the scope and intent of the law is
removed. The conclusive result of a deed of general assignment under all our previous bankruptcy acts, as well as under
the English bankrupt laws, and the significant import of the
incorporation of the previous rule, by an express statement, in
the present statute, have been lucidly expounded by Addison
Brown, J., In re Gutwillig, 90 Fed. 475, 478.
But it is argued that, whatever may have been the rule in
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previous bankruptcy statutes, the present act, in other than

the particular provision just considered, manifests a clear in-

tention to depart from the previous rule, and hence makes insol-

vency an essential prerequisite in every case. To maintain this

proposition, reliance is placed upon paragraph c of § 3, which

reads as follows:

"(c) It shall be a complete defense to any proceedings in

bankruptcy instituted under the first subdivision of this sec-

tion to allege and prove that the party proceeded against was

not insolvent as defined in this act at the time of the filing the

petition against him, and if solvency at such date is proved

by the alleged bankrupt the proceedings shall be dismissed, and

under said subdivision one the burden of proving solvency shall

be on the alleged bankrupt."

The argument is that the words "under the first subdivision

of this section" refer to all the provisions of paragraph a, be-

eause that paragraph, as a whole, is the first part of the section,

separately divided, and, although designated by the letter a,

it is nevertheless to be considered, as a whole, as subdivision 1.

But whether the words "first subdivision of this section," if

considered intrinsically and apart from the context of the act,

would be held to refer to paragraph a as an entirety, or only

to the first subdivision of that paragraph, need not be considered.
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We are concerned only with the meaning of the words as used

in the law we are interpreting. Now, the context makes it plain

that the words relied on were only intended to relate to the

first numerical subdivision of paragraph a. Thus, in the last

sentence of paragraph c the matter intended to be referred to

by the words "first subdivision of this section," used in the

prior sentences, is additionally designated as follows, "and

under said subdivision one," etc.,—language which cannot pos-

sibly be, in reason, construed as referring to the whole of para-

graph a, but only to subdivision 1 thereof.

This is, besides, more abundantly shown by paragraph d,

which provides as follows:

"(d) Whenever a person against whom a petition has been

filed as hereinbefore provided under the second and third sub-

divisions of this section takes issue with and denies the allega-

tions of his insolvency, it shall be his duty to appear in court on

the hearing with his books, papers and accounts and submit

to an examination, and give testimony as to all matters tending

to establish solvency or insolvency, and in case of his failure

previous bankruptcy statutes, the present act, in other than
the particular provision just considered, manifests a clear intention to depart from the previous rule, and hence makes insolvency an essential prerequisite in every case. To maintain this
proposition, reliance is placed upon paragraph c of § 3, which
reads as follows:
" ( c) It shall be a complete defense to any proceedings in
bankruptcy iDBtituted under the first subdivision of this section to allege and prove that the party proceeded against was
not· insolvent as defined in this act at the time of the filing the
petition against him, and if solvency at such date is proved
by the alleged bankrupt the proceedings shall be dismissed, and
under said subdivision one the burden of proving solvency shall
be on the alleged bankrupt."
. The argument is that the words "under the first subdivision
of this section'' refer to all the provisions of paragraph a, beea use that paragraph, as a whole, is the first part of the section,
separately divided, and, although designated by the letter a,
it is nevertheless to be considered, as a whole, as subdivision 1.
But whether the words "first subdivision of this section," if
considered intrinsically and apart from the context of the act,
would be held to refer to paragraph a as an entirety, or only
to the first subdivision of that paragraph, need not be coDBidered.
We are concerned only with the meaning of the words as used
i.n the law we are interpreting. Now, the context makes it plain
that the words relied on were only intended to relate to the
first numerical subdivision of paragraph a. Thus, in the last
sentence of paragraph c the matter intended to be referred to
by the words "first subdivision of this section," used in the
prior sentences, is additionally desiguared as follows, ''and
under said subdivision one,'' etc.,-language which cannot possibly be, in reason, constrn<'d n~ referring to the whole of paragraph a, but only to subdivision 1 thereof.
This is, besides, more abundantly shown by paragraph d,
which provides as follows:
"(d) Whenever a person against whom a petition has been
filed as hereinbefore provided under the second and third subdivisions of this section takes issue with and denies the allegations of his insolvency, it shall be his duty to appear in court on
the hearing with his books, papers and accounts and submit
to an examination, and give testimony as to all matters tending
to establish solvency or insolvency, and in case of his failure
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to so attend and submit to examination the burden of proving

his solvency shall rest upon him." .

This manifestly only refers to enumerations 2 and 3 found

in paragraph a, which, it will be remembered, make it essential

that the acts of bankruptcy recited should have been committed

by the debtor while insolvent. Indeed, if the contention ad-

vanced were followed, it would render § 3, in many respects,

meaningless. Thus, if it were to be held that the words "first

subdivision of this section," used in paragraph c, referred to the

first division of the section (that is, to paragraph a as a whole),

it would follow that the words "second and third subdivisions of

this section," used in paragraph d, would relate to the second

and third divisions of the section (that is, to paragraphs b and

e). But there is nothing in these latter paragraphs to which

the reference in paragraph d could possibly apply, and there-

fore, under the construction asserted, paragraph d would have

no significance whatever. To adopt the reasoning referred to

would compel to a further untenable conclusion. If the reference

in paragraph c to the '' first subdivision of this section'' relates

to paragraph a in its entirety, then all the provisions in para-

graph a would be governed by the rule laid down in paragraph

c The rule, however, laid down in that paragraph, would be
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then in irreconcilable conflict with the provisions of paragraph

d, and it would be impossible to construe the statute har-

moniously without eliminating some of its provisions.

Despite the plain meaning of the statute as shown by the

foregoing considerations, it is urged that the following pro-

vision contained in paragraph b of § 3 operates to render any

and all acts of bankruptcy insufficient, as the basis for proceed-

ings in involuntary bankruptcy, unless it be proven that at

the time the petition was filed the alleged bankrupt was in-

solvent. The provision is as follows: "A petition may be filed

against a person who is insolvent and who has committed an

act of bankruptcy within four months after the commission of

such act." Necessarily if this claim is sound, the burden in all

cases would be upon the petitioning creditors to allege and

prove such insolvency. The Contention, however, is clearly re-

butted by the terms of paragraph c, which provides as to one

of the classes of acts of"bankruptcy, enumerated in paragraph

a. that the burden should be on the debtor to allege and prove

his solvency. So, also, paragraph d, conforming in this respect

to the requirements of paragraph a, contemplates an issue as

to so attend and submit to examination the burden of \proving
his solvency shall rest upon him.''
,
This manifestly only refers to enumerations 2 and 3 found
in ptll'&graph a, which, it will be remembered, make it essential
that the act.s of bankruptcy recited should have .been committed
by the debtor · while insolvent. Indeed, if the contention advanced were followed, it would render § 3, in many respects,
meaningless. Thus, if it were to be held that the words ''first
subdivision of this section," used in paragraph c, referred to the
first division of the section (that is, to paragraph a as a whole),
it would follow that the words "second and third subdivisions of
this section," used in paragraph d, would relate to the second
and third divisions of the section (that is, 1lo paragraphs b and
c). But there is nothing in these latter paragraphs to which
the reference in paragraph d could possibly apply, and therefore, under the construction asserted, paragraph d would have
no significance whatever. To adopt the reasoning referred to
would compel to a further untenable conclusion. If the reference
in paragraph c to the "first subdivision of this section" relates
to paragraph a in its entirety, then all the provisions in paragraph a would be governed by the rule laid down in paragraph
c. The rule, however, laid down in that paragraph, would be
then in irreconcilable conflict with the provisions of paragraph
d, and it would be impossible to construe the statute harmoniously without eliminating some of its provisions.
Despite the plain meaning of the statute as shown by the
foregoing considerations, it is urged that the following provision contained in paragraph b of § 3 operates to render any
and all acts of bankruptcy insufficient, as the basis for proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy, unless it be proven that at
the time the petition was filed the alleged bankrupt was insolvent. The provision is as follows: ''A petition may be filed
against a person who is insolvent and who has committed an
act of bankruptcy within four months after the commission of
such act." Neeessarily if this claim is sound. the burden in all
cases would be upon the petitioning creditors to allt~ge and
prove such iusolvency. The contention, howcvC'f, is clearly rebutred by the terms of paragraph c, whieh pro\'idt>s as to one
of the classes of ads of ·bankrnptcy, enumerated in paragraph
a. that the lmrclen should be on the debtor to allege and prove
his solvency. Ro, also, paragraph d, conforming in this respect
to the requirements of paragraph a, contemplates an issue as
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to the second aud third classes of acts of bankruptcy, merely

with respect to the insolvency of the debtor at the time of the

commission of the act of bankruptcy. Further, a petition in a

proceeding in involuntary bankruptcy is defined in § 1 of the

act of 1898, enumeration 20, to mean "a paper filed • * *

by creditors alleging the commission of an act of bankruptcy

by a debtor therein named."

It follows that the mere statement in the statute, by way

of recital, that a petition may be filed "against a person who

is insolvent and who has committed an act of bankruptcy,"

was not designed to superadd a further requirement to those

contained in paragraph a of § 3, as to what should constitute

acts of bankruptcy. This reasoning also answers the argument

based on the fact that the rules in bankruptcy promulgated by

this court provide in general terms for an allegation of insol-

vency in the petition, and a denial of such allegation in the

answer. These rules were but intended to execute the act, and

not to add to its provisions by making that which the statute

treats in some cases as immaterial a material fact in every case.

Therefore, though the rules and forms in bankruptcy provide

for an issue as to solvency in cases of involuntary bankruptcy,

where by the statute such issue becomes irrelevant, because the

particular act relied on in a given case conclusively imports a
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right to the adjudication in bankruptcy if the act be established,

the allegation of insolvency in the petition becomes superfluous,

or, if made, need not be traversed. •

Our conclusion, then, is that as a deed of general assignment

for the benefit of creditors is made by the bankruptcy act alone

sufficient to justify an adjudication in involuntary bankruptcy

against the debtor making such deed, without reference to his

solvency at the time of the filing of the petition, the denial of

insolvency by way of defense to a petition based upon the mak-

ing of a deed of general assignment is not warranted by the

bankruptcy law, and therefore that the question certified must

be answered in the negative.

And it is so ordered.2

2—As to the necessity (before taxy petition, see In re Lachenmaier,

the 1910 amendment of § 4a) of an 203 Fed. 32, 121 C. C. A. 368.

averment of insolvency in a volun-

to the second and third classes of aets of bankruptcy, merely
with respect to the insolvency of the debtor at the time of the
commissi<m of the act of bmikruptcy. Further, a petition in a
proceeding in involuntary bankruptcy is defined in § 1 of the
act of 1898, enumeration 20, to mean "a paper filed • • •
by creditors alleging the commission of an act of bankruptcy
by a debtor therein named."
It follows that the mere statement in the statute, by way
of recital, that a petition may be filed ''against a person who
is insolvent and who has committed an act of bankruptcy,''
was not designed to superadd a further requirement to those
contained in paragraph a of § 3, as to what should constitute
actB of bankruptcy. This reasoning also answers the argument
based on the fact that the rules in bankruptcy promulgated by
this court provide in general terms for an allegation of insolvency in the petition, aud a denial of such allegation in the
answer. These rules were but intended to execute the act, and
not to add to itB provisions by making that which the statute
treats in some cases as immaterial a material fact in every case.
Therefore, though the rules and forms in bankruptcy provide
for an issue as to solvency in cases of involuntary bankruptcy,
where by the statute such issue becomes irrelevant, because the
particular act relied on in a given case conclusively imports a
right to the adjudication in bankruptcy if the act be established,
the allegation of insolvency in the petition becomes superfluous,
•
or, if made, need not be traversed.
Our conclusion, then, is that as a deed of general assignment
for the benefit of creditors is made by the bankruptcy act alone
sufficient to justify an adjudication in involuntary bankruplcy
against the debtor making such deed, without reference to his
solvency at the time of the filing of the petition, the denial of
insolvency by way of defense to a petition based upon the making of a deed of general assignment is not warranted by the
bankruptcy law, and therefore that the question certified must
be answertd in the negative.
And it is so ordered. 2
2-As to the necessity (before
the 1910 amendment of § 4a) of an
averment of insolvency in a. volun·

tary petition, see In re Lachenmaier,

203 Fed. 32, 121 C. C. A. 368.
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In re HINES

144 Fed. 142

(District Court, D. Oregon. February 5, 1906)

In re HINES

Several creditors of S. E. Hines, of North Bend, Coos county,

Or., on January 25, 1905, filed their petition in court charging

144 Fed. 142

him with having committed an act of bankruptcy, in that, while

insolvent, and on January 17, 1905, he suffered a judgment to

(District Court, D. Oregon. February 5, 1906)

be obtained against him in the sum of $2,030, upon which execu-

tion has been issued and certain property of defendant levied

upon, and that defendant has not vacated or discharged the

same. The defendant controverts these allegations, and avers

that his property, at a fair valuation, is worth $3,000 in excess

of his indebtedness or liabilities.

WOLVERTON, District Judge. The single question pre-

sented by counsel for the creditors for consideration is: Was

the defendant insolvent when the judgment was entered against

him and levy made in pursuance of the execution issued thereon?

If he was, he is guilty of the act of bankruptcy charged; if not,

the petition should be dismissed. In re Rome Planing Mill

(D. C). 96 Fed. 812.

By the first section (subdivision 15) of the bankruptcy act

(Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901,

Several creditors of S. E. Hines, of North Bend, Coos county,
Or., on January 25, 1905, filed their petition in court charging
him with having committed an act of bankruptcy, in that, while
insolvent, and on January 17, 1905, he suffered a judgment to
be obtained against him in the sum of $2,030, upon which executioa has been issued and certain property of defenqant levied
upon, and that defendant ha.s not vacated or discharged the
same. The defendant controverts these allegations, and avers
that his property, at a fair valuation, is worth $3,000 in excess
of his indebtedness or liabilities.

p. 3419]. See Collier on Bankruptcy. [4th ed.] p. 2.) a person
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is deemed insolvent whenever the aggregate of his property,

exclusive of any property that he may have conveyed, trans-

ferred, concealed, or removed, or permitted to be concealed or

removed, with intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors,

is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient in amount to pay his debts.

As it respects property considered in a commercial sense, I can

conceive of no better or surer standard by which to arrive at a

fair valuation than the market value; that is, what the prop-

erty will probably bring, or is worth in the general market, where

everybody buys. It could not be what it is worth to one person

or to another specially circumstanced, or having special use for

a particular article, but what it is worth as a marketable com-

modity, at a given time, with no special conditions prevailing

other than affect the market generally in the locality where the

commodity is for sale. "We think," says Mr. Justice Gray,

in an able and elaborate opinion rendered in the Circuit Court

WOLVERTON, District Judge. The single question presented by counsel for the creditors for consideration is: Was
the defendant insolvent when the judgment wa.s entere9 against
him and levy made in pursuance of the execution issued thereon 7
If he was, he is guilty of the act of bankruptcy charged ; if not,
the petition should be dismissed. In re Rome Planing Mill
(D. C). 96 Fed. 812.
By the first section (subdivision 15) of the bankruptcy act
(Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901,
p. 3419]. See Collier on Bankruptcy . [4th ed.] p. 2.) a person
is deemed insolvent whenever the aggregate of his property,
exclusive of any property that he may have conveyed, transferred, concealed, or removed, or permitted to be concealed or
removed, with intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors,
is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient in amount to pay his debts.
As it respects property considered in a commercial sense, I can
conceive of no better or surer standard by which to arrive at a
fair valuation than the market value; that is, what the property will probably bring, or is worth in the general market, where
everybody buys. It could not be what it is worth to one person
or to another specially circumstanced, or having special use for
a particular article, but what it is worth as a marketable commodity, at a given time, with no special conditions prevailing
other than affect the market generally in the locality where the
commodity is for sale. "We think," says l\fr. Justice Gray,
in an able and elaborate opinion rendered in the Circuit Court
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of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in the ease of Duncan v.

Landis, 106 Fed. 839, 858, 45 C. C. A. 666, 685, "that the

u~

Appeals for the Third Circuit, in the oase of Duncan v.

present market value of the property in question would be a

fair valuation of the same." See, also, In re Bloch, 109 Fed.

790, 48 C. C. A. 650, and In re Coddington (D. C.) 118 Fed. 281.

The intendment of the statute could scarcely be otherwise,

giving the language employed its usual and natural significance.

The difficulty is, and perhaps always will be, in arriving at the

market value. Unless the commodity has a value quotable in

the current markets of daily or frequent sales, there is much of

opinion that enters into the estimate, and from this must be

deduced the probable market value, and consequently, under

the bankruptcy act, a fair valuation. Nor is such valuation

affected by any depreciation of property consequent upon the

recovery of judgment against the debtor and a levy thereunder.

The language of the act is: "Having * • • suffered or

permitted, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain a preference

through legal proceedings," etc. (§3, subd. 3, Bankr. Act [30

Stat. 546; U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3422]; Collier on Bank-

ruptcy [4th ed.] p. 2, § 3, p. 27)—the intendment being that

the insolvency must exist at the time of suffering the preference 1

to be taken; for, if the debtor is solvent, it would be perfectly •

proper and legitimate for him to make any sort of preference
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that he might see fit. The fact of suffering the preference, there-

fore, unless it might be under circumstances indicating that he

intended to hinder, delay, or defraud certain of his creditors,

could not be permitted to affect the value of his assets. If

such were the case, then a person, who was before perfectly

solvent, might be rendered insolvent by an action, accompanied

by an attachment, and his insolvency would depend upon

whether he could pay his debts under the stress of the occasion,

and not, under the simple inquiry prescribed by the bankruptcy

act, whether the aggregate of his property, at a fair valuation,

is sufficient in amount to pay his debts. Such is the rationale

of the holding in Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Roebling's Sons

Co. (C. C.) 107 Fed. 71. That was an action by the trustee to

recover on account of a preference alleged to have been obtained

by a creditor attaching the manufacturing plant of the debtor,

together with raw materials in store. The attachment destroyed

the value of the plant as a going concern, and impaired also

the value of the materials. It therefore became material to

determine whether the valuation should be according to the

J.<:ndis, 106 Feel. 839, 858, 45 C. C. A. 666, 685, ''that the
pr~seut market value of the property in question would be a

fail' valuation of the same.'' See, also, In re Bloch, 109 Fetl.
7tl0, 48 C. C. A. 650, and In re Coddington (D. C.) 118 Fed. 281.
The intendment of the statute could scarcely be otherwise,
giving the language employed its usual and natural significance.
The difficulty is, and perhaps always will be, in arriving at the
market value. Unless the commodity has a value quotable in
the current markets of daily or frequent sales, there is much of
opinion that enters into the estimate, and from this must be
deduced the probable market value, and consequently, under
the bankruptcy act, a fair valuation. Nor is such valuation
affected by any depreciation of property consequent upon the
recovery of judgment against the debtor and a levy thereunder.
The language of the act is: "Having • • • suffered or
permitted, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain a preference
through legal proceedings," etc. ( § 3, subd. 3, Bankr. Act [30
Stat. 546; U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3422]; Collier on Bankruptcy [4th ed.] p. 2, § 3, p. 27)-the intendment being that
the insolvency must exist at the time of suffering the preference '
to be taken; for, if the debtor is solvent, it would be perfectly·
proper and legitimate for him to make any sort of preference
that he might see fit. The fact of suffering the preference, therefore, unless it might be under circumstances indicating that he
intended to hinder, delay, or defraud certain of his creditors,
could not be permitted to affect the value of his assets. If
such were the case, then a person, who was before perfectly
solvent, might be rendered insolvent by an action, accompanied
by an attachment, and his insolvency would depend upon
whether he could pay his debts under the stress of the occasion,
and not, under the simple inquiry prescribed by the bankruptcy
act, whether the aggregate of his property, at a fair valuation,
is sufficient in amount to pay his debts. Such is the rationale
of the holding in Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Roebling's Sons
Co. (C. C.) 107 Fed. 71. That was an action by the trustee to
recover on account of a preference alleged to have been obtained
by a creditor attaching the manufacturing plant of the debtor,
together with raw materials in store. The attachment destroyed
the value of the plant as a going concern, and impaired also
the value of the materials. It therefore became material to
determine whether the valuation should be according to· the

INSOLVENCY 113

INSOLVENCY

worth of the property prior or subsequent to such attachment,
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and the conclusion was that the prior worth was the appro-

priate standard by which to make the estimate; Kohlsaat, Dis-

trict Judge, saying:

'' While I regret to be forced to the conclusion, yet I am of the

opinion that, under the wording of the present bankruptcy act,

and especially the proper interpretation of the words 'being

insolvent,' such action on the part of a judgment creditor would

not create a preference recoverable by the trustee under the

terms of the act."

This decision, while not distinctly upon the point under dis-

cussion, is perfect in analogy, and its authority cannot be gain-

said. Nor should property exempt by the state law from execu-

tion be deducted from the debtor's assets in ascertaining

whether they are, at a fair valuation, sufficient in amount to

pay his debts. This has been directly decided in the case of

In re Baumann (D. C.) 96 Fed. 946. The question came up on

a construction of such subdivision 15, of § 1, of the bankruptcy

act. Mr. Justice Hammond says, relative to the provision:

"This is probably as arbitrary a provision as is to be found

in the statute. It was intended to wipe out, as with a sponge,

all that confusion which is to be found in previous bankruptcy

statutes and decisions as to the meaning of the word 'insolvency.'
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It had also the more comprehensive purpose of designating

with absolute fixity the only class of persons upon whom the

involuntary features of the bankruptcy statute should operate,

namely, those whose property was not sufficient in amount to

pay their debts. It does not proceed upon any theory that the

debts will in fact be paid by the appropriation of the property

to that end, nor upon the theory that as a matter of fact it is

available for compulsory payment, but upon the theory that

the defendant has sufficient property with which he may pay

his debts if he chooses to do so. * * * Moreover the language

of the above-quoted section is explicit. There is not the least

ambiguity about its meaning. It leaves no room for any con-

struction by implication or otherwise. Obviously, it was in-

tended to give us a rule in mathematics, the terms of which

are absolute."

So arguing, and in further consideration that the act has

made one exception, and one only—that of property conveyed

or concealed with intent to defraud—it was concluded that it

was clearly npt the intendment of Congress to make another
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worth of the property prior or subsequent to such attachment,
and the couclUBiou was that the prior worth was the appropriate standard by which to make the estimate; Kohlsaat, District Judge, saying:
''While I regret to be forced to the conclusion, yet I am of the
opinion that, under the wording of the present bankruptcy act,
and especially the proper interpretation of the words 'being
insolvent,' such action on the part of a judgment creditor would
not create a preference recoverable by the trustee under the
terms of the act.''
This decision, while not distinctly upon the point under discussion, is perfect in analogy, and its authority cannot be gainsaid. Nor should property exempt by the state law from execution be deducted from the debtor's assets in ascertaining
whether they are, at a fair valuation, sufficient in amount to
pay his debts. This has been directly decided in the case of
In re Baumann (D. C.) 96 Fed. 946. The question came up on
a construction of such subdivision 15, of § 1, of the bankruptcy
act. Mr. Justice Hammond says, relative to the provision:
''This is probably as arbitrary a provision as is to be found
in the statute. It was intended to wipe out, as with a sponge,
all tha.t confusion which is to be found in previous bankruptcy
statutes and decisions as to the meaning of the word 'insolvency.'
It had also the more comprehensive purpose of designating
with absolute fixity the only class of persons upon whom the
involuntary features of the bankruptcy statute should operate,
namely, those whose property was not sufficient in ·amount to
pay their debts. It does not proceed upon any theory that the
debts will in fact be paid by the appropriation of the property
to that end, nor upon the theory that as a matter of fact it is
available for compulsory payment, but upon the theory that
the defendant has sufficient property with which he may pay
his debts if he chooses to do so. • • • :Moreover the language
of the above-quoted section is explicit. There is not the least
ambiguity about its meaning. It leaves no room for any construction by implication or otherwise. Obviously, it was intended to give us a rule in mathematics, the terms of which
are absolute.''
So arguing, and in further consideration that the act 1rns
made one exception, and one only-that of property conwyPd
or concealed with intent to defraud-it was concluded that it
was clearly n9t the intendment of Congress to make another
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exception in relation to exempt property. The reasoning of the

learned justice is strong and cogent, and his conclusion irre-

sistible. The language of the act is very plain, without ambiguity

or double meaning, and, when it is found that one exception

is expressly made, it excludes, by almost absolute inference,

a deduction that another was also intended, so that, upon a

simple construction of the act, it is manifest that it was not the

purpose or intendment of the lawgiver that exempt property

should be deducted in ascertaining the amount of the debtor's

property at a fair valuation.

hi this view of the law, I will now examine the facts as

disclosed by the evidence, to determine whether Hines was in-

solvent at the time the judgment was entered against him and

levy made.

The property which Hines claims he owned consists of a

stock of merchandise (the same that was levied upon) ; bills and

accounts, and $350 in cash; lot 3, block 19, in the town of North

Bend, upon which is situated a two-story building 38x70 feet,

the lower floor being occupied by Hines as a storeroom; and

lots 1, 2 and 3 in block 45, without improvement. The day

following the levy, Hines, assisted by the sheriff and S. Bachy

and J. W. Grout, took an inventory of the stock in the store,

which footed up to $3,278.84. The original cost price, which
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was ascertained from the markings upon the different articles

going to make up the stock, or from the bills of purchase where

the marking could not be found, was made the basis of valua-

tion. No allowance was made for shopworn goods, as it was

said the stock was "not very old." Bachy and Grout concur

with Hines as to the manner of taking the inventory. I am

satisfied that it was fairly made upon the basis of the cost

price to Ilines when he purchased the goods in the first instance.

Hines testifies that at the time of the attachment he had some

bills that amounted to as much as $200; the amount set down

being $250. He further states that he had $350 in cash, which

also appears to have gotten into the inventory. This comprises

the whole of his personal property.

Lot 3, block 19, upon which the store building is situated,

is incumbered by a mortgage of $1,000. The value of this

piece of realty is variously estimated by the witnesses, ranging

from $3,000 to $4,500. The lot cost the defendant, on February

10, 1904, $1,000, excavation $300, and for construction of store

building about $2,000—thus aggregating $3,300. As to lots 1,

exc~ption in relation to exem~t property. The reasoning of the
learned justice is strong and cogent, and his conclusion irresistible. The language of the act is very plain, without ambiguity
or double meaning, and, when it is found that one exception
is expressly made, it excludes, by almost absolute inference,
a deduction that another was also intended, so that, upon a
simple construction of the act, it is manifest that it was not the
purpose or intendment of the lawgiver that exempt property
should be deducted in ascertaining the amount of the debtor'H
property at a fair valuation.
In this view of the law, I will now examine the facts as
disclosed by the evidence, to determine whether Hines W88 insolvent at the time the judgment was entered against him and
levy made.
The property which Hines claims he owned consists of a
stock of merchandise (the same that was levied upon); bills and
accounts, and $350 in cash; lot 3, block 19, in the town of North
Bend, upon which is situated a two-story building 38x70 feet,
the lower floor being occupied by Hines as a storeroom; and
lots 1, 2 and 3 in block 45, without improvement. The day
following the levy, Hines, assisted by the sheriff and S. Bacby
and J. W. Grout, took an inventory of the stock in the store,
which footed up to $3,278.84. The original cost price, which
was ascertained from the markings upon the different articles
going to make up the stock, or from the bills of purchase where
the marking could not be found, was made the basis of valuation. No allowance was made for shopworn goods, as it was
said the stock was ''not very old.'' Bachy and Grout concur
with Hines as to the manner of taking the inventory. I am
satisfied that it was fairly made upon the basis of the cost
price to Hines when he purchased the goods in the first instance.
Hines testifies that at the time of the attachment he had some
bills that amounted to as much as $200; the amount set down
being $250. He further states that he had $350 in cash, which
also appears to have gotten into the inventory. This comprises
the whole of his personal property.
Lot 3, block 19, upon which the store building is situated, ·
is incumbered by a mortgage of $1,000. The value of this
piece of realty is variously estimated by the witnesses, ranging
from $3,000 to $4,500. The lot cost the defendant, on February
10, .1904, $1,000, excavation $300, and for construction of store
building about $2,000-thus aggregating $31300. As to lots 1,
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2, and 3 of block 45, Hines testifies that he paid for them $200

each, or for the whole $600. These were valued by witnesses

ranging from $800 to $1,050. Hines had made some improve-

ment upon them, by way of clearing them in part of brush and

timber, at a cost, he affirms, of about $100. Touching the value

of the stock of merchandise, several witnesses testify that it is

worth, at sheriff's sale, being under attachment, from 50 to 65

and 70 cents on the inventoried value; that it would not bring

more than these figures at forced sale. Two witnesses, H. Lock-

hart and H. J. Edwards, testify to the value of the stock if dis-

posed of in bulk, while the concern was in active operation.

Lockhart says the discount to be allowed upon the invoice price

"is a matter to be agreed upon between the buyer and seller;

it depends upon the age of the stock and its condition, and the

value of the business. Twenty-five per cent. is the maximum

amount generally allowed in such cases; discount sometimes

being greatly in excess of that." Edwards corroborates this

view, and no one controverts it. It seems, therefore, that the

probable marketable value of this stock of goods, being in good

condition, that is, "not very old," if then sold in bulk, prior to

attachment and while the venture was a going concern, would

have approximated 75 per cent. of the invoice, or $2,459.13.
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Such an estimate is the only one reasonably deducible under

the evidence. The value of the accounts or bills has not been

proved. Hines says, in effect, they amounted to $200 or $250,

but he gives no itemized statement thereof, nor any informa-

tion whatever as to whether they are against solvent persons.

He may have had the bills, perhaps did, but they may have

been worthless. As to their value, he makes no suggestion or

statement. The cash item must be admitted, although the tes-

timony is meager as to that. The estimates of value placed

on the store property were based, sometimes upon the estimated

rental value (it not having been shown that any part of the

building had been rented, except six of the upper rooms at

$15 per month), and sometimes upon the witness' opinion of

the value of real property in North Bend, without reference to

any particular standard, as actual sales of property and the

like. There appears to be no estimate by any witness of sale

values in the market at the time of the attachment. Charles

Windsor, cashier of the North Bend Bank, testifies that in his"

opinion the property was worth from $3,000 to $3,500. He was

a witness for the defendant, and his statement approximates the

2, and 3 of block 45, Hines testifies that he paid for them $200
each, or for the whole $600. These' were valued by witnesses
ranging from $800 to $1,050. Hines had made some improvement upon them, by way of clearing them in part of brush and
timber, at a cost, he affirms, of about $100. Touching the value
of the stock of merchandise, several witnesses testify that it is
worth, at sheriff's sale, being under attachment, from 50 to 65
and 70 cenU! on the inventoried value ; that it would not bring
more than these figures at forced sale. Two witnesses, H. Lockhart and H. J. Edwards, testify to the value of the stock if disp08ed of in bulk, while the concern was in active operation.
Lockhart says the discount to be allowed upon the invoice. price
"is a matter to be agreed upon between the buyer and seller;
it depends upon the age of the stock and its condition, and the
value of the business. Twenty-five per cent. is the maximum
amount generally allowed in such cases ; discount sometimes
being greatly in excess of that.'' Edwards corroborates this
view, and no one controverts it. It seems, therefore, that the
probable marketable value of this stock of goods, being in good
condition, that is, "not very old," if then sold in hulk, prior to
attachment and while the venture was a going concern, would
have approximated 75 per cent. of the invoice, or $2,459.1~.
Such an estimate is the only one reasonably deducible under
the evidence. The value of the accounts or bills has not been
proved. Hines says, in effect, they amounted to $200 or $250,
but he gives no itemized statement thereof, nor any information whatever as to whether they are against solvent persons.
He may have had .the bills, perhaps did, but they may have
been worthless. As to their value, he makes no suggestion or
statement. The cash item must be admitted, although the testimony is meager as to that. The estimates of value placed
on the store property were based, sometimes upon the estimated
rental value (it not having been shown that any part of the
building had been rented, except six of the upper rooms at
$15 per month), and sometimes upon the witness' opinion of
the value of real property in North Bend, without reference to
any particular standard, as actual sales of property and the
like. There appears to be no estimate by any witness of sale
values in the market at the time of the attachment. Charles
'rindsor, cashier of the North Bend Bank, testifies that in his
opinion the property was worth from $3,000 to $3,500. He was .
a witness for the defendant, and his statement approximates the 1
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original cost of the property to Hines—the purchase price of

the lot and the cost of excavation and building. There is yet

no evidence, however, that the property was worth in the marke:

what it cost the owner. There is evidence that the value of

property has increased since Hines purchased, but there is much

that property values have been vacillating in range, and, while

there is much uncertainty in the testimony from which to form

an opinion, I am impelled to the conclusion that the cost value

is approximately what the sale value was at the time of the

judgment and levy, thus rating lot 3, block 19, at $3,300. It

was probably not worth less than this.

As respects lots 1, 2, and 3, of block 45, it appears from

developments in the testimony that Hines never acquired the

legal title to them, nor is it very clear that he has such an

equitable right as entitles him under any condition to the legal

title. J. L. Simpson, of the Simpson Lumber Company, who

at the time held the legal title to the lots in trust for the com-

pany, testifies that he sold the lots to Hines at $600; that the

amount was included in a note given by Hines to the lumber

company on settlement; and that the note is the same as sued

on by Guerry. So that it appears that nothing was paid down

on the lots, and this is shown by an account rendered by the

lumber company to Hines at the time of the alleged settlement.
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When it was inquired whether Hines had a written contract for

the purchase of the lots, neither he nor Simpson was sure that

any such contract was ever executed, and none was or could be

produced at the trial. This leaves nothing but possessory title

and some improvements made upon the lots, by way of clearing

them of brush and timber, upon which to base his right to the

legal title. These are shadowy and not well established.

Coupled therewith, it is not entirely clear that Hines did not

intend that the title to these lots should remain in doubtful

validity until his creditors were appeased. Consequently, he is

not entitled to have them included among his assets for the

purpose of determining his solvency.

As to the remainder of his property, I find no purpose on his

part to cover or conceal any part of it with a view to putting the

same beyond the reach of his creditors. His entire property,

therefore, to which he was entitled, at its fair valuation at the

time of the judgment, consists of stock of merchandise, $2.45!).13;

lot 3, block 19, North Bend, $3,300; and cash on hand, $350—

aggregating $6,109.13. The defendant's schedule of indebted-

original cost of the property to Hine&-tbe purchase price of
the lot and the cost of excavation and building. There is yet
no evidence, however, that the property was worth in the marke:
what it cost the owner. There is evidence that the value oJ
property has increased since Hines purchased, but there is much
that property values have been vacillating in range, and, while
there is much uncertainty in the testimony from which to form
an opinion, I am impelled to the conclusion that the cost ,:a1ue
is approximately what the sale value was at the time of the
judgment and levy, thus rating lot 3, block 19, at $3,300. It
was probably not worth less· than this.
As respects lots 1, 2, and 3, of block 45, it appears from
developments in the testimony that Hines never acquired the
legal title to them, nor is it very clear that he has such an
equitable right as entitles him under any condition to the legal
title. J. L. Simpson, of the Simpson Lumber Company, who
at the time held the legal title to the lots in truet for the company, testifies that he sold the lots to Hines at $600; that the
amount was included in a note given by Hines to the lumber
company on settlement; and that the note is the same as sued
on by Guerry. So that it appears that nothing was paid down
on the lots, and this is shown by an account rendered by the
, lumber company to Hines at the time of the alleged settlement.
When it was inquired whether Hines had a written contract for
the purchase of the lots, neither he nor Simpson was sure that
any such contract was ever executed, and none was or could be
produced at the trial. This leaves nothing but possessory title
and some improvements made upon the lots, by way of clearing
them of brush and timber, upon which to base his right to the
legal title. These are shadowy and not well _established.
Coupled therewith, it is not entirely clear that Hines did not
intend that the title to these lots should remain in doubtful
validity until his creditors were appeased. Consequently, he is
not entitled to have them included among his assets for the
purpose of determining bis solvency.
As to the remainder of his property, I find no purpose on his
part to cover or conceal any part of it with a view to putting the
same beyond the reach of his creditors. His entire property,
therefore, to which he was entitled, at its fair valuation at the
time of the judgment, consists of stock of merd1andis1>, $2,459.13;
lot 3, block l 9, North Bend, $3,300; and rash on hand, $350aggregating $6,109.13. The defendant's schedule of indebted-
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ness shows an aggregate of $5,807.78. To this schedule should

be added accrued interest on mortgage, $20; to Wm. Cluff Com-

pany 's demand, $1.94; to Fleischner, Mayer & Co.'s, $36.08;

to Wellman Peck & Co.'s, $10.15; to Cahn Nickelsburg & Co.'s,

$11.92—making a total of liabilities in the sum of $5,947.87.

Hines' property, at a fair valuation, therefore, exceeded his

liabilities by $161.26, at the time of the entry of the judgment

and levy.

It follows that he was not insolvent, and the petition in bank-

ruptcy should be dismissed; and such will be the order of the

court.

HUTTIG MFG. CO. v. EDWARDS

160 Fed. 619, 87 C. C. A. 521

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. March 27, 1908)

HOOK, Circuit Judge. The principal question on these

appeals is whether the Huttig Manufacturing Company received

nem shows an aggregate of $5,867.78. To this schedule should
be added accrued interest on mortgage, $20; to \Vm. Cluff Company ·s demand, $1.94; to Flei!!!chner, Mayer & Co. 's, $36.08;
to Wellman Peck & Co. 's, $10.15; to Cahn Nickelsburg & Co. 's,
$11.92-making a total of liabilities in the sum of $5,947.87. ,
Hines' property, at a fair valuation, therefore, exceeded his
liabilities by $161.26, at the time of the entry of the judgment
and levy.
It follows that he was not insolvent, and the petition in bankruptcy should be dismissed; and such will be the order of the
court.

a voidable preference when it took a mortgage on all of the

property of D. Winter, bankrupt. As the mortgage was taken

within the prohibited period of four months we proceed to

HUTTIG MFG. CO. v. EDWARDS

inquire whether Winter was then insolvent, and if so, whether

the manufacturing company or its agents acting therein had

160 Fed. 619, 87 C. C. A. 521

reasonable cause to believe a preference was intended. The

trustee says he was insolvent because, first, he was a member

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

March 27, 1908)
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of the firm of E. D. Winter & Co., also adjudged bankrupt,

and the addition of D. Winter's debts and assets to those of

the firm confessedly exhibited a condition of hopeless insolvency;

and second, if D. Winter was not a member of the firm his

debts exceeded the fair valuation of his property. We are of

opinion the second contention is well taken, and therefore need

not discuss the first. D. Winter's property consisted exclusively

of real estate. His indebtedness arose from lending his credit

to his son, E. D. Winter, who conducted the business of E. D.

Winter & Co., and from holding himself out as a partner, though

he may not have been one in fact. There are some expressions

in the testimony, mostly if not wholly hearsay, that the real

estate of D. Winter, including his homestead, was estimated to

be worth from $18,000 to $20,000. The assessed value of all

excepting the homestead was $16,000, of the homestead $1,200.

The value fixed by sworn appraisers appointed in the bank-

HOOK, Circuit Judge. The principal question on these
appeals is whether the Huttig Manufacturing Company receivrd
a voidable preference when it took a mortgage on all of the
property of D. Winter, bankrupt. As the mortgage was taken
within the prohibited period of four months we proceed to
inquire whether Winter was then insolvent, and if so, whether
the manufacturing company or its agents acting therein harl
reasonable cause to believe a preference was intended. The
trustee says he was insolvent because, first, he was a m<'mhrr
of the firm of E. D. Winter & Co., also adjudged bankrupt.
and the addition of D. Winter's debts and assets to those of
the firm confessedly exhibited a conditfon of hopeless insolwn<'y:
and second, if -D. Winter was not a member of the firm his
debts exceeded the fair valuation of his prop('rty. We :ire of
opinion the second contention is well taken, and therefore neerl
not discuss the first. D. Winter's property consisted exclusive]~·
of real estate. His indebtedness arose from lending his credit
to his son, E. D. Winter, who conducted the business of E. D.
Winter & Co., and from holding himself out as a partner, though
he may not have been one in fact. There are some expressions
in the testimony, mostly if not who11y hearsay, that the real
rstate of D. Winter, including his homestead, was estimated to
be worth from $18,000 to $20,000. The assessed value of nll
excepting the homestead was $16,000, of the homestead $1,200.
The value fixed by sworn· appraisers appointed in the bank-
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ruptcy proceedings was $15,150, with $3,000 additional for the

homestead. All that the trustee could obtain for the property

exclusive of the homestead was $12,245.50. The proceeds were

brought into court to abide the result of this litigation, and they

were insufficient to pay the mortgage claim of the manufactur-

ing company. When the mortgage was given D. Winter owed

the manufacturing company $13,391.73, August Carstens

$2,000, and the Merchants' National Bank of Burlington, Iowa,

$2,700, a total of $18,091.73. He also owed the bank an addi-

tional $5,500 on two notes, but they were dated after the mort-

gage in question, and it was not shown they were renewals of

prior notes or when the indebtedness originated. It is con-

tended by the manufacturing company that the $13,391.73 for

which it took the mortgage was not D. Winter's debt, and

should not be considered in determining his solvency or in-

solvency. It was for goods sold by the manufacturing company

to E. D. Winter & Co., and it is admitted D. Winter guaranteed

the debt before it was incurred. The trustee says the guaranty

was by a writing in which D. Winter also held himself out as

a member of the firm, while the manufacturing company con-

tends the signature of D. Winter to the writing was a forgery

by E. D. Winter, his son, and that the guaranty was an oral

one. In either event we think the amount of the debt directly

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

affected D. Winter's solvency. A surety or indorser for a bank-

rupt has been held to be a creditor within the meaning of the

bankruptcy law (Kobusch v. Hand [C. C. A.] 156 Fed. 660;

Swarts v. Siegel, 54 C. C. A. 399, 117 Fed. 13); and upon the

same principle a guarantor liable upon a fixed, liquidated de-

mand as this was, is a debtor to him who holds it, and his

liability is to be counted in determining his financial status.

That the guaranty may have been oral and therefore within the

statute of frauds of Towa where the transaction occurred is

immaterial. The Iowa statute relates merely to the evidence

or proof of the undertaking, and not to its validity. Berryhill

v. Jones, 35 Iowa, 335; Merchant v. O'Rourke, 111 Iowa, 351,

82 N. W. 759. In the latter case it was said:

"The statute of frauds does not prohibit an oral contract nor

make such an agreement illegal because certain formalities are

not complied with, but relates only to the method by which proof

may be made in an attempt to enforce it."

The manufacturing company asserted and D. Winter admitted

the validity of the demand against him, and the former is not

ruptcy proceedings was $15,150, with $3,000 additional for the
homestead. All that the trustee could obtain for the property
exclusive of the homestead was $12,245.50. The proceeds we:re
brought into court to abide the result of this litigation, and they
were insufficient to pay the mortgage claim of the manufacturing company. When the mortgage was given D. Winter owed
the manufacturing company $13,391.73, August Carstens
$2,000, and the Merchants' National Bank of Burlington, Iowa,
$2,700, a total of $18,091.73. He also owed the bank an additional $5,500 on two notes, but they were dated after the mortgage. in question, and it was not shown they were renewals of
prior notes or when the indebtedness originated. It is contended by the manufacturing company that the $13,391.73 for
which it took the mortgage was not D. Winter's debt, and
should not be considered in determining his solvency or insolvency. It was for goods sold by the manufacturing company
to E. D. Winter & Co., and it is admitted D. 'Vinter guaranteed
the debt before it was incurred. The trustee says the guaranty
was by a writing in which D. Winter also held himself out as
a member of the firm, while the manufacturing company contends the signature of D. Winter to the writing was a forgery
by E. D. Winter, his son, and that the guaranty was an oral
one. In either event we think the amount of the debt directly
affected D. Winter's solvency. A surety or indorser for a bankrupt has been held to be a creditor within the meaning of the
bankruptcy law (Kobusch v. Hand [C. C. A.] 156 Fed. 660;
Swarts v. Siegel, 54 C. C. A. 399, 117 Fed. 13); and upon the
same principle a guarantor liable upon a fixed, liquidated demand as this was, is a debtor to him who holds it, and his
liability is to be counted in determining his financial status.
That the guaranty may have been oral and therefore within the
statute of frauds of Iowa where the transaction occurred is
immaterial. The Iowa statute relates merely to the evidence
or proof of the undertaking, and not to its validity. Berryhill
v. Jones, 35 Iowa, 335; Merchant v. O'Rourke, 111 Iowa, 351,
82 N. W. 759. In the latter case it was said:
"The statute of frauds does not prohibit an oral contract nor
make such an agreement illegal because certain formalities are
not complied with, but relates only to the method by which proof
may be made in an attempt to enforce it."
The manufacturing company asserted and D. Winter admitted
the validity of the demand against him, and the former is not
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in position to say the latter was solvent because his property,

all of which it took under its mortgage, was sufficient to pay

his other creditors. If the mortgage held, the other creditors

would get nothing, and the solvency of the debtor would seem

quite unsubstantial.

There is another matter affecting the financial condition of

D. Winter. Some letters were received in evidence to which

his name was signed, and which stated he was a member of

E. D. Winter & Co. and liable for their debts. One of these

letters was to a mercantile agency which made it the basis of

commercial reports upon the faith of which Welt & Reddel-

sheimer sold the firm goods amounting to $914.70. The genuine-

ness of the signature to the letter was attacked, but there were

received in evidence before the referee for purposes of compari-

son admitted writings of D. Winter, and his decision that D.

Winter so held himself out as liable, affirmed as it was by the

District Court, should not be disturbed. It is altogether prob-

able that D. Winter owed much more, but the debts mentioned

rendered him insolvent when he made the mortgage. We are

also convinced he knew it. He had previously given his daughter

all his household effects and jewels in order, as he said, "to

avoid all trouble for her in the future." He was conscious of
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being deeply involved with his son who conducted the business

of E. D. Winter & Co., and he included in the mortgage to the

manufacturing company all of the property he had left. The

necessary effect of the mortgage was to give the mortgagee a

preference over other creditors.

The referee in bankruptcy and the District Court found the

manufacturing company had reasonable grounds to believe a

preference was intended. An attentive consideration of the

evidence and the fair inferences to be drawn from the facts

admitted or proved lead us to the conclusion the finding is

adequately supported. * * *

The decree of the District Court is * * • affirmed.

SANBORN, Circuit Judge (dissenting). I am unable to

assent to the opinion and the conclusion of the majority in this

case because in my opinion the competent evidence presented

fails to prove that D. Winter was insolvent, or that the Huttig

Manufacturing Company had reasonable cause to believe that he

was insolvent when lie gave the mortgage, and it seems to me

that there is no substantial competent evidence that he or any

in position to say the latter was solvent because his property,
all of which it took under Its mortgage, was sufficient to pay
his other creditors. If the mortgage held, the other creditors
would get nothing, and the solvency of the debtor would seem
quite unsubstantial.
There is another matter affecting the financial condition of
D. Winter. Some letters were received in evidence to which
his name was signed, and which stated he was a member of
E. D. Winter & Co. and liable for their debts. One of these
letters was to a mercantile agency which made it the basis of
commercial reports upon the faith of which \Veit & Reddelsheimer sold the firm goods amounting to $914.70. The genuineness of the signature to the letter was attacked, but there were
received in evidence before the referee for purposes of comparison admitted writings of D. WintRr, and his decision that D .
. Winter so held himself out as liable, affirmed as it was by the
District Court, should not be disturbed. It is altogether probable that D. Winter owed much more, but the debts mentioned
rendered him insolvent when he made the mortgage. We are
also convinced he knew it. He had previously given his dau~hter
all bis household effects and jewels in order, as he said, ''to
avoid all trouble for her in the future.'' He was conscious of
being deeply involved with his son who conducted the business
of E. D. Winter & Co., and he included in the mortgage to the
manufacturing company all of the property he had left. The
necessary effect of the mortgage was to give the mortgagee a
preference over other creditors.
The referee in bankruptcy and the District Court found the
manufacturing company had reasonable grounds to believe a
preference was intended. An attentive consideration of the
evidence and the fair inferences to be drawn from the facts
admitted or proved lead us to the conclusion the finding is
adequately supported. • • •
The decree of the District Court is • • • affirmed.

SANBORN, Circuit Judge (dissenting). I am unable to
assent to the opinion and the conclusion of the majority in this
case because in my opinion the competent evidence presented
fails to prove that D. ·winter was insolvent, or that the Huttig
~lanufacturing Company had reasonable cause to believe that he
was insolvent when he gave the mortgage, and it seems to me
·that there is no substantial competent evidence that he or any
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other person with his knowledge or permission ever held liiin

out to creditors who relied upon such holding as a member of

the firm of E. D. Winter & Co.

B. Debts Amounting to $1,000 or Over

§ 4b. Any natural person, except a wage-earner, or a person

engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of the soil, any unin-

other person with his knowledge or permission ever held hi:n
out to creditors who relied upon such holdi11g as a member of
the firm of E. D. Winter & Co.

corporated company, and any moneyed, business or commercial

corporation, except a municipal, railroad, insurance, or bank-

B.

ing corporation, owing debts to the amount of one thousand

DEBTS AMOUNTING TO

$1,000

OR

OVER

dollars or over, may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt.

•••

§1 (11). "Debt" shall include any debt, demand, or claim

provable in bankruptcy.8

§ 4b. Any natural person, except a wage-earner, or a person
engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of the soil, any lmin-

C. Petitioning Creditors

§ 59b. Three or more creditors who have provable claims

against any person which amount in the aggregate, in excess

of the value of securities held by them, if any, to five hundred

dollars or over; or if all of the creditors of such person are

less than twelve in number, then one of such creditors whose

claim equals such amount may file a petition to have him

adjudged a bankrupt.4

3— The matter of provable claims

will be taken up under the head of

corporated company, and any moneyed, business or commerei<1 l
corporation, except a municipal, rai1road, insurance, or hank ing- corporation, owing debts to the amount of one thousand
dollars or over, may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt.

• • •

§ 1 ( 11). ''Debt'' shall include any debt, demand, or claim
provable in bankruptcy.a

post.
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administration, see pages 384-476,

4— As to the right of a creditor,

C. PETITIONING CREDITORS

who has assented to an assignment

by the alleged bankrupt for the bene-

fit of his creditors, to join in a pe-

tition based on the assignment as

an act of bankruptcy under S 3a (4),

see Moulton v. Coburn, 131 Fed.

201, 66 C. C. A. 90 (certiorari de-

nied, 196 U. 8. 640, 49 L. ed. 631,

25 Sup. Ct. 796); Canner v. Web-

ster Tapper Co., 168 Fed. 519, 93

C. C. A., 541. As to whether such

assenting creditor should be counted

§ 59b. Three or more creditors who have provable claims
against any person which amount in the aggregate, in excess
of the value of securities held by them, if any, to five hundn•d
dollars or over; or if all of the creditors of such person are
less than twelve in number, then one of such creditors whose
claim equals such amount may file a petition to have him
adjudged a bankrupt.'

in determining the number of credi-

tors, see Stevens v. Neve-McCord

Merc. Co., 150 Fed. 71, 80 C. C. A.

25. As to status of preferred cred-

itors, see In re Smith, 176 Fed. 426.

3-The matter of provable claims
will be taken up under the head of
administration, see pages 384-476,

As to amendments to petition, see

post.

Manning v. Evans, 156 Fed. 106;

4-All to the right of a creditor,
who bas aasented to an assignmen~
by the alleged bankrupt for the benefit of his creditors, to join in a petition based on the aasignment a1
an act of bankruptcy under f 3a (4),
see Moulton v. Coburn, 131 Fed.
20 l, 66 C. C. A. 90 (certiorari denied, 196 U. S. 640, 49 L. ed. 631,
25 Sup. Ct. 796); Canner v. Webster Tapper Co., 168 Fed. 519, 93
C. C. A., 541. As to whether such
l.issenting creditor should be counted

In re Charles Town L. & P. Co., 183

Fed. 160.

As to time when petitioner must

have been a creditor, see Brake v.

Callison, 129 Fed. 201, 63 C. C. A.

359 (affirming 130 Fed. 987); In

re Perry & Whitney Co., 172 Fed.

745; In re Hanyon, 180 Fed. 498

(affirmed 181 Fed. 1021, 104 C. C.

A. 667); In re Stone, 206 Fed. 356.

in determining ~ number of creditors, Bee Stevens v. Neve-McCord
Mere. Co., 150 Fed. 71, 80 C. C. A.
25. As to status of preferred ~red
itors, see In re Smith, 176 Fed. 426.
As to amendments to petition, see
Manning v. Evans, 156 Fed. 106;
In re Charles Town L. & P. Co., 183
Fed. 160.
As to time when petitioner must
have been a creditor, see Brake ''·
Callison, 129 Feel 201, 63 C. C. A.
359 (affirming 130 Fed. 987); In
re Perry & Whitney Co., 172 Fed.
745 ; In re Hanyon, 180 Fed. 498
(affirmed 181 Fed. 1021, 104 C. C.
A. 667) ; In re St.one, 206 Fed. 356.
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D. Acts op Bankruptcy

1. CONVEYANCES WITH INTENT TO HINDER, DELAY OR DEFRAUD *

D.

GOWING v. RICH

1 Ired. L. 553

1.

ACTS OF BANKRUPTCY

CONVEYANCES WITH INTENT TO HINDER, DELAY OR DEFRAUD•

(Supreme Court of North Carolina. June, 1841)

This was an action of ejectment, tried at Davie Superior Court

of Law at Pall Term, 1840, before his Honor Judge Pearson.

Both parties claimed under one Sheeks. The defendant ad-

mitted himself in possession. The plaintiff offered in evidence

a judgment in favor of one Alexander against one Chloe Oaks

and others, an execution thereon and a sheriff's deed to him-

self, conveying all the interest of the said Chloe Oaks. The

plaintiff then offered evidence to prove, that the said Chloe

Oaks in the year 1836, while the suit of Alexander, which wad

for a debt of about $2,500 was pending, had sold a negro

and had sold her home place for $700, and had contracted ver-

bally to buy the land in question of Sheeks for $1,250; that,

on the day agreed upon to execute the writings, Sheeks went

to the house of Mrs. Oaks, when he was informed by Mrs.

Hoskins, who was the daughter of Mrs. Oaks and the widow

of one Hoskins, who had died a few years before insolvent,

leaving his widow destitute and dependant upon her mother for

support, that she was to buy the laud and would pay for it
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and take the deed in her own name. Sheeks expressed himself

willing to make the deed to whoever paid him the money, and,

accordingly, with the knowledge and consent of Mrs. Oaks, he

made the deed to Mrs. Hoskins and received from her $700 in

cash, of which $600 was in one hundred dollar bills, and took

Mrs. Hoskins' note under seal for the balance, $550. Sheeks

stated that he took Mrs. Hoskins' note without security, be-

cause he was told and believed that the land was bound to

him for the purchase money. The plaintiff then offered evi-

dence to prove that Mrs. Oaks had bought and paid for the

land; that the $700 paid was her money, which she had handed

to Mrs. Hoskins, with the understanding that the deed was

to be taken in the name of Mrs. Hoskins to keep off the creditors

of Mrs. Oaks; and that Mrs. Hoskins was to execute the note

for the balance of the purchase money, but Mrs. Oaks was to

pay it. The defendant offered evidence to shew that the $700

• The statute of 13 Elizabeth, and lation on this subject, will be found

an early New York statute, the pat- in the Appendix, post. pp. 715-718.

tern for much of the American legis-

GOWING v. RICH
1 Ired. L. 553
(Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June, 1841)

This was an action of ejectment, tried at Davie Superior Court
of Law at Fall Term, 1840, before his Honor Judge Pearson.
Both parties claimed under one Sheeks. The defendant admitted himself in possession. The plaintiff offered in evidence
a judgment in favor of one Alexander against one Chloe Oaks
and others, an execution thereon and a sheriff's deed to himself, conveying all the interest of the said Chloe Oaks. The
plaintiff then offered evidence to prove, that the said Chloe
Oaks in the year 1836, while the suit of Alexander, which W&.i
for a debt of about $2,500 was pending, had sold a negro
and had sold her home place for $700, and had contracted verbally to buy the land in question of Sheeks for $1,250; that,
on the day agreed upon to execute the writings, Sheeks went
to the house of Mrs. Oaks, when he was informed by l\Irs.
Hoskins, who was the daughter of Mrs. Oaks and the widow
of one Hoskins, who had died a few years before insolvent,
leaving his widow destitute and dependant upon her mother for
support, that she was to buy the land and would pay for it
and take the deed in her own name. Sheeks expressed himself
willing to make the deed to whoever paid him the money, and,
accordingly, with the knowledge and consent of Mrs. Oaks, he
made the deed to Mrs. Hoskins and received from her $700 in
cash, of which $600 was in one hundred dollar bills, and took
Mrs. Hoskins' note m1der seal for the balance, $550. Sheeks
stated that he took Mrs. Hoskins' note without security, because he was told and believed that the land was bound to
him for the purchase money. The plaintiff then offered evidence to prove that Mrs. Oaks had bonght and paid for the
land; that the $700 paid was her money, which she had handed
to :Mrs. Hoskins, with the understanding that the deed was
to be taken in the name of Mrs. Hoskins to keep off the creditors
of l\Irs. Oaks; and that Mrs. Hoskins was to exeeute the note
for the balance of the purchase monry, bnt l\frs. Oaks was to
pay it. The defendant offered evidence to shew that the $700
• The statute of 13 Elizabeth, and
an early New York statute, the pat·
tern for much of the American legi•

lation on this subject, will be found
in thE\ Appendix, post. pp. 715·718.
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was the money of Mrs. Hoskins—that a few months after the

deed was executed and after Mrs. Oaks and Mrs. Hoskins had

taken possession of their new home, the land in question, he

had married Mrs. Hoskins, without notice of any implied trust

in Mrs. Oaks, and had been compelled to pay the note of $550

executed by his wife. The plaintiff's counsel insisted, that, if

in fact Mrs. Oaks had bought the land and paid $700 of the

price and agreed to pay the balance, and made use of Mrs.

Hoskins' name in the deed and in the note, as a cover to keep

off creditors, then Mrs. Oaks had a trust estate, which was

subject to execution sale under the act of 1812. The defendant's

counsel insisted, 1st, that supposing the facts to be as con-

tended for by the plaintiff's counsel and that Mrs. Oaks had an

implied trust, the purchaser of this trust under the act of 1812,

did not acquire the legal title, but his remedy was in equity.

2dly, That the act of 1812 did not take within its operation an

implied trust. 3dly, That the defendant, as husband, was a

purchaser for valuable consideration, and, if he married with-

out notice, he was not bound by the trust. 4thly, That, tak-

ing the facts to be as contended for by the plaintiff, yet if the

jury were satisfied that the defendant had married without

notice of the understanding that Mrs. Oaks was to pay the $550

note, and had been compelled to pay the amount himself, then
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although Mrs. Oaks had a trust to the amount of $700, yet he also

had a trust to the amount paid by him, and the case would not

come within the operation of the act of 1812. 5thly, The de-

fendant's counsel insisted, as a matter of fact to the jury, that

the land was bought and paid for by Mrs. Hoskins for her own

use and out of her own money, and insisted that it made no

difference how she obtained the money, whether by loan from

Mrs. Oaks or from her other relations, or by secreting it out

of her husband's effects, provided it was not, at the time she

paid it, the money of Mrs. Oaks.

The court charged that to entitle the plaintiff to recover the

jury must be satisfied that Mrs. Oaks had bought the land,

and had, for the purpose of avoiding her creditors, resorted to

the plan of handing the $700 to Mrs. Hoskins, and getting her

to pay it over, and get the deed in her name and execute the

note, with the understanding that Mrs. Oaks was to pay the

amount of the note when due; that if these were the facts, then,

although the legal title was vested in Mrs. Hoskins by the deed

of Sheeks, still she held the land in trust for Mrs. Oaks, and

was the money of Mrs. Hoskins-that a few mouths after the
deed was executed and after Mrs. Oaks and Mrs. Hoskins had
taken possession of their new home, the land in question, he
had married Mrs. Hoskins, without notice of any implied trust
in l\Irs. Oaks, and had been compelled to pay the note of $550
executed by his wife. The plaintiff's counsel insisted, that, if
in fact )!rs. Oaks bad bought the land and paid $700 of the
price and agreed to pay the balance, and made use of Mrs.
Hoskins' name in the deed and in the note, as a cover to keep
off creditors, then Mrs. Oaks had a trust estate, which was
subject to execution sale under the act of 1812. The defendant's
counsel insisted, 1st, that supposing the facts to be as contended for by the plaintiff's counsel and that l\lrs. Oaks bad an
implied trust, the purchaser of this trust under the act of 1812,
did not acquire the legal title, but his remedy was in equity.
2dly, That the act of 1812 did not take within its operation an
implil'd trust. 3dly, That the defendant, as husband, was a
purcha!wr for valuable consideration, and, if be married without notice, he was not bound by the trust. 4thly, That, taking the facts to be as contended for by the plaintiff, yet if the
jury were satisfied that the defendant had married without
notice of the understanding that 1ifrs. Oaks was to pay the $550
note, and had been compelled to pay the amount himself, then
although Mrs. Oaks had a trust to the amount of $700, yet he also
had a trust to the amount paid by him, and the case would not
come within the operation of the act of 1812. 5thly, The defendant's counsel insisted, as a matter of fact to the jury, that
the land was bought and paid for by Mrs. Hoskins for her own
use and out of her own money, and insisted that it made no
difference how she obtained the money, whether by loan from
Mrs. Oaks or from her other relations, or hy secreti11g it out
of her husband's effects, provided it was not, at the time she
paid it, the money of l\lrs. Oaks.
The court charged that to entitle the plaintiff to recover the
jury must be satisfied that :\Irs. Oaks had bought the land,
and had, for the purpose of avoiding her creditors, resorted to
the plan of handing the $700 to Mrs. Hoskins, and getting her
to pay it over, and get the deed in her name and execute the
note, with the understanding that Mrs. Oaks was to pay the
amount of the note whe11 dm·; that if these were the facts, then,
although the legal title was vested in Mrs. Hoskins by the deed
of Sheeks, still she held the land in trust for Mrs. Oaks, and
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this was such a trust as was liable to execution; and the plaintiff,

as purchaser under the sheriff's sale, by virtue of the act of

1812, acquired not only the trust estate of Mrs. Oaks, but also

the legal estate of Mrs. Hoskins, and was entitled to recover

in this action—that the position taken by the defendant's coun-

sel, that a husband, marrying without notice, was considered in

the light of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, discharged

of the trust, was not true; for the husband, taking by operation

of law, stood in the place of the wife, and took no greater

estate, and was bound by the trust, whether he had notice or

not—that so far as the $550 note was concerned, if it was a

part of the understanding that the note was to be given in the

name of Mrs. Hoskins, but Mrs. Oaks was to pay it, then,

though the defendant, by marrying Mrs. Hoskins, made himself

liable for the note, and had in fact been compelled to pay it;

still his paying it would not alter the case, but would only

place him in the situation of a security, who had paid money

for Mrs. Oaks, without thereby acquiring a lien upon the land

or any interest in the land. On the other hand, if the jury were

not satisfied that the money was the money of Mrs. Oaks, but

came to the conclusion that Mrs. Hoskins had procured it either

by loan from Mrs. Oaks or in any other way; or, supposing
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the money was Mrs. Oaks', if the jury were not satisfied that

Mrs. Hoskins gave the note in her name with the understanding

that Mrs. Oaks was to pay it, then the defendant would be

entitled to a verdict; for if Mrs. Hoskins gave the note expect-

ing to pay it herself, then the trust estate would be divided,

and Mrs. Hoskins would hold the land in trust for Mrs. Oaks

as to the $700, supposing that to have been her money, and in

trust for herself as to the amount of the note, and thus would

be presented the case of a mixed trust, which does not come

within the operation of the act of 1812.

There was a verdict for the plaintiff; a motion for a new trial

for error in the opinion of the court was discharged, and, judg-

ment being thereupon rendered for the plaintiff, the defendant

appealed.

RUFFIN, C. J. In the instructions to the jury, the inten-

tions of the parties and the true character of the transaction,

upon which the deed was made to Hoskins, were fairly sub-

mitted to them. It must, therefore, be assumed, upon this ver-

dict, that the contract of purchase was made by Oaks for her

this was such a trust as was liable to execution; and the plaintiff,
as purchaser under the sheriff's sale, by virtue of the act of
1812, acquired not only the trust estate of Mrs. Oaks, but also
the legal estate of Mrs. Hoskins, and was entitled to recover
in this action-that the position taken hy the defendant's counsel, that a husband, marrying without notice, was considered in
the light of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, discharged
of the trust, was not true; for the husband, taking by operatiou
of law, stood in the place of the wife, and took no greater
estate, and was bound by the trust, whether he had notice or
not-that so far as the $550 note was concerned, if it was a
part of the understanding that the note was to be given in tlie
name of Mrs. Hoskins, but Mrs. Oaks was to pay it, then,
though the defendant, by marrying Mrs. Hoskins, made himself
liable for the note, and had in fact been compelled to pay it;
still his paying it would not alter the case, but would only
place him in the situation of a security, who had paid moHey
for ::\lrs. Oaks, without thereby acquiring a lien upon the land
or any interest in the land. On the other hand, if the jury were
not satisfied that the money was the money of Mrs. Oaks, but
came to the conclusion that Mrs. Hoskins had procured it either
by loan from Mrs. Oaks or in any other way; or, supposing
the money was Mrs. Oaks', if the jury were not satisfied that
Mrs. Hoskins gave the note in her name with the understanding
that Mrs. Oaks was to pay it, then the defendant would be
entitled to a verdict; for if Mrs. Hoskins gave the note expecting to pay it herself, then the trust estate would be divided,
and Mrs. Hoskins would hold the land in trust for Mrs. Oaks
as to the $700, supposing that to have been her money, and in
trust for herself as to the amount of the note, and thus would
be presented the case of a mixed trust, which does not come
within the operation of the act of 1812.
There was a verdict for the plaintiff; a motion for a new trial
for error in the opinion of the court was discharged, and, judgment being thereupon rendered for the plaintiff, the defendant
appealed.
RUFFIN, C. J. In the instructions to the jury, the intentions of the parties and the true character of the transaction,
upon which the deed was made to Hoskins, were fairly submitted to them. It must, therefore, be assumed, upon this verdict, that the contract of purchase was made by Oaks for her
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own benefit, that the sum paid, $700, was her money, and that

she was to pay the residue of the purchase money, $550; and

that she did not give Her own note as a security therefor, hut

procured her daughter to give her note, with the understand-

ing that Oaks should pay it; and that this was done with the

view to conceal the interest of Oaks from her creditors and pre-

vent them from seeking satisfaction of their debts out of the

land. We are then to treat this as a strong case of bad faith,

in which clearly the daughter held upon a secret agreement and

in confidence for the mother. In such a case, it would be a

reproach to any system of jurisprudence, if it provided no

means of reaching the land or the interest of the mother in it,

for the payment of her debts. We doubt not but her interest

may be made liable for her debts; but the question is, whether

it be so liable as to be the subject of sale uuder a fieri facias

on a judgment at law, and whether the purchaser at such a

sale gets the legal title? Upon that question, after deliberation,

we have come to a conclusion differing from the opinion held

by his Honor. ^

Before the act of 1812, which made trust property subject to

legal execution, such an interest as this certainly could not be

reached at law. It was the constant practice, both in England

and this country, for a purchaser to take his conveyance to a
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trustee; and it was allowed, though such conveyance defeated

dower, and prevented the redress of creditors at law, and obliged

them to sue in a court of equity. The act of 1812 altered and

corrected that, in cases, in which a person is seized simply

and purely for the debtor, without any beneficial iuterest in the

party having the legal title or in any other person except the

debtor in execution. Brown v. Graves, 4 Hawks, 342; Gillis v.

McKay, 4 Dev. 172. The reason for thus confining the opera-

tion of the. act is, that it divests the whole legal estate of the

trustee, and, therefore, can only extend to a case, in which the

trustee does not need that title to subserve the rights of himself

or third persons. The act embraces, therefore, only the case in

which the debtor in execution might call upon the trustee for a

conveyance of the legal estate, or, at the least, if there were sev-

eral equitable joint tenants for a conveyance of such part of

the legal estate, as would be commensurate with his equitable

right. The act in no case gives to the creditor of the cestui que

trust an interest or power over the estate, legal or equitable,

greater than that to which the cestui que trust may be entitled.

own benefit, that the sum paid, $700, was her money, and that
she .was to pay the residue of the purchase money, l1-550; and
that she did not give l1er own note as a st•eurity tlwrefor, hut
procured her daughter to give her note, with the understanding that Oaks should pay it; and that this was done with the
view to conceal the interest of Oaks from her creditors and prevent them from seeking satisfaction of their debts out of the
land. We are then to treat this as a strong case of bad faith,
in which clearly the daughter held upon a secret agreement and
in confidence for the mother. In such a case, it would be a
reproach to any system of jurisprudence, if it provided no
means of reaching the land or the interest of the mother in it,
for the payment of her debts. We doubt not but her interest
may be made liable for her debts; but the •1uestion is, whether
it be so liable as to be the subject of sale under a fieri /acias
on a judgment at law, and whether the purchaser ~t such a
sale gets the legal title T Upon that question, after deliberation,
we have come to a conclusion differing from the opinion held
by his Honor.
\
Before the act of 1812, which made trust property subject to
legal execution, such an interest as this certainly could not be
reached at law. It was the constant practice, both in Eugl,and
and this country, for a purchaser to take his conveyance to a
trustee; and it was allowed, though such conveyance defeated
dower, and prevented the redress of creditors at law, and obliged
them to sue in a court of equity. The act of 1812 altered and
corrected that, in cases, in which a person is seized simply
and purely for the debtor, without any beneficial interest in the
party having the legal title or in any other person except the
debtor in execution. Brown v. Graves, 4 Hawks, 342; Gillis v.
McKay, 4 Dev. 172. The reason for thus confining the operation of th~ act is, that it divests the whole legal estate of the
trustee, and, therefore, can only extend to a case, in which the
trustee does not need that title to subserve the rights of himself
or third persons. The act embraces, therefore, only the case in
which the debtor iu execution might call upon the trustee for a
conveyance of the legal estate, or, at the least, if there were several equitable joint tenants for a conveyance of such part of
the legal estate, as would be commensurate with his equitable
right. The act in no case gives to the creditor of the cestui qtte
trust an interest or power over the estate, legal or equitable,
greater than that to which the cestui que trust may be entitled.
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The purchaser holds the land exactly as the debtor held the

trust. The act does not, therefore, at all proceed on the idea of

a fraud in the creation of the trust; or provide that, by reason

thereof, the trustee shall be deprived of any interest in himself,

derived by the same conveyance. But it is founded on the fact

that the debtor, being entitled to the trust, is, in equity and in

substance, the owner of the land/ and therefore, that it ought

to he liable to be sold for his debts. The interest of the debtor,

as cestui que trust, is the subject of sale and the purchaser can

get no more. He therefore is to stand precisely in the shoes of

the debtor, except that the debtor would have been obliged to

apply to the chancellor to obtain the legal title; whereas the

purchaser gets that also by the sheriff's deed. The question

then is, whether, as between the debtor in execution and the

person having the legal title, the former could, in the state of

the dealings between them, call for an immediate conveyance

from the latter? Now we are clearly of opinion, that the daugh-

ter would not have been compelled to convey to the mother,

without first being discharged from her note, given for a part

of the purchase money, or, after the money was paid, without

its being repaid. If Oaks had given her note and Hoskins had

executed it as her surety, the latter would have been entitled

to retain the legal title as a security in the nature of a mortgage.
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This is the same case in substance. Hoskins gave her note for

Oaks' debt, and the latter agreed, as she ought, to pay it. But

she did not, and the former paid it; and, being for the pur-

chase money of this very land, the title could not be taken from-

her, without making her whole. As between these parties, that

cannot be denied. But it is contended, the bad faith towards

the mother's creditors is an ingredient in the case, which repels

all claim of the daughter upon the land, as against the creditors,

and gives them a higher right than the mother. Not, we think,

under this act of 1812. We have already endeavored to shew,

that the remedy given by it does not stand on the footing of

fraud. But another view will render this still clearer. If there

was an intention to defraud creditors, then it is a settled prin-

ciple, that equity will help neither party to such a contract;

and, consequently, the mother could not have had a decree

against the daughter for a conveyance, nor could the creditor

of the mother, that is to say, by way of insisting on such a trust

and asking its execution, since that would be to affirm and en-

force a fraudulent intent. The remedy of the creditor is founded ,

The purchaser holds the land exactly as the debtor held tl1e
trust. The act does not, therefore, at all proceed on the idea of
a fraud in the creation of the trust; or provide that, by reason
thereof, the trustPe shall be deprived of any interest in himself,
<lerived by the same conveyance. But it is founded on the fact
that the debtor, being entitled to the trust, is, in equity and in
substance, the owner of the land1 and therefore, that it ought
to be liable to be sold for his debts. The interest of the debtor,
as cestui que trust, is the subject of sale and the purchaser can
get no more. He therefore is to stand precisely in the shoes of
the debtor, except that the debtor would have been obliged to
apply to the chancellor to obtain the legal title; whereas the
purchaser gets that also by the sheriff's deed. The question
then is, whether, as between the debtor in execution and the
person having the legal title, the former could, in the state of
the dealings between them, call for an immediate conveyance
from the latterT Now we are clearly of opinion, that the daughter would not have been compelled to convey to the mother,
without first being discharged from her note, given for a part
of the purchase money, or, after the money was paid, without
its being repaid. If Oaks had given her note and Hoskins had
executed it as her surety, the latter would have been entitled
to retain the legal title as a security in the nature of a mortgage.
This is the same case in substance. Hoskins gave her note for
Oaks' debt, and the latter agreed, as she ought, to pay it. But
she did not, and the former paid it; and, being for the purchase money of this very land, the title could not be taken from'
her, without making her whole. As between these parties, that
cannot be denied. But it is contended, the bad faith towards
the mother's creditors is an ingredient in the case, which repels
all claim of the daughter upon the land, as against the creditors,
and gives them a higher right t'han the mother. Not, we think,
under this act of 1812. We have already endeavored to shew,
that the remedy given by it does not stand on the footing of
fraud. But another view will render this still clearer. If there
was an intention to defraud creditors, then it is a settled principle, that equity will help neither party to such a contract ;
and, consequently, the mother could not have had a decree
against the daughter for a conveyance, nor could the creditor
of the mother, that is to say, by way of insisting on such a trust
and asking its execution, since that would be to affirm and enforce a fraudulent intent. The remedy of the creditor is founded ,
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on a different principle, which is, the right in equity to follow

the funds of the debtor. Dobson v. Erwin, 1 Dev. & Bat. 569.

When the estate was once in the debtor and has been conveyed

by him in trust for himself, the redress of the creditor is plain

at law upon either of two grounds. He may sell the trust, and

that will, under the act of 1812, carry the legal estate; or he

may treat the conveyance as fraudulent and null ab initio under

the act of 13th Eliz. (Rev. St., c. 50, § 1), and therefore as leav-

ing the legal title in the debtor. But this last is invoking an-

other statute which is not applicable to a case like that before us;

which is not of a conveyance by a debtor of land before owned

by her, but that of a purchase by the debtor and a conveyance

to a trustee for her. That the statute of Eliz. does not apply

to the case of a purchase by the debtor is clear from the consid-

eration, that it operates entirely by making void the assurances

within its purview. In this case, that would leave the title in

Sheeks, which would not serve the plaintiff's purpose. As has

been already mentioned, however, before the statute 29th Charles

2nd, from which our act of 1812 is taken, purchases were daily

made in England in the name of trustees; and, though equity

found means of paying out of the estate the debts of the person,

who, in the view of that court, was the owner, yet the purchase

and conveyance to the trustee were never deemed within the
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statute of Elizabeth, so as to subject the land to a legal judg-

ment and execution. That was the cause of passing the acts to

operate at law on the trusts, qua trusts. And they have never

been construed to give more to the creditor than the debtor

could equitably claim, nor to apply to a case in which the debtor

could not, immediately and unconditionally claim a conveyance

of the legal estate. As Oaks could not, in this case, have done

that, but must have indemnified Hoskins or her husband for

the money paid as her surety, in part of the purchase money,

the case is not within the act of 1812, and the land was not

subject to be sold under execution.

Per Curiam. Judgment reversed and venire de novo

awarded.5

5—See also Webster v. Folsom,

58 Me. 230; Cone v. Hamilton, 102

Mass. 56; Mulford v. Peterson, 35

N. J. L. 127, 133; Garfield v. Hat-

maker, 15 N. Y. 475; Dewey v.

Long, 35 Vt. 564. As an example

of statutory provision affecting the

situation, see Consol. Laws of New

York, e. 50, I 94.

on a different principle, which is, the right in equity to follow
the funds of the debtor. Dobson v. Erwin, 1 Dev. & Bat. 569.
When the estate was once in the debtor and has been conveyed
by him in trust for himself, the redress of the creditor is plain
at law upon either of two grounds. He may sell the trust, and
that will, under the act of 1812, carry the legal estate; or h1•
may treat the conveyance as fraudulent and null ab initi.o under
the act of 13th Eliz. (Rev. St., c. 50, § 1), and therefore as lea Ying the legal title in the debtor. But this last is invoking auother statute which is not applicable to a case like that before us;
which is not of a conveyance by a debtor of land before owned
, by her, but that of a purchase by the debtor and a conveyarwe
to a trustee for her. That the statute of Eliz. does not apply
to the case of a purchase by the debtor is clear from the consideration, that it operates entirely by making vo-id the assurances
within its purview. In this case, that would leave the title in
Sheeks, which would not serve the plaintiff's purpose. As has
been already mentioned, however, before the statute 29th Charles
2nd, from which our act of 1812 is taken, purchases were daily
made in England in the name of trustees; and, though equity
found means of paying out of the estate the debts of the person,
who, in the view of that court, was the owner, yet the purchase
and conveyance to the trustee were never deemed within the
statute of Elizabeth, so as to subject the land to a legal judgment and execution. That was the cause of passing the acts to
operate at law on the trusts, qua trusts. And they have nevPr
been construed to give more to the creditor than the debtor
could equitably claim, nor to apply to a case in which the dt>btor
could not, immediately and unconditionally claim a conveyance
of the legal estate. As Oaks could not, in this case, have done
that, but must have indemnified Hoskins or her husband for
the money paid as her surety, in part of the purchase money.
the case is not within the act of 1812, and the land was not
subject to be sold under execution.
PER CURI.AM. Judgment
awarded.5
5-See also Webster v. Folsom,
58 l\Ie. 230; Cone v. Hamilton, 102
Mass. 56; Mulford v. Peterson, 35
N. J . L. 127, 133; Garfield v. Hat·
ma.leer, 15 N. Y. 475; Dewey v.

reversed and venire

de novo

Long, 35 Vt. 564. As &n enmple
of statutory provision aft'ecting the
situation, see Consol. Laws of New
York, e. 50, I 94.
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KIMMEL v. M'RIGHT

2 Pa. St. 38

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. September Term, 1845)

KIMMEL v. M 'RIGHT

Error to the Common Pleas of Westmoreland county.

The plaintiff, as purchaser of George Kimmel's estate at

2 Pa. St. 38

sheriff's sale, brought ejectment against him. It appeared from

the evidence, that Obadiah, a natural son of George, claimed

{Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Septem her Term, 1845)

the property under a conveyance from a stranger, and that his

father lived in the house with him; but he was not named de-

fendant on the record.

To avoid the effect of this conveyance, plaintiff showed that

at the time of this purchase, which was subsequent to his judg-

ment, Obadiah was but fourteen or sixteen years old. That his

father made the bargain and handed him the money to pay the

price. The defendant objected to evidence of a declaration by

George Kimmel, that "he would buy land in Obadiah's name."

The court told the jury the purchaser was entitled to recover,

if George Kimmel had any beneficial interest in the land; that

if he made the purchase at the time, and was indebted, a result-

ing trust would arise to him; though, as a general rule, such a

trust would not arise, where the payment was not with consent

of the grantee. Or if the jury found the purchase was with

intent to defraud his creditors, they would be entitled to retain
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it, under 13 Eliz., against Obadiah.

The fourthjpoint of defendant was, "That a man indebted is

not prevented or prohibited by law from making a present of

money, if he has it, to his children, that it is no fraud to do

so." "We answer that the law is the reverse of the statement

in this proposition."

ROGERS, J. No exception can be taken to the general charge,

nor to the answer to the points, except the fourth. The court

are made to say, that a man is prohibited from making a present

of money to his children. As an abstract principle, nothing can

be more erroneous, for undoubtedly, a man may do as he pleases

with his own property. But the court must have intended, as

appears very clearly from the general tenor of the charge, that

a man who is largely indebted in proportion to his means, cau-

i.ot give his property to his children at the expense of his cred-

itors. And this certainly is the law, a man must be just before

Error to the Common Pleas of Westmoreland county.
The plaintiff, as purchaser of George Kimmel 's estate at
sheriff's sale, brought ejectment against him. It appeared from
the evidence, that Obadiah, a natural son of George, claimed
the property under a conveyance from a stranger, and that his
father lived in the house with him; but he was not named defendant on the record.
To avoid the effect of this conveyance, plaintiff showed that
at the time of this purchase, which was subsequent to his judgment, Obadiah was but fourteen or sixteen years old. That his
father made the bargain and handed him the money to pay the
price. The defendant objected to evidence of a declaration by
George Kimmel, that "he would buy land in Obadiah's name."
The court told the jury the purchaser was entitled to recover,
if George Kimmel had any beneficial interest in the land; that
if he made the purchase at the time, and was indebted, a resulting trust would arise to him; though, as a general rule, such a
trust would not arise, where the payment was not with consent
of the grantee. Or if the jury found the purchase was with
intent to defraud his creditors, they would be entitled to retain
it, under 13 Eliz., against Obadiah.
The fourtvoint of defendu nt was, "That a man indebted is
not P{evented or P.rohibited by law from making a present of
money, if he has it, to his children, that it is no fraud to do
so." '"'We answer that the law is the reverse of the statement
in this proposition."
ROGERS, J. No exception can be taken to the general charge,
nor to the answer to the points, except the fourth. The court
are made to say, that a man is prohibited from making a present
of money to his children. As an abstract principle, nothing can
be more erroneous, for undoubtedly, a man may do as he pleases
with his own property. But the court must have intended, as
11ppears very clearly from the general tenor of the charge, that
a man who is largely indebted in proportion to his means, can1.ot give his property to his children at the expense of his creditors. And this certainly iS the law, a man must be just before
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he is generous. The title to the land passed from the several

grantors to Obadiah; and as against his father, as it appears to

have been a gift, he might have held the land. But the father,

at the time of the several conveyances, was largely indebted;

and these conveyances to his son were devices to cheat and de-

fraud his creditors. As against them, by the statute of fraud-

ulent conveyances, the title is utterly void.

We see no cause for complaint, admitting even the testimony

of the declarations of Dr. Kimmel, that "now he would buy

land, and that he would buy in Obadiah's name." If he was

indebted at the time the declarations were made, it is pertinent

testimony; if he was not, it is evidence in the defendant's favor,

as it shows his honesty of purpose. In no point of view is he

injured, and the court would be badly employed in reversing

judgments for errors which work no mischief.

Judgment affirmed.8

NORCUTT v. DODD

Cr. & Ph. 100

(High Court of Chancery. January 29, 1841)

This suit was instituted by the assignee, under the insolvent

debtor's act, of Robert Torre, one of the defendants, for the

purpose of setting aside a voluntary assignment of an annuity

he is generous. The title to the land passed from the several
grantors to Obadiah; and as against his father, as it appears to
have been a gift, he might have held the land. But ~he father,
at the time of the several conveyances, was largely indebted;
and these conveyances to his son were devices to cheat and defraud his creditors. As against them, by the statute of fraudulent conveyances, the title is utterly void.
We see no cause for complaint, admitting even the testimony
of the declarations of Dr. Kimmel, that "now he would buy
land, and that he would buy in Obadiah's name.'' If he was
indebted at the time the declarations were made, it is pertinent
testit~1ony; if he was not, it is evidence in the defendant's favor,
as it shows his honesty of purpose. In no point of view is he
injured, and the court would be badly employed in reversing
judgments for errors which work no mischief.
Judgment affi.rmed.6

to which he was entitled under his marriage settlement.
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By the settlement, which bore date the 12th of April, 1832,

and was made between Elizabeth Dodd, the intend*! wife of the

NORCUTT v. DODD

first part; Robert Torre of the second part; William Dodd, the

father of Elizabeth Dodd, of the third part; and Henry Le

Cr. & Ph. 100

Keux and another person, as trustees, of the fourth part, Wil-

liam Dodd covenanted with Robert Torre, that in case the mar-

(High Court of Chancery.

January 29, 1841)

riage should take effect, he, William Dodd, would, during the

joint lives of himself and his daughter, pay to Robert Torre, or

his assigns, the yearly sum of £50, as therein mentioned.

The marriage was solemnized on the 13th of April, 1832.

On the 17th of November, 1836, the plaintiff recovered judg-

ment against Robert Torre, in an action of debt, for the sum of

£70 and costs; but at the request of Robert Torre, who stated

6—Pennington v. Clifton, 11 Ind. 194 111. 638, 62 N. E. 794; Bloom-

162; Hawkins v. Cramer, 63 Tex. ingdale v. Stein, 42 Ohio State 168.

99 acc. See also Smith v. Patton,

This suit was instituted by the assignee, under the insolvent
debtor's act, of Robert Torre, one of the defendants, for the
purpose of setting aside a voluntary assignment of an annuity
to which he was entitled under his marriage settlement.
By the settlement, which bore date the 12th of April, 1832,
and was made between Elizabeth Dodd, the inteud~ wife of the
first part; Robert Torre of the second part; William Dodti, the
father of Elizabeth Dodd, of the third part; and Henry Le
Keux and another person, as trustees, of the fourth part, William Dodd covenanted with Robert Torre, that in case the marriage should take effect, he, William Dodd, would, during the
joint lives of himself and his daughter, pay to Robert Torre, or
his assigns, the yearly sum of £50, as therein mentioned.
The marriage was solemnized on the 13th of April, 1832.
On the 17th of November, 1836, the plaintiff recovered judgment against Robert Torre, in en action of debt, for the sum of
£70 and costs; but at the request of Robert Torre, who stated
6-Pennington v. Clifton, 11 Ind.
162; Hawkins v. Cramer, 63 Tex.
99 acc. See also Smith v. Patton,

194 Ill. 638, 62 N. E. 794; Bloom·
ingdale v. Stein, 42 Ohio State 168.
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that he expected to receive some money on the 19th of Novem-

ber, which would enable him to satisfy the plaintiff's debt, exe-

cution was delayed until that day. On the 19th of November,

Robert Torre having again made default in payment, the plain- \

tiff sued out a writ of execution; but the sheriff's officer, on

coming to Robert Torre's house for the purpose of executing

the writ, found another officer in possession of his goods, under

a similar writ, at the suit of one Mottram, to whom Robert

Torre had executed a warrant of attorney the day before, to

enter up judgment against him for the sum of £72 10s. On the

22nd of November, a third writ was lodged with the officer so

in possession of the goods, at the suit of one Perring, for £70.

The officer continued in possession until the 2d of January,

when the goods were sold by auction, and the net proceeds of

the sale were not sufficient for the satisfaction of Mottram's

debt.

On the 22d of December, 1836, Robert Torre executed a deed,

by which he assigned the annuity to Henry Le Keux, in trust

for the separate use of his wife; and in the month of May, 1837,

he surrendered himself to prison, and was subsequently dis-

charged under the insolvent debtors' act, after six months' con-

finement; and the plaintiff was duly chosen the assignee of his

estate and effects.
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The bill was filed against William Dodd, Henry Le Keux, and

Robert Torre and Elizabeth his wife; and it prayed that the

assignment might be declared fraudulent and void against the

plaintiff and the other creditors of the insolvent; that an ac-

count might be taken of what was due to the plaintiff for the

arrears of the annuity, and that William Dodd and Henry Le

Keux might be decreed to pay to the plaintiff what should be

found due from them respectively on account thereof, together

with the costs of the suit.

The cause now came on to be heard before the Lord Chan-

cellor.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR [Cottenham]. This being an

assignment of a chose in action, and the debtor being still living,

the transaction is not fraudulent under the statute of Eliz.

alone; but under that statute, taken in connection with the

insolvent debtors' act I am of opinion that it is. The difficulty

which arose upon the statute of Eliz., with respect to voluntary

assignments of choses in action, was, that, during the lifetime

H. & A. Bankruptcy—9

that he expected to receive some money on the 19th of November, which would enable him to satisfy the plaintiff's debt, execution was delayed until that day. On the 19th of November,
R-0bert Torre having again made default in payment, the plaintiff sued out a writ of execution; but the sheriff's officer, on
coming to R-0bert Torre's house for the purpose of ~xecuting
the writ, found another officer in possession of bis goods, under
a similar writ, at the suit of one Mottram, to whom Robert
Torre had executed a warrant of attorney the day before, to
enter up judgment against him for the sum of £72 10s. On the
22nd of November, a third writ was lodged with the officer so
in possession of the goods, at the suit of one Perring, for £70.
The officer continued in possession until the 2d of January,
when the goods were sold by auction, and the net proceeds of
the sale were not sufficient for the satisfaction of Mottram 's
debt.
On the 22d of December, 1836, Robert Torre executed a deed,
by which he assigned the annuity to Henry Le Keux, in trust
for the separate use of his wife; and in the month of May, 1837,
he surrendered himself to prison, and was subsequently discharged under the insolvent debtors' act, after six months' confinement; and the plaintiff was duly chosen the assignee of his
estate and effects.
The bill was filed against William Dodd, Henry Le Keux, and
Robert Torre and Elizabeth his wife; and it prayed that the
assignment might be declared fraudulent and void against the
plaintiff and the other creditors of the insolvent; that an account might be taken of what was due to the plaintiff for the
arrt-ars of the annuity, and that William Dodd and Henry Le
Keux might be decreed to pay to the plaintiff what should be
found due from them respectively on account thereof, together
with the costs of the suit.
The cause now came on to be heard before the Lord Chancellor.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR [Cottenham]. This being an
assignment of a chose in action, and the debtor being still living,
the transaction is not fraudulent under the statute of Eliz.
alone; but under that statute, taken in connection with the
insolvent debtors' act I am of opinion that it is. The difficulty
which arose upon the statute of Eliz., with respect to voluntary
assignments of choses in action, was, that, during the lifetime
H. A: A. Bankruptcy-9
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of the debtor, creditors could not be said to be prejudiced by

them, inasmuch as that species of property was not subject to

be taken in execution; but after his death, it was otherwise, be-

cause then the creditors might reach all his personal property

of whatever kind: and the same reason applies where the debtor

has brought himself within the operation of the insolvent

debtors' acts; because, under those acts, all his property becomes

applicable to the payment of his debts. In the present case,

however, there is no conclusive evidence that the debtor was

indebted to the extent of insolvency at the time of the assign-

ment, though the fact of their being three executions in his

house at the time makes it highly probable. As to that, there-

fore, there must be an inquiry.7 • • •

BRACKETT v. W ATKINS

21 Wend. 68

(Supreme Court of New York. January, 1839)

Error from Onondaga Common Pleas. Brackett sued Wat-

kins in an action of replevin, for taking 30 runs of woollen

of the debtor, creditors could not be said to be prejudiced by
them, inasmuch as that species of property was not subject to
be taken in execution; but after his death, it was otherwise, because then the creditors might reach all his personal property
of whatever kind : and the same reason applies where the debtor
has brought himself within the operation of the insolvent
debtors' acts; because, under those acts, all his property becomes
applicable to the payment of his debts. In the present case,
however, there is no conclusive evidence that the debtor was
indebted to the extent of insolvency at the time of the assignment, though the fact of their being three executions in his
house at the time makes it highly probable. As to that, therefore, there must be an inquiry. 7 • • •

yarn. The plaintiff proved that he was a householder, and that

BRACKETT v. WATKINS

in March, 1837, the yarn was taken from his possession by

virtue of an execution in favor of the defendant, and by his

21 Wend. 68

direction. In March, 1836, the plaintiff purchased 300 sheep,

which he sheared, and sold the whole of the wool except one
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large fleece of about 4 pounds. In the summer or autumn of

(Supreme Court of New York. January, 1839)

the same year he sold the sheep he purchased in March. On

this evidence the plaintiff rested. The defendant moved for a

nonsuit, on the following grounds: 1. That it was not shown

that the yarn in question was made from wool sheared from

the plaintiff's own sheep; 2. That there was no evidence that

the plaintiff did not own a large flock of sheep through 1836

and 1837; and 3. That the statute does not apply to a case where

a man has a large flock of sheep and sells all the wool except

ten fleeces. The court granted the nonsuit. The plaintiff ex-

cepted and brought error.

By the Court, COWEN, J. The first of the grounds taken

by the defendant's counsel in the court below is now given up

7—See Edmunds v. Edmunds

[1904], Prob. & Div. 362.

Error from Onondaga Common Pleas. Brackett sued Watkins in an action of replevin, for taking 30 runs of woollen
yarn. The plaintiff proved that he was a householder, and that
in 1farch, 1837, the yarn was taken from his possession by
virtue of an execution in favor of the defendant, and by his
direction. In March, 1836, the plaintiff purchased 300 sheep,
which he sheared, and sold the whole of the wool except one
large fleece of about 4 pounds. In the summer or autumn of
the same year he sold the sheep he purchased in March. On
this evidence the plaintiff rested. The defendant moved for a
nonsuit, on the following grounds: 1. That it was not shown
that. the yarn in question was made from wool sheared from
the plaintiff's own sheep; 2. That there was no evidence that
the plaintiff did not own a large flock of sheep through 1836
and 1837; and 3. That the statute does not apply to a case where
a man has a large flock of sheep and sells all the wool except
ten fleeces. The court granted the nonsuit. The plaintiff excepted and brought error.

By the Court, COWEN, J. The first of the grounds taken
l>y the defendant's counsel in the court below is now given up
7-See

Edmunds

v.

f1904], Prob. & Div. 362.

Edmunds
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as erroneous, on the authority of Hall v. Penney, 11 Wendell,

44. By this case the words of the statute were equitably ex-

tended beyond their literal import, and made to cover cloth,

yarn, etc., whether it comes from the sheep of the owner or not.

Nor can I perceive any force in the other points, when taken

in the abstract. It was pretty evident, that the plaintiff had

reduced himself to the 30 runs, and had no more. Being a

householder, the statute conferred upon this the same protec-

tion, whether the plaintiff had before owned but 10 or 1,000

sheep. I say in the abstract. Very likely the court below were

disgusted with the strong appearance of a"fraud upon the stat-

ute, by a man disposing of, or covering up all his other prop-

erty, and turning what was intended as a shield of poverty into

an instrument of fraud. It is quite common for dishonest men

to do so. But I think the court below have mistaken the remedy.

If there be an appearance from circumstances that the plaintiff

has reduced himself to exempt property, in order to defraud

his creditors, that question should be submitted to the jury,

under proper directions from the court. Their sagacity would

be, in general, quite a match for the case. On their being satis-

fied that the plaintiff had placed himself on his exempt property

in order to defraud his creditors, as in the instance below, by

a sale of his sheep and wool, they may clearly place him beyond
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the reach of the statute, by sustaining the levy. His sales or

other arrangements would come within the words of the statute,

13 Elizabeth, being to delay, hinder or defraud creditors; or,

if not, they would be void at the common law. The rule, then,

is this: prima facie the fleeces, yarn, cloth, and other things

limited to a certain amount by the statute, 2 R. S. 290, par. 22,

are protected. But if the jury believe that it was brought down

to the compass of exemption, with intent to defraud creditors,

they ought to find for the creditor. Most commonly, the other

goods being mortgaged or sold, remain still in the debtor's pos-

session, when either they may be seized, or those which are ap-

parently exempt, at the election of the creditor. In general,

the mortgaged or sold goods are seized. But the more artful

debtor will fix a more secure cover for his property, by chang-

ing it into money, or something as little tangible to an execu-

tion as may be, when the property claimed as exempt must be

resorted to, and the question of fraud litigated upon that. On

such obvious fraud as possession after a mortgage or sale, the

court may doubtless nonsuit, or direct the jury to find the covin,
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as erroneous, on the authority of Hall v. Penney, 11 Wendell,
44. By this case the words of the statute were equitably extended beyond their literal import, and made to cover cloth,
yarn, etc., whether it comes from the sheep of the owner or not .
.Nor can I perceive any force in the other points, when taken
in the abstract. It was pretty evident, that the plaintiff had
reduced himself to the 30 runs, and had no more. Being a
householder, the statute conferred upon this the same protection, whether the plaintiff had before owned but 10 or 1,000
sheep. I say in the abstract. Very likely the court below were
'disgusted with the strong appearance of a' fraud upon the statute, by a man disposing of, or covering up all his other property, and turning what was intended as a shield of poverty into
an instrument of fraud. It is quite common for dishonest men
to do so. But I think the court below have mistaken the remedy.
If there he an appearance from circumstances that the plaintiff
has reduced himself to exempt property, in order to defraud
his creditors, that question should be submitted to the jury,
under proper directions from the court. Their sagacity would
be, in general, quite a match for the case. On their being satisfied that the plaintiff had placed himself on his exempt property
in order to defraud his creditors, as in the instance below, by
a sale of his sheep and wool, they may clearly place him beyond
the reach of the statute, by sustaining the levy. His sales or
other arrangements would come within the words of the statute,
13 ·Elizabeth, being to delay, hinder or defraud creditors; or,
if not, they would be void at the common law. The rule, then,
is this: prim.a facie the fleeces, yarn, cloth, and other things
limited to a certain arnount by the statute, 2 R. S. 290, par. 22,
are protected. But if the jury believe that it was brought down
to the compass of exemption, with intent to defraud creditors,
they ought to find for the creditor. Most commonly, the other
goods being mortgaged or sold, remain still in the debtor's possession, when either they may be seized, or those which are apparently exempt, at the election of the creditor. In genernl,
the mortgaged or sold goods are seized. But the more artful
debtor will fix a more secure cover for his property, by changing it into money, or something as little tangible to an execution as may be, when the property claimed as exempt must be
resorted to, and the question of fraud litigated upon that. On
such obvious fraud as possession after a mortgage or sale, the
court may doubtless nonsuit, or direct the jury to find the covin,
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since the statute has declared the possession to be conclusive

evidence where it is not satisfactorily explained. Not so of

more equivocal instances. On these the question is, in general,

for the jury. We think it should have been put to them in the

case before us.

The judgment must, therefore, be reversed, and a venire de

novo go from the court below, the costs to abide the event.8

JOHNSON v. SILSBEE

49 N. H. 543

(Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire. June, 1870)

since the statute has declared the poBSession to be conclusive
evidence where it is not satisfactorily explained. Not so of
more equivocal instances. On these the question is, in general7
for the jury. We think it should have been put to them in the
case before us.
.
The judgment must, therefore, be reversed, and a venfre de
novo go from the court below, the costs to abide the event.8

This was assumpsit brought by Johnson & Fisher against R.

W. Silsbee, and one W. F. Howard, trustee. The only questions

raised related to the liability of the trustee. The depositions

JOHNSON v. SILSBEE

of the trustee and others were submitted to the court from

which the following facts appear. The trustee bought of defend-

49 N. H. 543

ant and of his daughter, J. Arlette Silsbee a sewing machine,

for which he agreed to pay the sum of $65.00, no part of which

(Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire. June, _1870)

had been paid. They both spoke of the machine as belonging:

to the daughter, and the trustee understood at the time that it

was hers, though her father assisted her in the sale. This ma-

chine was purchased by the said J. Arlette of her uncle in

Buffalo, N. Y., and she had paid $20.00 cash towards it. and was

to have a commission of $5.00 or more on it if she sold it, so
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that she only owed about $40.00 for it when she sold it. The

said J. Arlette Silsbee was and is a minor daughter of defend-

ant, who lives at home with him and acts as housekeeper for her

father. He has always boarded and clothed her as other fathers

generally board and clothe their daughters, and she has always

remained a member of his family and been supported there.

She is not emancipated and her father has never given her her

time or earnings by any express gift or contract. But she has,

with his consent, worked at sewing for the neighbors and earned

small sums of money,. which have been paid to her, and her

father has never claimed them or undertaken to control his

8—See Wilcox v. Havrtey, 31 N.

Y. 648; Bishop v. Johnson, 15

N. Y. St. Rep. 579; O'Donnell v.

Seaar. 25 Mich. 367; Comstock v.

Bechtel, 63 Wis. 656, 24 N. W. 465;

Hetrick v. Campbell, 14 Pa. St.

263; Bose v. Sharpless, 33 Gratt.

153; White v. Givens, 29 La. Ann.

571.

This was assumpsit brought by Johnson & Fisher against R.
W. Silsbee, and one W. F. Howard, trustee. The only questions
raised related to the liability of the trustee. The depositiocs
of the trustee and others were submitted to the court from
which the following facts appear. The trustee bought of defendant and of his daughter, J. Arlette 'Silsbee a sewing machine.
for which he agreed to pay the sum of $65.00, no part of whiC'h
had been paid. They both spoke of the machine as belongin~
to the daughter, and the trustee understood at the time that it
was hers, though her father assisted her in the sale. This machine was purchased by the said J. Arlette of her uncle in
Buffalo, N. Y., and she had paid $20.00 cash towards it, and was
to have a commission of $5.00 or more on it if she sold it, so
that she only owed about $40.00 for it when she sold it. The
said J. Arlette Silsbee was and is a minor daughter of defendant, who lives at home with him and acts as housekeeper for her
father. He has always boarded and clothed her as other fathers
generally board and clothe their daughters, and she has always
remained a member of his family and been supported there.
She is not emancipated and her father has never given her her
time or earnings by any express gift or contract. But she has,
with his consent, worked at sewing for the neighbors and earned
small sums of money,. which have been paid to her, anq her
father has never claimed· them or undertaken to control his
8-See Wilcox v. Hawley, 31 N.
648; Bishop v. Johnson, 15
N. Y. Rt. Rep. 579; O'Donnell v.
Se~ar. 25 Mkb. 367; Comstock v.
Bechtel, 63 Wis. 656, 24 N. W. 465;
Y.

Hetrick v. Campbell, 14 Pa. St.
263; Rose v. Sharpless, 33 Gratt.
153; White v. Givens, 29 La. Ann.
571.
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daughter in the manner of spending the same, hut she has ex-

pended a portion of such earnings in purchasing clothing for

"herself, and the $20.00 paid towards this sewing machine was

earned in that way, and paid by the daughter without any direc-

tion from the father or any objection on his part. Upon these

facts the plaintiffs claim to charge the trustee for the value of

the machine ($65.00), but if they cannot hold that amount then

they claim to hold him for the value of the machine, less the

amount remaining due for the same; while the defendant and

his daughter claim that the trustee cannot be charged for any-

thing.

-

SMITH, J. There is no evidence that the minor bought the

machine for, or on behalf of, her father.

Apart from the fact that the twenty dollars paid came from

her earnings, there could be no doubt that the machine was the

property of the minor. So far as it was bought on credit, it was

lha1ghtt>r in the manuer of spending the sanw, hut she has ex1w1 ded a portion of such earnings in purchasing clothing for
'lwrs1•l t', and the $20.00 paid towards this sewing machine was
earned in that way, and paid by the daughter without any direct ion from the father or any objection on his part. Upon these
faets the plaintiffs claim to charge the trustee for the value of
the machine ($65.00), but if they cannot holu that amount then
t h1=-y elaim to hold him for the value of the machine, less the
a mount remaining due for the same; while the defendant and
his daughter claim that the trustee cannot be charged for anyt hiug.

on her credit, not on her father's. Although a father is entitled

to the earnings of his child as a recompense for his liability to

support the child, he has no power over his child's estate except

as his trustee or guardian; 1 Blackstone's Com. 453. "He has

no title to the property of the child, nor is the capacity or right

of the latter to take property or receive money by grant, gift
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or otherwise, except as a compensation for services, in any de-

gree qualified or limited during minority. Whatever therefore

an infant acquires which does not come to him as a compensa-

tion for services rendered, belongs absolutely to him, and his

father cannot interpose any claim to it;" see Bigelow, C. J., in

Banks v. Conant, 14 Allen, 497, p. 498; Wendell v. Pierce, 13

X. H. 502. If therefore the father had any interest in this

machine, it must have been solely by reason of the fact that it

was partly paid for out of the earnings of his daughter.

In the present case, upon the evidence in the depositions, we

find, as matter of fact, that, when the daughter began to do the

work by which she earned the twenty dollars, the father con-

sented, in good faith that the wages to be earned by that labor,

should belong to the daughter.

The father did not "put his consent into words;" but his

acts (as detailed in the depositions) relative to the daughter's

employment at various times in sewing, and as to her disposi-

tion of the sums which had thus been earned, justify the infer-

ence that he so consented on this occasion, and thus express

SlHTII, J. There is no evidence that the minor bought the
machine for, or on behalf of, her father.
Apart from the fact that the twenty dollars paid came from
her earnings, there could be no doubt that the machine was the
property of the minor. So far as it was bought on credit, it was
on her credit, not on her father's. Although a father is entitled
to the earnings of his child as a recompense for his liability to
support the child, he has no power over his child's estate except
as his trustee or guardian; 1 Blackstone's Com. 453. "He has
no title to the property of the child, nor is the capacity or right
of the latter to take property or receive money by grant, gift
or otherwise, except as a compensation for services, in any degree qualified or limited during minority. Whatever therefore
au infant acquires which does not come to him as a compensation for services rendered, belongs absolutely to him, and his
father cannot interpose any claim to it;" see Bigelow, C. J., in
Banks v. Conant, 14 Allen, 497, p. 498; Wendell v. Pierce, 13
X. H. 502. If therefore the father had any interest in this
machine, it must have been solely by reason of the fact that it
was partly paid for out of the earnings of his daughter.
In the present case, upon the evidence in the depositions, we
find, as matter of fact, that, when the daughter began to do the
work by which she earned the twenty dollars, the father consented, in good faith that the wages to be earned by that labor,
should belong to the daughter.
The father did not ''put his consent into words;'' but his
acts (as detailed in the deposition&) relative to the daughter's
employment at various times in sewing, and as to her disposition of the sums which had thus been earned, justify the inference that he so consented on this occasion, and thus express
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his consent as effectually "as words would have done;" see 5

Am. Law Review, 11, 12. Can this relinquishment of the father's

right to the daughter's future earnings be avoided by his exist-

ing creditors as fraudulent in law?

A debtor cannot give away his attachable property, to the

prejudice of existing creditors. But his time and talents are

at his own disposal. If the debtor, instead of laboring to earn

wages which his creditors can attach by the trustee process,

chooses to remain idle, or "to give away his own services by

working gratuitously for another," his creditors have no legal

remedy. They "cannot compel him to work and earn wages

for their benefit." The laws of this state do not authorize "the

sale of the person of a debtor for the satisfaction of his debts."

Abbey v. Deyo, 44 N. Y. 353, pp. 346-9; Bush v. Vought, 55

Penn. State, 437, p. 441; see also Williams v. Chambers, 10

Queen's Bench, 337; Chippendale v. Tomlinson, 4 Douglas, 318.

If the father can give away his own labor, by working gratui-

tously for another, why may he not also give away his right to

the future labor of his child? The creditors of the father can-

not attach, or sell upon execution, the child's capacity to labor.

Practically, the father's right to the child's prospective earn-

ings is worthless unless the father and the child both choose to

make it valuable. There is no legal process, by which the cred-
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itors can compel the father, to make the son labor for their

benefit. No law requires the father "to work his son or his

daughter as he would work a horse or a slave for the benefit of

his creditors." Black, J., in McCloskey v. Cyphert, 27 Penn.

State, 220, p. 225.

If the father can give to a third person the right to his

daughter's future services, can there be any valid objection to

his giving this right to the daughter herself? We are not to

pass upon this question without giving some consideration to

the interests of the daughter. She is not a chattel, but is en-

titled to the care and protection of the law, just as much as her

father's creditors. See Parker, C. J., in Whiting v. Earle, 3

Pick. 201, p. 202; Isham, J., in Bray v. Wheeler, 29 Vt. 514,

pp. 516-7. If they can take her future earnings against her

will, and her father's will, she is, in effect reduced "to a con-

dition of qualified slavery." The law does not contemplate the

subjection of the child to any person not standing in loco par-

entis. The consequences to the child of denying the father's

power to relinquish his right to the child's future earnings,

his consent as effectually "as words would have done;" see 5
Am. Law Review, 11, 12. Can this relinquishment of the father's
right to the daughter's future earnings be avoided by his existing creditors as fraudulent in law 1
A debtor cannot give away his attachable property, to the
prejudice of existing creditors. But his time and talents are
at his qwn disposal. If the debtor, instead of laboring to earn
wages which his creditors can attach by the trustee process,
chooses to remain idle, or ''to give away his own services by
workiug gratuitously for another,'' his creditors have no legal
remedy. They "cannot compel him to work and earn wages
for their benefit." The laws of this state do not authorize "the
sale of the person of a debtor for the satisfaction of his debts."
Abbey v. Deyo, 44 N. Y. 353, pp. 346-9; Bush v. Vought, 55
Penn. State, 437, p. 441; see also Williams v. Chambers, 10
Queen's Bench, 337; Chippendale v. Tomlinson, 4 Douglas, 318.
If the father can give away his own labor, by working gratuitously for another, why may he not also give away his right to
the future labor bf his child? The creditors of the father cannot attach, or sell upon execution, the child's capacity to labor.
Practically, the father's right to the child's prospective earnings is worthless unless the father and the child both choose to
make it valuable. There is no legal process, by which the creditors can compel the father, to make the son labor for their
benefit. No law requires the father "to work his son or his
daughter as he would work a horse or a slave for the benefit of
his creditors." Black, J., in McCloskey v. Cyphert, 27 Penn.
State, 220, p. 225.
If the father can give to a third person the right to his
daughter's future services, can there be any valid objection to
his giving this right to the daughter herself T We are not to
pass upon this question without giving some consideration to
the interests of the daughter. She is not a chattel, but is entitled to the care and protection of the law, just as much as her
father's creditors. See Parker, C. J., in Whiting v. Earle, 3
Pick. 201, p. 202; Isham, J., in Bray v. Wheeler, 29 Vt. 514,
pp. 516-7. If they can take her future earnings against her
will, and her father's will, she is, in effect reduced "to a condition of qualified slavery. '' The law does not contempl&te the
subjection of the child to any person not standing in loco parentis. The consequences to the child of denying the father's
power to relinquish his right to the child's future earnings,
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would often prove extremely pernicious. If a son anticipates

that his wages will be applied, against his father's will, to pay

his father's debts, it is hardly probable that he will labor with

much vigor, or earn anything above his support. The creditors

will generally gain nothing, but the son may be ruined by the

absence, at the most important time of his life, of some of the

strongest incentives to the formation of industrious habits. We

are not now considering the validity of a gift by the father of

a claim for wages already due for his own past services, or of

a gift by the father of his claim for wages already earned by

labor which his minor child has performed without any previ-

ous understanding that the avails should go to the child's own

use. Nor is this a case where the arrangement between the

father and the child was merely colorable, designed by the"par-

ties to cover the earnings of the daughter for the father's use

and benefit, and in fraud of his creditors. See Gragg v. Martin,

12 Allen, 498. In the present case, the father, in good faith,

consented that his minor daughter should receive to her own

use, her future earnings in a certain employment. His cred-

itors cannot interpose to take from the daughter wages earned

by her in that employment subsequently to the father's relin-

quishment of his right. See Wolcott v. Rickey, 22 Iowa, 171;
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McCloskey v. Cyphert, 27 Penn. 220; Lyon v. Boiling, 14 Ala.

753; Bobo v. Bryson, 21 Ark. 387; Lord v. Poor, 10 Shepley,

569; Bray v. Wheeler, 29 Vt. 514; Manchester v. Smith, 12

Pick. 113; Whiting v. Earle, 3 Pick. 201; Jenney v. Alden, 12

Mass. 375.

It seems to have been asserted, that a bam fide relinquish-

ment by a husband to his wife, of his marital right to the wife's

future earnings, is invalid as against the husband's creditors.

See 2 Story's Equity Jur. § 1387. If the reason of such a doc-

trine is found in the common law disability of a husband to

contract with his wife, it can have no application to the present

case. If the doctrine can be sustained at all, it must be as an

exception, growing out of the peculiar status of the parties;

and not as a rule based upon general principles, applicable

alike to husband and wife, and parent and child.

The right of the daughter to hold the twenty dollars against

her father's creditors, does not depend on the question whether

she had [been] fully emancipated, or had ceased to receive any

support from her father. If she performed the labor, by which

that sum was earned, upon an understanding with her father

would often prove extremely pernicious. If a son anticipates
that his wages will be applied, against his father's will, to pay
his father's debts, it is hardly probable that he will labor with
much vigor, or earn anything above his support. The creditors
will generally gain nothing, but the son may be ruined by the
absence, at the most important time of his life, of some of the
strongest incentives to the formation of industrious habits. We
are not now considering the validity of a gift by the father of
a claim for wages already due for his own past services, or of'
a gift by the father of his claim for wages already earned by
labor which his minor child has performed without any previ0118 understanding that the avails should go to the child's own
use. Nor is this a case where the arrangement between the
father and the child was merely colorable, designed by the' parties to cover the earnings of the daughter for the father's use
and benefit, and in fraud of his creditors. See Gragg v. Martin,
12 Allen, 498. In the present case, the father, in good faith,
consented that his minor daughter should r~ceive to her own
use, her future earnings in a certain employment. His creditors cannot interpose to take from the daughter wages earned
by her in that employment subsequently to the father's relin·
quishment of his right. See Wolcott v. Rickey, 22 Iowa, 171;
McCloskey v. Cyphert, 27 Penn. 220; Lyon v. Bolling, 14 Ala.
753; Bobo v. Bryson, 21 Ark. 387; Lord v. Poor, 10 Shepley,
569; Bray v. Wheeler, 29 Vt. 514; Manchester v. Smith, 12
Pick. 113; Whiting v. Earle, 3 Pick. 201; Jenney v. Alden, 12
Mass. 375.
It seems to have been asserted, that a btma fide relinquishment by a husband to his wife, of his marital right to the wife's
future earnings, is invalid as against 'the husband's creditors.
See 2 Story's Equity Jur. § 1387. If the reason of such a doctrine is foµnd in the common law disability of a husband to
contract with his wife, it can have no application to the present
ease. If the doctrine can be sustained at all, it must be as an
exception, growing out of the peculiar status of the parties;
and not as a rule based upon general principles, applicable
alike to husband and wife, and parent and child.
The right of the daughter to hold the twenty dollars against
her father's creditors, docs not depend on the ciuestion whether
!!he had rhcen l fully emancipated, Or hRd ceased to receive any
impport from her father. If she pprformrd tlw labor, hy which
that sum was earned, upon an understanding with her father
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standing cannot be treated as a nullity merely, because it did

not extend to all other labor which the daughter might perform

during minority. A partial relinquishment of the parental

right avails pro tanto: see Tillotson v. McCrillis, 11 Vt. 477,

p. 480. Notwithstanding the decision in Godfrey v. Hays, 6

Ala. 501, we think that the fact that the daughter remained a

member of her father's family is material only as evidence to

be weighed in determining whether the alleged relinquishment

by the father was an act done in good faith, or merely colorable.

In many instances where minors are allowed to control their

own earnings, it may reasonably be expected, that they will

support themselves out of those earnings, and thus diminish

the claims on their parents. The probability of such a result

has had some weight in inducing courts to deny the right of

creditors to take the fruits of the minor's labor. But we do not

understand that the use which the minor makes of his earnings

is the test of his right to those earnings; nor that the contin-

uing liability of the father to support the minor is fatal to the

minor's cjaim to control his own earnings. If it were otherwise,

no emancipation by the father could ever be of any validity

against his creditors; for it is clear that a father cannot, by

his own act, "cast his son upon the public, and relieve himself
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from the obligation of maintenance" imposed upon him by the

pauper laws (see Gen. Stat. c. 74, § 8). The usual clause in

"freedom notices," in which the father declares that he will

pay none of the son's debts, can hardly have the full effect

which many fathers may imagine; see Bell, C. J., in Hall v.

Hall, 44 N. H. 293, pp. 295, 296; 1 Parsons on Contracts, 5th

ed., 310, 311. The continued receipt by the minor of support

from his father is competent evidence upon the question,

whether the father's alleged relinquishment of his right to any

portion of the minor's future earnings was a reality or a mere

sham; and it is not difficult to imagine cases where such evi-

dence would carry decisive conviction of the colorable nature

of the alleged relinquishment. But proof of this fact does not

give rise to a conclusive legal presumption of fraud. In the

present case, it seems not improbable that the daughter's serv-

ices as her father's housekeeper fully compensated him for her

support. *

We find that his consent to her receipt of the money earned

by sewing was given in good faith, and was not designed to

that she should receive the avails of that labor, that understanding cannot be treated as a nullity merely, because it did
not extend to all other labor which the daughter might perform
during minority. A partial relinquishment of the parental
right avails p1·0 tanto: see Tillotson v. l\IcCrillis, 11 Vt. 477,
p. 480. Notwithstanding the decision in Godfrey v. Hays, 6
Ala. 501, we think that the fact that the daughter remained a
member of her father's family is material only as evidence to
be weighed in determining whether the alleged relinquishment
by the father was an act done in good faith, or merely colorable.
In many instances where minors are allowed to control their
O\Vn earnings, it may reasonably be expected, that they will
support themselves out of those earnings, and thus diminish
the claims on their parents. The probability of such a result
has had some weight in inducing courts to deny the right of
creditors to take the fruits of the minor's labor. But we do not
understand that the use which the minor makes of his earnings
is the test of his right to those earnings; nor that the continuing liability of the father to support the minor is fatal to the
minOI' 's claim to control his own earnings. If it were otherwise,
no emancipation by the father could ever be of any validity
against his creditors; for it is clear that a father cannot, by
his own act, "cast his son upon the public, and relieve himself
from the obligation of maintenance" imposed upon him by the ·
pauper laws (see Gen. Stat. c. 74, § 8). The usual clause in
"freedom notices," in which the father declares that he will
pay none of the son's debts, can hardly have the full effect
which many fathers may imagine; see Bell, C. J., in Hall v.
Hall, 44 N. H. 293, pp. 295, 296; 1 Parsons on Contracts, 5th
ed., 310, 311. The continued receipt by the minor of support
from bis father is competent evidence upon the question,
whether the father's alleg<'d relinquishment of his right to any
portion of the minor's future earnings was a reality or a mere
sham; and it is not difficult to imagine cases where such evidence would carry decisive conviction of the colorable nature
of the alleged relinquishment. But proof of this fact does not
give rise to a conclusive legal presumption of fraud. In the
present case, it seems not improbable that the daughter's serv-'
ices as her father's housekeeper fully compensated him for her
11
support.
We find that his consent to her receipt of the money earned
by sewing was given in good faith, and was not designed to
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cover up the daughter's earnings for the father's benefit in

fraud of his creditors. It follows that the plaintiffs, though

assumed to be existing creditors of the father, had no claim on

the twenty dollars; and of course have no claim upon the prop-

erty purchased therewith.

If we had held that the twenty dollars should be regarded as

the father's money, it might have been necessary to inquire

whether that sum was paid down at the time of purchase, or

whether the machine was purchased wholly upon the daugh-

ter's credit and the sum of twenty dollars was afterwards ap-

plied by the daughter in part payment of her debt; see Adams

on Equity, 143, 144; 1 Leading Cases in Equity, 3 Am. ed. 275;

Francestown v. Deering, 41 N. H. 438; 2 Story on Equity

Jurisp., §§ 1258-9; Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule & Selwyn, 562;

2 Kent's Com. 623.

Caswell v. Hill, 47 N. H. 407, is not directly in point. There

the court found, as a matter of fact, that the transaction rela-

tive to the musical instrument was, really, "nothing more nor

less than a gift of this instrument" by a step-father to his step-

daughter; and the gift was of course held invalid as against

his existing creditors.

Trustee discharged.9
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CENTRAL NAT. BANK v. HUME

128 U. S. 195, 32 L. ed. 370, 9 Sup. Ct. 41

(United States Supreme Court. November 12, 1888)

On the 23d of April, 1872, in consideration of an annual pre-

mium of $230.89, the Life Insurance Company of Virginia issued

at Petersburgh, in that commonwealth, a policy of insurance on

the life of Thomas L. Hume, of Washington, D. C, for the term

of his natural life, in the sum of $10,000, for the sole use and

benefit of his wife, Annie Graham Hume, and his children, pay-

cover up the daughter's ear11ings for the father's benefit in
fraud of his creditors. It follows that the plaintiffs, though
assumed to be existing creditors of the father, had no claim on
the twenty dollars; and of course have no claim upon the property purchased therewith.
If we had held that the twenty dollars should be regarded as
the father's money, it might have been necessary to inquire
whether that sum was paid down at the time of purchase, or
whether the machine was purchased wholly upon the daughter's credit and the sum of twenty dollars was afterwards applied by the daughter in part payment of her debt; see Adams
on Equity, 143, 144; 1 Leading Cases in Equity, 3 Am. ed. 275;
Francestown v. Deering, 41 N. H. 438; 2 Story on Equity
Jurisp., §§ 1258-9; Taylor v. Plumer, 3 Maule & Selwyn, 562;
2 Kent's Com. 623.
Caswell v. Hill, 47 N. H. 407, is not directly in point. There
the court found, as a matter of fact, that the transaction relative to the musical instrument was, really, "nothing more nor
less than a gift of this instrument" by a step-father to his stepdaughter; and the gift was of course held invalid as ag~inst
his existing creditors.
'
Trustee discharged.9

ment to be made to them, their heirs, executors, or assigns, at

Petersburgh, Va. The charter of the company provided as fol-

CENTRAL NAT. BANK v. HUME

lows: "Any policy of insurance issued by the Life Insurance

Company of Virginia on the life of any person, expressed to be

128 U. S. 195, 32 L. ed. 370, 9 Sup. Ct. 41

for the benefit of any married woman, whether the same be

9—Cf. Tucky v. Lovell, 8 Idaho,

731, 71 Pac. 122; Delaney v. Green,

4 Harr. (Del.) 285.

(United States Supreme Court. November 12, 1888)
On the 23d of April, 1872, in consideration of an annual premium of $230.89, the Life Insurance Company of Virginia issued
at Petersburgh, in that commonwealth, a policy of insurance on
the life of Thomas L. Hume, of Washington, D. C., for the term
of his natural life, in the sum of $10,000, for the sole use and
benefit of his wife, Annie Graham Hume, and his children, payment to be made to them, their heirs, executors, or assigns, at
Petersburgh, Va. The charter of the company provided as follows: ''Any policy of insurance issued by the Life Insurance
Company of Virginia on the life of any person, expressed to be
for the benefit of any married woman, whether the same be
9--Cf. Tucky v. Lol"ell, 8 Idaho,
731, 71 Pac. 122; Delaney v. Green,
4 Harr. (Del.) 285.
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effected originally by herself or her husband, or by any other

person, or whether the premiums thereafter be paid by herself

,or her husband or any other person as aforesaid, shall inure for

her sole and separate use and benefit, and that of her or her hus-

band's" children, if any, as may be expressed in said policy, and

shall be held by her free from the control or claim of her hus-

band or his creditors, or of the person effecting the same and

his creditors." (§7.) The application for this policy was made

on behalf of the wife and children by Thomas L. Hume, who

signed the same for them. The premium of $230.89 was reduced

by annual dividends of $34.71 to $196.18, which sum was reg-

ularly paid on the 23d of April, 1872, and each year thereafter,

up to and including the 23d of April, 1881. On the 28th of

March, 1880, the Hartford Life & Annuity Company of Hart-

ford, Conn., issued five certificates of insurance upon the life of

Thomas L. Hume, of $1,000 each, payable at Hartford, to his

wife, Annie G. Hume, if living, but otherwise to his legal repre-

sentatives. Upon each of these certificates a premium of $10

was paid upon their issuance, amounting in all to $50; and there-

after certain other sums, amounting at the time of the death of

Hume to $41.25. On the 17th of February, 1881, the Maryland

Life Insurance Company of Baltimore issued, at Baltimore, a

policy of insurance upon the life of Thomas L. Hume, in the
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sum of $10,000, for the term of his natural life, payable in the

city of Baltimore to "the said insured, Annie G. Hume, for her

sole use, her executors, administrators, or assigns;" the said

policy being issued, as it recites on its face, in consideration of

the sum of $337.20 to them duly paid by said Annie G. Hume,

and of an annual premium of the same amount to be paid each

year during the continuance of the policy. The application for

this policy was signed '' Annie G. Hume, by Thomas L. Hume,

as is a recognized usage in such applications, and in accordance

with instructions to that effect printed upon the policy.

The charter of the Maryland Life Insurance Company pro-

vides as follows: "§ 17. That it shall be lawful for any married

woman, by herself, or in her name or in the name of any third

person, with his consent, as her trustee, to cause to be insured

in said company, for her sole use, the life of her husband,

for any definite period, or for the term of his natural life; and,

in case of her surviving her husband, the sum or net amount of

the insurance becoming due and payable by the terms of the

insurance shall be payable to her to and for her own use, free

effected originally by herself or her husband, or by any other
person, or whether the premiums thereafter be paid by herself
,or her husband or any other person as aforesaid, shall inure for
her sole and separate use and benefit, and that of her or her husband·~ children, if any, as may be expressed in said policy, and
shall be held by her free from the control or claim of her husband or his creditors, or of the person effecting the same and
his creditors." ( § 7.) The application for this policy was made
on behalf of the wife and children by Thomas L. Hume, who
signed the same for them. The premium of $230.89 was reduced
by annual dividends of $34.71 to $196.18, which sum was regularly paid on the 23d of April, 1872, and each year thereafter,
up to and including the 23d of April, 1881. On the 28th of
March, 1880, the Hartford Life & Annuity Company of Hartford, Conn., issued five certificates of insurance upon the life of
Tho~as L. Hume, of $1,000 each, payable at Hartford, to his
wife, Annie G. Hume, if living, but otherwise to his legal representatives. Upon each of these certificates a premium of $10
was paid upon their issuance, amounting in all to $50; and thl•reafter certain other sums, amounting at the time of the death of
Hume to $41.25. On the 17th of February, 1881, the Maryland
Life Insurance Company of Baltimore issued, at Baltimore, a
policy of insurance upon the life of Thomas L. Hume, in the
sum of $10,000, for the term of his natural life, payable in the
city of Baltimore to "the said insured, Annie G. Hume, for her
sole use, her executors, administrators, or assigns;'' the said
policy being issued, as it recites on its face, in consideration of
the sum of $337.20 to them duly paid by said Annie G. Hume,
and of an annual premium of the same amount to be paid each
year during the continuance of the policy. The application for
this policy was signed "Annie G. Hume, by Thomas L. Hume,"
as is a recognized usage in such applications, and in accordance
with instructions to that effect printed upon the policy.
The charter of the 1\1aryland Life Insurance Company provides as follows: '' § 17. That it shall be lawful for any married
woman, by herself, or in her name or in the name of any third
person, with hl.s consent, as her trustee, to cause to be insured
in said company, for her sole use, the life of her huiba.nd,
for any definite period, or for the term of his natural life; and,
in case of her surviving her husband, the sum or net amount of
the insurance becoming due and payable by the terms of the
insurance shall be payable to her to and for her own use, free
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from the claims of the representatives of her husband; or of

any of his creditors. In case of the death of the wife before the"

decease of the husband, the amount of the insurance may be

made payable, after the death of the husband, to her children,

or, if under age, to their guardian, for their use. In the event

of there being no children, she may have power to devise, and,

if dying intestate, then to go [to] the next of kin." The direc-

tions printed on the margin of the policy called especial atten-

tion to the provisions of the charter upon this subject, an extract

from which was printed on the fourth page of the application.'

The amount of premium paid on this policy was $242.26, a loan

having been deducted from the full premium of $337.20.

On the 13th of June, 1881, the Connecticut Mutual Life In-

surance Company of Hartford, in consideration of an annual

premium of $350.30, to be paid before the day of its date, issued

a policy of insurance upon the life of Thomas L. Hume, in the

sura of $10,000, for the term of his natural life, payable at Hart-

ford to Annie G. Hume and her children by him, or their legal

representatives. The application for this policy was signed

"Annie G. Hume, by Thomas L. Hume." It was expressly pro-

vided, as part of the contract, that the policy was issued and

delivered at Hartford, in the state of Connecticut, and was "to
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be in all respects construed and determined in accordance with

the laws of that state." The "statute of Connecticut, respect-

ing policies of insurance issued for the benefit of married

women," was printed upon the policy under that heading, and

is as follows: "Any policy of life insurance expressed to be

for the benefit of a married woman, or assigned to her or in

trust for her, shall inure to her separate use, or, in case of her

decease before payment, to the use of her children or of her hus-

band's children, as may be provided in such policy: provided,

that if the annual premium on such policy shall exceed three

hundred dollars, the amount of such excess, with interest, shall

inure to the benefit of the creditors of the person paying the

premiums; but if she shall die before the person insured, leav-

ing no children of herself or husband, the policy shall become

the property of the person who has paid the premiums, unless

otherwise provided in such policy;" and this extract from the

statute was printed upon the policy, and attention directed

thereto. From the $350.30 premium the sum of $105 was de-

ducted, to be charged against the policy in accordance with its

terms, with interest, and $245.30 was therefore the sum paid.

from the clnims of the representatives of her husband; or of
any of his creditors. In case of the death of the wife before the·
<lN~ease of the husband, the amount of the insurance may be
made payable, after the death of the husband, to her children,
or, if under age, to their guardian, for their use. In the event
of there being no children, she may have power to devise, and,
if dying intestate, then to go [to] the next of kiJ!. '' The directions printed on the margin of the policy called especial attention to the provisions of the charter upon this subject, an Pxtract
from which was printed on the fourth page of the application.
'rhe amount of premium paid on this policy was $242.26, a loan
having been deducted from the full premium of $337.20.
On the 13th of June, 1881, the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company of Hartford, in consideration of an annual
premium of $350.30, to be paid before the day of its date, issued
a policy of insurance upon the life of Thomas L. Hume, in the
lllm of $10,000, for the term of his natural life, payable at Hartford to Annie G. Hume and her children by him, or their legal
representatives. The application for this policy was signed
"Annie G. Hume, by Thomas L. Hume." It was expressly provided, as part of the contract, that the policy was issued and
delivered at Hartford, in the state of Connecticut, and was "to
be in all respects construed and determined in accordance with
the laws of that state.'' The ''statute of Connecticut, respecting policies of insurance issued for the benefit of married
women," was printed upon the policy under that heading, and
is as follows: "Any policy of life insurance expressed to be
for the benefit of a married woman, or assigned to her or in
tMJst for her, shall inure to her separate use, or, in case of her
decease before payment, to the use of her children or of her husband's children, as may be provided in such policy: provided,
that if the annual premium on such policy shall exceed three
hundred dollars, the amount of such excess, with interPst, shall
inure to t.he benefit of the creditors of the person paying the
premiums; but if she shall die before the person insured, leaving no children of herself or husband, the policy shall become
the property of the person who has paid the premiums, unless
otherwise provided in such policy;'' and this extract from the
statute was printed upon the policy, and attention directed
thereto. From the $350.30 premium the sum of $105 was deducted, to be charged against the policy in accordance with its
h rms, with interest, and $245.30 was therefore the sum paid.
1

'
140 PREREQUISITES TO ADJUDICATION

The American Life Insurance & Trust Company of Philadelphia

140

PREREQUISITES TO ADJUDICATION

had also issued a policy in the sum of $5,000 on the life of Hume,

payable to himself or his personal representatives, and this was

collected by his administrators.

Thomas L. Hume died at Washington on the 23d of October,

1881, insolvent, his widow, Annie G. Hume, and six minor chil-

dren, surviving him. November 2d, 1881, the Central National

Bank of Washington, as the holder of certain promissory notes

of Thomas L. Hume, amounting to several thousand dollars, filed

a bill in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against

Mrs. Hume and the Maryland Life Insurance Company, the case

being numbered 7,906, alleging that the policy issued by the

latter was procured while Hume was insolvent; that Hume paid

the premium of $242.26 without complainant's knowledge or

consent, and for the purpose of hindering, delaying, and de-

frauding the complainant and his other creditors; and praying

for a restraining order on the insurance company from paying

to, and Mrs. Hume from receiving, either for herself or children,

the amount due pending the suit, and "that the amount of the

said insurance policy may be decreed to be assets of said Thomas

L. Hume applicable to the payment of debts owing by him at

his death," etc. The temporary injunction was granted. On

the 12th of November the insurance company filed its answer to
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the effect that Mrs. Hume obtained the insurance in her own

name, and was entitled under the policy to the amount thereof,

and setting up and relying upon the seventeenth section of its

charter, quoted above. Mrs. Hume answered, November 16th,

declaring that she applied for and procured the policy in ques-

tion, and that it was not procured with fraudulent intent; that

the estate of her father, A. H. Pickrell, who died in 1879, was

the largest creditor of Hume's estate; that she is her father's

residuary legatee; that the amount of the policy was intended,

not only to provide for her, but also to secure her against loss;

that her mother had furnished Hume with about a thousand

dollars annually, to be used for her best interest, and that of his

wife and children; and that the premium paid on the policy in

question, and those paid on other policies, was and were paid

out of money belonging to her father's estate, or out of the

money of her mother, applied as directed and requested by the

latter. * • *

The evidence tends to show that Hume's financial condition,

as early as 1874, was such that, if called upon to respond on the

The American Life Insurance & Trust Company of Philadelphia
had also issued a policy in the sum of $5,000 on the life of Hume,
payable to himself or his personal representatives, and this was
collected by his administrators.
Thomas L. Hume died at Washington on the 23d of October,
1881, insolvent, his widow, Annie G. Hume, and six minor children, surviving him. November 2d, 1881, the Central National
Bank of Washington, as the holder of certain promissory notes
of Thomas L. Hume, amounting to several thousand dolla}'S, filed
a bill in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against
Mrs. Hume and the Maryland Life Insurance Company, the case
being numbered 7,906, alleging that the policy issued by the
latter was procured while Hume was insolvent; that Hume paid
the premium of $242.26 without complainant's knowledge or
consent, and for the purpose of hindering, delaying, and defrauding the complainant and his other creditors; and praying
for a restraining order on the insurance company from paying
to, and Mrs. Hume from receiving, either for herself or cQildren,
the amount due pending the suit, and "that the amounl of the
said insurance policy may be decreed to be assets of said Thomas
L. Hume applicable to the payment of debt.a owing by him at
his death,'' etc. The temporary injunction was granted. On
the 12th of November the insurance company filed its answer to
the effect that l\frs. Hume obtained the insurance in her own
name, and was entitled under the policy to the amount thereof,
and setting up and relying upon the seventeenth section of its
charter, quoted above. Mrs. Hume answered, November 16th,
declaring that she applied for and procured the policy in question, and that it was not procured with fraudulent intent; that
the estate of her father, A. H. Pickrell, who died in 1879, was
the largest creditor of Hume's estate; that she is her father's
residuary legatee; that the amount of the policy was intended,
not only to provide for her, but also to secure her against loss;
that her mother had furnished Hume with about a thousand
dollars annually, to be used for her best interest, and that of bis
wife and children; and that the premium paid on the policy in
question, and those paid on other policies, was and were paid
out of money belonging to her father's estate, or out of the
money of her mother, applied as directed and requested by the
latter. • • •
The evidence tends to show that Hume's financial condition,
as early as 1874, was such that, if called upon to respond on the
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instant, he could not have met his liabilities, and that this con-

dition grew gradually worse, until it culminated in irretrievable

ruin, in the fall of 1881; but it also indicates that for several

years, and up to October 21st, 1881, two days before his death,

he was a partner in a going concern apparently of capital and

credit; that he had a considerable amount of real estate, though

most of it was heavily incumbered; that he was an active busi-

ness man, not personally extravagant; and that he was, for two

years prior to October, in receipt of moneys from his wife's

mother, who had an income from her separate property. He

seems to have received from Mrs. Pickrell, or the estate of Pick-

rell, his wife's father, of which Mrs. Hume was the residuary

legatee, over $6,000 in 1879, over $3,000 in 1880, and over $1,700

in 1881, Mrs. Pickrell's fixed income was $1,000 a year from

rents of her own property, which, after the death of her hus-

band in May, 1879, was regularly paid over to Mr. Hume. She

testifies that she told Hume that "he could use all that I [she]

had for his own and his family's benefit, and that he could use

it for anything he thought best;" that she had out of it herself

from $200 to $250" a year from the death of Pickrell, in May,

1879, to that of Hume, in October, 1881; and that before his

death Mr. Hume informed his wife and herself that he had in-
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sured his life for Mrs. Hume's benefit, but did not state where

the premium money came from. Blackford, agent for the Mary-

land company, testified, under objection, that Hume told him

in February, 1881, that certain means had been placed in his

hands, to be invested for his wife and children, and he had con-

cluded to take $10,000 in Blackford's agency, and should, some

months later, take $10,000 in the Connecticut Mutual. He ac-

cordingly took the $10,000 in the Maryland, and subsequently,

during the summer, informed Blackford that he had obtained

the insurance in the Connecticut Mutual. Evidence was also

adduced that Mr. Hume was largely indebted to Pickrell's estate,

hy reason of indorsements of his paper by Pickrell, and the

use by him in raising money of securities belonging to the latter,

and that said estate is involved in litigation, and its ultimate

value problematical. The causes were ordered to be heard in

the first instance at a general term of the Supreme Court of the

District of Columbia; which court, after argument, on the 5th

day of January, 1885. decreed that the administrators should

recover all sums paid by Thomas L. Hume as premiums on all

-,rM policies, including those on the Virginia policy from 1874;

instant, he could not have met his liabilities, and that this condition grew gradually worse, until it culminated in irretrievable
ruin, in the fall of 1881; hut it also indicates that for several
years, and up to October 21st, 1881, two days before his death,
he was a partner in a going concern apparently of capital and
credit; that he had a considerable amount of real estate, though
most of it was heavily incumbered; that he was an active business man, not personally extravagant; and that he was, for two
years prior to October, in receipt of moneys from his wife's
mother, who had an income from her separate property. He
seems to have received from Mrs. Pickrell, or the estate of Pickrell, bis wife's father, of which Mrs. Hume was the residuary
legatee, over $6,000 in 1879, over $3,000 in 1880, a11d over $1,700
in 1881, Mrs. Pickrell 's fixed income was $1,000 a year from
rents of her own property, which, after the death of her husband in ~lay, 1879, was regularly paid over to Mr. Hume. She
testifies that she told Hume that "he could use all that I [she)
had for his own and his family's benefit, and that he could use
it for anything he thought best;" that she had out of it herself
from $200 to $250' a year from the death of Pickrell, in May,
1879, to that of Hume, in October, 1881; and that before his
death Mr. Hume informed his wife and herself that he had insured his life for Mrs. Hume's benefit, but did not state where
the premium money came from. Blackford, agent for the l\laryland company, testified, under objection, that Hume told him
in February, 1881, that certain means had been placed in his
hands, to be invested for his wife and children, and he had concluded to take $10,000 in Blackford 's agency, and should, some
months later, take $10,000 in the Connecticut Mutual. He accordingly took the $10,000 in the Maryland, and subsequently,
during the summer, informed Blackford that he had obtaine1l
th_e insurance in the Connecticut Mutual. Evidence was also
adduced that Mr. Hume was largely indebted to Pickrell 's est.Rte,
by reason of indorsements of his paper by Pickrell, and the
use by him in raising money of securities belonging to the latter,
and that said estate is involved in litigation, and its ultimate
value problematical. The causes were ordered to be heard in
the first instance at a general term of the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia; which court, after argument, on the' 5th
day of .January, 1885, decreed that the administrators should
re<'o,·er all sums paid by Thomas L. Hume as premiums on all
:;r.iii policies, including those on the Virginia policy from 1874;
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and that, after deducting said premiums, the residue of the

money paid into court (being that received from the Mary-

land and the Connecticut Mutual) be paid to Mrs. Hume in-

dividually, or as guardian for herself and children; and that

the Hartford Life & Annuity Company pay over to her the

amount due on the certificates issued by it. From this decree

the said Central National Bank, Benjamin U. Keyser, the

Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank of Georgetown, George

W. Cochran, and the administrators, as well as Mrs. Hume,

appealed to this court, and the cause came on to be heard here

upon these cross-appeals.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the case, delivered

the opinion of the court.

No appeal was prosecuted from the decree of January 4,

1883, directing the amount due upon the policy issued by the

Life Insurance Company of Virginia to be paid over to Mrs.

and that, after deducting said premiums, the residue of the
money paid into court (being that received from the Maryland and the Connecticut Mutual) be paid to Mrs. Hume individually, or as guardian for herself and children; and that
the Hartford Life & Annuity Company pay over to her the
amount due on the certificates issued by it. From this decree
the said Central National Bank, Benjamin U. Keyser, the
Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank of Georgetown, George
W. Cochran, and the administrators, as well as Mrs. Hume,
appealed to this court, and the cause came on to be heard here
upon these cross-appeals.

Hume for her own benefit and as guardian of her children,

nor is any error now assigned to the action of the court in that

regard. Indeed, it is conceded by counsel for the complainants

that this contract was perfectly valid as against the world, but

it is insisted that, assuming the proof to establish the insolvency

of Hume in 1874 and thenceforward, the premiums paid in that

and the subsequent years on this policy belonged in equity to
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the creditors, and that they were entitled to a decree therefor,

as well as for the amount of the Maryland and Connecticut

policies, and the premiums paid thereon. It is not denied that

the contract of the Maryland Insurance Company was directly

between that company and Mrs. Hume, and this is, in our judg-

ment, true of that of the Connecticut Mutual, while the Hart-

ford company's certificates were payable to her. if living.

Mr. Hume having been insolvent at the time the insurance was

effected, and having paid the premiums himself, it is argued

that these policies were within the provisions of 13 Eliz. c. 5,

and inure to the benefit of his creditors as equivalent to trans-

fers of property with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud. The

object of the statute of Elizabeth was to prevent debtors from

dealing with their property in any way to the prejudice of their

creditors; but dealing with that which creditors, irrespective of

such dealing, could not have touched, is within neither the

letter nor the spirit of the statute. In the view of the law,

credit is extended in reliance upon the evidence of the ability

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after st.ating the case, delivered
the opinion of the court.
No appeal was prosecuted from the decree of January 4,
18S3, directing the amount due upon the policy issued by the
Life Insurance Company of Virginia to be paid over to Mrs.
Hume for her own benefit and as guardian of her children,
nor is any error now assigned to the action of the court in that
regard. Indeed, it is conceded by counsel for the complainant.s
that this contract was perfectly valid as against the world, but
it is insisted that, assuming the proof to establish the insolvency
of Hume in 1874 and thenceforward, the premiums paid in that
and the subsequent years on this policy belonged in equity to
the creditors, and that they were entitled to a decree therefor,
as well as for the amount of the Maryland and Connecticut
policies, and the premiums paid thereon. It is not denied that
the contract of the Maryland Insurance Company was directly
between that company and Mrs. Hume, and this is, in our judgment, true of that of the Connecticut Mutual, while the Hartford company's certificates were payable to her. if living.
Mr. Hume having been insolvent at the time the insurance was
et!ected, and having paid the premiums himself, it is argued
that these policies were within the provisions of 13 Eliz. c. 5,
and inure to the benefit of his creditors as equivalent to transfers of property with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud. The
object of the statute of Elizabeth was to prevent debtors from
dealing with their property in any way to the prejudice of their
creditors; but dealing with that which creditors, irrespective of
such dealing, could not have touched, is within neither the
letter nor the spirit of the statute. In the view of the law,
credit is extended in reliance upon the evidence of the ability
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of the debtor to pay, ar.d in confidence that his possessions will

not be diminished to the prejudice of those who trust him.

This reliance is disappointed, and this confidence abused, if

he divests himself of his property by giving it away after he

has obtained credit. And where a person has taken out policies

of insurance upon his life for the benefit of his estate, it has

been frequently held that, as against creditors, his assignment,

when insolvent, of such policies, to or for the benefit of wife

and children, or either, constitutes a fraudulent transfer of

assets within the statute; and this, even though the debtor may

have had no deliberate intention of depriving his creditors of

a fund to which they were entitled, because his act has in

point of fact withdrawn such a fund from them, and dealt with

it by way of bounty. Freeman v. Pope, L. R. 9 Eq. 206, L. R.

5 Ch. 538. The rule stands upon precisely the same ground

as any other disposition of his property by the debtor. The

defect of the disposition is that it removes the property of the

debtor out of the reach of his creditors. Cornish v. Clark, L. R.

14 Eq. 184, 189. But the rule applies only to that which the

debtor could have made available for payment of his debts. For

instance, the exercise of a general power of appointment might be

fraudulent and void under the statute, but not the exercise

of a limited or exclusive power; because, in the latter case, the
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debtor never had any interest in the property himself which

could have been available to a creditor, or by which he could

have obtained credit. May, Fraud. Conv. 33. It is true that

creditors can obtain relief in respect to a fraudulent convey-

ance where the grantor cannot, but that relief only restores

the subjection of the debtor's property to the payment of his

indebtedness as it existed prior to the conveyance.

A person has an insurable interest in his own life for the

benefit of his estate. The contract affords no compensation to

him, but to his representatives. So the creditor has an insurable

interest in the debtor's life, and can protect himself accord-

ingly, if he so chooses. Marine and fire insurance is considered

as strictly an indemnity; but while this is not so as to life

insurance, which is simply a contract, so far as the company

is concerned, to pay a certain sum of money upon the occurrence

of an event which is sure at some time to happen, in considera-

tion of the payment of the premiums as stipulated, neverthe-

less the contract is also a contract of indemnity. If the creditor

insures the life of his debtor, he is thereby indemnified against

of the debtor to pay, m~d in confidence that his possessions will
uot be diminishl'd to the prejurlice of those who trust him.
This reliance is disappointed, and this confidence abused, if
he divests himself of his property by giving it away after he
has obtained credit. And where a person has taken out policies
of insurance upon his life for the benefit of his estate, it has
been frequently held that, as against creditors, his assignment,
when insolvent, of such policies, to or for the benefit of wife
and children, or either, constitutes a fraudulent transfer of
assets within the statute; and this, even though the debtor may
have had no deliberate intention of depriving his creditors of
a fund to which they were entitled, because his act has in
point of fact withdrawn such a fund from them, and dealt with
it by way of bounty. Freeman v. Pope, L. R. 9 Eq. 206, L. R.
5 Ch. 538. The rule stands upon precisely the same ground
as any other disposition of his property by the debtor. The
defect of the disposition is that it removes the property of the
debtor out of the reach of his creditors. Cornish v. Clark, L. R.
14 Eq. 184, 189. But the rule applies only to that which the
debtor could have made available for payment of his debts. For
instance, the exercise of a general power of appointment might be
fraudulent and void under the statute, but not the exercise
of a limited or exclusive power; because, in the latter case, the
debtor never had any interest in the property himself which
could have been available to a creditor, or by which he could
have obtained credit. May, Fraud. Conv. 33. It is true that
creditors can obtain relief in respect to a fraudulent conveyance where the grantor cannot, but that relief only restores
the subjection of the debtor's property to the payment of his
indebtedness as it existed prior to the conveyance.
A person has an insurable interest in his own life for the
benefit of his estate. The contract affords no compensation to
him, but to his representatives. So the creditor has an insurable
interest in the debtor's life, and can protect himself accordingly, if he so chooses. Marine and fire insurance is considered
88 strictly an indemnity; but while this is not so as to life
insurance, which is simply a contract, so far as the company
is concerned, to pay a certain sum of money upon the occurrence
of an event which is sure at some time to happen, in consideration of the payment of the premiums as stipulated, nevertheless the contract is also a contract of indemnity. If the creditor
insures the life of his debtor, he is thereby indemnified against
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the loss of his debt by the death of the debtor before payment,

yet if the creditor keeps up the premiums, and his debt is paid

before the debtor's death, he may still recover upon the con-

tract, which was valid when made, and which the insurance

company is bound to pay according to its terms; but if the

debtor obtains the insurance on the insurable interest of the

creditor, and pays the premiums himself, and the debt is ex-

tinguished before the insurance falls in, then the proceeds would

go to the estate of the debtor. Knox v. Turner, L. R. 9 Eq. 155.

The wife and children have an insurable interest in the life of

the husband and father, and if insurance thereon be taken out

by him, and he pays the premiums and survives them, it might

be reasonably claimed, in the absence of a statutory provision

to the contrary, that the policy would inure to his estate. In

Insurance Co. v. Palmer, 42 Conn. 60, the wife insured the

life of the husband, the amount insured to be payable to her

if she survived him; if not, to her children. The wife and one

son died prior to the husband, the son leaving a son surviving.

The court held that, under the provisions of the statute of that

State, the policy being made payable to the wife and children,

the children immediately took such a vested interest in the policy

that the grandson was entitled to his father's share, the wife

having died before the husband; but that, in the absence of
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the statute, "it would have been a fund in the hands of his

representatives for the benefit of creditors, provided the pre-

miums had been paid by him." So in the case of Anderson's

Estate, 85 Pa. St. 202, A. insured his life in favor of his wife,

who died intestate in his life-time, leaving an only child. A.

died intestate and insolvent, the child surviving, and the court

held that the proceeds of the policy belonged tb the wife's

estate, and, under the intestate laws, was to be distributed share

and share alike between her child and her husband's estate, not-

withstanding, under a prior statute, life insurance taken out for

the wife vested in her free from the claims of the husband's

creditors. But if the wife had survived she would have taken

the entire proceeds.

"We think it cannot be doubted that in the instance of con-

tracts of insurance with a wife or children, or both, upon their

insurable interest in the life of the husband or father, the

latter, while they are living, can exercise no power of disposi-

tion over the same without their consent, nor has he any in-

terest therein of which he can avail himself, nor upon his death

the loss of his debt by the death of the debtor before payment,
yet if the creditor keeps up the premiums, and his debt is pnid
before the debtor's death, he may still recover upon the contract, which was valid when made, and which the insurance
company is bound to pay according to its terms; but if the
<lehtor obtains the insurance on the insurable interest of the
creditor, and pays the premiums himself, and the debt is extinguished before the insurance falls in, then the proceeds would
go to the estate of the debtor. Knox v. Turner, L. R. 9 Eq. 155.
The wife and children have an insurable interest in the life of
the husband and father, and if insurance thereon be taken out
by him, and he pays the premiums and survives them, it might
be reasonably claimed, in the absence of a statutory provision
to the contrary, that the policy would inure to his estate. In
Insurance Co. v. Palmer, 42 Conn. 60, the wife insured the
life of the husband, the amount insured to be payable to her
if she survived him; if not, to her children. The wife and one
son died prior to the husband, the son leaving a son surviving.
The court held that, under the provisions of the statute of that
State, the policy being made payable to the wife and children,
the children immediately took such a vested interest in the policy
that the grandson was entitled to his father's share, the wife
having died before the husband; but that, in the absence of
the statute, ''it would have been a fund in the hands of his
representatives for the benefit of creditors, provided the premiums had been paid by him.'' So in the case of Anderson's
Estate, 85 Pa. St. 202, A. insured his life in favor of his wife,
who died intestate in his life-time, leaving an only child. A.
died intestate and insolvent, the child surviving, and the court
held that the proceeds of the policy belonged tb the wife's
estate, and, under the intestate laws, was to be distributed share
and share alike between her child and her husband's estate, notwithstanding, under a prior statute, life insurance taken out for
the wife vested in her free from the claims of the husband's
creditors. But if the wife had survived she would have taken
the entire proceeds.
We think it cannot be doubted that in the instance of contracts of insurance with a wife or children, or both, upon their
insurable interest in the life of the husband or father, the
latter, while they are living, can exercise no power of disposition over the same without their consent, nor has he any interest therein of which he ean avail himself, nor upon his death
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have his personal representatives or his creditors any interest

in the proceeds of such contracts, which belong to the bene-

ficiaries, to whom they are payable. It is indeed the general

rule that a policy, and the money to become due under it, belong,

the moment it is issued, to the person or persons named in it

as the beneficiary or beneficiaries; and that there is no power

in the person procuring the insurance, by any act of his, by deed

or by will, to transfer to any other person the interest of the

person named. Bliss, Ins. (2d ed.) 517; Glanz v. Gloeckler,

10 Ill. App. 484, per McAllister, J.; Id., 104 Ill. 573; Wilburn

v. "Wilburn, 83 Ind. 55; Ricker v. Insurance Co., 27 Minn. 193,

6 N. W. Rep. 771; Insurance Co. v. Brant, 47 Mo. 419; Gould

v. Emerson, 99 Mass. 154; Insurance Co. v. Weitz, Id. 15T.

This must ordinarily be so where the contract is directly

with the beneficiary; in respect to policies running to the person

insured, but payable to another having a direct pecuniary in-

terest in the life insured; and where the proceeds are made to

inure by positive statutory provisions. Mrs. Hume was con-

fessedly a contracting party to the Maryland policy; and, as

to the Connecticut contracts, the statute of the state where they

were made and to be performed explicitly provided that a policy

for the benefit of a married woman shall inure to her separate
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use or that of her children; but, if the annual premium exceed

$300, the amount of such excess shall inure to the benefit of

the creditors of the person paying the premiums. The rights

and benefits given by the laws of Connecticut in this regard

are as much part of these contracts as if incorporated therein,

not only because they are to be taken as if entered into there,

but because there was the place of performance, and the stipu-

lation of the parties was made with reference to the laws of that

place. And if this be so as between Hume and the Connecticut

companies, then he could not have at any time disposed of these

policies without the consent of the beneficiary; nor is there

anything to the contrary in the statutes or general public policy

of the District of Columbia. It may very well be that a transfer

by an insolvent of a Connecticut policy, payable to himself or

his personal representatives, would be held invalid in that dis-

trict, even though valid under the laws of Connecticut, if the

laws of the district were opposed to the latter, because the posi-

tive laws of the domicile and the forum must prevail; but there

is no such conflict of laws in this case, in respect to the power

H. A A. Bankruptcy—4 0

have his personal representatives or his creditors any iuterPst
in the proceeds of such couh·acts, which beloug to the lw11e-

ficiaries, to whom they are payable. It is indeed the gem•ral
rule that a policy, and the money to become due under it, belong,
the moment it is issued, to the person or persons named in it
as the beneficiary or beneficiaries; and that there is no pom·r
in the person procuring the insurance, by any act of his, by deed
or by will, to transfer to any other person the interest of the
person named. Bliss, Ins. (2d ed.) 517; Glanz v. Gloeckler,
10 Ill. App. 484, per McALLISTER, J.; Id., 104 Ill. 573; \Vilburn
v. Wilburn, 83 Ind. 55; Ricker v. Insurance Co., 27 l\Iinn. 193,
6 N. W. Rep. 771; Insurance Co. v. Brant, 47 l\fo. 419; Gould
v. Emerson, 99 Mass. 154; Insurance Co. v. Weitz, Id. 157'.
This must ordinarily be so where the contract is directly
with the beneficiary; in respect to policies running to the person
insured, but payable to another having a direct pecuniary interest in the life insured; and where the proceeds are made to
inure by positive statutory provisions. Mrs. Hume was confessedly a contracting party to the ·M aryland policy; and, as
to the Connecticut contracts, the statute of the state where they
were made and to be performed explicitly provided that a policy
for the benefit of a married woman shall inure to her separate
use or that of her children; but, if the annual premium exceed
$300, the amount of such excess shall inure to the benefit of
the creditors of the person paying the premiums. The rights
and benefits given by the laws of Connecticut in this regard
are as much part of these contracts as if incorporated therein,
not only because they are to be taken as if entered int-0 there,
but because there was the place of performance, and the stipulation of the parties was made with reference to the laws of that
place. And if this be so as between Hume and the Connecticut
companies, then he could not have at any time disposed of these
policies without the consent of the beneficiary; nor is there
anything to the contrary in the statutes or general public policy
of the District of Columbia. It may very well be that a transfer
hy an insolvent of a Connecticut policy, payable to himself or
his personal representatives, would be held invalid in that distrit•t, even though valid under the laws of Connecticut, if the
laws of !he district were opposed to the latter, because the positive laws of the domicile and the forum must prevail; hut there
1s no such conflict ol laws in this case, in respect to the power
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of disposition by a person procuring insurance payable to

another.

The obvious distinction between the transfer of a policy taken

out by a person upon his insurable interest in his own life, and

payable to himself or his legal representatives, and the obtain-

ing of a policy by a person upon the insurable interest of his

wife and children, and payable to them, has been repeatedly

recognized by the courts. Thus in Elliott's Appeal, 50 Pa. St.

75, 83, where the policies were issued in the name of the husband,

and payable to himself or his personal representatives, and

while he was insolvent were by him transferred to trustees for

his wife's benefit, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, while

holding such transfers void as against creditors, say: '' We are

to be understood in thus deciding this case that we do not

mean to extend it to policies effected without fraud, directly

and on their face for the benefit of the wife, and payable to

her; such policies are not fraudulent as to creditors, and are not

touched by this decision." In the use of the words "without

fraud," the court evidently means actual fraud participated

in by all parties, and not fraud inferred from the mere fact of

insolvency; and, at all events, in McCutcheon's Appeal, 99 Pa.

St. 133, 137, the court say, referring to Elliott's Appeal: "The

policies in that case were effected in the name of the husband,
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and by him transferred to a trustee for his wife at a time when

he was totally insolvent. They were held to be valuable choses

in action, the property of the assured, liable to the payment of

his debts, and hence their voluntary assignment operated in

fraud of creditors, and was void as against them under the

statute of 13 Eliz. Here, however, the policy was effected in the

name of the wife, and in point of fact was given under an

agreement for the surrender of a previous policy for the same

amount, also issued in the wife's name. • * * The question

of good faith or fraud only arises in the latter case; that is,

when the title of the beneficiary arises by assignment. When

it exists by force of an original issue in the name or for the

benefit of the beneficiary, the title is good, notwithstanding the

claims of creditors. * * • There is no anomaly in this, nor

any conflict with the letter or spirit of the statute of Elizabeth,

because in such cases the policy would be at no time the property

of the assured, and hence no question of fraud in its transfer

could arise as to his creditors. It is only in case of the assign-

ment of a policy that once belonged to the assured that the ques-

of disposition by a person procuring insurance payable to
another.
The obvious distinction between the transfer of a policy taken
out by a person upon his insurable interest in his own life, and
payable to himself or his legal representatives, and the obtaining of a policy by a person upon the insurable interest of his
wife and children, and payable to them, has been repeatedly
recognized by the courts. Thus in Elliott's Appeal, 50 Pa. St.
75, 83, where the policies were issued in the name of the husband,
and payable to himself or his personal representatives, and
while he was insolvent were by him transferred to trustees for
his wife's benefit, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, while
holding such transfers void as against creditors, say: ''We are
to be understood in thus deciding this case that we do not
mean to extend it to policies effected without fraud, directly
and on their face for the benefit of the wife, and payable to
her; such policies are not fraudulent as to creditors, and are not
touched by this decision.'' In the use of the words ''without
fraud," the court evidently means actual fraud participated
in by all parties, and not fraud inferred from the mere fact of
insolvency; and, at all events, in McCutcheon 's Appeal, 99 Pa.
St. 133, 137, the court say, referring to Elliott's Appeal: "The
policies in that case were effected in the name of the husband,
and by him transferred to a trustee for his wife at a time when
he was totally insolvent. They were held to be valuable choses
in action, the property of the assured, liable t-0 the payment of
his debts, and hence their voluntary assignment operated in
fraud of creditors, and was void as against them under the
statute of 13 Eliz. Here, however, the policy was effected in the
name of the wife, and in point of fact was given under an
agreement for the surrender of a previous policy for the same
amount, also issued in the wife's name. • • • The question
of good faith or fraud only arises in the latter case; that iq,
when the title of the beneficiary arises by assignment. Wheu
it exists by force of an original issue in the name or for the
benefit of the beneficiary, the title is good, notwithstanding the
claims of creditors. • • • There is no anomaly in this, nor
any conflict with the letter or spirit of the statute of Elizabeth,
because in such eases the policy would be at no time the property
of the assured, and hence no question of fraud in its transfer
could arise as to his creditors. It is only in case of the assignment of a poliey that once belonged to the assured that the ques-
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tion of fraud can arise under this act." And see Bank v. Insur-

ance Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 770; Pence v. Makepeace, 65 Ind. 345,

347; Succession of Hearing, 26 La. Ann. 326; Stigler's Ex'r

v. Stigler, 77 Va. 163; Thompson v. Cundiff, 11 Bush. 567.

Conceding, then, in the case in hand, that Hume paid the

premiums out of his own money, when insolvent, yet, as Mrs.

Hume and the children survived him, and the contracts covered

their insurable interest, it is difficult to see upon what ground

the creditors, or the administrators as representing them, can

take away from these dependent ones that which was expressly

secured to them in the event of the death of their natural sup-

porter. The interest insured was neither the debtor's nor his

creditors'. The contracts were not payable to the debtor, or

his representatives, or his creditors. No fraud on the part of

the wife, or the children, or the insurance company is pretended.

In no sense was there any gift or transfer of the debtor's prop-

erty, unless the amounts paid as premiums are to be held to

constitute such gift or transfer. This seems to have been the

view of the court below, for the decree awarded to the com-

plainants the premiums paid to the Virginia Company from

1874 to 1881, inclusive, and to the other companies from the

date of the respective policies; amounting, with interest, to

January 4,1883, to the sum of $2,696.10, which sum was directed
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to be paid to Hume's administrators out of the money which

had been paid into court by the Maryland and Connecticut

Mutual Companies. But, even though Hume paid this money

out of his own funds when insolvent, and if such payment were

within the statute of Elizabeth, this would not give the creditors

any interest in the proceeds of the policies, which belonged to

the beneficiaries for the reasons already stated.

Were the creditors, then, entitled to recover the premiums?

These premiums were paid by Hume to the insurance companies,

and to recover from them would require proof that the latter

participated in the alleged fraudulent intent, which is not

claimed. Cases might be imagined of the payment of large

premiums, out of all reasonable proportion to the known or

reputed financial condition of the person paying, and under

circumstances of grave suspicion, which might justify the infer-

ence of fraud on creditors in the withdrawal of such an amount

from the debtor's resources; but no element of that sort exists

here. The premiums form no part of the proceeds of the

policies, and cannot be deducted therefrom on that ground.

tion of fraud can arise under this act.'' And see Bank v. Insurance Co., 24 F'ed. Rep. 770; Pence v. Makepeace, 65 Ind. 345,
347; Succession of Hearing, 26 La. Ann. 326 ; Stigler 's Ex 'r
v. Stigler, 77 Va. 163; Thompson v. Cundiff, 11 Bush. 567.
Conceding, then, in the case in hand, that Hume paid the
premiums out of his own money, when insolvent, yet, as Mrs.
Hume and the children survived him, and the contracts covered
their insurable interest, it is difficult to see upon what ground
the creditors, or the administrators as representing them, can
take away from these dependent ones that which was expressly
secured to them in the event of the death of their natural supporter. The interest insured was neither the debtor's nor his
creditors'. The contracts were not payable to the debtor, or
his representatives, or his creditors. No fraud on the part of
the wife, or the children, or the insurance company is pretended.
In no sense was there any gift or transfer of the debtor's property, unless the amounts paid as premiums are to be held to
constitute such gift or transfer. This seems to have been the
view of the court below, for the decree awarded to the complainants the premiums paid to the Virginia Company from
1874 to 1881, inclusiYe, and to the other companies from the
date of the respective policies; amounting, with interest, to
January 4, 1883, to the sum of $2,696.10, which sum was directed
to be paid to Hume's administrators out of the money which
had been paid into court by the Maryland and Connecticut
Mutual Companies. But, even though Hume paid this money
out of his own funds when insolvent, and if such payment were
within the statute of Elizabeth, this would not give the creditors
any interest in the proceeds of the policies, which belonged to
the beneficiaries for the reasons already stated.
Were the creditors, then, entitled to recover the premiums'
These premiums were paid by Hume to the insurance companies,
and to recover from them would require proof that the latter
participated in the alleged fraudulent intent, which is not
claimed. Cases might be imagined of the payment of large
premiums, out of all reasonable proportion to the known or
reputed :financial condition of the person paying, and under
circumstances of grave suspicion, which might justify the inference of fraud on creditors in the withdrawal of such an amount
from the debtor's resources; but no element of that sort exists
here. The premiums form no part of the proceeds of the
policies, and cannot be deducted therefrom on that ground.
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Mrs. Hume is not shown to have known of or suspected her

husband's insolvency, and if the payments were made at her

instance, or with her knowledge and assent, or if, without her

knowledge, she afterwards ratified the act, and claimed the

benefit, as she might rightfully do, (Thompson v. Ins. Co.,

46 N. Y. 675,) and as she does, (and the same remarks apply

to the children,) then has she thereby received money which

ex aquo et bono she ought to return to her husband's creditors;

and can the decree against her be sustained on that ground?

If in some cases payments of premiums might be treated as

gifts inhibited by the statute of Elizabeth, can they be so treated

here?

It is assumed by complainants that the money paid was

derived from Hume himself, and it is therefore argued that to

that extent his means for payment of debts were impaired.

That the payments contributed in any appreciable way to

Hume's insolvency, is not contended. So far as premiums

were paid in 1880 and 1881, (the payments prior to those years

having been the annual sum of $196.18 on the Virginia policy,)

we are satisfied from the evidence that Hume received from

Mrs. Pickrell, his wife's mother, for the benefit of Mrs. Hume

and her family, an amount of money largely in excess of these

payments, after deducting what was returned to Mrs. Pickrell;
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and that, in paying the premiums upon procuring the policies in

the Maryland and the Connecticut Mutual, Hume was appro-

priating to that purpose a part of the money which he con-

sidered he thus held in trust; and we think that, as between

Hume's creditors and Mrs. Hume, the money placed in Hume's

hands for his wife's benefit is, under the evidence, equitably

as much to be accounted for to her by Hume, and so by them,

as is the money paid on her account to be accounted for by

her to him or them. We do not, however, dwell particularly

upon this, nor pause to discuss the bearing of the laws of the

states of the insurance companies upon this matter of the

payment of premiums by the debtor himself, so far as they

may differ from the rule which may prevail in the District of

Columbia, in the absence of specific statutory enactment upon

that subject, because we prefer to place our decision upon

broader grounds.

In all purely voluntary conveyances it is the fraudulent intent

of the donor which vitiates. If actually insolvent, he is held to

knowledge of his condition; and if the necessary consequence

Mrs. Hume is not shown to have known of or suspected her
husband's insolvency, and if the payments were made at her
instance, or with her knowledge and assent, or if, without her
knowledge, she afterwards ratified the act, and claimed the
benefit, as she might rightfully do, (Thompson• v. Ins. Co.,
46 N. Y. 675,) and as she does, (and the same remarks apply
to the children,) then has she thereby received money which
ex aquo et b<>no she ought to return to her husband's creditors;
and can the decree against her be sustained on that ground f
If in some cases payments of premiums might be treated as
gifts inhibited by .the statute of Elizabeth, can they be so treated
here!
It is assumed by complainants that the money paid was
derived from Hume himself, and it is therefore argued that to
that extent his means for payment of debts· were impaired.
That the payments contributed in any appreciable way to
Hume 'e insolvency, is not contended. So far as premiums
were paid in 1880 and 1881, (the payments prior to those years
having been the annual sum of $196.18 on the Virginia policy,)
we are satisfied from the evidence that Hume received from
l\Irs. Pickrell, his wife's mother, for the benefit of Mrs. Hume
and her family, an amount of money largely in excess of these
payments, after deducting what was returned to Mrs. Pickrell;
and that, in paying the premiums upon procuring the policies in
the Maryland and the Connecticut Mutual, Hume was appropriating to that purpose a part of the money which he considered he thus held in trust; and we think that, as between
Hume's creditors and Mrs. Hume, the money placed in Hume's
hands for his wife's benefit is, under the evidence, equitably
as much to be accounted for to her by Hume, and so by them,
as is the money paid on her account to be accounted for by
her to him or them. We do not, however, dwell particularly
upon this, nor pause to discuss the bearing of the laws of the
states of the insurance companies upon this matter of the
payment of premiums by the debtor himself, so far as they
may differ from the rule which may prevail in the District of
Columbia, in the absence of specific statutory enactment upon
that subject, because we prefer to place our decision upon
broader grounds.
In all purely voluntary conveyances it is the fraudulent iut~nt
of the donor which vitiates. If actually insolvent, he is held to
knowledge of his condition; and if the necessary consequence
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of his act is to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, within

the statute, the presumption of the fraudulent intent is irre-

buttable and conclusive, and inquiry into his motives is inad-

missible. But the circumstances of each particular case should be

considered, as in Partridge v. Gopp, 1 Eden, 163, 168, Amb. 596,

599, where the Lord Keeper, while holding that debts must be

paid before gifts are made, and debtors must be just before they

are generous, admitted that "the fraudulent intent is to be col-

lected from the magnitude and value of the gift." "Where fraud

is to be imputed, or the imputation of fraud repelled, by an

examination into the circumstances under Which a gift is made

to those towards whom the donor is under natural obligation,

the test is said, in Kiff v. Hanna. 2 Bland, 33, to be the

pecuniary ability of the donor at that time to withdraw the

amount of the donation from his estate without the least hazard

to his creditors, or in any material degree lessening their then

prospects of payment; and, in considering the sufficiency of the

debtor's property for the payment of debts, the probable, im-

mediate, unavoidable, and reasonable demands for the support

of the family of the donor should be taken into the account and

deducted, having in mind also the nature of his business and his

necessary expenses. Emerson v. Bemis, 69 Ill. 541. This argu-

ment in the interest of creditors concedes that the debtor may
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rightfully preserve his family from suffering and want. It

seems to us that the same public policy which justifies this, and

recognizes the support of wife and children as a positive obliga-

tion in law as well as morals, should be extended to protect

them from destitution after the debtor's death, by permitting

him, not to accumulate a fund as a permanent provision, but

to devote a moderate portion of his earnings to keep on foot

a security for support already, or which could thereby be, law-

fully obtained, at least to the extent of requiring that, under

such circumstances, the fraudulent intent of both parties to

the transaction should be made out. And inasmuch as there is

no evidence from which such intent on the part of Mrs. Hume or

the insurance companies could be inferred, in our judgment

none of these premiums can be recovered.

The decree is affirmed, except so far as it directs the payment

to the administrators of the premiums in question and interest,

and, as to that, is reversed, and the cause remanded to the

of his act is to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, within
the statute, the presumption of the fraudulent intent is irrebuttable and conclusive, and inquiry into his motives is inadmissible. But the circumstances of each particular case should be
considered, as in Partridge v. Gopp, 1 Eden, 163, 168, Amb. 596,
599, where the Lord Keeper, while holding that debts must be
paid before gifts are made, and debtors must be just before they
are generous, admitted that 11 the fraudulent intent is to be collected from the magnitude and value of the gift.'' Where fraud
is to be imputed, or the imputation of fraud repelled, by an
examination into the circumstances under which a gift is made
to those towards whom the donor is under natural obligation,
the test is said, in Kiff v. Hanna. 2 Bland, 33, to be the
pecuniary ability of the donor at that time to withdraw the
amount of the donation from his estate without the least hazard
to his creditors, or in any material degree lessening their then
prospects of payment; and, in considering the sufficiency of the
debtor's property for the payment of debts, the probable, immediate, unavoidable, and reasonable demands for the support
of the family of the donor should be taken into the account and
deducted, having in mind also the nature of his business and his
necessary expenses. Emerson v. Bemis, 69 Ill. 541. This argument in the interest of creditors concedes that the debtor may
rightfully preserve his family from suffering and want. It
seems to us that the same public policy which justifies this, and
recognizes the support of wife and children as a positive obligation in law as well as morals, should be extended to protect
them from destitution after the debtor's death, by permitting
him, not to accumulate a fund as a permanent provision, but
to devote a moderate portion of his earnings to keep on foot
a security for support already, or which could thereby be, lawfully obtained, at least to the extent of requiring that, undrr
such circumstances, the fraudulent intent of both parties to
the transaction should be made out. And inasmuch as there is
no evidence from which such intent on the part of Mrs. Hume or
the insurance companies eould be inferred, in our judgment
none of these premiums can be recovered.
The decree is affirmed, except so far as it directs the payment
to the administrators of the premiums in question and interest,
and, as to that, is reversed, and the cause remanded to the
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court below, with directions to proceed in conformity with this

opinion.10

FIRST NAT. BANK OF HUMBOLDT, NEB., v. GLASS et al.

court below, with directions to proceed in conformity with this
opinion. 10

79 Fed. 706, 25 C. C. A. 151

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. March 22, 1897)

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the

District of Kansas.

FIRST NAT. BANK OF HUMBOLDT, NEB., v. GLASS et al.

This appeal challenges a decree which sustained a demurrer

to a bill brought by a judgment debtor to subject a homestead,

79 Fed. 706, 25 C. C. A. 151

which the debtor had bought and caused to be conveyed to his

wife, to the payment of the judgment. The bill disclosed these

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

March 22, 1897)

facts: The statutes of Nebraska exempt from judicial sale a

homestead not exceeding in value $2,000, consisting of a dwell-

ing house in which the claimant resides and the land on which

the house is situated, not exceeding 160 acres in extent. Consol.

St. Neb. 1891, c. 19, p. 430. The constitution of the state of

Kansas exempts from forced sale under process of law a home-

stead not exceeding 160 acres of farming land, or one acre within

the limits of an incorporated town or city, and all the improve-

ments thereon, when it is occupied as a residence by the family

of the owner, whatever its value may be. Const. Kan. art. 15,

§ 9; 1 Gen. St. 1889, par. 235. From May 4, 1892, until March

22, 1894, the appellee, John F. Glass, owned, and with his wife,
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Harriet H. Glass, resided upon and occupied, 160 acres of land

in the state of Nebraska, as their homestead. In May, 1892,

Glass purchased of one Gravatte some fruit trees which were

planted on his farm, and which enhanced its value $3,000. He

gave Gravatte a span of horses and six of his promissory notes

for these trees. The appellant, the First National Bank of

Humboldt, Neb., purchased four of these notes before their

maturity, and on November 19, 1894, obtained a judgment

thereon for $2,278.44 against John F. Glass, in an action which

10—Cf. The Merchants' and

Miners' Transportation Co. v. Bor-

land, 53 N. J. Eq. 282.

See article in 25 Am. L. Rev.

185, where the cases and statutes

are discussed.

As to amount recoverable by cred-

itors in case transaction is declared

fraudulent see Roberts v. Winton,

100 Tenn. 484; Bailey v. Wood, 202

Mass. 549; Lehman v. Gunn, 124

Ala. 213; Asbury Park First Nat.

Bank v. White, 60 N. J. Eq. 487,

46 Atl. 1092.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the
District of Kansas.
This appeal challenges a decree which sustained a demurrer
to a bill brought by a judgment debtor to subject a homestead,
which the debtor had bought and caused to be conveyed to his
wife, to the payment of the judgment. The bill disclosed these
facts: The statutes of Nebraska exempt from judicial sale a
homestead not exceeding in value $2,000, consisting of a dwell"ing house in which the claimant resides and the land on which
the house is situated, not exceeding 160 acres in extent. Consol.
St. Neb. 1891, c. 19, p. 430. The constitution of the state of
Kansas exempts from forced sale under process of law a homestead not exceeding 160 acres of farming land, or one acre within
the limits of an incorporated town or city, and all the improvements thereon, when it is occupied as a residence by the family
of the owner, whatever its value may be. Const. Kan. art. 15,
§ 9; 1 Gen. St. 1889, par. 235. From May 4, 1892, until .?\larch
22, 1894, the appellee, John .£<'. Glass, owned, and with his wife,
Harriet H. Glass, resided upon and occupied, 160 acres of land
in the state of Nebraska, as their homestead. In May, 1892,
Glass purchased of one Gravattc some fruit trees which were
planted on his farm, and which enhanced its value $3,000. He
gave Gravatte a span of horses and six of his promissory notes
for these trees. The appellant, the First National Ba1ik of
Humboldt, Neb., purchased four of these notes before their
maturity, and on November 19, 1894, obtained a judgment
thereon for $2,278.44 against John F. GJn.qs, in an action which
10--Cf. The Merchants' and
Miners' Transportation Co. v. Bor·
land, 63 N. J. Eq. 282.
See article in 25 Am. L. Rev.
185, where the cases and statutes
are discussed.
As to amount recoverable by cred-

itors in case transaction is declared
fraudulent 9Ce Roberts v. Winton.
100 Tenn. 484; Bailey v. Wood, 202
Mal's. 549; Lehman v. Gunn, 124
Ala. 213; Asbury Park First Nat.
Bank v. White, 60 N. J. Eq. 487,
46 Atl. 1092.
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it had commenced in the District Court of Pawnee county, in

the state of Nebraska, on June 24, 1893. Glass was insolvent,

and he had no property except the farm which he occupied as

his homestead. On March 22, 1894, he sold and conveyed this

farm to one Huff for $6,100, and with that money he bought

160 acres of farming land in Franklin county in the state of

Kansas, and caused the vendor to convey it to his wife. He

and his wife immediately took possession of it, and have ever

since resided upon, occupied, and claimed it as their homestead.

The bank caused an execution to be issued on its judgment in

1895, and it was returned nulla bona. It then brought an action

upon this judgment, and obtained a judgment in that action,

and a return of execution unsatisfied, in the District Court of

Franklin county, in the state of Kansas. Thereupon it exhibited

its bill in the court below, and alleged, in addition to the fore-

going facts, that the appellees sold their farm in Nebraska,

secretly fled to the state of Kansas, and purchased and took

possession of their farm in that state with the intent and for

the purpose of cheating and defrauding the bank out of its

claim against Glass, and for the purpose of preventing it from

collecting its judgment from the farm in Nebraska, which was

worth $4,100 more than the value of an exempt homestead,
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under the statutes of that state. The bank prayed for the

sale of the farm in Kansas, and for the application of the pro-

ceeds of the sale to the payment of its judgment.

SANBORN, Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above,

delivered the opinion of the court.

An insolvent debtor may use with impunity any of his prop-

erty that is free from the liens and the vested equitable interests

of his creditors to purchase a homestead for himself and his

family in his own name. If he takes property that is not

exempt from judicial sale and applies it to this purpose, he

merely avails himself of a plain provision of the constitution or

the statute enacted for the benefit of himself and his family.

it had commenced in the District Court of Pawnee county, in
the state of Nebraska, on June 24, 1893. Glass was insolvent,
and he had no property except the farm which he occupietl ns
his homestead. On March 22, 1894, he sold and conveyed this
farm to one Huff for $6,100, and with that money he bought
160 acres of farming land in Franklin county in the state of
Kansas, and caused the vendor to convey it to his wife. He
and his wife immediately took possession of it, and have ever
since resided upon, occupied, and claimed it as their homestRad.
The bank caused an execution to be issued on its judgment in
1895, and it was returned null.a bona. It then brought an action
upon this judgment, and obtained a judgment in that action,
and a return of execution unsatisfied, in the District Court of
Franklin county, in the state of Kansas. Thereupon it exhibited
its bill in the court below, and alleged, in addition to the foregoing facts, that the appellees sold their farm in Nebraska,
secretly fled to the state of Kansas, and purchased and took
possession of their farm in that state with the intent and for
the purpose of cheating and defrauding the bank out of its
claim against Glass, and for the purpose of preventing it from
collecting its judgment from the farm in Nebraska, which was
worth $4,100 more than the value of an exempt homestead,
under the statutes of that state. The bank prayed for the
sale of the farm in Kansas, and for the application of the proceeds of the sale to the payment of its judgment.

He takes nothing from his creditors by this action in which

they have any vested right. The constitution or statute exempt-

ing the homestead from the judgments of creditors is in force

when they extend the credit to him, and they do so in the face

of the fact that he has this right. Nor can the use of property

that is not exempt from execution to procure a homestead be

held to be a fraud upon the creditors of an insolvent debtor,

SANBORN, Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above,
delivered the opinion of the court.
An insolvent debtor may use with impunity any of bis property that is free from the liens and the vested equitable interests
of his creditors to purchase a homestead for himself and bis
family in bis own name. If he takes property that is not
exempt from judicial sale and applies it to this purpose, he
merely avails himself of a plain provision of the constitution or
the statute enacted for the benefit of himself and his family.
He takes nothing from bis ereditors by this action in which
they have any vested right. The constitution or statute exempting the homestead from the judgments of creditors is in force
when they extend the credit to him, and they do so in the face
of the fat:>t that he has this right. Nor can the use of property
that is not exempt from execution to procure a homestead be
held to be a fraud upon the creditors of an insolvent debtor,
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because that which the law expressly sanctions and permits can-

not be a legal fraud. Jacoby v. Distilling Co., 41 Minn. 227.

43 N. W. 52; Kelly v. Sparks, 54 Fed. 70; Sproul v. Bank.

22 Kan. 238; Tucker v. Drake, 11 Allen, 145; O'Donnell v.

Segar, 25 Mich. 367; North v. Shearn, 15 Tex. 174; Cipperly v.

Rhodes, 53 Ill. 346; Randall v. Buffington, 10 Cal. 491. Whpn

the appelles sold their farm in Nebraska, and bought and took

possession of their homestead in Kansas, the bank had acquired

no lien and no specific equitable interest in any of the property

of its debtor. It was his simple contract creditor, and it ha.i

no vested right in either his property or his residence. He had

the right to change his residence from one state to another, and

to secure for himself a homestead in any state where he chose

to live. If, therefore, he had taken the conveyance of his home-

stead in Kansas in his own name, it would have been exempt

from the judgment of the appellant.11

The only question remaining is whether the farm lost this

exemption because he caused it to be conveyed to his wife. Upon

this question the authorities are not in accord. The Supreme

Court of Minnesota declares that such a transaction is a fraud

upon creditors, and subjects the property so acquired to the

payment of their debts. Sumner v. Sawtelle, 8 Minn. 309 (Gil.

272); Rogers v. McCauley, 22 Minn. 384. The Supreme Court
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of Kansas, on the other hand, holds that a homestead purchased

and paid for from the unexempt property of the husband is

equally exempt from judicial sale, under the constitution of that

state, whether the title is taken in the name of the husband or

in that of the wife. Monroe v. May, 9 Kan. 466, 475, 476; Hixon

v. George, 18 Kan. 253, 258. The decisions of the highest

judicial tribunal of the state of Kansas, which we have cited,

settle this question in the case at bar. • • • The decree be-

low is in accordance with the constitution and statutes of the

state of Kansas, as they have been construed by its supreme

court, the property in controversy is situated in that state, and

its title is fixed by that construction. Let the decree be affirmed,

with costs.12

11—To same effect is In re Wil- 12—As to creditor's possible

son, 123 Fed. 20, reviewing earlier remedy, see Riddell v. Shirley, 5

cases contra. See also Ferguson v. Cal. 488; Comstock v. Bechtel, 63

Little Bock Trust Co., 90 Ark. 45, Wis. 656, 24 N. W. 465.

137 8. W. 555 Ann. Cas. 1913 A, Fraudulent Conveyance of Ex-

960 and note wherein many cases empt Property.-^'"tiaa case was

are collected. determined by the court below in

because that which the law expressly sanctio11s 1111d permit!' 1·:1:1 ·
not be a legal fraud. Jacoby v. Distilling Co., -11 ~li1111. 2~4.
43 N. W. 52; K',elly v. Sparks, 54 Fed. 70; Sproul v. Rrnk.
22 Kan. 23$; Tucker v. Drake, 11 Allen, 145; 0 'Donnell v.
Segar, 25 Mich. 367; North v. Shearn, 15 Tex. 174; Cipperly ,._
Rhodes, 53 Ill. 346; Randall v. Buffington, 10 Cal. 491. WlH•n
the appelles sold their farm in Nebraska, and bought and t01)k
possession of their homestead in Kan888, the bank had acquired
no lien and no specific equitable interest in any of the property
of its debtor. It was his simple contract creditor, and it had
no vested right in either his property or his residence. He h:1d
the right to change his residence from one state to anotht>r, arnl
to secure for himself a homestead in any state where he chose
to live. If, therefore, he had taken the conveyance of his homestead in Kansas in his own name, it would have been exempt
from the judgment of the appellant.11
The only question remaining is whether the farm lost this
exemption because be caused it to be conveyed to his wife. Upon
this question the authorities are not in accord. The Supreme
Court of Minnesota declares that such a transaction is a fraud
upon creditors, and subjects the property so acquired to the
payment of their debts. Sumner v. Sawtelle, 8 Minn. 309 (Gil.
272); Rogers v. McCauley, 22 Minn. 384. The Supreme Court
of Kansas, on the other hand, bolds that a homestead purchased
and paid for from the unexempt property of the husband is
equally exempt from judicial sale, under the constitution of that
state, whether the title is taken in the name of the husband or
in that of the wife. Monroe v. May, 9 Kan. 466, 475, 476; Hixon
v. George, 18 Kan. 253, 258. The decisions of the highest
judicial tribunal of the state of Kansas, which we have cited,
settle this question in the case at bar. • • • The decree he·
low is in accordance with the constitution and statutes of the
state of Kansas, as they have been construed by its supreme
court, the property in controversy is situated in that state, and
its title is fixed by that construction. Let the decree be affirmed,
with costs. 12
11-To same effect is In re Wil·
son, 123 Fed. 20, reviewing earlier
cases contra. See also Ferguson v.
Little Rock Trust Co., 911 Ark. 45,
137 S. W. 555 Ann. Cas. 1913 A,
960 and note wherein many cases
are collected.

12-Ae to creditor's possible
remedy, see Riddell v. Shirley, 5
Cal. 488; Comstock v. Bechtel, 63
Wis. 656, 24 N. W. 465.
Fraudulent Conveyance of Exempt Property.~' ' This ease was
determined by the court below in
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TWYNE'S CASE

3 Coke, 80 b.

TWYNE'S CASE

(Star Chamber, 1602)

In an information by Coke, the Queen's Attorney General,

3 Coke, 80 b.

against Twyne of Hampshire, in the Star Chamber, for mak-

ing and publishing of a fraudulent gift of goods: the case on

(Star Chamber, 1602)

the stat. 13 Eliz. c. 5 was such; Pierce was indebted to Twyne

in four hundred pounds, and was indebted also to C. in two

hundred pounds. C. brought an action of debt against Pierce,

and pending the writ, Pierce being possessed of goods and chat-

tels of the value of three hundred pounds, in secret made a

general deed of gift of all his goods and chattels real and per-

accordance with what hag been gen-

erally understood to be the tendency

and logical result of Piper v. John-

ston, 12 Minn. 60, and before the

decisions of this court in Morrison

v. Abbott, 27 Minn. 116; Fergu-

son V. Kumler, Id. 156; and Fur-

man v. Tenney, ante, p. 77, were

In an information by Coke, the Queen's Attorney General,
against Twyne of Hampshire, in the Star Chamber, for making and publishing of a fraudulent gift of goods: the case on
the stat. 13 Eliz. c. 5 was such ; Pierce was indebted to Twyne
in four hundred pounds, and was indebted also to C. in two
hundred pounds. C. brought an action of debt against Pierce,
and pending the writ, Pierce being possessed of goods and chattels of the value of three hundred pounds, in secret made a
general deed of gift of all his goods and chattels real and per-

promulgated. So far as this Court

is concerned, the latter cases estab-
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lish the rule that a debtor's trans-

fer of property exempt from execu-

tion is not void, but valid, even

against his creditors, though the

transfer be voluntary. It is, of

course, no less valid if made upon

a consideration.'' Berry, J., in

Baldwin v. Rogers, 28 Minn. 544,

548.

'' There is no principle of law

more consonant with reason, or bet-

ter supported by authority, than

that a conveyance which is fraudu-

lent as to creditors, binds, never-

theless, the parties to it. Through

that 'cloud of authorities' of which

the counsel speak; this principle

shines perpetually, and it guides us

to the conclusion that the appellant

is here without merits.

"Having caused his house and

lot to be conveyed to his wife for

the purpose of hindering and delay-

ing his creditors, denying his own-

ership as long as denial would serve

to keep them off, he chops round

now when they have raised $314.26

out of the property by a sheriff's

sale of it, and claims $300 of the

proceeds under our exemption stat-

ute.

"It would be a perversion of

that humane law to apply it to such

a case. As to his creditors, the

fraudulent deed was void, and he

remained the owner of the property,

but the deed concluded him for all

other purposes. The statute was

not made as an instrument of fraud

to delay and hinder creditors, but

to secure to honest debtors from

the wreck of their fortunes a sub-

sistence until they can do something

for themselves and families.''

Woodward, J., in Huey's Appeal,

29 Pa. St. 219, 220. For the cases

accordance with what bas been gen·
erally undenitood to be the tendency
and logical result of Piper v. John·
&ton, 12 .Minn. 60, and before the
deeiaions of this court in Morrison
v. Abbott, 27 Minn. 116; Fergu·
son v. Kumler, Id. 156; and Furman v. Teillley, ante, p. 77, were
promulgated. So far as this Court
ia concerned, the latter case• establish the rule thnt a debtor's transfer of property exempt from execution is not void, but valid, e\'en
against his creditors, though the
transfer be voluntary. It ia, of
course, no less valid if made upon
a consideration.'' Berry, J., in
Baldwin v. Rogers, 28 Minn. 544,
548.
• •There is no principle of law
more consonant with reason, or better aupported by authority, than
that a conveyance which is fraudu·
lent as to creditors, binds, never·
thelesa, the parties to it. Through
that 'cloud of authorities' of which
the counsel speak; this principle
!!hines perpetually, and it guide• us
to the conclusion that the appellant
is here without merits.
'' Ha\·ing caused bis house and
lut to be conveyed to bis wife for

the purpose of hindering and delaying bis creditors, denying his ownership as long as denial would serve
to keep them oft', be chops round
now when they have raised $314.26
out .of the property by a sheriff's
sale of it, and claims $300 of the
proceeds under our exemption stat·

ute.

''It would be a perversion of
that humane law to apply it to su<'h
a case. As to his creditora, the
fraudulent deed was void, and be
remained the owner of the property,
but the deed concluded him for all
other purposes. The statute was
not made as an instrument of frau1l
to delay and hinder creditors, but
to secure to honest debtors from
the wreck of their fortunes a snh·
eistence until they <'an do something
for themselves and families. ''
Woodward, J., in Huey '1 Appeal,
29 Pa. St. 219, 2::!0. For the ease!l
generally, see 20 Cyc. 377, et seq.
Property of Little or No Value.Compare French v. Holmes, 67 Me.
186, with Garrison v. ~Jonaghan, 33
Pa. St. 232. See dil"<senting opinion
in Aultman, etc., Co. v. Pikop, 56
Minn. 531. See also Williams v.
Robbins, 15 Gray, 590.
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sonal whatsoever to Twyne, in satisfaction of his debt; not-

withstanding that Pierce continued in possession of the said

goods, and some of them he sold; and he shore the sheep, and

marked them with his own mark: and afterwards C. had judg-

ment against Pierce, and had a fieri facias directed to the sheriff

of Southampton, who by force of the said writ came to make

execution of the said goods; but diVers persons, by the com-

mand of the said Twyne, did with force resist the said sheriff,

claiming them to be the goods of the said Twyne by force of

the said gift; and openly declared by the commandment of

Twyne, that it was a good gift, and made on a good and lawful

consideration. And whether this gift on the whole matter, was

fraudulent and of no effect by the said Act of 13 Eliz. or not,

was the question. And it was resolved by Sir Thomas Egerton.

l,ord Keeper of the Great Seal, and by the Chief Justice Pophani

and Anderson, and the whole Court of Star Chamber, that this

gift was fraudulent, within the statute of 13 Eliz. And in this

case divers points were resolved:

1st. That this gift had the signs and marks of fraud, because

the gift is general, without exception of his apparel, or any-

thing of necessity; for it is commonly said, quod dolus versatur

in generalibus.

2nd. The donor continued in possession, and used them as
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his own; and by reason thereof he traded and trafficked with

others, and defrauded and deceived them.

3rd. It was made in secret, et dona clandestina sunt semper

suspiciosa.

4th. It was made pending the writ.

5th. Here was a trust between the parties, for the donor

possessed all, and used them as his proper goods, and fraud

is always apparelled and clad with a trust, and a trust is the

cover of fraud.

6th. The deed contains, that the gift was made honestly, truly,

and bona fide; et clausula, inconsuet' inducunt snspicionem.

Secondly, it was resolved, that notwithstanding here was a

true debt due to Twyne, and a good consideration of the gift,

yet it was not within the proviso of the said Act of 13 Eliz. by

which it is provided, that the said Act shall not extend to any

estate or interest in lands, etc., goods or chattels made on a

good consideration and bona fide; for although it is on a true

and good consideration, yet it is not bona fide, for no gift shall

be deemed to be bona fide within the said proviso which is acconi-

sonal w~atsoever to Twyne, in satisfaction of his debt; notwithstanding that Pierce continued in possession of the said
goods, and some of them he sold; and he shore the sheep, and
marked them with his own mark: and afterwards C. had judgment against Pierce, and had a fieri facias directed to the sheriff
of Southampton, who by force of the said writ came to make
execution of the said goods; but dil.rers persons, by the command of the said Twyne, did with force resist the said sheriff.
claiming them to be the goods of the said Twyne by force of
the said gift; and openly declared by the commandment of
Twyne, that it was a good gift, and made on a good and lawful
consideration. And whether this gift on the whole matter, was
fraudulent and of no effect by the said Act of 13 Eliz. or not,
was the question. And it was resolved by Sir Thomas Egerton,
J.,ord Keeper of the Great Seal, and by the Chief Justice Popham
and Anderson, and the whole Court of Star Chamber, that this
gift was fraudulent, wi.thin the statute of 13 Eliz. And in this
case divers points were resolved:
1st. That this gift had the signs and mar's of fraud, because
the gift is general, without exception of his apparel, or anything of necessity; for it is commonly said, quod dotus versatur
in generalibus.

2nd. The donor continued in possession, and used them as
his own ; and by reason thereof be traded and trafficked with
others, and defrauded and deceived them.
3rd. It was made in secret, et dona clandestina su11t 1ernper
suspiciosa.
4th. It was made pending the writ.
5th. Here was a trust between the parties, for the donor
possessed all, and used them as his proper goods, and fraud
is always apparelled and clad with a trust, and a trust is the
cover of fraud.
6th. The deed contains, that the gift was made honestly,·truly,
and bona fide; et clausula inconsuet' ind1tcunt sttspicio-nem.
Secondly, it was resolved, that notwithstanding here was a
true debt due to Twyne, and a good consideration of the gift,
yet it was not within the ·proviso of the said Act of 13 Eliz. by
which it is provided, that the said Act shall not extend to any
estate or interest in lands, etc., goods or chattels made on a
good consideration and bona fide; for although it is on a true
and good consideration, yet it is not b<>na fide, for no gift shall
be deemed to be bmia fide within the said proviso which is accom-

.
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panied with any trust; as if a man be indebted to five several

persons, in the several sums of twenty pounds, and hath goods

of the value of twenty pounds, and makes a gift of all his goods

to one of them in satisfaction of his debt, but there is a trust

between them, that the donee shall deal favourably with him

in regard of his poor estate, either to permit the donor, or some

other for him, or for his benefit, to use or have possession of

them, and is contented that he shall pay him his debt when he

is able; this shall not be called bona fide within the said pro-

viso; for the proviso saith on a good consideration, and boiui

fide; so a good consideration doth not suffice, if it be not also

bona fide; and therefore, reader, when any gift shall be to you

in satisfaction of a debt, by one who is indebted to others also;

1st, Let it be made in a public manner, and before the neighbours,

and not in private, for secrecy is a mark of fraud. 2nd, Let the

goods and chattels be appraised by good people to the very

value, and take a gift in particular in satisfaction of your debt.

3rd, Immediately after the gift, take the possession of them;

for continuance of the possession in the donor, is a sign of

trust. And know, reader, that the said words of the proviso,

on a good consideration, and bona fide, do not extend to every

gift made bona fide; and therefore there are two manners of
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gifts on a good consideration, scil. consideration of nature or

blood, and a valuable consideration. As to the first, in the

case before put; if he who is indebted to five several persons,

to each party in twenty pounds, in consideration of natural

affection, gives all his goods to his son, or cousin, in that case,

forasmuch as others should lose their debts, etc., which are things

of value, the intent of the Act was, that the consideration in such

case should be valuable; for equity requires, that such gift,

which defeats others, should be made on as high and good con-

sideration as the things which are thereby defeated are; and it

is to be presumed, that the father, if he had not been indebted

to others, would not have dispossessed himself of all his goods,

and subjected himself to his cradle; and therefore it shall be

intended, that it was made to defeat his creditors; and if con-

sideration of nature or blood should be a good consideration

within this proviso, the statute would serve for little or nothing,

and no creditor would be sure of his debt. And as to gifts made

bona fide, it is to be known, that every gift made bona fide,

either is on a trust between the parties, or without any trust;

every gift made on a trust is out of this proviso; for that which

panied with any trust; as if a man be indebted to five sewral
persons, in the several sums of twenty pounds, and hath goods
of the value of twenty pounds, and makes a gift of all his goods
to one of them in satisfaction of his debt, but there is a trust
between them, that the donee shall deal favourably with him
in regard of his poor estate, either to permit the donor, or some
other for him, or for his benefit, to use or have possession of
them, and is contented that he shall pay him his debt when he
is able; this shall not be called bona fide within the said proviso; for the proviso saith on a good consideration, and b01w
fide; so a good consideration doth not suffice, if it be not also
bona fide; and therefore, reader, when any gift shall be to you
in satisfaction of a debt, by one who is indebted to others also;
1st, Let it be made in a public manner, and before the neighbours,
and not in private, for secrecy is a mark of fraud. 2nd, Let the
goods and chattels be appraised by good people to the very
value, and take a gift in particular in satisfaction of your debt.
3rd, Immediately after the gift, take the possession of them;
for continuance of the possession in the donor, is a sign of
trust. And know, reader, that the said words of the proviso,
on a good consideration, and bo-na fide, do not extend to every
gift ma.de bt:ma fide; and therefore there are two manners of
gifts on a good consideration, scil. consideration of nature or
blood, and a valuable consideration. As to the first, in the ,
case before put; if he who is indebted to five several persons,
to each party in twenty pounds, in consideration of natural
affection, gives all his goods to his son, or cousin, in that case,
forasmuch as others should lose their debts, etc., which are things
of value, the intent of the Act was, that the consideration in such
case should be valuable; for equity requires, that such gift,
which defeats others, should be made on as high and good consideration as the things whlch are thereby defeated are; and it
is to be presumed, that the father, if he had not been indebted
to others, would not have dispossessed himself of all his goods,
and subjected himself to his cradle; and therefore it shall be
intended, that it was made to defeat his creditors; and if consideration of nature or blood should be a good consideration
within this proviso, the statute would serve for little or nothing,
and no creditor would be sure of his debt. And as to gifts made
bona fide, it is to be known, that every gift made bona fide,
t>itber is on a trust between the parties, or without any trust;
every gift made on a tnlSt is out of this proviso; for that which
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is betwixt the donor and donee, called a trust per nomen

speciosum, is in truth, as to all the creditors, a fraud, for they

are thereby defeated and defrauded of their true and due debts.

And every trust is either expressed, or implied; an express

trust is, when in the gift, or upon the gift, the trust by word

or writing is expressed; a trust implied is, when a man makes

a gift without any consideration, or on a consideration of

nature, or blood only; and therefore, if a man before the stat.

of 27 H. 8 had bargained his land for a valuable consideration

to one and his heirs, by which he was seized to the use of the

bargainee; and afterwards the bargainor, without a considera-

tion, infeoffed others, who had no notice of the said bargain; in

this case the law implies a trust and confidence, and they shall

be seized to the use of the bargainee; so in the same case, if the

feoffees, in consideration of nature, or bloode had without a

Valuable consideration enfeoffed their sons, or any of their

blood who, had no notice of the first bargain, yet that shall not

toll the use raised on a valuable consideration; for a feoffment

made only on consideration of nature or blood, shall not toll

an use raised on a valuable consideration but shall toll an

use raised on consideration of nature, for both considerations

are in aquali jure, and of one and the same nature.

And when a man, being greatly indebted to sundry persons,
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makes a gift to his son, or any of his blood, without considera-

tion, but only of nature, the law intends a trust betwixt them,

soU. that the donee would, in consideration of such gift being

voluntarily and freely made to him, and also in consideration

of nature, relieve his father, or cousin, and not see him want

who had made such gift to him, vide 33 H. 6, 33, by Prisot, if

the father enfeoffs his son and heir apparent within age bona

fide, yet the lord shall have the wardship of him: so note, valu-

able consideration is a good consideration within this proviso;

and a gift made bona fide is a gift made without any trust either

expressed or implied: by which it appears, that as a gift made

on a good consideration, if it be not also bona fide, is not within

the proviso; so a gift made bona fide, if it be not on a good con-

sideration, is not within the proviso; but it ought to be on a

good consideration, and also bona fide.

To one who marvelled what should be the reason that Acts

and statutes are continually made at every Parliament without

intermission, and without end; a wise ma-n made a good and

short answer, both of which are well composed in verse.

/

is betwixt the donor and donee, called a trust per ttomen
speciosum, is in truth, as to all the creditors, a fraud, for they
are thereby defeated and defrauded of their true and due debts.
And every trust is either expressed, or implied; an express
trust is, when in the gift, or upon the gift, the trust by wol'd
or writing is expressed; a trust implied is, when a man makes
a gift without any consideration, or on a consideration of
nature, or blood only; and therefore, if a man before the stat.
of 27 H. 8 had hargained his land for a valuable consideration
to one and his heirs, by which he was seized to the use of the
bargainee; and afterwards the bargainor, without a consideration, infeoffed others, who had no notice of the said bargain; in
this case the law implies a trust and confidence, and they shall
be seized to the use of the bargainee; so in the same case, if the
feoffees, in consideration of nature, or bloode had without a
valuable consideration enfeoffed their sons, or any of their
blood who, had no notice of the first bargain, yet that shall not
toll the use raised on a valuable consideratittn ; for a feoffment
made only on consideration of nature or blood, shall not toll
an use raised on a valuable considerution but shall toll an
use raised on consideration of nature, for both considerations
are in aq1uzli jure, and of one and the same nature.
And when a man, being greatly ind_ehted to sundry persons,
/ makes a gift to his son, or a.ny of his 'blood, without consideration, but only of nature, the law intends a trust betwixt them,
scil. that the donee would, in consideration of such gift being
voluntarily and freely made to him, and also in consideration
of nature, -relieve his father, or cousin, and not see him want
~ho had made such gift to him, vide 33 H. 6, 33, by Prisot, if
the father enfeoffs his son and heir apparent within age bona
fide, yet the lord shall have the wardship of him: so note, valuable consideration is a good consideration within this proviso;
and a gift marle b<>na fide is a gift made without any trust either
expressed or implied: hy which it appPnrs, that as a gift made
on a good consideration, if it be not also bona fide, is not within
the proviso; so a gift made bt>na fide, if it be not on a good consideration, is not within the proviso; but it ought to be on a
good consideration, and also bo-na fide.
To one who marvelled what should be the reason that Acts
and statutes are continually made at every Parliament without
intermission, and without end; a wise mdn made a good and
short answer, both of which are well composed in verse.
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Quaeritur, ut crescitnt tot magna volumina legist

In promptu causa est, orescit in orbe dolus.

And because fraud and deceit abound in these days more than

in former times, it was resolved in this case by the whole Court,

Quacritur, ut crescunt tot magna volu.mina legisf
In prompt u causa est, C'T'escit in orbe dol1i.~.

that all statutes made against fraud should be liberally and

beneficially expounded to suppress the fraud. Note, reader,

according to their opinions, divers resolutions have been

made. * • •

CADOGAN v. KENNETT

2 Cowp. 432

(King's Bench. May 6, 1776)

Upon shewing cause why a new trial should not be granted

in this case, Lord MANSFIELD reported as follows:

This was an action of trover brought by the plaintiffs, who

And because fraud and deceit abound in these days more than
in former times, it was resolved in this case by the whole Court,
that all statutes made against fraud should be liberally and
beneficially expounded to suppress the fraud. Note, reader,
according to their opinions, divers resolutions have been
made. • • •

are the trustees under the marriage settlement of Lord Montfort,

against the defendant Mr. Kennett, who is a judgment creditor

of Lord Montfort's, and the other defendants, who are sheriff's

CADOGAN v. KENNETT

officers, to recover certain goods taken by them in execution

under a fi. fa.—At the trial the plaintiffs proved Lord Mont-

2 Cowp. 432

fort's marriage settlement, by which it appeared that the goods

in question, which were the household goods belonging to Lord

(King's Bench. May 6, 1776)

Montfort, at his lordship's house in town, and which were very

minutely particularized in a schedule annexed to the settle-
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ment, were all conveyed to the plaintiffs, as trustees, for the

use of Lord Montfort for life, remainder to Lady Montfort for

her life, remainder to the first and other sons of the marriage

in strict settlement.

One of the witnesses proved, that at the time of the settle-

ment being made, it was known Lord Montfort was in debt:—

but be thought the fortune of the lady he was to marry, which

amounted to £10,000 was amply sufficient to pay all the debts

he owed at that time, and had no idea of disappointing any

creditor. That Mr. Kennett was a creditor of Lord Montfort

at the time of the settlement. That Lady Montfort was a ward

of the Court of Chancery; and the reason for including the

household goods in the settlement was, because it was thought

Lord Montfort's real estate was not of itself sufficient to make

a proper and adequate settlement.—It appeared also that the

Upon shewing cause why a new trial should not be granted
in this case, Lord MANSFIELD reported as follows:
This was an action of trover brought by the plaintiffs, who
are the trustees under the marriage settlement of Lord Montfort,
against the defendant Mr. Kennett, who is a judgment creditor
of Lord .Montfort 's, and the other defendants, who are sberitf 's
officers, to recover certain goods taken by them in execution
under a fi. fa.-At the trial the plaintiffs proved Lord Montfort 's marriage settlement, by which it appeared that the goods
in question, which were the household goods belonging to Lord
Montfort, at his lordship's house iu town, and which were very
minutely particularized in a schedule annexed to the settlement, were all conveyed to the plaintiffs, as trustees, for the
use of Lord Montfort for life, remainder to Lady Montfort for
her life, remainder to the first and other sons of the marriage
in strict settlement.
One of the witnesses proved, that at the time of the settlement being made, it was known Lord Montfort was in debt:but he thought the fortune of the lady he was to marry, which
amounted to £10,000 was amply sufficient to pay all the debts
he owed at that time, and had no idea of disappointing any
creditor. That Mr. Kennett was a creditor of Lord l\fontfort
at the time of the settlement. That Lady Montfort was a ward
of the Court of Chancery ; and the reason for including the
household goods in the settlement was, because it was thought
Lord Montfort 's real estate was not of itself sufficient to make
a proper and adequate settlement.-It appeared also that the
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settlement was referred to a Master in Chancery, who approved

of the settlement, and the inserting the household goods for the

reason above-mentioned.

At the trial, I inclined to think, that the settlement being made

under a treaty with the Court of Chancery, and approved of

by the Master, was a bona fide transaction, and that the posses-

sion of Lord Montfort was not fraudulent, because it was in

pursuance^, and in execution, of the trust.

The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs, damages 1s. and

if the court should be of opinion with the plaintiffs, then the

goods were to be delivered specifically.

LORD MANSFIELD.—The question in this case is, whether

the plaintiffs, who are trustees under the marriage settlement of

Lord Montfort, by which the household goods in question are

settled as heir looms with the house in strict settlement, and

specifically enumerated in a schedule annexed to the settle-

settlement was referred to a Master in Chancery, who approved
of the settlement, and the inserting the household goods for the
reason above-mentioned.
At the trial, I inclined to think, that the settlement being made
under a treaty with the Court of Chancery, and approved of
by the :Master, was a bona fide transaction, and that the possession of Lord Montfort was not fraudul-ent, because it was in
pursuamct., and in executi<>n, of the trust.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs, damages ls. and
if the court should be of opinion with the plaintiffs, then the
goods were to be delivered specifically.

ment, so as to avoid any fraud by the addition or purchase

of new; whether, the trustees are entitled to the possession of

these goods against the defendant Mr. Kennett.

The defendant has taken the goods in execution; and it is

not disputed that he is a fair creditor. But the plaintiffs bring

this action as trustees under the marriage settlement, and the

question is, whether they are, against the defendant, entitled
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to the possession of these goods for the purposes of the trust.

I have thought much of this case since the trial, and in every

light in which I have considered it, I have not been able to

raise a doubt.

* The principles and rules of the common law, as now uni-

versally known and understood, are so strong against fraud in

every shape, that the common law would have attained every

end proposed by the statutes 13 El. c. 5, and 27 El. c. 4. The

former of these statutes relates to creditors only; the latter to

purchasers. These statutes cannot receive too liberal a construc-

tion, or be too much extended in suppression of fraud.

The stat. 13 El. c. 5, which relates to frauds against creditors,

directs "that no act whatever done to defraud a creditor or

creditors shall be of any effect against such creditor or cred-

itors." But then such a construction is not to be made in

support of creditors as will make third persons sufferers. There-

fore, the statute does not militate against any transaction bona

fide, and where there is no imagination of fraud. And so is the

LORD MANSFIELD.-The question in this case is, whether
the plaintiffs, who are trustees under the marriage settlement of
Lord Montfort, by which the household goods in question are
settled as heir looms with the house in strict settlement, and
specifically enumerated in a schedule annexed to the settlement, so as to avoid any fraud by the addition or purchase
of new; whether, the trustees are entitled to the possession of
these goods against the defendant Mr. Kennett.
The defendant has taken the goods in execution; and it is
not disputed that he is a fair creditor. But the plaintiff's bring
this action as trustees under the marriage settlement, and the
question is, whether they are, against the defendant, entitled
to the possession of these goods for the purposes of the trust.
I have thought much of this case since the trial, and in every
light in which I have considered it, I have not been able to
raise a doubt.
"' The principles and rules of the common law, as now universally known and understood, are so strong against fraud in
every shape, that the common law would have attained every
end proposed by the statutes 13 El. c. 5, and 27 El. c. 4. The
former of these statutes relates to creditors only; the latter to
ptt-rokasers. These statutes canno-t receive too liberal a construction, or be too much extended in suppression of fraud.
The stat. 13 El. c. 5, which relates to frauds against creditors,
directs ''that no act whatever done to defraud a creditor or
creditors shall be of any effect against such creditor or creditors.'' But then such a construction is not to be made in
support of creditors as will make third persons sufferers. Therefore, the statute does not militate against any transaction bona
fide, and where there is no imagination of fraud. And so is the
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common law. But if the transaction be not bona fide, the cir-

cumstances of its being done for a valuable consideration, will

not alone take it out of the statute. I have known several cases

where persons have given a fair and full price for goods, and

where the possessi&n was actually changed; yet being done for

the purpose of defeating creditors, the transaction has been held

fraudulent, and therefore void.

One case was, where there had been a decree in the Court of

Chancery, and a sequestration. A person with knowledge of the

decree, bought the house and goods belonging to the defendant,

and gave a full price for them. The court said, the purchase

being with a manifest view to defeat the creditor, was fraudu-

lent, and therefore, notwithstanding a valuable consideration,

void. So, if a man knows of a judgment and execution, and,

with a view to defeat it, purchases the debtor's goods, it is void:

because, the purpose is iniquitous. It is assisting one man to

cheat another, which the law will never allow. There are many

things which are considered as circumstances of fraud. The

statute says not a word about possession. But the law says,

if after a sale of goods, the vendee continue in possession, and

appear as the visible owner, it is evidence of fraud; because

goods pass by delivery: but it is not so in the case of a lease,

for that does not pass by delivery.
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The stat. 27 El. c. 4, does not go to voluntary conveyances

merely as voluntary, but to such as are fraudulent. A fair

voluntary conveyance may be good against creditors, notwith-

standing its being voluntary. The circumstance of a man being

indebted at the time of his making a voluntary conveyance, is an

argument of fraud. The question, therefore, in every case is,

whether the act done is a bona fide transaction, or whether it is

a trick and contrivance to defeat creditors. If there be a con-

veyance to a trustee for the benefit of the debtor, it is fraudu-

lent. The question then is, whether this settlement is of that

sort. It is a settlement which is very common in great families.

In urUls of great estates, nothing is so frequent as devises of

part of the personal estate to go as heir looms; for instance,

the devise of the Duke of Bridgewater's library.—the old Duke

of Newcastle's plate. So in marriage settlements, it is very

common for libraries and plate to be thus settled, and for

chattels and leases to go along with the land. If the husband

grows extravagant, there never was an idea that these could

common law. But if the transaction be not b<nia fide, the circumstances of its being done for a valuable consideration, will
not alone take it out of the statute. I have known several cases
where persons have given a fair and full p·r£ce for goods, and
where the possession was actually changed; yet being done for
the purpose of defeating creditors, the transaction has been held
fraudulent, and therefore void.
One case was, where there had been a decree in /the Court of
Chancery, and a sequestration. A person with knowledge of the
decree, bought the house and goods belonging to the defendant,
and gave a full price for them. The court said, the purchase
being with a manifest view to defeat the creditor, was fraudulent, and therefore, notwithstanding a valuable consideration,
void. So, if a man knows of a judgment and execution, and,
with a view to defeat it, purchases the debtor's goods, it is void:
because, the purpose is ini.qu.itous. It is assisting one man to
cheat another, which the law will never allow. There are many
things which are considered as circumstances of fraud. The
statute says not a word about possession. But the law says,
if after a sale of goods, the vendee continue in possession, and
appear as the visible owner, it is evidence of fraud; because
goods pass by delivery: but it is not. so in the case of a lease,
for that does not pass by delivery.
The stat. 27 El. c. 4, does not go to voluntary conveyances
merely as voluntary, but to such as are fraudulent. A fair
voluntary conveyance may be good against creditors, notwithstanding its being voluntary. The circumstance of a man being
indebted at the time of his making a voluntary conveyance, is an
argument of fraud. The question, therefore, in every case is,
whether the act done is a bona fide transaction, or whether it is
a trick and contrivance to defeat creditors. If there be a conveyance to a trustee for the benefit of the debtor, it is fraudulent. The question then is, whether this settlement is of that
sort. It is a settlement which is very common in great families.
In W'ills of great estates, nothing is so frequent as devises of
part of the perscnial estate to go as heir looms; for instance,
the devise of the Duke of Bridgewater's library.-the old Duke
of Newcastle's plate. So in marriage settlements, it is very
common for libraries and plate to be thus settled, and for
chattels and leases to go along with the land. If the husband
grows extravagant, there never was an idea that these could
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afterwards be overturned. If this court were to determine they

should, the parties would resort to Chancery.—We come then

to the circumstances of the present case, which are very strong.

There is not a suggestion of any intention to defraud, or the

most distant view of disappointing any creditor. The very

object of the marriage settlement was, that the lady's fortune

might be applied to the discharge of all Lord Montfort's debts:

the amount of this fortune was £10,000 and was thought fully

sufficient for that purpose. Besides this, it is a settlement

approved by a Master in Chancery. Most clearly the Master in

Chancery and the Great Seal could have no fraudulent view.

But it appears further, that the reason why the goods were

inserted was, because the settlement of the real estate alone was

thought inadequate without them. Clearly, therefore, it was no

contrivance to defeat creditors, but meant as a provision for

the lady if she survived, and heir looms for the eldest son.

An argument, however, is drawn from the possession, as a

strong circumstance of fraud: but it does not hold in this case.

It is a part of the trust that the goods shall continue in the

house; and for a very obvious reason: because, the furniture

of one house will not suit another; and it was the business of

the trustee to see the goods were not removed.

If Lord Montfort had let his house with the furniture, reserv-
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ing one rent for the house, and another for the furniture; or

if the rent could be apportioned, the creditors would be en-

titled to the rent; but they have no right to take the goods

themselves: the possession of them belongs to the trustees, and

the absolute property of them is now vested in the eldest son.

I expected an authority; but though such settlements are

frequent, no ease has been cited to shew they are fraudulent.

How common are settlements of chattels, and money in the

stocks; can there be a doubt but they are good? Yet the creditors

would be entitled to the dividends during the interest of the

debtor. Here, there was clearly no intention to defraud, and

there is a good consideration. Therefore, I am of opinion it

could not be left to the jury to find the settlement fraudulent,

merely because there were creditors. The goods must now be

kept in the house for the benefit of the son.

ASTON, Justice. I am of the same opinion.

WILLES, Justice. I am of the same opinion.

Per Cur. Rule for a new trial discharged.

afterwards be overturned. If this court were to determine tht'Y
should, the parties would resort to Chancery.-We come then
to the circumstances of the present case, which are very strong.
There is not a suggestion of any intention to defraud, or the
most distant view of disappointing any creditor. The very
object of the marriage settlement was, that the lady's fortune
might be applied to the discharge of all Lord Montfort's debts:
the amount of this fortune was £10,000 and was thought fully
sufficient for that purpose. Besides this, it is a settlement
approved by a Master in Chancery. Most clearly the Master in
Chancery and the Great Seal could have no fraudulent view.
But it appears further, that the reason why the goods were
inserted was, because the settlement of the real estate alone was
thought inadequate without them. Clearly, therefore, it was no
contrivance to defeat creditors, but meant as a provision for
the lady if she survived, and heir looms for the eldest son.
An argument, however, is drawn from the possession, as a
strong circumstance of fraud: but it does not hold in this case.
It is a parl of the trust that the goods shall continue in the
house ; and for a very obvious reason : because, the furniture
of one house will not suit another; and it was the business of
the trustee to see the goods were not removed.
If Lord l\lontfort had let his house with the furniture, reserving one rent for the house, and another for the furniture; or
if the rent could be apportioned, the creditors would he entitled to the rent; but they have no right to take the goods
themselves: the possession of them belongs to the trustee.a, and
the absolu~ property of them is now vested in the eldest son.
I expected an authority; but though such settlements are
frequent, no case has been cited to shew they are fraudulent.
How common are settlements of chattels, and money in the
stocks; can there be a doubt but they are good T Yet the creditors
would be entitled to the dividends during the interest of the
debtor. Here, there was clearly no intention to defraud, and
there is a. good consideration. Therefore, I am of opinion it
could not be left to the jury to find the settlement fraudulent,
merely because there were creditors. The goods must now be
kept in the house for the benefit of the son.
ASTON, Justice.
WILLES, Justice.

I am of the same opinion.
I am of the same opinion.

Per Cur. Rule for a new trial discharged.
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MEUX v. HOWELL

4 East 1

MEUX v. HOWELL

(King's Bench. June 13, 1803)

This was an action on the statute 13 Eliz. c. 5, wherein the

4 East 1

declaration stated, that the defendants of their malice, fraud,

covin, and collusion, on the 10th of June, 1802, at, etc., were

(King's Bench.

parties to a certain feigned, eovenous, and fraudulent suit

June 13, 1803)

against one J. Norton, in which a certain feigned, eovenous, and

fraudulent judgment against him, to which the defendants were

also parties, was signed and entered of record in B. R. as of

Easter term, 42 Geo. 3; by which said judgment the defendants

feignedly, covenously, and fraudulently recovered against the

said J. N. as well a supposed debt of £800, as also 63s. damages,

etc., to the purpose and intent to delay, hinder, and defraud the

plaintiffs of their just debt, the plaintiffs then being creditors of

the said J. N. for a debt of £176, etc.; which said feigned, cove-

nous, and fraudulent judgment, the defendants being parties

and privies to, and knowing of the same, afterwards, on 12th

June, 1802, at, etc., did wittingly and willingly put in use,

avow, maintain, and defend as true, simple, bona fide, and upon

good consideration, contrary to the form of the statute, etc.;

by reason whereof an action hath accrued to the plaintiffs,

they being the parties aggrieved, etc., to demand £803 3s.
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being so much contained in the said feigned, eovenous, and

fraudulent judgment, etc. Plea, nil fabet.

At the trial before Lord Ellenborough, C. J., at the sittings

after last Hilary term, at Westminster, the plaintiff recovered a

verdict upon the first count of the declaration above stated;

and upon a rule nisi obtained in the last term for setting aside

the verdict and entering a nonsuit, or arresting the judgment,

which stood over till now, the following facts appeared.

The plaintiffs were brewers, and landlords of a public house

tenanted by J. Norton, who was indebted to them £92 10s. for

three years' rent in arrear, and also £116 for beer supplied to

him by the plaintiffs. On the 11th of May, 1802, the plaintiffs

distrained for the £92 10s. rent in arrear, and an agent was put

in possession of the goods distrained on the premises, but no

sale was made, Norton applying to them for time to settle his

affairs, and agreeing that the plaintiffs' agent should continue

in possession of the distress in the mean time. Prior to the

H. A A. Bankruptcy—11

This was an action on the statute 13 Eliz. c. 5, wherein the
declaration stated, that the defendants of their malice, fraud,
covin, and collusion, on the 10th of June, 1802, at, etc., were
parties to a certain feigned, covenous, and fraudulent suit
against one J. Norton, in which a certain feigned, covenous, and
fraudulent judgment against him, to which the defendants were
also parties, was signed and entered of record in B. R. as of
Easter term, 42 Geo. 3 ; by which said judgment the defendants
feignedly, covenously, and fraudulently recovered against the
said J. N. as well a supposed debt of £800, as also 63s. damages,
etc., to the purpose and intent to delay, hinder, and defraud the
plaintiffs of their just debt, the plaintiffs then being creditors of
the said J. N. for a debt of £176, etc.; which said feigned, covenous, and fraudulent judgment, the defendants being parties
and privies to, and knowing of the same, afterwards, on 12th
June, 1802, at, etc., did wittingly and willingly put in use,
avow, maintain, and defend as true, simple, bcma fide, and upon
good consideration, contrary to the form of the statute, etc.;
by reason whereof an action hath accrued to the plaintiffs,
they being the parties aggrieved, etc., to demand £803 3s.
being so much contained in the said feigned, covenous, and
fraudulent judgment, etc. Plea, nil d.ebet.
At the trial before Lord Ellenborough, C. J., at the sittings
after last Hilary term, at Westminster, the plaintiff recovered a
verdict upon the first count of the declaration above stated;
and upon a rule nisi obtained in the last term for setting aside
the verdict and entering a nonsuit, or arresting the judgment,
which stood over till now, the following facts appeared.
The plaintiffs were brewers, and landlords_ of a public house
tenanted by J. Norton, who was indebted to them £92 10s. for
three years' rent in arrear, and also £116 for beer supplied to
him by the plaintiffs. On the 11th of :May, 1802, the plaintiffs
distrained for the £92 10s. rent in arrear, and an agent was put
in possession of the goods distrained on the premises, hut no
sale was made, Norton applying to them for time to settle his
affairs, and agreeing that the plaintiffs' agent should continue
in possession of the distress in the mean time. Prior to the
H.
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sending in the distress Norton was arrested by the defendants,

who were distillers, for £42, for which he had at first given bail,

but on the 12th of May was rendered in discharge of his bail.

On the 19th of May, Norton having agreed to dispose of his

business to one J. W., while the plaintiffs' distress still con-

tinued, entered into an agreement in writing with the plaintiffs'

agent Deady, whereby he requested him to let J. W. into posses-

sion of his (Norton's) house for £30 goodwill, and to sell by

appraisement all the goods, fixtures, and stock in trade on the

premises to J. W. before the 24th of May, and after such settle-

ment Deady was to pay all the rent, taxes, expenses, and the

book debt due to Meux and Co., and another debt to him,

(Deady) and another to his brother; the overplus to be re-

turned to Norton, etc. In consequence of this authority Deady

procured the goods, etc., to be appraised, and the gross amount

was £236 7s. 3d., out of which certain deductions were to be

made for taxes, expenses, etc. The defendants being apprised

by Norton of these circumstances, on the 25th of May, while

the plaintiffs' agent was still in possession under the distress,

the defendant Atlee told Norton that he should be very sorry that

Deady should run away with the whole of the property, and

that if he (Norton) would consent to sign an instrument, he

would give him his discharge immediately. What the instru-
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ment was Norton did not know till he had signed it; but

Atlee proposed that it should be for the benefit of the creditors

in general. Norton did not himself consult any of his creditors,

of whom he had several, but left that to Atlee. Norton, how-

ever, swore that he did not sign the instrument for the purpose

of defeating the plaintiffs' distress; and at the time of the trial

he was still in custody at the suit of the defendants. This instru-

ment, which was prepared by Mr. Wild, the attorney for the

defendants, was a warrant of attorney to confess judgment for

£800, with a defeazance that execution should issue to levy

£500 (which the defendants' attorney computed to be the prob-

able amount of the debts), and that with the produce of the

sale an equal distribution should be made amongst all the

creditors. Under this power judgment was entered up on the

10th of June, and execution issued on the 12th, when all the

goods were sold for about £104, and no part of the money was

paid to the plaintiffs either on account of their distress for

the rent, in respect of which the plaintiffs' agent was still on

the premises, with Norton's consent, or for their book debt: but

sending in the distress Norton was arrested by the defendants,
who were distillers, for £42, for which he had at first given bail,
but on the 12th of May was rendered in discharge of his bail
1 On the 19th of May, Norton having agreed to dispose of his
business to one J. W., while the plaintiffs' distress still continued, entered into an agreement in writing with the plaintiffs'
agent Deady, whereby he requested him to let J. W. into possession of his (Norton's) house for £30 goodwill, and to sell by
appraisement all the goods, fixtures, and stock in trade on the
premises to J. W. before the 24th of May, and after such settlement Deady was to pay all the rent, taxes, expenses, and the
book debt due to Meux and Co., and another debt to him1
(Deady) and another to bis brother; the overplus to be returned to Norton, etc. In consequence of this authority Deady
procured the goods, etc., to be appraised, and the gross a.mount
was £236 7s. 3d., out of which certain deductions were to be
made for taxes, expenses, etc. The defendants being apprised
by Norton of these circumstances, on the 25th of May, while
the plaintiffs' agent was still in possession under the distress,
the defendant Atlee told Norton that he should be very sorry that
Deady should run away with the whole of the property, and
that if he (Norton) would consent to sign an instrument, ·he
would give him his discharge immediately. What the instrument was Norton did not know till he had signed it; but
Atlee proposed that it should be for the benefit of the creditors
in general. Norton did not himself consult any of his creditors,
of whom he had several, but left that to Atlee. Norton, however, swore that he did not sign the instrument for the purp08e
of defeating the plaintiffs' distress; and at the time of the trial
he was still in custody at the suit of the defendants. This instrument, which was prepared by l\fr. Wild, the attorney for the
defendants, was a warrant of attorney to confess judgment for
£800, with a defeazance that execution should issue to levy
- £500 (which the defendants' attorney computed to he the probable amount of the debts), and that with the produce of the
sale an equal distribution ' should be made amongst all the
ereditors. Under this power judgment was entered up on the
10th of June, and execution issued on the 12th, when all the
goods were sold for about £104, and no part of the money was
paid to the plaintiffs either on account of their dist~ for
the rei1t, in respect of which the plaintiffs' agent was still on
the premises, with Norton's consent, or for their book debt: but

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 163

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES

16:3

a tender was made to the plaintiffs as for the rent (but less

than the two years' rent), which they would not receive. The

defendants had not previously consulted any of the other

creditors of Norton; but Atlee, in answer to one of them who

afterwards called upon him, said, that he meant to divide the

money equally amongst the creditors as soon as he could pro-

cure a list of them. On the part of the defendants, Mr. Wild

their attorney swore, that the instructions he received from them

was merely to take such measures as the occasion required to

effect an equal distribution of Norton's property amongst all

his creditors, leaving the particular mode of doing it to him

(Wild); in consequence of which he prepared the warrant of

attorney on which the judgment in question was entered up.

The defeazance was taken for £500, considering that to be about

the amount of Norton's debts altogether. It was left to the

jury to consider whether the defendants were privy to the actual

judgment and execution, founded upon the power of attorney

prepared by Wild their ageut, or merely to the general object

of obtaining possession of the property to prevent the plaintiffs

from satisfying their demand in prejudice to the general

creditors. The jury found, that the defendants were privy to

the means used as well as to the general object, and found a

verdict for the plaintiffs for £803 3s.
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LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C. J. It is not every feoffment,

judgment, etc., which will have the effect of delaying or hinder-

ing creditors of their debts, etc., that is therefore fraudulent

within the statute; for such is the effect pro tanto of every

assignment that can be made by one who has creditors: every

assignment of a man's property, however good and honest the

consideration, must diminish the fund out of which satisfaction

is to be made to his creditors. But the feoffment, judgment,

etc., must be devised of malice, fraud, or the like, to bring it

within the statute. Then was this judgment of that sort?

a tender was made to the plaintiffs a~ for the rent (but less
than the two years' rent), which they would not receive. The
defendants had not previously consulted any of the otbet
creditors of Norton; but Atlee, in answer to one of them who
afterwards called upon him, said, that he meant to divide the
money equally amongst the creditors as soon as he could procure a list of them. On the part of the defendants, Mr. \Vild
their attorney swore, that the instructions he received from them
was merely to take such measures as the occasion required to
effect an equal distribution of Norton's property amongst all
his creditors, leaving the particular mode of doing it to him
(Wild) ; in consequence of which he prepared the warrant of
attorney on which the judgment in question was entered up.
The defea.zance was taken for £500, considering that to be about
the amount of Norton's debts altogether. It was left to the
jury to consider whether the defendants were privy to the actual
judgment and execution, founded upon the power of attorney
prepared by Wild their agent, or merely to the general object
of obtaining possession of the property to prevent the plaintiffs
from satisfying their demand in prejudice to the general
creditors. The jury found, that the defendants were privy to
the means used as well as to the general object, and fowid a
verdict for the plaintiffs for £803 3s.

For whose benefit was the fraud? Norton has extinguished no

debt by means of it, further than as the execution shall turn

out productive in satisfying the demands of his just creditors.

It holds out no protection to him otherwise. He is even left

under arrest at the suit of the particular creditor, as . he was

before the judgment was confessed. Then how are the defend-

ants implicated in any fraud? Instead of having, as they

might have had, a satisfaction for their whole debt, by having

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C. J. It is not every feoffment,
judgment, etc., which will have the effect of delaying or hindering creditors of their debts. etc., that is therefore fraudulent
within the statute; for such is the effect pro tan to of every
assignment that can be made by one who has creditors: every
assignment of a man's property, however good and honest the
consideration, must diminish the fund out of which satisfaction
is to be made to his creditors. nut the feoffment, judgment,
etc., must he devised of malice. fraud, or the like, to bring it
within the statute. Then was this judgment of that sort T
For whose benefit was the fraud T Norton has extinguished no
debt by means of it, further than as t.he execution shall turn
out productive in satisfying the demands of his just creditors.
It holds out no protection to him otherwise. He is even left
under arrest at the suit of the particular creditor, as. he was
before the judgment was confessed. Then how are the defendants implicated in any fraud T Instead of having, as they
might have had, a satisfaction for their whole debt, by having
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the judgment confessed to them for that alone, they forego that

advantage, and take a judgment confessed for the amount of

the debts of the creditors at large, being contented to come in

pari passu with the other creditors. They have derived there-

fore no benefit to themselves. Nor was the judgment confessed

in prejudice of any right of the plaintiffs. For their distress

which was in could not be defeated by the operation of the

judgment. And as to their book debt, they had taken no inchoate

legal steps to recover it, for the paper signed by Norton operated

nothing. The judgment put the plaintiffs in the same situation

as the rest of the creditors. It delayed the plaintiffs indeed so

far as a proportionable payment to creditors in general is a

delay of each of them in particular: but there was no fraud, no

colour, no undue protection to the debtor. The defendants were

placed in a worse situation than if they had taken the judg-

ment for themselves alone. Therefore unless we were to go the

length of saying that every assignment to a creditor is fraudu-

lent as to the rest of the creditors, and prohibited to be made,

this was not fraudulent. It has none of the qualities of fraud

within the act of parliament, which was meant to prevent deeds,

etc., fraudulent in their concoction, and not merely such as in

their effect might delay or hinder other creditors.

GROSE, J. The statute in its whole frame is calculated to
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prevent certain frauds, and to punish those who are guilty of

them; and we must be satisfied that the defendants have been

so guilty before we can say that the verdict ought to stand,

which is to induce that punishment upon them. The first clause

of the statute speaks of judgments, etc., devised of "malice,

fraud, covin, collusion, or guile," not only to "the let or

hindrance of the due course and execution of law and justice,"

but also to "the overthrow of all true and plain dealing." The

the judgment confessed to them for that alone, they forego that
advantage, and take a judgment conf~d for the ~mount pf
the debts of the creditors at large, being contented to come in
pari passu with the other creditors. They have derived therefore no benefit to themselves. Nor was the judgment confessed
in prejudice of any right of the plaiutiffs. For their distress
which was in could not be defeated by the operation of the
judgment. And as to their book debt, they had taken no inchoate
legal steps to recover it, for the paper signed by Norton operated
nothing. The judgment put the plaintiffs in the same situation
as the rest of the creditors. It delayed the plaintiffs indeed so
far as a proportionable payment to creditors in general is a
delay of each of them in particular: but there was no fraud, no
colour, no undue protection to the debtor. The defendants were
placed in a worse situation than if they had taken the judgment for themselves alone. Therefore unless we were to go the
length of saying that every assignment to a creditor is fraudulent 88 to the rest of the creditors, and prohibited to be made,
this was not fraudulent. It has none of the qualities of fraud
within the act of parliament, which was meant to prevent deeds.
etc., fraudulent in their concoction, and not merely such as m
their effect might delay or hinder other creditors.

second clause speaks of persons whose suits, debts, etc., are

hindered, delayed, or defrauded "by such guileful, covenous,

or fraudulent devices and practices as aforesaid." And the

third section inflicts punishment upon such as put in ure, etc.,

"as true, simple and done bona fide and upon good considera-

tion," such acts. This satisfies me that if the judgment, etc.,

be given bona fide and upon good consideration, it is not within

the act. Here there is nothing like a fraud. And it makes one

shudder to think that persons who appear like the defendants to

have acted most honestly should have been in any hazard of being

GROSE, J. The statute in its whole frame is calculated to
prevent certain frauds, and to punish those who are guilty of
them; and we must be satisfied that the defendants have been
so guilty before we can say that the verdict ought to stand,
which is to induce that punishment upon them. The first clause
. of the statute speaks of judgments, etc., devised of ''malice,
fraud, covin, collusion, or guile,'' not only to ''the let or
hindrance of the due course and execution of law and justice,''
but also to "the overthrow of all true and plain dealing." The
second clause speaks of persons whose suits, debts, etc., are
hindered, delayed, or defrauded ''by such guileful, covenous,
or fraudulent devices and practices as aforesaid." And the
third section inflicts punishment upon such as put in ure, etc.,
"as true, simple and done bona fide and upon good consideration,'' such acts. This satisfies me that if the judgment, etc.,
be given bona fide and upon good consideration, it is not within
the act. Here there is nothing like a fraud. And it makes one
shudder to think that persons who appear like the defend.ants to
have acted most honestly should have been in any hazard of being
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subjected to punishment for having endeavoured to procure

an equal distributiou of their debtors' effects amongst all his

creditors. Their conduct was meritorious, and the judgment

confessed by Norton was not covenous or feigned, but given bona

fide and upon good consideration for debts due to the defend-

ants and the other creditors. Therefore, I think there ought to

be a new trial.

Lord ELLENBOROUGH, C. J., then observed, that he

thought the third clause of the act imposing the penalty, which

in one part only mentions the word bond, had had a fair con-

struction put upon it by the plaintiffs' counsel; and that it must

subjeded to punishment for having eudeavoureu to procure
an equal distribution of their debtors' effects amongst all his
creditors. Their conduct was m~ritorious, and the judg111c11t
confessed by Norton was not cove11ous or feigned, Lut given bona
fide and upon good consideration for debts due to the defendants and the other creditors. Therefore, I think there ought to
be a new trial.

be taken to extend to feoffments, judgments, etc., as mentioned in

the other parts of the clause.

LAWRENCE, and LE BLANC, Justices, declared themselves

of the same opinion for the defendants.

Rule absolute.

FREEMAN v. POPE

5 Ch. App. 538

(Chancery. June 7, 1870) |

This was an appeal by the Defendant Pope from a decree of

Lord ELLENBOROUGH, C. J., then observed, that he
thought the third clause of the act imposing the penalty, which
in one part only mentions the word bond, had had a fair construction put upon it by the plaintiffs' couusel; and that it must
be taken to extend to feoffments, judgments, etc., as mentioned in
the other parts of the clause.

Vice-Chancellor James, setting aside a voluntary settlement,

dated the 3d of March, 1863, by which the Rev. J. Custance

assigned to trustees for the benefit of Julia Pope (then Julia
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Thrift) a policy of insurance for £1000 (effected by him in

1845 on his own life), and covenanted to pay the premiums. It

appeared that he had previously settled this policy upon her in

LAWHENCE, and LE BLANC, Justices, declared themselves
of the same opinion for the defendants.
Rule absolute.

1853, reserving a power of revocation, which he exercised in

1861, in order that he might receive a bonus.

At the time when the settlement now impeached was made,

FREEMAN v. POPE

the settlor held two livings producing a net income of £815, and

he was entitled to a Government life-annuity of a little more

5 Ch. App. 538

than £180, and to a copyhold cottage which he on the same day

covenanted to surrender to Mrs. Walpole, the mother of Julia

(Chancery.

June 7, 1870)

Pope, for £50. He had no other property except his furniture,

and he was being pressed by his creditors. Among other debts,

he owed £489 to Messrs. Gurney, his bankers at Norwich, and

£7 8s. 6d. to a postmaster. On the same 3d of March, 1863, he

This was an appeal by the Defendant Pope from a decree of
Vice-Chancellor James, setting aside a voluntary settlement,
dated the 3d of ~larch, 1863, hy which the Rev. J. Custance
assigned t.o trustees for the benefit of Julia Pope (then Julia
Thrift) a policy of insurance for £1000 (effected by him in
1845 on his own life), and covenanted to pay the premiums. It
appeared that he had previously settled this policy upon her in
1853, reserving a power of revocation, which he exercised in
1861, in order that he might receive a bonus.
At the time when the settlement now impeached was made,
the settlor held two livings producing a net income of £815, and
he was entitled to a Government life-annuity of a little more
than £180, and to a copyhold cottage which he on the same day
covenanted to surrender to l\lrs. Walpole, the mother of Julia
Pope, for £50. He had no other property except his furniture,
and he was being pressed by his creditors. Among other debts,
he owed £489 to Messrs. Gurney, his bankers at Norwich, and
£7 Bs. 6d. to a postmaster. On the same 3d of March, 1863, he

I

166 PREREQUISITES TO ADJUDICATION

166

PREREQUISITES TO ADJUDICATION

I

borrowed from Mrs. Walpole £350, for which he gave her a bill

of sale of his furniture. Mrs. Walpole was privy to, and one of

the trustees of, the settlement. At the same time he made an

arrangement with his bankers that his solicitor, Mr. Copenian,

should receive certain income from the benefices, and pay out of

it £50 each half-year towards discharge of the balance. The

banking account at Norwich was to remain a dead account, and

to be discharged, with interest, by the above instalments. A

new account was to be opened with the Aylsham branch of the

same bank, and Copeman was to pay the residue of the income

(after deducting the £50) to this new account, which was to be

an ordinary current banking account.

At the testator's death, in April, 1868, the balance of £489

due to the bankers had been reduced to £117 by means of the

annual instalments of £50. The Aylsham account showed no

balance on either side. The postmaster's debt of £7 8s. 6d., and

Mrs. Walpole's £350, with an arrear of interest, remained un-

paid. The other debts due at the date of the settlement had

been paid. The settlor, however, owed many debts subsequently

contracted, and there were no assets whatever to pay them; the

furniture having been sold under a subsequent bill of sale, to

which Mrs. Walpole had agreed to postpone her security.
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The Plaintiff, a tradesman who had supplied goods to the

settlor after the date of the settlement, filed his bill for adminis-

tration of the settlor's estate, and to set aside the settlement,

to the benefit of which the Defendant Pope had become entitled

under an appointment by Julia Pope.

The Vice-Chancellor James made a decree for setting aside

the settlement, from which Pope appealed.

LORD HATHERLEY, L. C. The principle on which the

statute of 13 Eliz. c. 5, proceeds is this, that persons must be

just before they are generous, and that debts must be paid before

gifts can be made.

The difficulty the Vice-Chancellor seems to have felt in this

case, was, that if he, as a special juryman, had been asked

whether there was actually any intention on the part of the

settlor in this case to defeat, hinder, or delay his creditors, he

should have come to the conclusion that he had no such inten-

tion. With great deference to the view of the Vice-Chancellor,

and with all the respect which I most unfeignedly entertain

horrowed from Mrs. Walpole £350, for which he gave her a bill
of sale of his furniture. Mrs. 'Valpole was privy to, and ooe of
the trustees of, the settlement. At the same time be made an
arrangemeut with his hankers that his solicitor, Mr. Copeman,
should receive certain income from the benefices, and pay out of
it £50 each half-year towards discharge of the balance. The
banking account at Norwich was to remain a dead account, and
to he discharged, ,with interest, by the above instalments. A
11ew account was to be opened with the Aylsham branch of the
same bank, and Copeman was to pay the residue of the income
(after deducting the £50) to this n~w account, which was to be
an ordinary current banking account.
At the testator's death, in April, 1868, the balance of £489
due to the bankers had been reduced to £117 by means of the
annual instalments of £50. The Aylsham account showed no
balance on either side. The postmaster's debt of £7 Sa. 6d., and
Mrs. Walpole's £350, with an arrear of interest, remained unpaid. The other debts due at the date of the settlement had
been paid. The settlor, however, owed many debts subsequently
contracted, and there were no assets whatever to pay them; the
furniture having been sold under a subsequent bill of sale, to
which Mrs. 'Valpole bad agreed to postpone her security.
The Plaintiff, a tradesman who had supplied goods to the
settlor after the date of the settlement, filed bis bill for administration of the settlor's estate, and to set aside the settlement,
to the benefit of which the Defendant Pope had become entitled
under an appointment by Julia Pope.
The Vice-Chancellor James made a decree for setting aside
the settlement, from which Pope appealed.

for his judgment, it appears to me that this does not put the

LORD HA THERLEY, L. C. The principle on which tbP.
statute of 13 Eliz. c. 5, proceeds is this, that persons must be
just before they are generous, and that debts must be paid before
gifts can be made.
The difficulty the Vice-Chancellor seems to have felt in this
case, was, that if he, as a special juryman, bad been asked
whether there was actually any intention on the part of tht!
settlor in this case to defeat, hinder, or delay his creditors, he
should have come to the conclusion that he had no such intent.ion. With great deference to the view of the Vice-Chancellor,
and with all the respect which I most unfeignedly entertain
for his jµdgment, it appears to me that this does not put the
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question exactly on the right ground; for it would never be left

to a special jury to find, simpliciter, whether the settlor intended

to defeat, hinder, or delay his creditors, without a direction from

the Judge that if the necessary effect of the instrument was to

defeat, hinder, or delay the creditors, that necessary effect was

to be considered as evidencing an intention to do so. A jury

would undoubtedly be so directed, lest they should fall into

the error of speculating as what was actually passing in the

mind of the settlor, which can hardly ever be satisfactorily

ascertained, instead of judging of his intention by the necessary

consequences of his act, which consequences can always be esti-

mated from the facts of the case. Of course there may be cases

—of which Spirett v. Willows, 3 D. J. & S. 293, is an instance—

in which there is direct and positive evidence of an intention

to defraud, independently of the consequences which may have

followed, or which might have been expected to follow, from

the act. In Spirett v. Willows the settlor, being solvent at the

time, but having contracted a considerable debt, which would

fall due in the course of a few weeks, made a voluntary settle-

ment by which he withdrew a large portion of his property from

the payment of debts, after which he collected the rest of his

assets and (apparently in the most reckless and profligate man-

ner) spent them, thus depriving the expectant creditor of the
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means of being paid. In that case there was clear and plain evi-

dence of an actual intention to defeat creditors. But it is

established by the authorities that in the absence of any such

direct proof of intention, if a person owing debts makes a settle-

ment which subtracts from the property which is the proper

fund for the payment of those debts, an amount without which

the debts cannot be paid, then, since it is the necessary conse-

quence of the settlement (supposing it effectual) that some

creditors must remain unpaid, it would be the duty of the

Judge to direct the jury that they must infer the intent of the

settlor to have been to defeat or delay his creditors, and that

the case is within the statute.

The circumstances of the present case are these: The settlor

was pressed by his creditors on the 3d of March, 1863. He was

a clergyman with a very good income, but a life income only.

He had a life-annuity of between £180 and £190 a year, and

besides that he had an income from his benefice—his income

from the two sources amounting to about £1,000 a year. But at

the same time his creditors were pressing him, and he had to

question exactly on the right ground; for it would never be left
to a special jury to find, sinipliciter, whether the settlor intended
to defeat, hinder, or delay his creditors, without a direction from
the Judge that if the necessary effect of the instrument was to
defeat, hinder, or delay the creditors, that necesSRry effect was
to be considered as evidencing an intention to do so. A jury
would undoubtedly be so directed, lest they should fall into
the error of speculating as what was actually passing in the
mind of the settlor, which can hardly ever be satisfactorily
ascertained, instead of judging of his intention by the necessary
consequences of his act, which consequences can always be e<>timated from the fact.a of the case. Of course there may be cases
-of which Spirett v. Willows, 3 D. J. & S. 293, is an instancein which there is direct and positive evidence of an intention
to defraud, independently of the consequences which may have
followed, or which might have been expected to follow, from
the act. In Spirett v. Willows the settlor, being solvent at the
time, but having contracted a considerable debt, wQ.ich would
fall due- in the course of a few weeks, made a voluntary settlement by which he withdrew a large portion of his property from
the payment of debts, after which he collected th~ rest of his
asset.a and (apparently in the most reckless and profligate manner) spent them, thus depriving the expectant creditor of the
means of being paid. In that case there was clear and plain evidence of an actual intention to defeat creditors. But it is
established by the authorities that in the absence of any such
direct proof of intention, if a person owing debts makes a settlement which subtract.a from the property which is the proper
fund for the payment of those debts, an amount without which
the debt.a cannot be paid, then, since it is the necessary consequence of the settlement (supposing it effectual) that some
creditors must remain unpaid, it would be the duty of the
.Judge to direct the jury that they must infer the intent of the
settlor to have been to defeat or delay his creditors, and that
the case is within the statute.
The circu018tances of the present cal'~ are these: The settlor
was pressed by his creditors on the 3d of March, 1863. He was
a clergyman with a very good income, but a life income only.
He had a life-annuity of between £180 and £190 a year, and
besides that he had an income from his benefice-his income
from the two sources amounting to about £1,000 a year. But at
the same time his creditors were pressing him, and he had to

168 PREREQUISITES TO ADJUDICATION

borrow from Mrs. Walpole, who lived with him as his house-

keeper, a sum of £350 wherewith to pay the pressing creditors.

That accordingly was done, and he handed over to her as security

the only property he had in the world beyond his life income

and the policy which is now in question, namely, his furniture,

and a copyhold of trifling value. It is said, however, that the

value of the furniture exceeded (and I will take it to be so)

by about £200 the value of the debt which was secured to Mrs.

Walpole. That debt may be put out of consideration, not only on

that account, but because Mrs. Walpole, being herself a trustee

of the settlement which is impeached, cannot be heard to com-

plain of that settlement. But he also owed at the time of this

pressure a debt of £339 to his bankers at Norwich, and he re-

quired for the purpose of clearing the pressing demands upon

him, not only the sum which he borrowed from Mrs. Walpole,

but an additional sum of £150, which sum the bankers agreed

to furnish, making their debt altogether, at the date of the execu-

tion of this settlement. a debt of £489. They made with him

an arrangement (which probably intended, in a great measure,

as a friendly act towards a gentleman who was seventy-three

years of age, and the duration of whose life, therefore, could

not be expected to be very long), that they would for the

present (for it cannot be held to be more than a present arrange-
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ment) suspend the proceedings, which, it appears, they were

contemplating, upon his allowing his solicitor to receive part

of his income, pay £100 a year towards liquidating the £489

(which was to be carried to what is called a "dead account")

and pay the residue into their branch bank at Aylsham, to an

account upon which the settlor might draw. That arrangement

was made, but there was no bargain on the part of the bankers

that they would not sue at any time they thought fit; and, on

the other hand, they had nothing in the shape of security for the

payment of their debt, for they had not taken out sequestration,

and there could be nothing in the shape of a charge upon the

living except through the medium of a sequestration. When the ■

settlor had made the voluntary assignment of the policy, he

stood in this position, that he had literally nothing wherewithal

to pay or to give security for the debt of £489, except the sur-

plus value of the furniture, which must be taken to be worth

about £200, and he was clearly and completely insolvent the

moment he had executed the settlement, even if we assume that

some portion of his tithes and of the annuity was due to him.
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borrow .from Mrs. Walpole, who lived with him as his housekeeper, a sum of £350 wherewith to pay the pressing creditors.
That accordi11gJy was done, and he handed over to her as security
the only property he had in the world beyond his life income
and the policy which is now in question, namely, his furniture,
and a copyhold of trifling value. It is said, however, that the
value of the furniture exceeded (and I will take it to be so)
by about £200 the value of the debt which was secured to Mrs.
Walpole. That debt may he put out of consideration, not only on
'that account, but because Mrs. Walpole, being herself a trustee
of the settlement which is impeached, cannot be heard to complain of that settlement. But he also owed at the time of this
pressure a debt of £339 to his bankers at Norwich, and he required for the purpose of clearing the pressing demands upon
him, not only the sum which he borrowed from Mrs. Wal pole,
but an additional sum of £150, which sum the bankers agreed
to furnish, making their debt altogether, at the date of the execution of this settlement, a debt of £489. They made with him
an arrangement (which probably intended, in a great measure,
as a friendly act towards a gentleman who was seventy-three
years of age, and the duration of whose life, therefore, could
not be expected to be very long), that they would for the
present 1( for it cannot be held to be more than a present arrangement) suspend the proceedings, which, it appears, they were
contemplating, upon his allowing his solicitor to receive part
of his income, pay £100 a year towards liquidating the £489
(which was to be carried to what is called a "dead account")
and pay the residue into their branch bank at Aylsham, to an
account upon which the settlor might draw. · That arrangement
was made, but there was no bargain on the part of the bankers
that they would not sue at any time they thought fit; and, on
the other hand, they had nothing in the shape of security for the
payment of their debt, for they had not taken out sequestration,
and there could be nothing in the shape of a charge upon the
living except through the medium of a sequestration. When the
settlor had made the voluntary assignment of the policy, he
stood in this position, that be had literally nothing wherewithal
to pay or to give security for the debt of £489, except the surplus value of the furniture, which must be taken to be worth
about £200, and he was clearly and completely insolvent the
moment he had executed the settlement, even if we assume that
some portion of his tithes and of the annuity was due to him.
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It appears that a payment of the tithes was made in January,

and we cannot suppose that there was more owing to him than

the £200 which was paid in May, two mouths after the date of

the deed; and if we add to that £200 as the surplus value of the

furniture, and add something for an apportioned part of the

annuity, the whole put together would not meet the £489. He,

in truth, was at that time insolvent; and there I put it more

favourably than I ought to put it, because he could not at once

put his hands upon that sum, so as to apply it towards satisfy-

ing the debt, at any time between March and May. The case,

therefore, is one of those where an intention to delay creditors

is to be assumed from the act.

The Vice-Chancellor seems to have felt himself very much

pressed by the case of Spirett v. Willows, 3 D. J. & S. 293, 302,

and the dicta of Lord Westbury in that case. The first of those

dicta is: "If the debt of the creditor by whom the voluntary

settlement is impeached existed at the date of the settlement,

and it is shown that the remedy of the creditor is defeated or

delayed by the existence of the settlement, it is immaterial

whether the debtor was or was not solvent after making the

settlement." The Vice-Chancellor seems to have thought him-

self bound by this expression of opinion, and to have set aside

the settlement upon that ground alone. It is clear, however,
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that this expression of opinion on the part of the Lord Chan-

cellor was by no means necessary for the decision of the case

before him, where the settlor was guilty of a plain and manifest

fraud. It is expressed in very large terms, probably too large;

but at all events, it is unnecessary to resort to it in the present

case. It seems to me that the difficulty felt by the Vice-Chan-

cellor arose from his thinking that it was necessary to prove an

actual intention to delay creditors, where the facts are such as

to show that the necessary consequence of what was done was to

delay them. If we had to decide the question of actual inten-

tion, probably we might conclude that the settlor, when he

made the settlement, was not thinking about his creditors at

all, but was only thinking of the lady whom he wished to bene-

fit; and that his whole mind being given up to considerations

of generosity and kindness towards her, he forgot that his

creditors had higher claims upon him, and he provided for her

without providing for them. It makes no difference that Messrs.

Gurney, the bankers, seem to have been willing to forego the

immediate payment of their debt; the question is, whether they

It appears that a payment of the tithes was made in January,
and we cannot suppose that there was more owing to him than
the £200 which was paid in May, two mouths after the date of
the deed; and if we add to that £200 as the surplus value of the
furniture, and add something for an apportioned part of the
annuity, the whole put together would not meet the £489. He,
in truth, was at that time insolvent; and there I put it more
favourably than I ought to put it, because he could not at once
put his hands upon that sum, so as to apply it towards satisfying the debt, at any time between :March and May. The case,
therefore, is one of those where an intention to delay creditors
is to be assumed from the act.
The Vice-Chancellor seems to have felt himself very much
pl'E'ssed by the case of Spirett v. Willows, 3 D. J. & S. 293, 302,
and the dicta of Lord Westbury in that case. The first of those
dicta is: "If the debt of the creditor by whom the voluntary
settlement is impeached existed at the date of the settlement,
and it is shown that the remedy of the creditor is defeated or
delayed by the existence of the settlement, it is immaterial
whether the debtor was or was not solvent after making the
settlement." The Vice-Chancellor seems to have thought himself bound by this expression of opinion, and to have set aside
the settlement upon that ground alone. It is clear, however,
that this expression of opinion on the part of the Lord Chancellor was by no means necessary for the decision of the case
before him, where the settlor was guilty of a plain and manifest
fraud. It is expressed in very large terms, probably too large;
but at a\I events, it is unnecessary to resort to it in the present
ease. It seems to me that the difficulty felt by the Vice-Chancellor arose from bis thinking that it was necessary to prove an
actual intention to delay creditors, where the facts are such as
to show that the necessary consequence of what \Vas done was to
delay them. If we had to decide the question of actual intention, probably we might conclude that the settlor, when he
made the settlement, was not thinking about his creditors at
all, but was only thinking of the lady whom he wished to benefit; and that his whole mind being given up to considerations
of generosity and kindness towards her, he forgot that his
creditors had higher claims upon him~ and he provided for her
without providing for them. It makes no difference that Messrs.
Garney, the bankers, seem to have been willing to forego the
immediate payment of their debt; the question is, whether they
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could not within a month or less after the execution of the settle-

ment, if they had been so minded, have called in the debt and

overturned the settlement?

Beyond all doubt they could, on the ground that it did not

leave sufficient property to pay their debt; and this being so.

we are not to speculate about what was actually passing in his

mind. I am quite willing to believe that he had no deliberate

intention of depriving his creditors of a fund to which they

were entitled, but he did an act which, in point of fact, with-

drew that fund from them, and dealt with it by way of bounty.

That being so, I come to the conclusion that the decree of the

learned Vice-Chancellor is right. • • •

Sir G. M. GIFFARD, L. J. In this case I quite agree with the

Vice-Chancellor in thinking that if the propositions laid down in

Spirett v. Willows are taken as abstract propositions, they go too

far and beyond what the law is; but if they are taken in connec-

tion with the facts of that case, then undoubtedly there is abun-

could not within a month or less after the execution of the settle·
ment, if they had been so minded, have called in the debt and
overturned the settlement T
Beyond all doubt they could, on the ground that it did uot
leave sufficient property to pay their debt; and this being so,
we are not to speculate about what was actually passing in his
mind. I am quite willing to believe that he had no deliherate
intention of depriving his creditors of a fund to which they
were entitled, but he did an act which, in point of fact, withdrew that fund from them, and dealt with it by way of bounty.
That being so, I come to the conclusion that the dect'E'e of the
learned Vice-Chancellor is right. • • •

dantly enough to support the decision, for there was a voluntary

settlement by a man who, at its date, was solvent, but immediately

afterwards realized the rest of his property and denuded himself

of everything.

Of course the irresistible conclusion from that was, that

the voluntary settlement was intended to defeat the subsequent
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creditors. That being so, I do not think that the Vice-Chancellor

need have felt any difficulty about the case of Spirett v. Wil-

lows, but he seems to have considered, that in order to defeat

a voluntary settlement there must be proof of an actual and

express intent to defeat creditors. That, however, is not so.

There is one class of cases, no doubt, in which an actual and

express intent is necessary to be proved—that is, in such cases

as Holmes v. Penney, 3 K. & J. 90, and Lloyd v. Attwood,

3 De G. & J. 614, where the instruments sought to be set aside

were founded on valuable consideration; but where the settle-

ment is voluntary, then the intent may be inferred in a variety

of ways. For instance, if after deducting the property which

is the subject of the voluntary settlement, sufficient available

assets are not left for the payment of the settlor's debts, then

the law infers intent, and it would be the duty of a Judge, in

leaving the case to the jury, to tell the jury that they must pre-

sume that that was the intent. Again, if at the date of the

settlement the person making the settlement was not in a posi-

Sir G. M. GIFFARD, L. J. In this case I quite agree with the
Vice-Chancellor in thinking that if the propositiona laid down in
Spirett v. Willows are taken as abstract propositions, they go too
far and beyond what the law is; but if they are taken in connection with the facts of that case, then undoubtedly there is abundantly enough to support the decision, for there was a voluntary
settlement by a man who, at its date, was solvent, but immediately
afterwards realized the rest of his property and denuded himself
of everything.
Of course the irresistible conclusion from that was, that
the voluntary settlement was intended to defeat the subsequent
creditors. That being so, I do not think that the Vice-Chancellor
need have felt auy difficulty about the case of Spirett v. Willows, but he seems to have considered, that in order to defeat
a voluntary settlement there must be proof of an actual and
express intent to defeat creditors. That, however, is not so.
There is one class of cases, no doubt, in which an actual and
express intent is neceBMry to be proved-that is, in such cases
as Holmes v. Penney, 3 K. & J. 90, and Lloyd v. Attwood,
3 De G. & J. 614, where the instruments sought to be set aside
were founded on valuable consideration; but where the settlement is voluntary, then the intent may be inferred in a variety
of ways. For instance, if after deducting the property which
is the subject of the voluntary settlement, sufficient available
assets are not left for the payment of the settlor's debts, then
the law infers intent, and it would be the duty of a Judge, in
leaving the cAse to the jury, to tell the jury that they must presume that that was the intent. Again, if at the date of the
settlement the person making the settlement was not in a posi- '
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tion actually to pay his creditors, the law would infer that

he intended, by making the voluntary settlement, to defeat and

delay them.

Now, in this case, at the date of the settlement, Mr. Custance

was really insolvent; and if at the date of the settlement the

bankers had insisted on payment, and had issued execution^

they could not have got a present payment unless they had

resorted to that particular policy. That being so, it seems to

me that the facts of this case bring the matter entirely within

all the decided cases, and it is enough to say that at the date

of this settlement Mr. Custance was not in a position to make

any voluntary settlement whatever.

That being so, the appeal must be dismissed, and dismissed

with costs, as I can see no reason for saying that the decree was

not right in giving the whole costs of the suit. There was,

previously to this case, a decision by Vice-Chancellor Kindersley

(Jenkyns v. Vaughan, 3 Drew. 419), laying down the rule that

where a subsequent creditor institutes a suit and proves the

existence of a debt antecedent to the settlement, he can maintain

a suit such as this, and therefore it is not a new case. There

can be no reason for doubting the correctness of that decision,

either in point of principle or justice.13
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In re JOHNSON—GOLDEN v. GILLAM

20 Ch. D. 389

(Chancery Division. December 13-15, 1881)

This was an action to set aside a deed of gift as fraudulent

and void under the statute 13 Eliz. c. 5.

The deed of gift was dated the 12th of June, 1878, and wit-

nessed that in consideration of the natural love and affection of

Judith Johnson, widow, towards her daughters Alice and Amy,

tion actually to puy his creditors, the law would infer that
he intended, by making the voluntary settlement, to defeat and
delay then"l.
No,...-, in tl1is case, at the date of the settlement, Mr. Custance
wns really insolvent; and if at the date of the settlement the
bankers had insisted on payment, and had issued executio1~,
they could not - have got a present payment unless they had
resorted to that partirular policy. That being so, it seems to
me that the facts of this case bring the matter entirely within
all the decided cases, and it is enough to say that at the date
of this settlement Mr. Custance was not in a position to make
any voluntary settlement whatever.
That being so, the appeal must be dismissed, and dismissed
with costs, as I can see no reason for saying that the decree was
not right in giving the whole costs of the suit. There was,
pre,-iously to this case, a decision by Vice-Chancellor Kindersley
(.Jenkyns Y. Vaughan, 3 Drew. 419), laying down the rule that
where a subsequent creditor institutes a suit and proves the
existence of a debt antecedent to the settlement, he can maintain
a suit such as this, and therefore it is not a new case. There
can be no reason for doubting the correctness of that decision,
either in point of principle or justice. ts

and of the covenants thereinafter contained, the said Judith

Johnson granted a farmhouse and premises in Trunch, in the

In re JOHNSON-GOLDEN v. GILLAM

county of Norfolk, to Stephen Gillam and his heirs, as to one

moiety to the use of her daughter Alice, and as to the other

20 Ch. D. 389

moiety to the use of her daughter Amy, and assigned the crops

of the farm as to one moiety in trust for Alice, and as to the

(Chancery Division.

other moiety in trust for Amy. And Alice and Amy covenanted

December 13-15, 1881)

J3—See also In re Lane-Fox

(1900), 2 Q. B. 508.

This was an action to set aside a deed of gift as fraudulent
and void under the statute 13 Eliz. c. 5.
The deed of gift was dated the 12th of June, 1878, and witnessed that in consideration of the natural love and affection of
~Judith Johnson, widow, towards her daughters Alice and Amy,
and of the covenants thereinafter contained, the said Judith
Johnson granted a farmhouse and premises in Trunch, in the
county of Norfolk, to Stephen Gillam and his heirs, as to one
moiety to the use of her daughter Alice, and as to the other
moiety to the use .of her daughter Amy, and assigned the crops
of the farm as to one moiety in trust for Alice, and as to the
other moiety in trust for Amy. And Alice and Amy covenanted
13-See

nlso

In

(1900), 2 Q. B. 508.

re

Lane-Fox
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that they, or one of them, would "pay all the just debts incurred

by the said Judith Johnson up to the date of the said indenture

in connection with the working and management of the said

farm," and would maintain the said Judith Johnson during

her life, providing her with a- home, food, clothes, and medical

or other attendance in such style or manner as she had been

theretofore accustomed to.

This deed of gift, which was executed by Judith Johnson and

Alice Johnson, was a conveyance of all the property of Judith

Johnson.

The plaintiff was a creditor of Mrs. Johnson at the date of

the deed for £120. This debt was not incurred by Mrs. John-

son, but by William Johnson, her predecessor in the farm, and

she had adopted it by giving a promissory note for the amount.

Evidence was offered that there were other creditors of Mrs.

Johnson besides the plaintiff, who were not provided for by the

deed, but the court held that none of these debts were proved

to have been incurred for purposes unconnected with the farm.

The state of the family of Judith Johnson when the deed was

executed was as follows: Judith Johnson was the widow of

William Johnson, who had previously been the husband of her

sister, and had had by her a family of whom one son, James,

was living. After his first wife's death William Johnson had
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gone through the ceremony of marriage with Judith Johnson,

his deceased wife's sister, and had a family by her, of whom

George, Arthur, Alice, and Amy were living. William Johnson

had provided for his children, other than Alice and Amy, out

of other property, and shortly before he died he granted the

Trunch farm—the subject of this litigation—by deed of gift to

Judith Johnson, in consideration of her covenant "to pay all

debts incurred by William Johnson in connection with the work-

ing and management of the farm, and all liabilities that he

might incur for means of living, medical attendance, and ex-

penses of a like nature."

George and James Johnson were living away from the farm,

Arthur lived with his mother, Mrs. Johnson, till 1877, when he

left, and, Mrs. John being then bedridden, the farm was carried

on by Alice, the elder daughter, and Amy (who was an infant

at the date of the deed), with the assistance of the Defendant

Gillam. Gillam made them advances of money from time to time

for the purchase of cattle and stock, and repaid himself out of

the produce. The plaintiff claimed to set aside the deed to the

that they, or one of them, would "pay all.the just debts ineurred
by the said Judith Johnson up to the date of the said indenture
in connection with the working and management of the said
farm," and would maintain the said Judith Johnson during
her life, providing her with a· home, food, clothes, and medical
or other attendance in such style or manner as she had been
theretofore accustomed to.
This deed of gift, which was executed by Judith Johnson and
Alice Johnson, was a conveyance of all the property of Judith
Johnson.
The plaintiff was a creditor of Mrs. Johnson at the date of
the deed for £120. This debt was not incurred by Mrs. Johnson, but by William Johnson, her predecessor in the farm, and
she had adopted it by giving a promissory note for the amount.
Evidence was offered that there were other creditors of Mrs.
Johnson besides the plaintiff, who were not provided for by the
deed, but the court held that none of these debts were proved
to have been incurred for purposes unconnected with the farm.
The state of the family of Judith Johnson when the deed was
executed was as follows: Judith Johnson was the widow of
William Johnson, who had previously been the husband of her
sister, and had had by her a family of whom one son, James,
was living. After his first wife's death William Johnson had
gone through the ceremony of marriage with Judith Johnson,
his deceased wife's sister, and had a family by her, of whom
George, Arthur, Alice, and Amy were living. William Johnson
had provided for his children, other than Alice and Amy, out
C?f other property, and shortly before he died he granted the
Trunch farm-the subject of this litigation-by deed of gift to
Judith Johnson, in consideration of her covenant "to pay all
debts jncurred by William Johnson in connection with the working and management of the farm, and all liabilities that he
might incur for means of living, medical attendance, and expenses of a like nature.''
George and James Johnson were living away from the farm,
Arthur lived with his mother, Mrs. Johnson, till 1877, when he
left, and, Mrs. John being then bedridden, the farm was carried
on by Alice, the elder daughter, and Amy (who was an infant
at the date of the deed), with the assistance of the Defendant
Gillam. Gillam made them advance~ of money from time to time
for the purchase of cattle and stock, and repaid himself out of
the produce. The plaintiff claimed to set aside the deed to the

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 173

defendant as fraudulent against himself and the other creditors

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES

173

of Mrs. Johnson.

FRY, J., after stating the effect of the deed, said:

It is clear that the consideration for the deed of the 12th of

June, 1878, was in part meritorious and in part valuable. The

defendant as fraudulent against himself and the other creditors
of Mrs. Johnson.

question before me is whether the deed is void against creditors

under the statute of 13 Eliz., c. 5.

For the purpose of deciding this, it will be convenient and

proper to refer to the material words of the statute, and I find

these sufficiently stated in a passage of the judgment of Sir

Thomas Plumer, when Vice Chancellor, in Copis v. Middleton

(2 Madd. 410). He says (2 Madd. 427), "The preamble of the

act is, for the avoiding and abolishing of feigned, covinous, and

fraudulent feoffments, as well of lands and tenements as of goods

and chattels, devised and contrived of malice, fraud, covin, col-

lusion, or guile, to the end, purpose, and intent to delay, hinder,

or defraud creditors and others of their just and lawful actions,

suits, debts, etc., not only to the let or hindrance of the due

course and execution of law and justice, but also to the over-

throw of all true and plain dealing * * * between man

and man, without which no commonwealth or civil society can

be maintained or continued. A conveyance, therefore, (the Vice-

Chancellor continues), to be affected by this act, must be shewn
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to be feigned, covinous, and fraudulent, and made with an intent

to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors: But if this case were

held to be within the statute, it would be the overthrow of all

true and plain dealing and bargaining between man and man;

for, as a purchaser cannot know the circumstances of the ven-

dor, it would prevent all dealing and bargaining between man

and man, and counteract the object of the statute. The statute,

in order to prevent this inconvenience, has by the 6th section

provided that the act shall not extend to any conveyance upon

good consideration and bona fide to any person not having at

the time of such conveyance any manner of notice or knowledge'

of such covin, fraud, or collusion. A conveyance, therefore, can-

not be invalidated by this act if there has been a bona fide pur-

chaser. ''

In Thompson v. Webster (4 Drew. 628), Vice-Chancellor

Kindersley said (4 Drew. 632), with regard to the general prin-

ciple of the act, "The principle now established in this. The

language of the act being that any conveyance of property is

FRY, J., after stating the e:fl'ect of the deed, said:
It is clear that the consideration for the deed of the 12th of
June, 1878, was in part meritorious and in part valuable. The
question before me is whether the deed is void against creditors
under the statute of 13 Eliz., c. 5.
For the purpose of deciding this, it will be convenient and
proper to refer to the material words of the statute, and I find
these sufficiently stated in a passage of the judgment of Sir
Thomas Plumer, when Vice Chancellor, in Copis v. Middleton
(2 Madd. 410). He says (2 Madd. 427), "The preamble of the
act is, for the avoiding and abolishing of feigned, covinous, and
fraudulent feotfments, as well of lands and tenements as of goods
and chattels, devised and contrived of malice, fraud, covin, collusion, or guile, to the end, purpose, and intent to delay, hinder,
or defraud creditors and others of their just and lawful actions,
suits, debts, etc., not only to the let or hindrance of the due
course and execution of law and justice, but also to the overthrow of all true and plain dealing • • • between man
and man, without which no commonwealth or civil society can
be maintained or continued. A conveyance, therefore, (the ViceChancellor continues), to be affected by this act, must be shewn
to be feigned, covinous, and fraudulent, and made with an intent
to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors: But if this case were
held to be within the statute, it would be the overthrow of all
true and plain dealing and bargaining between man and man;
Cor, as a purchaser cannot know the circumstances of the vendor, it would prevent all dealing and bargaining between man
and man, and counteract the object of the statute. The statute,
in order to prevent this inconvenience, has by the 6th section
provided that the act shall not extend to any conveyance upon
good consideration and bona fide to any p~rson not having at
the time of such conveyance any manner of notice or knowledge
of such covin, fraud, or collusion. A conveyance, therefore, cannot be invalidated by this act if there has been a bona fide purchaser.''
In Thompson v. Webster (4 Drew. 628), Vice-Chancellor
Kindersley said ( 4 Drew. 632), with regar.d to the general prindple of the act, "The principle now established in this. The
language of the act being that any conveyance of property is
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void against creditors if it is made with intent to defeat, hinder,
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or delay creditors, the court is to decide in each particular case

whether on all the circumstances it can come to the conclusion

that the intention of the settlor in making the settlement was to

defeat, hinder, or delay his creditors."

It is obvious that the intent of the statute is not to provide

equal distribution of the estates of debtors among their cred-

itors—there are other statutes which have that object; nor is it

the intent of this statute to prevent any honest dealing between

one man and another, although the result of such dealing may

be to delay creditors. And cases have been cited accordingly

where deeds of this nature have been held good, though the re-

sult of them has been that creditors have been not only delayed

but excluded.

The effect on a deed of this sort of its being for good consid-

eration is very great. It does not necessarily shew that the deed

may not be void under the statute, because in many cases good

consideration has been proved, and yet the object of the deed

has been to defeat and delay creditors; such has been, therefore,

for an unconscientious purpose, and the fact that there has been

good consideration will not uphold the deed. But nevertheless

it is a material ingredient in considering the case, and for very

obvious reasons: the fact that there is valuable consideration

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

shews at once that there may be purposes in the transaction other

than the defeating or delaying of creditors, and renders the

case, therefore, of those who contest the deed more difficult. In

the case of Harman v. Richards, the Lord Justice Turner, then

Vice-Chancellor, makes this observation (10 Hare, 89): "It re-

mains to be considered whether the settlement which was thus

made for valuable consideration was also made bona fide, for a

deed, though made for valuable consideration, may be affected

by mala fides. But those who undertake to impeach for mala

fides a deed which has been executed for valuable consideration,

have, I think, a task of great difficulty to discharge."

Lord Hatherley, when Vice-Chancellor, adopted the same view

in the case of Holmes v. Penney (3 K. & J. 90), which has been

discussed before me, and the same point was stated with even

more force by Lord Justice Giffard in Freeman v. Pope (Law

Rep. 5 Ch. 538). He said in that case (Law Rep. 5 Ch. 544),

"I do not think that the Vice-Chancellor need have felt any

difficulty about the case 'of Spirett v. Willows (3 D. J. & S. 293),

but he seems to have considered that in order to defeat a volun-

void against creditors if it is made with intent to defeat, hinder,
or delay creditors, the court is to decide in each particular case
whether on all the circumstances it can come to the conclusion
that the intention of the settlor in making the settlement was to
defeat, hinder, Or delay his Creditors. 1 I
It is obvious that the intent of the statute is not to provide
equal distribution of the estates of debtors among their creditors-there are other statutes which have that object; nor is it
the intent of this statute to prevent any honest dealing between
one man and another, although the result of such dealing may
be to delay creditors. And cases have been cited accordingly
where deeds of this nature have been held good, though the result of them has been that creditors have been not only delayed
but excluded.
The effect on a deed of this sort of its being for good consideration is very great. It does not necessarily shew that the deed
may not be void under the statute, because in many cases good
consideration has been proved, and yet the object of the deed
has been to defeat and delay creditors; such has been, therefore,
for an unconscientious purpose, and the fact that there has been
good consideration will not uphold the deed. But nevertheless
it is a material ingredient in considering the case, and for very
obvious reasons: the fact that there is valuable consideration
shews at once that there may be purposes in the transaction other
than the defeating or delaying of creditors, and renders the
case, therefore, of those who contest the deed more difficult. In
the case of Harman v. Richards, the Lord Justice Turner, then
Vice-Chancellor, makes this observation (10 Hare, 89) : "It remains to be considered whether the settlement which was thus
made for valuable consideration was also made bona fide, for a
deed, though made for valuable consideration, may be affected
by mala /ides. But those who undertake to impeach for ma1.a
fides a deed which has been executed for valuable consideration,
have, I think, a task of great difficulty to discharge.,'
Lord Hatherley, when Vice-Chancellor, adopted the same view
in the eE1se of Holmes v. Penney (3 K. & J. 90), which has been
discusst'd before me, and the same point was stated with even
more force by Lord Justice Giffard in Freeman v. Pope (Law
Rep. 5 Ch. 538). He said in that case (Law Rep. 5 Ch. 544),
''I do not think that the Vice-Chancellor need have felt any
difficulty about the case of Spirett v. Willows (3 D. J. & S. 293),
but he seems to have considered that in order to defeat a volun·
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tary settlement there must be proof of an actual and express

intent to defeat creditors. That, however, is not so. There is

one class of cases, no doubt, in which an actual and express

intent is necessary to be proved, that is in such cases as Holmes

v. Penney (3 K. & J. 90), and Lloyd v. Attwood (3 De G. & J.

614), where the instruments sought to be set aside were founded

on valuable consideration; but where a settlement is voluntary,

then the intent may be inferred in a variety of ways." I there-

fore proceed to inquire, looking to all the circumstances of the

case and at the nature of the instrument itself, whether I can or

ought to infer an intent to defraud creditors in the parties to the

deed. I say in the parties to the deed, because it appears to me

to be plain that whatever fraudulent intent there may have been

in the mind of Judith Johnson, it would not avoid the deed

unless it was shewn to have been concurred in by Alice, who

became the purchaser under the deed. It has not been con-

tended, and it could not be contended, that the mere fraudulent

intent of the vendor could avoid the deed, if the purchaser

were free from that fraud.

[HIS LORDSHIP then adverted to the provision which had

been made before the date of the deed for the other children of

Judith Johnson, and continued:—]

Having regard to the condition of the family, the deed was a
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highly proper one; the sons had left the home, and were pro-

vided for by the dispositions which their father had made of the

residue of his property; Mrs. Johnson was possessed of this farm

and of nothing else; the two single daughters living with her

must have been objects of her anxiety and care; she was bed-

ridden and not likely to recover; the farm was practically car-

ried on by Alice. Thereupon this deed was executed with the

obvious intention of making over to the daughters that farm

which their mother hoped they would reside on after her decease,

to avoid the heavy succession duty which would ensue if she

allowed the farm to pass to them under her will, they not being

legally her children, but strangers to her. The deed is, I ob-

serve, framed on the model of the previous deed, which had

been executed by her husband on his death-bed.

Now, it is important to inquire what was the indebtedness of

Mrs. Johnson when she executed the deed. She appears to have

had some current debts, mostly, if not entirely, in respect of the

farming business. She owed a Mr. Simpson, a witness in the

tary settlement. there must be proof of an actual and express
intent to defeat creditors. That, however, is not so. There is
one class of cases, no doubt, in which an actual and express
intent is necessary to be proved, that is in such cases as Holmes
v. Penney (3 K. & J. 90), and Lloyd v. Attwood (3 De G. & J.
614), where the instruments sought to be set aside were founded
on valuable consideration; but where a settlement is voluntary,
then the intent may be inferred in a variety of ways.'' I therefore proceed to inquire, looking to all the circumstances of the
case and at .the nature of the instrument itself, whether I can or
ought to infer an intent to defraud creditors in the parties to the
deed. I say in the parties to the deed, because it appears to me
to be plain that whatever fraudulent intent there may have been
in the mind of Judith Johnson, it would not a.void the deed
unless it was shewn to have been concurred in by Alice, who
became the purchaser under the deed. It has not been contended, and it could not be contended, that the mere fraudulent
intent of the vendor could avoid the deed, if the purchaser
were free from that fraud.
[HIS LORDSHIP then adverted to the provision which had
been made before the date of the deed for the other children of
Judith Johnson, and continued:-]
Having regard to the condition of the family, the deed was a
highly proper one ; the sons had left the home, and were provided for by the dispositions which their father had made of the
residue of his property; Mrs. Johnson was possessed of this farm
and of nothing else; the two single daughters living with her
must have been objects of her anxiety and care; she was bedridden and not likely to recover ; the farm was practically carried on by Alice. Thereupon this deed was executed with the
obvious intention of making over to the daughters that farm
which their mother hoped they would reside on after her decE>11se,
to avoid the heavy succession duty which would ensue if she
allowed the farm to pass to them under her will, they not being
legally her children, but strangers to her. The deed is, I observe, framed on the model of the previous deed, which had
been executed by her husband on his death-bed.
N'ow, it is important to inquire what was the indebtedness of
Mrs. Johnson when she executed the deed. She appears to have
had some current debts, mostly, if not entirely, in respect of the
farming business. She owed a Mr. Simpson, a witness in the

•
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case, an account for saddlery, the whole of which (with possible

one unimportant exception) was due in respect of the carrying

on of the farm. She owed her sister Sarah Golden £80, and I

cannot infer that that money was borrowed for any other pur-

pose than carrying on the farm, because it is for the plaintiff

to shew that that was so, and he has had Sarah Golden in the

box and has not asked her anything about it. The sum of £120

was owing from Judith Johnson to her brother William Golden,

the plaintiff. That sum was borrowed by William Johnson, and

when she became the owner of the farm she adopted the debt by

executing a promissory note, and there was a mortgage debt

upon the farm, which had also been a debt of William Johnson.

It appears by the evidence that Mrs. Johnson was a person of

good repute among her friends, as a respectable and honest

woman, who paid her way, and was in no difficulty. Beyond

what I have mentioned she does not appear to have owed any-

thing except ordinary current debts, and was not pressed by a

single creditor. That was the state of things when this instru-

ment was executed. One other fact I must mention with regard

to the state of the family, which is this, that litigation had been

going on which led to some alienation of feeling between Mrs.

Johnson and other members of the family, and which made it

more natural that she should desire the whole of this farm to
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go for the benefit of her two daughters. Mr. Gillam appears to

have been the most natural person to select as trustee of the

deed, if the purpose of the parties was honest and fair. From

what I have seen of him, I do not believe he is a person who

would have been a party to a deed which was intended to be

kept secret, or to be entered into for the purpose of fraud. I

think his selection as trustee is an indication of the good faith

with which the transaction was conceived.

With regard to what took place under the deed, it appears to

me that there was neither concealment nor publication. Mrs.

Johnson's name continued to be used as before with regard to

the farm. The daughter continued to make the payments, and

there was no material change in the way that things were car-

ried on.

The circumstances, looked at independently of the result of

the deed, therefore lead me to the conclusion that the intention

of the parties was to make a perfectly honest family arrange-

ment, under which the daughters were to undertake the burden

of paying their mother's debts, and in consideration of that, to

case, an account for saddlery, the whole of which (with possihlt">
one unimportant exception) was due in respect of the carryi::g
on of the farm. She owed her sister Sarah Golden £80, a 11 d I
eannot infer that that money was borrow<.'d for any other purpose than carrying on the farm, because it is for the pl1Ji11tiff
to .shew that that was so, and he has had Sarah Gol<len in the
box and has not asked her anything about it. The sum of £120
was owing from Judith Johnson to her brother William Golden,
the plaintiff. That sum was borrowed by William Johnson, and
when she became the owner of the farm she adopted the debt by
<'Xecuting a promissory note, and there was a mortgage debt
upon the farm, which had also been a debt of William Johnson.
It appears by the evidence that Mrs. Johnson was a person of
good repute among her friends, as a respectable and honest
woman, who paid her way, and was in no difficulty. Beyond
what I have mentioned she does not appear to have owed anything except ordinary current debts, and was not pressed by a
single creditor. That was the state of things when this instrument was executed. One other fa<'t I must mention with regard
to the state of the family, which is this, that litigation had been
going on which led to some alienation of feeling between Mrs.
Johnson and other members of the family, and which made it
more natural that she should desil"(' the whole of this farm to
go for the benefit of her two daughters. Mr. Gillam appears to
have been the most natural person to select as trustee of the
deed, if the purpose of the parties was honest and fair. From
what I have seen of him, I do not believe he is a person who
would have been a party to a deed which was intended to be
kept secret, or to be entered into for the purpose of fraud. I
think his selection as trustee is an indication of the good faith
with which the transaction was conceived.
With regard to what took place under the deed, it appears to
me that there was neither concealment nor publication. Mrs.
Johnson's name continued to be used as before with regard to
the farm. The daughter continued to make the payments, and
there was no material change in the way that things were carried on.
The circumstances, looked at independently of the result of
the deed, therefore lead me to the conclusion that the intention
of the parties was to make a perfectly honest family arrangement, under which the daughters were to undertake the burden
of paying their mother's debts, and in consideration of that, to
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take immediately that farm which in all probability they would

otherwise have received by will upon their mother's death.

Then it is said, and said truly, that a person must generally

be taken to intend the result of his acts. That is often, but by

uo means always, true, because, although no doubt the immediate

and main result of our acts must be the object of our intention,

there are many collateral results of acts which are not only not

objects of our intention, but against our wish. There are many

unintentional results of intentional acts. The operation of the

deed, it is said in this case, was to defeat and delay creditors,

therefore it is said that that must have been intended. That

argument has been presented in two ways. In the first place it

has been observed that the deed contained a provision only for

the payment of creditors whose debts had been contracted in

connection with carrying on the farm: It is said that there must

have been debts of other descriptions, and that there was in fact

ODe debt at any rate of another description. But it does not

appear to me to be shewn that that debt was present to the mind

of the settlor, Mrs. Johnson, or to the mind of her daughter;

and nothing is more probable, if I were to speculate upon the

intention, than that Mrs. Johnson, having adopted the debt of

William Johnson, after a deed conceived in similar terms, would

have anticipated that her daughters must in like manner adopt
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the debt of their uncle under this deed. It appears plain from

the case of Holmes v. Penney (3 K. & J. 90), that the mere fact

of a bona fide creditor being defeated is not of itself sufficient

to set aside a deed founded on valuable consideration. In this

case, if I uphold the deed, it seems probable that the plaintiff

will have no remedy in respect of his debt. In that case, by up-

holding the deed, the plaintiff was excluded from all remedy in

respect of his debt, and that debt must have been plainly present

to the mind of the settlor, but the Vice-Chancellor thought that

the only object of the brother, who was the purchaser of the

estate, was to make an honest family arrangement with regard

to it. So it appears to me, in the present case, that the object

of the mother and daughters was to make an honest family set-

tlement of the property.

Then again it is said that with respect to many creditors who

are included in the covenant, they are defeated and delayed, be-

cause before the execution of the deed they had a right against

the property, and after the execution of the deed they would

only have a right to the enforcement of the covenant. But that
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take immediately that farm which in all probability they would
otherwise have received by will upon their mother's death.
Then it is said, and said truly, that a person must generally
he taken to intend the result of his acts. That is often, but by
uo means always, true, because, although no doubt the immediate
aud main result of our acts must be the object of our intention,
there are many collateral results of acts which are not only not
ohjects of our intention, but against our wish. There are many
uriiutentional results of intentional acts. The operation of the
deed, it is said in this case, was to defeat and delay creditors,
therefore it is said that that must have been intended. That
argument has been presented in two ways. In the first place it
has been observed that the deed contained a provision only for
the payment of creditors whose debts had been contracted in
connection with carrying on the farm: It is said that there must
have been debts of other descriptions, and that there was in fact
one debt at any rate of another description. But it does not
appear to me to be shewn that that debt was present to the mind
of the settlor, Mrs. Johnson, or to the mind of her daughter;
and nothing is more probable, if I were to speculate upon the
intention, than that Mrs. Johnson, having adopted the debt of
William Johnson, after a deed conceived in similar terms, would
have anticipated that her daughters must in like manner adopt
the debt of their uncle under this deed. It appears plain from
the case of Holmes v. Penney (3 K. & J. 90), that the mere fact
of a bona fide creditor being defeated is not of itself sufficient
to set aside a deed founded on valuable consideration. In this
case, if I uphold the deed, it seems probable that the plaintiff
will have no remedy in respect of his debt. In that case, by upholding the deed, the plaintiff was excluded from all remedy in
respect of his debt, and that debt must have been plainly present
to the mind of the settlor, but the Vice-Chancellor thought that
the ooly object of the brother, who was the purchaser of the
estate, was to make an honest family arrangement with regard
to it. So it appears to me, in the present case, that the object
of the mother and daughters was to make an honest family settlement of the property.
Then again it is said that with respect to many creditors who
are included in the covenant, they are defeated and delayed, because before the execution of the deed they had a right against
the property, and after the execution of the deed they would
only have a right to the enforcement of the covenant. But that
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is the result of almost any dealing. If I am indebted and sell

my estate, my creditors lose their right of proceeding against

is the result of almost any dealing.

If I am indebted and sell

the estate, and can only proceed against the purchase money.

So in a variety of cases visible chattels or real estate are con-

verted into choscs in actum, and if creditors could complain of

that it would, as Sir Thomas Plumer pointed out, '' restrain hon-

est dealings and transactions between man and man."

There is only one other point on which I wish to observe,

although it has not been put to me. It appears plain, that though

valuable and good consideration was given by the daughters, that

consideration cannot have been the full value of the estate. But

it also appears to me to be plain that when a bona fide and hon-

est instrument is executed for which valuable consideration is

given, and the instrument is one between relatives, the court

cannot say that the difference between the real value of the estate

and the consideration given is a badge of fraud, and if it is not

a badge of fraud, or evidence of an intention to defeat creditors,

it has no relation to the case.

I have come, therefore, to the conclusion upon the whole of

the case, that the instrument impeached was executed in good

faith and for a valuable consideration, that it was an honest

family arrangement, and was executed without any intention to

defraud or delay creditors. That being so, I dismiss the action
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with costs.

CRUMBAUGH v. KUGLER v

2 Oh. St. 374

(Supreme Court of Ohio. December Term, 1853)

CALDWELL, J. This is a bill filed by the creditors of Mat-

thias Kugler, the principal object of which is to set aside cer-

tain conveyances made by him to his children in March, 1847.

At the time of these conveyances, Matthias Kugler was pos-

sessed of property (according to the estimate of the master to

whom this case was referred) of the value of $176,540.65, and

was indebted to the amount of $98,327.86. About $146,000 of

my estate, my creditors lose their right of proceeding against

the estate, and can only proceed against the purchase money.
So in a variety of cases visible chattels or real estate are converted into choses in action, and if creditors could complain of
that it would, as Sir Thomas Plumer pointed out, "restrain honest dealings and transactions between man and man.''
There is only one other point on which I wish to observe,
although it has not been put to me. It appears plain, that though
valuable and good consideration was given by the daughters, that
consideration cannot have been the full value of the estate. But
it also appears to me to be plain that when a bona fide and honest instrument is executed for which valuable consideration is
given, and the instrument is one between relatives, the court
cannot say that the difference between the real value of the estate
and the consideration given is a badge of fraud, and if it is not
a badge of fraud, or evidence of an intention to defeat creditors,
it has no relation to the case.
I have come, therefore, to the conclusion upon the whole of
the case, that the instrument impeached was executed in good
faith and for a valuable consideration, that it was an honest
family arrangement, and was executed without any intention to
defraud or delay creditors. That being so, I dismiss the action
with costs.

the property consisted of real estate—on which were several

mills and distilleries. On the 13th of March, 1847, Matthias

Kugler conveyed to different members of his family what in the

aggregate amounted to $105,674.74. On the property thus con

CRUMBAUGH v. KUGLER '

veyed, over $40,000 of Kugler's indebtedness was secured by

2 Oh. St. 374
(Supreme Court of Ohio. December Term, 1853)

CALDWELl.J, J. This is a bill filed by the creditors of :Matthias Kugler, the principal object of which is to set aside certain conveyances made by him to his children in March, 1847.
At the time of these conveyances, Matthias Kugler was possessed of property (according to the estimate of the master to
whom this case was referred) of the value of $176,540.65, and
was indebted to the amount of $98,327.86. About $146,000 of
the property consisted of real estate-on which were several
mills and distilleries. On the 13th of March, 1847, Matthias
Kugler conveyed to different members of his family what in the
aggregate amounted to $105,674.74. On the property thus con.
veyed, over $40,000 of Kugler's indebtedness was secured by
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mortgage—the grantees took the property subject to the liquida-

tion of these incumbrances. Schultz and Kugler, two of the

grantees, also executed a mortgage to Matthias Kugler, Sen., to

secure the payment of about $15,000 more of the indebtedness.

The amount of Kugler's indebtedness intended to be secured by

this family arrangement amounted to about $55,800. The

amount of Kugler's indebtedness left wholly unprovided for by

the arrangement, is stated by the master in the alternative; upon

one hypothesis, it amounts to $42,599.55, and on the other to

$47,190.05.

The master estimates the property retained by Kugler, at the

time of the conveyance to his family, at $70,837.93; the real

estate he values at $51,152, and the personalty at $19,685.93.

This estimate, the master reports, is made by setting down to

Kugler's sole account several tracts of land that had been con-

veyed to Kugler and wife, and stood in their names, and the

half of which, it is contended, belonged to Mrs. Kugler's heirs.

Deducting the one-half of the value of the property thus sit-

uated, the real estate retained by Kugler would amount, accord-

ing to the master's estimate, to $28,376, and the entire assets,

real and personal, retained, to $48,061.93. This latter the court

regard as the true estimate. The property in the joint names
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of Kugler and wife, was the property that formerly belonged

to Mrs. Kugler's father, Christian Waldsmith. On the death of

Christian Waldsmith, Mrs. Kugler, as heiress, became entitled

to one-seventh. A petition was filed by some of the heirs for

partition; Kugler and wife elected to take the property, and the

sheriff conveyed it to them jointly, on Kugler giving bond to

pay the other heirs. Although Kugler may have considered this

property as his, and liable to the payment of his debts, yet Mrs.

Kugler had the legal title to the one-half by the conveyance,

and was the owner of one-seventh previous to that time. The

title had remained in their joint names since 1817, and we think

the one-half of the property belonged to Mrs. Kugler, and r,l

her death descended to her heirs, and could in no way be liable

for Kugler's debts. Kugler continued, after the conveyances,

to carry on an extensive business, until some time in 1849, when

he failed; his mill and distillery were destroyed by fire, and he

became largely insolvent.

It is said, on the part of the complainants, that these convey-

ances were fraudulent, as to the creditors of Matthias Kugler.

The first question that we propose to consider, is whether

mortgage-the grantees took the property subject to the liquidation of these incumbrances. Schultz and Kugler, two of the
grantees, also executed a mortgage to Matthias Kugler, Sen., to
secure the payment of about $15,000 more of the indebtedness.
The amount of Kugler's indebtedness intended to be secured by
this family arrangement amounted to about $55,800. The
amount of Kugler 's indebtedness left wholly unprovided for by
the arrangement, is stated by the master in the alternative; upon
one hypothesis, it amounts to $42,599.55, and on the other to
$4 7,190.05.
The master estimates the property retained by Kugler, at the
time of the conveyance to his family, at $70,837.93; the real
estate he values at $51,152, and the personalty at $19,685.93.
This estimate, the master reports, is made by setting down to
Kugier's sole account several tracts of land that had been con\.·eyed to Kugler and wife, and stood in their names, and the
half of which, it is contended, belonged to Mrs. Kugler's heirs.
Deducting the one-half of the value of the property thus situated, the real estate retained by Kugler would amount, according to the master's estimate, to $28,376, and the entire assets,
real and personal, retained, to $48,061.93. This latter the court
regard as the t.rue estimate. The property in the joint names
of Kugler and wife, was the property that formerly belonged
to Mrs. Kugler 's father, Christian 'Valdsmith. On the death of
Christian Waldsmith, Mrs. Kugler, as heiress, became entitled
to one-seventh. A petition was filed by some of the heirs for
partition; Kugler and wife elected to take the property, and the
sheriff conveyed it to them jointly, on Kugler giving bond to
pay the other heirs. Although Kugler may have considered this
property as his, and liable to the payment of his debts, yet Mrs.
Kugler had the legal title to the one-half by the conveyanee.
and was the owner of one-seventh previous to that time. The
title bad remained in their joint names since 1817, and we think
the one-half of the property brlonged to Mrs. Kugler, a11d ;: t
her death descended to her heirs, and could in no way be liabl1·
for Kugler's debts. Kugler continued, after the conveyarn·r·s.
to carry on an extensive business, until some time in 1849. wlH· P
he failed; his mill and distillery were destroyed by fire, and '11•
became largely insolvent.
It is said, on the part of the complainants, that these convc·yances were fraudulent, as to the creditors of Matthias Kugler.
The first question that we propose to consider, is whether
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there was any actual fraud intended by Kugler in thus dispos-

ing of his property.

Wherever a person, largely indebted, gives away a large

amount of his property, without amply providing for the pay-

ment of his debts, a suspicion of fraud will generally attach to

the transaction. There are, however, connected with this case

many circumstances going to rebut any suspicion that fraud was

intended. Kugler was engaged at the time in a very extensive

business; the arrangement does not appear to have been made

with any intention of stopping business, although the convey-

ance of this property necessarily curtailed his operations; for

two years after, however, he continued to operate extensively.

From the number and amount of his debts that he afterward

contracted, it would appear that he still had credit, and must

have been regarded as a responsible man.

After the conveyance, he commenced paying off his indebted-

ness that existed at that time, and although the evidence does

not furnish us with any certain data on the subject, yet it

appears that he succeeded in paying off the principal part of

that indebtedness. The most of the debts that he now owes are

such as were contracted after the conveyance, or such as were

secured by it. It was very natural, considering the advanced age

of Matthias Kugler, that he should find it necessary to con-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

tract his business. His sons and sons-in-law had been doing

business for him at his different milling and distillery estab-

lishments. By making the conveyances as he did, he could free

himself from a large portion of his indebtedness, establish sev-

eral members of his family in business on their own account,

and free himself from the harassing care of such an extensive

and complicated business. He acted as if he intended to retain

the property reserved; he says in his answer, that he intended

the Germany property at his death for his son Jacob; his con-

duct accords with this statement; no conveyance is made to

Jacob, and he enters into partnership with him.

It may be said, however, that Matthias Kugler gave away too

much of his property, considering the amount of his indebted-

ness. In reference to this, we would say, in the first place, that

from the manner in which Mr. Kugler obtained and used the

property, and treated it, that he made no distinction between

that which stood in the names of himself and wife jointly, and

there was any actual fraud intended by Kugler in thus disposing of his property.
Wherever a person, largely indebted, gives away a large
amount of his property; without amply providing for the payment of his debts, a suspicion of fraud will generally attach to
the transaction. There are, however, connected with this case
many circumstances going to rebut any suspicion that fraud was
intended. Kugler was engaged at the time in a very extensive
business; the arrangement does not appear to have been made
with any intention of stopping business, although the conveyance of this property necessarily curtailed his operations; for
two years after, however, he continued to operate extensively.
From the number and amount of his debts that he afterward
contracted, it would appear that he · still had credit, and must
have been regarded as a responsible man.
After the conveyance, he commenced paying off bis indebtedness that existed at that time, and although the evidence does
not furnish us with any certain data on the subject, yet it
appears that he succeeded in paying off the principal part of
that indebtedness. The most of the debts that he now owes are
such as were contracted after the conveyance, or such as were
secured by it. It was very natural, considering the advanced age
of Matthias Kugler, that he should find it necessary to contract his business. His sons and sons-in-law had been doing
business for him at his different milling and distillery establishments. By making the conveyances as he did, he could free
himself from a large portion of his indebtedness, establish several members of his family in business on their own account,
and free himself from the harassing care of such an extensive
and complicated business. He acted as if he intended to retain
the property reserved; he says in his answer, that he intended
the Germany property at his death for his son Jacob; his conduct accords with this statement; no conveyance is made to
Jacob, and he enters into. partnership with him.
It may be said, however, that Matthias Kugler gave away too
much of his property, considering the amount of bis indr.htedness. In reference to this, we would say, in the first place, thnt
from the manner in which Mr. Kugler obtained and used tht•
property, and treated it, that he made no distinction betwe('.I:
that which stood in the names of himself and wife jointly, al!d
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his other property, and regarded it as liable to the payment

of his debts; which opinion, although erroneous, would lead

him to believe that he had retained for the payment of his debts

more than twenty thousand dollars' worth of property, above

what he really had. But, supposing we are mistaken in this

supposition, still the amount of property retained that abso-

lutely belonged to Matthias Kugler is valued at more than all

his indebtedness. A part of this property consisted of a mill

and distillery which Kugler had been carrying on for many

years; if his business in future should be profitable, he would

be able to pay his debts, and he no doubt continued it in the

expectation that it would be so. Kugler's conduct and busi-

ness transactions, after these conveyances were made, show that

they were not made with any intention of suspending business;

on the contrary, they show that his business, although disas-

trously, was vigorously pursued, and he only suspended when

he was compelled to do so. We think from the whole facts in

the case, that although, as future events proved, this family

arrangement was improvidently made, yet that no actual fraud

was intended at the time it was consummated, on the creditors

of M. Kugler. Nor is there any circumstance to induce the belief

that any fraud was intended as to subsequent creditors.

But, although we do not think that any fraud was intended
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by the parties to these conveyances, the question still remains,

whether they operated to the prejudice of creditors.

These several conveyances must be considered in the light of

gifts. It is true, that part consideration was received in most

of the cases; yet we think that does not change the character

of the transaction. Although other motives no doubt induced

the arrangement, yet the ruling object was to make an advance-

ment to the several grantees. Now, a man largely indebted, as

Kugler was, can not make a gift of his property without the

most careful regard to the rights of his creditors. And such

gift is never upheld, unless property, clearly and beyond doubt,

is retained sufficient to pay all the donor's debts. See King's

Heirs v. Thompson and wife, 9 Peters, 220; Salmon v. Bennett,

1 Conn. 543; Jackson v. Peck, 4 Wend. 303; Hinde v. Long-

worth, 11 Wheaton, 199; Seward v. Jackson, 8 Cow.; Jackson

v. Form, 4 Con. 604; Gale v. Williamson, 8 Mees. & Welsby,

409; Seward v. Vanwyck, 1 Edw. Ch. 334; Brackett v. Waite,

his other property, and regarded it as liable to the payment
of his debts; which opinion, although erroneous, would lead
him to believe that he had retained for the paymeut of his debts
more than twenty thousand dollars' worth of property, above
what he really had. But, supposing we are mistaken in this
supposition, still the amount of property retained that absolutely belonged to .Matthias Kugler is valued at more than all
his indebtedness. A part of this property consisted of a mill
and distillery which Kugler had been carrying on for many
years; if his business in future should be profitable, he would
be able to pay his debts, and he no doubt continued it in the
expectation that it would be so. Kugler 's conduct and business transactions, after these conveyances were made, show that
they were not made with any intention of suspending business:
on the contrary, they show that his business, although disastrously, was vigorously pursued, and he only suspended when
he was compelled to do so. We think from the whole facts in
the case, that although, as future events pro'ved, this family
arrangement was improvidently made, yet that no actual fraud
was intended at the time it was consummated, on the creditors
of M. Kugler. Nor is there any circumstance to induce the belief
that any fraud was intended as to subsequent creditors.
But, although we do not think that any fraud was intended
by the parties to these conveyances, the question still remains,
whether they operated to the prejudice of creditors.
These several conveyances must be considered in the light of
gifts. It is true, that part consideration was received in most
of the cases; yet we think that does not change the character
of the transaction. Although other motives no doubt induced
the arrangement, yet the ruling object was to make an advancement to the several grantees. Now, a man largely indebted, as
Kugler was, can not make a gift of his property without the
most careful regard to the rights of his creditors. And such
gift is never upheld, unless property, cleai:Iy and beyond doubt,
is retained sufficient to pay all the donor's debts. See King's
Heirs v. Thompson and wife, 9 Peters, 220; Salmon v. Bennett,
1 Conn. 543; Jackson v. Peck, 4 \Vend. 303; Hinde v. Longworth, 11 Wheaton, 199; Seward v. Jackson, 8 Cow.; Jackson
v. Form, 4 Con. 604; Gale v. Williamson, 8 Mees. & Welsby,
409; Seward v. Vanwyck, 1 Edw. Ch. 334; Brackett v. Waite,
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4 Vt. 389; Usher v. Hazletine, 5 Greenl. 474; Chambers v.

Spencer, 5 Watts, 404; Morteer v. Hissim, 3 Penn. 165; Wallace,

108; Lessee of Burget v. Burget, 1 Ohio, 482; Brice v. Meyers,

5 Ohio, 124; Lessee of Douglass v. Dunlap, 10 Ohio, 162; Miller

v. Wilson, 15 Ohio, 114; Tremper v. Barton, 18 Ohio, 423; Creed

v. Lancaster Bank, 1 Ohio St. 1.

Now, how was it in this case? The property retained by

Kugler, liable to the payment of his debts, amounted to about

$48,000. His debts, at the lowest calculation, amounted to

$42,000, and they probably amounted to $47,000. But taking

the amount of indebtedness at the lowest estimate, $42,000, and

experience teaches us that, owing to the expenses incident to

the sale, and the sacrifice almost universally attending forced

sales, the amount of property reserved would not have paid the

debts, if subjected to that purpose. Kugler, then, not having

reserved property clearly ample to pay his debts, was not in a

situation to make the gifts good, and the conveyances, as to all

debts in existence at the time of their execution, must be held

as of no effect.

The next question that arises in the case is, whether the con-

veyances not being good as to the prior creditors, the subsequent

creditors can avail themselves of that objection?

Now, we have previously determined, that these conveyances
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were made without any intentional fraud as to either prior or

subsequent creditors. If Kugler had not been in debt, he would

have had a perfect right to distribute his property amongst his

children; no person could have objected. No policy of law,

or principle of justice, would have been violated; his gift of

his property would have been as valid as a sale. It is only be-

cause that, being in debt. he is bound in good faith to have a re-

gard, in the disposition of his property, to the just claims of his

creditors—to regard the obligation which he has incurred to

them—that any objection can be made to the transaction. This

principle does not apply at all to the subsequent creditors; they

give credit to their debtor as he is—for what he has, not for what

lie once had. We must then regard the conveyances, as to subse-

quent creditors, and all persons other than the creditors, then

occupying that relation, as good. See United States Bank v.

Housman, 6 Paige Ch. 535; Saxton v. Wheat., 8 Wheat. 229;

Hinde v. Longworth, 11 Wheat. 199; Parker v. Proctor et aL, 9

4 Vt. 389; Usher v. Hazletine, 5 Greenl. 474; Chambers v.
Spencer, 5 Watts, 404; ~Iorteer v. Hissim, 3 Penn. 165; Wallace,
108; Lessee of Burget v. Burget, 1 Ohio, 482; Brice v. Meyers,
5 Ohio, 124; Lessee of Douglass v. Dunlap, 10 Ohio, 162; Miller
v. Wilson, 15 Ohio, 114; Tremper v. Barton, 18 Ohio, 423; Creed
v. Lancaster Bank, 1 Ohio St. 1.
Now, how was it in this case T The property retained by
Kugler, liable to the payment of his debts, amounted to about
$48,000. His debts, at the lowest calculation, amounted to
$42,000, and they probably amounted to $47,000. But ta.king
the amount of indebtedness at the lowest estimate, $42,000, and
experience teaches us that, owing to the expenses incident to
the sale, and the sacrifice almost universally attending forced
sales, the amount of property reserved would not have paid the
debts, if subjected to that purpose. Kugler, then, not having
reserved property clearly ample to pay his debts, was not in a
situation to make the gifts good, and the conveyances, as to all
debts in existence at the time of their execution, must be held
as of no effect.
The next question that arises in the case is, whether the conveyances not being good as to the prior creditors, the subsequent
creditors can avail themselves of that objection f
Now, we have previously determined, that these conveyances
were made without any intentional fraud as to either prior or
subsequent creditors. If Kugler had not been in debt, he would
have had a perfect right to distribute his property amongst his
children; no person could have objected. No policy of law,
or principle of justice, would have been violated; his gift of
his property would have been as valid as a sale. It is only because that, being in deht. he i8 bound in good faith to have a regard, in the disposition of his property, to the just claims of his
creditors-to regard the obligation which he has incurred to
them-that any objection can be made to the transaction. This
principle does not apply at all to the subsequent creditors; they
give credit to their debtor as he is-for what he has, not for what
he once had. We must then regard the conveyances, as to subsequent creditorsi and all persons other than the creditors, then
occupying that relation, as good. See United States Bank v.
Housman, 6 Paige Ch. 535; Saxton v. Wheat., 8 Wheat. 229:
Hinde v. Longworth, 11 Wheat. 199; Parker v. Proctor et al, 9
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Mass. 374, 4 Wash. C. C. 137; Lush v. Wilkinson, 5 Vesey, Jr.

387; 9 Peters 220, 12 Vesey, Jr. 155. * • *

Decree for complainants.14

CHURCH v. CHAPIN

35 Vt. 223

(Supreme Court of Vermont. February Term, 1862)

Mass. 374, 4 Wash. C. C. 137; Lush v. Wilkinson, 5 Vesey, Jr.
387; 9 Peters 220, 12 \'escy, Jr. 155. ,. • •
Decree for complainants. 14

Ejectment. The plaintiff claimed title under a warranty deed

from one Fortin Church to him, dated October 29th, 1855.

The defendant offered in evidence certified copies of the

CHURCH v. CHAPIN

record of a judgment in favor of one Deborah Church against

Fortin Church, rendered in 1858, for $524.50, for which sum

35 Vt. 223

execution issued May 4th, 1858; also, a copy of this execution

and the officer's return thereon, showing a levy of the same

upon the premises in question; also, a warranty deed from

(Supreme Court of Vermont.

February Term, 1862)

Deborah Church to the defendant, Chapin, dated April 4th,

1859, to all of which the plaintiff objected, but the court ad-

mitted them, and the plaintiff excepted.

It appeared in evidence that at the date of the deed from

Fortin Church to the plaintiff, Fortin Church was a single man,

without issue, and of about sixty-four years of age; that at the

time of the execution of the deed, Fortin Church also executed,

under seal, a bill of sale to the plaintiff of all his personal

property, except clothing, cash on hand and debts due; and at
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the same time the plaintiff executed to Fortin Church a mort-

gage deed of all the real estate described in the deed of Fortin

Church to the plaintiff, conditioned for the payment of certain

debts of Fortin Church, amounting to about $850, for the pay-

ment to certain nephews and nieces of the said Fortin (twenty-

eight in number), of $100 each, and for the maintenance, care

and support of the said Fortin Church during his natural life.

The plaintiff was a nephew of Fortin Church, and immediately

took possession of the personal property conveyed, and entered

upon the support of Fortin Church. The conditions named in

the mortgage constituted the consideration of said conveyance.

There was no provision that the plaintiff should pay the debt of

14—See 20 Cyc. 453-461, for ref-

eienees to many cases involving the

same or similar questions.

\

Ejectment. The plaintiff claimed title under a warranty deed
from one Fortin Church to him, dated October 29th, 1855.
The defendant offered in evidence certified copies of the
record of a judgment in favor of one Deborah Church against
Fortin Church, rendered in 1858,· for $524.50, for which sum
execution issued l\lay 4th, 1858; also, a copy of this execution
and the officer's return thereon, showing a levy of the same
upon the premises in question; also, a warranty deed from
Deborah Church to the defendant, Chapin, dated April 4th,
1859, to all of which the plaintiff objected, but the court admitted them, and the plaintiff excepted.
It appeared in evidence that at the date of the deed from
Fortin Church to the plaintiff, Fortin Church was a single man,
without issue, and of about sixty-four years of age; that at the
time of the execution of the deed, Fortin Church also ~xecuted,
under seal, a bill of sale to the plaintiff of all his personal
property, except clothing, cash on hand and debts due; and at
the same time the plaintiff executed to Fortin Church a mortgage deed of all the real estate described in the deed of Fortin
Church to the plaintiff, conditioned for the payment of certain
debts of Fortin Church, amounting to about $850, for the payment to certain nephews and nieces of the said Fortin (twentyeight in number), of $100 each, and for the maintenance, care
and support of the said Fortin Church during his natural life.
The plaintiff was a nephew of Fortin Church, and immediately
took possession of the personal property conveyed, and enterea
upon the support of Fortin Church. The conditions named in
the mortgage constituted the consideration of said conveyance.
There was no provision that t_he plaintiff should pay the debt of
H-See 20 Cyc. 453-461, for ref·
e1 e11<•es to many cases involving the
same or similar questiona.
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Deborah Church, nor any evidence that the plaintiff or Fortin

Church at the time of the conveyance supposed she had a debt

against Fortin Church; but they were both awafre that she

claimed that Fortin Church was indebted to her, and that was

a subject of conversation between Fortin Church and the plain-

tiff at the time.

It appeared that said judgment was recovered for the per-

sonal services of Deborah Church for Fortin Church as his house-

keeper from 1850 to the spring of 1855; that Deborah was a

single woman of between fifty and sixty years of age, without

any other home, and that the plaintiff, though knowing to the

fact of Deborah Church's working for Fortin Church, supposed

that she was making* it her home with her brother, Fortiu

Church, and did not suppose that she was at work for pay.

There was no evidence tending to show that said conveyance

was made for the purpose of defrauding Deborah Church, or

that there was any intentional fraud on the part of the plaintiff

or Fortin Church.

The plaintiff offered evidence to prove that at the time of

the conveyance to him no actual indebtedness to Deborah

Church from Fortin Church existed, to which the defendant

objected. The court rejected the evidence, to which the plaintiff

excepted.
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It appeared in this connection that Deborah Church's suit was

commenced in August, 1856, and was defended throughout by

the plaintiff, as agent of Fortin Church, and in consequence of

his taking the conveyance of Fortin Church's property.

It appeared that at the time of the conveyance from Fortin

Church to the plaintiff, the cash on hand and debts due, reserved

by Fortin Church, in said bill of sale, consisted of $100 cash on

hand, a debt of about $200 against one Bardwell, of Walpole,

New Hampshire, a note of $75 against James Church, of

Townshend, Vermont, notes against the Stones, of Westminster,

Vermont, of about $300, a note against one Sawtell, of Bellows

Falls, of about $400, and notes against men by the name of

Phillips, in the state of New York, then amounting to about

$1,100. All of these debts were considered good except the

note against Sawtell. The notes against the Phillipses were

secured by mortgage in New York, and were intended to be

made a gift to the sons of his sister, their mother, by Fortin

Church, and were soon after so disposed of. The plaintiff had

nothing to do with these debts due or cash on hand, except that

Deborah Church, nor any evidence that the plaintiff or Fortin
Church at the time of the conveyance supposed she had a debt
against F'ortin Church; but they were both aw~re that she
claimed that Fortin Church was indebted to her, and that was
a subject of conversation between Fortin Church and the plaintiff at the time.
It appeared that said judgment was recovered for the personal services of Deborah Church for Fortin Church as his housekeeper from 1850 to the spring of 1855; that Deborah was a
single woman of between fifty and sixty years of age, without
any other home, and that the plaintiff, though knowing to the
fact of Deborah Church's working for Fortin Church, supposed
that she was making' it her home with her brother, Fortin
Church, and did not suppose that she was at work for pay.
There was no evidence tending to show that said conveyance
was made for the purpose of defrauding Deborah Church, or
that there was any intentional fraud on the part of the plaintiff
or Fortin Church.
The plaintiff offered evidence to prove that at the time of
the conveyance to him no actual indebtedness to Deborah
Church from Fortin Church existed, to which the defendant
objected. The court rejected the evidence, to which the plaintiff
excepted.
It appeared in this connection that Deborah Church's suit was
commenced in August, 1856, and was defended throughout by
the plaintiff, as agent of Fortin Church, and in consequence of
bis taking the conveyance of Fortin Church's property.
It appeared that at the time of the conveyance from Fortin
Church to the plaintiff, the cash on hand and debts due, reserved
by Fortin Church, in said bill of sale, consisted of $100 cash on
hand, a debt of about $200 against one Bardwell, of Walpole,
New Hampshire, a note of $75 against James Church, of
Townshend, Vermont, notes against the Stones, of Westminster, ·
Vermont, of about $300, a note against one Sawtell, of Bellows
Falls, of about $400, and notes against men by the name of
Phillips, in the state of New York, then amounting to about
$1,100. All of these debts were considered good except the
note against Sawtell. The notes against the Phillipses were
secured by mortgage in New York, and were intended to be
made a gift to the sons of his sister, their mother, by Fortin
Church, and were soon after so disposed of. The plaintiff had
nothing to do with these debts due or cash on hand, except that

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 185

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES

185

I

it appeared that there were other debts against Fortin Church,

amounting to about $200, uot mentioned in said mortgage, which

the plaintiff afterwards paid at Fortin Church's request, and

Fortin Church gave him notes sufficient to pay him for so doing.

It appeared that it was the understanding between the plaintiff

and Fortin Church that the plaintiff was to have all of Fortin

Church's personal property at Fortin's decease, and they sup-

posed the last clause in the bill of sale was sufficient to convey

said debts and personal property at Fortin Church's decease.

The court intimated an opinion to the plaintiff's counsel that

the conveyance to the plaintiff by Fortin Church, being a dis-

position of his property to collateral relations, and to secure

his own maintenance, must be treated, in law, as a voluntary

conveyance, and that as the claim of Deborah Church existed

prior to the conveyance and was known to both parties, and

subsequently matured into a judgment after full defence made

by the plaintiff, it became conclusively, as to him, a prior

existing debt of the grantor, which would render the conveyance

inoperative as to her, notwithstanding the plaintiff might have

acted in perfect good faith in the whole transaction, and that

the amount and kind of property retained by the grantor, as

above stated, could not be properly regarded as an ample pro-
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portion of his estate for the security and indemnification of his

creditors, and that the title of Deborah Church thus acquired

must be regarded as paramount to that of the plaintiff. Where-

upon the court directed a verdict for the defendant, and the

plaintiff excepted to the foregoing decision.

PECK, J. The question in this case is which of these parties

acquired the better title from Fortin Church. The plaintiff

shows title by deed from Fortin Church, dated October 29th,

1855. The defendant shows title by levy of an execution in

favor of Deborah Church against Fortin Church, in 1858, for

between $500 and $600, issued on a judgment recovered in

1858, in a suit commenced in 1856, and by deed from Deborah

Church to the defendant, dated April 4th, 1859. Nothing

appears invalidating the deed to the plaintiff as against Fortin

Church. The question is whether it is good against his creditors,

it appeared that there were other debts against Fortin Church,
amou11ti11g to about $200, not mentioned in said mortgage, which
the plaintiff afterwards paid at Fortin Church's request, and
Fortin Church gave him notes sufficient to pay him for so doing.
It appeared that it was the understanding between the plaintiff
and Fortin Church that the plaintiff was to have all of Fortin
Church's personal property at :F'ortin 's decease, and they supposed the last clause in the bill of sale was sufficient to convey
said debts and personal property at Fortin Church's decease.
The court intimated an opinion to the plaintiff's counsel that
the conveyance to the pl~intiff by Fortin Church, being a dis-position of his property to collateral relations, and to secure
his own maintenance, must be treated, in law, as a voluntary
conveyance, and that as the claim of Deborah Church existed
prior to the conveyance and was known to both parties, and
subsequently matured into a judgment after full defence made
by the plaintiff, it became conclusively, as to him, a prior
existing debt of the grantor, which would render the conveyance
inoperative as to her, notwithstanding the plaintiff might have
acted in perfect good faith in the whole transaction, and that
the amount and kind of property retained by the grantor, as
above stated, could not be properly regarded as an ample proportion of his estate for the security and indemnification of his
creditors, and that the title of Deborah Church thus acquired
must be regarded as paramount to that of the plaintiff. ·whereupon the court directed a verdict for the defendant, and the
plaintiff excepted to the fore going decision.

or rather against the creditor under whose levy the defendant

claims. The case finds that in the execution of the deed to the

plaintiff there was no fraud in fact, or actual intent to defraud

creditors generally, or to defraud this particular creditor. As-

PECK, J. The question in this case is which of these parties
acquired the better title from Fortin Church. The plaintiff
shows title by deed from Fortin Church, dated October 29th,
1855. The defendant shows title by levy of an execution in
favor of Deborah Church against Fortin Church, in 1858, for
between $500 and $600, issued on a judgment recovered in
1858, in a suit commenced in 1856, and by deed from Deborah
Church to the defendant, dated April 4th, 1859. Nothing
appears invalidating the deed to the plaintiff as against Fortin
Church. The question is whether it is good against his creditors.
or rather against the creditor under whose levy the defendant
claim.Ii. The case finds that in the execution of the deed to the
plaintiff there was no fraud in fact, or actual intent to defraud
ereditors generally, or to defraud this particular creditor. As-
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suming for the present that Deborah Church was a creditor

of Fortin Church in respect of the debt or claim for which

she levied, at the date of Fortin Church's deed to the plaintiff,

the question arises whether upon the facts stated in the excep-

tions, the amount, nature and character of the consideration of

that deed was such as to render it valid against Deborah Church

as such creditor, or whether as to her and the defendant who

has her title, it is to be treated, as the county court treated it,

as a voluntary conveyance and inoperative against her levy.

On reference to the judge's minutes of the testimony referred

to, and the deed and bill of sale, it appears that the amount of

property conveyed to the plaintiff by Fortin Church on that occa-

sion was, in round numbers, from $7,000 to $10,000. The consid-

eration for this property is all expressed in the mortgage deed

from the plaintiff to Fortin Church, from which it appears that

the plaintiff was to pay certain specified debts of his grantor,

amounting to about $850, and pay to the children of certain

persons named $100 each, as they should respectively arrive

at the age of twenty-one years, and also support Fortin Church

during his natural life. It appears there were twenty-eight of

these children, who were the nephews and nieces of the plaintiff's

grantor. If the $850 and the $2,800 constituted the whole con-

sideration for this property, it would be regarded as so far
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below the real value of the property as to render the conveyance

void as against existing creditors, on the ground of inadequacy

of consideration. A debtor cannot give away his property, and

thereby deprive his creditors of all means of collecting their

debts. He must be just before he is generous; or in other words,

he must not be generous at the expense of justice to his creditors.

If such is the effect the gift is void as to creditors. Nor can

this principle be avoided by having a partial consideration. In

such case the gift is equally void, at least to the extent of the

want of consideration. But in this case there is a further con-

sideration, the agreement of the plaintiff to support the grantor

during life. The amount or value of this part of the considera-

tion is in its nature so uncertain, depending so much on future

contingencies, the duration of life and the future wants and

requirements of the grantor, that it can not be assumed that

the consideration was inadequate in amount. The question

must turn upon the character of the consideration. The $850

which the plaintiff agreed to pay to the two creditors named in

the mortgage deed can not be objected to as to its character;

snming for the present that Deborah Church was a creditor
of Fortin Church in respect of the debt or claim for which
she levied, at the date of Fortin Church's deed to the plaintiff,
the question arises whether upon the facts stated in the exceptions, the amount, nature and character of the consideration of
that deed was such as to render it valid against Deborah Church
as such creditor, or whether as to her and the defendant who
has her title, it is to be treated, as the county court treated it,
as a voluntary conveyance and inoperative against her levy.
On reference to the judge's minutes of the testimony referred
to, and the deed and bill of sale, it appears that the amount of
property conveyed to the plaintiff by Fortin Church on that occasion was, in round numbers, from $7 ,000 to $10,000. The consideration for this property is all expressed in the mortgage deed
from the plaintiff to Fortin Church, from which it appears that
the plaintiff was to pay certain specified debts of his grantor,
. amounting to about $850, and pay to the children of certain
persons named $100 each, as they should respectively arrive
at the age of twenty-one years, and also support Fortin Church
during his natural life. It appears there were twenty-eight of
these children, who were the nephews and nieces of the plaintitf 's
grantor. If the $850 and the $2,800 constituted the whole consideration for this property, it would be regarded as so far
below the real value of the property as to render the conveyance
void as against existing creditors, on the ground of inadequacy
of consideration. A debtor cannot give away his property, and
thereby deprive his creditors of all means of collecting their
debts. He must be just befOl'e he is generous; or in other words,
be must not be generous at the expense of justice to bis creditors.
If such is the effect the gift is void as to creditors. Nor can
this principle be avoided by having a partial consideration. In
such case the gift is equally void, at least to the extent of the
want of consideration. But in this case there is a further consideration, the agreement of the plaintiff to support the grantor
during life. The amount or value of this part of the considers- tion is in its nature so uncertain, depending so much on future
contingencies, the duration of life and the future wants and
requirements of the grantor, that it can not be assumed that
the consideration was inadequate in amount. The question
must turn upon the character of the consideration. The $850
which the plaintiff agreed to pay to the two creditors named in
the mortgage deed can not be objected to as to its character;
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and although the grantor in this disposition of his property
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made no provision for the payment of the debt to Deborah

Church, she can not set aside that deed on the ground that the

grantor gave preference to other creditors. Whether the $2,800

the plaintiff agreed to pay to the collateral relatives of the

grantor should also be so considered, is not so clear. On the

one hand it may be said that although it was a gift as between .

such relatives and the grantor, yet as between him and the

plaintiff it was to be a payment, and that the want of con-

sideration as between the plaintiff's grantor and the persons to

whom the grantor required the plaintiff to make the payment,

can not affect the deed. On the other hand it may be said that

as the plaintiff was a party to this arrangement by which this

grantor was giving away this portion of the consideration of the

deed, and not having paid or legally bound himself to the

donees to pay to them, he ought not to be allowed to stand

upon this agreement with the grantor, and thus perfect the gift

to the detriment of creditors, a gift which the grantor, as to

creditors, had no right to make. But we do not find it neces-

sary to decide whether this agreement to pay the $2,800 in the

manner stipulated, is a good consideration to that amount as

against creditors or not, because the remaining portion of the

consideration, the agreement for support for life, is not of such
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a character as will sustain the deed if the creditors are thereby

deprived of the means of collecting their debts. It is true

that as between the parties to the deed it is a valuable con-

sideration, and in this respect a deed founded on it differs from

a gift; but as to creditors it is not different from a deed of

gift. It has long been settled that a party can not either by

gift or in consideration of an agreement for support for life,

convey his property without reserving what is amply sufficient

for the payment of his then existing debts. If we allow the

plaintiff the benefit of the $850 and the $2,800, as a good con-

sideration to that extent, there is still, at the lowest estimate

of the property, between $3,000 and $4,000 of the consideration

accounted for in no other way than by the agreement for sup-

port. Where there is a partial, but not a full consideration

good against creditors, whether the deed is voidable in toto, or

only to the extent of the want of consideration, is a question

not material in this case, as the amount of the consideration rest-

ing on the agreement for support exceeds the amount of the levy

in question. The levy must prevail over the deed, unless the

and although the grantor in this disposition of his property
made no provision for the payment of the debt to Deborah
Church, she can not set aside that deed on the ground that the
grantor gave preference to other creditors. 'Vhether the $2,800
the plaintiff agreed to pay to the collateral relatives of the
grantor should also be so considered, is not so clear. On the
one hand it may be said that although it was a gift as between
such relatives and the grantor, yet as between him and the
plaintiff it was to be a payment, and that the want of consideration as between the plaintiff's grantor and the persons to
whom the grantor required the plaintiff to make the payment,
can not affect the deed. On the other hand it may be said that
as the plaintiff was a party to this arrangement by which this
grantor was giving away this portion of the consideration of the
deed, and not having paid or legally hound himself to the
donees to pay to them, he ought not to be allowed to stand
upon this agreement with the grantor, and thus perfect the gift
to the detriment of creditors, a gift which the grantor, as to
creditors, had no right to make. But we do not find it necessary to decide whether this agreement to pay the $2,800 in the
manner stipulated, is a good consideration to that amount as
against creditors or not, because the remaining portion of the
consideration, the agreement for support for life, is not of such
a character as will sustain the deed if the creditors are thereby
deprived of the means of collecting their debts. It is true
that as between the parties to the deed it is a valuable consideration, and in this respect a deed founded on it differs from
a gift; but as to creditors it is not different from a deed of
gift. It has long been settled that a party can not either by
gift or in consideration of an agreement for support for life,
convey his property without reserving what is amply sufficient
for the payment of his then existing debts. If we allow the
plaintiff the benefit of the $850 and the $2,800, as a good conside~ation to that extent, there is still, at the lowest estimate
of the property, between $3,000 and $4,000 of the consideration
accounted for in no other way than by the agreement for support. Where there is a partial, but not a full consideration
good against creditors, whether the deed is voidable in toto, or
only to the extent of the want of consideration, is a question
not material in this case, as the amount of the consideration resting on the agreement for support exceeds the amount of the levy
in question. The levy must prevail over the deed, unless the
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property of the grantor not conveyed is sufficient to prevent

that result.

A creditor has no right to impeach a conveyance of his debtor

on the ground that it was voluntary, or without sufficient con-

sideration, unless it would operate, if allowed to stand, to his

detriment in the collection of his debt. The debtor is bound to

reserve property ample for the payment of his debts. Whether

the property reserved is what will be deemed ample for this

purpose, does not depend entirely on the amount and value, as

the real end to be accomplished is, that the deed or conveyance

shall not deprive creditors of the means of collecting their debts.

Hence the nature and situation of the property is to be regarded

as well as the amount and value, in view of the facilities the

creditors have left for the collection of their debts. In this

case the debtor conveyed all his property except $100 cash on

hand, and debts due him. These debts amounted nominally to

$2,075, due from various individuals. The debt of $400 against

Sawtell may be thrown out, as Sawtell had failed and become

insolvent. This leaves the amount due the grantor $1,675.

In relation to the Phillips' debt of $1,100 and the Bardwell debt

of $200, the debtors resided out of this state, so that they could

not be reached by process in this state; as debts due from per-

sons residing out of the state are not attachable by trustee

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

process, except in some particular cases. The cash on hand

was in point of law liable to attachment if so situated that an

officer could obtain possession of it without committing a tres-

pass on the person of the owner; but it is not probable that it

would be accessible for the purposes of attachment so as to be

available to a creditor, especially as the amount was so small.

Deducting the $400 debt as worthless, there was but $375 of

the debts reserved by the grantor that was attachable, and that

only by trustee process. The grantor owed about $200 besides

this debt for which the levy was made and the debts the plaintiff

agreed to pay. This $200 the plaintiff paid, and it was repaid

to him out of the debts the grantor reserved. There is another

fact stated worthy of consideration; that is, at the time Fortin

Church made the conveyance in question, it was his purpose to

give the $1,100 debt to certain collateral relations in the state

of New York, where the debtor resided, and it was soon after so

disposed of. The bill of sale to the plaintiff also professed to

transfer all the personal property that Fortin Church might

own at his decease, and the parties so understood its legal

property of the grantor not conveyed is sufficient to prevent
that result.
A creditor has no right to impeach a conveyance of his debtor
on the ground that it was voluntary, or without sufficient consideration, unless it would operate, if allowed to stand, to his
detriment in the collection of his debt. The debtor is hound to
reserve property ample for the payment of his debts. w·hether
the property reserved is what will be deemed ample for this
purpose, does not depend entirely on the amount and value, as
the real end to be accomplished is, that the deed or conveyance
shall not deprive creditors of the means of collecting their debts.
Hence the nature and situation of the property is to be regarded
as well as the amount and value, in view of the facilities the
creditors have left for the collection of their debts. In this
case the debtor conveyed all his property except $100 cash on
hand, and debt.s due him. These debt.s amounted nominally to
$2,075, due from various individuals. The debt of $400 against
Sawtell may be thrown out, as Sawtell had failed and become
insolvent. This leaves the amount. due the grantor $1,675.
In relatiop. to the Phillips' debt of $1,100 and the Bardwell debt
of $200, the debtors resided out of this state, so that they could
not be reached by process in this state; as debts due from persons residing out of the state are not attachable by trustee
process, except in some particular cases. The cash on hand
was in point of law liable to attachment if so situated that an
officer could obtain possession of it without committing a trespass on the person of the owner; but it is not probable that it
would be accessible for the purposes of attachment so as to be
available to a creditor, especially as the amount was so small.
Deducting the $400 debt as worthless, there was but $375 of
the debts reserved by the grantor that was attachable, and that
only by trustee process. The grantor owed about $200 besides
this debt for which the levy was made and the debts the plain.tiff
agreed to pay. This $200 the plaintiff paid, and it was repaid
to him out of the debts the grantor reserved. There is another
fact stated worthy of consideration; that is, at the time Fortin
Church made the conveyance in question, it was his purpose to·
give the $1,100 debt to certain collateral relations in the state
of New York, where the debtor resided, and it was soon after so
disposed of. The bill of sale to the plaintiff also professed to
transfer all the personal property that Fortin Church might
own at his decease, and the parties so understood its legal
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effect. The rule that a party who conveys his property without

sufficient consideration, such as will be valid against creditors,

must reserve property ample for the payment of his existing

debts, is from its nature somewhat general and indefinite; and

whether sufficient is reserved in a given case to answer this pur-

pose, depends, as already stated, on the amount and nature, in

connection with the character and situation, of the property in

reference to the facilities it affords the creditors for collecting

their debts. We think upon all the facts appearing in this case

the conveyance must be regarded as invalid as against the levy-

ing creditor, if she was a creditor at the time of this conveyance,

in respect of this debt. This conclusion is the more just since

it appears that the grantee knew at the time he took the con-

veyance, that this creditor had rendered services for the grantor,

and that she claimed he was indebted to her for such services,

and yet he took the deed and bill of sale without any provision

for the payment of this debt.

The only remaining question is whether the county court( erred

in excluding certain evidence offered by the plaintiff. The case

states that "the plaintiff offered evidence to prove that at the

time of said conveyance to him, no actual indebtedness to said

Deborah Church from said Fortin Church existed" which was

excluded by the court. If this offer is to be construed as an

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

offer merely to show the time when the debt accrued, and that

it accrued subsequent to the conveyance, the decision was

erroneous, as the evidence would not necessarily tend to impeach

the judgment. A judgment, even between the same parties, is

conclusive only of such facts as must have been found to warrant

the judgment. This judgment may be correct, and yet the debt

not have existed till after the conveyance. But we do not so

understand the offer. The offer evidently was to show that no

debt ever existed on which the recovery was had, for the excep-

tions state that it appeared that the judgment was recovered for

the services of Deborah Church (Fortin Church's sister) as his

house-keeper from 1850 to the spring of 1855. The deed was not

executed till October, 1855. The offer therefore must be under-

stood as an offer to show that the judgment was founded on no

actual indebtedness, and not an offer to prove that the debt

accrued after the conveyance. The evidence offered tended

directly to impeach the judgment. The judgment is clearly con-

clusive on this point upon Fortin Church. But in order to entitle

a creditor to impeach a conveyance of his debtor for want of

effect. The rule that a party who conveys his property without
sufficient consideration, such as will be valid against creditors,
n;nst reserve property ample for the payment of his existing
debts, is from its nature somewhat general a11d indefinite; anJ
whether sufficieut is reserved in a given case to answer this purpose, depends, as already stated, on the amount and nature, in
connection with the character and situation, of the property iH
reference to the facilities it affords the creditors for collecting
their debts. We think upon all the facts appearing in this case
the conveyance must be regarded as invalid as against the levying creditor, if she was a creditor at the time of this conveyance,
in respect of this debt. This conclusion is the more just since
it appears that the grantee knew at the time he took the conveyance, that this creditor bad rendered services for the grantor,
and that she claimed he was indebted to her for such services,
and yet he took the deed and bill of sale without any provision
for the payment of this debt.
The only remaining question is whether the county courtJ erred
in excluding certain evidence offered by the plaintiff. The case
states that "the plaintiff offered evidence to prove that at the
time of said conveyance to him, no actual indebtedness to said
Deborah Church from said Fortin Church existed'' which was
excluded by the court. If this offer is to be construed as an
offer merely to show the time when the debt accrued, and that
it accrued subsequent to the conveyance, the decision was
erroneous, as the evidence would not necessarily tend to impeach
the judgment. A judgment, even between the same parties, is
conclusive only of such facts as must have been found to warrant
the judgment. This judgmeut may be correct, and yet the debt
not have existed till after the conveyance. But we do not so
understand the offer. The offer evidently was to show that no
debt ever existed on which the recovery was had, for the exceptions state that it appeared that the judgment was recovered for
the services of Deborah Church (Fortin Church's sister) as his
house-keeper from 1850 to the spring of 1855. The deed was not
exrcuted till October, 1855. The offer therdore must be understood as an offer to show that the judgment was founded on no
actual indebtedness, and not an offer to prove that the debt
accrued after the conveyance. The evidence offered tended
directly to impeach the judgment. The judgment is clearly conclusive on this point upon Fortin Church. But in order to entitle
a creditor to impeach a conveyance of his debtor for want of
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sufficient consideration where there is no fraud, it must appear

that he was a creditor, and a judgment in his favor against the

grantor is not conclusive against the grantee who is no party

to it. He may, as a general rule, show that the judgment was

collusive, and not founded on an actual indebtedness or liability.

But in this case the plaintiff can not be regarded as a stranger

to the judgment, as it appears that the suit was defended by this

plaintiff not only as agent of Fortin Church, but also in his own

behalf to protect the property conveyed to him by the defendant

in that suit. Under such circumstances the plaintiff can not be

permitted again to try the question of indebtedness. He is bound

by the result of that suit.

The judgment of the county court is affirmed.141

GORMLEY v. POTTER

29 Oh. St. 597

(Supreme Court of Ohio. December Term, 1876)

Motion for leave to file a petition in error to reverse the judg-

ment of the District Court of Cuyahoga county.

sufficient consideration where there is no fraud, it must appear
that he was a creditor, and a judgment in his favor against the
grantor is not conclusive against the grantee who is no party
to it. He may, as a general rule, show that the judgment was
collusive, and not founded on an actual indebtedness or liability.
But in this case the plaintiff can not be regarded as a stranger
to the judgment, as it appears that the suit was defended by this
plaintiff not only as agent of Fortin Church, but also in his own
behalf to protect the property conveyed to him by the defendant
in that suit. Under such circumstances the plaintiff can not be
permitted again to try the question of indebtedness. He is bound
by the result of that suit.
The judgment of the county court is affirmed. 10

The original petition was filed by Abel H. Potter and others,

judgment creditors of Patrick Gormley, against said Patrick and

Ann his wife, Edward Flynn, and the West Side Home and Loan

GORMLEY v. POTTER

Association.

The plaintiffs below having recovered a judgment against Pat-

29 Oh. St. 597
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rick Gormley and one Edward Keegan, caused an execution

issued thereon to be levied on the real estate described in the

(Supreme Court of Ohio. December Term, 1876)

petition.

The petition avers, in substance, that with intent to defraud

his creditors, Patrick Gormley had, previous to the levy, con-

veyed the premises to Edward Flynn, who, for the purpose of

consummating the fraud, conveyed the same to the wife of

Patrick. The West Side Home and Loan Association held a

mortgage on the premises.

The object of the petition was to have the conveyances from

Patrick to Flynn, and from Flynn to Patrick's wife, set aside,

and the property sold free from all claims on account thereof,

14a—See further Walker v. Cady, v. Johnson, 70 Me. 258; Kelsey v.

106 Mich: 21, 63 N. W. 1005; Har- Kelley, 63 Vt. 41, 13 L. B. A. 640.

ris v. Brink, 100 Iowa, 366, 69 N. Cf. Tibbals v. Jacobs, 31 Conn. 428.

W. 684, 62 Am. St. Rep. 578; Egery

Motion for leave to file a petition in error to reverse the judgment of the District Court of Cuyahoga county.
The original petition was filed by Abel H. Potter and others,
judgment creditors of Patrick Gormley, against said Patrick and
Ann his wife, Edward Flynn, and the West Side Home and Loan
Association.
The plaintiffs below having recovered a judgment against Patrick Gormley and one Edward Keegan, caused an execution
issued thereon to be levied on the real estate described in the
petition.
The petition avers, in substance, that with intent to defraud
his creditors, Patrick Gormley had, previous to the levy, conveyed the premises to Edward Flynn, who, for the purpose of
consummating the fraud, conveyed the same to the wife of
Patrick. The West Side Home and Loan Association held a
mortgage on the premises.
The object of the petition was to have the conveyances from
Patrick to Flynn, and from Flynn to Patrick's wife, set aside,
and the property sold free from all claims on account thereof,
14a-See further Walker v. Cady,
106 Mich: 21, 63 N. W. 1005; Harris v. Brink, 100 Iowa, 366, 69 N.
W. 684, 62 Am. St. Rep. 578 ; Egery

v. Johnaon, 70 Me. 258; Kelsey v.
Kelley, 63 Vt. 41, 13 L. B. A. 640.
Cf. Tibbals v. Jacobs, 31 CoDD. i28.
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l!Jl

and to adjust the liens between the plaintiffs and the loan asso-

ciation.

The case was taken to the District Court by appeal, where a

decree was rendered, granting the plaintiffs the relief prayed

for.

It is claimed that the petition is defective in not averring that

the judgment debtor had no other real or personal estate subject

to execution for the payment of the plaintiffs' judgment.

For this alleged defect, leave is asked to file a petition in error

to reverse the judgment of the District Court.

WHITE, J. The ruling of the District Court is correct. The

mistake of the plaintiff in error is in regarding the original peti- x

tion as in the nature of a creditor's bill to reach equities of the

judgment debtor.

and to adjust the liens between the plaintiffs and the loan association_
The case was taken to the District Court by appeal, where a
decree was rendered, granting the plaintiffs the relief prayecl
for.
It is claimed that the petition is defective in not averring that
the judgment debtor had no other real or personal estate subject
to execution for the payment of the plaintiffs' judgment.
For this alleged defect, leave is asked to file a petition in error
to reverse the judgment of the District Court.

The action is not founded on § 458 of the code. In order to

maintain an action under that section, it is necessary to aver that

I
the judgment debtor has not personal or real property subject

to levy on execution sufficient to satisfy the judgment.

The land in controversy was subject to levy on execution, and

the levy upon it was properly made. The conveyance to Flynn by

the judgment debtor, and by Flynn to the debtor's wife, having

been made with intent to defraud creditors, was, as against the

creditors, absolutely void. As respects the rights of creditors,
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the land was still the property of the judgment debtor, and sub-

ject to execution as fully as if the conveyance, had not been made.

The petition was founded upon the fact that the land had been

taken in execution, and had for its object the removal of the

cloud cast upon the title by the fraudulent conveyance. The

removal of this cloud was in the interest of both the debtor and

the creditors by enabling the property to be sold at a better price.

That a suit may be maintained for this purpose, has been several

times declared by this court. Soekman v. Sockman, 18 Ohio,

366; Beaumont et al. v. Herrick, 24 Ohio St. 455, 456.

Whether, at the time of making the conveyance, the debtor

retained sufficient property to satisfy his creditors, would be a

proper subject of inquiry in determining the character of the

conveyance.

But if the conveyance is found to be fraudulent as to creditors,

and thus the property was properly taken in execution, neither

the debtor nor his fraudulent grantee can require the creditor

to abandon his levy, on the ground that the debtor has other prop-

WHITE, J. The ruling of the District Court is correct. The
mistake of the plaintiff in error is in regarding the original peti- ,
tion as in the nature of a creditor's bill to reach equities of the
judgment debtor.
The action is not founded -on § 458 of the code. In order to
maintain an action under that section, it is necessary to aver that
the judgment debtor has not personal or real property subject
to levy on execution sufficient to satisfy the judgment.
The land in controversy was subject to levy on execution, and
the levy upon it was properly made. The conveyance to Flynn by
the judgment debtor, and by Flynn to the debtor's wife, having
been made with intent to defraud creditors, was, as against the
creditors, absolutely void. As respects the rights of creditors,
the land was still the property of the judgment debtor, and subject to execution as fully as if the conveyance. had not been made.
The petition was founded upon the fact that the land had been
taken in execution, and had for its object the removal of the
cloud cast upon the title by the fraudulent conveyance. The
removal of this ctoud was in the interest of both the debtor and
the creditors by enabling the property to be sold at a better price.
That a suit may be maintained for this purpose, has been several
times declared by this c~urt. Soekman v. Sockman, 18 Ohio,
366; Beaumont et al. v. Herrick, 24 Ohio St. 455, 456.
Whether, at the time of making the conveyance, the debtor
retained sufficient property to satisfy his creditors, would be a
proper subject of inquiry in determining the character of the
conveyance.
But if the conveyance is found to be fraudulent as to creditors,
and thus the property was properly taken in execution, neither
the debtor nor his fraudulent grantee can require the creditor
to abandon his levy, on the ground that the debtor has other prop-
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erty which might have been taken by the creditor. Westerman v.

Westerman, 25 Ohio St. 500. Before a valid levy can be made

on land, the goods and chattels of the judgment debtor subject to

levy must be first exhausted by the officer having the execution.

This is averred to have been done in the present case before the

levy was made On the lands in controversy.

The case of Bomberger et al. v. Turner et al., 13 Ohio St. 264,

relied on by the plaintiff in error, was an action brought under

§ 458 of the code, to subject the equitable interest of the debtor

in certain lands which had descended to his heirs, to the payment

of a decree obtained against him in his lifetime. There had been

no levy in that case, and it was averred in the petition that the

conveyance was made in trust for the debtor. That case stands

on a different footing from the present, and is no authority

against the decision of the court below. • * •

Leave refused.

BIBB v. FREEMAN

59 Ala. 612

(Supreme Court of Alabama. December Term, 1877)

On the 29th day of December, 1857, Fleming Freeman sold and

executed to Joseph B. Bibb a deed of conveyance of twelve

hundred and eighty-five acres of land situated in the county ofv

Montgomery. The deed contained the usual covenants of war-

nty which might have been taken by the creditor. Westerman v.
Before a valid levy can be made
on land, the goods and chattels of the judgment debtor subject to
levy must be first exhausted by the officer having the execution.
This is averred to have been done in the present case before the
levy was made <>n the lands in controversy.
The case of Bomberger et al. v. Turner et al., 13 Ohio St. 264,
relied on by the plaintiff in error, was an action brought under
§ 458 of the code, to subject the equitable interest of the debtor
in certain lands which had descended to his heirs, to the payment
of a decree obtained against him in his lifetime. There had been
no levy in that case, and it was averred in the petition that the
conveyance was made in trust for the debtor. That case stands
on a different footing from the present, and is no authority
against the decision of the court below. • • •
Leave refused.

"\Yesterman, 25 Ohio St. 500.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ranty. The purchaser entered upon and took possession of the

premises, for which he paid nineteen thousand two hundred and

seventy-five dollars.

BIBB v. FREEMAN

About the 23rd day of November, 1859, one Jesse Boseman, as

the guardian of Daniel Flinn (a minor), instituted a suit in the

59 Ala. 612

Circuit Court of Montgomery county against Joseph B. Bibb to

recover of him about eighty acres of land held by Bibb under

. (Supreme Court of Alabama.

December Term, 1877)

the deed of Freeman. Due notice of the pendency of this suit

was given to Freeman; and at the June term, 1868, of the

Montgomery Circuit Court, a judgment for the land and

damages for its detention, was rendered against Bibb. In Sep-

tember, 1869, Joseph B. Bibb made his will and died. By it

James M. Newman was named as executor. He accepted the

;ippointment and entered upon the discharge of his duties.

In the meantime Fleming Freeman had become totally in-

solvent.

On the 29th day of December, 1857, Fleming Freeman sold and
executed to Joseph B. Bibb a deed of conveyance of twelve
hundred and eighty-five acres of land situated in the county of,
Jiontgomery. The deed contained the usual covenants of warranty. The purchaser entered upon and took possession of the
premises. for which he paid nineteen thousand two hundred and
seventy-five dollars.
About the 23rd day of November, 1859, one Jesse Boseman, as
the guardian of Daniel Flinn (a minor), instituted a suit in the
Circuit Court of Montgomery county against Joseph B. Bibb to
recover of him about eighty acres of land held by Bibb under
the deed of Freeman. Due notice of the pendency of this suit
was given to Freeman; and at the June term, 1868, ·of the
Montgomery Circuit Court, a judgment for the land and
damages for its detention, was rendered against Bibb. In Septembn, 1869, Joseph B. Bibb made his will and died. By it
.James l\1. Newman was named as executor. He aecepted the
:ippointment and entered upon the discharge of his duties.
In the meantime Fleming Freeman had become totally insolvent.
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For the purpose of recovering damages for the breach of

covenants contained in the deed executed by Freeman to Bibb

on the 29th day of December, 1857, Newman filed a bill of com-

plaint in the Chancery Court of Talladega county on the 10th

day of July, 1872. The complainant sought to set aside the fol-

lowing deeds of conveyances, and to subject the land therein

described to the payment of the said damages:

"The State of Alabama, Montgomery county. Know all men

by these presents, that I, Fleming Freeman, of the county and

state aforesaid, for and in consideration that David H. Remson

shall come and abide on my plantation, known as the Taylor

plantation, and plant a portion thereof under an agreement

made between the said Remson and myself, bearing date with

this instrument, and for the further consideration of good-will

and affection which I bear to said Remson and his family, give,

grant and convey unto said Remson the following described

lands, viz.: Southeast quarter of section twenty-two, southwest

quarter of section twenty-three, northeast quarter and southeast

quarter of section twenty-seven, and northwest quarter and

southwest quarter of section twenty-six—all in township sixteen

and range eighteen—to have and to hold the same to him, sub-

ject to the following conditions and trusts, viz.: During my

life I am to have the right to cultivate such portions of said
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lands as is authorized under the agreement between said Remson

and myself as above named. After my death, the said David

H. Remson, should he survive me, shall hold the said lands dur-

•

ing his life-time for his own use and benefit, and at his death

the said lands shall be vested in Caroline N. Remson, wife of

said David H. Remson should she then be living, and all the

children of the said David H., excepting Charles F. F., and

Seaborn W., the oldest children of said Caroline N., for whom

other provision has been made. But should the said Caroline

N. not be living at the death of the said David H. Remson, then

the said lands shall vest in all the children of the said David

H. Remson, excepting the said Charles F. F. and Seaborn W.

"And I, Nancy Freeman, the wife of the said Fleming Free-

man, for the good-will and affection I bear to the said David

H. Remson and his family, do hereby relinquish all right of

dower in the real estate herein described, and hereby join in this

conveyance. «

"In witness of all of which, we the said Fleming Freeman and

H. * A. Bankruptcy—IS

For the purpose of recovering damages for the breach of
covenants contained iu the deed executed by Freeman to Bibb
on the 29th day of December, 1857, Newman filed a bill of complaint in the Chancery Court of Talladega county on the 10th
day of July, 1872. The complainant sought to set aside the following deeds of conveyances, and to subject the land therein
described to the payment of the said damages:
"The State of Alabama, Montgomery county. Know all men
by these presents, that I, Fleming Freeman, of the county nnd
state aforesaid, for and in consideration that David H. Remson
shall come and abide on my plantation, known as the Taylor
plantation, and plant a portion thereof under an agreement
made between the said Remson and myself, bearing date with
this instrument, and for the further consideration of good-will
and affection which I bear to said Remson and his family, give,
grant and convey unto said Remson the following described
lands, viz. : Southeast quarter of section twenty-two, southwest
quarter of section twenty-three, northeast quarter and southeast
quarter of section twenty-seven, and northwest quarter and
southwest quarter of section twenty-six-:--all in township sixteen
and range eighteen-to have and to hold the same to him, subject to the following conditions and trusts, viz. : During my
life I am to have the right to cultivate such portions of said
lands as is authorized under the agreement between said Remson
and myself as above named. After my death, the said David
H. Remson, should he survive me, shall hold the said lands during his life-time for his own use and benefit, and at his death
the said lands shall be vested in Caroline N. Remson, wife of
said David H. Remson should she then be living, and all the
children of the said David H., excepting Charles F. F., and
Seaborn W., the oldest children of said Caroline N., for whom
other provision has been made. But should the said Caroline
N. not be living at the death of the said David H. Remson, then
the said lands shall vest in all the children of the said David
H. Remson, excepting the said Charles F. F. and Seaborn W.
''And I, Nancy Freeman, the wife of the said Fleming Freeman, for the good-will and affection I bear to the said David
H. Remson and his family, do hereby relinquish all right of
dower in the real estate herein described, and hereby join in this
couveyance.
''In witness of all of which, we the said Fleming Freeman and
B. II A. Bankrupt07-U
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I
Nancy Freeman have hereunto set our hands and seals this day of January, 1859.

"Fleming Freeman,

"Nancy Freeman."

'The State of Alabama, Montgomery county. By these pres-

ents, I, Fleming Freeman, and Nancy Freeman, wife of Fleming

Freeman, of the above state and county, do make this codicil to

a deed of gift made to David H. Remson, his wife, Caroline N.

Remson and children, bearing date January, 1859, and recorded

in the office of the judge of probate of said county on the 16th

day of May, 1859. One of the considerations of the deed of gift

as described above, requires the said Remson to live and abide

on the plantation, and to plant a portion thereof under an

agreement made between said Remson and myself, said agree-

ment bearing date with the deed of gift, thereby depriving said

Remson and family from moving or leaving said plantation, in

the event they should think proper to do so. Now, for the pur-

pose of securing the Taylor tract of land, as described in the

deed of gift, to the said Caroline Remson and her children by

the said D. H. Remson, we do hereby declare all articles of

agreement affecting or in the least detrimental to his interest or

her interest, null and void, and of no further value, and we do

furthermore, in consideration of the good-will and affection which

we bear to said Remson and family, give, grant and convey unto
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Caroline Remson and children, the following described lands

as described in the deed of gift to said D. H. Remson and

family, viz.: Southeast quarter of section twenty-two, south-

west quarter section twenty-three, northeast quarter, southeast

quarter section twenty-seven, northeast quarter of southwest

quarter of section twenty-six—all in township sixteen and range

eighteen—to have and to hold the same during her life, and

after her death to the said D. II. Remson's children. It is

furthermore expressly understood that this deed of gift is not

to take effect until after the death of myself and my wife, Nancy

Freeman. In fee simple whereof we have hereunto set our

hands and seals, this ninth of May, in the year of our Lord

one thousand eight hundred and sixty-four.

"F. Freeman (L. S.),

"Nancy Freeman (L. S.)."

At the time of the execution of the foregoing deeds, the

grantor was not in debt, and possessed great wealth.

The chancellor, on the final hearing, dismissed the bill of com-

Nancy Freeman have hereunto set our bands and seals this
...... day of January, 1859.
''Fleming Freeman,
''Nancy Freeman.''
·'The State bf Alabama, Montgomery county. By these presents, I, Fleming Freeman, and Nancy Freeman, wife of Fleming
Freeman, of the above state and county, do make this codicil to
a deed of gift made to David H. Remson, his wife, Caroline N.
Remson and children, bearing date January, 1859, and recorded
in the office of the judge of probate of said county on the 16th
day of May, 1859. One of the considerations of the deed of gift
as described above, requires the said Remson to live and abide
on the plantation, and to plant a portion thereof under an
agreement made between said Remson and myself, said agreement bearing date with the deed of gift, thereby depriving said
Remson and family from moving or leaving said plantation, in
the event they should think proper to do so. Now, for the purpose of securing the Taylor tract of land, as described in the
deed of gift, to the said Caroline Remson and her children by
the said D. H . Remson, we do hereby declare all articles of
agreement affecting or in the least detrimental to bis interest or
her interest, null and void, and of no further value, and we do
furthermore, in consideration oft the good-will and affection which
we bear to said Remson and family, give, grant and convey unto
Caroline Remson and children, the following described lands
as described in the deed of gift to said D. H. Remson and
family, viz. : Southeast quarter of section twenty-two, southwest quarter section twenty-three, northeast quarter, southeast
quarter section twenty-seven, northeast quarter of southwest
quarter of section twenty-six-all in township sixteen and range
eighteen-to have and to hold the same during her life, and
after her death to the said D. H. Remson children. It is
furthermore expressly understood that this deed of gift is not
to take effect until after the death of myself and my wife, Nan<.>y
Freeman. In fee simple whereof we have hereunto set our
hands and seals, this ninth of May, in the year of our T.ord
one thousand eight hundred and sixty-four.
"F. Freeman (L. S.),
"Nancy Freeman (L. S.)."
At the time of the execution of the foregoing deeds, the
grantor was not in debt, and possessed great wealth.
The chancellor, on the final hearing, dismissed the bill of com-
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plaint for want of equity. After the decree, and before an

appeal was taken, the complainant died. Mrs. Martha D. Bibb

was then appointed administratrix de bonis non, with the will

annexed. Upon her petition, the suit was revived, and an appeal

was taken to the Supreme Court.

BRICKELL, C. J. The law in this state is settled, that as

plaint for want of equity. After the decree, and before an
appeal was taken, the complainant died. Mrs. Martha D. Bibb
was then appointed administratrix de bonis -non, with the will
annexed. Upon her petition, the suit was revived, and an appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court.

to existing creditors, a voluntary conveyance by a debtor is by

presumption of law, absolutely void, though no fraudulent

intent is imputable to donor or donee, and though the donor

may have reserved from the conveyance property more than

sufficient for the satisfaction of all debts and demands against

him. Miller v. Thompson, 3 Port. 196; Foote v. Cobb, 18 Ala.

585; Gunnard v. Eslava, 20 Ala. 732; Thomas v. De Graffen-

reid, 17 Ala. 602; Moore v. Spence, 6 Ala. 506; Stiles & Co. v.

Lightfoot, 26 Ala. 443; Huggins v. Perrins, 30 Ala. 396.15

15—The same doctrine is estab-

lished in several other states. In

New Jersey—Gardner v. Kleinke,

46 N. J. Eq. 90; Horton v. Bam-

ford, 79 N. J. Eq. 356; in Ken-

tucky—Carrol's Stats. (1907)

BRICKELL, C. J. The law in this state is settled, that as
to existing creditors, a voluntary conveyance by a debtor is by
presumption of law, absolutely void, though no fraudulent
intent is imputable to donor or donee, and though the donor
may have reserved from the conveyance property more than
sufficient for the satisfaction of all debts and demands against
him. Miller v. Thompson, 3 Port. 196; Foote v. Cobb, 18 Ala.
585; Ounnard v. Eslava, 20 Ala. 732; Thomas v. De Graffenreid, 17 Ala. 602; Moore v. Spence, 6 Ala. 506; Stiles & Co. v.
Lightfoot, 26 Ala. 443; Huggins v. Perrins, 30 Ala. 396. 1 lS

§ 1907; in Virginia—Fink v. Denny,
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75 Va. 663; in West Virginia—

Lockhard v. Beckley, 10 W. Va. 87.

This doctrine is founded upon the

decision of Chancellor Kent in Reade

v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. 481.

"It was at one time the rule that

a voluntary conveyance by one in-

debted at the time was fraudulent

as a matter of law towards his cred-

itors. No evidence was allowed to

rebut the presumption of fraud.

Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch.

481, 8 Am. Dec. 120. This rule was

subsequently deemed to be too se-

vere by the courts, and the less

stringent rule was adopted that,

while a conveyance by a person in-

debted was presumptively and prima

facie fraudulent, the presumption

might be rebutted by proof to the

contrary. Seward v. Jackson, 8

Cow. 406. This presumption, how-

ever, is not to be overthrown by

mere evidence of good intent or

generous impulses or feelings. It

must be overcome by circumstances

showing on their face that there

could have been no bad intent, such

as that the gift was a reasonable

provision and that the debtor still

retained sufficient means to pay his

debts. He can no more delay his

creditors by such voluntary convey-

ance than he can actually defraud

tbem." Cole v. Tyler, 65 N. Y. 73,

78.

'' To authorize the setting aside

of a conveyance as fraudulent, the

evidence must show that the grantor,

at the time of making it, did not

have enough other property subject

to execution to pay his debts, and

that the conveyance was either with-

out consideration, or that the

grantee accepted it with knowledge

of the grantor's fraudulent purpose.

15--Tbe same doctrine is established in several other states. Io
New Jersey-Gardner v. Kleinke,
46 N. J. Eq. 90; Horton v. Bamford, 79 N. J. Eq. 356; in Kentucky - Carrol's Stats.
( i90i)
I 1907; in Virginia-Fink v. Denny,
75 Va. 663; in West VirginiaLockhard v. Beckley, 10 W. Va. 87.
Thia doctrine is founded upon the
deei.sion of Chancellor Kent in Reade
v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Cb. 481.
"It wu at one time the rule that
a voluntary conveyance by one indebted at the time was fraudulent
as a maiter of law towards his creditors. No evidence was allowed to
rebut the preeumption of fraud.
Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Cb.
481, 8 Am. Dec. 120. This rule was
11ubeequeotly deemed to be too severe by the courte, and the less
stringent rule was adopted that,
while a conveyance by a person indebted "·aa presumptively and prima
facie fraudulent, the presumption
might be rebutted by proof to the
contrary. Seward v. Jackson, 8
Cow. 406. This presumption, however, ie not to be overthrown by
mere evide11ce of good intent or

generous impulses or feelings. It
must be overcome by circumstances
showing on their face that there
could have been no bad intent, such
as that the gift was a reasonable
provision and that the debtor still
retained sufficient means to pay his
debts. He can no more delay bis
creditors by such voluntary conveyance than be can actually defraud
them." Cole v. 'l)ler, 65 N. Y. 73,
78.
' 'To authoriie the setting aside
of a conveyance as fraudulent, the
evidence must ehow that the grantor,
at the time of making it, did not
have enough other property subject
to execution to pay hie debts, and
that the eonveyance was either with·
out eonsideration, or that the
grantee accepted it with knowledge
of the grantor 's fraudulent purpose.
Pennington v. Flock, 93 Ind. 378.
'l'he proof in this case, upon the
pointe abo\'e suggested, was unsat·
isfactory. Fraud is not pre!lumed,
but must be proved by the party
alleging its existence.'' Andrews
v. Flanagan, 94 Ind. 383.
For citations of many easee on
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It is equally well settled, that a creditor within the statute

of frauds (Code of 1876, §2124), as to whom a voluntary

conveyance is void, is not necessarily one having a demand for

money which is due, or running to maturity, or one having an

existing cause of action. Whoever has, or may have a claim or

demand upon a contract in existence at the time the voluntary

conveyance is executed, is a creditor within the meaning of the

statute. Foote v. Cobb, supra. A contingent claim, is as fully

protected, as a claim that is certain and absolute. The cove-

nantee of a covenant of general warranty, who is evicted by a

title paramount and outstanding at the time the covenant is

entered into, is regarded as a creditor, not from the time of evic-

tion, but from the time the covenant was executed; and a sub-

sequent voluntary conveyance, is, as to him, void. Gunnard v.

Eslava, supra.19 .

In the application of the principle that voluntary conveyances

are, as matter of law, conclusively presumed fraudulent and

void as to existing creditors, the definition of a voluntary con-

veyance must be steadily kept in view. It is a conveyance

founded merely and exclusively on a good, as distinguished

from a valuable consideration, on motives of generosity and

affection, rather than on a benefit received by the donor, or

detriment, trouble, or prejudice to the donee. If the donor
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receives a benefit, or the donee suffers detriment, as the con-

sideration of the conveyance, the consideration is valuable, not

good merely. However inadequate such consideration may be

—however trivial the benefit to the one, or the damage to the

other, the conveyance is not voluntary. The inadequacy, is a

circumstance which with other facts, may impart an actual

intent to hinder, delay and defraud the creditors of the grantor,

but it does not change the character of the conveyance—does not

convert it into a voluntary conveyance. Bump on Fraud. Con.

262. The intent of the party making it, determines its validity

or invalidity, whatever may be its form, or the consideration

it recites. If he intends to give, and the donee accepts with

knowledge of the intention, the conveyance is voluntary. If he

intends to sell, and there is a valuable consideration, the con-

veyance is not voluntary. The true inquiry therefore is, was

the transaction in which the conveyance originates, a gift, or

above propositions see Bigelovr, Fr. 16—Cf. Evans v. Lewis, 30 Oh.

Conv. (Knowlton's ed.) 206, et seq. St. 11.

It is equally well settled, that a creditor within the statute
of frauds (Code of 1876, § 2124), 88 to whom a voluntary
conveyance is void, is not necessarily one having a demand for
money which is due, or running to maturity, or one having an
existing cause of action. Whoever has, or may have a claim or
demand upon a coutract in existence at the time the voluntary
conveyance is executed, is a creditor within the meaning of the
statute. Foote v. Cobb, supra. A contingent claim, is as fully
,protected, as a claim that is certain and absolute. The coveuautee of a covenant of general warranty, who is evicted by a
title paramount and outstanding at the time the covenant is
entered into, is regarded 88 a creditor, not from the time of eviction, but from the time the covenant was executed; and a subsequent voluntary conveyance, is, as to him, void. Gunnard v.
Eslava, supra. 16
In the application of the principle that voluntary conveyances
are, as matter of law, conclusively presumed fraudulent and
void as to existing creditors, the definition of a voluntary conveyance must be steadily kept in view. It is a conveyance
founded merely and exclusively on a good, as distinguished
from a valuable consideration, on motives of generosity and
affection, rather than on a benefit received by the donor, or
detriment, trouble, or prejudice to the donee. If the donor
receives a benefit, or the donee suffers detriment, as the consideration of the conveyance, the consideration is valuable, not
good merely. However inadequate such consideration may be
-however trivial the benefit to the one, or the damage to the
other, the conveyance is not voluntary. The inadequacy, is a
circumstance which with other facts, may impart an actual
intent to hinder, delay and defraud the creditors of the grantor,
but it does not change the character of the conveyance-does not
convert it into a voluntary conveyance. Bump on Fraud. Con.
262. The intent of the party making it, determines its validity
or invalidity, whatever may be its form, or the consideration
it recites. If he intends to give, and the donee accepts with
knowledge of the intention, the conveyance is voluntary. If he
intends to sell, and there is a valuable consideration, the conveyance is not voluntary. The true inquiry therefore is, was
the transaction in which the conveyance originates, a gift, or
aboYe propositions see Bigelow, Fr.
Conv. (Knowlton 's ed.) 206, et seq.

16-Cf. Evans v. Lewis, 30 Oh.

St. 11.
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a sale. Van Wyck v. Seward, 18 Wend. 386. In this case, a

conveyance was made by a father of real estate to his son, requir-

ing the latter to pay his sisters such an amount as the father

should decree their portion of his estate. Though the son by

accepting the conveyance, became liable to pay the daughters

the amount the father should declare, the conveyance was held

voluntary. The manifest intent of the donor was to dispose of

the lands to and among his children from motives of affection.

After a careful examination of the conveyance made by Free-

man, in January, 1859, to Remson, its terms, limitations, and

conditions, and a consideration of the cotemporaneous agreement

to which it refers, so far as the contents of that agreement are

shown by the evidence,—of the relation of the parties, the cir-

cumstances surrounding them, when the conveyance was exe-

cuted, and their subsequent conduct in reference to it, we can

discover no substantial ground on which the conveyance can be

regarded as a sale, and not as a gift—as founded on a valuable

consideration, and not merely and exclusively on generosity and

affection. The element of value, which it is supposed entered

into the consideration, freeing the conveyance from the char-

acter of voluntary, is that it was made in pursuance of a promise

by the donor to give the lands to Remson, if the latter would
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move from his residence in the county of Talladega, and reside

on the lands, cultivating them under the cotemporaneous agree-

ment to which reference has already been made.

It is often a matter of great difficulty, to discern the line

which separates promises creating legal obligations, from mere

gratuitous agreements. Each case depends so much on its own

peculiar facts and circumstances, that it affords but little aid

in determining other cases of differing facts. The promise, or

agreement, the relation of the parties, the circumstances sur-

rounding them, and their intent, as it may be deduced from

these, must determine the inquiry. If the purpose is to confer

on the promisee, a benefit from affection and generosity the

agreement is-gratuitous. If the purpose is to obtain a quid pro

quo—if there is something to be received, in exchange for which

the promise is given, the promise is not gratuitous, but of legal

obligation. Erwin v. Erwin, 25 Ala. 241. In Kirksey v. Kirk-

sey, 8 Ala. 131, a brother-in-law, wrote to the widow of his

brother, living sixty miles distant, that if she would come and

see him, he would let her have a place to raise her family.

Shortly after, she broke up and removed to the residence of her

a sale. Van Wyck v. Seward, 18 Wend. 386. In this case, a
conveyance was made by a father of real estate to his son, requiring the latter to pay his sisters such an amount as the father
should decree their portion of his estate. Though the son by
accepting the conveyance, became liable to pay the daughters
the amount the father should declare, the conveyance was ,held
voluntary. The manifest intent of the donor was to dispose of
the lands to and among his children from motives of affection.
After a careful examination of the conveyance made by Freeman, in January, 1859, to Remson, its terms, limitations, and
conditions, and a consideration of the cotemporaneous agreement
to which it refers, so far as the contents of that agreement are
shown by the evidence,-of the relation of the parties, the cireumstances surrounding them, when the conveyance was executed, and their subsequent conduct in reference to it, we can
discover no substantial ground on which the conveyance can be
rt'gard<.>d as a sale, and not as a gift-as founded on a valuable
consideration, and not merely and exclusively on generosity and
affection. The element of value, which it is supposed entered
irito the consideration, freeing the conveyance from the char;1cter of voluntary, is that it was made in pursuance of a promise
liy the donor to give the lands to Remson, if the latter would
111on' from bis residence in the county of Talladega, and reside
on the lands, cultivating them under the cotemporaneous agreement to which reference has already been made.
It is often a matter of great difficulty, to discern the line
whieh separates promises creating legal obligations, from mere
gratuitous agreements. Each case depends so much on its own
peculiar facts and circumstances, that it affords but little aid
in determining other cases of differing facts. The promise, or
agreement, the relation of the parties, the circumstances surrounding them, and their intent, as it may be deduced from
these, must determine the inquiry. If the purpose is to confer
on the promisee, a benefit from affection and generosity the
agreement is.gratuitous. If the purpose is to obtain a quid pro
quo-if there is something to be received, in exchange for which
the promise is given, the promise is not gratuitous, but of legal
obligation. Erwin v. Erwin, 25 Ala. 241. In Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131, a brother-in-law, wrote to the widow of his
brother, living sixty miles distant, that if she would come and
see him, he would let her have a place to raise her family.
Shortly after, she broke up and removed to the residence of her
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brother-in-law, who for two years furnished her with a com-

fortable residence, and then required her to give it up. The

promise was held gratuitous, though the sister-in-law in conse-

quence of it had sustained the loss and inconvenience of break-

ing up and moving to the residence of the promisor. In For-

ward v. Armstead, 12 Ala. 124, a father residing in this state,

promised a son residing in North Carolina, to give him a par-

ticular plantation in this state, and slaves, if he would remove

to and settle upon it. The son was induced by the promise to

break up his residence in North Carolina at a loss, and was

put to eKpense and inconvenience in removing to this state. The

promise was declared gratuitous, and that the father could

not be compelled to perform it specifically. The inconvenience

and loss the son sustained, was insisted on as furnishing a valu-

able consideration for the promise. But the court said: "It

seems to us, that the expense incurred in a removal under such

inducements, does not furnish the test whether the engagement

is to be considered a contract, instead of a gratuity, because

expense, or at least trouble, which is equivalent to it, must

always be incurred; but as we have before indicated, the test

is, whether the thing is to be paid in consideration of the

removal, instead of being given from motives of benevolence,

kindness, or natural affection."
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The conveyance refers to the cotemporaneous agreement be-

tween the donor and the adult, active donee who was free from

disability. It is shown that agreement was in writing, and has

been lost. Its terms according to the evidence of the donor,

and one of the donees, who are the only witnesses speaking of

them, were, that Remson should remain on the lands conveyed,

and superintend their cultivation, and that of two other planta-

tions, the property of the donor. The fact is not distinctly

stated, but it is of necessary inference from the facts stated that

each of these three plantations were supplied with hands and

every other necessary appliance for cultivation, the property

of the donor. To their cultivation, Remson was to contribut€ no

more than his personal services in superintending them. From

all three plantations he was to receive one-fifth of the products

of cultivation—receiving no more from the cultivation of the

lands conveyed, than from the plantations not conveyed. If

compensation was intended to be paid him for removing from

his home in Talladega to the lands conveyed—for loss and in-

convenience sustained in the removal—for personal services

brother-in-law, who for two years furnished her with a comfortable residence, and then required her to give it up. The
promise was held gratuitous, though the sister-in-law in consequence of it had sustained the loss and inconvenience of breaking up a.ud moving to the residence of the promisor. In Forward v. Armstead, 12 Ala. 124, a father residing in this state,
promist•d a son residing in North Carolina, to give him a particular plantation in this state, and slaves, if he would remove
to and settle upon it. The son was induced by the promise to
bl'eak up his residence in North Carolina at a loss, and was
put to eKpense and inconvenience in removing to this state. The
promise was declared gratuitous, and that the father could
not be compelled to perform it specifically. The inconvenience
and loss the son sustained, was insisted on as furnishing a valuable consideration for the promise. But the court said: "It
seems to us, that the expense incurred in a removal under such
inducements, does not furnish the test whether the engagement
is to be considered a contract, instead of a gratuity, because
rxpense, or at least trouble, which is equivalent to it, must
always be incurred; but as we have before indicated, the test
is, whether the thing is to be -paid in consideration of the
removal, instead of being given from motives of benevolence,
kindness, or natural affection.''
The conveyance refers to the cotemporaneous agreement between the donor and the adult, active donee who was free from
disability. It is shown that agreement was in writing, and has
been lost. I t.s terms according to the evidence of the donor,
and one of the_donees, who are the only witnesses speaking of
them, were, that Remson should remain on the lands conveyed,
and superintend their cultivation, and that of two other plantations, the property of the donor. The fact is not distinctly
stated, but it is of necessary inference from the facts stated that
each of these three plantations were supplied with hands and
every other necessary appliance for cultivation, the property
of the donor. To their cultivation, Remson was to contribute no
more than his personal services in superintending them. From
all three plantations he was to receive one-fifth of the products
of cultivation-receiving no more from the cultivation of the
lands conveyed, than from the plantations not conveyed. If
compensation was intended to be paid him for removing from
his home in Talladega to the lands conveyed-for loss and in·
convenience sustained in the removal-for personal services
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share of the products of the cultivation of the several planta-

tions, to which the agreement entitled him. We can not regard

these as forming part of the consideration of the conveyance of

the lands.

When the conveyance was executed, Remson was involved in

debt, and the donor was of ample fortune. A relationship existed

between them, the donor not having probably nearer relatives

than Remson and his family, and none so far as is shown, whose

condition appealed more strongly to his sympathy. The con-

veyance does not vest the right to immediate absolute posses-

sion until the death of the donor. At his death it confers on

Remson a life estate only, with remainder to his wife if she

survives him, and all their children except two, for whom other

provision has been made. The wife of the donor joins in the

conveyance for the purpose of releasing her contingent right

of dower, and the release is expressed to be in consideration of

good will and affection borne to said David H. Remson and

family. The whole scheme of the conveyance is testamentary.

We do not mean to say that it is a will, though it may closely

approach it—but it is a disposition by deed from motives of

affection, to take effect after the death of the donor. It has all

the elements, qualities, limitations and terms to be found in a
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voluntary conveyance executed by parties sustaining the rela-

tions of the parties to it, surrounded by the circumstances sur-

rounding them, and but few, if any, of the elements of a sale

between parties contracting on a valuable consideration. We

repeat we cannot doubt it was founded on no other considera-

tion than love and affection—that the parties never thought of

buying and selling—and that the stress of subsequent and unan-

ticipated events, has induced them to suppose that there was

some other consideration for it than affection and benevolence.

Without closing our eyes to the truth of the transaction—to

the motives we irresistibly feel must have actuated the donor,

and to the intent of the parties collected from the circumstances

surrounding them, we cannot hesitate to pronounce the con-

veyance voluntary. It is consequently void as against the

appellant.

The decree of the chancellor is reversed and a decree here

rendered granting the complainant the relief prayed for. • * •

rendered, or to be rendered, it was to be derived from the
share of the products of the cultivation of the several plantations, to which the agreement entitled him. We can not regard
these as forming part of the consideration of the conveyance of
the lands.
When the conveyance was executed, Remson was involved i11
debt, and the donor was of ample fortune. A relationship existed
between them, the donor not having probably nearer relati\'es
than· Remson a.nd his family, and none so far as is shown, whos''
condition appealed more strongly to his sympathy. The co11veyance does not vest the right to immediate absolute possession until the death of the donor. At his death it confers on
Remson a life estate only, with remainder to his wife if she
survives him, and all their children except two, for whom other
provision has been made. The wife of the donor joins in the
conveyance for the purpose of releasing her contingent right
of dower, and the release is expressed to be in consideration of
good will and affection borne to said David H. Remson and
family. The whole scheme of the conveyance is testamentary.
We do not mea.n to say that it is a will, though it may closely
approach it-but it is a disposition by deed from motives of
affection, to take effect after the death of the donor. It has all
the elements, qualities, limitations and terms to be found in a
voluntary conveyance executed by parties sustaining the relations of the partie.s to it, surrounded by the circumstances surrounding them, and but few, if ~ny, of the elements of a sale
between parties contracting on a valuable consideration. We
repeat we cannot doubt it was founded on no other consideration than love and affection-that the parties never thought of
buying and selling-and that the stress of subsequent and unanticipated events, has induced them to suppose that there was
some other consideration for it than affection and benevolence.
Without closing our eyes to the truth of the transaction--to
the motives we irresistibly feel must have actuated the donor,
and to the intent of the parties collected from the circumstances
surrounding them, we cannot hesitate to pronounce the conveyance voluntary. It is consequently void as agai:11st the
appellant.
The decree of the chancellor is reve:rsed and a decree here
rendered granting the complainant the relief prayed for. • • •
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73 Mo. 74

(Supreme Court of Missouri. October Term, 1880)

SHELLEY v. BOOTHE

i

NORTON, J. This is an action for the recovery of the posses-

sion of a stock of goods, on the trial of which defendant obtained

73 Mo. 74

judgment, from which the plaintiffs have appealed. The stock

of goods in question had been seized by defendant, Boothe, as

(Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1880)

sheriff of Jackson county, by the levy of a writ of attachment

sued out at the instance of J. W. Wood & Co., creditors of the

firm of Woy & Smith, as the property of said Woy & Smith.

Plaintiffs, after the goods were thus seized, brought this suit

and replevied the goods so levied upon. Plaintiffs base their

claim to the goods on the ground that Woy & Smith, before the

levy of the attachment sued out by Wood & Co., had transferred

the goods in payment of the debts of certain of their creditors,

of whom plaintiffs were one, and that under this transfer the

goods had been sold and bought by plaintiffs and the proceeds

applied to the payment of the debts of Woy & Smith. The

defendant, on the other hand, claims that said transfer was

made by said Woy & Smith with the intent and for the purpose

of hindering, delaying and defrauding said Wood & Co. in the

collection of their debt against said Woy & Smith, for the col-
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lection of which they had a suit pending at the time of said

transfer, and that plaintiffs accepted the goods with knowledge

of these facts. The contest is virtually between two creditors of

Woy & Smith, and the evidence adduced on the trial tended to

establish each one of the above theories, and the only question

presented for our determination is, whether the court in giving

instructions properly declared the law.

The instructions given on behalf of plaintiffs recognize to the

fullest extent the doctrine that the debtor has a clear and undis-

puted right to prefer one creditor to another, and apply his

property to the payment of one set of creditors to the exclusion

of other creditors, and when this is done in payment of bona

fide debts the transaction will be upheld, although in doing so

the act of the debtor had the effect, and it was his intention, to

defer or hinder another creditor, wyho at the time had a suit

pending against him. While the instructions given on behalf

of the plaintiffs covered their theory of the case, those given for

defendant, especially the third, which authorized the jury to

NORTON, J . This is an action for the recovery of the possession of a stock of goods, on the trial of which defendant obtained
judgment, from which the plaintiffs have appealed. The stock
of goods in question had been seized by defendant, Boothe, as
sheriff of Jackson county, by the levy of a writ of attachment
sued out at the instance of J. W. 'Vood & Co., creditors of the
firm of Woy & Smith, as the property of said Woy & Smith.
Plaintiffs, after the goods were thus seized, brought this suit
and replevied the goods so levied upon. Plaintiffs base their
claim to the goods on the ground that Woy & Smith, before the
levy of the attachment sued out by Wood & Co., had transferred
the goods in payment of the debts of certain of their creditors,
of whom plaintiffs were one, and that under this transfer the
goods had been sold_ and bought by plaintiffs and the prooeeds
applied to the payment of the debts of Woy & Smith. The
defendant, on the other hand, claims that said transfer was
made by said Woy & Smith with the intent and for the purpose
of hindering, delaying and defrauding said Wood & Co. in the
collection of their debt against said Woy & Smith, for the collection of which they had a suit pending at the time of said
transfer, and that plaintiffs accepted the goods with knowledge
of these facts. The contest is virtually between two creditors of
Woy & Smith, and the evidence adduced on the trial tended to
establish each one of the above theories, and the only question
presented for our determination is, whether the court in giving
instructions properly declared the law.
The instructions given on behalf of plaintiffs recognize to the
fullest extent the doctrine that the debtor has a clear and undisputed right to prefer one creditor to another, and apply his
property to the payment of one set of creditors to the exclusion
of other creditors, and when this is done in payment of bona
fide debts the transaction will be upheld, although in doing so
the act of the debtor had the effect, and it was his intention, to
defer or hinder another creditor, who at the time had a suit
pending against him. While the instructions given on behalf
of the plaintiffs covered their theory of the case, those given for
defendant, especially the third, which authorized the jury to
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find for the defendant if they believed that at the time the goods

were transferred, plaintiffs were aware of the fact that it was

the intention of Woy & Smith, in making it, to hinder and delay

Wood & Co. in the collection of their debt, go farther, we think,

than the law warrants. The third instruction is as follows:

"If Woy & Smith, in making the conveyance of the goods in

suit, intended to delay J. W. Wood & Co., their creditors, and

if the plaintiff, either by himself or his agent present at the

sale, was aware of such intent, then you will find for the

defendant."

There is a class of cases to which the doctrine asserted in

the instruction applies; as, if one knowing of judgment and

execution against another, goes and purchases his goods in order

to defeat the execution, or if one knowing that a debtor is sell-

ing his property to hinder, delay or avoid the payment of his

debts, buys it, and pays the full value of it, thereby enabling

the debtor to carry out his fraudulent design, such sales will

be adjudged fraudulent because the purchaser becomes a par-

ticipant in the iniquitous purpose of the debtor. But cases of

this kind should not be confounded with those which only

amount to giving a preference of one creditor over another.

A debtor may give a preference to a particular creditor or set
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of creditors by a direct payment or assignment, if he does so

in payment of his or their just demands, and not as a mere

screen to secure the property to himself. The pendency of

another creditor's suit is immaterial, and the transaction is

valid though done to defeat that creditor's claim. Kuykendall

v. McDonald, 15 Mo. 416; Murray v. Cason, 15 Mo. 415; State

v. Benoist, 37 Mo. 500; Bump on Fraud. Con. 350, 351; Potter

v. McDowell, 31 Mo. 74. The right of a debtor to prefer one

creditor over another necessarily implies the right of such

creditor to accept such preference. While the effect of such

preference must, to the extent that it is made, necessarily be to

defer or to hinder or delay other creditors, the mere knowledge

of the preferred creditor that such will be its effect, and the

debtor intended it should have that effect, will not be sufficient

to avoid the transaction as to a creditor not preferred. But if

in such case it further appears from the circumstances attend-

ing the transaction that the preferred creditor was not acting

from an honest purpose to secure the payment of his own debt,

but from a desire to aid the debtor in defeating other creditors,

or in covering up his property, or in giving him a secret

find fOl' the defendant if they believed that at the time the goods
were transferred, plaintiffs were aware of the fact that it wa:";
the intention of Woy & Smith, in making it, to hinder and dday
Wood & Co. in the collection of their debt, go farther, we thi!1k,
than the law warrants. The third instruction is as follows:
''If Woy & Smith, in making the conveyance of the goods in
suit, intend~d to delay J. W. Wood & Co., their creditors, and
if the plaintiff, either by himself or his agent present at the
sale, was aware of such intent, then you will find for the
defendant.''
There is a class of cases to which the doctrine asserted in
the instruction applies; as, if one knowing of judgment and
execution against another, goes and purchases his goods in order
to defeat the execution, or if one knowing that a debtor is selling his property to hinder, delay or avoid the payment of his
debts, buys it, and pays the full value of it, thereby enabling
the debtor to carry out his fraudulent design, such sales will
be adjudged fraudulent because the purchaser becomes a participant in the iniquitous purpose of the debtor. But cases of
this kind should not be confounded with those which only
amount to giving a preference of one creditor over another.
A debtor may give a preference to a particular creditor or set
of creditors by a direct payment or assignment, if he does so
in payment of his or their just demands, and not as a mere
screen to secure the property to himself. The pendency of
another creditor's suit is immaterial, and the transaction is
valid though done to defeat that creditor's claim. Kuykendall
v. McDonald, 15 l\Io. 416; Murray v. Cason, 15 Mo. 415; StRte
v. Benoist, 37 Mo. 500; Bump on Fraud. Con. 350, 351; Potter,
v. McDowell, 31 Mo. 74. The right of a debtor to prefer one
creditor over another necessarily implies the right of such
creditor to accept such preference. ·while the effect of such
preference must, to the extent that it is made, necessarily be to
defer or to hinder or delay other creditors, the mere knowledge
of the preferred creditor that such will be its effect, and the
debtor intended it should have that effect, will not be sufficient
to avoid the transaction as to a creditor not preferred. But if
in such case it further appears from the circumstances attending the transaction that the preferred creditor was not acting
from an honest purpose to secure the payment of his own debt,
but from a desire to aid the debtor in defeating other creditors,
or in covering up his property, or in giving him a secret
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interest therein, or in locking it up in any way for the debtor's

own use and benefit, he will not be protected, and the sale

would be fraudulent as to other creditors, because in such cases

the fraud of the debtor becomes the fraud of the preferred

creditor because of his participancy therein. Judgment reversed

and cause remanded, in which all concur.17

BENSON v. BENSON

70 Md. 253, 16 Atl. 657

(Court of Appeals of Maryland. February 8, 1889)

STONE, J. Joseph M. Brian became security on the guar-

interest therein, or in locking it up in any way for the debtor's
own use and benefit, he will not be protected, and the salt'
would be fraudulent as to other creditors, because in such eases
the fraud of the debtor becomes the fraud of the preferrt'd
creditor because of his participancy therein. Judgment reversed
and cause remanded, in which all concur. 11

dian bond of Thales A. Linthicum, who was the guardian of

the complainant, Elizabeth H. Benson, about the year 1868.

BENSON v. BENSON

The said Joseph M. Brian died in 1878, and the guardian,

Linthicum, in 1880. The same year in which he died Brian

conveyed all his property to his two children, a son and a

daughter. Linthicum, the guardian, died insolvent, and, before

any final settlement of his guardian accounts, and after his

70 Md. 253, 16 Atl. 657
(Court of Appeals of Maryland. February 8, 1889)

death, it was discovered that he was largely indebted to his

ward. It also turned out that the other two securities on the

guardian bond were totally insolvent, and Mrs. Benson then filed

the bill in this case to set aside the deeds made by Brian to his

children as fraudulent and void against her; and whether these

deeds are fraudulent and void as against her is the first and
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most important point in the case.

These deeds were executed by Brian a short time—a few

months—before his death. The consideration set forth in the

deed to his daughter professed to be love and affection. The

consideration set forth in the deed to his son was the sum of

$17,000; but the son proves that he did not pay his father a

dollar in money, but claims to have paid, subsequently, debts

due by his father to about that amount. The deed executed by

17—See Dumas v. Clayton, 32

App. Cas. D. C. 566; Jackson v.

Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 53 Fla.

265, 44 So. 516; Cron v. Cron, 56

Mich. 8, 22 N. W. 94; Crawford v.

Neal, 144 V. S. 585; Griswold v.

Szwanek, 82 Neb. 761, 118 N. W.

1073, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 222. See

also infra, Preferences, pp. 247-366.

In re Banks, 207 Fed. 662, the

Court held that a payment of one

dollar to a creditor whose claim

was barred by the statute of lim-

itations did not amount to a fraud-

ulent conveyance, though the pay-

ment was made just before going

into bankruptcy.

STONE, J. Joseph M. Brian became security on the guardian bond of Thales A. Linthicum, who was the guardian of
the complainant, Elizabeth H. Benson, about the year 1868.
The said Joseph M. Brian died in 1878~ and the guardian,
Linthicum, in 1880. The same year in which he died Briim
conveyed all his property to his two children, a son and a
daughter. Linthicum, the guardian, died insolvent, and, before
any final settlement of his guardian accounts, and after his
death, it was discovered that he was largely iudebted to his
ward. It also turned out that the other two securities on the
guardian bond were totally insolvent, and Mrs. Benson then filed
the bill in this case to set aside the deeds made by Brian to his
children as fraudulent and void against her; and whether these
deeds are fraudulent and void as against her is the first and
most important point in the case.
These deeds were executed by Brian a short time-a few
months-before his death. The consideration set forth in the
deed to his daughter professed to be love and affection. The
consideration set forth in the deed to his son was the sum of
$17,000; but the son proves that he did not pay bis father a
dollar in money, but claims to have paid, subsequently, dehts
due by his father to about that amount. The deed executed hy
17-See Dumas v. Clayton, 32
App. Cas. D. C. 566; Jackson v.
Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 53 Fla.
265, 44 So. 516; Cron v. Cron, 56
Mich. 8, 22 N. W. 94; Crawford v.
Neal, 144 U. S. 585; Griswold v.
Szwanek, 82 Neb. 761, 118 N. W.
1073, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 222. See
aleo infra, Preferences, pp. 247-366.

In re Banks, 207 Fed. 662, the
Court held that a payment of one
dollar to a creditor whoae claim
was barred by the statute of iimitations did not amount to a fraud·
ulent conveyance, though the payment was made just before going
into bankruptcy.
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Brian to his daughter was for real estate only, and was executed

on the 3d of September, 1878. The deed to his son was exe-

cuted on the following day, and embraced all the property, both

real and personal, of the said Joseph M. Brian, except what he

had before given to his daughter.

There is no evidence in the record of the value of the prop-

erty given to his daughter, but there is evidence of the value of

the real estate given to the son, and it seems to have been worth

about $40,000, or perhaps a little more. There was a consider-

able amount of personal property which passed to the son under

the deed to him, which, if vfe understood his evidence correctly,

was intended as compensation to the son for services rendered

the father. Simultaneous with the execution of these deeds, the

father, Joseph M. Brian, entered into a written agreement with

his children by which each agreed to pay him, if he demanded

it, $500 a year. If he demanded any money from one, he

promised to demand an equal amount from the other, so that

he might not be a greater burden on one than the other; and

all arrears of his annuity were to be considered as paid and

settled at the time of his death, so that his personal representa-

tive, if any, could make no claim for such arrears.

The recital of these facts shows conclusively the character of

this whole transaction. A man advanced in life and of con-
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siderable wealth about two months before his death conveys all

his property to his children. His son is to pay his debts, and his

share was probably for that reason greater by the amount of

such debts than his daughter's. The doed to his daughter was

confessedly a purely voluntary conveyance, and the deed to the

son, upon the proof, is also a voluntary conveyance. The son

did not pay a dollar for the property. All he professes to have

done was to pay some debts of the father, not amounting at

most to half the value of the real estate alone that he got. It

needs no authority for so plain a proposition that the son was

not, under these circumstances, a purchaser for a valuable con-

sideration, and to be treated as such. The deeds, the agree-

ment, and the proof show that Mr. Brian's object was to divide

his property between his children in his life-time, retaining only

an annuity sufficient for his wants for his life.

There is nothing in this record to show that Mr. Brian con-

templated any fraud whatever. He may not, and probably did

not, apprehend any loss on account of his being on this guardian

bond; but, whether he did or did not, these deeds cannot avail

Brian to his daughtl!r was for real estate only, and was executed
on the 3d of September, 1878. The deed to his son was executed on the following day, and embraced all the property, both
real and personnl, of the said Joseph M. Brian, except what he
bad before given to his daughter.
There is no evidence in the record of the value of the property given to his daughter, but there is evidence of the value of
the real estate given to the son, and it seems to have been worth
about $40,000, or perhaps a little more. There was a considerable amount of personal property which passed to the son under
the deed to him, which, if \~ understood his evidence correctly,
was intended as compensation to the son for services rendered
the father. Simultaneous with the execution of these deeds, the
father, Joseph M. Brian, entered into a written agreement with
his children by which each agreed to pay him, if he demanded
it, $500 a year. If he demanded any money from one, he
promised to demand an equal amount from the other, so that
he might not be a greater burden on one than the other; and
all arrears of bis annuity were to be considered as paid and
settled at the time of his death, so that his personal representative, if any, could make no claim for such arrears.
The recital of these facts shows conclusively the character of
this whole transaction. A man advanced in life and of considerable wealth about two months before his death conveys all
his property to his children. His son is to pay his debts, and his
share was probably for that reason greater by the amount of
such debts than his daughter's. The doed to his daughter was
confessedly a purely voluntary conveyance, and the deed to the
son, upon the proof, is also a voluntary conveyance. The son
did not pay a dollar for the property. All he professes to have
done was to pay some debts of the father, not amounting at
most to half the value of the real estate alone that he got. It
needs no authority for so plain a proposition that the son was
not, under these circumstances, a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and to be treated as such. The deeds, the agreement, and the proof show that Mr. Brian's object was to divide
his property between his children in his life-time, retaining only
an annuity sufficient for his wants for his life.
There is nothing in this record to show that Mr. Brian contemp1ated any fraud whatever. He may not, and probably did
r•ot. apprehend any loss on account of his being on this guardian
bond; but, whether he did or did not, these deeds cannot avail
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against the claim of these complainants, and must be declared,

as against them, fraudulent and void. To hold otherwise would

be to declare that an obligor on a bond might always relieve him-

self when loss was apprehended by giving his property to his

wife or child. • * •

We are therefore of opinion that the proceeds of the sale were

properly in the hands of the guardian, and that his security

is liable therefor. While, as we have said, the deeds, the sub-

ject of controversy here, are void against the claims of the com-

plaining creditors, and the property must be sold if necessary to

pay them, yet it is proper to stat» that Joseph M. Brian, Jr.,

is entitled out of the proceeds of the property that he received

from his father, if such sale should be made, to be allowed a

credit for all the debts due bona fide from his father, and which

he can show that he paid after he received a deed for the prop-

erty. The decree must be reversed, and the case remanded, that

a decree may be entered in conformity with this opinion.18

i BALDWIN v. SHORT

i

♦ 125 N. Y. 553, 26 N. E. ,928

(Court of Appeals of New York. February 24, 1891)

FINCH, J. The findings of fact in this case establish that

the conveyance of the house and lot to Mrs. Short by Mrs. Sperry
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was made and accepted with an intent on the part of both

grantee and grantor to hinder, delay, and defraud the creditors

against the claim of these complainants, and must be declared,
as against them, fraudulent and void. To hold otherwise would
be to declare that an obligor on a bond might always relieve himself when loss was apprehended by giving bis property to his
wife or child. • • •
We are therefore of opinion that the proceeds of the sale were
properly in the hands of the guardian, and that his security
is liable therefor. While, as we have said, the deeds, the subject of controversy here, are void against the claims of the complaining creditors, and the property must be sold if necessary to
pay them, yet it is proper to stat• that Joseph M. Brian, Jr.,
is entitled out of the proceeds of the property that he received
from bis father, if such sale should be made, to be allowed a
credit for all the debts due bona fide from his father, and which
he can show that he paid after he received a deed for the property. The decree must be reversed, and the case remanded, that
a decree may be entered in conformity with this opinion. 18

of the latter. The conveyance was not voluntary, for it was

made in part in consideration of a debt of about $8,000 which

BALDWIN v. SHORT

the findings show was an honest debt, and justly due to the

grantee from the grantor. The conclusion of a fraudulent

intent on the part of Mrs. Short was therefore essential to a

recovery, and was established by proof that the balance of the

consideration for the transfer was made up of a false and pre-

tended debt for board and washing, which was wholly fictitious,

and never in fact existed, and which both parties to the transac-

tion falsely concocted to make up a full and fair consideration

for the conveyance. The existence or the falsity of that in-

debtedness was therefore an essential and vital element in the

18—For references to many cases

in accord see 20 Cyc. 421. Cf. Ex

parte Mercer, 12 Q. B. D. 290.

125 N. Y. 553, 26 N. E. 1928
(Court of Appeals of New York.

February 24, 1891)

FINCH, J. The findings of fact in this case establish that
the conveyance of the house and lot to Mrs. Short by Mrs. Sperry
was made and accepted with an intent on the part of both
grantee and grantor to hinder, delay, and . defraud the creditors
of the latter. The conveyance was not voluntary, for it was
made in part in consideration of a debt of about $8,000 which
the findings show was an honest debt, and justly due to the
grantee from the grantor. The conclusion of a fraudulent
intent on the part of Mrs. Short was therefore essential to a
recovery, and was established by proof that the balance of the
consideration for the transfer was made up of a false and pretended debt for board and washing, which was wholly fictitious,
and never in fact existed, and which both parties to the transaction falsely concocted to make up a full and fair consideration
for the conveyance. The existence or the falsity of that indebtedness was therefore an essential and vital element in the
18-For references· to many cases
in accord see 20 Cyc. 421. Cf. Ex
parte Mercer, 12 Q. B. D. 290.
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controversy; and the appellants claim that, in the effort to

show it to have been a fabrication, evidence was admitted against

Mrs. Short of declarations made by Mrs. Sperry, at a period

preceding the conveyance, which bore directly upon the validity

of the disputed debt, and were inadmissible as against Mrs.

Short. Mrs. Parker, a witness for the plaintiff, was permitted

to testify that, just prior to the assignment, she had a conversa-

tion with Mrs. Sperry, in the absence of Mrs. Short, in the course

of which Mrs. Sperry said: "I think I shall sell this house. It

costs so much to keep it up just for Mary's and my board."

The defendants had asserted that such board was an honest debt

due to Mrs. Short from her mother; and the plaintiff, that it

was paid and extinguished as it accrued by the rent of the house,

and that by agreement the board was to be furnished in exchange

for the rent which would otherwise have been due from Mrs.

Short on account of her occupation. The declaration sworn to

by Mrs. Parker tended to show the truth of plaintiff's conten-

tion, but was made in the absence of Mrs. Short, constituted no

part of the res gestce, and was inadmissible as against the

grantee, in whose behalf the objection was made. But it is a

conclusive answer to this allegation of error that Mrs. Short

herself, when examined as a witness, admitted all and more

than what the objectionable evidence tended to prove. She
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acknowledged that during her occupation of the house her mother

paid all the taxes and insurance, and almost all the charges for

repairs; and further testified: "I don't remember saying to

Mrs. Sherwood that I boarded my mother and Mary for the

rent of the house; did their washing; that, while I thought a

great deal of my sister, I thought it was hard I should pay the

rent, and that my sister should receive it. I would not say I

didn't. I don't remember. I don't know when I said it. That

was the arrangement under which I was in the house." She

said again, at a later period of her examination: "I had loaned

my mother this money. I boarded her and my sister, and

did their washing, for this house,—for the rent of the house.

• • * I was not to pay any rent, only in that way,—only

to board them in that way, and do their washing. That was to

pay my rent. And that arrangement continued down to the

time I received my deed." Of course, these admissions made

the declarations to Mrs. Parker wholly superfluous and imma-

terial. Mrs. Parker was also permitted to narrate other declara-

tions of Mrs. Sperry, made prior to the conveyance, under

controversy; and the appellants claim that, in the effort to
show it to have been a fabrication, evidence was admitted against
Mrs. Short of declarations made by Mrs. Sperry, at a period
preceding the conveyance, which bore directly upon the validity
of the disputed debt, and were inadmissible as against Mrs.
Short. l\Irs. Parker, a witness for the plaintiff, was permitted
to testify that, just prior to the assignment, she had a conversation with Mrs. Sperry, in the absence of Mrs. Short, in the course
of which Mrs. Sperry said: "I think I shall sell this house. It
costs so much to keep it up just for Mary's and my board.''
The defendant.a had asserted that such board was au honest debt
due to Mrs. Short from her mother; and the plaintiff, that it
was paid and extinguished as it accrued by the rent of the h~mse,
and that by agreement the board was to be furnished in exchange
for the rent which would otherwise have been due from Mrs.
Short on account of her occupation. The declaration sworn to
by .Mrs. Parker tended to show the truth of plaintiff's contention, but was made in the absence of Mrs. Short, c~nstituted no
part of the res gestce, and was inadmissible as against the
grantee, in whose behalf the objection was made. But it is a
conclusive answer to this allegation of error that Mrs. Short
herself, when examined as a witness, admitted all and more
than what the objectionable evidence tended to prove. She
acknowledged that during her occupation of the house her mother
paid all the taxes and insurance, and almost all the charges for
repairs; and further testified: ''I don't remember saying to
)frs. Sherwood that I boarded my mother and Mary for the
rent ·of the house; did their washing; that, while I thought a
great deal of my sister, I thought it was hard I should pay the
rent, and that my sister should receive it. I would not say I
didn't. I don't remember. I don't know when I said it. That
was the arrangement under which I was in the house.'' She
said again, at a later period of her examination: ''I had loaned
my mother this money. I boarded her and my sister, and
did their washing, for this house,-for the rent of the house.
• • • I was not to pay any rent, only in that way,-only
to board them in that way, and do their washing. That was to
pay my rent. And that arrangement continued down to the
time I received my deed." Of course, these admissions made
the declarations to l\lrs. Parker wholly superfluous and immaterial. Mrs. Parker was also permitted to narrate other declarations of Mrs. Sperry, made prior to the conveyance, under
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objection. These were, in substance, that it was preposterous

to suggest that she should make presents to her daughters be-

cause they took care of her when she was sick; that they only

did their duty. In answer to the objection interposed in behalf

of Mrs. Short, the court held the declarations not competent,

but, to accommodate the witness, allowed them to be detailed,

conditioned upon their being stricken out if not made compe-

tent. In the further progress of the trial, both Mrs. Short and

Mrs. Sperry testified to the transfer to the former by the latter

of some "ranch stock" a few months before the assignment, and

added that it was done as remuneration for the .services ren-

dered during Mrs. Sperry's sickness. The declarations sworn

to by the witness tended to show that the mother did not regard

the services of her daughters during her illness as constituting

a debt which she was in any manner bound to repay; and that

is the sole element of value in the proof. But exactly that, Mrs.

Short herself finally admitted. She said expressly that for her

services in the illness referred to she neither asked nor expected

any pay; that the transfer of the ranch stock was a present; that

it was given to her, and so constituted a gift, rather than a pur-

chase. If it be still suggested that the declaration proved

showed an existing unwillingness to make her a present, the fact

was both immaterial and harmless; for the admitted delay of
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at least eight years shows the same thing much more forcibly,

and leaves no doubt about the suggested lack of inclination.

But another class of evidence was received under objection.

The plaintiff proved several instances of transfers of property

by Mrs. Sperry to persons other than Mrs. Short prior to the

conveyance to the latter; and it was objected in her behalf that

she could not be affected by transactions to which she was not

a party, and of which she had no knowledge. But the plaintiff

was bound to prove the fraudulent intent of Mrs. Sperry, both

as against herself and as against Mrs. Short, and as against the

latter by evidence competent as against her. The acts and trans-

fers of Mrs. Sperry pertinent to the question of her intent

were admissible against both to establish that intent, and are

not to be excluded because they do not also bear upon the intent

of Mrs. Short. It is not necessary that the same fact offered

in evidence should tend to establish both intents. If it proved

Mrs. Sperry's alone, but was a kind of evidence competent

against Mrs. Short, no error would follow its admission. It

objection. These were, in substance, that it was preposterous
to suggest that she should make presents to her daughters because they took care of her when she was sick; that they only
did their duty. In aDBwer to the objection interposed in behalf
of Mrs. Short, the court held the declarations not competent,
but, to accommodate the witness, allowed them to be detailed,
conditioned upon their being stricken out if not made competent. In the further progress of the trial, both Mrs. Short and
Mrs. Sperry testified to the transfer to the former by the latter
of some "ranch stock" a few months before the assignlllent, and
added that it was done as remuneration for the .services rP.ndered during Mrs. Sperry's sickness. The deciarations sworn
to by the witness tended to show that the mother did not regard
the services of her daughters during her illness as coDBtituting
a debt which she was in any manner bound to repay; and that
is the sole element of value in the proof. But exactly that, Mrs.
Short herself finally admitted. She said expressly that for her
services in the illness referred to she neither asked nor expect~d
any pay ; that the transfer of the ranch stock was a present; that
it was given to her, and so constituted a gift, rather than a purchase. If it be still suggested that the declaration proved
showed an existing unwillingness to make her a present, the fact
was both immaterial and harmless; for the admitted delay of
at least eight years shows the same thing much more forcibly,
and leaves no doubt about the suggested lack of inclination.
But another class of evidence was received under objection;
The plaintiff proved several instances of transfers of property
by Mrs. Sperry to persons other than Mrs. Short prior to the
conveyance to the latter; and it was objected in her behalf that
she could not be affected by transactions to which she was not
a party, and of which she had no knowledge. But the plaintiff
was bound to prove the fraudulent intent of Mrs. Sperry, both
as against herself and as against Mrs. Short, and as against the
latter by evidence competent as against her. The acts and transfers of Mrs. Sperry pertinent to the question of her intent
were admissible against both to establish that intent, and are
not to be excluded because they do not also bear upon the intent
of Mrs. Short. It is not necessary that the same fact offered
in evidence should tend to establish both intents. If it proved
l\Irs. Sperry's alone, but was a kind of evidence competent
against Mrs. Short, no error would follow its admission. It
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would tend to prove one branch of the issue, leaving the other

to be met in some different way.

There are some other objections to evidence, but of so little im-

portance as not to justify discussion. They related principally

to the declarations of Mrs. Sperry on. the day of the assignment

and conveyance, and pending the preparation of those instru-

ments, and were either within the res gestae, or wholly imma-

terial, in view of the ultimate course of the trial.

The contention that the conveyance to Mrs. Short may be

sustained to the extent of the adequate and honest part of the

consideration is fully answered by the authorities which hold

that, where the deed is fraudulent against creditors, it is wholly

void, and cannot stand to any extent as security or indemnity.

Boyd v. Dunlap; 1 Johns. Ch. 478; Dewey v. Moyer, 72 N. Y.

70; Billings v. Russell, 101 N. Y. 226, 4 N. E. Rep. 531. A

different rule would put a premium upon fraud. Almost in-

variably, some honest consideration is made the agency for

floating a scheme of fraud against creditors; and, if that may

always be saved, nothing is lost by the effort, and the tempta-

tion to venture it is increased. We are thus unable to find in

the record any error which will justify a reversal. Indeed,

since the ground of recovery against the defendants rests almost

wholly upon the single fact of a false and fraudulent considera-
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tion fabricated by the joint act of both grantor and grantee, and

distinctly admitted by each to have been without an honest

foundation, the questions of evidence raised can hardly be said

to have affected the ultimate result. The judgment should be

affirmed, with costs. All concur, except Ruger, C. J., and

Andrews, J., not voting.19

19—For many cases in accord, see

20 Cyc. 638.

"I do not discover, from a view

of the pleadings and proofs, such

traces of actual and direct fraud

as to feel myself warranted in di-

recting the conveyance of the real

estate to be delivered up and can-

celled as absolutely null and void.

* * * The only question with

n\e has been whether the plaintiffs

ought to be left to their legal rem-

edy, or whether the case affords

would tend to prove one branch of the issue, leaving the other
to be met in some different way.
There are some other objections to evidence, but of so little importance as not to justify discussion. They related principally
to the declarations of Mrs. Sperry on. the day of the assignment
and conveyance, and pending the preparation of those instruments, and were either within the res gestre, or wholly immaterial, in view of the ultimate course of the triaJ.
The contention that the conveyance to Mrs. Short may be
sustained to the extent of the adequate and honest part of the
consideration is fully answered by the authorities which hold
that, where the deed is fraudulent against creditors, it is wholly
void, and cannot stand to any extent as security or indemnity.
Boyd v. Dunlap; 1 Johns. Ch. 478; Dewey v. Moyer, 72 N. Y.
70; Billings v. Russell, 101 N. Y. 226, 4 N. E. Rep. 531. A
different rule would put a premium upon fraud. Almost invariably, some honest consideration is made the agency for
fl08ting a scheme of fraud against creditors; and, if that may
always be saved, nothing is lost by the effort, and the temptation to venture it is increased_ We are thus unable to find in
the record any error which will justify a reversal. Indeed,
since the ground of recovery against the defendants rests almost
wholly upon the single fact of a false and fraudulent consideration fabricated by the joint act of both grantor and grantee, and
distinctly admitted by each to have been without an honest
foundation, the questions of evidence raised can hardly be said
to have affected the ultimate result. The judgment should be
affirmed, with costs. All concur, except Ruger, C. J., and
Andrews, J., not voting.10

tufficient ground for a limited in-

terference by allowing the deed of

the real estate to stand as a security

only for such consideration as has

been shown by the younger Dunlap.

There appears to be very consider-

able inadequacy of price, even ad-

mitting the consideration expressed

in the deed; and to allow the deed

to stand as security only for the

true sum due would be doing justice

to the parties, and granting a relief

which cannot be afforded at law.

A court of law can hold no middle

course. The entire claim of each

19-For many cases in accord, see
2U Cyc. 638.

"I do not discover, from a view
of the pleadings and proof11, such
tra~eo of actual and direct fraud
a~ to feel myself warranted in directing the conveyance of the real
e11tate to be delivered up and can·
eelled as absolutely null .and void.
• • • The only question with
me has been whether the plaintiffs
ought to be left to their legal remedy, or whether the case affords
•u.fficient ground for a limited in·

terference by allowing the deed of
the real estate to stand as a security
only for such consideration as has
been shown by the youngor Dunlap.
There appears to be very consider·
uble inadequacy of price, even admitting the consideration expressed
in the deed; and to allow the deed
to stand as security only for the
true Aum due would be doing juetice
to the parties, nnd granting a relief
which cannot be afforded at law.
A court of law can hold no middle
course. The entire claim of each
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WILSON v. WALRATH

103 Minn. 412, 115 N. W. 203

(Supreme Court of Minnesota. February 21, 1908)

WILSON v. WALRATH

ELLIOTT, J. This was an action in replevin, in which the

plaintiff sought to recover possession of an automobile. The

103 Minn. 412, 115 N. \V. 203

case was tried by the court without a jury, and findings of fact

and conclusions of law were made in favor of the defendant.

(Supreme Court of Minnesota.

February 21, 1908)

From the judgment entered thereon the plaintiff appealed to this

court.

The principal facts are undisputed. The ultimate conclusion

only is questioned. If the findings of facts are sustained by

the evidence, the conclusions of law were properly drawn.

One Spargo sold the automobile in question to the appellant,

Wilson, who paid full consideration therefor, but agreed to allow

Spargo to retain possession of the property for certain purposes

and under certain conditions for a specified time. While in

possession, Spargo mortgaged the machine to Walrath, who

had no knowledge of the sale to Wilson. The court found as

a fact that the evidence does not prove that the sale to Wilson

"was made in good faith and without intent to injure, delay,

or defraud creditors and subsequent purchasers in good faith

of said Spargo." If the evidence sustains this finding of fact,

the respondent must prevail in this court.
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party must rest and be determined

at law on the single point of the

validity of the deed; but it is an

ordinary case, in this court, that a

deed, though not absolutely void,

yet, if obtained under unequitable

circumstances, should stand only as

a security for the sum really due.

* * * A deed fraudulent in fact

is absolutely void, and it is not per-

mitted to stand as a security, for

any purpose of reimbursement or

indemnity; but it is otherwise with

ELLIOTT, J. This was an action in replevin, in which the
pJaintiff sought to recover possession of an automobile. The
case was tried by the court without a jury, and findings of fact
and conclusions of law were made in favor of the defendant.
From the judgment entered thereon the plaintiff appealed to this
court.
The principal facts are undisputed. The ultimate conclusion
only is questioned. If the findings of facts are sustained by
the evidence, the conclusions of law were properly drawn.
One Spargo sold the automobile in question to the appellant.,
Wilson, who paid full consideration therefor, but agreed to allow
Spargo to retain possession of the property for certain purposes
and under certain conditions for a specified time. While in
possession, Spargo mortgaged the machine to Walrath, who
had no knowledge of the sale to Wilson. The court found as
a fact that the evidence does not prove that the sale to Wilson
"was made in good faith and without intent to injure, delay,
or defraud creditors and subsequent purchasers in good faith
of said Spargo.'' If the evidence sustains this finding of fact,
the respondent must prevail in this court.

a deed obtained under suspicious or

unequitable circumstances, or which

is only constructively fraudulent.

* * * Nothing can be more

equitable than this mode of dealing

with these conveyances of such in-

decisive and dubious aspect that

they cannot either be entirely sup-

pressed or entirely supported with

satisfaction and safety." Chancel-

lor Kent, in Boyd v. Dunlap, 1

Johns. Ch. 478; Clark v. Sherman,

128 Iowa, 353, 103 N. W. 982;

Griswold v. Szwanek, 82 Neb. 761,

118 N. W. 1073, 21 L. B- A. (N. 8.)

222; Horton v. Bamford, 79 N. J.

Eq. 356, 81 Atl. 761; McGovern v.

Motor Co., 141 Wis. 309, 124 N. W.

269; Pringle v. Olshinetsky, 17 Ont.

L. B. 38, 11 Ont. W. B. 871.

See Dickinson v. Way. 3 Rich.

Eq. 412; Johnston v. Bank, 3 Strobh.

Eq. 263; Bobinson v. Stewart, 10

N. Y. 189.

party must rest and be determined
at law on the single point of the

'alidity of the deed; but it is an
ordinary case, iu this court, that a
deed, though not absolutely void,
yet, if obtained under unequitable
circumstances, should stand only as
a security for the sum really due.
• • • A deed fraudulent in fact
ilj absolutely void, and it is not permitted to stand as a security, for
any purpose of reimbursement or
indemnity; but it is otherwise with
a d£-ed obtained under suspicious or
unequitable circumstances, or which
is only constructiYely fraudulent.
• • * Nothing can be more
equitable than this mode of dealing
with these con\·eyances of such in-

decisive and dubious aspect that
they rannot either be entirely suppressed or entirely supported with
s:itisfaetion and &&fety." Chancellor Kent, in Boyd v. Dunlap, l
Johns. Cb. 478; Clark v. Sherman,
12S Iowa, 353, 103 N. W. 982;
Griswold v. Szwanek, 82 Neb. 761,
118 N. W. 10i3, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.)
222 ; Horton v. Bamford, 79 N. J.
Eq. 356, 81 Atl. 761; McGovern v.
Motor Co., 141 Wis. 309, 124 N. W.
269; Pringle v. Olshinetsky, 17 Ont.
L. R. 38, 11 Ont. W. R. 871.
See Dickinson v. Way, 3 Rich.
Eq. 41~; Johnston v. Bank, 3 Strobh.
Eq. 263; Robinson v. Stewart, 10
N. Y. 189.
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1. There is a line of cases which holds that, while delivery

is not essential to pass title as between the vendor and vendee

of personal property, it is necessary for such purpose as against

every one but the vendor. Under this rule, when the same goods

are sold to different persons by conveyances equally valid, he

who first lawfully acquires the possession will hold them as

against the other. The motives and intentions of the parties

are immaterial, as the doctrine rests upon the general principle

that, where one of two innocent persons must suffer, the loss

should fall on him whose acts or omissions have made or con-

tributed to make the loss possible. Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass.

110, 9 Am. Dec. 119; Crawford v. Porristall, 58 N. H. 114;

Buruell v. Robertson, 10 Ill. 282; Stephens v. Gifford, 137 Pa.

219, 20 Atl. 542, 21 Am. St. Rep. 868; Norton v. Doolittle, 32

Conn. 405. For other cases see 2 Mechem on Sales, § 981.

Closely connected with this doctrine, but resting on other prin-

ciples, is the rule which makes the retention of possession by

the vendor conclusive evidence of fraud. This doctrine also

rests upon grounds of assumed public policy. It prevails by

virtue of statutes or decisions based on the common law in a

number of states. 2 Mechem on Sales, § 984; 20 Cyc. 539, note

13.20 In the greater number of states, however, the rule is estab-

lished that the mere retention of possession by the vendor is
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presumptive evidence only of a fraudulent and colorable sale,

and the vendee is permitted to overthrow this presumption by

evidence which establishes his good faith and want of knowledge

of any fraudulent intent on the part of the vendor. 20 Cyc.

20—See the extensive note in 24

L. B. A. (N. S.) 1127-1154, where

the cases and statutes are collected.

The matter of whether the reten-

tion of possession is consistent with

the deed or not has been deemed in

some cases to have been of impor-

tance. Hopkins v. Scott, 20 Ala.

179; Hempstead v. Johnston, 18

Ark. 123; Clayton v. Brown, 17 Ga.

217; Bass v. Pease, 79 HI. App.

1. There is a line of cases which holds that, while delivery
is not essential to pass title as between the vendor and vendee
of personal property, it is necessary for such purpose as against
every one but the vendor. Under this rule, when the same goods
are sold to different persons by conveyances equally valid, he
who first lawfully acquires the possession will hold them as
against the other. The motives and intentions of the parties
are immaterial, as the doctrine rests upon the general principle
that, where one of two innocent persons must suffer, the loss
should fall on him whose acts or omissions have made or contributed to make the loss possible. Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 l\Iass.
110, 9 Am. Dec. 119; Cr,awford v. Forristall, 58 N. H. 114;
Burnell v. Robertson, 10 Ill. 282; Stephens v. Gifford, 137 Pa.
219, 20 Atl. 542, 21 Am. St. Rep. 868; Norton v. Doolittle, 32
Conn. 405. For other cases see 2 Mechem on Sales, § 981.
Closely connected with this doctrine, but resting on other principles, is the rule which makes the retention of possession by
the vendor conclusive evidence of fraud. This doctrine also
rests upon grounds of assumed public policy. It prevails by
virtue of statutes or decisions based on the common law in a
number of states. 2 Mechem on Sales, § 984; 20 Cyc. 539, note
13.20 In the greater number of states, however, the rule is established that the mere retention of possession by the vendor is
presumptive evidence only of a fraudulent and colorable sale,
and the vendee is permitted to overthrow this presumption by
evidence which establishes his good faith and want of knowledge
of any fraudulent intent on the part of the vendor. 20 Cyc.

308; Edwards v. Harben, 2 T. B.

587; Martindale v. Booth, 3 B. & A.

498. In Bass v. Pease, supra, the

Court said: "Ever since the case

of Thornton v. Davenport, 1 Scam.

296, the rule has been, in Illinois,

H. A A. Bankruptcy—14

that all absolute sales of chattel

property, where possession is per-

mitted to remain with the vendor,

are fraudulent per se, and void as

to creditors and purchasers, unless

the retention of possession by the

vendor is consistent with the provi-

sions of the deed of transfer or

bill of sale. In all such cases the

vendor's possession is not merely

evidence of fraud, but, by legal in-

ference, is fraud in itself, and can

not be rebutted although the parties

2<>-See the extensive note in 24
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1127-1154, where
the eases and statutes are collecterl.
'J'he matter of whether the retention of possession is consistent with
the deed or not bas been deemed in
somo cru;es to have been of importance. Hopkins v. Scott, 20 Ala.
179; Hempstead v. Johnston, 18
Ark. 123; Clayton v. Brown, 17 Ga.
217; Bass v. Pease, 79 llJ. App.
:J08; Edwards v. Harben, 2 T. R.
587; Martindale v. Booth, 3 B. & A.
498. In Baee v. Pease, supra, the
C'ourt said: "Ever since the case
of Thornton v. Davenport, 1 Scam.
~96, the rule has been, in Illinois,

may have acted in the best of

faith.'' But see Clow v. Woods, 5

S. & B. 275; also Bigelow on Pr.

Conv. (Enowlton's ed.) 404, et seq.

H.

a.

A. Bankruptcy-14

that all absolute sales of chattel
propet"ty, where possession is per·
mitted to remain with the vendor,
are fraudulent per se, and void as
to creditors and purchasers, unless
the retention of possession by the
vendor is consistent with the provisions of the deed of tr1msfer or
hill of sale. In all such cases the
vendor's possession is not merely
evidence of fraud, but, by legal inference, is fraud in itself, and can
not be rebutted although the parties
may have acted in the best of
faith.'' But see Clow v. Woods, 5
S. & R. 275; also Bigelow on Fr.
Conv. (Knowlton 's ed.) 404, et seq.
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536 et seq. The statutes are referred to in the notes to 2

Mechem on Sales, §§ 960, 961.

2. In the thirteenth year of Elizabeth there was enacted the

famous statute which made all conveyances not made bona fide

and for value, with intent to injure and delay or defraud the

creditors, void as to such creditors. St. 13 Eliz. c. 5. A later

statute extended this protection to subsequent purchasers as

well as creditors. St. 27 Eliz. c. 4. These statutes did not in

terms apply to personal property, but from the time of Sir

Edward Coke's decision in Twyne's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 80b, 5 Eng.

Rul. Cas. 2, sales of personal property made with intent to delay

and defraud creditors or subsequent purchasers have been re-

garded as within the provisions of the statutes. The question

soon arose whether, under these statutes, possession by the vendor

was fraudulent per se, and therefore conclusive, or merely pre-

sumptively fraudulent. In Twyne's Case, in speaking of the

indicia of fraud, it was said that "continuance of the posses-

sion in the donor is the sign of trust for himself.'' In Edwards

v. Harben, 2 T. R. 587, it was held that, "if there be nothing

but the absolute conveyance without the possession, that in

point of law is fraudulent." For some time thereafter this was

the established rule in the English courts, but it was finally held

that the proper construction of the statute made such a con-
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veyance presumptively fraudulent only. Hale v. Metropolitan

Co., 28 L. J. Ch. 777; Gregg v. Holland, [1902] 2 Ch. 360.

To clear up the difficulty which arose under the statute, Parlia-

ment enacted the various bills of sale acts, which are fully

discussed and explained by Lord Blackburn in Cookson v.

Swire, 9 A. C. 653-670 (1884). See, also, references to these

acts and decisions thereunder in notes to the fifth English edi-

tion of Benjamin on Sales, p. 496, and appendix, p. 1029, and

in the note to Twyne's Case in 5 Eng. Rul. Cas. 27-39. See,

also, Mr. Bennett's note to the sixth American edition of Benja-

min on Sales, pp. 458-462, and Jones on Chattel Mortgages,

§ 320 et seq. In the United States Edwards v. Harben was

followed by Chancellor Kent in Sturtevant v. Ballard, 9 Johns.

(N. Y.) 337, 6 Am. Dec. 281, and by the Supreme Court of the

United States in Hamilton v. Russell, 1 Cranch (U. S.) 309,

2 L. ed. 118. But in Warner v. Norton, 20 How. (U. S.) 448,

15 L. ed. 950, Mr. Justice McLean stated that "for many years

past the tendency has been in England and the United States

to consider the question of fraud as a fact for the jury under

536 et seq. The statutes are referred to in the notes to 2
Mechem on Sales, §§ 960, 961.
2. In the thirteenth year of Elizabeth there was enacted the
famous statute which made all conveyances not made bona fide
and for value, with intent to injure and delay or defraud the
creditors, void as to such creditors. St. 13 Eliz. c. 5. A later
statute extended this protection to subsequent purchasers as
well as creditors. St. 27 Eliz. c. 4. These statutes did not iu
terms apply to personal property, but from the time of Sir
Edward Coke's decision in Twyne 's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 80b, 5 Eng.
Rul. Ca.s. 2, sales of personal property made with intent to delay
and defraud creditors or subsequent purchasers have been regarded as within the provisions of the statutes. The question
soon arose whether, under these statutes, possession by the vendor
was fraudulent per se, and therefore conclusive, or merely presumptively fraudulent. In Twyne's Case, in speaking of the
indicia of fraud, it was said that ''continuance of the possession in the donor is the sign of trust for himself." In Edwards
v. Harben, 2 T. R. 58i, it was held that, "if there be nothing
but the absolute conveyance without the possession, that in
point of law is fraudulent.'' For some time thereafter this was
the established rule in the English courts, but it was finally held
that the proper construction of the statute made such a conveyance presumptively fraudulent only. Hale v. Metropolitan
Co., 28 L. J. Ch. 777; Gregg v. Holland, [1902) 2 Ch. 360.
To clear up the difficulty which arose under the statute, Parliament enacted the various bills of sale acts, which are fully
discussed and explained by Lord Blackburn in Cookson v.
Swire, 9 A. C. 653-670 ( 1884). See, also, references to these
acts and decisions thereunder in notes to the fifth English edition of Benjamin on Sales, p. 496, and appendix, p. 1029, and
in the note to Twyne's Case in 5 Eng. Rul. Cas. 27-39. See,
also, Mr. Bennett's note to the sixth American edition of Benjamin on Sales, pp. 458-462, and Jones on Chattel Mortgages,
§ 320 et seq. In the United States Edwards v. Harben was
followed by Chancellor Kent in Sturtevant v. Ballard, 9 Johns.
(N. Y.) 337, 6 Am. Dec. 281, and by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Hamilton v. Russell, 1 Cranch (U. S.) 309,
2 L. ed. 118. But in Warner v. Norton, 20 How. (U. S.) 448,
15 L. ed. 950, Mr. Justice l\IcLean stated that "for many years
past the tendency has been in England and the United States
t<? consider the question of fraud as a fact for the jury under
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the instruction of the court." This is now the established doc-

trine of the court. Jewell v. Knight, 123 U. S. 426, 8 Sup. Ct.

193, 31 L. ed. 190; Smith v. Craft, 123 U. S. 436, 8 Sup. Ct.

196, 31 L. ed. 267. See note 18 L. R. A. 604.21

§ 3496, Rev. Laws 1905, and the previous statutes which are

embodied therein, were enacted for the purpose of removing

any doubts as to whether the retention of possession by the ven-

dor is conclusive or only presumptive evidence of fraud. It

provides in express terms that such possession shall be presumed

to be fraudulent and void as against subsequent purchasers in

good faith, unless those claiming under such sale make it ap-

pear that the sale was made in good faith and without any intent

to defraud such purchasers. The effect is to cast upon the ven-

dee the burden of rebutting the statutory presumption of fraud-

ulent intent by proving his own good faith and want of knowl-

edge of fraudulent intent on the part of the vendor. Leqve v.

Smith, 63 Minn. 24, 65 N. W. 121. The statute controls this

case. If Wilson proved that he purchased the machine in good

faith without knowledge of any intent on the part of Spargo

to defraud his creditors or subsequent purchasers, he was en-

titled to the possession of the property. It is conceded that on

April 5, 1906, Spargo owed Wilson $250, the proceeds of an old

machine which had been sold by Spargo for Wilson. The money
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had been retained for some time with the consent of Wilson.

Spargo then owned a Jackson machine, which he used for dem-

onstrating purposes. Wilson wished to purchase a new machine,

and after various negotiations he purchased the Jackson ma-

chine for $1,000, which was substantially its actual value. In

payment he at the time gave Spargo $700 in cash and satisfied

the debt for $250 and accumulated interest. Wilson was inter-

ested in country banks, and his business called him away from

home a great deal of the time. It was necessary that the ma-

chine should be stored in some garage. Spargo, being agent

for the Jackson automobile, and having no other machine of

that make on hand, wished to retain possession of this machine

for a time and use it for demonstrating purposes. It was there-

fore agreed and stated in the bill of sale that Spargo might

retain possession of the machine for 30 days and in the mean-

time use it for demonstrative purposes, in consideration of which

"-'1—Federal courts, however, will applicable. Etheridge v. Sperry,

follow the law of the state properly 139 U. S. 266, 277.

the instruction of the court.'' This is now the established doctrine of the court. Jewell v. Knight, 123 U. S. 426, 8 Sup. Ct.
193, 31 L. ed. 190; Smith v. Craft, 123 U. S. 436, 8 Sup. Ct.
196, 31 L. ed. 267. See note 18 L. R. A. 604.21
§ 3496, Rev. Laws 1905, and the previous statutes which are
embodied therein, were enacted for the purpose of removing
any doubts as to whether the retention of possession by the vendor is conclusive or only presumptive evidence of fraud. It
provides in ex.press terms that such possession shall be presumed
to be fraudulent and void as against subsequent purchasers in
good faith, unless those claiming under such sale make it appear that the sale was made in good faith and without any intent
to defraud such purchasers. The effect is to cast upon the vendee the burden of rebutting the statutory presumption of fraudulent intent by proving his own good faith and want of knowledge of fraudulent intent on the part of the vendor. Leqve v.
Smith, 63 Minn. 24, 65 N. W. 121. The statute controls this
ease. If 'Vilson proved that he purchased the machine in good
faith without knowledge of any intent on the part of Spargo
to defraud his creditors or subsequent purchasers, he was entitled to the possession of the property. It is conceded that on ·
April 5, 1906, Spargo owed Wilson $250, the proceeds of an old
machine which had been sold by Spargo for \Vilson. The money
had been retained for some time with the consent of Wilson.
Spargo then owned a Jackson machine, which he used for demonstrating purposes. Wilson wished to purchase a new machine,
and after various negotiations he purchased the Jackson machine for $1,000, which was substantially its actual value. In
payment he at the time gave Spargo $700 in cash and satisfied
the debt for $250 and accumulated interest. 'Vilson was interested in country banks, and his business called him away from
home a great deal of the time. It was necessary that the machine should be stored in some garage. Spargo, being ·agent
for the Jackson automobile, and having no other machine of
that make on hand, wished to retain possession of this machine
for a time and use it for demonstrating purposes. It was therefore agreed and stated in the bill of sale that Spargo might
retain possession of the machine for 30 days and in the meantime use it for demonstrative purposes, in consideration of which
:?I-Federal courts, however, will
follow the law of the state properly

applicable. Etheridge
139 u. s. 266, 277.

v.

Sperry,
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he was to store the machine and keep it in repair. Spargo's

business and personal standing was good, and Wilson had no

reason to suspect, and did not suspect, that Spargo was in-

solvent. It appears from all the evidence that if he had made

special investigations he would have found that Spargo's stand-

ing was good. Spargo kept the machine in his garage after the

expiration of the 30 days and continued to use it in his busi-

ness. During this time he mortgaged it to the respondent,

Walrath, who had no knowledge of the previous sale to Wilson

and acquired his lien in good faith for value. Neither Wil-

son's bill of sale nor Walrath's mortgage was recorded. Wal-

rath finally took possession of the machine, and in this action

Wilson sought to recover possession from him.

A careful examination of the evidence compels the conclusion

that Wilson was entitled to a finding of fact to the effect that

he purchased the automobile in good faith and without any

intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Spargo's creditors, or sub-

sequent purchasers from Spargo. Wilson certainly acted in

good faith in the matter, if such a thing is possible when the

vendor is allowed to retain possession of the chattel. He paid

full value for the property, and this in itself is persuasive evi-

dence of his good faith. The respondent says that the appel-
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lant was not prejudiced by reason of his absence from the trial,

"because no one disputed his good faith in buying the automo-

bile." It is not contended that there was any actual bad faith

on the part of Wilson. In his brief the respondent thus states

his position. The sale was not accompanied with immediate

delivery and followed by an open and continuous change of

possession, within the meaning of § 3496, Rev. Laws 1905; and

hence, "while in this case it may be true that on April 25, 1906,

appellant in the utmost good faith purchased the automobile, but

from that time on the action of the appellant in permitting and

agreeing to allow Mr. Spargo, the vendor, to keep and use that

machine in exactly the same manner after the sale as before, was

a fraud per se upon any person who might either purchase or

take the same as security without notice of the rights of a prior

purchaser." This is the doctrine of Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass.

110, 9 Am. Dec. 119, and the other cases of the group to which

reference has been made. As an abstract principle of law, that

doctrine is sound and controlling when applied to appropriate

facts and conditions. But the effect which shall be given to pos-

session under the particular circumstances disclosed in this rec-

he was to store the machine and keep it in repair. Spargo 'K
business and personal standing was good, and Wilson had no
reason to suspect, and did not suspect, that Spargo was insolvent. It appears from all the evidence that if he had made
special investigations be would have found that Spargo 's standing was good. Spargo kept the machine in his garage after the
expiration of the 30 days and continued to use it in his business. During this time he mortgaged it to the respondez;i t,
Walrath, who had no knowledge of the previous sale to Wilson
and acquired his lien in good faith for value. Neither Wilson's bill of sale nor Walrath 's mortgage was recorded. Walrath ·finally took possession of the machine, and in this action
Wilson sought to recover possession from him.
A careful examination of the evidence compels the conclusion
that Wilson was entitled to a finding of fact to the effect that
he purchased the automobile in good faith and without any
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Spargo's creditors, or subsequent purchasers from Spargo. Wilson certainly acted in
good faith in the matter, if such a thing is possible when the
vendor is allowed to retain possession of the chattel. He paid
full value for the property, and this in itself is persuasive evi. dence of his good faith. The respondent says that the appellant was not prejudiced by reason of his absence from the trial,
''because no one disputed his good faith in buying the automo- ·
bile.'' It is not contended that there was any .actual bad faith
on the part of Wilson. In his brief the respondent thus states
his position. The sale was not accompanied with immediate
delivery and followed by an open and continuous change of
possession, within th.e meaning of § 3496, Rev. Laws 1905; and
hence, "while in this case it may be true that on April 25, 1906,
appellant in the utmost good faith purchased the automobile, but
from that time on the action of the appellant in permitting and
agreeing to allow l\Ir. Spargo, the vendor, to keep and use that
machine in exactly the same manner after the sale as before, was
a fraud per se upon any person who might either purchase or
take the same as security without notice of the rights of a prior
purchaser." This is the doctrine of Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass.
110, 9 Am. Dec. 119, and the other cases of the group to which
reference has been made. As an abstract principle of law, that
doctrine is sound and controlling when applied to appropriate
facts and conditions. But the effect which shall he given to possession under the particular circumstanC'es disclosed in this rec-
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ord is declared by the statute, and the statute should not be dis-

regarded and annulled by the application of the doctrine of

equitable estoppel. Upon the evidence Wilson sustained the

burden which the statute imposes upon him, and the finding of

the trial court was thus erroneous.

We are inclined to believe that the court was misled by cer-

tain statements made in the case of Flanigan v. Pomeroy, 85

Minn. 264, 88 N. W. 761, which approve the doctrine of Lan-

fear v. Sumner. In that case it appeared that Hogau was the

owner of a horse which he desired to sell. Flanigan agreed to

pay $350 for the horse, and paid $10 on account, with the un-

derstanding that he should pay the balance before 11 o'clock the

next day and then get the horse. Before the time had elapsed

Boynton offered to purchase the horse from Hogan, and was

informed that another party had an option which expired at

11 o'clock. Flanigan failed to appear within the time limit,

and Hogan sold the horse to Boynton, who paid the purchase

price in full and took possession of the property. Flanigan,

claiming that the title of the horse passed to him at the time

of the payment of the $10, brought an action in replevin and

was defeated. The trial court did not make a finding that

Flanigan was a purchaser in good faith, and, as this was neces-
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sary to his right to recover, the order was properly affirmed on

that ground. As an additional reason why Boynton was en-

titled to retain possession of the horse, the court referred with

approval to the doctrine of Lanfear v. Sumner, and cited cer-

tain eases in which that doctrine has been approved. The case

was properly decided upon the first ground stated, and the ad-

ditional reason given in the opinion must be regarded as no

longer meeting with the approval of this court.

The judgment is therefore reversed, and a new trial granted.

FORD LUMBER & MFG. CO. v. CURD

150 Ky. 738, 150 S. W. 991

(Court of Appeals of Kentucky. November 26, 1912)

CARROLL, J. This suit was brought by the appellant com-

pany to subject to the payment of a debt it had against the

appellee John P. Curd a house and lot conveyed to the appellee

Anna Curd, his wife, upon the ground that the conveyance was

fraudulent and made for the purpose of defeating the collection

ord is declared by the statute, and the statute should not be disregarded and annulled by the application of the doctrine of
equitable estoppel. Upon the evidence Wilson sustained the
burden which the statute imposes upon him, and the fin~ing of
the trial court was thus erroneous.
We are inclined to believe that the court was misled by certain statements made in the case of Flanigan v. Pomeroy, 85
Minn. 264, 88 N. W. 761, which approve the doctrine of Lanfear v. Sumner. In that case it appear<>d that Hogan was the
owner of a horse which he desired to sell. Flanigan agreed to
pay $350 for the horse, and paid $10 on account, with the understanding that he should pay the balance before 11 o'clock the
next day and then get the horse. Before the time had elapsed
Boynton offered to purchase the horse from Hogan, and was
informed that another party had an option which expired at I
11 o'clock. Flanigan failed to appear within the time limit,
and Hogan sold the horse to Boynton, who paid the purchase
price in full and took possession of the property. Flanigan,
daiming that the title of the horse passed to him at the time
of the payment of the $10, brought an action in replevin and
was defeated. The trial court did not make a finding that
Flanigan was a purchaser in good faith, and, as this was necessary to his right to recover, the order was properly affirmed on
that ground. As an additional reason why Boynton was entitled to retain possession of the horse, the court referred with
approval to the doctrine of Lanfear v. Sumner, and cited certain cases in which that doctrine has been approved. The case
was properly decided upon the first ground stated, and the additional reason given in the opinion must ·he rrgarded as no
longer meeting with the approval of this court.
The judgment is therefore reversed, and a new trial granted.
FORD LUMBER & MFG. CO. v. CURD
150 Ky. 738, 150 S. W. 991
{Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

November 26, 1912)

CARROLL, J. This suit was brought by the appellant company to subject to the paymrnt of a debt it had against the
appellee John P. Curd a house and lot conveyed to the appellee
Anna Curd, his wife, upo11 the ground that the conveyance was
fraudulent and made for the purpose of defeating the collection
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of its debt. The lower court dismissed the suit, and to reverse

that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

The debt sued on by the appellant was created by John P.

Curd some time prior to February 10, 1908, on which date he

executed to the company his note for the amount due. In

August, 1908, the property sought to be subjected was conveyed

to Anna Curd; the consideration being $1,150. Of this amount,

$100, perhaps something over, was paid on the consideration of

the vendor, and a few days after the conveyance was made the

Home & Savings Fund Company advanced to the Curds about

$1,000, to satisfy the remainder due on the purchase price and

took a mortgage on the property. At the time, or perhaps before,

this transaction occurred, John P. Curd had become a member

of this Home & Savings Fund Company, the dues in which were

$2.30 a week, and the purpose of obtaining the money from the

Home & Savings Fund Company was to enable the Curds to

pay off the mortgage debt in weekly installments. The evi-

dence shows that the first payment, of about $100, made to the

vendor, was paid out of money that Mrs. Curd had received

from the estate of her parents; but the weekly payments of

$2.30 to the Home & Savings Fund Company were paid by Mrs.

Curd out of money given to her by her husband. The evidence

further shows that Curd earned, from August, 1908, to August,
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1911, when the suit was brought, about $20 a week, and that he

gave the money so earned to his wife, who, with this money, in

addition to $4 a week received from a boarder, paid all the

expenses of the house and family, which consisted of herself

and husband and two children, and was able to save out of it a

few dollars each week. It is also shown that she was an in-

dustrious, thrifty, economical woman, and that she did the cook-

ing for the family and all the household work, except occa-

sionally when she had a young girl to help her.

On these facts it is the contention of counsel for appellant

that as the weekly payments made on the house were, in fact,

made by Curd out of money earned by him, the property should

be subjected to the debt sued on; while counsel for appellee

insist that Curd had the legal right to give to his wife, for the

support of his family, the wages he received, and if she saved

enough out of this to pay the weekly dues to the Home & Savings

Fund Company, thus reducing the debt against the house, no

fraud was practiced on the appellant, and it cannot subject the

of its debt. The lower court
dismissed the suit, and to reverse
I
that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
The debt sued on by the appellant was created by John P.
Curd some time prior to February 10, 1908, on which date he
executed· to the company his note for the amount due. In
August, 1908, the property sought to be subjected was conveyed
to Anna Curd; the consideration being $1,150. Of this amount,
$100, perhaps something over, was paid on the consideration of
the vendor, and a few days after the conveyance was made the
Home & Savings Fund Company advanced to the Curds about
$1,000, to satisfy the remainder due on the purchase price and
took a mortgage on the property. At the time, or perhaps before,
this transaction occurred, John P. Curd had become a member
of this Home & Savings Fund Company, the dues in which were
$~.30 a week, and the purpose of obtaining the money from the
Home & Savings Fund Company was to enable the Curds to
pay off the mortgage debt in weekly installments. The evidence shows that the first payment, of about $100, made to the
vendor, was paid out of money that Mrs. Curd had received
from the estate of her parents; but the weekly payments of
$2.30 to the Home & Savings Fund Company were paid hy Mrs.
Curd out of money given to her by her husband. The evidence
further shows that Curd earned, from August, 1908, to August,
1911, when the suit was brought, about $20 a week, and that be
gave the money so earned to his wife, who, with this money, in
addition to $4 a week received from a boarder, paid all the
expenses of the house and family, which eonsisted of herself
a11d husband and two children, and was able to save out of it a
few dollars each W(lek. lt is also shown that she was an industrious, thrifty, economical woman, and that she did the cooking for the family and all the houst•hold work, except occasionally when she had a young girl to· help her.
On these facts it is the contention of counsel for appellant
that as the weekly payments made on the house were, in fact,
made by Curd out of money earned by him, the property should
be subjected to the debt sued on; while counsel for appellee
insist that Curd had the legal right to give to his wife, for the
support of bis family, the wages he received, and if she saved
enough out of this to pay the weekly dues to the Home & Savings
Fund Company, thus reducing the debt against the house, no
fraud was practiced on the appellant, and it cannot subject the
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property to the extent of the payments so made in satisfaction

of its debt.

As the evidence shows that Mrs. Curd paid, out of her own

money, the initial payment on the property, there is, of course,

no fraud attached to this feature of the case, and we may put

it aside without further comment. The remaining question is:

Does the fact that the property was conveyed to Mrs. Curd, and

the weekly payments made out of money earned by her hus-

band and given to her, constitute such fraud, in the meaning of

the law, as would authorize the court to subject the property

to appellant's debt to the extent of the weekly payments? We

think this question must be answered in the negative, as it was

by the lower court.

The cases of Gross v. Eddinger, 85 Ky. 168, 3 S. W. 1, 8 Ky.

Law Rep. 829; Brooks-Waterfield Co. v. Frisbie, 99 Ky. 125, 35

S. W. 106, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 555, 59 Am. St. Rep. 452; Black-

burn v. Thompson, Wilson & Co.. 66 S. W. 5, 23 Ky. Law Rep.

1723, 56 L. R. A, 938; and Patton v. Smith, 130 Ky. 819, 114

S. W. 315, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1124—relied on by counsel for

appellant, do not, in our opinion, support his contention that

the appellant should succeed in this case. We approve of those

opinions and the principles of law announced in them; but they

are plainly distinguishable from the case at bar. In the Gross
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case the husband, by his exclusive business effort, accumulated

-in a few years $3,000 or $4,000, which was invested in the name

of his wife, and the court held, under the facts of that case, it

was plainly the purpose of the husband to defraud his creditors

by attempting to place the income from a profitable business,

conducted by him, in the name of his wife and beyond their

reach. In the Brooks-Waterfield case, Frisbie, who was a suc-

cessful and prosperous business man. accumulated several thou-

sand dollars, in the course of a few years, and invested it in

real estate in the name of his wife, and the court subjected, at

the instance of his creditors, the property in the name of his

wife, to the extent of $3,000 to the payment of his debts. In the

Blackburn case, the husband, who was conducting a profitable

line of business, invested, in the name of his wife, some $2,500

realized from his business, and the court held that the scheme

of permitting his wife to take the title to property that was paid

for in this way by the husband was a fraud upon his creditors.

property to the extent of the payments so made in satisfaction
of" its debt.
As the evidence shows that Mri:i. Curd paid, out of her own
money, the initial payment on the property, there is, of course,
no fraud attached to this feature of the case, an<l we may put
it aside without further comment. The remaining question is:
DO€S the fact that the property was cqnveyed to l\Irs. Curd, and
the weekly payments made out of money earned by her bus.
band and given to her, constitute such fraud, in the meaning of
the law, as would authorize the court to subject the property
to appellant's debt to the extent of the weekly payments T WP
think this question must be answered in the negative, as it was
by the lower court.
The cases of Gross v. Eddinger, 85 Ky. 168, 3 S. W. 1, 8 Ky.
Law Rep. 829; Brooks-Waterfield Co. v. Frisbie, 99 Ky. 125, 35
S. W. 106, 18 K,y. Law Rep. 555, 59 Am. St. Rep. 452; Blackbun1 v. Thompson, Wilson & Co.. 66 S. W. 5, 23 Ky. Law Rep.
1723, 56 L. R. A, 938; and Patton v. Smith, 130 Ky. 819, 114
S. W. 315, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1124-relied on by counsel for
appellant, do not, in our opiniou, support his contention that
the appellant should succeed in this case. We approve of those
opinions and the principles of law announced in them ; but they
are plainly distinguishable from the case at bar. In the Gross
case the husband, by his exclusive business effort, accumulated
-in a few years $3,000 or $4,000, which was invested in the uame
of his wife, and the court held, under the facts of that case, it
was plainly the purpose of the husband to defraud his creditors
by attempting to place the income from a profitable business,
conducted by him, in the name of his wife and beyond their
reach. In the Brooks-Waterfield case, Frisbie, who was a successful and prosperous husiuess man. accumulated several thousand dollars, in the course of a few years, and invested it in
r<'al estate in the name of his wife, and the court subjected, at
the instance of his creditors, the property in the name of his
wife, to the extent of $3,000 to the payment of his debts. In the
Blackburn case, the husband. who was conducting a profitable
line of bm~iness. invested. in the name of his wife, some $2,500
rea Jiu•d from his busi1wss, and the court held that the scheme
of permitting his wife to take the title to property that was paid
for in U1is way by the husband was a fraud upon bis creditors.
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In the Patton case the husband, in a few years, by industry and

business ability, accumulated several thousand dollars, with

which land was bought and the title taken in the name of the

wife, and it was held that the husband could not, by this method,

defeat the claims of his creditors, and so much of the property

as represented the result of his business capacity was subjected

to the payment of his debts. In all of these cases it appeared

that the earnings or profits made by the husband were greatly

in excess of the amount necessary to comfortably provide a

home and support for his family, and the court in substance

said that a husband engaged in a successful and prosperous busi-

ness, by which he was able to accumulate considerable estate,

would not be permitted to invest his accumulations in property

in the name of his wife, and thus defeat his creditors. But we

have here a very different state of case. Curd, with a wife and

two children to support, was earning a salary of $20 a week, or

$80 a month, not more than sufficient to provide for and support

his family, if his wife had not been an industrious, economical,

good housekeeper. If, in place of handing to his wife every

week all of his meager salary, Curd had seen proper, as many

husbands do, to spend a part of the money in purchasing pleas-

ures and comforts for himself and family, or if he had given

the money to his wife and she had spent it, as many wives do,
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in extravagant living, his creditors could not have reached any

part of it, because he would have been entitled to the $20 re-

ceived each week, under the exemption laws of the state. But

even if it was not so exempt, no court would have compelled him

to set aside, out of this salary, a certain sum each week for the

benefit of his creditors, or have required him to live more

economically than he desired to, and in this way save a portion

of his wages for his creditors.

Where the earnings of the husband are not more than rea-

sonably sufficient to comfortably provide for and support his

family, hire household labor, and furnish his wife and children

with some of the pleasures of life, he may give his earnings to

his wife, and if she is willing to deny herself the pleasures and

little luxuries that she might have, and to dress plainly and live

frugally, and do her own cooking and household work in place

of hiring help to do it, and by this close economy in the manage-

ment of her personal and household affairs is able to save enough

Jn the Patton ease the husband, in a ft•w )"l'ars. by industry a11d
husi11Pss ability, accumulated several thousand dollars, with
which land was bought and the title taken in the name of the
wife, and it was held that the husband could not, by this method,
defeat the claims of his creditors, and so much of the property
as represented the result of his business capacity was subjected
to the payment of his debts. In all of these cases it appeare<l
that the earnings or profits made by the husband were greatly
in excess of the amount necessary to comfortably provide a
home and support for his family, and the court in substance
said that a husband engaged in a successful and prosperous busim·ss, by which he was able to accumulate considerable estate.
would not be permitted to invest his accumulations in property
in the name of his wife, and thus defeat his creditors. But we
liave here a very different state of case. Curd, with a wife and
two children to support, was earning a salary of $20 a week, or
$80 a month, not more than sufficient to provide for and support
his family, if his wife had not been an industrious, economical,
good housekeeper. If, in place of handjng to his wife every
week all of bis meager salary, Curd had seen proper, as many
husbands do, to spend a part of the money in purchasing pleasures and comforts for himself and family, or if he had given
the money to his wife and she had spent it, as many wives do,
in extravagant living, bis creditors could not have reached any
part of it, because he would have been entitled to the $20 received each week, under the exemption laws of the state. But
even if it was not so exempt, no court would have compelled him
to set aside, out of this salary, a certain sum each week for the
benefit of his creditors, or have required him to live more
economically than he desired to, and in this way save a portion
of his wages for his creditors.
\Vhere the earnings of the husband are not more than reasonably sufficient to comfortably provide for and support his
family, hire household labor, and furnish his wife and children
with some of the pleasures of life, he may give his earnings to
his wife, and if she is willing to deny herself the pleasures and
little luxuries that she might have, and to dress plainly and live
frugally, and do her own cooking and household work in place
of hiring help to do it, and by this close economy in the management of her personal and household affairs is able to save enough
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to buy an humble home, his creditors cannot take it from her.

Anderson v. Mundo, 77 S. W. 926, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1644. i

The judgment dismissing the petition is affirmed.22
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to buy an humble home, his creditors cannot take it from her.
Anderson v . .Mundo, 77 S. W. 926, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1644.
The judgment dismissing the petition is affirmed. 22

86 Vt. 1, 83 Atl. 746

(Supreme Court of Vermont. May 14, 1912)

HASELTON, J. This is a bill in chancery brought by the

LYNCH'S ADM'R v. MURRAY

administrator de bonis non of the estate of Thomas Lynch. The

bill is founded on P. S. 2863, which authorizes an executor or

86 Vt. 1, 83 Atl. 746

administrator, where there is a deficiency of assets, to maintain

a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance made by the deceased

(Supreme Court of Vermont. l\fay 14, 1912)

person whom he represents. The conveyance in question was

made by Thomas Lynch to William Murray, the defendant, June

20, 1898. The case was heard on bill, answer, master's report,

and defendant's exceptions thereto, and on the defendant's

motion for a decree in his favor, and it was decreed that the

conveyance in question is void as to the creditors of Lynch and

of his estate to the extent of the deficiency of the assets of the

estate to pay such creditors. There were further provisions in

the decree the propriety of which, except as herein noticed, is

not questioned, provided the decree, so far as above recited, was

rightly made. The decree is in substantial conformity with that

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

directed by this court in its mandate in the well-considered case

of McLane v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 48. Murray, the defendant,

appeals.

It is claimed by Murray that it does not appear by the report

that the conveyance to him was made with an actual fraudulent

intent on the part of Lynch. It appears from the report that

Lynch had owned and occupied the farm for about 10 years

before the conveyance in question and that during most of that

time, a period of about 10 years, he had kept in his family one

McCabe, who had left shortly before the conveyance, and who

claimed that there was due to him from Lynch a large sum on

account of labor done by the former for the latter; that McCabe

threatened to bring suit on such claim; that Lynch hearing of

the threatened, or contemplated, action of McCabe consulted his

22—Cf. Trefethen v. Lyman, 90 son v. McKenna, 21 R. I. 117, 42

Me. 376, 38 Atl. 335, 60 Am. St. Atl. 510, 79 Am. St. Rep. 793.

Rep. 271, 38 L. E. A. 190; Robin-

HASELTON, J. This is a bill in chancery brought by the
administrator de bo-nis non of the estate of Thomas Lyuch. The
bill is founded on P. S. 2863, which authorizes an executor or
administrator, where there is a deficiency of assets, to maintain
a suit to set a.side a fraudulent conveyance made by the deceased
person whom he represents. The conveyance in question was
made by Thomas Lynch to William :Murray, the defenuant, June
20, 1898. The case was heard on bill, answer, master's report,
and defendant's exceptions thereto, and on the defendant's
motion for a decree in his favor, and it was decreed that the
conveyance in question is void as to the creditors of Lynch and
of his estate to the extent of the deficiency of the assets of the
estate to pay such creditors. There were further provisions in
the decree the propriety of which, except as herein noticed, is
not questioned, provided the decree, so far as above recited, was
rightly made. The decree is in substantial conformity with that
directed by this court in its mandate in the well-considered case
of ~fcLane v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 48. Murray, the defendant,
appeals.
It is claimed by Murray that it does not appear by the report
that the conveyance to him was made with an actual fraudulent
intent on the part of Lynch. It appears from the report that
Lynch had owned and occupied the farm for about 10 years
before the conveyance in question and that duriug most of that
time, a period of about 10 years, he had kept in his family one
~lcCabe, who had left shortly before the conveyance, and who
claimed that there was due to him from Lynch a large sum on
account of labor done by the former for the latter; th.at McCabe
threatened to bring suit on such claim; that Lynch hearing of
the threatened, or contemplated, action of McCabe consulted his
22-Cf. Trefethen v. Lyman, 90
Me. 376, 38 Atl. 335, 60 Am. St.
Rep. 271, 38 L. R. A. 190; Robin·

son v. McKenna, 21 R. I. 117, 42
Atl. 510, 79 Am. St. Rep. 793.
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close friend Murray as to what should be done under the cir-

cumstances; and that the two called upon a third person to draw

the deed in question; and that, after it had been properly exe-

cuted, Lynch delivered it to Murray, and Murray took it and had

it recorded. The farm was then worth $1,800. It was unin-

cumbered except by a mortgage of $600. There was no con-

sideration for the deed of Lynch's equity of redemption, but

Murray assumed the comparatively small mortgage. Lynch be-

lieved that he had more than paid McCabe and that the latter's

claim was unfounded and unjust, but feared that the latter

might obtain a large judgment on his claim, and he gave the

deed for the purpose of so transferring the apparent title to the

property that it could not be reached in execution by McCabe.

Lynch told Murray that McCabe had been more than paid, and

it was agreed between Lynch and Murray at the time of the

giving of the deed that on settlement of the McCabe claim the

property should be deeded back to Lynch.

The master does not in terms find that the conveyance

was fraudulent, but the facts found as above stated are equiva-

lent to a" finding that the conveyance was actually fraudulent;

for, as has well been said, actual fraud means "fraud according

to the common conscience." And it is that conscience, and not

Lynch's or Murray's, which determines the character of this
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conveyance. Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances (Knowlton's

ed.) 1, 444. Even though Lynch did not believe that he owed

McCabe, it was the latter's right, if he thought otherwise, to

bring suit and have his rights determined, not by the judgment

of Lynch, but by the judgment of the court, and it was the duty

of Lynch, so far as his property not exempt would enable him,

to satisfy any such judgment, and so the conveyance was made

with the fraudulent intent of defeating the right of McCabe

and of avoiding the duty of Lynch, and was an actual fraud

upon one who, as was contemplated, might become a judgment

creditor in consequence of claims existing at the time of the

conveyance. Foster v. Foster, 56 Vt. 540; Corey v. Morrill, 71

Vt. 51. 42 Atl. 076; Kimball v. Thompson, 4 Cush. 441, 447,

50 Am. Dec. 799; Rogers v. Evans, 3 Ind. 574, 56 Am. Dec. 537.

With great good sense, the Statute of Elizabeth counted as

fraudulent conveyances which tended "to the let or hindrance

of the due course and execution of law and justice." 13 Eliz.

c. 5, cl. 1.

To say that fears of an unjust judgment against Lynch af-

(

close friend Murray as to what should be done under the circumstances; and that the two called upon a third person to draw
the deed in question; and that, after it had been properly execut.eg., Lynch delivered it to Murray, and Murray took it and had
it recorded. The farm was then worth $1,800. It was unincumbered except by a mortgage of $600. There was no consideration for the deed of Lynch's equity of redemption, but
.Murray assumed the comparatively small mortgage. Lynch believed that he had more than paid McCabe and that the latter's
claim was unfowided and unjust, but feared that the latter
might obtain a large judgment on his claim, and he gave the
deed for the purpose of so transferring the apparent title to the
prop~rty that it could not be reached in execution by McCabe.
Lynch told Murray that McCabe had been more than paid, and
it was agreed between Lynch and Murray at the time of the
giving of the deed that on settlement of the McCabe claim the
property should be deeded back to Lynch.
The master does not in terms find that the conveyance
was fraudulent, but the facts found as above stated are equivalent to a· finding that the conveyance was actually fraudulent;
for, as has well been said, actual fraud means "fraud according
to the common conscience." And it is that conscience, and not
Lynch's or Murray's, which determines the character of this
conveyance. Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances (Knowlton 's
ed.) 1, 444. Even though Lynch did not believe that he owed
McCabe, it was the latter's right, if he thought otherwise, to
bring s.uit and have his rights determined, not by the judgment
of l.iynch, but by the judgment of the court, and it was the duty
of Lynch, so far as his property not exempt would enable him,
to satisfy any such judgment, and so the conveyance was made
with the fraudulent intent of defeating the right of McCabe
ar;d of avoiding the duty of Lynch, and was an actual fraud
upon one who, as was contemplated, might become a judgment
crt>ditor i11 consequence of claims existing at the time of. the
1 onV<'YH!! C
·c. Foster v. Foster, 56 Vt. 540; Corey v. Morrill, 71
Yt. 51. ·f2 Atl. 976; Kimball v. Thompson, 4 Cush. 441, 447,
50 Am. Dt•c. 799; Rogers v. Evans, 3 Ind. 574, 56 Am. Dec. 537.
·w ith great good sense, the Statute of Elizabeth counted as
fraudull:nt conveyances which tended ''to the let or hindrance
of the due course and execution of law and justice." 13 Eliz.
c. 5, cl. 1.
To say that fears of an unjust judgment against Lynch af-
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fected the character of the transaction would be much like say-

ing that a mob is justified in hanging or burning one charged

with crime because of apprehensions that a court of law will

unjustly acquit him.

It is further claimed by Murray that there is no finding

in the report that he had any fraudulent intent in taking the

deed, and that he must be considered as an innocent grantee.

But the facts above stated permit but one conclusion; that is,

that he was in collusion with Lynch; that he took the deed in

furtherance of the fraudulent intent of Lynch and for the pur-

pose of effectuating it. It is therefore to be presumed that the

trial court drew that conclusion. Davenport v. Crowell, 79 Vt.

419, 65 Atl. 557; Johnson v. Paine, 84 Vt. 84, 78 Atl. 732; Per-

kins v. Perley, 82 Vt. 524, 74 Atl. 231.

We have then a case of a conveyance given by the grantor

and taken by the grantee with the actual fraudulent intent on

the part of both of defeating such existing claim, if any, as

McCabe might succeed in establishing through regular proceed-

ings in a court of justice.

The defendant claims that this was not a voluntary con-

veyance, on the ground that Murray assumed to pay the mort-

gage on the farm. As we have seen, the farm at the time of the

conveyance was worth $1,800, the mortgage was $600, and noth- ,
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ing was paid for the valuable equity of redemption. This could'

be levied upon by creditors, and its alienation without considera- 1

tion was within the statute. The circumstance of the assump-

tion of the mortgage, and other circumstances connected there-

with, do not tend to relieve the transaction of its fraudulent

character in view of the fact that it was agreed between the

parties that, when the McCabe claim was put out of the way,

the property should be deeded back to Lynch. In view of that

agreement, the assumption of the mortgage seems to have been

intended rather to give a fair aspect to the fraud than to make

the transaction bona fide. Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances

(Knowlton's ed.) 39, 122; Spencer v. Caverhill (Iowa) 133 N.

W. 450, 453; First National Bank v. Bertschy, 52 Wis. 438, 9

N. W. 534; Lyons v. Haddock, 59 Iowa, 682, 13 N. W. 737;

Randall v. Vroom, 30 N. J. Eq. 353; Stutson v. Brown, 7 Cow.

732; Welcome v. Batchelder, 23 Me. 85.

•••

Decree affirmed and cause remanded.

fected the character of the transaction would be much likP saying that .a mob is justified in hanging or burning one charged
with crime because of apprehensions that a court of law will
unjustly acquit him.
It is further claimed by l\lurray that there is no finding
in the report that he had any fraudulent intent in taking the
deed, and that he must be considered as an innocent grantee.
But the facts above stated permit but one conclusion; that is,
that he was in collusion with Lynch; that he took the deed in
furtherance of the fraudulent intent of Lynch and for the purpose of effectuating it. It is therefore to be presumed that the
trial court drew that conclusion. Davenport v. Crowell, 79 Vt.
419, 65 Atl. 557; Johnson v. Paine, 84 Vt. 84, 78 Atl. 732; Perkins v. Perley, 82 Vt. 524, 74 Atl. 231.
'Ve have then a case of a conveyance given by the grantor
and taken by the grantee with the actual fraudulent intent on
the part of both of defeating such existing claim, if any, as
McCabe might succeed in establishing through regular proceedings in a court of justice.
The defendant claims that this was not a voluntary conveyance, on the ground that Murray assumed to pay the mortgage on the farm. As we have seen, the farm at the time of the
conveyance was worth $1,800, the mortgage was $600, and nothing was paid for the valuable equity of redemption. This could
be levied upon by creditors, and its alienation without consideration was within the statute. The circumstance of the assumption of the mortgage, and other circumstances connected therewith, do not tend to relieve the transaction of its fraudulent
character in view of the fact that it was agreed between the
parties that, when the McCabe claim was put out of the way,
the property should be deeded back to Lynch. In view of that
agreement, the assumption of the mortgage seems to have been
intended ·rather to give a fair aspect to the fraud than to make
the transaction bona fide. Bigelow, Fraudulent Conveyances
(Knowltoo's ed.) 39, 122; Spencer v. Caverhill (Iowa) 133 N.
W. 450, 453; First National Bank v. Bertschy, 52 Wis. 438, 9
N. W. 534; Lyons v. Haddock, 59 Iowa, 682, 13 N. W. 737;
Randall v. Vroom, 30 N. J. Eq. 353; Stutson v. Brown, 7 Cow.
i32; Welcome v. Batchelder, 23 Me. 85.

• • •

Decree affirmed and cause remanded.
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HOLLOWAY v. MILLARD

1 Madd. 225

(Chancery, February 25-Mareh 4, 1816)

HOLLOWAY

v. MILLARD

This was a creditor's bill, filed against the executors of S. H.

and also against the trustees, and cestuis que trust, under a

1 Madd. 225

voluntary settlement made by her, praying an account against

the executors; and that if it should appear that her estate -was

(Chancery,. February 25-March 4, 1816)

insufficient for the payment of her debts, the deficiency might

be made good out of the property of which the voluntary settle-

ment had been made, and that a competent part might be sold

for that purpose.

S. H. by her will, 29th April, 1809, gave all her real estate,

etc., to the use of M. Lewis (since deceased), and the defendant,

John Millard, their heirs and assigns, in trust to sell the same,

and apply the produce in aid of her personal estate, in discharge

of her debts, etc., and gave the residue to F. T. Lewis and

Millard were appointed executors.

By a settlement, dated 22nd of December, 1810, S. H., after

reciting that she was entitled as one of four co-heiresses to a

fourth part of certain estates, estimated at the value of £170,000,

parts of which estate had been contracted to be sold, she cove-

nanted and agreed with the trustees Lewis and Millard, that, out

of her share of the monies to be produced by the sale of the
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estates, she would pay them £36,000 sterling, upon trust, to invest

the same in government securities, and apply the dividends as

she should appoint, and for want of appointment to pay the same

to her for her life, and after her decease, then upon the trusts

mentioned in the deed, in favor of the defendants, the cestuis que

trust. By a codicil, 5th March, 1811, S. H. confirmed her will,

and the settlement. The £36,000 was afterwards paid to the

trustees, and they invested the same in government securities,

and applied the dividends and the principal according to the

trusts of the settlement.

The bill did not state that the deceased was indebted at the

time she made the voluntary settlement; but charged that it

was made in favor of an illegitimate child, and others, and that

the whole was voluntary, and made without good or valuable

consideration, and void against the plaintiffs, who were creditors

subsequent to the settlement.

This was a creditor's bill, filed against the executors of S. H.
and also against the trustees, and cestuis que trust, under a
voluntary settlement made by her, praying an account against
the executors; and that if it should appear that her estate was
insufficient for the payment of her debts, the deficiency might
be made good out of the property of which the voluntary settle·
ment had been made, and that a competent part might be sold
for that purpose.
S. H. by her will, 29th April, 1809, gave all her real estate,
etc., to the use of M. Lewis (since deceased), and the defendant,
John Millard, their heirs and assigns, in trust to sell the same,
and apply the produce in aid of her personal estate, in discharge
of her debts, etc., and gave the 1 residue to F. T. Lewis and
Millard were appointed executors.
By a settlement, dated 22nd of December, 1810, S. H., after
reciting that she was entitled as one of four co-heiresses to a
fourth part of certain estates, estimated at the value of £170,000,
parts of which estate had been contracted to be sold, she covenanted and agreed with the trustees Lewis and Millard, that, out
of her share of the monies to be produced by the sale of the
estates, she would pay them £36,000 sterling, upon trust, to invest
the same in government securities, and apply the dividends as
she should appoint, and for want of appointment to pay the same
to her for her life, and after her decease, then upon the trusts
mentioned in the deed, in favor of the defendants, the cestuis que
trust. By a codicil, 5th March, 1811, S. H. confirmed her will,
and the settlement. The £36,000 was afterwards paid to the
trustees, and they invested the same in government securities,
and applied the dividends and the principal according to the
trusts of the settlement.
The bill did not state that the deceased was indebted at the
time she made the voluntary settlement ; but charged that it
was made in favor of an illegitimate child, and others, and that
the whole was voluntary, and made without good or valuable
consideration, and void against the plaintiffs, who were creditors
subsequent to the settlement.
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THE VICE-CHANCELLOR. Two questions have been made

in this cause; 1st. Whether a voluntary settlement by one not

indebted, in favor of an illegitimate child, and others, can be

impeached by creditors subsequent to the settlement; and 2dly.

Whether the plaintiff, though he has not stated in his bill

that the settler was indebted when she made the settlement, is

entitled to an inquiry as to that fact, the bill being a creditor's

bill.

With respect to the first point, it appears, that S. H. being

entitled to £42,500, makes a settlement to the extent of £36,000.

It is a pure voluntary settlement in favor of strangers (for the

illegitimate child cannot be considered otherwise than as a

stranger), without pecuniary consideration, or consideration of

blood, by one not indebted at the time. It has been strongly

insisted that, though a voluntary settlement by one not indebted,

is good against future creditors, if made in favor of a wife or

child; yet, that if made in favor of strangers, as in this case,

it is not effectual against future creditors.

It was not from any doubt on this point, but only from its

general importance, and in deference to the argument, that I

thought it right to look into the cases.

Let us first see how it stands independent of authority. The

word "voluntary" is not to be found either in the statute of
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the 13th Eliz. c. 5 (upon which the present question arises), or

in the 27th Eliz. c. 4. The 13th Eliz. is pointed only against

"fraudulent" conveyances, as appears from the preamble; and

such conveyances only are thereby invalidated. Fraudulent con-

veyances are such, to use the words of the preamble, as are '' de-

vised and contrived of malice, fraud, covin, collusion, or guile,

to the end, purpose, and intent, to delay, hinder, or defraud

creditors." This conveyance is not one of that description. It

is not fraudulent merely because it is voluntary. A voluntary

conveyance may be made of real or personal property, without

any consideration whatever, and cannot be avoided by subse-

quent creditors, unless it be of the description mentioned in the

statute. If a person having £1,000 a year, and not indebted at

the time, gives away £500 a year, the gift is not fraudulent, un-

less it were made with an intent to defeat subsequent creditors.

Its being voluntary is prima facie evidence, where the party is

loaded with debt at the time, of an intent to defeat and defraud

his creditors; but if unindebted, his disposition is good. There

is no suggestion in the bill that this settler was indebted at the

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR. Two questions have been made
in this cause; lst. 'Vhether a voluntary settlement by one not
i11d1'ht<•d. in farnr of an illegitimate child, and others, can be
impeached by crerlitors subsequent to the settlement; and 2dly.
Whether the plaintiff, though he has not stated in his bill
that the settler was indebted when she made the settlement, is
entitled to an inquiry as to that fact, the bill being a creditor's
bill.
\Vith respect to the first point, it appears, that S. H. being
entitled to £42,500, makes a settlement to the extent of £36,000.
It is a pure voluntary settlement in favor of strangers (for the
illegitimate child cannot be considered otherwise than as a
stranger), without pecuniary consideration, or consideration of
blood, by one not indebted at the time. It has been strongly
insisted that, though a voluntary settlement by one not indebted,
is good against future creditors, if made in favor of a wife or
child; yet, that if made in favor of strangers, as in this case,
it is not effectual against future creditors.
It was not from any doubt on this point, but only from its
general importance, and in deference to the argument, that I
thought it right to look into the cases.
Let us first see how it stands independent of authority. The
word "t'Oluntary" is not to be found either in the statute of
the 13th Eliz. c. 5 (upon which the present question arises), or
in the 27th Eliz. c. 4. The 13th Eliz. is pointed only against
"fraudulent" conveyances, as appears from the preamble; and
such conveyances only are thereby invalidated. Fraudulent conveyances are such, to use the words of the preamble, as are "devised and contrived of malice, fraud, covin, collusion, or guile,
t-0 the end, purpose, and intent, to delay, hinder, or defraud
creditors." This conveyance is not one of that description. It
is not fraudulent merely because it is voluntary. A voluntary
conveyance may be made of real or personal property, without
any consideration whatever, and cannot be avoided by subsequent creditors, unless it be of the description mentioned in the
statute. If a person having £1,000 a year, and not indebted at
the time, gives away £500 a year, the gift is not fraudulent, unless it were made with an intent to defeat subsequent creditors. (
Its being voluntary is prima facie evidence, where the party is
loaded with debt at the time, of an intent to defeat and defraud
his creditors; but if unindebted, his disposition is good. There
is no suggestion in the bill that this settler was indebted at the
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time; she was not in trade; and the settlement did not include

all her property; £6,000 being left unsettled. She was culpable

in becoming the parent of such a child, but the child being born,

it was her duty to protect and provide for it. A voluntary dis-

position, even in favor of a child, is not good, if the party is

indebted at the time. (Fitzer v. Fitzer, 2 Atk. 511. Taylor v.

Jones, 2 Atk. 600.)

A dictum of Lord Hardwicke, in Townshend v. Windham (2

Ves. sen. 10), has been much relied on. Supposing Lord Hard-

wicke's words to be correctly reported, they only amount to

this, that he is speaking affirmatively, when a voluntary deed will

be good, and so far the proposition is true; but it is not thence

to be inferred, that every voluntary conveyance not in favor of

a child is bad against subsequent creditors. If, in that passage,

the words "for a child" had been omitted, still the proposition

would have been correct, and I have Lord Hardwicke's authority

for saying so, as will appear from some, determinations of his,

which I shall notice. In Walker v. Burroughs (1 Atk. 93), his

Lordship says, "It has been said, all voluntary settlements are

void against creditors, equally the same as they are against

subsequent purchasers under the statute 27th Eliz. c. 4; but this

will not hold; for there is always a distinction upon the two

statutes (the 13th Eliz. c. 5, and the 27th Eliz. c. 4.) It is

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

necessary on the 13th Eliz. to prove at the making of the settle-

ment, tlie person conveying was indebted at the time, or imme-

diately after the execution of the deed, or otherwise it would be

attended with bad consequences, because the statute extends to

goods and chattels, and such construction would defeat every

provision for children and families, though the father was not

indebted at the time." In another passage in the same case, he

says, "Where a man has died indebted, who in his lifetime made

a voluntary settlement, upon application to this court to make

it subject to his debts as real assets, the court have always de-

nied it, unless you show he was indebted at the time the con-

veyance was executed." Now here, you observe, the proposition

is laid down generally, that a voluntary settlement by one not

indebted, is good against subsequent creditors; and it is not

said, that to be good such voluntary settlement must be made in

favor of a child. In Russell v. Hammond (1 Atk. 15), Lord

Hardwicke expresses himself in the same manner. In that case

it was also determined, that where a father took back an annuity

to the value of the estate comprised in the settlement, it was

time; she was not in trade; and the settlement did not include
all her property; £6,000 being left unsettled. She was culpable
in becoming the parent of such a child, but the child being boru,
it was her duty to protect and provide for it. A voluntary disposition, even in favor of a child, is not good, if the party is
indebted at the time. (Fitzer v. Fitzer, 2 Atk. 511. Taylor v.
Jones, 2 Atk. 600.)
A dictum of Lord Hardwicke, in Townshend v. Windham (2
Ves. sen. 10), has been much relied on. Supposing Lord Hardwicke 's words to be correctly reported, they only amount to
this, that he is speaking affirmatively, when a voluntary deed will
be good, and so far the proposition is true; but it is not thence
to be inferred, that every voluntary conveyance not in favor of
a child is bad against subsequent creditors. If, in that passage,
the words "for a chud" had been omitted, still the proposition
would have been correct, and I have Lord Hardwicke 's authority
for saying so, as will appear from some. determiIIBtions of bis,
which I shall notice. In Walker v. Burroughs (1 Atk. 93), his
Lordship says, "It has been said, all voluntary settlements are
void against creditors, equally the same as they are against
subsequent purchasers under the statute 27th Eliz. c. 4; but this
will not hold; for there is always a distinction upon the two
statutes (the 13th Eliz. c. 5, and the 27th Eliz. c. 4.) It is
necessary on the 13th Eliz. to prove at the making of the settlement, the person conreying was indebted at the time, or immediately after the execution of the deed, or otherwise it would be
attended with bad consequences, because the statute extends to
goods and chattels, and such construction would defeat every
provision for ~hildren antl families, though the father was not
indebted at the time.'' In another passage in the same case, he
says, "Where a man has died indebted, who in his lifetime made
a voluntary settlement, upon application to this court to make
it subject to his debts as real assets, the court have always denied it, unless you show he was indebted at the time the conveyance was executed.'' Now here, you observe, the proposition
{ is laid down generally, that a voluntary settlem~nt by one not
\ indebted, is good against subsequent creditors; and it is not
said, that to be good such voluntary settlement must be made in
favor of a child. In Russell v. Hammond (1 Atk. 15), Lord
Hardwicke expresses himself in the same manner. In that case
it was also determined, that where a father took back an annuity
to the value of the estate comprised in the settlement, it was
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tantamount to a continuance in possession, and a circumstance

of fraud; and he relieved the creditors against the settlement;

but it does not therefore follow that every interest taken back

for life is to be considered as fraudulent, but only where it is

so reserved for the purpose of defeating future creditors. The

meaning, therefore, of what Lord Hardwicke said in Townshend

v. "Windham, is clearly ascertained by what he said in the other

cases to which I have alluded. In Lush v. Wilkinson (5 Ves.

384), a bill by a creditor subsequent to a voluntary settlement

made by one not indebted at the time, seeking to impeach the

settlement, was dismissed; and in Kidney v. Coussmaker (12

Ves. 155), a voluntary settlement was held to be fraudulent only

against such as were creditors at the time. In Sykes v. Hastings,

recently determined at the Rolls (A. D. 1814), the same rule

was acted upon, though the settlement was made under very

extraordinary circumstances. It is clear, therefore, from the

authorities, that a voluntary settlement of real or personal prop-

erty, by a person not indebted at the time, nor meaning a fraud,

is good against subsequent creditors. • * *

The bill, so far as regards the defendant, F. T., and the other

parties interested in the settlement, must be dismissed with

costs; and the usual decree taken for an account against the

representatives of S. H.23
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JENKYN v. VAUGHAN

3 Drew. 419

(High Court of Chancery. January 15, 1856)

This was a bill to set aside certain indentures of post-nuptial

settlement made by George Concannen, as being fraudulent and

void against creditors.

The bill was filed by simple contract creditors of Concannen

against the executrix of his will; against the sole acting trustee

of one of the deeds; and against the widow; the latter being the

real and substantial defendant.

tantamount to a continuance iu possession, and a ci1·cumstance
of fraud; and he relieved the creditors against the settlement;
but it does not therefore follow that every interest taken back
for life is to be considered as fraudulent, but only where it is
so reserved for the purpose of defeating future creditors. The
meaning, therefore, of what Lord Hardwicke said in Townshend
v. Windham, is clearly ascertained by what he said in the other
cases to which I have alluded. In Lush v. Wilkinson (5 Ves.
384), a bill by a creditor subsequent to a voluntary settlement
made by one not indebted at the time, seeking to impeach the
settlement, was dismissed; and in Kidney v. Coussmaker (12
Ves. 155), a voluntary settlement was held to be fraudulent only
against such as were creditors at the time. In Sykes v. Hastings,
recently determined at the Rolls (A. D. 1814), the same rule
was acted upon, though the settlement was made under very
extraordinary circumstances. It is clear, therefore, from the
authorities, that a voluntary settlement of real or personal prop- \
erty, by a person not indebted at the time, nor meaning a fraud,
is good against subsequent creditors. • • •
The bill, so far as regards the defendant, F. T., and the other
parties interested in the settlement, must be dismissed with
costs; and the usual decree taken for an account against the
representatives of S. H.2 3

In 1834 Concannen had insured his life for £1,000; in 1833 for

£800; and in 1832 for £300.

JENKYN v. VAUGHAN

In 1834 he assigned the £800 policy to Gillson for securing an

advance.

3 Drew. 419

23—In re Lane-Fox [1900], 2 Q.

B. 508 ace

(High Court of Chancery.

January 15, 1856)

This was a bill to set aside certain indentures of post-nuptial
settlement made by George Concannen, as being fraudulent and
void against creditors.
The bill . was filed by simple contract creditors of Concannen
against the executrix of his will ; against the sole acting trustee
of one of the deeds; and against the widow; the latter being the
real and substantial defendant.
In 1834 Concannen had insured bis life for £1,000; in 1833 for
£800 ; and in 1832 for £300.
In 1834 he assigned the £800 policy to Gillson for securing an
advance.
~3-In

n. sos

re Lane-Fox [1900], 2 Q.

acc.
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In 1842 he assigned the three policies to trustees to secure cer-

tain benefits to his wife, reserving to himself an absolute power

of revocation.

In 1844 he made his will, by which he gave certain property,

not including the policies, to his wife; and he gave his residue

to Fanny Vaughan, whom he made his executrix.

In 1845 he revoked the deed of 1842, and reassigned the policies

to trustees (one of whom disclaimed, leaving W. D. Lewis, a

defendant, the sole trustee) on trusts for his wife, again re-

serving an absolute power of revocation.

He kept the deed in his own hands, and paid the premiums on

the policies during his life; and died in 1852, largely indebted.

The debts of the plaintiff arose in 1852.

It was admitted that at the dates of the settlements Con-

cannen was indebted in considerable amounts, besides the mort-

gage debt secured by the deed of 1834; and there was one in

particular to a person named Bouverie, the state of which is

noticed in the judgment. But on the evidence it was not clear

whether all these previous debts had been liquidated at the

dates of the settlements, or whether some of them did not still

subsist at the time when the plaintiff's debt accrued.

The principal question was, whether, under these circum-

stances, the plaintiff could sustain a bill to set aside the volun-
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tary settlements?

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR. The first question, is, whether,

in the case of a voluntary settlement, a creditor, whose debt

accrued subsequently to the execution of the deed, can file a bill

for the purpose of setting it aside. Now it is not in dispute that

a subsequent creditor is entitled to participate, if the instrument

is set aside by any creditor; and I am not aware that in that

case there is any distinction between the two classes of creditors,

those who were so before, and those who became so after the

deed. I believe they all participate pro rata. It is clear there-

fore that a subsequent creditor has an equity to some extent,

viz., a right to participate in the division of the property if the

In 1842 he assigned the three policies to trustees t-0 secure ce1·tain benefits to his wife, reserving to himself an absolute power
of revocation.
In 1844 he made his will, by which he gave certain property,
not including the policies, to his wife; and he gave his residue
to Fanny Vaughan, whom he made his executrix.
In 1845 he revoked the deed of 1842, and reassigned the policies
to trustees (one of whom disclaimed, leaving W. D. Lewis, a
defendant, the sole trustee) on trusts for his wife, again reserving an absolute power of revocation.
·
He kept the deed in his own hands, and paid the premiums on
the policies during his life; and died in 1852, largely indebted.
The debts of the plaintiff arose in 1852.
It was admitted that at the dates of the settlements Concannen was indebted in considerable amounts, besides the mortgage debt secured by the deed of 1834; and there was oue in
particular to a person named Bouverie, the state of which is
noticed in the judgment. But on the evidence it was not clear
whether all these previous debts had been liquidated at the
dates of the settlements, or whether some of them did not still
subsist at the time when· the plaintiff's debt accrued.
The principal question was, whether, under these circumstances, the plaintiff could sustain a bill to set aside the voluntary settlements Y

settlement is set aside.

Prima facie then, if a subsequent creditor has an equity, one

would suppose there could be no reason to prevent him from

filing a bill to enforce it; it is indeed possible that there may

be cases where a person who has an equity to participate has not

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR. The first question, is, whether,
in the case of a voluntary settlement, a creditor, whose debt
accrued subsequently to the execution of the deed, can file a bill
for the purpose of setting it aside. Now it is not in dispute that
a subsequent creditor is entitled to participate, if the instrument
is set aside by any creditor; and I am not aware that in that
case there is any distinction between the two classes ()f <'reditors,
those who were so before, and those who became so after the
deed. I believe they all participate pro rata. It is clear therefore that a subsequent creditor has an equity to some extent,
viz., a right to participate in the division of the property if the
settlement is set aside.
Prima facie then, if a subsequent creditor has an equity, one
"·onld suppose there could be no reason to prevent him from
filing a bill to enforce it; it is indeed possible that there may
be cases where a person who bas an equity to participate has not
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the right to file a bill; but, prima facie, when a party has an

equity, he may file a bill to enforce it.

Now the statute of 13 Eliz. c. 5, which is referred to in this

case, avoids deeds which are made with intent to defraud or

delay creditors. The instrument must be made with the intent

to defraud creditors. Now, no doubt an instrument may be

executed for the purpose of defrauding subsequent creditors;

and, with regard to creditors being so at the time, it is estab-

lished that it is not necessary to show from anything actually

said or done by the party, that he had the express design by the

deed to defeat creditors; but if he includes in it property to

such an amount that, having regard to the state of his property,

and to the amount of his liabilities, its effect might probably be

to delay or defeat creditors, if the court is satisfied of that, the

deed is within the meaning of the statute.

In cases where a subsequent creditor files a bill, it occurs to

me that much may depend on this (supposing there is no evi-

dence of anything to show the fraudulent intention but the fact

of the settlor being indebted to some extent),—whether, at the

time of filing the bill, any of the debts remain due which were

due when the deed was executed. In such a case, as any of the

prior creditors might file a bill, it appears to me that a subse-

quent creditor might do so too; but if at the time of filing the
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bill no debt due at the execution of the deed remains due, the

distinction may be that then a subsequent creditor could not file

. a bill, unless there were some other ground than the settlor being

indebted at the date of the deed to infer an intention to defraud

creditors. However, I do not find any such rule laid down, and

I shall not take upon myself to lay it down positively. But if

a subsequent creditor files a bill, and you can show that the

person who executed the deed, though indebted at the time he

made it, has since paid every debt, it is very difficult to say

that he executed the settlement with an intention to defeat or

delay creditors, since his subsequent payment shows that he had

not such an intention. But it appears to me, in the absence of

authority to the contrary, that a subsequent creditor may file a

bill, if any debt due at the date of the deed remains due at the

time of filing the bill.

When wo look at the authorities, we find that in two or three

cases, where the question has been raised as to the plaintiff's

right to file a bill, being a subsequent creditor, and debts ante-

B. A A. Bankruptcy—IS

the right to file a bill ; but, prima f acie, when a party has .an
equity, he may tile a bill to enforce it.
Now the statute of 13 Eliz. c. 5, which is referred to in this
case, avoids deeds which are made with intent to defraud or
delay creditors. The instrument must be made with the intent
to defraud creditors. Now, no doubt an instrument may be
executed for the purpose of defrauding subsequent creditors;
and, with regard to creditors being so at the time, it is established that it is not necessary to show from anything actually
said or done by the party, that he had the express design by the
deed to defeat creditors; but if he includes in it property to
such an amount that, having regard to the state of his property,
and to the amount of his liabilities, its effect might probably be
to delay or defeat creditors, if the court is satisfied of that, the
deed is within the meaning of the statute.
Jn cases where a subsequent creditor files a bill, it occurs to
me that much may depend on this (supposing there is no evidence of anything to show the fraudulent intention but the fact
of the settlor being indebted to some extent) ,-whether, at the
time of filing the bill, any of the debts remain due which were
due \vhen the deed was executed. In such a case, as any of the
prior creditors might file a bill, it appears to me that a subsequent creditor might do so too; but if at the time of filing the
bill no debt due at the execution of the deed remains due, the
distinction may be that then a subsequent creditor could not file
a bill, unless there were some other ground than the settlor being
indebted at the date of the deed to infer an intention to defraud
creditors. However, I do not find any such rule laid down, and
I shall not take upon myself to lay it down positively. But if
a subsequent creditor files a bill, and you can show that the
person who executed the deed, though indebted at the time he
made it, has since paid every debt, it is very difficult to say
that he executed the settlement with an intention to defeat or
delay creditors, since his subsequent payment shows that he had
not such an intention. But it appears to me, in the absence of
authority to the contrary, that a subsequent creditor may file a
bill, if any debt due at the date of the deed remains due at the
time of filing the bill.
When wr look at the authorities, we find that in two or three
cases, where the question has been raised as to the plaintiff's
right to file a bill, being a subsequent creditor, and debts antes.
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cedent have been shown still to subsist, the court, having its

attention drawn to that, has made a decree in favor of the

creditor.

In this case I find sufficient prima facie evidence to lead me

to the conclusion that something still remains due in respect of

the debts which existed at the date of the deed; there is sufficient

prima facie evidence to justify me in directing an inquiry.

I put aside the mortgage debt secured on the policies of in-

surance. The policies, so far as the mortgage debt extended,

were the property of the mortgagee; and what was retained and

settled was only that which remained after satisfaction of the

mortgage debt; I put that aside.

But, as to the debt to Bouverie, there is sufficient evidence to

induce me to direct an inquiry. The evidence on that debt goes

to this,—that to the best of the knowledge and belief of the

witness the debt consists of a balance of monies advanced by

Bouverie to Concannen, some part of which at least was ante-

cedent to the date of the settlement.

It appears to me that that justifies inquiry; and there are

besides various claims, which may turn out to establish debts

due at the date of the deed remaining unpaid.

But, in addition to the circumstances arising out of this debt

and the claims, it appears that the property which Concannen
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left is extremely trivial; and at bis death it is proved that he

was indebted to the extent of many thousands; so that it is not

unnatural to suppose that there are still debts unsatisfied which

were due at the date of the deed.

As to the. intention to delay creditors, it is not immaterial that

both deeds arc made with general powers of revocation, which

enable the settlor to deal with the property, and that he retained

possession of the deeds till the time of his death; and it does not

appear that any notice was given to any of the insurance offices.

All these circumstances are not, it is true, conclusive of fraudu-

lent intention; but they have an important bearing on the ques-

tion of fraudulent or improper design.

I think, therefore, that I ought to direct inquiries, which will

be in the usual form, the form adopted in the cases cited.24

24—See Freeman v. Pope, supra, Cf. Lane v. Newton, 140 Ga. 415,

p. 165; Ideal Co. v. Holland [1907], 78 S. E. 1082.

2 Ch. 157.

cedent have been shown still to subsist, the court, having its
attention drawn to that, has made a decree in favor of the
creditor.
. In this case I find sufficient prima f ac~ evidence to lead me
to the conclusion that something still remains due in respect of
the debts which existed at the date of the deed ; there is sufficient
prima facie evidence to justify me in directing an inquiry.
I put aside the mortgage debt secured on the policies of insurance. The policies, so far as the mortgage debt extended,
were the property of the mortgagee; and what was retained and
settled was only that which remained after satisfaction of the
mortgage debt; I put that aside.
But, as to the debt to Bouverie, there is sufficient evidence to
induce me to direct an inquiry. The evidence on that debt goes
to this,-that to the best of the knowledge and belief of the
witness the debt consists of a balance of monies advanced by
Bouverie to Concannen, some part of which at least was antecedent to the date of the settlement.
It appears to me that that justifies inquiry; and thert: are
besides various claims, which may turn out to establish debts
due at the date of the deed remaining unpaid.
But, in addition to the circumstances arising out of this debt
and the claims, it appears that the property which Concannen
left is extremely trivial; and at his death it is proved that he
was indebted to the extent of many thousands; so that it is not
unnatural to suppose that there are still debts unsatisfied which
were due at the date of the deed.
As to tho..intention to delay creditors, it is'not immaterial that
both deeds are made with general powers of revocation, whiCh
enable the settlor to deal with the property, and that he retained
possession of the deeds till the time of his death; and it does not
appear that any notice was given to any of the insurance offices.
All these circumstances are not, it is true, conclusive of fraudulent intention; but they have an important bearing on the question of fraudulent or improper design.
I think, therefore, that I ought to direct inquiries, which will
be in the usual form, the form adopted in the cases cited.u
24-See Freeman v. Pope, supra,
p. 165; Ideal Co. v. Holland [1907],
· ~ Ch. 157.

Cf. Lane v. Newton, 140 Ga. 4151
78 S. E. 1082.
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READE v. LIVINGSTON

3 Johns. Ch. 481

READE v. LIV IN GS TON

(Court of Chancery, New York. September 28, 1818)

THE CHANCELLOR. This case turns upon the validity of

3 Johns. Ch. 481

the conveyance by Henry G. Livingston to Gilbert Aspinwall.

The bill charges that Livingston was indebted to John Reade,

(Court of Chancery, New York.

September 28, 1818)

the plaintiff's intestate, as early as the year 1800, in $6,000, and

that, in August term, 1807, Reade obtained a judgment against

H. G. L., for upwards of that sum, and that $3,072 of it remains

unpaid. That by deed, dated the 7th of December, 1805, H. G. L.

conveyed his lands, to the amount in value of $45,000, to Aspin-

wall, in trust for his wife, and that he had no other property to

satisfy the balance of the judgment.

The answer of H. G. L., and of his wife, admitted that in

1800, there were sundry unsettled accounts between the parties,

and that they were finally, by rule of court, referred to referees,

and that the judgment upon such reference was rendered, as

charged in the bill; they admit further, that the lands included

in the deed to Aspinwall, composed the greater part of the real

estate of H. G. L., though they deny the lands to be of the value

charged. H. G. L. states that, prior to his marriage, and with

a view to it, he agreed with his wife's father to settle on her,
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and her children, $30,000, and that the deed was executed in

pursuance of that agreement. He admits the sum of $1,392.92

to be still due upon the judgment, and that Reade might have

obtained satisfaction out of his personal estate; and he declares,

that he was then worth little or no property, though, at the

time of his marriage, he was worth $80,000.

It appears, by the proof taken in the cause, that the judgment

was founded upon two bonds dated in the year 1794; that the

consideration of them was a farm sold by Reade to H. G. L., and

that with the proceeds, or by the exchange of that farm, H. G. L.

procured the greater part of the lands included in the deed of

settlement. That he was married as early as the year 1791, and

that at the date of the. judgment he owned personal property to

$1,000; but it does not appear that he possessed any real prop-

erty free from incumbrance. Valentine Nutter, the wife's father,

says that his wife, Mrs. Nutter, informed him just previous to

the marriage that H. G. L. had promised to settle $30,000 on his

daughter, and that H. G. L. frequently, after the marriage,

THE CHANCELLOR. This case turns upon the validity of
the conveyance by Henry G. Livingston to Gilbert Aspinwall.
The bill charges that Livingston was indebted to John Reade,
the plaintiff's intestate, as early as the year 1800, in $6,000, and
that, in August term, 1807, Reade obtained a judgment against
II. G. L., for upwards of that sum, and that $3,072 of it remains
uupaid. That by deed, dated the 7th of December, 1805, II. G. L.
conveyed his lands, to the amount iu value of $45,000, to Aspinwall, in trust for his wife, and th.at he had no other property to
satisfy the balance of the judgment.
The answer of H. G. L., and of his wife, admitted that in
1800, there were sundry unsettled accounts between the parties,
and that they were finally, by rule of court, referred to referees,
and that the judgment upon such reference was rendered, as
charged in the bill; they admit further, th.at the lands included
in the deed to Aspinwall, composed the greater part of the real
estate of H. G. L., though they deny the lands to be of the value
charged. H. G. L. states that, prior to his marriage, and with
a view to it, he agreed with his wife's father to settle on her,
and her children, $30,000, and that the deed was executed in
pursuance of that agreement. He admits the sum of $1,392.92
to be still due upon the judb"Illent, and that Reade might have
obtained satisfaction out of his personal estate; and he declares,
that he was then worth little or no property, though, at the
time of his marriage, he was worth $80,000.
It appears, by the proof taken in the cause, that the judgment
was founded upon two bonds .dated in the year 1794; that the
consideration of them was a farm sold by Reade to H. G. h, and
that with the proceeds, or by the exchange of that farm, H. G. L.
procured the greater part of the lands included in the deed of
settlement. That he was married as early as the year 1791, and
that at the date of the. judgment he owned personal property to
$1,000; but it does not appear that he possessed any real prop.
erty free from incumbrancc. Valentine Nutter, the wife's father,
says that his wife, :\lrs. Nutter, informed him just previous to
the marriage that H. G. L. had promised to settle $30,000 on bis
daughter, and that H. G. L. frequently, after the marriage,
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admitted the promise, and at last, at the repeated request of the

witness, executed the deed.

The deed to Aspinwall contains no reference to, or recital of,

any previous agreement; but it is simply a deed in fee, for the

consideration of $5,000, and in trust to convey the lands, and

the rents and profits thereof, as the wife of H. G. L., by deed or

will, should direct; and, in default of such direction, in trust

for her heirs.

I have stated, perhaps, as much of the pleadings and proofs

as may be requisite to a full understanding and discussion of

the important legal questions involved in the case.

H. G. L. owed the very debt now in question, at the time of

the settlement of his real estate upon his wife; and a great part

of the lands so settled were purchased with property procured

by that same debt. The deed of settlement was not made until

14 years after the marriage, when it is admitted, that, in the

meantime, his estate had diminished one-half. It had no refer-

ence or allusion to any ante-nuptial contract, nor is there any

evidence in writing of such an agreement.

Upon such a state of facts, my earliest impressions were

against the soundness of the defense; and I apprehend, there is

not a case to be met with that gives any colorable support to

such a settlement against such a creditor. But after the elaborate
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argument which has been made in favor of the deed, I have con-

sidered it due to the counsel, as well as to the importance of every

question of this nature, to look into the cases, and to give to

every topic of argument a careful investigation.

[After concluding that a voluntary settlement as to existing

creditors is conclusively presumed to be fraudulent, the chan-

cellor continued]:

With respect to the claims of subsequent creditors, there is

more difficulty in arriving at the conclusion; and I am not called

upon in this case to give any definitive opinion, for there are no

such creditors before the court. But since the subject has been

examined, I would suggest what appears to me at present, but

with my mind still open for further discussion and considera-

tion, to be the better opinion from the cases; it is, that the pre-

sumption of fraud as to these creditors, arising from the circum-

stance, that the party was indebted at the time, is repelled by

the fact of these debts being secured by mortgage, or by a pro-

vision in the settlement; that if no such circumstance exists,

they are entitled to impeach the settlement by a bill properly

admitted the promise, and at last, at the repeated request of the
witness, executed the deed.
The deed to Aspinwall contains no reference to, or recital of,
any previous agreement; but it is simply a deed in fee, for the
consideratio11 of $5,000, and in trust to convey the lands, and
the rents and profits thereof, as the wife of H. G. L., by deed or
will, should direct; and, in default of such direction, in trust
for her heirs.
I have stated, perhaps, as much of the pleadings and proofs
as may be requisite to a full understanding and discussion of
the important legal questions involved in the ease.
H. G. L. owed the very debt now in question, at the time of
the settlement of his real estate upon his wife; and a great part
of the lands so settled were purchased with property procured
by that same debt. The deed of settlement was not made until
14 years after the marriage, when it is admitted, that, in the
meantime, his estate had diminished one-half. It had no reference or allusion to any ante-nuptial contract, nor is there any
evidence in writing of such an agreement.
Upon such a state of facts, my earliest impressions were
against the soundness of the defense; and I apprehend, there is
not a case to be met with that gives any cvlorable support t-0
such a settlement against such a creditor. But after the elaborate
argument which has been made in favor of the deed, I have considered it due to the counsel, as well as to the importance of every
question of this nature, to look into the cases, and to give to
every topic of argument a careful investigation.
[After concluding that a voluntary settlement as to existing
creditors is conclusively presumed to be fraudulent, the chanceJlor continued] :
With respect to the claims of subsequent creditors, there is
more difficulty in arriving at the conclusion; and I am not called
upon in this case to give any definitive opinion, for there are no
such creditors before the court. But since the subject has been
examined, I would suggest what appears to me at present, but
with my mind still open for further discussion and consideration, to be the better opinion from the cases; it is, that the presumption of fraud as to these creditors, arising from the circumstance, that the party was indebted at the time, is repelled by
the fact of these debts being secured by mortgage, or by a provision in the settlement; that if no such circumstance exists,
they are entitled to impeach the settlement by a bill properly
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adapted to their purpose, and charging and proving indebtedness

at the time, so that their rights will not depend on the mere

pleasure of the prior creditors, whether they will, or will not

impeach the settlement, that the question then arises, To what

extent must the subsequent creditors show a prior indebtedness?

Must they follow the dictum of Lord Alvanley, and show in-

solvency, or will it be sufficient to show any prior debt, however

small, as is contended for by Mr. Atherley, with his usual ability,

in his Treatise on Marriage Settlements? (Ath. Mar. Set. pp.

212 to 219.) I should apprehend, that the subsequent creditors

would be required to go so far, and only so far, in showing debts,

as would be sufficient to raise reasonable evidence of a fraudu-

lent intent. To show any existing debt, however trifling and

inevitable (to which every person is, more or less, subject),

would not surely support a presumption of fraud in fact; no

voluntary settlement in any possible case could stand upon that

construction. I should rather conclude, that the fraud in the

voluntary settlement was an inference of law, and ought to be

so, as far as it concerned existing debts; but that, as to subse-

quent debts, there is no such necessary legal presumption, and

there must be proof of fraud in fact; and the indebtedness at

the time, though not amounting to insolvency, must be such as

to warrant that conclusion. It appears, in all the cases (and
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particularly in the decision of Sir Thomas Plumer since the pub-

lication of Mr. Atherley's treatise), that a marked distinction

does exist, under the statute of 13 Eliz., between prior and sub-

sequent creditors, in respect to these voluntary settlements; and

it is now settled that the settlement is not void, as of course,

against the latter, when there were no prior debts at the time.

The law in Massachusetts seems to be laid down according to

this view of the subject. .

In Bennett v. Bedford Bank (11 Tyng, 421), there was a

voluntary conveyance to a son by a father, indebted at the time,

but not in embarrassed circumstances, or equal in debt to the

value of his property. The debt to the plaintiff did, not accrue

until several years afterwards. It was held by the court, that

as there was no fraud in fact, the deed in this case was good

against the subsequent creditor, "and against all persons but

such as were creditors at the time."

But there is a case, recently decided by the Supreme Court of

Errors of Connecticut (Salmon v. Bennett, 1 Day's Conn. Rep.

adapted to their purpose, and charging and proving indebtedness
<:t thf> time, so that their rights will not depend on the mere
pleasure of the prior creditors, whether they will, or will not
imp<-·a('h the settlement, that the question then arises, To what
extent must the subsequent creditors show a prior indebtedne~s 1
)lust they follow the dictum of Lord Alvanley, and show insolvency, or will it be sufficient to show any prior debt, however
small, as is contended for by :Mr. Atherley, with his usual ability,
ill his Treatise on Marriage Settlements T ( Ath. Mar. Set. pp.
~I 2 to 219.)
I should apprehend, that the subsequent creditors
would be required to go so far, and only so far, in showing debts,
as would be sufficient to raise reasonable evidence of a fraudulent intent. To show any existing debt, however trifling and
i.a·vitable (to which every person is, more or less, subject),
would not surely support a presumption of fraud in fact; no
voluntary settlement in any possible case could stand upon that
coustruetion. I should rather conclude, that the fraud in the
voluntary settlement was an inference of law, and ought to be
so, as far as it concerned existing debts; but that, as to subse11uent debts, there is no such necessary legal presumption, and
there must be proof of fraud in fact; and the indebtedness at
the time, though not amounting to insolvency, must be such as
to warrant that conclusion. It appears, in all the cases (and
particularly in the decision of Sir Thomas Plumer since the publication of :\Ir. Atherley's treatise), that a marked distinction
<lo~s exist, under the statute of 13 Eliz., between prior and subsequent creditors, in respect to these voluntary settlements; and
it is now settled that the settlement is not void, as of course,
against the latter, when there were no prior debts at the time.
The law in l\Ia~achusetts seems to be laid down according to
this view of the subject..
In Bennett v. Bedford Bank ( 11 Tyng, 421), there was a
voluntary conveyance to a son by a father, indebted at the time,
but not in embarrassed circumstances, or equal in debt to the
value of his property. The debt to the plaintiff die\ not accrue
until several years afterwards. It was held by the court, that
as there was no fraud in fact, the deed in this case was good
agaiust the subsequent creditor, ''and against all persons but
such as were creditors at the time.''
But there is a case, recently decided by the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut (Salmon v. Bennett, 1 Day's Conn. Rep.
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N. S. p. 525), which lays down a rule somewhat different from

that which I have deduced from the English cases.

The question arose in an action of ejectment. The plaintiff

had purchased Virginia lauds of Sherwood, in 1794, and paid

him the purchase money. In 1809, by a decree in chancery, the

sale was annulled, on the ground of fraud, and the purchase

money decreed to be refunded, on condition that the plaintiff

executed a release. This was done, and he afterwards, in 1814,

levied an execution founded on that decree, on lands which

Sherwood owned in 1794, but which he had conveyed to his son

in 1798, in consideration of natural affection only, and which

lands the son had, in 1802, conveyed to the defendant, with

knowledge of the deed to the son. It was proved, that when

- Sherwood executed the deed of gift, he was not indebted to any

person, except to the plaintiff, in the manner stated, and that

the lands conveyed did not contain more than one-eighth part

of his real estate. But it was admitted that long before the levy

of the execution, he had conveyed all his real estate, and was

at that time, destitute of property.

One question was whether the deed to the son, being voluntary,

was not fraudulent as against the plaintiff; and as the opinion of

the court was on this point, I need not notice any other. It was

also made a question, at the bar, whether the plaintiff was to be
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deemed an existing creditor at the time of the deed to the son;

but as the court assumed the fact of an existing indebtedness

at the time of the conveyance, I need not notice that point.

The judgment of the court was in favor of the defendant,

and the opinion of eight of the judges, as delivered by the chief

justice was, that a distinction existed in the case of a voluntary

conveyance, between the children of the grantor and strangers,

and that mere indebtedness at the time will not, in all cases,

render a voluntary conveyance void as to creditors, where it is

a provision for a child; that an actual or express intent to de-

fraud need not be proved, for this would be impracticable in

many instances where the conveyance ought not to be e*tal>-

lished, and it may be collected from the circumstances of the

case; that if there be no fraudulent intent, and the grantor be

in prosperous circumstances, unembarrassed, and not consider-

ably indebted, and the gift a reasonable provision for the child,

leaving ample funds unencumbered, for the payment of the

grantor's debts, the voluntary conveyance to the child will be

valid against existing creditors. But if the grantor be con-

?\. S. p. 523), which lays down a rule somewhat different from
that whi~h I have .deduced from the English cases.
The 1pwstion arose in an action of ejectment. The plaintiff
ha<l purehased Virginia lands of Sherwood, in 1794, and paid
him the purchase money. In 1809, by a decree in chancery, the
sale was annulled, on the ground of fraud, and the purchase
money decreed to be refunded, on condition that the plaintiff
executed a release. This was done, and he afterwards, in 1814,
levied an execution founded on that decree, on lands which
Sherwood owned in 1794, but which he had conveyed to his son
iu 1798, in consideration of natural affection only, and which
lands the son had, in 1802, conveyed to the defendant, with
knowledge of the deed to the son. It was proved, that when
'Sherwood executed the deed of gift, he was not indebted to any
person, except to the plaintiff, in the manner stated, and that
the lands conveyed did not contain more than one-eighth part
of his real estate. But it was admitted that long before the levy
of the execution, he had conveyed all his real estate, and Wal
at that time, destitute of property.
One question was whether the deed to the son, being voluntary,
was not fraudulent as against the plaintiff; and as the opinion of
the court was on this point, I need not notice any other. It wa1
also made a question, at the bar, whether the plaintiff was to be
deemed an existing creditor at the time of the deed to the son;
but as the court assumed the fact of an existing indebtedne!&
at the time of the conveyance, I need not notice that point.
The judgment of the court was in favor of the defendant,
au<l the opinion of eight of the judges, as delivered by the chief
justice was, that a distinction existed in the case of a voluntary
conveyance, between the children of the grantor and strangers,
a11d that mere indebtedness at the time will not, in all cases,
render a voluntary conveyance void as to creditors, where it is
a provision for a child; that an actual or express intent to defraud need not be proved, for this would be impracticable in
many instances where the conveyance ought not to be ~tah
lished, and it may be collected from the circumstances of the
case; that if there be no fraudulent intent, and the grantor be
in prosperous circumstances, unembarrassed, and not considerably indebted, and the gift a reasonable provision for the child,
leaving ample funds unencumbered, for the payment of the
grantor's debts, tli.e voluntary conveyance to the child will be
valid against existing creditors. But if the grantor be con·
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siderably indebted and embarrassed, and on the eve of bank-

ruptcy, or if the gift be unreasonable, disproportioned to his

property, and leaving a scanty provision for his debts, the con-

veyance will be void, though there be no fraudulent intent. And

it was concluded, that, under the circumstances of that case the 1

indebtedness of the grantor, at the time, to the plaintiff, was

not sufficient to affect the conveyance to his son.

The court do not refer to authorities in support of their opin-

ion, and, perhaps, they may have intended not to follow, strictly,

the decisions at Westminster Hall, under the statute of 13 Eliz.

I can only say that, according to my imperfect view of those

decisions (and by which I consider myself governed), this case

was not decided in conformity to them; but I make this observa-

tion with great deference to that court. There may be loose

sayings, and mere notes of cases, from which nothing very cer-

tain or intelligible can be deduced; but I have not been able to

find the case in which a mere voluntary conveyance to a wife or

child has been plainly and directly held good against a creditor

existing at the time. The cases appear to me to be upon that point

uniformly in favor of the creditor. The vice-chancellor, in Hollo-

way v. Millard, says, in so many words, that "a voluntary dis-

position, even in favor of a child, is not good, if the party is

indebted at the time." The cases of St. Amand v. Barbara,
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Fitzer v. Fitzer, Taylor v. Jones, and, indeed, the general lan-

guage throughout the cases, seem to me to establish this point.

So Lord Hardwicke observed, in Lord Townshend v. Windham,

that, "He knew of no case on the 13 Eliz. where a man, indebted

at the time, makes a mere voluntary conveyance to a child, with-

out consideration, and dies indebted, but that it shall be con-

sidered as part of his estate for the benefit of his creditors."

In a preceding part of the same page, he said expressly, there

was "no such case," unless the conveyance was "in consideration

of marriage, or other valuable consideration;'' and he draws the

distinction between prior and subsequent creditors, in saying

that if the voluntary conveyance of real estate, or a chattel in-

terest, was by one not indebted at the time, and was for a child,

and no particular evidence or badge of fraud as against subse-

quent creditors, it would be good. The decision in that case

was, that a general power of appointment given over an estate,

in lieu of a present interest in it, having been executed volun-

tarily, though for a daughter, was to be deemed assets in favor

of creditors.

siderably indebted and embarrassed, and on the eve of bankruptcy, or if the gift be unreasonable, disproportioned to his
property, and leaving a scanty provision for his debts, the conveyance will be void, though there be no fraudulent intent. And
it was concluded, that, under the circumstances of that case the
indebtedness of the grantor, at the time, to the plaintiff, was
not sufficient to affect the conveyance to his son.
The court do not refer to authorities in support of their opinion, and, perhaps, they may have intended not to follow, strii:tly.
the decisions at Westminster Hall, under the statute of 13 Eliz.
I can only say that, according to my imperfect view of thosl'
dedsions (and by which I consider myself governed), this case
was not decided in conformity to them; but I make this observation with great deference to that court. There may be loose
sayings, and mere notes of cases, from which nothing very certain or intelligible can be deduced; but I have not been able to
find the case in which a mere voluntary conveyance to a wife or
child has been plainly and directly held good against a creditor
existing at the time. The cases appear to me to be upon that point
uniformly in favor of the creditor. The vice-chancellor, in Holloway v. Millard, says, in so many words, that "a voluntary disposition, even in favor of a child, is not good, if the party is
indebted at the time." The cases of St. Amand v. Barbara,
Fitzer v. Fitzer, Taylor v. Jones, and, indeed, the general language throughout the cases, seem to me to establish this point.
So Lord Hardwicke observed, in Lord Townshend v. Windham,
that, ''He knew of no case on the 13 Eliz. where a man, indebted
at the time, makes a mere voluntary conveyance to a child, without consideration, and dies indebted, but that it shall be considered as part of his estate for the benefit of his creditors.''
In a preceding part of the same page, he said expressly, there
was "no such case," unless the conveyance was "in consideration
of marriage, or other valuable consideration;'' and he draws the
distinction between prior and subsequent creditors, in saying
that if the voluntary conveyance of real estate, or a chattel interest, was by one not indebted at the time, and was for a child,
and no particular evidence or badge of fraud as against subsequent creditors, it would be good. The decision in that case
was, that a general power of appointment given over an estate,
in lieu of a present interest in it, having been executed voluntarily, though for a daughter, was to be deemed assets in favor
of creditors.
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If the question rests not upon an actual fraudulent intent (as

is admitted in all the cases), it must be a case of fraud in law,

arising from the fact of a voluntary disposition of property,

while indebted; and the inference founded on that fact cannot

depend on the particular circumstances, or greater or less de-

gree of pecuniary embarrassment of the party. These are mat-

ters for consideration, when we are seeking, as in the case of

subsequent creditors, for actual fraud. I apprehend it is, upon

the whole, better and safer not to allow a party to yield to

temptation or natural impulse, by giving him the power of

placing property in his family beyond the reach of existing

creditors. He must be taught by the doctrines of the court, that

the claims of justice are prior to those of affection. The inclina-

tion of my mind is strongly in favor of the policy and wisdom

of the rule, which absolutely disables a man from preferring,

by any arrangement whatever, and with whatever intention, by

gifts of his property, his children to his creditors. Though hard

cases may arise in which we should wish the rule to be otherwise,

yet, as a permanent regulation, more good will ensue to families,

and to the public at large, by a strict adherence to the rule, than

by rendering it subservient to circumstances, or by making it to

depend upon a fraudulent intent, which is so difficult to ascer-
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tain, and frequently so painful to infer.

The effect of these donations, by a debtor, inter vivas, is much

discussed by Voet in his commentaries, on the Digest, lib. 39,

tit. 5, De Donationibus, s. 20; and he concludes that the prop-

erty in the hands of the donee is chargeable with the existing

debts of the donor. Ex eo autem, quod donator competentiae

gaudens beneficio deducit primo aes alienum, facilis est decisio

quaestionis, utrum donatis omnibus bonis, aut majore eorum

parte, donatarius ad aes alienum donantis solvcndum obligatus

sit?—Aequum haud foret, ex liberalitate, defuncti creditores ejus,

doimtione antiquiores (nam qui postea demum crediderunt, ex

donatione praecedente jam perfecta videri nequeunt fraudati

esse) credito suo defraudari, satinsque visum, donata rcvocori per

actionem Paulianam, etiam a douatorio in bo-na fide posito ac

fraudis haud participe. Dum tnelior esse debuit conditio credi-

torum de damno evitando agentium, quam donatarii agentis de

lucro captando. Secundum hodiemi juris simplicitatem donatar-

ium a crcditoribus donatoris recta via absque circuitu ad solven-

dum aes alienum donantis compelli posse, post multos alios citatos

tradit. Graenewegen, ad. I., 28 ff. h. t.

If th~ question rests not upon an actual fraudulent intent (as
is admitted in all the cases), it must be a case of fraud in law,
arising from the fact of a voluntary disposition of property,
while indebted; and the inference founded on that fact cannot
depend on the particular circumstances, or greater or less degree of pecuniary embarrassment of the party. These are ma~
ters for consideration, when we are seeking, as in the case of
subsequent creditors, for actual fraud. I apprehend it is, upon
the whole, better aud safer not to allow a. party to yield to
temptation or natural impulse, by giving him the power of
placing property in his family beyond the reach of existing
creditors. He must be taught by the doctrines of the court, that
the claims of justice are prior to those of affection. The inclination of my mind is strongly in favor of the policy and wisdom
of the rule, which absolutely dt&ables a man from preferring,
by any arrangement whatever, and with whatever intention, by
gifts of his property, his children to his creditors. Though hard
cases may arise in which we should wish the rule to be otherwise,
yet, as a permanent regulation, more good will ensue to families,
and to the public at large, by a strict adherence to the rule, than
by rendering it subservient to circumstances, or by making it to
depend upon a fraudulent intent, which is so difficult to ascertain, and frequently so painful to infer.
The effect of these donations, by a debtor, mter vivoo, is much
discussed by Voet in his commentaries, on the Digest, lib. 39,
tit. 5, De Donationibus, s. 20; and he concludes that the prol>'"
erty in the hands of the donee is chargeable with the ezisti·11g
debts of the donor. Ex eo autem., quod donator competen.ti.ae
gaudens beneficio ded11cit primo aes alien.um, facilis est decisio
quaestionis, utrum donatis om-nibus boni.s, aut maj01·e eorum
pa.rte, dona.tari11s ad aes alienum donantis solvendum obligatu$
sitt-Aequmn haud foret, ex liberalitate, defuncti creditores ejU-8,
donatione antiquiores (nam qui postea demum crediderunt~ ez
donatione praecedente jam perfecta i·ideri nequeunt frauilati
esse) credito suo defraudari, satiusque t•isum, donata revocori per
actioncm Paulianam, etiam a d011atorio in b&na fide posi.to ac
.fraudis haud participe. Dum melior esse debuit conditio creditornm de dmnno evitando agentium, quam donatarii agentis de
luc1·0 captando. Secundum hodierni juris simplicitatem do-natarinm a creditoribus donatoris recta via ab.'lque circuitu ad sofoendu m aes alienum d01urnti,s compelli posse, post multos alios c1'.tatos
tradit. Graenewegen, od. l., 28 ff. k. t.
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This learned civilian makes the same distinction that our law

does, between debts existing at the time, and debts created subse-

quent to the gift.

The same doctrine, on this subject, in all essential respects, is

adopted in France. The gift of specific articles does not charge

the donee with the debts of the donor, unless the latter knew, or

ought to have known, that he was not solvent at the time; in

which case the gift is held to be fraudulent. But in other more

general dispositions of the whole, or part, of his estate, the prop-

erty in the hands of the donee is subject to the existing, though

not to the future, debts, to the value of the gift. (Traite des

Donat. entre vifs. § 3, art. 1, % 2. Oeuvres posth. de Pothier,

torn. 6.)

The question does not arise, in this case, as to what extent

these voluntary dispositions of property can be reached. Here

the land itself exists in the hands of the trustee for the wife,

and we have no concern, at present, with the question, how far

gifts of chattels, of money, of choses in action, of corporate, of

public stock, or of property alienated to a botia fide purchaser,

This learned civilian makes the same distiuctiou that our law
does, between debts existing at the timt., an<l debts created subsequent to the gift.
The same doctrine, on this suhject, iu all essential respects, is
adopted in France. The gift of specif:c articles does not charge
the donee with the debts of the donor, unless the latter knew, or
ought to have known, that he was not solvent at the time; in
whieh case the gift is held to be fraudulent. But in other more
general dispositions of the whole, or part, of his estate. the property in the hands of the donee is subject to the existing, though
not to the future, debts, to the value of the gift. (Traite des
D()Mt. entre vifs. § 3, art. 1, ~ 2. Oeuvres pastlt. de Pothier,

tom. 6.)

can be affected. The debt in the present case was large, and the

disposition extravagant, beiug of the greater part of the real

estate; and we have no evidence of sufficient property left un-

encumbered. Even if we were to enter into the particular cir-
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cumstances of the case, I should have no doubt of the justice of

the creditor's claim.

I shall, accordingly, decree, that a reference be had to ascer-

tain the balance of principal and interest due to the plaintiff,

and that so much of the lands, included in the conveyance to

Gilbert Aspinwall, as the master shall judge sufficient to satisfy

that amount, -with costs, be sold; and that the said G. A. be

directed to join in the conveyance.

Decree accordingly.

HARLAN v. MAGLAUGHLIN

90 Pa. St. 293

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. October 6, 1879)

Ejectment by Maud Maglaughlin and Wilmer K. Maglaughlin,

by their guardian, William A. Coffey, against Anne Harlan and

David Sipe for two lots in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

On March 31, 1859, John Mell conveyed by a deed a lot of

ground to Isabella Noble, wife of John B. Noble, for $50. This

The question does not arise, in this case, as to what extent
these voluntary dispositions of property can be reached. Here
the land itself exists in the hands of the trustee for the wife ,
and we have no concern, at present, with the question, how far
gifts of chattels, of money, of choses in action, of corporate, of
public stock, or of property alienated to a bona fide purchaser,
can be affected. The debt in the present case was large, and the
disposition extravagant, being of the greater part of the real
estate ; and we have no evidence of sufficient property left unencumbered. Even if we were to enter into the particular circumstances of the case, I should have no doubt of the justice of
the creditor's claim.
I shall, according1y, decree, that a reference be had to ascertain the balance of principal and interest due to the plaintiff,
aDd that so much of the lands, included in the conveyance to
Gilbert .Aspinwall, as the master shall judge sufficient to satisfy
that amount, ·with costs, be sold; and that the said G. A. be
directed to join in the conveyance.
Decree accordingly.
HARLAN v. MAGLAUGHLIN
90 Pa. St. 293
(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. October 6, 1879)
Ejectment by Maud Maglaughlin and Wilmer K. Maglaughlin,
by their guardian, \Villiam A. Coffey, against Anne Harlan and
David Sipe for two lots in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
On March 31, 1859, John Mell conveyed by a deed a lot of
ground to Isabella Noble, wife of John B. Noble, for $50. This
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deed was duly recorded August 27, 1859. To the same grantee

William Blair conveyed, by deed, a lot of ground on March 20.

18(55, for $200, which deed was recorded March 28, 1868. On

March 5, 1869, John B. Noble made a note payable to Christ.

Ki.sdlcr, upon which suit was brought, and judgment recovered

for $129.47, with interest from 22d September, 1869. .A fi. fa.

and vend. ex. issued upon this judgment and the above-men-

tioned lots .were sold, as the property of John B. Noble, in 1870.

to Charles E. Maglaughlin, whose heirs bring this ejectment.

Isabella Noble, dying about 28th June, 1875, letters of ad-

ministration on her estate were issued to J. J. Good, who, nmler

an order of the Orphans' Court of Cumberland County, sold

the above lots, October 31, 1877, to David Sipe, one of the

defendants.

At the trial, before Herman, P. J., the plaintiff gave evi-

dence tending to show that John B. Noble paid for these lots and

directed the name of his wife to be used as that of the grantee

therein. There was also evidence that, when the first deed was

made, Noble was indebted to different parties, in the sums of

$3.37, and $60, payment of which was not shown; that, in the

year 1859, after the Mell deed was made, debts were contracted

to the following amounts: May 10th, $18; May 20th, $45;

November 29th, $39 (reduced October 14, 1861, to $35.49) ; in
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the year 1860, as follows: January 13th, $60, which was paid;

February 22d, $21.92, likewise paid; judgment April 14, 1860,

for $5 penalty, for use of scales at suit of Borough of Carlisle;

and in 1862, May 14th, $4.02, which was paid; another, originally

$65, but, 26th November, 1862, reduced to $6.50.

As evidence of fraudulent intent on the part of Noble in

having these conveyances made to his wife, one-Foote testified

that Noble "told me before the war, in 1859, that he was in a

good bit of trouble, and that he was going to put what he had,

his property, over into Belle's hands. He called his wife Belle.''

•••

The verdict was for the plaintiffs. Defendants took this writ.

and, inter alia, assigned for error the answers to the above points.

MR. JUSTICE GORDON delivered the opinion of the court.

The court below fell into an error which pervades every part

of this case. A single point and answer will serve to develop

this error, and determine the material questions involved in this

controversy. The counsel for the defendants below, plaintiffs

deed was duly recorded August 27, 1859. To the same grantee
William Bhiir ronveyed, by deed, a lot of ground on March 20.
1865, for $200, which deed was recorded March 28, 1868. OH
Mardi 5, 1869, John B. Noble made a note payable to Christ.
F ir;dlcr, upo11 which suit was brought, and judgment recovered
- for $129.47, with interest from 22d September, 1869.. A fi_ fa.
and V<'lld. ex. issued upon this judgment and the above-men, tioned lots .were sold, as the property of John B. Noble~ in 1870,
to Charles E. t"laglaughlin, whose heirs bring this ejectment.
Isabella Noble, dying about 28th June, 1875, letters of administration on her estate were issued to J. J. Good, who, under
an order of the Orphans' Court of Cumberland County, sold
the above lots, October 31, 1877, to David Sipe, one of thf'
defendants.
At the trial, before Herman, P. J., the plaintiff gave evidence tending to show that John B. Noble paid for these lots and
directed the name of his wife to be used as that of the grantee
therein. There was also evidence that, when the first deed was
made, Noble W88 indebted to different parties, in the sums of
$3.37, and $60, payment of which was not shown; that, in the
year 1859, after the l\Iell deed was made, debts were contracted
to the following amounts: l\lay 10th, $18 ; May 20th, $45 ;
November 29th, $39 (reduced October 14, 1861, to $35.49); in
the year 1860, as follows: January 13th, $60, which was paid;
February 22d, $21.92, likewise paid; judgment April 14, 1860,
for $5 penalty, for use of scales at suit of Borough of Carlisle;
and in 1862, May 14th, $4.02, which was paid; another, originally
$65, but, 26th November, 1862, reduced to $6.50.
As evidence of fraudulent intent on the part of Noble in
having these conveyances made to his wife, one· Foote testified
that Noble ''told me before the war, in 1859, that he w88 in a
good bit of trouble, and that he was going to put what he bad,
his property, over into Belle's hands. He called his wife Belle. ''

•••

The verdict was for the plaintiffs. Defendants took this writ,
and, inter alia, assigned for error the answers to the above points.
MR. JUSTICE GORDON ,delivered the opinion of the court.
The court below fell into an error which pervades every part
of this case. A single point and answer will serve to develop
this error, and determine the material questions involved in this
controversy. The counsel for the defendants below, plaintiffs
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in error, asked the court to say to the jury that "to render a

voluntary conveyance void, as to subsequent creditors, it must

appear that it was made in contemplation of future indebted-

ness, and, until this was shown, the plaintiffs could not call upon

the defendants to prove the consideration for the conveyance to

Isabella Noble through whom they claim title." The court an-

swered: "This would be so, if, at the time of the voluntary con-

veyance, no debts of the grantor existed, the recovery of which

would be thereby delayed, hindered or defeated. Where there

are existing debts at the time, and the conveyance has delayed,

hindered or defeated their recovery, this circumstance raises a

suspicion of fraud from which an intent to defraud subsequent

as well as existing creditors may be inferred."

This language is borrowed from the case of Thompson v.

Dougherty, 12 S. & R. 448, where it is applied, as in the ease in

hand, to debts contracted after the execution of the voluntary

grant. It is, however, mere obiter dicta, not called for by the

facts in the ease, and not true in law. Notwithstanding the many

loose declarations in the books to the contrary, the statute 13

Elizabeth does not make voluntary conveyances void as to future

creditors, unless there is some evidence to indicate that the

grantor intended to withdraw his property from the reach of

such creditors: Snyder v. Christ, 3 Wright 499. And it is
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properly said in Williams v. Davis, 19 P. F. Smith 21, that even

an expectation of future indebtedness will not render a voluntary

conveyance void where there is no fraud intended by such con-

veyance. And so, also, in Thompson v. Dougherty, Mr. Justice

Duncan, citing Saxton v. Wheaton, 8 Wheat. 229, says, "Chief

Justice Marshall decided that a post-nuptial settlement on a

wife and children by a man who is not indebted at the time,

was valid against subsequent creditors, and that the statute does

not apply to such creditors if the conveyance be not made with

a fraudulent intent." A similar ruling will be found in Town-

send v. Maynard, 9 "Wright 198, and in Greenfield's Estate, 2

Harris 489. In the latter case, which involved a deed of trust

of all the grantor's property, it was alleged by Mr. Justice Bell,

to be a sound rule of law that subsequent indebtedness cannot

be invoked to invalidate a voluntary settlement made by one not

indebted at the time, or who reserves sufficient to pay all existing

debts, unless there be something to show that the settlement was

made in anticipation of future indebtedness. It is further said

that though some doubt was thrown on this principle by Thomp-

in error, asked the court to say to the jury that "to render a
voluntary conYeyance void, as to subsequent crellitors, it must
appear that it was made in contemplation of future indebtNlness, and, until this was shown, the plaintiffs could not call upon
the defendants to prove the consideration for the conveyance to
Isahella Noble through whom they claim title." The court .answered : ''This would be so, if, at the time of the voluntary cou~·ey ance, no debts of the grantor existed, the recovery of which
would be thereby delayed, hindered or defeated. Where there
are existing debts at the time, and the conveyance bas delayed,
hindered or defeated their recovery, this circumstance raises a
suspicion of fraud from which an intent to defraud subsequent
as well as existing creditors may be inferred."
This language is borrowed from the case of Thompsen v.
Dougherty, 12 S. & R. 448, where it is applied, as in the case in
hand, to debts contracted after the execution of the voluntary
grant. It is, however, mere obiter dicta, not called for by the
facts in the ease, and not true in law. ~otwithstan<ling the many
loo8e declarations in the books to the contrary, the statute 13
Elizabeth does not make voluntary conveyances void as to future
ereditors, unless there is some evidence to i11dicate that the
grautor intended to withdraw his property from the reach of
such creditors: Snyder v. Christ, 3 'Yrigbt 499. And it is
properly said in Williams v. Davis, 19 P. F. Smith 21, that even
an expectation of future indebtedness will not render a voluntary
·~onveyance void where there is no fraud intended by such conveyance. And so, also, in Thompson v. Dougherty, Mr. Justice
Duncan, citing Saxton v. Wheaton, 8 \Vhcat. 229, says, ''Chief
..Justice l\Iarshall decided that a post-nuptial settlement on a
wife and children by a man who is not indebted at the time,
was valid agai11st subsequent creditors, and that the statute does
not apply to such creditors if the conveyance be not made with
a fraudulent intent." A simil.ar ruling will be found in Townsend v. Maynard, 9 Wright 198, and in Greenfield's Estate, 2
Harris 489. In the latter case, which involved a deed of trust
of alJ the grantor's property, it was alleged by Mr. Justice Bell,
to be a sound rule of law that subsequent indebtedness cannot
be invoked to invalidate a voluntary settlement made by one not
indebted at the time, or who reserves sufficient to pay all existing
debts, unless there be something to show that the settlement was
made in anticipation of future indebtedness. It is further said
that though some doubt was thrown on this principle by Thomp-
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son v. Dougherty, it was afterwards dissipated by Mateer v.

Hissim, 3 P. & W. 161. Furthermore, the case of Snyder v.

Christ, above mentioned, which is very like the case in hand,

settled any doubts that may previously have existed as to the

effect of subsequent indebtedness. For though it seems to have

been generally admitted that the statute is not operative as to

such indebtedness, yet the admission has been so beclouded by

apparently inconsistent dicta and qualifications, as to render its

meaning obscure and unintelligible. The settlement is good

against after contracted debts if the settlor is unindebted at the

time, or if he has made provision for existing debts, and so on.

But how, if there be existing debts not provided for, and how if

the settlement is fraudulent as to such debts? Will the settle-

ment, in such case, be void as to all future indebtedness 1 la

there no place for repentance and atonement by the after pay-

ment of existing debts, or may after creditors, notwithstanding

such payment, avoid the deed? Justice Duncan answers these

questions by saying: "If the jury find a prior indebtedness and

any of that class of creditors is defeated by the settlement, then,

my opinion is, that the property conveyed is to be considered as

part of the estate of the debtor for the benefit of all his creditors.

I know no midway. When a statute declares a matter void it

thrusts all to destruction like a tyrant, while the common law,
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like a nursing father, makes that void where the fault is and

preserves the rest." In this, singularly enough, the fact is

overlooked that the statute makes the gift or deed void, only,

as to those who may be hindered, delayed or defrauded thereby,

and that in this it follows the common law. This oversight, how-

ever, would seem to be accounted for by the fact that the opin-

ion of Chief Justice Spencer in Anderson v. Roberts, 18 Johns.

526, is adopted, wherein it is said, that the Statute of 13 Eliza-

beth protects creditors whose debts accrue subsequently to the

fraudulent conveyance equally as those whose debts were due

when it was made.

It would seem to be on this that Justice Duncan founds the

assertion, already referred to, that the existence of prior debts

creates a suspicion of fraud, which can only be repelled by show-

ing that the subsequent creditors were provided for in the set-

tlement. This, as it stands, is unintelligible; for one cannot pro-

vide for what he does not anticipate; if he has no future debts

in contemplation, how is it possible to make provision for them?

It, in fact, simply amounts to saying that the statute is operative

son v. Dougherty, it was afterwards dissipated by Mateer v.
Hissim, 3 P. & W. 161. Furthermore, the case of Snyder v.
Christ, above mentioned, which is very like the case in hand,
settled any doubts that may previously have existed as to the
effect of subsequent indebtedness. For though it seems to have
been generally admitted that the statute is not operative as to
such indebtedness, yet the admission has been so beclouded b~.
apparently inconsistent dicta and qualifications, as to render its
meaning obscure and unintelligible. The settlement is good
against after contracted debts if the sett.lor is unindebted at the
time, or if he has made provision for existing debts, and so 0!1.
But how, if there be existing debts not provided for, and how if
the settlement is fraudulent as to such debts T Will the settlement, in such ~' be void as to all future indebtedne.ss T Is
there no place for repentance and atonement by the after payment of existing debts, or may after creditors, notwithstanding
such payment, avoid the deed 1 Justice Duncan answers these
questions by saying: ' 'If the jury find a prior indebtedness and
any of that class of creditors is defeated by the settlement, then,
my opinion is, that the property conveyed is to be considered as
part of the estate of the debtor for the benefit of all his creditors.
I know no midway. When a statute declares a matter void it
thrusts all to destruction like a tyrant, while the common law,
like a nursing father, makes that void where the fault is and
preserves the rest.'' In this, singularly enough, the fact is
overlooked that the statute makes the gift or deed void, on.l.y,
as to those who may be hindered, delayed or defrauded thereby,
and that in this it follows the common law. This oversight, however, would seem to be accounted for by the fact that the opinion of Chief Justice Spencer in Anderson v. Roberts, 18 Johns.
526, is adopted, wherein it is said, that the Statute of 13 Elizabeth protects creditors whose debts accrue subsequently to the
fraudulent conveyance equally as those whose debt.s were due
when it was made.
It would seem to be on this that Justice Duncan founds the
assertion, already referred to, that the existence of prior debts
creates a suspicion of fraud, which can only be repelled by show.
ing that the subsequent creditors were provided for in the settlement. This, as it stands, is unintelligible; for one cannot provide for what he does not anticipate; if he has no future debts
in contemplation, how is it possible to make provision for them T
It, in fact, simply amounts to saying that the statute is operative
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lier, it has been said, the settlor must not only retain property

enough to satisfy present debts, but also to answer the reason-

able probabilities of the future. But this rule is unreasonable

in this, that it prevents men of limited means from making any

settlement whatever upon their wives and children, a result cer-

tainly not contemplated by the statute. Besides this, the attempt

to keep men and women in judicial leading strings all their

lives, to direct what they shall or shall not do with their own

property, is a matter which commends itself neither to sound

legal reason nor to common sense. If a man is in debt, he may

not give away his property until he has paid or provided for

such debt; the reason for this is found in the principles of com-

mon honesty. If he contemplates future indebtedness, he must,

for a like reason, provide for it, but he must not provide for

what he does not anticipate, and for what may never occur. And

if, without concealment, a man chooses to give away all his

estate, or settle it upon his wife and children, what right has a

subsequent creditor to complain? It did him no harm; he gave

the grantor no credit because of such property; he is, therefore,

neither cheated nor impoverished by such gift. Furthermore,

if A, by a voluntary conveyance, defrauds B this year, how is

C, whose debt has no existence until ten years after, defrauded
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by that same conveyance? It certainly will not do to say that

because B was cheated therefore C is cheated, for between B

and C there is no possible connection or privity. But if C has

not been defrauded by the grant, then, if the statute means

what it most expressly says, he cannot impeach it.

We turn, therefore, with satisfaction to the case of Snyder v.

Christ. where we have the plain and unambiguous declaration,

that the subsequent creditor can avail himself only of that fraud

which is practiced against himself. The doctrine thus announced

is made the more positive in that it is said, if the creditor knew

of the voluntary conveyance when he gave the credit, he could

not be defrauded thereby, and, hence, could not impeach it.

This case, not only from the direct manner in which the prin-

cipal subject of discussion is treated, but also by reason of the

facts upon which it depends, must be regarded as a final deter-

mination of the question in hand.

These facts are briefly as follows: John Snyder, being the

owner of a tract of one hundred acres of land, conveyed it to

one John Reger, in trust for the use of himself and wife for

upou subsequent, as well as present, indebtedness. In like manr:er, it has been said, the settlor must not only retain property
enough to satisfy present debts, but also to answer the reason;:ble probabilities of the future. But this rule is unreasonable
ia this, that it prevents men of limited means from making any
si>ttlement whatever upon their wives and children, a result certainly uot contemplated by the statute. Besides this, the attempt
to keep men and women in judicial leading strings all their
livLs, to direct what they shall or shall not do with their own
property, is a matter which commends itself neither to sound
ll'gal reason nor to common sense. If a man is in debt, he may
11ot give away his property until he has paid or provided for
such debt; the reason for this is found in the principles of common honesty. If he contemplates future indebtedness, he must,
for a like reason, prO'Vide for it, but he must not provide for
what he does not anticipate, and for what may never occur. And
if, without concealment, a man chooses to give away all his
estate, or settle it upon his wife and children, what right has a.
subsequent creditor to complain T It did him no harm; he gave
the grantor no credit because of such property ; he is, therefore,
neither cheated nor impoverished by such gift. Furthermore,
if A, by a voluntary conveyance, defrauds B this year, how is
C, whose debt bas no existence until ten years after, defrauded
by that same conveyance T It certainly will not do to say that
because B was cheated therefore C is cheated, for between B
and C there is no possible connection or privity. But if C has
not been defrauded by the grant, then, if the statute means
what it most expressly says, he cannot impeach it.
We turn, therefore, with satisfaction to the case of Snyder v.
Christi where we have the plain and unambiguous declaration,
that the subsequent creditor can avail himself only of that fraud
which is practiced against himself. The doctrine thus announced
is made the more positive in that it is said, if the creditor knew
of the voluntary conveyance when he gave the credit, he could
not be defrauded thereby, and, hence, rould not impeach it.
This case, not only from the direct manner in which the principal subject of discussion is treated, but also by reason of the
facts upon which it depends, must be regarded as a final determination of the question in hand.
These facts are briefly as follows: .John Snyder, being the
owm·r of R tract of one hundred acres of land, conveyed it to
;iti e John Reger, in trust for the use of himself and wife for
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their joint lives and the life of the survivor of them, with re-

mainder to two children of the wife, and to such children as

the grantors might have. This was all the real estate Snyder

owned, and it was in proof, that at the date of the deed, his

debts amounted to some $200, and that his personal property

did not exceed in value $150. Furthermore, he had expressed

apprehensions of a claim for damages for a breach of promise

suit of marriage, and, within a few days after the making of the

deed, he had borrowed $200, and had also contracted the debt,

on a judgment for which the property in suit was sold.

Here, then, we have every element necessary for a test case.

A voluntary deed in trust of all the grantor's real estate, pro-

viding, inter alia, for himself for life; existing debts unprovided

for, and as to which this deed was undoubtedly fraudulent; no

property reserved for the reasonable probabilities of the future,

an immediate contraction of subsequent debts, and an expressed

apprehension of a pending claim for damages. It was, never-

theless, held, that of these facts the subsequent creditor could

not avail himself, unless he could further show that a fraud was

intended against himself. In other words, these facts standing

alone, did not make for him even a prima facie case.

Snyder v. Christ was followed in Monroe v. Smith, 29 P. F.

Smith 459, in which it was said that a deed, void as to existing

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

creditors, by reason of the grantor's fraud, is not necessarily

void as to subsequent creditors; that it is bad only as to those

it is intended to defraud.

It is scarcely necessary to say that these cases rule the one

now under consideration. The deed of John Mell to Isabella

Noble was executed on the 31st of March, 1859, and was re-

corded in August of the same year. The deed of William Blair

to Mrs. Noble was made March 20, 1865, and was recorded 28th

of March, 1868. The judgment of Kindler v. John B. Noble,

upon which the property in dispute was sold, was founded on a

note dated March 5, 1869, ten years after the date of the first

deed, and nearly three years after the date of the second. When,

in addition to this, we reflect that Noble's debts at no time were

large; that the testimony of Foote relates to declarations made

by Noble ten years before Kindler's debt had an existence; that

there is not one particle of evidence, direct or indirect, that a

fraud was intended on future creditors, we must certainly con-

their joint lives and the life of the survivor of them, with remainder to two children of the wife, and to such children as
the grantors might have. This was all the real estate Snyder
owned, and it was in proof, that at the date of the deed, his
debts amounted to some $200, and that his personal property
did not exceed in value $150. Furthermore, he had expressed
apprehensions of a claim for damages for a breach of promise
suit of marriage, .and, within a few days after the making of the
deed, he had borrowed $200, and had also contracted the debt,
on a judgment for which the property in suit was sold. ,
Here, then, we have every element necessary for a test case.
A voluntary deed in trust of all the grantor's real estate, providing, inter alia, for himself for life; existing debts unprovided
for, and as to which this deed was undoubtedly fraudulent; no
property reserved for the reasonable probabilities of the future,
an immediate contraction of subsequent debts, and an expressed
apprehenBion of a pending claim for damages. It was, nevertheless, held, that of these facts the subsequent creditor could
not avail himself, unless he could further show that a fraud was
intended against himself. In other words, these facts standing
alone, did not make for him even a prim.a f acie case.
Snyder v. Christ was followed in Monroe v. Smith, 29 P. F.
Smith 459, in which it was said that a deed, void as to existing
creditors, by reason of the grantor's fraud, is not necessarily
void as to subsequent creditors; that it is bad only as to those
it is intended to defraud.
It is scarcely necessary to say that these cases rule the one
now under consideration. The deed of John Mell to Isabella
Noble was executed on the 31st of March, 1859, and was recorded in August of the same year. The deed of William Blair
to Mrs. Noble was made March 20, 1865, and was recorded 28th
of .March, 1868. The judgment of Kindler v. John B. Noble,
upon which the property in dispute was sold, was founded on a
note dated March 5, 1869, ten years after the date of the first
deed, and nearly three years after the date of the second. When,
in addition to this, we reflect that Noble's debts at no time were
large ; that the testimony of Foote relates to declarations made
by Noble ten years before Kindler's debt had an existence; that
there is not one particle of evidence, direct or indirect, that a
fraud was intended on future creditors, we must certainly con-
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elude that the plaintiffs had no case, and that the court should

so have instructed the jury.

The judgment is reversed, and venire facias de novo awarded.25

WASHINGTON NAT. BANK v. BEATTY

77 N. J. Eq. 252, 76 Atl. 442

elude that the plaintiffs had no case, and that the court should
so have instructed the jury.
The judgment is reversed, and venire facias de novo awarded.25

(Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. June 21, 1910)

DILL, J. This appeal from the Court of Chancery brings up

WASHINGTON NAT. BANK v. BEATTY

for review a judgment dismissing the bill in a creditor's action

to set aside a voluntary conveyance of real estate. The bill

77 N. J. Eq. 252, 76 Atl. 442

charges the transaction as being "in violation of the statute en-

titled 'An act for the prevention of frauds and perjuries,' ap-

(Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. June 21, 1910)

proved March 27, 1874." Rev. St. 1874, p. 299. There is no

element in the case, either by way of pleading or proof, that the

complainant bank gave any credit to the defendant relying upon

his ownership of the property in question. The answer, deny-

ing the material allegations of the bill, specifically raises the

25—Schell v. Gamble, 153 Cal.

448; Cartersville First Nat. Bank

v. Bayless, 96 Ga. 684; Springer v.

Bigford, 160 IU. 495; Stumph v.

Bruner, 89 Ind. 556; Brundage v.

Chenowortb, 101 Iowa, 256; Shep-
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pard v. Thomas, 24 Kan. 780; Wil-

liams v. Kemper, 99 Minn. 301;

Simmons v. Ingram, 60 Miss. 886;

Cole v. Cole, 231 Mo. 236; Ayers v.

DILL, J. This appeal from the Court of Chancery brings up
for review a judgment dismissing the bill in a creditor's action
to set aside a voluntary conveyance of real estate. The bill
charges the transaction as being "in violation of the statute entitled 'An act for the prevention of frauds and perjuries,' approved March 27, 1874." Rev. St. 1874, p. 299. There is no
element in the case, either by way of pleading or proof, that the
complainant bank gave any credit to the defendant relying upon
his ownership of the property in question. The answer, denying the material allegations of the bill, specifically raises the

Wolcott, 66 Neb. 712; Crawford t.

Beard, 12 Ore. 447; Aldons v. 01-

verson, 17 S. D. 190; Schreyer v.

Scott, 134 U. S. 405, acc.

"It is true, that it has been held

in some cases, that where a con-

veyance by a debtor was fraudulent

in its inception as to his creditors

at the time, it will be so treated as

to subsequent creditors. But those

cases must rest upon one of two

principles, the property was either

bo situated that it enabled the debt

or to obtain credit upon the faith

of it, or the fraudulent vendee was

regarded as a trustee under the

secret arrangement between the

parties, and in virtue of such secret

understanding, bound at least so far

as his word or such contract could

bind him, to account to the fraudu-

lent vendor. * * * In the pres-

ent case, however, it is neither

shown that the debts were con-

tracted upon the faith of the prop-

erty, nor that the defendant was in

any manner a trustee for, or ac-

countable to, her husband." Winn

v. Barnett, 31 Miss. 653.

"It seems that the fraudulent in-

tent should relate to or affect sub-

sequent creditors, and the burden

of proving the necessary ingredients

of the fraud is placed upon the sub-

sequent creditors. Where it is not

simply a case of subsequent cred-

itors seeking to share with prior

creditors in the proceeds, but the

case is, as here, that of a subse-

quent creditor alone seeking to in-

validate the conveyance, and subject

the land to sale for his benefit, the

25-Scbell v. Gamble, 153 Cal.
-448; Cartersville First Nat. Bank
v. Bayles!, 96 Ga. 684; Springer v.
Bigford, 160 Ill. 495; Stumph v.
Bruner, 89 Ind. 556; Brundage v.
(..'"benowortb, 101 Iowa, 266; Shep·
pard v. Thomas, 24 Kan. 780; Williams v. Kemper, 99 Minn. 301;
Simmons v. Ingram, 60 Miss. 886;
Cole v. Cole, 231 Mo. 236; Ayers v.
Wolcott, 66 Neb. 712; Crawford 1'.
Beard, 12 Ore. 447; Aldons v. 01·
'l"erson, 17 S. D. 190; Schreyer v.
~cott, 134 U. S. 405, acc.
''It is true, that it bas been held
in 11ome cases, that where a con·
,-eyance by n c;lebtor was fraudulent
in its inception as to his creditors
at the time, it will be so treated ns
to subsequent creditors. But th<'I!('
cases must rest upon one of two
principles, the property was either
so situated that it enabled the clt>l•t ·
or to obtain credit upon the faith
of it, or the fraudulent vendee was
regarded 88 a trustee under the
secret arrangement between the

parti~s,

and in virtue of 11uch secret
uudentanding, bound at least so far
as his word or such contract could
bind him, to account to the fraudulent vendor. * * * In the present case, however, it is neither
shown that the debts were contracted upon the faith of the prop·
erty, nor that the defendant was in
any manner a trustee for, or accountable to, her husband." Winn
v. Barnett, 31 Miu. 653.
''It seems that the fraudulent intent should relate to or affect subsequent creditors, and the burden
of proving the necessary ingredients
of the fraud is placed upon the subEiequent creditors. ·where it is not
simply a case of subsequent cred·
itors seeking to share with prior
creditors in the proceeds, but the
case is, as here. that of a subsequent creditor alone seeking to in·
"alidate the conveyance, and subject
the land to sale for bis benefit, the
prior creditor, to defraud whom
alone the conveyance was made, hav·
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issue that the firm of commission merchants, hereinafter referred

to, were not at the time of the conveyance or subsequently,

creditors of the defendant, within the purview of the statute.

The essential facts of the case are within a narrow scope. In

1894, David C. Beatty, a farmer, consigned certain farm produce

to a firm of commission merchants in New York. They failed to

remit the proceeds. Beatty, in his wrath, exposed to public

view a card on which he had written "All fruit shippers beware

of" [naming the commission merchants]. "They are damned

frauds." Two days later, the commission merchants wrote,

threatening to sue him for $100,000 damages. This so alarmed

the farmer that he put his property out of his hands, transferring

the farm which he owned and the mortgages he held on another

farm to his son without consideration, and at once duly recorded

the conveyances. The complainant offered no evidence to con-

trovert Beatty's statement that the commission merchants were

frauds in that they converted to their own use proceeds due him.

The case shows affirmatively that the commission merchants

never did more than to threaten Beatty and never proceeded, in

ing been paid by the grantee, the

plaintiff should show that the con-

veyance was a continuing fraud, and

not rely solely on the fact that it
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was made to defraud the prior cred-

itor." Stumph v. Bruner, 89 Ind.

556, 561.

'' Now it is true that the fact that

issue that the firm of commission merchants, hereinafter referred
to, were not at the time of the conveyance or subsequently,
creditors of the defendant, within the purview of the statute.
The essential facts of the case are within a narrow scope. In
1894, David C. Beatty, a farmer, consigned certain farm pro<lU<~e
to a firm of commission merchants in New York. They failed to
remit the proceeds. Beatty; in his wrath, exposed to pub!ie
view a card on which he had written" All fruit shippers beware
of" [naming th& com.mission merchants]. "They are damned
frauds. 11 Two days later, the commission merchants wrote,
threatening to sue him for $100,000 damages. This eo alarmed
the farmer that he put his property out of his hands, transferring
the farm which he owned and the mortgages he held on another
farm to his son without consideration, and at once duly recorded
the conyeyances. The complainant offered no evidence to con.
trovert l3eatty's statement that the commission merchants were
frauds in that they converted to their own use proceeds due him.
The case shows affirmatively that the commission merchants
never did more than to threaten Beatty and never proceeded, in

a person has entered into a haz-

ardous business, or engaged in a

speculative enterprise, at or soon

alter the execution of a voluntary

conveyance, is strong evidence of a

fraudulent intent. It evinces a de-

sire to reap the benefit for himself

if successful, and escape responsi-

bility if unlucky. Nevertheless,

each case must stand upon its own

footing, and no legal rule can be

adopted as to the quantity of proof

or the particular complexity of facta

uhich. will annul a conveyance upon

this ground. The character of the

business, the degree of pecuniary

lmard incurred, the amount of

property remaining in the grantor,

the value of the property conveyed,

the acts and words occurring coin-

cidently with the transaction, are

to be viewed together in solving the

question of fraudulent intent."

Uagerman v. Buchanan, 45 N. J.

Eq. 292, 302.

'' It is doubtless true, as con-

tended by the defendant, that a

finding of fraud as to subsequent

creditors would not be warranted

by the simple proof that the trans-

fer was made with a design to set-

tle the property upon the defendant

so that it should not be exposed to

the hazards of his future business

or liable for any future debts which

he might contract. Winchester v.

Charter, 12 Allen. 606, 611; Mowry

v. Beed, 187 Mass. 174, 177, and

cases cited. It must further appear

that at the time of the conveyance

he had an actual intent to contract

debts and a purpose to avoid by

ing been paid by the grantee, the
. plaintift' should show that the eon,·eyance wlUI a continuing fraud, and
not rely solely on the fact that it
was made to defraud the prior cred·
itor. '' Stumph v. Bruner, 89 Ind.
556, 561.
''Now it is true that the tact that
a person baa entered into a hazardous busine88, or engaged in a
t<peculative enterprise, at ~r soon
after the execution of a voluntary
conveyanee, is strong evidence of a
fraudulent intent. It evinces a deeire to reap the benefit for himself
if successful, and escape responsil·ility if unlucky. Nevertbele118,
C"a cb case must stand upon its own
footing, and no legal rule can be
adopted as to the quantity of proof
or the particular complexity of facts
\1birb. will annul a conveyance upon
this ground. The character of the
businees, the degree of pecuiiiary
ha:rard incurred, the amount of
property remaining in the grantor,
the ,·alue of the property conveyed,

the acts and words occurring coincidently with the transaction, are
to be viewed together in solving the
question of fraudulent intent.''
Hagerman v. Buchanan, 45 N. J.
Eq. 292, 302.
'' It ie doubtle&11 true, as eon·
tended by the defendant, that a ...
finding of fraud as to subeequent
creditors would not be warranted
by the simple proof that the transfer was made with a design to settle the property upon the defendant
BO that it should not be exposed to
the harards of his future business
or liable for any future debts which
he might contract. Winchester v.
Charter, 12 Allen. 606, 611; Mowl'1
v. Reed, 18i Mass. 174, 177, a.nd
eases cited. It must further appear
that at the time of the conveyanee
he bad an actual intent to contract
debt! and a purpose to avoid by
the conveyance the payment of them.
Stratton v. Edward.I, 174 Maes. 374,
378, and cues eited.'' Gateley v.
Kappler, 208 Maaa. 426, 428.
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any way, to establish the verity of their claim for damages,

never sued him, and never obtained any judgment against him,

but were content to let the matter stand in statu quo until the

statute of limitations had intervened. Admittedly, Beatty made

the trausfer for the purpose of making himself judgment proof

against these commission merchants, if they should sue him and

if the judgment should go against him. There is no evidence of

auy other claims or debts against Beatty. The bank, which was

net organized until five years after the conveyance by Beatty,

obtained a judgment against him on an accommodation note 12

years after the transfer, and to collect this judgment it now

seeks to svt aside the deed. The vice chancellor below dismissed

the bill, holding: First. That under the evidence the commis-

sion merchants whose threat to bring suit induced the transfers

wire, within the meaning of the statute of frauds, creditors at

the time the transfers were made, and that the deeds were fraud-

ulent as to them. Second. That a conveyance made for the pur-

pose of defrauding a single existing creditor is not void as

against subsequent creditors, the incurring of the debts to whom

w as not within the contemplation of the debtor at the time when

the conveyance was made. t

We concur in the action of the vice chancellor in dismissing

the bill, but not with his conclusions of law. Taking them in
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their inverse order, the first legal question is whether a creditor

whose debt is contracted subsequent to the execution of a deed,

which is fraudulent as against a single existing creditor, in

order to have such deed set aside, must show not only that the

deed was fraudulent as to such existing creditor, but also that

it was made with intent to defraud such persons as should, sub-

sequent to its date, become creditors of the grantor. The vice

chancellor held to the affirmative of this proposition, relying to

some extent upon the statement of Vice Chancellor Pitney in

Gray v. Folwell, 57 N. J. Eq. 446, at p. 456, 41 Atl. 869, and

following the rule laid down by Vice Chancellor Van Fleet in

Gardner v. Kleinke, 46 N. J. Eq. 90, 18 Atl. 457. In our judg-

ment the rule laid down by Vice Chancellor Van Fleet in Gard-

ner v. Kleinke, supra, and the holding of the vice chancellor in

this case below, in accordance therewith, were erroneous.

The effect of the statute is to make a voluntary deed fraud-

ulent as against existing creditors, without regard to the inten-

tion with which it was executed. It is fraudulent in law. This

was settled in 1879 by this court in Haston v. Castner, 31 N. J."

H. & A. Bankruptcy—16

any way, to establish the verity of their claim for damages,
never sued him, aud never obtai11cd any judgme11t agaiust him,
but were content to let the matter stand in statu quo until the
statute of limitations had intervened. Admittedly, Beatty made
the transfer for the purpose of making himself judgment proof
::gainst these commission merchants, if they should sue him and
if the judgment should go against him. Th~re is no evidence of
auy other claims or debts against Beatty. The bank, which was
uct organized until five years after the conveyance by Beatty,
ohtai,:eil a judgment against him on an accommodation note 12
yt>c;rs artt-r the transfer, and to collect this judgment it now
seeks to s~·t aside the deed. The vice chancellor below dismissed
the bill, holding: First. That under the evidence the commission mere: hants whose threat to bring suit induced the transfers
' ' 1 re, within the meaning of the statute of frauds, creditors at
1ltL' time the transfers were made, and that the deeds were fraud11IP11t as t() them. Second. That a conveyance made for the purpose of <lc-frauding a single existing creditor is not void as
ag<!iust subsequent creditors, the incurring of the debts to whom
wus not within the contemplation of the debtor at the time when
the conveyance was made.
1
We concur in the action of the vice chancellor in dismissing
the bill, but not with his conclusions of law. Taking them in
their inverse order, the first legal question is whether a creditor
whose debt is contracted subsequent to the execution of a deed,
which is fraudulent as against a single existing creditor, in
order to have such deed set aside, must show not only that the
deed was fraudulent as to such existing creditor, but also that
it was made with intent to defraud such persons as should, sub!'equeut to its date, become creditors of the grantor. The vice
chancellor held to the affirmative of this proposition, relying to
some extent upon the statement of Vice Chancellor Pitney in
Gray v. Folwell, 57 N. J. Eq. 446, at p. 456, 41 Atl. 869, and
following the rule laid down by Vice Chancellor Van Fleet in
Gardner v. Kleinke, 46 N. J. Eq. 90, 18 Atl. 457. In our judgment the rule laid down by Vice Chancellor Van FJeet in Gardner v. Kleinke, supra, and the holding of the vice chancellor in
this case below, in accordance therewith, were erroneous.
The effect of the statute is to make a voluntary deed frauduleut as against existing creditors, without regard to the intention ";th which it was executed. It is fraudulent in law. This
was settled in 1879 by this court in Haston v. Castner, 31 N. J.'
H. & A. Bankruptcy-16
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Eq. 697. The effect of a voluntary conveyance upon the rights

of subsequent creditors was decided by us in 1889. Hagerman

v. Buchanan, 45 N. J. Eq. 292, 17 Atl. 946, 14 Am. St. Rep. 732.

It is true that it was considered by the Court of Chancery in

Gardner v. Kleinke, supra, that Hagerman v. Buchanan estab-

lished the principle that a subsequent creditor was not entitled

to have a voluntary conveyance set aside unless he could show

that it was made with intent to defraud such persons as should,

subsequent to its date, become creditors of the grantor. The

following language of Mr. Justice Reed in the opinion was cited

by Vice Chancellor Van Fleet as requiring that conclusion: "A

voluntary settlement can be attacked by a subsequent creditor

only upon the ground of the existence of an actual intent in the

mind of the parties, at the time of the execution of the convey-

ance, to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors by means of the

deed." But the citation does not justify the conclusion. In

fact, it declares that the test is an actual intent in the mind of

the grantor to defraud creditors—not subsequent creditors alone,

but any creditors—and that this is the principle intended to be

established by that decision is made plain by the subsequent

language of the opinipn, where Mr. Justice Reed, speaking of

subsequent creditors, says: "An actual fraudulent intent to

defraud some creditors must be proved."
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The true rule is that, when a conveyance is attacked by a sub-

sequent creditor, the question to be determined is whether the

conveyance was fraudulent. The question is the same when

attacked by an existing creditor; the only difference is the method

of proof. When an existing creditor attacks the conveyance, and

shows that his debt was incurred before, and was existing at

the time when, the conveyance was made, the law, without fur-

ther proof, raises a conclusive presumption of fraud so far as

that creditor is concerned. When, however, the conveyance is

attacked by a subsequent creditor, he must prove fraud as a

fact,2" that is, "an actual fraudulent intent to defraud some

creditor.'' By some creditor is meant any creditor, either exist-

ing at the time when the conveyance is made or subsequently.

If this be shown, the conveyance is proven to be fraudulent, and

it may be set aside at the instance of any class of creditors, with-

out regard to the time when the debt came into existence.27

26— See 20 Cye. 424, note 12, for Co., 115 Ala. 668; Buchanan v. Wil-

many cases in accord. Hams (Ark.), 160 S. W. 190; Mu-

27— Prestwood v. Troy Fertilizer lock v. Wilson, 19 Colo. 296; Wood

Eq. 697. The effect of a voluntary conveyance upon the rights
of subsequeut creditors was decided by us in 1889. Hagerman
v. Buchanan, 45 N. J. Eq. 292, 17 Atl. 946, 14 Am. St. Rep. 732.
It is true that it was considered by the Court of Chancery in
Gardner v. Kleinke, supra, that Hagerman v. Buchanan established the principle that a subsequent creditor was not entitled
to have a voluntary conveyance set aside unless he could show
that it was made with intent to defraud such persons as should,
subsequent to its date, become creditors of the grantor. The
following language of Mr. Justice Reed in the opinion was cited
by Vice Chancellor Van Fleet as requiring that conclusion : "A
voluntary settlement can be attacked by a subsequent creditor
only upon the ground of the existence of an actual intent in the
mind of the parties, at the time of the execution of the conveyance, to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors by means of the
deed.'' But the citation does not justify the conclusion. In
fact, it declares that the test is an actual intent in the mind of
the grantor to defraud creditors--not subsequent creditors alone,
but any creditors-and that this is the principle intended to be
established by that decision is made plain by the subsequent
language of the opinipn, where Mr. Justice Reed, speaking of
subsequent creditors, says: ''An actual fraudulent intent to
defraud some creditors must be proved.''
The true rule is that, when a conveyance is attacked by a sub·
sequent creditor, the question to be determined is whether the
conveyance was fraudulent. The question is the same when
a_ttacked by an existing creditor; the only difference is the method
of proof. When an existing creditor attacks the conveyance, and
shows that his debt was incurred before, and was existing at
the time when, the conveyance was made, the law, without further proof, raises a conclusive presumption of fraud so far as
that creditor is concerned. When, however, the conv,eyance is
attacked by a subsequent creditor, be must prove fraud as &
fact, 26 that is, ''an actual fraudulent intent to defraud some
creditor.'' By some creditor is meant any creditor, either exist·
ing at the time when the conveyance is made or subsequently.
If this be shown, the conveyance is proven to be fraudulent, and
it may be set aside at the instance of any class of creditors, without regard to the time when the debt came into existence.IT
26-See 20 Cyc. 424, note 12, for
many cases in accord.
27- Prestwood v. Troy Fertilizer

Co., 115 Ala. 668; Buchanan v. Wil·
Iiams (Ark.), 160 S. W. 190; Mu·
lock v. Wilson, 19 Colo. 296; Wood·
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The next question is whether, under the evidence, the com-

mission merchants, who asserted the claim for damages upon an

alleged liability, were proven to be existing lawful creditors or

other persons named in the statute entitled to set aside the con-

veyance as fraudulent against them.

It was necessary for the bank, as a subsequent creditor, to

prove: (1) A voluntary conveyance; (2) an existing creditor

or other person having a lawful claim or debt within the mean-

ing of the statute; (3) an actual intent on the part of the de-

fendant by means of the deed to delay or hinder some creditor,

existing or subsequent.

Conceding that an actual intent on the part of the defendant

to defeat any judgment which the commission merchants might

have obtained is proven, the question still remains whether they

come within the purview of the statute. The rule, both in Eng-

land (Twyne's Case, 3 Coke, 82), and in this state, is that the

statute extends its protection to all persons having a valid cause

of action arising from torts as well as from contracts. Boid v.

Dean, 48 N. J. Eq. 193, 21 Atl. 618; Post v. Stiger, 29 N. J. Eq.

554; Scott v. Hartman, 26 N. J. Eq. 89; Thorp v. Leibrecht, 56

N. J. Eq. 499, 39 Atl. 361.28 Nevertheless, a tort claimant, to

place himself in the position of a lawful creditor or person
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competent under the statute to set aside a voluntary convey-

ance, must reduce his claim to judgment, and thus establish a

legal debt against the fraudulent grantor. When his claim has

thus been liquidated and established as a lawful debt, he may

attack a voluntary conveyance made after the liability arose

and before suit was brought, to defeat his debt, on the theory

that such judgment when once obtained relates back and es-

tablishes a debt as of the time when the original cause of action

accrued.29

bury v. Sparrel Print., 187 Mass.

426; Jones v. Light, 86 Me. 437;

Cook v. Lee, 72 N. H. 569; Treze-

vant v. Terrell, 96 Tenn. 528; Mc-

I.ane v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 48; John-

son v. Wagner, 76 Va. 587; Silver-

nail v. Greaser, 27 W. Va. 550, acc.

In Cole v. Brown, 114 Mich. 369,

400, the Court said: "We are not

palled upon to determine whether a

subsequent creditor can successfully

attack a conveyance by the sole

The next question is whether, under the evidence, the commission merchants, who asserted the claim for damages upon an
alleged liability, were proven to be existing lawful creditors or
other persons named in the statute entitled to set aside the conveyance as fraudulent against them.
It was necessary for the bank, as a subsequent creditor, to
prove: (1) A voluntary conveyance; (2) an existing creditor
or other person having a lawful claim or debt within the meaning of the statute; (3) an actual intent on the part of th~ defendant by means of the deed to delay or hinder some creditor,
existing or subsequent.
Conceding that an actual intent on the part of the defendant
to defeat any judgment which the commission merchants might
have obtained is proven, the question still remains whether they
come within the purview of the statute. The rule, both iu England (Twyne 's Case, 3 Coke, 82), aud in this state, is that the
statute extends its protection to all persons having a valid cause
of action arising from torts as well as from contracts. Boid v.
Dean, 48 N. J. Eq. 193, 21 Atl. 618; Post v. Stiger, 29 N. J. Eq.
554; Scott v. Hartman, 26 N. J. Eq. 89; Thorp v. Leibrecht, 56
N. J. Eq. 499, 39 Atl. 361. 28 Neverthel~ss. a tort claimant, to
place himself in the position of a lawful creditor or person
competent under the statute to set aside a voluntary conveyance, must reduce his claim to judgment, and thus establish a
legal debt against the fraudulent grantor. When his claim has
thus been liquidated and established as a lawful debt, he may
attack a voluntary conveyance made after the liability arose
and before suit was brought, to defeat his debt, on the theory
that such judgment when once obtained relates back and establishes a debt as of the time when the original cause of action
accrued.29

proof of an actual intent to de-

fraud existing creditors. Upon this

question the authorities do not seem

to be in harmony. See Bump,

Fraud. Conv. c. 13.'' But see

Herschfeldt v. George, 6 Mich. 456;

Hopson v. Paine, 7 Mich. 334.

28— See Rosen v. Levy, 120 Tenn.

642, 113 S. W. 1042.

29— See 20 Cyc. 430, for citation

of many cases in accord.

"At the time of the execution of

bury v. Sparrel Print., 187 Ma88.
4:!6; Jones v. Light, 86 Me. 437;
Cook v. Lee, 72 N. H. 569; Treze·
,·ant v. Terrell, 96 Tenn. 528; Mc·
Lane v. Johneon, 43 Vt. 48; John·
son v. Wagner, 76 Va. 587; Sih·eroail v. Greaser, 27 W. Va. 550, acc.
In Cole v. Brown, 114 Mich. 369,
400, the Court said: ''We are not
ralled upon to determine whether a
subsequent creditor can successfully
attat'k a ~onveyance by the sole

proof of an actual intent to de·
fraud existing creditors. Upon this
question the authorities do not seem
to be in harmony. See Bump,
Fraud. Conv. c. 13.'' But see
Herschfeldt v. George, 6 .Mich. 456;
Hopson v. Paine, 7 Mich. 334.
28-See Rosen v. Levy, 120 Tenn.
642, 113 S. W. 1042.
29-See 20 Cyc. 430, for citation
of many cases in accord.
''At the time of the execution of
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The complainant failed to bring this case within the rule that

if after a person has incurred a liability for a tort, and before

suit brought upon it, he makes a voluntary conveyance or settle-

ment of his property, and judgment afterwards goes against

him for the tort, the conveyance is void as against that judg-

ment. See Boid v. Dean, 48 N. J. Eq. 193, 203, 21 Atl. 618. A

subsequent creditor who attacks a voluntary conveyance as in

fraud of a person at the time of the conveyance, claiming dam-

ages based on the tort of the grantor, must make legal proof of

the verity and legality of the claim. See Baker v. Gilman, 52

Barb. (N. Y.) 26. A judgment in favor of the claimant and

against the tort-feasor would be conclusive evidence. What

further or other proof would be equivalent thereto we are not

called upon in this case to decide, for the complainant, upon this

point, offered no evidence. The verity of the claim of the com-

mission merchants has not been established by any judgment or

competent proof, and the complainant bank, therefore, failed to

prove that the commission merchants were lawful creditors or

other persons within the meaning of the statute, the intent to

defraud whom would vitiate the conveyance. As against claims

and demands, the verity of which is never established by any

judgment or competent proof, the statute does not forbid con-

veyances or assignments or declare them to be void.
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Therefore, upon the ground stated in this opinion, the judg-

ment of the court below dismissing the bill of complaint is

affirmed.

WADSWORTH v. SCHISSELBAUER

32 Minn. 84

(Supreme Court of Minnesota. May 15, 1884)

Plaintiff brought this action in the District Court for McLeod

County, alleging in his complaint the recovery, on April 25, 1882,

the conveyances, which Mrs. Lewis,

the plaintiff below, sought to have

set aside as fraudulent and void as

to creditors, she was not a creditor

of the grantor, Thomas Evans.

The complainant failed to bring this case. within the rule that
if after a person has incurred a liability for a tort, and before
suit brought upon it, he makes a voluntary conveyance or ~ttle
ment of his property, and judgment afterwards goes against
him for the tort, the conveyance is void as against that judgment. See Boid v. Dean, 48 N. J. Eq. 193, 203, 21 Atl. 618. A
subsequent creditor who attacks a voluntary conveyance as in
fraud of a person at the time of the conveyance, claiming damages based on the tort of the grantor, must make legal proof of
the verity and legality of the claim. See Baker v. Gilman, 52
Darb. (N. Y.) 26. A judgment in favor of the claimant and
against the tort-fe.asor would be conclusive evidence. What
further or other proof would be equivalent thereto we are not
called upon in this case to decide, for the complainant, upon this
point, offered no evidence. The verity of the claim of the commission merchants has not been established by any judgment or
competent proof, and the complainant bank, therefore, failed to
prove that the commission merchants were lawful creditors or
other persons within the meaning of the statute, the intent to
defraud whom would vitiate the conveyance. As against claims
ar:d demands, the verity of which is never established by any
judgment Ol' competent proof, the statute does not forbid conveyances or assignments or declare them to be void.
Therefore, upon the ground stated in this opinion, the judgment of the court below dismissing the bill of complaint is
affirmed.

True, she had a valid cause of ac-

tion against him, at that time, but

one sounding in tort, and which was

WADSWORTH v. SCHISSELBAUER

not atserted even by bringing suit

thereon, till a month or more there-

32 Minn. 84

after. The existence of such a cause

of action clearly does not establish

(Supreme Court of Minnesota. May 15, 1884)

the legal relation of debtor and cred-

itor between the wrongdoer and the

party injured. Evans v. Lewis, 30

Oh. St. 11, 14. See Bigelow Ft.

Plaintiff brought this action in the District Court for McLeod
County, alleging in his complaint the recovery, on April 25, 1882,

Conv. (Knowlton's cd.), p. 194 n.

the cQJ1veyances, which Mrs. Lewis,

tho plaintiff below, sought to have

set ns ide as fraudulent and void as
t<J crt>ditors, she was not a creditor
of the gnmtor, Thomas Evan11.
True, she had a ,·nlid eause of action against him, at that time, but
0:1e sounding in tort, and which was
1:ot aEBerted e1·en by bringing suit

thereon, till a month or more tbereThe existence of such a cause
of action clearly does not establish
the legal relation of debtor and creditor hetween the wrongdoer and the
pnrty injmed. Evans v. Ll'wi:<, ~O
Oh. St. 11, 14. See Bigelow FL
Com·. (Knowlton 's ed.), p. 194 n.
::i ftor.
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of a judgment in Justice Court in the same county, in favor of

one Albrecht and against defendant, A. Schisselbauer, for $66.55,

the cause of action being a promissory note made by him; the

issuing and return unsatisfied of an execution from the Justice

Court; the subsequent docketing of the judgment in the Dis-

trict Court for the same county on January 24, 1883, and an

assignment to the plaintiff filed in the same court on January

25, 1883. He also alleges the recovery and docketing of a judg-

ment in his own favor against the same defendant, on January

13, 1883, in Justice Court in the same county for $92.40, in an

action founded on express contract; the issuing and return un-

satisfied of an execution from the Justice Court; the docketing

of the judgment in the District Court for the same county on

January 24, 1883. The complaint also states that on January

25, 1883, and after the assignment to plaintiff, executions on

the two judgments issued from the District Court, and were

delivered to the proper officer for service, who returned them

wholly unsatisfied. That on March 24, 1882, and after he had

become indebted upon the causes of action on which the judg-

ments were rendered, the defendant, A. Schisselbauer, and the

defendant, Barbara, his wife, conveyed to defendant, Dorman,

lots 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 in block 7 in the platted portion of Glencoe

in McLeod County, and containing more than one acre, with
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intent to defraud the creditors of the former, and especially the

plaintiff; that Dorman took the deed with knowledge of the

fraud, and on April 15, 1882, conveyed the same property to

defendant, Barbara, without any consideration; that both deeds

were recorded.

Judgment is demanded that each of the deeds be declared

fraudulent and void, and be cancelled of record; that each of

the judgments be adjudged to be a lien on the real estate, and

that it be adjudged to be subject to levy and sale on execution

for the satisfaction of the judgments, with the general prayer

for relief.

A demurrer to the complaint as not stating a cause of action

was sustained by Macdonald, J., and the plaintiff appealed.

MITCHELL, J. There are two classes of cases, both com-

monly called creditors' suits, which, although closely allied, are

clearly distinguishable. The first, a creditor's suit strictly so-

called, is where the creditor seeks to satisfy his judgment out

of the eqnitable assets of the debtor, which could not be reached

of a judgmeut iu Justice Court in the same county, in favor of

one Albrecht and against defendant, A. Schisselbauer, for $66.55,
the cause of action beiug a promissory note made by him; the
issuing and return unsatisfied of an execution from the Justice
Court; the subsequent docketing of the judgment in the District Court for the same county on January 24, 1883, and an
assignment to the plaintiff filed in the same court on January
25, 1883. He also alleges the recovery and docketing of a judgment in his own favor against the same defendant, on January
13, 1883, in Justice Court in the same county for $92.40, in an
action founded on express contract; the issuing and return unsatisfied of an execution from the Justice Court; the docketing
of the judgment in the District Court for the same county on
January 24, 1883. The complaint also states that on January
25, 1883, and after the. BBSignment to plaintiff, executions on
the two judgments issued from the District Court, and were
delh·ered to the proper officer for service, who returned them
wholly unsatisfied. That on l\Iarch 24, 1882, and after he had
become indebted upon the causes of action on which the judgments were rendered, the defendant, A. Schisselbauer, and the
defendant, Barbara, his wife, conveyed to defendant, Dorman,
lots 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 in block 7 in the platted portion of Glencoe
in McLeod County, and containing more than one acre, with
intent to defraud the creditors of the former, and especially the
plaintiff; that Dorman took the deed with knowledge of the
fraud, and on April 15, 1882, conveyed the same property to
defendant, Barbara, without any consideration; that both deeds
were recorded.
Judgment is demanded that each of the deeds be declared
fraudulent and void, and be cancelled of record; that each of
the judgments be adjudged to be a lien on the real estate~ and
that it be adjudged to be subject to levy and sale on execution
for the satisfaction of the judgments, with the general prayer
for relief.
A demurrer to the complaint as not stating a cause of action
was sustained by Macdonald, J., and the plaintiff appealed .
.MITCHELL, J. There are two classes of cases, both commonly called creditors' suits, which, although closely allied, are
· clearly distinguishable. The first, a creditor's suit strictly socalled, is where the creditor seeks to satisfy his judgment out
of the equitable assets of the debtor, which could not be reached
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on execution. The general rule is that such an action cannot

be brought until the creditor has exhausted his remedy at law

by the issue of an execution and its return unsatisfied. This

was required because equity would not aid the creditor to col-

lect his debt until the legal assets were exhausted, for, until

this was done, he might have an adequate remedy at law. The

execution had to be issued to the county where the debtor re-

sided, if a resident of the state. Its issue to another county

would not suffice. Reed v. Wheaton, 7 Paige, 663. The second

class of cases is where property legally liable to execution has

been fraudulently conveyed or incumbered by the debtor, and the

creditor brings the action to set aside the conveyance or in-

cumbrance as an obstruction to the enforcement of his lien; for,

though the property might be sold on execution notwithstand-

ing the fraudulent conveyance, the creditor will not be required

to sell a doubtful or obstructed title. In the latter class of

cases, the prevailing doctrine is that it is not necessary to allege

that an execution has been returned unsatisfied, or that the

debtor has no other property out of which the judgment can be

satisfied; for that is not the ground upon which the court of

equity assumes to grant relief in such cases, but upon the theory

that the fraudulent conveyance is an obstruction which prevents

the creditor's lien from being efficiently enforced upon the prop-
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erty. As to him the conveyance is void, and he has a right to

have himself placed" in the same position as if it had never been

made. The fact that other property has been retained by the

debtor may be evidence that the conveyance is not fraudulent;

but if the grantee's title be tainted with fraud, he has no right

to say that all other means to satisfy the debt shall be exhausted

before he shall be disturbed. Botsford v. Beers, 11 Conn. 369 -,

Weightman v. Hatch, 17 Ill. 281; Vasser v. Henderson, 40

Miss. 519.

There is much conflict of authority as to how far the creditor

must first proceed at law. It has been held in some cases that

if an execution has not been returned unsatisfied, an execution

must be issued and the action brought in aid of an execution

then outstanding. Such seems to be the latest view of the courts

of New York, after much vacillation and conflict of decision.

Adsit v. Butler, 87 N. Y. 585. But the prevailing and, as we

think, on principle, the better rule is that the creditor need

only proceed at law far enough to acquire a lien upon the prop-

erty sought to be reached before filing his bill to set aside a

on execution. The general rule is that such an action cannot
be brought until the creditor has exhausted his remedy at law
by the issue of an e:.ecution and its return unsatisfied. This
was required because equity would not aid. the creditor to collect his debt until the legal assets were exhausted, for, until
this was done, he might have an adequate remedy at law. The
execution had to be issued to the county wber~ th.e <kbtor resided, if a resident of the state. Its issue to anotl1er couuty
would not suffice. Reed v. Wheaton, 7 Paige, 663. The second
class of cases is where property legally liable to execution has
been fraudulently conveyed or incumbered by the debtor, and the
creditor brings the action to set aside the conveyance or incumbrance as an obstruction to the enforcement of his lien; for,
though the property might be sold on execution notwithstanding the fraudulent conveyance, the creditor will not be required
to sell a doubtful or obstructed title. In the latter class of
cases, the prevailing doctrine is that it is not necessary to allege
that an execution has been returned unsatisfied, or that the
debtor has no other property out of which the judgment cnn be
satisfied; for that is not the ground upon which the court of
equity assumes to grant relief in such cases, but upon the theory
that the fraudulent conveyance is an obstruction which prevents
the creditor's lien from being efficiently enforced upon the property. As to him the conveyance is void, and he has a right to
have himself placed' in the same position as if it had never been
made. The fact that other property has been retained by the
debtor may be evidence that the conveyance is not fraudulent ;
but if the grantee's title be tainted with fraud, he has no right
to say that all other means to satisfy the debt shall be exhausted
before he shall be disturbed. Botsford v. Beers, 11 Conn. 369 ;
Weightman v. Hatch, 17 Ill. 281; Vasser v. Henderson, W
Miss. 519.
There is much conflict of authority as to how far the creditor
must first proceed at law. It has been held in some cases that
if an execution has not been returned unsatisfied, an execution
must be issued and the action brought in aid of an execution
then outstanding. Such seems to be the latest view of the courts
of New York, after much vaciUation and conflict of decision.
Adsit v. Butler, 87 N. Y. 585. But the prevailing and, as we
think, on principle, the better rule is that the creditor peed
only proceed at law far enough to acquire a lien upon the property sought to be reached before filing his bill to set aside a
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fraudulent conveyance. The extent to which he must proceed

to do this will depend on the nature of the property. If it be

personal, there must be a levy, for until this is made he has no

lien. If it be real estate, it is enough to obtain judgment, and

docket it in the county where the lands are situated. 1 Am.

Lead. Cas. 54, 55; 2 Barb. Ch. Pr. 160; Bump on Fraudulent

Conveyances, 523; Weightman v. Hatch, supra; Newman v.

Willetts, 52 Ill. 98; Vasser v. Henderson, supra; Dodge v. Gris-

wold, 8 N. H. 425; Tappan v. Evans, 11 N. H. 311; Cornell v.

Radway, 22 Wis. 260; Clarkson v. De Peyster, 3 Paige, 320;

Dunham v. Cox, 10 N. J. Eq. 437-466. The lien on the land,

and the right to sell it in satisfaction of the debt, is the basis

of the right to have the deed set aside.

This was a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real

estate executed by the judgment debtor, and hence falls within

the second class. It follows from what has been said that it was

not necessary to issue an execution at all before commencing

the present action. Hence it is wholly immaterial that it does

not appear that it was directed to the county where the debtor

resided. In our view the complaint is good.

Order reversed

2. PREFERENCES 80

Note.—"There is a large class of cases falling under the in-
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fluence, though not under the language until recent times, of

bankruptcy laws, in which conveyances, transfers, and payments

by debtors to any of their creditors, even when made with express

intent to defeat other creditors equally entitled to payment,

have from the beginning been treated as not within the statute

of Elizabeth. If one went no further than the statute itself,

one might well suppose that here the doctrine of liberal construc-

fraudulent conveyance. Thr exh•nt to which he must proceed
to do this will depend 011 the nature of the property. If it be
personal, there must lw a levy, for until this is ma<le he has no
lir.n. If it be real estate, it is enough to obtain judgment, and
docket it in the county where the lands are situated. 1 Am.
Lead. Cas. 54, 55; 2 Barb. Ch. Pr. 160; Bump on ~,raudnlent
Conveyances, 523; \Yeightman v. Hatch, supra; Newman v.
\Villetts, 52 Ill. 98; Vasser v. Henderson, supra,,· Dodge v. Griswold, 8 N. H. 425; Tappan v. Evans, 11 N. H. 311; Cornell v.
Radway, 22 Wis. 260; Clarkson v. De Peyster, 3 Paige, 320;
Dunham v. Cox, 10 N. J. Eq. 437-466. The lien on the land,
and the right to sell it in satisfaction of the debt, is the basis
of the right to have the deed set aside.
This was a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real
estate executed by the judgment debtor, and hence falls within
the second class. It follows from what has been said that it was
not necessary to issue an execution at all before commencing
the present action. Hence it is wholly immaterial that it does
not appear that it was directed to the county where the debtor
resided. In our view the complaint is good.
Order reverseil

tion had been rejected. Why, it might naturally be asked, were

such cases relegated to bankruptcy laws, nay to actual proceed-

ings in bankruptcy or winding-up,—for even the bankruptcy

2.

PREFERENCES 80

laws do not meet these cases except in bankruptcy proceedings?

There is nothing either in the letter or in the spirit in the

statute of Elizabeth to require the courts to hold that it has no

application to such cases; and yet it has always been held that

30—Under the bankruptcy law sirable to cover here the subject in

preferences are important in sev- all its phases, rather than to split

era! connections. It has seemed de- it up.

NOTE.-'' There is a large class of cases falling under the influence, though not under the language until recent times, of
bankruptcy laws, in which conveyances, transfers, and payments
by debtors to any of their creditors, even when made with express
intent to defeat other creditors equally entitled to payment,
have from the beginning been treated as not within the statute
of. Elizabeth. If one went no further than the statute itself,
one might well suppose that here the doctrine of liberal construction had been rejected. 'Vhy, it might naturally be asked, were
such cases relegated to bankruptcy laws, nay to actual proceedings in bankruptcy or winding-u;>,-for even the bankruptcy
laws do not meet these cases except in bankruptcy proceedings f
There is nothing either in the letter or in the spirit in the
statute of Elizabeth to require the courts to hold that it has no
application to such cases; and yet it has always been held that
30-Under the bankruptcy law
preferences are important in several connections. It bas seemed de·

sirable to cover here the subject in
all its phases, rather than to aplit
it up.
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the statute of Elizabeth was not a statute touching bankruptcy

or insolvency.

"The explanation of the apparent anomaly sometimes" given,

that a debtor ought to have the right to pay creditor A in pref-

erence to creditor B, if he choose to so, is not satisfactory; for

that is virtually saying that the debtor may defraud B. The

true explanation appears to be that there existed already, at

the time the statute of Elizabeth was passed, an Act of Bank-

ruptcy, and that another Act of the kind was passed iu the very

same year with our statute. Questions of preference of course

fell within either of these other statutes. Still there is reason

to regret that the statute of Elizabeth was not so construed as

to cover all cases of bankruptcy not deemed to be covered by

the bankruptcy laws, such as preferences by an insolvent arising

in other proceedings than those of bankruptcy or winding-up."

Bigelow on Fr. Conv. (Knowlton's ed.) 73, et seq. See also

Shelley v. Boothe, ante, p. 200.

(a) Being Insolvent

In re HINES

144 Fed. 142

[See this case given ante, p. 111.]

(b) Within Four Months

LOESER v. SAVINGS DEPOSIT BANK & TRUST CO.
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148 Fed. 975, 78 C. C. A. 597

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. November 22, 1906)
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the statute of Elizabeth was not a statute touching ba11kruptey
or insolvency.
•'1'he explanation of the apparent anomaly sornetimeS"' given,
that a debtor ought to have the right to pay creditor A in preference to creditor B, if he choose to so, is not satisfactory ; for
that is virtually saying that the debtor may defraud B. The
true explanation appears to be that there existed already, at
the time the statute of Elizabeth was passed, an Act of Bankruptcy, and that another Act of the kind was passed iu the \'ery
same year with our statute. Questions of preference of course
fell within either of these other statutes. Still there is reason
to regret that the statute of Elizabeth was not so construed as
to cover all cases of bankruptcy not deemed to be covered by
the bankruptcy laws, such as preferences by an insolv~nt arising
in other proceedings than those of bankruptcy or winding-up."
Bigelow on Fr. Conv. (Knowlton'& ed.) 73, et seq. See also
, Shelley v. Boothe, ante, p. 200.

LURTON, Circuit Judge. The question in this case is as to

whether Mrs. Chadwick's chattel mortgage securing a past in-

( t1} Being ln1ol1Jettt

debtedness to the Savings Deposit & Trust Company of $37,000

is invalid as a preference under § 60a of the Bankruptcy Law of

July 1, 1898 (30 Stat. 562, c. 541 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p.

In re HINES

3445]), as amended by Act. Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, § 13, 32 Stat.

799 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1905, p. 689].

144 Fpd. 142

This mortgage was made April 27, 1904. By an agreement

between the parties it was withheld from record until November

[See this case given ante, p. 111.]

22, 1904, on which day the mortgagee took actual possession of

the mortgaged property and put the mortgage to record. On

(b) With.in Four Months

I December 1, 1904, proceedings in bankruptcy were begun against

LOESER v. SAVINGS DEPOSIT BANK & TRUST CO.
148 Fed. 975, 78 C. C. A. 597
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. November 22, 1906)
LURTON, Circuit Judge. The question in this case is as to
whether Mrs. Chadwick's chattel mortgage securing a past iudP.btedness to the Savings Deposit & Trust Company of $37,000
is invalid as a preference under § 60a of the Bankruptcy Law of
July 1, 1898 (30 Stat. 562, c. 541 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p.
3445]), as amended by Act. Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, § 13, 32 Stat.
799 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1905, p. 689].
This mortgage was made April 27, 1904. By an agreement
between the parties it was withheld from record until November
22, 1904, on which day the mortgagee took actual possession of
! he mortgaged property and put the mortgage to record. On
Uccember 1, 1904, proceedings in bankruptcy were begun against

PREFERENCES 249

PREFERENCES

249

Mrs. Chadwick, and in due course she was adjudged a bankrupt.

By agreement the mortgaged property was placed in the hands

of the bankrupt receiver for purpose of sale, the rights of the

mortgagee in the fund to be reserved and adjudicated by the

court. Thereupon the bankrupt trustee filed a petition attack-

ing the mortgage as a preference voidable under the bankrupt

law. The bank consented to the jurisdiction and entered its

appearance, and filed a cross-petition asserting its right to en-

force the lien of its said mortgage, and that its claim, when

determined, be awarded priority by virtue of the lien of its

said mortgage against the fund in the possession of the court,

t lie proceeds of the sale by the trustee of the chattels covered

by the mortgage. The District Court denied this relief, and the

cross-petitioner has appealed. The property mortgaged included

Mrs. Chadwick's entire chattel estate, and consisted of house-

hold furniture, china, bric-a-brac, pictures, jewels, an automo-

bile, and all chattels in her residence on Euclid avenue,

Cleveland, and in her barns.

The transcript recites that it was conceded by the mortgagee

bank on the hearing below:

"That at the time the chattel mortgage was executed by

Cassie L. Chadwick, to-wit: April 27, 1904, and delivered to

J. C. Hill, its president, that said Cassie L. Chadwick was
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insolvent, and that said J. C. Hill as president of said bank had

reasonable cause to believe at that time that she was insolvent

and that such condition existed on the 22d day of November,

1904. It also appeared from the evidence that the effect of

enforcing such chattel mortgage, if held valid, will be to enable

said bank to obtain a greater percentage of its debt than any

other of the bankrupt creditors of the same class."

The concession brings this transfer squarely within the defi-

nition of a voidable preference, provided it was such a transfer

as under the law of Ohio was "required" to be recorded within

the meaning of § 60a of the bankrupt law of 1898 as amended

by the act of February 5, 1903. District Judge Tayler, who

heard this case in the court below, was of opinion that under

the laws of Ohio, the state wherein the mortgaged property was

situated, a chattel mortgage is not "required" to be recorded

within the meaning of the amendment referred to, and that the

preference related to the date of the actual execution of the

transfer, and was, therefore, valid as a preference made more

than four months before the filing of the petition. To support

:\I rs. Chadwick, and in due course she was adjudged a bankrupt.
By agreemer.t the mortgaged property was placed in the hands
of the bankrupt receiver for purpose of sale, the rights of the
mortgagee in the fund to he reserved and adjudicated by the
t·uurt. Tlll~rcupon the bankrupt trustee filed a petition attacking the mortgage as a preference voidable under the bankrupt
law. The bauk consented to the jurisdiction and entered its
:i ppearance, and filed a cross-petition asserting its right to enforce the lien of its said mortgage, and that its claim, when
determined, be awarded priority by virtue of the lien of its
said mortgage agains~ the fund in the possession of the court,
the proceeds of the sale by the trustee of the chattels covered
by the mortgage. The District Court denied this relief, and the
cross-petitioner has appealed. The property mortgaged included
~Irs. Chadwick's entire chattel estate, and consisted of household furniture, china, bric-a-brac, pictures, jewels, an automobile, and all chattels in her residence on Euclid avenue,
Cleveland, and in her barns.
The transcript recites that it was conceded by the mortgagee
bank on the hearing below:
"That at the time the chattel mortgage was executed by
Cassie L. Chadwick, to-wit: April 27, 1904, and delivered to
J. C. Hill, its president, that said Cassie L. Chadwick was
insolvent, and that said J. C. Hill as president of said bank bad
reasonable cause to believe at that time that she was insolvent
and that such condition existed on the 22d day of November,
1904. It also appeared from the evidence that the effect of
enforcing such chattel mortgage, if held valid, will be to enable
said bank to obtain a greater percentage of its debt than _any
other of the bankrupt creditors of the same class.''
The concession brings this transfer squarely within the definition of a voidable preference, provided it was such a transfer
as under the law of Ohio was ''required'' to be recorded within
the meaning of § 60a of the bankrupt law of 1898 as amended
by the act of February 5, 1903. District Judge Tayler, who
heard this case in the court below, was of opinion that under
the laws of Ohio, the state wherein the mortgaged property was
situated, a chattel mortgage is not "required" to be recorded
within the meaning of the amendment referred to, and that the
preference related to the date ' of the actual execution of the
tra!1sfer, and was, therefore, valid as a preference made _more
thaa four months before the filing of the petition. 'ro support
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this conclusion he cites § 4150, Ohio Rev. St. 1906, Francisco v.

Ryan, 54 Ohio St. 307, and In re Shirley, 112 Fed. 301, 50 C. C.

A. 252, as to the validity of an unrecorded chattel mortgage

"not accompanied by an immediate delivery and followed by an

actual and continual change of possession," as against all per-

sons except "creditors of the mortgagor, subsequent purchasers

and mortgagees in good faith." To support the proposition that

an unrecorded lien, good as between the parties under the law

of the state, is good against a bankrupt trustee, if the lien ante-

dates the filing of the petition more than four months, the eases

of Humphrey v. Tatman, 198 U. S. 91, 25 Sup. Ct. 567, 49 L.

ed. 956, and Rogers v. Page et al., 140 Fed. 596, 72 C. C. A. 164,

decided by this court, are cited. As to the construction of

§ 60a before the amendment of 1903, Meyer Brothers Drug Co.

v. Pipkin Drug Co., 136 Fed. 396, 69 C. C. A. 240, an opinion

arising under the recording statute of Texas, and decided by

the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit, is cited as

holding that the law has not been changed by the amendment

of February 5,1903. It must be conceded that, under the settled

law of Ohio, this mortgage was valid without recording, as be-

tween the parties and became good when recorded against all

creditors who had fastened no lien thereon before, questions of

actual fraud in withholding it from record out of the way. It
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must also be conceded that prior to the amendment of the bank-

rupt law by the amending act of February 5, 1903, the pref-

erence, if free from actual fraud, would relate to the date of

the making and delivery of the instrument creating it, and, if

that date was more than four months before the filing of the

petition for adjudication in bankruptcy, the lien would be good

against the trustee. Humphrey v. Tatman and Rogers v. Page

et al., cited above. Both of the cases last cited arose under

preferences given before the amendment of February 5, 1903.

What has been the effect of that amendment? This fact was re-

ferred to by Mr. Ray of the House Judiciary Committee, who

explained the amendment in question, when proposed in Con-

gress, as intended to prevent preferences under unrecorded

instruments given more than four months before the filing of

the petition. Touching this he said:

"By adding to 'A' a clause which shall be equivalent to

that found in § 3B (1) Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 546

[U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3422]. It seems that as § 60A now

stands a preferential mortgage may be given and the creditor

this conclusion he cites § 4150, Ohio Rev. St. 1906, l<'rancisco v.
Ryan, 54 Ohio St. 307, and In re Shirley, 112 Fed. 301, 50 C. C.
A. 252, as to the validity of an unrecorded chattel mortgage
''not accompanied by an immediate delivery and followed by an
actual and continual change of possession,'' as against all persons except "creditors of the mortgagor, subsequent purchasers
and mortgagees in good faith.'' To support the proposition that
an unrecorded lien, good as between the parties under the law
of the state, is good against a bankrupt trustee, if the lien antedates the filing of the petition more than four months, the cases
of Humphrey v. Tatman, 198 U. S. 91, 25 Sup. Ct. 567, 49 L.
ed. 956, and Rogers v. Page et al., 140 Fed. 596, 72 C. C. A. 164,
decided by this court, are cited. As to the construction of
§ 60a before the amendment of 1903, Meyer Brothers Drug Co.
v. Pipkin Drug Co., 136 Fed. 396, 69 C. C. A. 240, an opinion
arising under the recording statute of Texas, and decided by
the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit, is cited as
holding that the law has not been changed by the amendment
of February 5, 1903. It must be conceded that, under the settled
law of Ohio, this mortgage was valid without recording, as betwee11 the parties and became good when recorded against all
creditors who had fastened no lien thereon before, questions of
actual fraud in withholding it from record out of the way. It
inust also be conceded that prior to the amendment of the be.nkrupt law by the amending act of February 5, 1903, the preference, if free from actual fraud, would relate to the date of
the making and delivery of the instrument creating it, and, if
that date was more than four months before the filing of the
petition for adjudication in bankruptcy, the lien would be good
against the trustee. Humphrey v. Tatman and Rogers v. Page
et al., ei ted tt hove. Both of the cases last cited arose under
preferences given before the amendment of February 5, 1903.
What has been the effect of that amendment? This fact was referred to hy l\Ir. Ray of the House J udieiary Committee, who
explained the amendment in question, when proposed in Congress, as intended to prevent preferences under unrecorded
instruments given more than four mouths before the filing of
the petition. Touching this he said :
''By adding to 'A' a clause which shall be equivalent to
that found in § 3B (1) Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 546
[U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3422]. It seems that as § 60A now
stands a preferential mortgage may be given and the creditor
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preferred, by withholding it from record four months be able

to dismiss the trustee suit to recover the same though the paper

was actually recorded within the four months period. See In re

Wright (D. C. Ga.) 96 Fed. 187; In re Mersman (N. Y.) 7 Am.

Bankr. Rep. 46." Volume 35, part. 7, Cong. Record, 6,943.

Before this amendment § 60a read as follows:

"A person shall be deemed to have given a preference if,

being insolvent, he has procured or suffered a judgment to be

entered against himself in favor of any person, or made a trans-

fer of any of his property, and the effect of the enforcement of

such judgment or transfer will be to enable any one of his cred-

itors to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any other

of such creditors of the same class."

This section, in its original form, was construed in the cases

of Humphrey v. Tatman and Rogers v. Page et al., cited above,

and in several other reported cases as avoiding no preference

which originated under an unrecorded transfer made more than

four months before the beginning of bankruptcy proceedings

against the maker. Subsequently Mr. Ray became district judge

for the Northern District of New York, and in the case styled

In re Hunt (D. C.) 139 Fed. 283, he quotes from Collier on

Bankruptcy (5th Ed.) p. 453, a statement that the amendment
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as offered added after the word "required" the words "or per-

mitted," and "that the Senate for some reason struck out these

words." Judge Ray, from this history, held that because under

the laws of New York an unrecorded conveyance was good as

against everybody except subsequent purchasers without notice,

that it was not'' required" to be recorded in order to be effectual

against a bankrupt trustee. Independently of this legislative

history, Judge Archbald, in English v. Ross (D. C.) 140 Fed.

630, and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,

in First National Bank v. Connett (C. C. A.) 142 Fed. 33,

reached an opposite conclusion and held that a recording stat-

ute, which required a conveyance or transfer to be recorded to

be effectual against a certain class or classes of persons, was a

law which '' required'' the recording of the transfer in question,

within the meaning of § 60a as amended. With this conclusion

we agree.

Among the reasons which justify this interpretation are these:

(1) A preference which is an act of bankruptcy by § 3

should in an harmonious law be voidable by the trustee. By

that section a transfer made by one "while insolvent" of ary

preferred, by withholding it from record four months he able
to dismiss the trustee suit to recover the same though the paper
was actually recorded within the four months period. See In re
Wright (D. C. Ga.) 96 Fed. 187; In re Mersman (.N. Y:) 7 Am.
Bankr. R~p. 46." Volume 35, part. 7, Cong. Reeord, 6,943.
Before this amendment § 60a read as follows :
"A person shall be deemed to have given a preference if,
being insolvent, he has procured or suffered a judgment to be
entered against himself in favor of any person, or made a trans·
fer of any of his property. and the effect of the enforcement of
sueh judgment or transfer will be to enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater pel"('entage of his debt than any other
of sueh creditors of the same class."
This section, in its origin~ form, was construed in the cases
of Humphrey v. Tatman and Rogers v. Page et al., cited above,
aud in several other reported cases as avoiding no preference
which originated under an unrecorded transfer made more than
four months before the beginning of bankruptcy proceedings
against the maker. Subsequently Mr. Ray became district judge
for the Northern District of New York, and in the case styled
In re Hunt (D. C.) 139 Fed. 283, he quotes from Collier on
Bankruptcy (5th Ed.) p. 453, a statement that the amendment
as offered added after the word ''required'' the words ''or permitted," and "that the Senate for some reason struck out these
words." Judge Ray, from this history, held that because under
the laws of New York an unrecorded conveyance was good as
against everybody except subsequent purchasers without notice,
that it was not "required" to be recorded in order to be effeM:ual
against a bankrupt trustee. Independently of this legislative
history, Judge Archbald, in English v. Ross (D. C.) 140 Fed.
630, and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
in First National Bank v. Connett (C. C. A.) 142 Fed. 33,
reached an opposite conclusion and held that a recording statute, which required a conveyance or transfer to be recorded to
be effectual against a certain class or classes of persons, ·was a
law which "required" the recording of the transfer in question,
within the meaning of § 60a as amended. With this conclusion
we agree.
Among the reasons which justify this interpretation arc> th1'S<>:
( 1) A preference which is an act of bankruptcy by ~ 1
should in an harmonious law be voidable by the trustee. Ry
that section a transfer made by one "while insolvent" of a:·y
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portion of his property to one or more of his creditors "with

intent to prefer such creditors over his other creditors" is made

an act of bankruptcy, and a petition may be filed against such

person "within four months after the commission of such act."

With respect to the date of the commission of such act of bank-

ruptcy, subdivision (1) of the same section provides that the

date from which the four months begins to run shall be "the

date of the recording or registering of the transfer or assignment

when the act consists in having made a transfer of any of his

property * • * for the purpose of giving a preference as

hereinbefore provided, * • * if by law such recording or

registering is required or permitted, or, if it is not, from the

date when the beneficiary takes notorious, exclusive or continu-

ous possession of the property unless the petitioning creditors

have received actual notice of such transfer or assignment." By

§ 60a, a definition of a "preference" is given which under § 3

would constitute an act of bankruptcy and by § 60b, a '' prefer-

ence" so defined is made voidable by the trustee. But, as we

have seen heretofore, §§ 60a and 60b did not make a preference

voidable by the trustee unless the preference, whether under a

recorded or unrecorded instrument, was given within four

months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. Thus a

"preference" under § 3, as denned by § 60a, might constitute

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

an act of bankruptcy and justify an adjudication if given by an

unrecorded instrument more than four months prior to bank-

ruptcy and the preference itself be enforced as a perfectly valid

act. The plain purpose of the amendment of § 60a was to bring

it into harmony with § 3, by making the same period of time the

test as to whether a preference may be avoided by the trustee,

under the former, or may constitute an act of bankruptcy under

the latter. The construction given to § 3 should be carried for-

ward and given to § 60a as amended; thus bringing them into

consistent relations. "The two," said Judge Archbald, in Eng-

lish v. Ross, cited above, "are intimately related, the one in this

particular being the basis of and dominating the other, and it is

the failure to realize this and to draw them together as they

should be that is responsible for any misapprehension. What

is thus 'required' in the way of recording in the one is also

'required' as a conveyance in the other and for the same

purpose.''

(2) The evil to be corrected was that of secret preferences,

given by withholding from record instruments which by the

portion of his property to one or more of his creditors '' with
intent to prefer such creditors over his other creditors'' is made
an act of bankruptcy, and a petition may be filed against such
person ''within four months after the commission of such act. ''
With respect to the date of the commission of such act of bankruptcy, subdivision (1) of the same section provides that the
date from which the four mooths begins to run shall be ''the
date of the recording or registering of the transfer or assignment
when the act consists in havink made a transfer of any of his
property • • • for the purpoee of giving a preference as
hereinbefore provided, • • • if by law such recording or
registering is required or permitted, or, if it is not, from the
date when the beneficiary takes notorious, exclll8ive or continuous possession of the property unleJIS the petitioning creditors
have received actual notice of such transfer or assignment." By
§ 60a, a definition of a ''preference'' is given which under § 3
would coll8titute an act of bankruptcy and by § 60b, a ''preference"' so defined is made voidable by the trustee. But, 88 we
have seen heretofore, § § 60a and 60b did not make a preference
voidable by the trustee unless the preference, whether under a
recorded or unrecorded instrument, was given within four
months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. Thus a
''prefere nee'' under § 3, as defined by § 60a, might constitute
an act of bankruptcy and justify an adjudication if given by an
unrecorded instrument more than. four months prior to bankruptcy and the preference itself be enforced as a perfectly valid
act. The plain purpose of the amendment of § 60a was to bring
it into harmony with § 3, by making the same period of time the
test as to whether a preference may be avoided by the trustee,
under the former, or may constitute an act of bankruptcy under
the latter. The construction given to § 3 should be carried forward and given to § 60a as amended; thus bringing them into
consistent relations. "The two," said Judge Archbald, in English v. Ross, cited above, "are intimately related, the one in this
particular being the basis of and dominating the other, and it is
the failure to realize this and to draw them together 88 they
· should he that is responsible for any misapprehension. What
is thus 'required' in the way of recording in the one is also
'required' as a conveyance in the other and for the same
purpose. ''
(2) The evil to be corrected was that of secret preferences,
given by withholding from record instruments which by the

PREFERENCES

253

PREFERENCES

253

whole policy of recording statutes should be recorded. This evil

was pointed out by the author of the amendatory act of 1903

and the object of the amendment of 60a was stated to be the

remedying of this evil. The law, as it stood, encouraged such

secret liens and preferences, for, if they could be concealed for

four months, though acts of bankruptcy, they were not voidable

by the trustee. If we say that unless the law of the state where

the transfer is made makes void all such transfers as to all the

world, that it is not a law which "requires" recording, the evil

will continue and judges will continue to bewail the iniquity of

a law which makes such a secret transfer an act of bankruptcy

and yet holds the preference valid against the bankrupt's estate

because made more than four months before starting bankrupt

proceedings against the maker. See the lament of Judge Ray

In re Hunt, 139 Fed. 286, 287.

(3) Some effect should be given to the amendment of § 60a

if the language of the provision will permit. If "required" be

construed as applying only to a law which makes every such

transfer absolutely void as to all persons, the amendment will

be of no effect, for no recording statute, of which we have any

knowledge, makes void transfers or conveyances as between the

parties and all of them give effect to such instruments as against
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some classes of persons having actual notice. The amendment

would be idle, and the evil sought to be remedied would flourish

as before and the legislative purpose be frustrated.

(4) In view of all of the foregoing considerations, we reach

the conclusion that the word "required," as used in the amend-

ment, refers to the character of the instrument giving the pref-

erence or making the transfer, without reference" to the fact that

as to certain persons or classes of persons it may be good or bad

according to circumstances. If to be valid against certain classes

of persons, the law of the state '' requires'' the constructive notice

of registration it is a transfer which under the amendment is

"required" to be recorded. This takes account of the purpose

and policy of recording acts, remedies the evil which flourished

under the law before the amendment, gives effect to the plain

purpose of Congress, and gives some effect and force to a pro-

vision which would otherwise be meaningless, and brings § 3

and 60a and 60b into harmony of purpose and meaning.

(5) We do not ignore the argument that in § 3 the word "re-

quired" is followed by the words "or permitted," and that the

latter words are omitted from the amendment, and that the

whole policy of recording statutes should be recorded. This evil
was pointed out by the author of the amend.atory act of 1UOJ
a 11d the object of the amendment of 60a was stated to be the
remedying of this evil. The law, as it stood, encouraged such
secret liens and preferences, for, if they could be concealed for
four months, though acts of bankruptcy, they were not voidable
by the trustee. If we say that unless the law of the state where
the transfer is made makes void all such transfers as to all the
world, that it is not a law which "requires" recording, the evil
will continue and judges will continue to bewail the iniquity of
a law which makes such a secret transfer an act of bankruptcy
and yet holds the preference valid against the bankrupt's estate
because made more than four months before starting bankrupt
proceedings against the maker. See the lament of Judge Ray
In re Hunt, 139 Fed. 286, 287.
( 3) Some effect should be given to the amendment of § 60a
if the language of the provision will permit. If "required" be
construed as applying only to a law which makes every such
transfer absolutely void as to all persons, the amendment will
be of no effect, for no recording statute, of which we have any
knowledge, makes void transfers or conveyances as between the
parties and all of them give effect to such instruments as against
some classes of persons having actual notice. The amendment
would be idle, and the evil sought to be remedied would flourish
as before and the legislative purpose be frustrated.
( 4) In view of all of the foregoing considerations, we reach
the conclusion th.at the word ''required,'' as used in the amendment, refers to the character of the instrument giving the preference or making the transfer, without reference· to the fact that
as to certain persons or classes of persons it may be good or bad
according to circumstances. If to be valid against certain classes
of persons, the law of the state ''requires'' the constructive notice
of registration it is a transfer which under the amendment is
''required'' to be recorded. This takes account of the purpose
and policy of recording acts, remedies the evil which flourished
under the law before the amendment, gives effect to the plain
purpose of Congress, and gives some effect and force to a provision which would otherwise be meaningless, and brings § 3
and 60a and 60b into harmony of purpose and meaning.
( 5) We do not ignore the argument th.at in § 3 the word ''required'' is followed by the words ''or permitted,'' and that the
latter words are omitted from the amendment, and that the
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words "or permitted" were in the act as introduced by the

author of the bill and retained in the amendment as it passed

the House, but was dropped in the Senate.

It is a fact of which we may take notice that it is common to

recording statutes to set out a list of contracts, conveyances, and

transfers which may be registered, or as "entitled" or '-permit-

ted" registration. But, if an instrument is not "entitled" or

"permitted" by law to be recorded, its record is of no effect as

constructive notice. The effect of recording statutes is limited

to such instruments as the statute permits record of. Burck v.

Taylor, 152 U. S. 634, 14 Sup. Ct. 696, 38 L. ed. 578; Lynch v.

Murphy, 161 U. S. 247, 16 Sup. Ct. 523, 40 L. ed. 688; Blake v.

Graham, 6 Ohio St. 580, 67 Am. Dec. 360; 24 Encyclopedia of

Law, p. 142, and cases cited. The Ohio statute concerning the

recording of chattel mortgages does not require that such mort-

gages shall be recorded in order to be valid as against the parties

or purchasers with notice. Only creditors and purchasers with-

out notice can ignore an unrecorded chattel mortgage, and they

cannot do so if there immediately followed a delivery and no-

torious change of possession. Yet the mortgagor or mortgagee

is entitled or "permitted" to record the instrument, though not

essential to its validity as against certain classes of persons.

We conclude from the general purpose and policy of record-
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ing statutes that the words '' or permitted'' are of no vital signi-

fication in § 3. If the instrument giving the preference is one

which is "permitted" to be recorded in order to give it validity

as against certain classes of persons, though perfectly valid with-

out record as to other classes, it is an instrument '' required'' to

be recorded within the meaning of the word as there used. The

words "required" and "permitted" in the connection used are

of synonymous legal meaning. The dropping of the words "or

permitted" by the Senate is, therefore, of no vital signification

if we are right in regarding § 3 and § 60a as closely connected

provisions. It is only in extremely doubtful matters of interpre-

tation that the legislative history of an act of Congress becomes

important. If the word "required," as used in §§ 3 and 60a, is

used as referring to the character of the instrument giving the

preference, and not as to the persons as between whom it may be

valid without recording or the persons as to whom it is void

for failure to record, the words "or permitted" in § 3 were

surplusage, and the Senate might well omit them from the

amendment, the plain purpose being to tie the two provisions

words ''or permitted'' were in the act as introduced by the
author of the hill and retained in the amendment as it passed
the House, but was dropped in the Senate.
It is a fact of which we may take notice that it is common to
recording statutes to set out a. list of contracts, conveyances, and
transfers which may be registered, or as ''entitled'' or '·permitted" registration. But, if an instrument is not "entitled" or
''permitted'' by law to be recorded, its record is of no effect as
constructive notice. The effect of recording statutes is limited
to such instruments as the statute permits record of. Burck v.
Taylor, 152 U. S. 634, 14 Sup. Ct. 696, 38 L. ed. 578; Lynch v.
Murphy, 161 U. S. 247, 16 Sup. Ct. 523, 40 L. ed. 688; Blake v.
Graham, 6 Ohio St. 580, 67 Am. Dec. 360; 24 Encyclopedia of
Law, p. 142, and cases cited. The Ohio statute concerning the
recording of chattel mortgages does not require that such mortgages shall be recorded in order to be valid as against the parties
or purchasers with notice. Only creditors and purchasers without notice can ignore an unrecorded chattel mortgage, and they
cannot do so if there immediately followed a delivery and notorious change of possession. Yet the mortgagor or mortgagee
is entitled or ''permitted'' to record the instrument, though not
essential to its validity as against certain classes of persons.
We conclude from the general purpose and policy of recording statutes that the words ''or permitted'' are of no vital signification in § 3. If the instrument giving the preference is one
which is ''permitted'' to be recorded in order to give it validity
as against certain classes of persons, though perfectly valid without record as to other classes, it is an instrument ''required'' to
be recorded within the meaning of the word as there used. The
WOrds ''required I I and 11 permitted I I in the Connection Used are
of synonymous legal meaning. The dropping of the words "or
permitted'' by the Senate is, therefore, of no vital signification
if we are right in regarding § 3 and § 60a as closely connected
provisions. It is only in extremely doubtful matters of interpretation that the legislative history of an act of Congress becomes
important. If the word "required,'' as used in§§ 3 and 60a, is
used as referring to the character of the. instrument giving the
preference, and not as to the persons as between whom it may be
valid without recording or the persons as to whom it is void
for failure to record, the words "or permitted" in § 3 were
surplusage, nnd the Senate might well omit them from the
amendment, the plain purpose being to tie the two provisions
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together. Why they were omitted from the bill as it finally

passed we can only conjecture. If they had been retained, no

one would question that the amendment made the preference,

constituting an act of bankruptcy by § 3, voidable by the trustee

under §§ 60a and 60b. To say that this plain purpose has failed

because "or permitted" was inserted by one house and stricken

out by the other, would be to make nothing of the amendment.

We should so construe the act as to give it vitality if the words

of the act will permit.

Under § 4150, Rev. St. Ohio 1906, a mortgage of chattels, not

followed by immediate delivery and no actual and notorious

change of possession, is "required" to be recorded. Otherwise

it is invalid as to some persons and valid as to others. That such

a mortgage is "required" by the law of Ohio to be recorded

within the meaning of § 60a as amended, we have no doubt.

»*•

The decree of the court below must be reversed, and the case

remanded, with direction to proceed in accordance with this

opinion.

In re BECKHAUS

RASMUSSEN v. McKEY

177 Fed. 141, 100 C. C. A. 561

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. January 4, 1910)

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

In October, 1907, Beckhaus was adjudged a bankrupt, and

respondent came into possession of property consisting of a stock

of merchandise, fixtures, book accounts, etc., as the property of

the bankrupt. Rasmussen, petitioner here, filed a petition in the

together. Why they were omitted from the bill as it finally
passed we can only conjecture. If they had been retained, no
one would question that the amendment made the preference,
constituting an act of bankruptcy by § 3, voidable by the trustee
under §§ 60a and 60b. To say that this plain purpose has failed
because ''or permitted'' was inserted by one house and stricken
out by the other, would be to make nothing of the amendment.
We should so coll8true the act as to give it vitality if the words
of the act will permit.
Under § 4150, Rev. St. Ohio 1906, a mortgage of chattels, not
followed by immediate delivery and no 11ctual and notorious
change of possession, is ''required'' to be recorded. Otherwise
it is invalid as to some persons and valid as to others. That such
a mortgage is ''required'' by the law of Ohio to be recorded
within the meaning of § 60a as amended, we have no doubt.

• • •

The decree of the court below must be reversed, and the case
remanded, with direction to proceed in accordance with th~s
opinion.

District Court, asking that respondent be ordered to surrender

the property to the petitioner. The petition was based on a

written agreement entered into on March 6, 1907, by Beckhaus,

of the first part, Rasmussen, of the second part, and certain of

the pre-existing creditors of Beckhaus, of the third part, whereby

In re BECK1HAUS
RASMUSSEN v. McKEY

Beckhaus transferred the property to Rasmussen to hold, use,

and ultimately dispose of for the benefit of the first and third

177 Fed. 141, 100 C. C. A. 561

parties. On issues joined the District Court found that on

March 6, 1907, at and before the time the agreement was made,

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. January 4, 1910)

Reckhaus was insolvent, and so remained; that the agreement

was never recorded; that Rasmussen never took notorious, ex-

clusive, or continuous possession of the property, but Beckhaus

In October, 1907, Beckhaus was adjudged a bankrupt, and
respondent came into possession of property consisting of a stock
of merchandise, fixtures, book accounts, etc., as the property of
the bankrupt. Rasmussen, petitioner here, filed a petition in the
District Court, asking that respondent be ordered to surrender
the property to the petitioner. The petition was based on a
written agreement entered into on l\larch 6, 1907, by Beckhaus,
of the first part, Rasmussen, of the second part, and certain of
the pre-existing creditors of Ileckhaus, of the third part, whereby
Beckhaus transferred the property to Rasmussen to hold, use,
and ultimately dispose of for the benefit of the first and third
partil.'s. On issues joined the District Court found that on
March 6, 1907, at and before the time the agreement was made,
BP.ckhaus was insolvent, and so remained; that the agreement
wns never recorded; that Rasmussen never took notorious, ex(·lusive, or continuous possession of the property, but Beekhaus
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was permitted to remain, and did remain^ in possession until the

petition in bankruptcy was filed and respondent came into pos

session, first as receiver, and then as trustee; that Beckhans

intended to prefer said third parties, and said third parties had

reasonable cause to believe that Beckhaus intended by such

transfer to give them a preference; and that the effect of the

enforcement of such transfer would be to enable said third par-

ties as creditors of Beckhaus to obtain a greater percentage of

their debts than any other of Beckhaus's creditors of the same

class. Being of the opinion that the agreement of transfer,

within the meaning of § 60a of the bankruptcy act (Act July 1,

1898, c. 541, 30 Stat . 562 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3445]), as

amended in 1903 (Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, § 13, 32 Stat. 799

[U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 1314]), was "required" to be

recorded under the law of Illinois, the District Court adjudged

that the petitioner take nothing. • * •

§ 1, c. 95, 2 Starr & C. Ann. St. Ill.: "Be it enacted by the

people of the state of Illinois, represented in the General As-

sembly, that no mortgage, trust deed or other conveyance of

personal property having the effect of a mortgage or lien upon

such property, shall be valid as against the rights and interests

of any third person, unless possession thereof shall be delivered

to and remain with the grantee, or the instrument shall provide
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for the possession of the property to remain with the grantor,

and the instrument is acknowledged and recorded as hereinbe-

fore directed; and every such instrument shall, for the purposes

of this act, be deemed a chattel mortgage."

BAKER, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

1. On the basis that the Illinois statute, as construed by the

courts of the state, does not declare unrecorded chattel mort-

gages void except as against the rights arid interests of innocent

purchasers or mortgagees and attachment or execution cred:

itors; that no such "third person" is concerned in these proceed-

ings; and that the respondent has no standing except as the

representative of the bankrupt and his general creditors, against

whom an unrecorded chattel mortgage is valid—the petitioner

contends that the contract here involved (considered as the

equivalent of an unrecorded chattel mortgage), having been

'

was permitted to remain, and did remain\ in possession until the
petition in bankruptcy was filed and respondent came into possession, first as receiver, and then as trustee; that Beckham;
intended to prefer said third parties, and said third parties had
reasonable cause to believe that Beckhaus intended by sUt·h
transfer to give them a preference ; and that the effect of the
enforcement of such transfer would be to enable said third parties as creditors of Beckhaus to obtain a greater percentage of
their debts than any other of Beckhaus 's creditors of the same
class. Being of the opinion that the agreement of transfer,
within the meaning of § 60a of the bankruptcy act (Act July 1,
1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 562 [ U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3445]), as
amended in 1903 (Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, § 13, 32 Stat. 799
[U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 1314]), was "required" to be
recorded under the law of Illinois, the District Court adjudged
that the petitioner take nothing. • • •
§ 1, c. 95, 2 Starr & C. Ann. St. Ill.: ''Be it enact.ed by the
people of the state of Illinois, represented in the General Assem bly, that no mortgage, trust deed or other conveyance of
personal property having the effect of a mortgage or lien upon
such property, shall be valid as against the rights and intel'e6ta
of any third person, unless possession thereof shall be delivered
to and remain with the grantee, or the instrument shall provide
for the posse.ssion of the property to remain with the grantor,
and the instrument is acknowledged and recorded .as hereinbefore directed; and every such instrument shall, for the purposes
of this act, be deemed a chattel mortgage.''

executed over four months before the petition in bankruptcy

was filed, cannot be assailed by the respondent as a voidable

BAKER, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above) .
1. Ou the basis that the Illinois statute, as construed by the

courts of the state, does not declare unrecorded chattel mortgages void except as against the rights arid interests of innocent
purchasers or mortgagees and attachment or execution creel~
itors; that no such ''third person'' is concerned in these proceedings; and that the respondent has no standing except 88 the
representative of the bankrupt and his general creditors, against
whom an unrecorded chattel mortgage is valid-the petitioner
contends that the contract here involved (considered 88 the
<'qnivalent of an unrecorded chattel mortgage), having been
executed over four months before the petition in bankruptcy
was filed, cannot be assailed by the respondent as a voidable
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preference, because it was not "required by law" to be recorded

within the meaning of amended § 60a.

The contention mainly rests on a comparison of original § 3b

with the history of the amendment to § 60a. § 3b provided that

the four months within which an act of bankruptcy was avail-

able as the basis of a petition against an insolvent should "not

expire until four months after the date of the recording, or

registering of the transfer • * * when the act consists in

having made a transfer * * * for the purpose of giving a

preference * • • if by law such recording or registering is

required or permitted, or, if it is not, from the date when the

beneficiary takes notorious, exclusive or continuous possession

of the property." The last sentence of § 60a, "Where the pref-

erence," etc., was added by the amendment of 1903. As passed

by the House the sentence did not end with "required." The

continuation was "or permitted, or, if it is not, from the date

when the beneficiary takes notorious, exclusive, or continuous

possession of the property transferred.'' These last-quoted words

were stricken out by the Senate. Inasmuch as the present case

does not involve "possession," but turns wholly upon "record-

ing," the inquiry is limited to the effect of the excision of the

words "or permitted" after "required"; and the particular
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question concerns the soundness of the petitioner's proposition

that such excision compels a construction of the amendment as

adopted, whereby a chattel mortgage, which a trustee in bank-

ruptcy is assailing as a voidable preference, is not required to be

recorded unless an examination of the local law shows that the

chattel mortgage, to be impregnable, must be recorded as notice

to the persons presently represented by the trustee.

If, as we are inclined to believe, the Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit, in In re Loeser (148 Fed. 975), was correct in

concluding that "the words 'required' and 'permitted' in the

connection used are of synonymous legal meaning," no effect

could be attributed to the dropping of the redundant word.

If they are not synonymous, the omission of "permitted"

does not imply inevitably (on the basis that no other inference

can fairly be drawn) that the lawmakers intended that "re-

quired" should be qualified or limited to less than it would have

meant if the clause in § 3b and in the original draft of the amend-

ment to § 60a had ended with "required"; for Congress may

well have conceived that an insolvent debtor and a diligent cred-

itor were not necessarily to be dealt with in the same way. That

H. 4 A. Bankruptcy—17

preference, because it was not "required by law" to be recorded
within the me~ning of amended § 60a.
The contention mainly rests on a comparison of original § 3b
with the history of the amendment to § 60a. § 3b provided that
the four months within which an act of bankruptcy was available as the basis of a petition against an insolvent should ''not
expire until four months after the date of the recording, or
registering of the transfer • • • when the act consists in
having made a transfer • • • fOI" the purpose of giving a
preference • • • if by law such recording or registering is
required or permitted, or, if it is not, from the date when the
beneficiary takes notorious, exclusive or continuous possession
of the property." The last sentence of § 60a, "Where the preference,'' etc., was added by the amendment of 1903. As passed
by the House the sentence did not end with "required." The
continuation was ''or permitted, or, if it is not, from the date
when the beneficiary takes notorious, exclusive, or continuous
p088e.ssion of the property transferred.'' These last-quoted words
were stricken out by the Senate. Inasmuch as the present case
does not involve ''possession,'' but turns wholly upon ''recording,'' the inquiry is limited to the effect of. the excision of the
words ''or permitted'' after ''required'' ; and the particular
question concerns the soundness of the petitioner's proposition
that such excision compels a construction of the amendment as
adopted, whereby a chattel mortgage, which a trustee in bankruptcy is assailing as a voidable preference, is not required to be
recorded unless an examination of the local law shows that the
chattel mortgage, to be impregnable, must be recorded as notice
to the persons presently represented by the trustee.
If, as we are inclined to believe, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, in In re Loeser (148 Fed. 975), was correct in
concluding that "the words 'required' and 'permitted' in the
connection used are of synonymous legal meaning,'' no effect
could be attributed to the dropping of the redundant word.
If they are not synonymous, the omission of "permitted"
does not imply inevitably (on the basis that no other inference
can fairly be drawn) that the lawmakers intended that "required" should be qualified or limited to less than it would have
meant if the clause in § 3b and in the original draft of the amendment to § 60a had ended with ''required'' ; for Congress may
well have conceived that an insolvent debtor and a diligent creditor were not necessarily to be dealt with in the same way. That
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is, in the interest of fair and open dealing by those who do busi-

ness on credit, it might have been thought that an insolvent

debtor who does not cause a chattel mortgage given to some of

his creditors, to the exclusion of others, to be recorded, whether

recording be "required" or only "permitted" by the local law,

should be liable to be thrown into bankruptcy; while the diligent

creditor (diligence being usually favored in the law) should be

permitted, after four months, to retain his security, if on tak-

ing it he did all the law "required." See Little v. Hardware

Co. (133 Fed. 874).

Whether the words be deemed synonymous or not, the drop-

ping of '' permitted'' only eliminated whatever idea pertained to

that word—it could not affect "required," for "required""

stands full and untouched, without adverb or clause to cut it

down. The primal canon of statutory construction is that the

language actually used be given its full and fair meaning, that

unqualified words be taken without qualification, and that in th-?

absence of ambiguity extraneous matters be not considered. Un-

der this canon probably nothing more can profitably be saitl

than, if recording is required, it is required. If required for

any purpose, or without purpose, how can it be said to be not

required? If recording be not required, unless required for all

purposes, it could never be said to be required where the instru-
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ment is valid between the immediate parties without recording.

We are further restrained by what seems to us to be the absurd

consequences of any other ruling. If a good-faith second mort-

gage had been taken, then according to the petitioner's theory

the trustee could avoid the preference. But if, as is frequently

the case, each mortgage was large enough to exhaust the mort-

gaged property, why should the trustee consume the free assets

in his hands in carrying on one end of a lawsuit between the

mortgagees? The trustee could gain nothing for the general

creditors whichever way the litigation ended, but would be spend-

ing their pittances to benefit a preferred creditor. The same

would be true even if the recorded second mortgage was less than

the value of the mortgaged property; for, on the hypothesis that

the trustee has no right to resist the unrecorded first mortgage

on behalf of the general creditors, the surplus above the second

mortgage would have to be applied upon the first mortgage.

Preferential mortgagees and lienholders are "adverse claim-

ants," entitled to have their rights determined in plenary suits.

They seek to withhold or diminish the fund which otherwise

is, in the interest of fair and open dealing by those who do business on credit, it might have been thought that an insolvent
debtor who does not cause a chattel mortgage given to some of
his creditors, to the exclusion of others, to be recorded, whether
recording be "required" or only "permitted" by the local law,
should be liable to be thrown into bankruptcy; while the diligent
creditor (diligence being usil&lly favored in the law) should be
permitted, after four months, to retain his security, if on taking it he did all the law "required." See Little v. Hardware
Co. (133 Fed. 874).
·whether the words be deemed synonymous or not, the dropping of" permitted" only eliminated whatever idea pertaiued t<•
that word-it could not affect ''required,'' for ''required ' ·
stands full and untouched, without adverb or clause to cut it
down. The primal canon of statutory construction is that tht.>
language actually used be given its full and fair meaning, that
unqualified words be taken without qualification, and that in tlH'
· absence of ambiguity extraneous matters be not considered. Under this canon probably nothing more can profitably be said
than, if recording is required, it is required. If required for
any purpose, or without purpose, bow can it be said to be not
required 7 If recording be not required, unless required for all
purposes, it could never be said to be required where the instrument is valid between the immediate parties without recording.
\Ve are further restrained by what seems to us to be the absurd
consequences of any other ruling. If a good-faith second mortgage had been taken, then according to the petitioner's theory
the trustee could avoid the preference. But if, as is frequently
the case, each mortgage was large enough to exhaust the mort"
gaged property, why should the trustee consume the free assets
in his hands in carrying on one end of a lawsuit between the
mortgagees f The trustee could gain nothing for the general
creditors whichever way the litigation ended, but would be spending their pittances to benefit a preferred creditor. The same
would be true even if the recorded second mortgage was less than
the value of the mortgaged property; for, on the hypothesis that
the trustee has no right to resist the unrecorded first mortgage
on behalf of the general creditors, the surplus above the second
mortgage would have to be applied upon the first mortgage.
Prcf1~re11tial mortgag(•es and lienhol<lers are "'adverse claimants," entitl~d to havP th1~ir rights determined in plenary suits.
They seek to withhold or diminish the fund which otherwise
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would be shared among the general creditors, and the general

creditors are in fact interested in resisting that reduction. Now

if the trustee may not assail preferences except in favor of one

preferred creditor as against another, and if the general cred-

itors have no interest in such contests except to pray that their

fund be not therein completely consumed in costs and fees, the

amendment to § 60a not merely failed to accomplish any bene-

fit—it brought about a positive injustice.

When the amended section is read against the background of

the nature and purpose of the act, our interpretation, we be-

lieve, is confirmed. The act is a national act. It practically

supplants the state insolvency laws. We think it clear that Con-

gress recognized the vast sweep of interstate commerce and meant

to free interstate traders from the confusion and harassment

attendant upon a multiplicity of variant local laws. Therefore

the act in all its parts ought to be interpreted in a national view,

doing away as far as possible with the variances in the local

laws. To release an insolvent debtor from his debts is an act of

grace. Through the whole law runs the clear purpose of extend-

ing grace only to honest debtors. Honesty, fairness, equity is

the whole spirit of the law. Nothing is more abhorrent to equity

than deceitful appearances covering secret preferences. So the

diligent creditor who obtains security must not help the debtor
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to be dishonest, unfair, secretive; he can hold his security only

on condition that he give his fellow creditors a four-months op-

portunity to determine whether or not they will file a petition

in bankruptcy against the debtor. The openness and fairness

of the preferred creditor are made the terms upon which he may

retain his preference. In this view the only inquiry is: Does

the local law require instruments of the kind in question to be

recorded? There is no need of further investigation into the

scope or purposes of the local law. There is no concern whether

or not the trustee represents innocent purchasers, mortgagees,

attachment or execution creditors. No issue is to be made with

respect to the validity of the lien claims supposed to be repre-

sented by the trustee. § 60b, which authorizes the trustee to

"recover the property or its value," says nothing about the rep-

resentation of the trustee. It is enough on this point that the

trustee is trustee, and that the preferred creditor has failed to

record the instrument of transfer, if by the local law instru-

ments of that kind are required for any purpose to be recorded.

would be shared among the general creditors, and the general
creditors are in fact interested in resisting that reduction. Now
if the trustee may not assail preferences except in favor of one
preferred creditor as against another, and if the general creditors have no interest in such contests except tQ pray that their
fund be not therein completely consumed in costs and fees, the
amendment to § 60a not merely failed to accomplish any benefit-it brought about a positive injustice.
\Vhen the amended section is read against the background of
the nature and purpose of the act, our interpretation, we believe, is confirmed. The act is a national act. It practically
supplants the state insolvency laws. Vl e think it clear that Congress recognized the vast sweep of interstate commerce and meant
to free interstate traders from the confusion and harassment ·
attendant upon a multiplicity of variant local laws. Therefore
thE> act in all its parts ought to be interpreted in a national view,
doing away as far as possible with the variances in the local
laws. To release an insolvent debtor from his debts is an act of
grace. Through the whole law runs the clear purpose of extending grace only to honest debtors. Honesty, fairness, equity is
the whole spirit of the law. Nothing is more abhorrent to equity
than deceitful appearances covering secret preferences. So the
diligent creditor who obtains security must not help the debtor
to be dishonest, unfair, secretive; he can hold his security only
on condition that he give his fellow creditors a four-months opportunity to determine whether or not they will file a petition
in bankruptcy against the debtor. The openness and fairness
of the preferred creditor are made the terms upon which he may
retain his preference. In this view the only inquiry is: Does
the local la.w require instruments of the kind in question to be
re~orded 7 There is no need of further investigation into the
scope or purposes of the local law. There is no concern whether
or not the trustee represents innocent purchasers, mortgagees,
attachment or execution creditors. No issue is to be made with
respect to the validity of the lien claims supposed to be rPpresented by the trustee. § 60b, which authorizes the trustee to
"recover the property or its value," says nothing about the representation of the trustee. It is enough on this point that the
trnstee is trustee, and that the preferred creditor has failed to
record the instrument of transfer, if by the local law instruments of that kind are required for any purpose to be recorded.
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Only by this interpretation can this national law be administered

with anything like uniformity respecting preferences.

2. Even if the true interpretation of § 60a compelled us to

decide this case upon the meaning of the Illinois statute, with

due regard to the construction thereof by the Illinois courts, we

could not agree with the petitioner.

Recording a mortgage of chattels left in the possession of the

mortgagor is required "as against the rights and interests of

any third person." The term "third person" is broad enough

to include everybody outside of the immediate parties to the

instrument and their privies. A simple contract creditor who

has not obtained a judgment is just as much a "third person,"

is just as much a stranger to the mortgage, as is the simple con-

tract creditor who has obtained a judgment. Both have the right

to enforce payment, if that oan be done. The interests of both

are prejudiced if the debtor's property is covered by a fraudu-

lent transfer. If at the time of the fraudulent transfer one

creditor has obtained a judgment and the other has not, the only

difference is that one has proceeded farther than the other in

the enforcement of his rights and the protection of his interests.

And when it is said that a fraudulent transfer is void only as

to judgment creditors the expression means no more than that

a creditor cannot seize his debtor's property until he has ob-
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tained some process which authorizes the seizure. As stated in

Skilton v. Codington, 185 N. Y. 80, 77 N. E. 790, 113 Am. St.

Rep. 885:

"The rule that a creditor must first recover a judgment is

simply one of procedure and does not affect the right. There-

fore, where the recovery of a judgment becomes impracticable,

it is not an indispensable requisite to enforcing the rights of

the creditor."

Our examination of the Illinois cases has led us to conclude

that the Illinois courts have not decided, independently of pro-

cedure and having regard solely to rights, that simple contract

creditors, irrespective of the progress they may have made in

suing their debtor, are not "third persons" within the meaning

ana intent of the recording statute. Indeed, we think that the

case of Long v. Cockern 31 goes quite a way towards holding

that they are. But at all events we consider that the question

31—128 m. 29, 21 N. E. 201.

Only by this interpretation can this national law be administered
with anything like uniformity respecting preferences.
2. Even if the true interpretation of § 60a compelled us to
decide this case upon the meaning of the Illinois statute, with
due regard to the construction thereof by the Illinois courts, we
could not agree with the petitioner.
Recording a mortgage of chattels left in the possession of the
mortgagor is required ''as against the rights and interests of
any third person.'' The term ''third person'' is broad enough
to include everybody outside of the immediate parties to the
instrument and their privies. A simple contract creditor who
has not obtained a judgment is just as much a "third person,"
is just as much a stranger to the mortgage, as is the simple contract creditor who has obtained a judgment. Doth have the right
to enforce payment, if that oan be doue. The interests of both
are prejudiced if the debtor's property is covered by a fraudulent transfer. If at the time of the fraudulent transfer one
creditor has obtained a judgment and the other has not, the only
difference is that one has proceeded farther than the other iu
the enforcement of his rights and the protection of his iuterest<i.
And when it is said that a fraudulent transfer is void only as
to judgment creditors the expression means no more than that
a creditor cannot seize his debtor's property until he has obtained some process which authorizes the seizure. As stated in
Skilton v. Codington, 185 N. Y. 80, 77 N. E. 790, 113 Am. St.
Rep. 885:
''The rule that a creditor must first recover a judgment is
simply one of procedure and does not affect the right. Therefore, where the recovery of a judgment becomes impracticable,
it is not an indispensable requisite to enforcing the rights of
the creditor.''
Our examination of the Illinois cases has led us to conclude
that the Illinois courts have not decided, independently of procedure and having regard solely to rights, that simple contract
creditors, irrespective of the progress they may have made ia
suing their debtor, are not ''third persons'' within the meaning
ana intent of the recording statute. Indeed, we think that the
case of Long v. Cockern 31 goes quite a way towards holding
that they are. But at all events we consider that the question
31-128 Ill. 29, 21 N. E. 201.

PREFERENCES

PREFERENCES

261

261

is open, and that we are therefor^ at liberty to adopt the con-

struction we believe to be sound and righteous.

The petition to review and revise is dismissed.

(c) Procuring, Suffering or Permitting a Judgment

WILSON BROTHERS v. NELSON

is open, and that we are therefor\ at liberty to adopt the construction we believe to be sound and righteous.
The petition to review and revise is dismissed.

183 U. S. 191, 46 L. ed. 147, 22 Sup. Ct. 74

(United States Supreme Court. December 9, 1901)

( c) Procuring, Suffering or Permitting a Judgment

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit certified

to this court the following statement of facts and questions of

WILSON BROTHERS v. NELSON

law. [The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.] • • •

"The questions of law upon which this court [the Circuit

183 U. S. 191, 46 L. ed. 147, 22 Sup. Ct. 74

Court of Appeals] desires the advice and instruction of the

Supreme Court are:

(United States Supreme Court.

December 9, 1901)

"1. Whether the said Cassius B. Nelson, by failure to file his

voluntary petition in bankruptcy before the sale under such

levy, and to procure thereon an adjudication of bankruptcy, or

by his failure to pay and discharge the judgment before the sale

under such levy, committed an act of bankruptcy, within the

meaning of § 3a, subd. (3), of the bankrupt act.

"2. Whether the judgment so entered and the levy of the

execution thereon was a preference 'suffered' or 'permitted' by

the said Nelson within the meaning of clause (3) of § 3a of the
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bankrupt law.

"3. Whether the failure of Nelson to vacate and discharge

the preference so obtained, if it was one, at least five days before

the execution sale, was an act of bankruptcy."

Mr. JusticeJSRAY, after stating the facts, delivered the opin-

ion of the court:

On February 5, 1885, Nelson, in consideration of so much

money then lent to him by Sarah Johnstone, executed and de-

livered to her his promissory note for the sum of $8,960, payable

in five years, with interest until paid. Attached to that note

was an irrevocable power of attorney, executed by Nelson, in the

usual form, authorizing any attorney of a court of record in his

name to confess judgment thereon after its maturity. The in-

terest on the note was paid until November 1, 1898. At that

date Nelson, as he well knew, was, and long had been, and ever

since continued to be, insolvent. On November 21, 1898, Sarah

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit certified
to this court the following statement of facts and questions of
law. [The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.] • • •
"The questions of law upon which this court [the Circuit
Court of Appeals] desires the advice and instruction of the
Supreme Court are:
'' 1. 'Vhether the said Cassius B. Nelson, by failure to file his
Yoluntary petition in bankruptcy before the sale under such
levy, and to procure thereon an adjudication of bankruptcy, or
by his failure to pay and discharge the judgment before the sale
under such levy, committed an act of bankruptcy, within the
meaning of§ 3a, subd. (3), of the bankrupt act.
'' 2. "'Whether the judgment so entered and the levy of the
execution thereon was a preference 'suffered' or 'permitted' by
the said Nelson within the meaning of clause (3) of § 3a of the
bankrupt law.
"3. 'Vhether the failure of Nelson to vacate a.nd discharge
the preference so obtained, if it was one, at least five days before
the execution sale, was an act of bankruptcy.''
:Mr. JusticeJ.lRA Y, after stating the facts, delivered the opin·
ion of the court:
On February 5, 1885, Nelson, in consideration of so mnch
money then lent to him by Sarah Johnstone, executed and delivered to her his promi~ory note for the sum of $8,960, payable
in five years, with interest until paid. Attached to that note
was an irrevocable power of attorney, executed by Nelson, in the
usual form, authorizing any attorney of a court of record in his
name to confess judgment thereon after its maturity. The in·
terest on the note was paid until November 1, 1898. At that
date Nelson, as he well knew, was, and long had been, and ever
since continued to be, insolvent. On November 21, 1898, Sarah
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•Johnstone caused judgment to be duly entered in a court of

Wiseoiisi i upon the uote and the warrant of attorney for the

face of the note and costs. Upon that judgment, execution was

issued to the sheriff, who on the same day levied on Nelson's

goods, and on December 15, 1898, sold the goods by auction, and

applied the proceeds thereof in part payment of the judgment.

This proceeding left Nelson without means to meet any other of

his obligations. The judgment was entered and the levy made

without the procurement of Nelson and without his knowledge

or consent. The judgment and levy were unassailable in law,

and could not have been vacated or discharged by any legal pro-

ceedings, except by his voluntary petition in bankruptcy. On

December 10, 1898, a petition in bankruptcy was filed against

Nelson; and the questions certified present, in various forms,

the question whether Nelson committed an act of bankruptcy

within the meaning of § 3, el. 3, &S the bankrupt act of 1898.

In considering these questions, strict regard must be had to

the provisions of that act, which, as this court has already had

occasion to observe, differ in important respects from those of

the earlier bankrupt acts. Bardes v. First Nat. Bank, 178 U. S.

524, 44 L. ed. 1175, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1000; Bryau v. Bernheimer,

181 U. S. 188, 45 L. ed. 814, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 557; Wall v. Cox,

181 U. S. 244, 45 L. ed. 845, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 642; Pirie v. Chi-
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cago Title & T. Co., 182 U. S. 438, 45 L. ed. 1171, 21 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 906.

In § 3 of the bankrupt act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, acts of

bankruptcy are defined as follows: "Acts of bankruptcy by a

person shall consist of his having (1) conveyed, transferred,

concealed, or removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed,

any part of his property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud

his creditors, or any of them; or (2) transferred, while insolvent,

ary portion of his property to one or more of his creditors, with

intent to prefer such creditors over his other creditors; or (3)

suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain a

preference through legal proceedings and not having, at least

five days before a sale or final disposition of any property af-

fected by such preference, vacated or discharged such preference;

or (4) made a general assignment for the benefit of his creditors;

or (5) admitted in writing his inability to pay his debts and his

willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt on that ground." [30

Stat. at L. 544.]

In the first and second of these an intent on the part of the

'

caused judgment to be duly entered in a court of
upon ·the note and the warrant of attorney for the
face of tbe note and costs. Upon that judgment, execution was
issued to the sheriff, who on the same day levied on Nelson 'a
goods, and on December 15, 1898, sold the goods by auction, and
applied the proceeds thereof in part payment of the judgment.
This proceeding left Nelson without means to meet any other of
his obligations. The judgment was entered and the levy made
without the procurement of Nelson and without his knowledge
or consent. The judgment and levy were un8888i1able in law,
and could not have been vacated or discharged by any legal proceedings, except by his voluntary petition in bankruptcy. On
December 10, 1898, a petition in bankruptcy was filed against
Nelson; and the questions certified present, in various forms,
tlie questio~ whether Nelson committed an act of bankruptcy
within the meaning of § 3, cl. 3, <If. the bankrupt act of 1898.
In considering these questions, strict regard must be had to
the provisions of that act, which, es this court hes already had
occasion to observe, differ in important respects from those of
the earlier bankrupt acts. Bardes v. First Nat. Bank, 178 U.S.
524, 44 L. ed. 1175, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1000; Bryan v. Bernheimer,
181 U. s. 188, 45 L. ed. 814, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 557; Wall v. Cox,
181 U. S. 244, 45 L. ed. 845, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 642; Pirie v. Chicago Title & T. Co., 182 U. S. 438, 45 L. ed. 1171, 21 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 906.
In § :3 of the bankrupt act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, acts of
bankruptcy are defined es follows: "Act.a of bankruptcy by a
person sh.all cousist of his having (1) conveyed, transferred,
concealetl, or removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed,
auy part of his property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
his creditors, or any of them; or (2) transferred, while insolvent,
ar·y portion of his property to one or more of°his creditors, with
intent to prefer such creditors over his other creditors; or (3)
suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain a
preference through legal proceedings and not having, at least
five days before a sale or final disposition of any property affected by such preference, vacated or discharged.such preference,;
or ( 4) made a general assignment for the benefit of his creditors;
or ( 5) admitted in writing his inability to pay his debts and bis
willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt on that ground." [30
Stat. at L. 544.)
In the first and second of these an intent on the part of the
.Jul111s1011e
\\' ist:o~ :l)i · j
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bankrupt, either to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, or to

prefer over other creditors, is necessary to constitute the act of

bankruptcy. But in the third, fourth, and fifth no such intent

is required.

The third, which is that in issue in the case at bar, is in these

words: "(3) suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any creditor

to obtain a preference through legal proceedings, and not having,

at least five days before a sale or final disposition of any prop-

erty affected by such preference, vacated or discharged such

preference."

By the corresponding provision of the bankrupt act of 1867,

any person who, being bankrupt or insolvent, or in contempla-

tion of bankruptcy or insolvency, "procures or suffers his prop-

erty to be taken on legal process, with intent to give a preference

to one or more of his creditors," "or with the intent, by such

disposition of his property, to defeat or delay the operation of

this act," was deemed to have committed an act of bankruptcy.

Act of March 2, 1867, c. 176, § 39, 14 Stat. at L. 536; Rev. Stat.

§ 5021.

The act of 1898 differs from that of 1867 in wholly omitting

the clauses, "with intent to give a preference to one or more of

his creditors" or "to defeat or delay the operation of this act;"
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and in substituting for the words '' procures or suffers his prop-

erty to be taken on legal process," the words "suffered or per-

mitted, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain a preference

through legal proceedings," and not having, five days before a

sale of the property affected, "vacated or discharged such pref-

erence."

There is a similar difference in the two statutes in regard to

the preferences declared to be avoided.

The act of 1867 enacted that if any person, being insolvent, or

in contemplation of insolvency, within four months before the

filing of the petition by or against him, "with a view to give a

preference to any creditor or person having a claim against him,

or who is under any liability for him, procures or suffers any

part of his property to be attached, sequestered, or seized on

execution," or makes any payment, pledge, or conveyance of

any part of his property, the person receiving such payment,

pledge, or conveyance, or to be benefited thereby, "or by such

attachment," having reasonable cause to believe that such per-

son is insolvent and that the same is made in fraud of this act,

I he same should be void and the assignee might recover the prop-

bankrupt, either to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, or to
prefer over other creditors, is necessary to constitute the act of
bankruptcy. But in the third, fourth, and fifth no such intent
is required.
The third, which is that in issue in the case at bar, is in these
words: " ( 3) suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any creditor
to obtain a preference through legal proceedings, and not ha viJJg,
at least five days before a sale or final disposition of any property affected by such preference, vacated or discharged such
preference. ''
By the corresponding provision of the bankrupt act of 1867,
any person who, being bankrupt or insolvent, or in contemplation of bankruptcy or insolvency, "procures or suffers his property to be taken on legal process, with intent to give a preference
to one or more of his creditors," "or with the intent, by such
disposition of his property, to defeat or delay the operation of
this act," was deemed to have committed an act of bankruptcy.
Act of March 2, 1867, c. 176, § 39, 14 Stat. at L. 536; Rev. Stat.
§ 5021.
The act of 1898 differs from that of 1867 in wholly omitting
the clauses, ''with intent to give a preference to one or more of
his creditors" or "to defeat or delay the operation of this act;"
and in substituting for the words ''procures or suffers his property to be taken on legal process,'' the words ''suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain a preference
through legal proceedings,'' and not having, five days before a
sale of the property affected, ''vacated or discharged such preference.''
There is a similar difference in the two statutes in regard to
the preferences declared to be avoided.
The act of 1867 enacted that if any person, being insolvent, or
in contemplation of insolvency, within four months before the
filing of the petition by or against him, ''with a view to give a
preference to any creditor or person having a claim against him,
or who is under any liability for him, procures or suffers any
part of his property to be attached, sequestered, or seized on
·execution,'' or makes any payment, pledge, or conveyance of
any part of his property, the person receiving such payment,
pledge, or conveyance, or to be benefited thereby, "or by such
attachment," having reasonable cause to believe that such person is insolvent and that the same is made in fraud of this act,
the same should he void and the assignee might recover the prop-
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erty. Act of March 2, 1867, c. 176, §35, 14 Stat. at L. 534;

Rev. Stat. § 5128.

The corresponding provisions of the act of 1898 omit the req-

uisite of the act of 1867, "with a view to give a preference."

§60 of the act of 1898, relating to "preferred creditors,"

begins by providing that "a person shall be deemed to have

given a preference, if, being insolvent, he has procured or suf-

fered a judgment to be entered against himself in favor of any

person, or made a transfer of any of his property, and the effect

of the enforcement of such judgment or transfer will be to

enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage

of his debt than any other of such creditors of the same class."

§67, relating to "liens," provides, in subd. c, as fol-

lows: "A lien created by, or obtained in, or pursuant to, any

suit or proceeding at law or in equity, including an attachment

upon mesne process, or a judgment by confession, which was

begun against a person within four months before the filing of

the petition in bankruptcy by or against such person, sball be

dissolved by the adjudication of such person to be a bankrupt,

if (1) it appears that said lien was obtained and permitted while

the defendant was insolvent, or [and] that its existence and en-

forcement will work a preference, or (2) the party or parties to
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be benefited thereby had reasonable cause to believe the defend-

ant was insolvent and in contemplation of bankruptcy, or (3)

that such lien was sought and permitted in fraud of the pro-

visions of this act."

The same section provides, in subd. /, "that all levies, judg-

ments, attachments, or other liens obtained through legal pro-

ceedings against a person who is insolvent, at any time within

four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against

him, shall be deemed null and void, in case he is adjudged a

bankrupt." This provision evidently includes voluntary, as well

as involuntary, bankrupts; for the 1st clause of the 1st section

of the act, defining the meaning of words and phrases used in

the act, declares that " 'a person against whom a petition has

been filed' shall include a person who has filed a voluntary

petition."

Taking together all the provisions of the act of 1898 on this

subject, and contrasting them with the provisions of the act of

1867, there can be no doubt of their meaning.

The 3d clause of §3, omitting the word "procure," and the

phrase "intent to give a preference," of the former statute,

erty. Act of March 2, 1867, c. 176, § 35, 14 Stat. at L. 534;
Rev. Stat. § 5128.
The corresponding provisions of the act of 1898 omit the requisite of the act of 1867, "with a view to give a preference.''
§ 60 of the act of 1898, relating to "preferred creditors,"
begins by providing that ''a person shall be deemed to have
given a preference, if, being insolvent, he has procured or suffered a judgment to be entered against himself in favor of any
pel'llon, or made a transfer of any of his property, and the effect
of the enforcement of such judgment or transfer will be to
enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage
of his debt than any other of such creditors of the same class."
§ 67 ,. relating to "liens," provides, in subd. c, as follows: "A lien created by, or obtained in, or pursuant to, any
suit or proceeding at law or in equity. including an att.achment
upon mesne process, or a judgment by confession, which was
begun against a person within four months before the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy by or against such person, shall be
dissolved by the adjudication of such person to be a bankrupt,
if (1) it appears that said lien was obtained and permitted while
the defendant was insolvent, or [and] that its existence and enforcement will work a preference, or (2) the party or parties to
be benefited thereby had reasonable cause to believe the defendant was insolvent and in contemplation of bankruptcy, or (3)
that such lien was sought and permitted in fraud of the provisions of this act.''
The same section provides, in subd. f, ''that all levies, judgments, attachments, or other liens obtained through legal proceedings against a person who is insolvent, at any time within
four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against
him, shall be deemed null and void, in case he is adjudged a
bankrupt." This provision evidently includes voluntary, as well
as involuntary, bankrupts; for the 1st clause of the 1st section
of the act, defining the meaning of words and phrases used in
the act, declares that '' 'a person against whom a petition has
been filed• shall include a person who has filed a voluntary
petition.''
Taking together all the provisions of the act of 1898 on this
subject, and contrasting them with the provisions of the act of
1867, there can be no doubt of their meaning.
The 3d clause of § 3, omitting the word ''procure,'' and the
phrase "intent to give a preference," of the former statute,
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makes it an act of bankruptcy if the debtor has "suffered or

permitted, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain a preference

through legal proceedings," and has not "vacated or discharged

such preference" five days before a sale of the property. By

§ 60 he is "deemed to have given a preference" if, being insol-

vent, he has "suffered a judgment to be entered against himself

in favor of any person, * * * and the effect of the enforce-

ment of such judgment * * * will be to enable any one of

his creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his debt" than

other creditors. By § 67, subd. c, a lien obtained in any suit,

"including an attachment upon mesne process, or a judgment

by confession," begun within four months before the filing of

the petition in bankruptcy, is dissolved by the adjudication in

bankruptcy, not only if "such lien was sought and permitted

in fraud of the provisions of this act,'' but also if "its existence

and enforcement will work a preference." And by subd. / of

the same section "all levies, judgments, attachments, or other

liens obtained through legal proceedings against a person who

is insolvent," within the four months, shall be deemed null and

void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt.

The act of 1898 makes the result obtained by the creditor, and

not the specific intent of the debtor, the essential fact.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

In the case at bar, the warrant of attorney to confess judg-

ment was indeed given by the debtor nearly thirteen years be-

. fore. But being irrevocable and continuing in force, the debtor

thereby, without any further act of his, "suffered or permitted"

a judgment to be entered against him, within four months be-

fore the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the effect of the en-

forcement of which judgment would be to enable the creditor to

whom it was given to obtain a greater percentage of his debt

than other creditors; and the lien obtained by which, in a pro-

ceeding begun within the four months, would be dissolved by

the adjudication in bankruptcy, because "its existence and en-

forcement will work a preference." And the debtor did not,

within five days before the sale of the property on execution,

vacate or discharge such preference, or file a petition in bank-

ruptcy. By failing to do so, he confessed that he was hopelessly

insolvent, and consented to the preference that he failed to

vacate.

The cases on which the appellee relies, of Wilson v. City Bank,

17 Wall. 473, 21 L. ed. 723; Clark v. Iselin, 21 Wall. 360, 22 L.

ed. 568; and Tenth Nat. Bank v. Warren, 96 U. S. 539, 24 L.

makes it an act of bankruptcy if the dthtor has ''suffered or
permitted, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain a preference
through legal proceedings," and has not "vacated or discharged
such preference" five days before a sale of th~ property. Dy
§ 60 he is "deemed to have given a preference" if, being insolvent, he has "suffered a judgment to be entered against himself
in faTor of any person, • • • and the effect of the enforcement of such judgment • • • will be to enable anv oue of
his creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his debt" than
other creditors. By § 67, subd. c, a lien obtained in any suit,
"including an attachment upon mesne process, or a judgment
by confession," begun within four months before the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy, is dissolved by the adjudication in
bankruptcy, not only if ''such lien was sought and permitted
in fraud of the provisions of this act,'' but also if ''its existence
and enforcement will work a preference.'' And by subd. f of
the same section ''all levies, judgments, attachments, or other
liens obtained through legal proceedings against a person who
is insolvent,'' within the four months, shall be deemed null and
l'oid in case he is adjudged a bankrupt.
The act of 1898 makes the result obtained by the creditor, and
not the specific intent of the debtor, the essential fact.
In the case at bar, the warrant of attorney to confess judgment was indeed given by the debtor nearly thirteen years before. But being irrevocable and continuing in force, the debtor
thereby, without any further act of his, "suffered or permitted"
a judgment to be entered against him, within four months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the effect of the enforcement of which judgment would be to enable the creditor to
whom it was given to obtain a greater percentage of his debt
than other creditors; and the lien obtained by which, in a proceeding begun within the four months, would be dissolved by
the adjudication in bankruptcy, because "its existence and enforcement will work a preference.'' And the debtor did not,
within five days before the sale of the property on execution,
vacate or discharge such preference, or file a petition in bankroptcy. By failing to do so, he confessed that he was hopelessly
insolvent, and consented to the preference that he failed to
Vacate.

The cases on which the appellee relies, of Wilson v. City Bank,
17 Wall. 473, 21 L. ed. 723; Clark v. Iselin, 21 Wall. 360, 22 L.
ed. 568; and Tenth Nat. Bank v. Warren, 96 U. S. 539, 24 L.

266 PREREQUISITES TO ADJUDICATION

266

PREREQUISITES TO ADJUDICATION

ed. 640, have no application, because they were decided under

the act of 1867, which expressly required the debtor to have

acted with intent to give &. preference.

The case of Buckingham v. McLean, 13 How. 150, 14 L. ed.

90, arose under the still earlier Bankrupt Act of August 19, 1841,

c. 9, § 2 (5 Stat. at L. 442). And the point there decided was

that a power of attorney to confess a judgment was an act of

the bankrupt creating a "security," which that bankrupt act in

express terms declared void only if made in contemplation of

bankruptcy and for the purpose of giving a preference or

priority over general creditors.

The careful change in the language of the provisions of the

Bankrupt Act of 1898 from those of the former Bankrupt Acts

upon the subject must have been intended by congress to pre-

vent a debtor from giving a creditor an irrevocable warrant of

attorney which would enable him, at any time during the in-

solvency of the debtor, and within four months before a peti-

tion in bankruptcy, to obtain a judgment and levy the execution

on all the property of the bankrupt, to the exclusion of his other

creditors.

The answer to the second and third questions certified must

be that the judgment so entered and the levy of the execution

thereon were a preference "suffered or permitted" by Nelson,
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within the meaning of clause 3 of § 3 of the bankrupt act; and

that the failure of Nelson to vacate and discharge, at least five

days before the sale on execution, the preference so obtained,

was an act of bankruptcy; and it becomes unnecessary to answer

the first question.

Second and third questions answered in the affirmative?2

CITIZENS BANKING CO. v. RAVENNA NAT. BANK

234 U. S. 360, 58 L. ed. 1352, 34 Sup. Ct . 806

(United States Supreme Court. June 8, 1914)

Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the

court:

Upon a petition filed in the District Court for the Northern

District of Ohio by one of her creditors, Cora M. Curtis was ad-

32—The Chief Justice, Mr. Jus-

tice Shtras, Mr. Justice Brewer,

and Mr. Justice Peckham dissented.

The dissenting opinion by Mr. Jus-

tice Shiras is omitted.

In Duncan v. Landis, 106 Fed.

ed. 640, have no application, because they were decided under
the act of 1867, which expressly required the debtor to h11ve
acted with intent to give _)1 preference.
The case of Buckingham v. l\1cLean, 13 How. 150, 14 L. ed.
90, arose under the still earlier Bankrupt Act of August 19, 1841,
c. !), ~ 2 (5 Stat. at L. 442). And the point there decided was
that a power of attorney to confess a judgment was an act of
the bankrupt creating a "security," which that bankrupt act in
express terms declared void only if made in contemplation of
bankruptcy and for the purpose of giving a preference or
priority over general creditors.
The careful change in the language of the provisions of the
Bankrupt Act of 1898 from those of the former Bankrupt Acts
upon the subject must have been intended by congress to prevent a debtor from giving a creditor an irrevocable warrant of
attorney which would enable him, at any time during the insolvency of the debtor, and within four months before a petition in bankruptcy, to obtain a judgment and levy the execution
on all the property of the bankrupt, to the exclusion of his other
creditors.
The answer to the second and third questions certified must
be that the judgment so entered and the levy of the execution
thereon were a preference "suffered or permitted" by Nelson,
within the meaning of clause 3 of § 3 of the bankrupt act; and
that the failure -0f Nelson to vacate and discharge, at least fiYe
days before the sale on execution, the preference so obtained,
was an act of bankruptcy; and it becomes unnecessary to answer
the first question.
Second and third questions answered in the affirmative.a 2
CITIZENS BANKING CO. v. RAVENNA NAT. BANK
234 U. S. 360, 58 L. ed. 1352, 34 Sup. Ct. 806
(United States Supreme Court. June 8, 1914)
Mr. JUBtice VAN DEV ANTER delivered the opinion of the
court:
Upon a petition filed in the District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio by one of her creditors, Cora 1\1. Curtis was ad32-The CmEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice SHTB.AS, Mr. Justice BREWER,
and Mr. Justice PECKHAM diasented.

The dissenting opinion by Mr. Ju.
tice SHIR.As is omitted.
In Duncan v. La.ndia, 106 Fed.
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judged a bankrupt. In addition to matters not requiring notice,

the petition charged that within four months next preceding its

filing the respondent committed an act of bankruptcy, in that

(a), while insolvent, she suffered and permitted the Citizens

Banking Company to recover a judgment against her for

$1,598.78 and costs, in the Common Pleas Court of Erie County,

Ohio, and to have an execution issued under the judgment and

levied on real estate belonging to her, whereby the company ob-

tained a preference over her other creditors, and (b) at the

time of the filing of the petition, which was one day less than

four months after the levy of the execution, she had not vacated

or discharged the levy and resulting preference.

The company appeared in the bankruptcy proceedings and

challenged the petition on the ground that it disclosed no act of

bankruptcy, but the court, deeming that such an act was charged,

overruled the objection, and, there being no denial of the facts

stated in the petition, adjudged the respondent a bankrupt. The

company appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and that

court, having briefly reviewed the opposing views touching the

point in controversy (121 C. C. A. 250, 202 Fed. 892), certified

the case here, with a request that instruction be given on the

following questions:
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"(1) Whether the failure by an insolvent judgment debtor,

and for a period of one day less than four months after the levy

of an execution upon his real estate, to vacate or discharge such

levy, is a 'final disposition of the property' affected by the levy,

under the provisions of § 3a (3) of the bankruptcy act of 1898

[30 Stat. at L. 546, c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3422].

"(2) Whether an insolvent debtor commits an act of bank-

ruptcy, rendering him subject to involuntary adjudication as a

bankrupt under the bankruptcy act of 1898, merely by inaction

for the period of four months after the levy of an execution

upon his real estate."

It will be observed that no reference is made to an accom-

plished or impending disposal of the property in virtue of the

levy, although the mode of disposal prescribed by the local law

is by advertisement and sale. 2 Bates's Anno. Stat. (Ohio)

,§§ 5381, 5393.

839, the Court of Appeals for tbe

Third Circuit, by a vote of two to

one, had arrived at the same con-

clusion as the dissenting Justices

above.

judged a bankrupt. In addition to matters not requiring notice,
the petition charged that within four mouths next precedi11g its
filing the respondent committed an act of bankruptcy, in that
(a), while insolvent, she suffered and permitted the Citizell!:i
Banking Company to recover a judgment against her for
$1,598.78 and costs, in the Common Pleas Court of Erie County,
Ohio, and to have an execution issued under the judgment aud
le~·ied on real estate belonging to her, whereby the compauy obtained a preference over her other creditors, and ( b) at the
time of the filing of the petition, which was one day Jess tha11
four months after the levy of the execution, she had not vacated
or discharged the levy and resulting preference.
The company appeared in the bankruptcy proceedings alH.l
ehallenged the petition on the ground that it disclosed no act of
bankruptcy, but the court, deeming that such an act was charged,
OYerruled the objection, and, there being no denial of the facts
stated in the petition, adjudged the respondent a bankrupt. The
company appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and that
court, having briefly reviewed the opposing views touching the
point in controversy (121 C. C. A. 250, 202 Fed. 892), certified
the case here, with a request that instruction be given on the
following questions :
"(1) 'Vhether the failure by an insolvent judgment debtor,
and for a period of one day less than four months after the levy
of an execution upon his real estate, to vacate or discharge such
l1~vy, is a' final disposition of the property' affected by the levy,
u:ider the provisions of § 3a (3) of the bankruptcy act of 1898
(30 Stat. at L. 546, c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3422].
"(2) Whether an insolvent debtor commits an act of bankruptcy, rendering him subject to involuntary adjudication as a
bankrupt under the bankruptcy act of 1898, merely by inactiou
for the period of four months after the levy of an execution
upon his real estate."
It will be observed that no reference is made to an accomplished or impending disposal of the property in virtue of the
le\...}~, a1though the mode of disposal prescribed by the local law
is by advertisement and sale. 2 Bates 's Anno. Stat. (Ohio)
§§ 5381, 5393.
839, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, by a vote of two to
one, had arrived at the same con-

clusion as the dissenting Justices
above.
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The answers to the questions propounded turn upon the true

construction of § 3a (3) of the bankruptcy act, which declares:

"Acts of bankruptcy by a person shall consist of his having

* • * (3) suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any creditor

to obtain a preference through legal proceedings, and not having

at least five days before a sale or final disposition of any prop-

erty affected by such preference vacated or discharged such

preference." 30 Stat. at L. 544, c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901,

p. 3418.

Looking at the terms of this provision, it is manifest that the

act of bankruptcy which it defines consists of three elements.

The first is the insolvency of the debtor; the second is suffering

or permitting a creditor to obtain a preference through legal

proceedings; that is, to acquire a lien upon property of the

debtor by means of a judgment, attachment, execution, or kindred

proceeding, the enforcement of which will enable the creditor

to collect a greater percentage of his claim than other creditors

of the same class; and the third is the failure of the debtor to

vacate or discharge the lien and resulting preference five days

before a sale or final disposition of any property affected. Only

through the combination of the three elements is the act of

bankruptcy committed. Insolvency alone does not suffice, nor

is it enough that it be coupled with suffering or permitting a
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creditor to obtain a preference by legal proceedings. The third

element must also be present, else there is no act of bankruptcy

within the meaning of this provision. All this is freely conceded

by counsel for the petitioning creditor.

The questions propounded assume the existence of the first two

elements, and are intended to elicit instruction respecting the

proper interpretation of the clause describing the third; namely,

"and not having, at least five days before a sale or final dis-

position of any property affected by such preference, vacated or

discharged such preference." It is to this point that counsel

have addressed their arguments.

Without any doubt this clause shows that the debtor is to have

until five days before an approaching or impending event within

which to vacate or discharge the lien out of which the preference

arises. What, then, is the event which he is required to antici-

pate? The statute answers, "a sale or final disposition of any

property affected by such preference.'' As these words are part

of a provision dealing with liens obtained through legal proceed-

ings, and as the enforcement of such a lien usually consists in

The answers to the questions propounded turn upon the true
construction of § 3a ( 3) of the bankruptcy act, which declares:
''Acts of bankn1ptc~· by a person shall consist of his having
• • • ( 3) suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any creditor
to obtain a preference through legal proceedings, and not having
at least five days before a sale or final disposition of any property affected by such preference vacated or discharged such
preference.'' 30 Stat. at L. 544, c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901,
p. 3418.
Looking at the terms of this provision, it is manifest that the
act of bankruptcy which it defin~ consista of three elements.
The first is the insolvency of the debtor; the second is suffering
or permitting a creditor to obtain a preference through legal
proceedings; that is, to acquire a lien upon property of the
debtor by means of a judgment, attachment, execution, or kindred
proceeding, the enforcement of which will enable the creditor
to collect a greater percentage of his claim than other creditors
of the same class; and the third is the failure of the debtor to
vacate or discharge the lien and resulting preference five days
before a sale or final disposition of any property affected. Only
through the combination of the three elements is the act of
bankruptcy committed. Insolvency alone does not suffice, nor
is it enough that it be coupled with suffering or permitting a
creditor to obtain a preference by legal proceedings. The third
element must also be present, else there is no act of bankruptcy
within the meaning of this provision. All this is freely conceded
by counsel for the petitioning creditor.
The questions propounded assume the existence of the first two
elements, and are intended to elicit instruction respec'ting the
proper interpretation of the clause describing the third; namely,
''and not having, at least five days before a sale or final disposition of any property affeC'tt'd by such preference, vacated or
discharged such preference.'' It is to this point that counsel
have addressed their arguments.
Without any doubt this clause shows that the debtor is to have
until five days before an approaching or impending event within
which to vacate or discharge the lien out of which the preference
arises. What, then, is the event which he is required to anticipate 7 The statute answers, ''a sale or final disposition of any
property affected by such preference.'' As these words are part
of a provision dealing with liens obtained through legal proceedings, and as the enforcement of such a lien usually consists in
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selling some or all of the property affected, and applying the pro-

ceeds to the creditor's demand, it seems quite plain that it is to

such a sale that the clause refers. And as there are instances in

which the property affected does not require to be sold, as when

it is money seized upon execution or attachment, or reached by

garnishment, • • • it seems equally plain that the words

"or final disposition" are intended to include the act whereby

the debtor's title is passed to another when a sale is not re-

quired. No doubt, the terms "sale or final disposition," ex-

plained as they are by the context, are comprehensive of every

act of disposal, whether by sale or otherwise, which operates as

an enforcement of the lien or preference.

But we do not perceive anything in the clause which suggests

that the time when the lien is obtained has any bearing upon

when the property must be freed from it to avoid an act of bank-

ruptcy. On the contrary, the natural and plain import of the

language employed is that it will suffice if the lien is lifted five

days before a sale or final disposition of any of the property

affected. This is the only point of time that is mentioned, and

the implication is that it is intended to be controlling.

To enforce a different conclusion counsel for the petitioning

creditor virtually contends that the clause has the same meaning
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as if it read, "and having failed to vacate or discharge the

preference at least five days before a sale or final disposition of

any of the property affected, or, at most, not later than five days

before the expiration of four months after the lien was obtained.''

But we think such a meaning cannot be ascribed to it without

rewriting it, and that we cannot do. The contention puts into

it an alternative which is not there, either in terms or by fair

implication, and to which Congress has not given assent. Indeed,

it appears that in the early stages of its enactment the bank-

ruptcy bill contained a provision giving the same effect to a fail-

ure to discharge the lien within a prescribed period after it

attached as to a failure to discharge it within a designated num-

ber of days before an intended sale; and that during the final

consideration of the bill that provision was eliminated and the

one now before us was adopted. This, of course, lends strength

to the implication otherwise arising that the clause names the

sole test of when the lien must be vacated or discharged to avoid

an act of bankruptcy.

The contention to the contrary is sought to be sustained

by a reference to §§ 3b, 67c, and 67f. But we perceive noth-

selling some or all of the property affected, and applying the proceeds to the creditor's demand, it seems quit_e plain that it is to
such a sale that the clause refers. And as there are instances in
which the property affected does not require to be sold, as when
it is money seized upon execution or attachment, or reached by
garnishment, • • • it seems equally plain that the words
''or final disposition'' are intended to include the act whereby
the debtor's title is passed to another when a sale is not required. No doubt, the terms "sale or final disposition," explained as they are by the context, are comprehensive of every
act of disposal, whether by sale or otherwise, which operates as
an enforcement of the lien or preference.
But we do not perceive anything in the clause which suggests
that the time when the lien is obtained has any bearing upon
when the property must be freed from it to avoid an act of bankruptcy. On the contrary, the natural and plain import of the
language employed is tl!Jlt it will suffice if the lien is lifted five
days before a sale or final disposition of any of the property
affected. This is the only point of time that is mentioned, and
the implication is that it js intended to be controlling.
To enforce a different conclusion counsel for the petitioning
creditor virtually contends thkt the clause has the same meaning
as if it read, ''and having failed to vacate or discharge the
preference at least five days before a sale or final disposition of
any of the property affected, or, at most, not later than five days
before the expiration of four months after the lien was obtained.''
But we think such a meaning cannot be ascribed to it without
rewriting it, and that we cannot do. The contention put.s into
it an alternative which is not there, either in terms or by fair
implication, and to which Congress has not given assent. Indeed,
it appears that in the early stages of its enactment the bankruptcy bill contained a provision giving the same effect to a failure to discharge the lien within a prescribed period after it
attached as to a failure to discharge it within a designated number of days before an intended sale; and that during the final
consideration of the bill that provision was eliminated and the
one now before us was adopted. This, of course, lends strength
to the implication otherwise arising that the clause names the
sole test of when the lien must be vacated or discharged to avoid
an act of bankruptcy.
The contention to the contrary is sought to be sustained
by a reference to §~ 3b, 67c, and 67f. But we perceive noth·
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ing in those sections to disturb the plain meaning of § 3a (3).

It defines a particular act of bankruptcy, and purports to be

complete in itself, as do other subsections defining other acts

of bankruptcy. § 3b deals with the time for filing petitions in

bankruptcy and limits it to four months after the act of bank-

ruptcy is committed. It says nothing about what constitutes

an act of bankruptcy, but treats that as elsewhere adequately

defined. §§ 67c and 67f deal with the retrospective effect of

adjudications in bankruptcy, the former declaring that certain

liens obtained in suits begun within four months before the

filing of the petition shall be dissolved by the adjudication,

and the latter that certain levies, judgments, attachments, and

other liens obtained through legal proceedings within the same

period shall become null and void upon the adjudication. Both

assume that the adjudication will be grounded upon a sufficient

act of bankruptcy, as elsewhere defined, and give to every ad-

judication the same effect upon the liens described, whether it

be grounded upon one act of bankruptcy or another. And what

is more in point, there is no conflict between § 3a (3) and the

sections indicated. All can be given full effect according to

their natural import without any semblance of interference be-

tween § 3a (3) and the others.

But it is said that unless § 3a (3) be held to require the ex-
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tinguishment of the lien before the expiration of four months

from the time it was obtained the result will be that in some in-

stances the lien will not be dissolved or rendered null through

the operation of §§ 67c and 67f, because occasionally the full

four months will intervene before an act of bankruptcy is com-

mitted, and therefore before a petition can be filed. Conceding

that this is so, it proves nothing more than what is true of all

liens obtained through legal proceedings more than four months

prior to the filing of the petition. And while it may be true, as

is suggested, that if the debtor is not restricted to less than four

months within which to extinguish the lien there will be in-

stances in which general creditors will be affected disadvan-

tageously, it must be reflected that there also will be instances

in which an honest and struggling debtor'will be able to ex-

tinguish the lien the requisite number of days before a sale or

final disposition of any of the property affected, and thereby to

avoid bankruptcy, without injury to any of his creditors. But

with this we are not concerned. The advantages and disadvan-

ing in those sections to disturb the plain meaning of § 3a ( 3).
It defines a particular act of bankruptcy, and purports to be
complete in itself, as do other subsections defining other acts
of bankruptcy. § 3b deals with the time for filing petitions in
bankruptcy and limits it to four months after the act of bankruptcy is committed. It says nothing about what constitutes
an act of bankruptcy, but treats that as elsewhere adequate1y
defined. §§ 67c and 67f deal with the retrospective effect of
adjudications in bankruptcy, the former declaring that certain
liens obtained in suits begun within four months before the
filing of the petition shall be dissolved by the adjudication,
and the latter that certain levies, judgments, attachments, and
other liens obtained through legal proceedings within the same
period shall become null and void upon the adjudication. Both
assume that the adjudication will be grounded upon a sufficient
act of bankruptcy, as elsewhere defined, and give to every adjudication the same effect upon the liens described, whether it
be grounded upon one act of bankruptcy or another. And what
is more in point, there is no conflict between § 3a (3) and the
sections indicated. All can be given full effect according to
their natural import without any semblance of interference between § 3a ( 3) and the others.
But it is said that unless § 3a ( 3) be held to require the extinguishment of the lien before the expiration of four months
from the time it was obtained the result will be that in some instances the lien will not be dissolved or rendered null through
the operation of §§ 67c and 67f, because occasionally the full
four months will int~rvene before an act of bankruptcy is committed, and therefore before a petition can be filed. Conceding
that this is so, it proves nothing more than what is true of all
liens obtained through legal proceedings more than four months
prior to the filing of the petition. And while it may be true, as
is suggested, that if the debtor is not restricted to less than four
months within which to extinguish the lien there will be instances in which general creditors will be affected disadvantageonsly, it must be reflected that there also will be instances
in which an honest and struggling debtor 1will be able to extinguish the lien the requisite number of days before a sale or
final disposition of any of the property affected, and thereby to
avoid bankruptcy, without injury to any of his creditors. But
with this we are not concerned. The advantages and disadvan-
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tages have been balanced by Congress, and its will has been ex-

pressed in terms which are plain and therefore controlling.

Lastly, it is said that the term "final disposition" is not used

in the sense hereinbefore indicated, but as denoting the status

which a lien acquires through the lapse of four months before

the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. This is practically a

reiteration of the contention already noticed, but probably is

intended to present if from a different angle. It overlooks, as

we think, the influence which rightly must be given to the con-

text, and also the manifest inaptness of the term to express the

thought suggested. When one speaks of a sale or final disposition

of property, he means by final disposition an act having sub-

stantially the effect of a sale,—a transfer of ownership and con-

trol from one to another,—and especially is this true when he

is referring to a sale or final disposition in the enforcement of a

hen. We regard it as entirely clear that the term is so used in

this instance, and that it signifies an affirmative act of disposal,

not a mere lapse of time which leaves the lien intact and still

requiring enforcement. To illustrate, let us take the instance

of a provisional attachment of real property, which the creditor

is not entitled to enforce unless he sustains the demand which is

the subject of the principal suit; and let us suppose that the
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debtor defends against the demand, and that the suit is pend-

ing and undetermined four months after the levy. Of course,

an adjudication in bankruptcy upon a petition filed thereafter

would not disturb the attachment. But could it be said that

the property attached was finally disposed of at the end of the

four months? An affirmative answer seems quite inadmissible.

We conclude that both of the questions propounded by the

Circuit Court of Appeals should be resolved in the negative.

As shown by the reported cases, some diversity of opinion has

arisen in other Federal courts in disposing of similar questions

(Re Rome Planing Mill, 96 Fed. 812, 815; Re Vastbinder, 126

Fed. 417, 420; Re Tupper, 163 Fed. 766, 770; Re Windt, 177

Fed. 584, 586; Re Crafts-Riordon Shoe Co., 185 Fed. 931, 934;

Folger v. Putnam, 114 C C. A. 513, 194 Fed. 793, 797; Re

Truitt, 203 Fed. 550, 554), and so we deem it well to observe

that the conclusion here stated has been reached only after full

consideration of those cases.

Questions answered "No."

tages have been balanced by Congress, and its will has been expressed in terms which are plain and therefore controlling.
Lastly, it is said that the term "final disposition" is not used
in the sense hereinbefore indicated, but as denoting the status
which a lien acquires through the lapse of four months before
the filing of. a. petition in bankruptcy. This is practically a
reiteration of the contention already noticed, but probably is
intended to present if from a different angle. It overlooks, as
we think, the influence which rightly must be given to the context, and also the manifest inaptness of the term to express the
thought suggested. When one speaks of a sale or final disposition
of property, he means by final disposition an act having substantially the effect of a sale,-a transfer of ownership and control from one to another,-and especially is this true when he
is referring to a sale or final disposition in the enforcement of a
lien. We regard it as entirely clear that the term is so used in
this instance, and that it signifies an affirmative act of disposal,
not a mere lapse of time which leaves the lien intact and still
requiring enforcement. To illustrate, let us take the instance
of a provisional attachment of real property, which the creditor
is not entitled to enforce unless he sustains the demand which is
the subject of the principal suit; and let us suppose that the
debtor defends against the demand, and that the suit is pending and undetermined four months after the levy. Of course,
an adjudication in bankruptcy upon a petition filed thereafter
would not disturb the attachment. But could it be said that
the property attached was finally disposed of at the end of the
four months Y An affirmative answer seems quite inadmissible.
We conclude that both of the questions propounded by the
Circuit Court of Appeals should be resolved in the negative.
As shown by the reported cases, some diversity of opinion has
arisen in other Federal courts in disposing of similar questions
(Re Rome Planing 1t'Iill, 96 Fed. 812, 815; Re Vastbinder, 126
Fed. 417, 420; Re Tupper, 163 Fed. 766, 770; Re Windt, 177
Fed. 584, 586; Re Crafts-Riordon Shoe Co., 185 Fed. 931, 934;
Folger v. Putnam, 114 C. C. A. 513, 194 Fed. 793, 797; Re
Truitt, 203 Fed. 550, 554), and so we deem it well to observe
that the conclusion here stated has been reached only after full
<'onsideration of those cases.
Questions answered "No."
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(d) Transfer of Bankrupt's Properly

JAQUITH v. ALDEN

189 U. S. 78, 47 L. ed. 717, 23 Sup. Ct. 649

(d) Transfer of Bankrupt's Properly

(United States Supreme Court. April 27, 1903)

Statement by Mr. Chief Justice PULLER:

JAQUITH v. ALDEN

F. N. Woodward et al. filed their petition in bankruptcy, and

were adjudicated bankrupts November 26, 1901. They had

189 U. S. 78, 47 L. ed. 717, 23 Sup. Ct. 649

become insolvent August 15, and on that day were not indebted

to G. Edwin Alden, who afterwards, in ignorance of the in-

(United States Supreme Court.

April 27, 1903)

solvency, made sales to Woodward et al., and received payments

from them therefor in the regular course of business, and with-

out any idea or intention on the part of Alden of obtaining a

preference thereby, the sales and payments being as follows:

Sales

Aug. 17, 1901. Rubber $289.46

28,"" 657.89

Sept. 30,"" 644.28

Oct. 18,"" 535.99

Oct. 18, " Cartage 50

31, " Asbestine 10.40

Payments

Sept. 4, 1901. Payment of bill Aug. 17 $289.46

Statement by Mr. Chief Justice FULLER:
F. N. Woodward et al. filed their petition in bankruptcy, and
were adjudicated bankrupts November 26, 1901. They had
become insolvent August 15, and on that day were not indebted
to G. Edwin Alden, who afterwards, in ignorance of the insolvency, ma.de sales to Woodward et al., and received payments
from them therefor in the regular course of busine8s, and without any idea or intention on the part of Alden of obtaining a
preference thereby, the sales and payments being as follows:

Sept. 28, 1901. Payment of bill Aug. 28 657.89
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Oct. 29, 1901. Payment of bill Sept. 30 644.28

The merchandise sold Woodward et al. was manufactured by

them, and the result of the transactions was to increase their

estate in value. Alden petitioned to be allowed to prove his

claim of $546.89.

The referee disallowed the claim unless at least the amount of

$633.88 was surrendered to the estate. The district judge re-

versed the judgment of the referee and allowed the claim, and

the decree of the District Court was affirmed by the Circuit Court

of Appeals (118 Fed. 270) on the authority of Dickson v.

Wyman, 55 L. R. A. 349, 49 C. C. A. 574, 111 Fed. 726. There-

upon an appeal to tins court was allowed and a certificate granted

under § 25, b, 2.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER delivered the opinion of the court:

The facts found established that on August 15 the aggregate

Saks
Aug. 17, 1901. Rubber ............................. $289.46
,, ............................. 657.89
28, ''
''
............................. 644.28
Sept. 30, ''
,, ... . ......................... 535.99
Oct. 18, ''
Oct. 18, '' Cartage..... . .......................
.50
31, '' A.sbestine............................ 10.40
Payments
Sept. 4, 1901. Payment of bill Aug. 17 .............. $289.46
Sept. 28, 1901. Payment of bill Aug. 28 .............. 657.89
Oct. 29, 1901. Payment of bill Sept. 30 .............. 644.28
The merchandise sold 'Voodward et al. was manufactured by
them, and the result of the transactions was to increase their
estate in value. Alden petitioned to be allowed to prove his
claim of $546.89.
The referee disallowed the claim unless at least the amount of
$633.88 was surrendered to the estate. The district judge reversed the judgment of the referee and allowed the claim, and
the decree of the District Court was affirmed by the Circuit Court
of Appeals (118 Fed. 270) on the authority of Dickson v.
Wyman, 55 L. R. A. 349, 49 C. C. A. 574, 111 Fed. 726. Thereupon an appeal to fois court was allowed and a certificate granted
under § 25, b, 2.
l\fr. Chief Justice FULLER delivered the opinion of the court:

The facts found established that on August 15 the aggregate
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of the property of the bankrupts was not, at a fair valuation,

sufficient in amount to pay their debts, but that Alden was

ignorant of this, and, in good faith and in the regular course of

business, sold material to the bankrupts, and received payment

therefor several times between August 15 and November 26,

when the petition was filed, on which day the amount of $546.89

for material delivered shortly before had not been paid. All the

material so sold to them was manufactured by the bankrupts,

and increased their estate in value.

The question is whether the payments made to Alden (or

either of them) were preferences within § 60 of the bankruptcy

act of 1898 [30 Stat. at L. 562, c. 541, U. S. Comp.,Stat. 1901, p.

- 3445], which must be surrendered, under § 57gr, before his claim

could be allowed. • * *

In Pirie v. Chicago Title & T. Co., 182 U. S. 438, 45 L. ed.

1171, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 906, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit had affirmed an order of the District Court for

the Northern District of Illinois, rejecting a claim of Carson,

Pirie, & Company against the estate of Prank Brothers, bank-

rupts, and the case was then brought to this court on findings

of fact and conclusions of law of the Circuit Court of Appeals,

made and filed "pursuant to the requirements of subdivision 3,
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rule 36 of General Orders in Bankruptcy." The first three of

the findings were as follows:

"First. That on February 11, 1899, August Frank, Joseph

Frank, and Louis Frank, trading as Frank Brothers, were duly

adjudged bankrupts.

"Second. That for a long time prior thereto appellants

carried on dealings with the said bankrupt firm, said dealings

consisting of a sale by said appellants to said Frank Brothers of

goods, wares, and merchandise amounting to the total sum of

$4,403.77.

'' Third. That said appellants, in the regular and ordinary

course of business, and within four months prior to the adjudi-

cation in bankruptcy herein, did collect and receive from said

bankrupts as partial payment of said account for such goods,

wares, and merchandise so sold and delivered to said Frank

Brothers, the sum of $1,336.79, leaving a halance due, owing and

unpaid, amounting to $3,093.98."

It was further found that, at the time this payment was made,

Frank Brothers were hopelessly insolvent, to their knowledge;

but that Carson, Pirie, & Company had no knowledge of such

H. & A. Bankruptcy—18

of the property of the bankrupts was not, at a fair valuation,
sufficie11t in amount to pay their debts, but that Alden was
ignorant of this, and, in good faith and in the regular ronrsl' of
business, sold material to the bankrupts, and received payment
therefor several times between August 15 and November 26,
when the petition was filed, on which day the amount of $546.89
for material delivered shortly before had not been paid. All the
material so sold to them was manufactured by the bankrupts,
aud increased their estate in value.
The question is whether the payments made to Alden (or
either of them) were preferences within § 60 of the bankruptcy
act of 1898 [30 Stat. at L. 562, c. 541, U. S. Comp., Stat. 1901, p.
3445], which must be surrendered, wider § 57g, before his claim
could be allowed. • • •
In Pirie v. Chicago Title & T. Co., 182 U. S. 438, 45 I... ed.
1171, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 906, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit had affirmed an order of the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, rejecting a claim of Carson,
Pirie, & Company against the estate of J<'rank Brothers, bankrupts, and the case was then brought to this court on findings
of fact and conclusions of law of the Circuit Court of Appeals,
made and filed "pursuant to the requirements of subdivision 3,
rule 36 of General Orders in Bankruptcy." The first three of
the findings were as follows:
''First. That on February 11, 1899, August Frank, Joseph
Frank, and Louis Frank, trading as Frank Brothers, were duly
adjudged bankrupts.
''Second. That for a long time prior thereto appellants
carried on dealings with the said bankrupt firm, said dealings
consisting of a se.le by said appellants to said Frank Brothers of
goods, \Vares, and merchandise amounting to the total sum of
$4t403.77.
''Third. That said appellants, in the regular and ordinary
course of business, and within four months prior to the adjudication in bankruptcy herein, did collect and receive from said
bankrupts as partial payment of said account for such goods,
wares, and merchandise so sold and delivered to said ~"'rank
Brothers, the sum of $1,336.79, leaving a balance due, owing and
unpaid, amounting to $3,093.98."
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but that Carson, Pirie, & Company had no knowledge of such
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insolvency, nor had reasonable cause to believe that it existed;

nor did they have reasonable cause to believe that the bank-

rupts, by the payment, intended thereby to give a preference;

and that they had refused to surrender to the trustee the amount

of the payment made to them by the bankrupts, as a condition

of the allowance of their claim. Upon the facts the Circuit

Court of Appeals concluded, as matter of law, that the payment

made '' at the time and in the manner above shown'' constituted

a preference; and that, by reason of the failure and refusal of

Carson, Pirie, & Company to surrender the preference, they were

not entitled to prove their claim:

The judgment below was affirmed by this court, and it was

held that a payment of money was a transfer of property, and

when made on an antecedent debt by an insolvent was a prefer-

ence within § 60a, although the creditor was ignorant of the in-

solvency, and had no reasonable cause to believe that a prefer-

ence was intended. The estate of the insolvent, as it existed at

the date of the insolvency, was diminished by the payment, and

the creditor who received it was enabled to obtain a greater per-

centage of his debt than any other of the creditors of the same

class.

In the present case all the rubber was sold and delivered after

the bankrupts' property had actually become insufficient to pay

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

their debts, and their estate was increased in value thereby to

an amount in excess of the payments made. The account was a

running account, and the effect of the payments was to keep it

alive by the extension of new credits, with the net result of a

gain to the estate of $546.89, and a loss to the seller of that

amount, less such dividends as the estate might pay. In these

circumstances the payments were no more preferences than if

the purchases had been for cash, and, as parts of one continuous

bona fide transaction, the law does not demand the segregation

of the purchases into independent items so as to create distinct

pre-existing debts, thereby putting the seller in the same class as

creditors already so situated, and impressing payments with the

character of the acquisition of a greater percentage of a total

indebtedness thus made up.

We do not think the slight variation in the dates of sales and

payments affords sufficient ground for the distinction put for-

ward by counsel between the payments of September 4 and 28

and the payment of October 29 (which he concedes should be

upheld) in their relation to the rubber furnished August 17 and

insolvency, 11or had reasonable cause to believe that it existed;
nor did they have reasonable cause to believe that the bankrupts, by the payment, intended thereby to give a preference;
and that they had refused to surrender to the trustee the amount
of the payment made to them by the bankrupts, as a condition
of the allowance of their claim. Upon the facts the Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded, as matter of law, that the paymeut
made ''at the time and in the manner above shown'' constituted
a preference; and that, by reason of the failure and refusal of
Carson, Pirie, & Company to surrender the preference, they were
uot e11titled to prove their claim:
The judgment below was affirmed by this court, and it was
held that a payment of money was a transfer of property, and
when made on an antecedent debt by an insolvent was a prefer1ence within § 60a, although the creditor was ignorant of the inl solvency, and had no reasonable cause to believe that a preference was intended. The estate of the insolvent, as it existed at
the date of the insolvency, was diminished by the payment, and
the creditor who received it was enabled to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any other of the creditors of the same
class.
In the present case all the rubber was sold and delivered after
the bankrupts' property had actually become insufficient to pay
their debts, and their estate was increased in value thereby to
an amount in excess of the payments made. The account was a
running account, and the effect of the payments was to keep it
alive by the extension of new credits, with the net result of a
gain to the estate of $546.89, and a loss to the seller of that
amount, less such dividends as the estate might pay. In these
circumstances the payments were no more preferences than if
the purchases had been for cash, and, as parts of one continuous
bona fide transaction, the law does not demand the segregation
of the purchases into independent items so as to create distinct
pre-existing debts, thereby putting the seller in the same class as
creditors already so situated, and impressing payments with the
character of the acquisition of a greater percentage of a total
indebtedness thus made up.
We do not thillk the slight variation in the dates of sales and
payments affor<ls sufficient ground for the distinction put forward by counsel between the payments of September 4 and 28
n11d the payment of Octoboc 29 (which he concedes should be
upheld) in their rcllltion to the rubber furnished August 17 and
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28 and September 30. All the material was sold and delivered

after August 15, and neither of the items can properly be

singled out as constituting outstanding indebtedness, payment

of which operated as a preference.

The facts as found in Pirie v. Chicago Title & T. Co. were so

entirely different from those existing here that this case is not

controlled by that. In view of similar vital differences it has been

held by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the first circuit (Dick-

son v. Wyman, 55 L. R. A. 349, 49 C. C. A. 574, 111 Fed. 726),

second circuit (Re Sagor, 9 Am. Bankr. Rep. 361), third cir-

cuit (Gans v. Ellison, 52 C. C. A. 366, 114 Fed. 734), eighth

circuit (Kimball v. Rosenham Co., 52 C. C. A. 33, 114 Fed. 85),

that payments on a running account, where new sales succeed

payments, and the net result is to increase the value of the es-

tate, do not constitute preferential transfers under § 60a.

Judgment affirmed.33

Mr. Justice WHITE and Mr. Justice McKENNA, not being

able to concur in the reasons by which the court, in the opinion

just announced, distinguishes this case from that of Pirie v.

Chicago Title & T. Co., and deeming the latter case controlling

in this, dissent.

NEW YORK COUNTY NATIONAL BANK v. MASSEY

28 and September 30. All the material was sold and delivered
after A~st 15, and neither of the items can properly be
singled out as constituting outstanding indebtedness, payment
of which operated as a preference.
The facts as found in Pirie v. Chicago Title & T. Co. were so
entirely different from those existing here that this case is not
controlled by that. In view of similar vital differences it has bee11
held by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the first circuit (Dickson v. Wyman, 55 L. R. A. 349, 49 C. C. A. 574, 111 Fed. 726),
second circuit (Re Sagor, 9 Am. Bankr. Rep. 361), third circuit (Gans v. Ellison, 52 C. C. A. 366, 114 Fed. 734), eighth
circuit (Kimball v. Rosen ham Co., 52 C. C. A. 33, 114 Fed. 85),
that payments on a running account, where new sales succeed
payments, and the net result is to increase the value of the estate, do not constitute preferential transfers under § 60a.
Judgment affirmed.as
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192 U. S. 138, 48 L. ed. 380, 24 Sup. Ct. 199

-(United States Supreme Court. January 4, 1904)

Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court of

Appeals for the second circuit, reversing the order of the District

Court affirming the order of the referee in bankruptcy, allowing

a claim against the estate of Stege & Brother. This claim was

allowed against the contention of the trustee of the bankrupt,

Mr. Justice WHITE and Mr. Justice McKENNA, not being
able to concur in the reasons by which the court, in the opinion
just announced, distinguishes this case from that of Pirie v.
Chicago Title & T. Co., and deeming the latter case controlling
in this, dissent.

that it could not be proved until the bank should surrender a

certain alleged preference given to it in contravention of the

bankrupt act. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the order

NEW YORK COUNTY NATIONAL BANK v. MASSEY

of the District Court, holding that the bank must first surrender

the preference before it could be allowed to prove its claim.

192 U. S. 138, 48 L. ed. 380, 24 Sup. Ct. 199

33—See Yaple v. Dahl-Millikan

Grocery Co., 193 U. S. 526; Wild &

-(United States Supreme Court. January 4, 1904)

Co. t. Trust Co., 153 Fed. 562.

Mr. JU8tice DAY delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the second circuit, reversing the order of the District
Court affirming the order of the referee in bankruptcy, allowing
a claim against the estate of Stege & Brother. This claim was
allowed against the contention of the trustee of the bankrupt,
that it could not be proved until the bank should surrender a
certain alleged preference given to it in contravention of the.
bankrupt a.ct. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the order
of the District Court, holding that the bank must first surrender
the preference before it could be allowed to prove its claim.
33-See Yaple v. Dahl-Millikan
Grocery Co., 193 U. S. 526; Wild &
Co. v. Trust Co., 163 Fed. 562.
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54 C. C. A. 116, 116 Fed. 342. The Circuit Court of Appeals

made the following findings of fact:

"For a number of years past the bankrupts, George H. Stege

and Frederick H. Stege, were engaged, in the city and county

of New York, in the business of dealing in butter, eggs, etc., at

wholesale, under the firm name and style of Stege & Brother.

On January 27, 1900, they filed a voluntary petition of bank-

ruptcy in the District Court, with liabilities of $67,232.49 and

assets of $20,729.66, and upon the same day were duly adju-

dicated bankrupts. Among their liabilities there was an in-

debtedness of $40,000 to the New York County National Bank

for money loaned upon four promissory notes for $10,000 each.

The money was loaned to the bankrupts and the notes were

originally given as follows:

"April 26, 1899, $10,000, 6 months, due October 26, 1899.

"April 26, 1899, $10,000, 7 months, due November 26, 1899.

"June 26, 1899, $10,000, 4 months, due October 26, 1899.

"August 2, 1899, $10,000, 4 months, due December 2, 1899.

"None of these notes were paid when they fell due, but were

all renewed as follows:

"October 26, 1899, $10,000, 3 months, due January 26, 1900.

"November 26, 1899, $10,000, 75 days, due February 9, 1900.
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"October 26, 1899, $10,000, 3 months, due January 26, 1900.

"December 2, 1899, $10,000, 69 days/due February 9, 1900.

'' On January 23, 1900, in the morning, the bankrupts went to

the New York County National Bank and asked the officers to

have the two notes of $10,000 each, which fell due on January

26, extended. The bankrupts at that time informed the bank

officers that they were unable to pay the notes then about to fall

due. In the afternoon of the same day, January 23, 1900, the

bankrupts again called upon the bank officers, and at that time

they delivered to them a statement of their assets and liabilities,

which statement was not delivered until after the deposit of

$3,884.47 had been made on that day. This statement as of

January 22, 1900, showed their assets to be $19,095.67 and their

liabilities $65,864.61.

""The bankrupts kept their bank account in the New York

County National Bank since May 6, 1899. On January 22, 1900,

their balance in the bank was $218.50. On the same day they

deposited in that account $536.83; on January 23, 1900, $3,-

884.47; on January 25, 1900, $1,803.95, making a total of $6,-

225.25 deposited in the three days mentioned. Of this amount

54 C. C. A. 116, 116 Fed. 342. The Circuit Court of Appeals
made the following findings of fact:
''For a number of years past the bankrupts, George H. Stege
. and Frederick H. Stege, were engaged, in the city and county
of New York, in the business of dealing in butter, eggs, etc., at
wholesale, under the firm name and style of Stege & Brother.
On January 27, 1900, they filed a voluntary petition of bankruptcy in the District Court, with liabilities of $67,232.49 and
assets of $20,729.66, and upon the same day were duly adjudicated bankrupts. Among their liabilities there was an indebtedness of $40,000 to the New York County National Bank
for money loaned upon four promissory notes for $10,000 each.
The money ·was loaned to the bankrupts and the notes were
originally given as follows:
"April 26, 1899, $10,000, 6 months, due October 26, 1899.
''April 26, 1899, $10,000, 7 months, due November 26, 1899.
"June 26, 1899, $10,000, 4 months, due October 26, 1899.
"August 2, 1899, $10,000, 4 months, due December 2, 1899.
''None of these notes were paid when they fell due, but were
all renewed as follows:
"October 26, 1899, $10,000, 3 months, due January 26, 1900.
''November 26, 1899, $10,000, 75 days, due February 9, 1900.
"October 26, 1899, $10,000, 3 months, due January 26, 1900.
"December 2, 1899, $10,000, 69 days,' due February 9, 1900.
''On January 23, 1900, in the morning, the bankrupts went to
the New York County National Bank and asked the officers to
have the two notes of $10,000 each, which fell due on January
26, extended. The bankrupts at that time informed the bank
officers that they were unable to pay the notes then about to fall
due. In the afternoon of the same day, January 23, 1900, the
bankrupts again called upon the bank officers, and at that time
they delivered to them a statement of their assets and liabilities, ·
which statement was not delivered until after the deposit of
$3,884.47 had been made on that day. This statement as of
January 22, 1900, showed their assets to be $19,095.67 and their
1ia bilities $65,864.61.
"The bankrupts kept their bank account in the New York
County National Bank since May 6, 1899. On January 22, 1900,
their balance in the bank was $218.50. On the same dny they
deposited in that account $536.83; on ,January 23, 1900, $:~.884.47; on January 25, 1900, $1,803.95, making a total of $6,225.25 deposited in the three days mentioned. Of this amount
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there was left in the bank account on the day of the adjudica-

tion in bankruptcy, January 27, 1900, the sum of $6,209.25, the

bank having honored a check of Stege Brothers after the date of

«11 these deposits.

"At the first meeting of creditors, February 9, 1900, the New

York County National Bank filed its claim for $33,790.25.

"In its proof of claim the bank credited upon one of the notes

which became due on January 26, 1900, the deposit of $6,209.25.

The claim was allowed by the referee in the sum of $33,750.25,

being $40,000 less the amount on deposit in bank ($6,209.25)

and a small rebate of interest on the unmatured notes. Some

of the creditors at this meeting reserved the right to move to

reconsider the claim of the New York County National Bank;

the referee granted this request. Afterwards the trustee, as the

representative of the creditors, moved before the referee to dis-

allow and to expunge from his list of claims the claim of the

New York County National Bank unless it surrendered the

amount of the deposit, namely, $6,209.25, which had been credited

by the bank upon one of the notes. The referee denied that

motion, and an appropriate order was made and entered. The

trustee thereupon duly filed his petition to have the question

certified to the district judge. The district judge on the 25th

day of November, 1901, made an order affirming the order of
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the referee. From that order an appeal was duly taken by the

trustee to the Circuit Court of Appeals. The deposits were made

in the usual course of business; at the time they were made Stege

Brothers were insolvent."

As a conclusion of law, the Court of Appeals held that thy

deposit would amount to a transfer enabling the bank to obtain

a greater percentage of the debt due to it than other creditors

of the same class, and that allowance of the claim should be

refused unless the preference was surrendered. This case re-

quires an examination of certain provisions of the bankrupt law.

§ 68 of that law provides:

"J 68. Set-offs and counterclaims:

"(a) In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between

the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor, the account shall be

stated and one debt shall be set off against the other and the

balance only shall be allowed or paid.

"(b) A set-off or counterclaim shall not be allowed in favor

of any debtor of the bankrupt which (1) is not provable against

the estate, or (2) was purchased by or transferred to him after

there was left in the hank account on the day of the adjudil'ation in bankruptcy, January 27, 1900, the sum of $6,20!J.~:>. the
hank having honored a check of Stcge Brothers ftfter the date of
All these deposits.
.
"At the first meeting of creditors, February 9, 1900, the Nt~w
York County National Bank filed its claim for $:3a,790.25.
''In its proof of claim the b8l1k credited upon one of the nofl>s
which became due on January 26, 1900, the deposit of $6,20!).2fl.
The claim was allowed by the referee in the sum of $33,730.25,
lwing $40,000 less the amount on deposit in bank ($6,209.25)
and a small rebate of interest on the unmaturecl notes. Somt:>
of the creditors at this meeting ·reserved the right to move to
reconsider the claim of the New York County National Bank;
the referee grnuted this request. Afterwards the trustee, as the
representative of the creditors; moved before the referee to disallow and to expunge from his list of claims the claim of the
~ew York County National Bank unless it surrendered the
amount of the deposit, namely, $6,209.25, which had been credited
by the bank upon one of the notes. The referee denied that
motion, and an appropriate order was made and entered. The
trustee thereupon duly filed his petition to have the question
certified to the district judge. The district judge on the 25th
<lay of November, 1901, made an order affirming the order of
the referee. From that order an appeal was duly taken by the
trustee to the Circuit Court of Appeals. The deposits were made
in the usual course of business; at the time they were made Stege
Brothers were insolvent.''
As a conclusion of law, tl!e Court of Appeals held that th~
deposit would amount to a transfer enabling the bank to obtain
a greater percentage of the debt due to it than other creditors
of the same class, and that allowance of thP- claim should be
refused unless the preference was surrendered. This case requires an C'Xarnination of certain provisions of the bankrupt law.
§ 68 of that law provides:
'' ~ 68. Set-offs and counterch1ims:
'' (a) In all eases of mutual debts or mutual credits between
thr> Pstate of a bankrupt and a creditor, the account shall be
stated and one debt shall be set off against the other and the
balance only shall be allowed or paid.
'' ( b) A set-off or counterclaim shall not be allowed in favor
of any debtor of the bankrupt which (1) is not provable against
the estate, or (2) was purchased by or transferred to him after
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the filing of the petition or within four months before such filing,

with a view to such use and. with knowledge or notice that such

bankrupt was insolvent or had committed an act of bankruptcy."

§ 60 provides (prior to the amendment of February 5, 1903):

"§ 60. Preferred creditors: a. A person shall be deemed to

have given a preference if, being insolvent, he has • • •

made a transfer of any of his property, and the effect of the

* * * transfer will be to enable any one of his creditors to

obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any other of such

creditors of the same class."

§ 57<7 provides (prior to amendment of February 5, 1903):

'' Claims of creditors who have received preferences shall not be

allowed unless such creditors shall surrender their preferences."

Considering, for the moment, § 68, apart from the other sec-

tions, subdivisions a contemplates a set-off of mutual debts or

credits between the estate of the bankrupt and the creditor, with

an account to be stated and the balance only to be allowed and

paid. Subdivision b makes certain specific exceptions to this

allowance of set-off, and provides that it shall not be allowed in

favor of the debtor of the bankrupt upon an unproved claim or

one transferred to the debtor after the filing of the petition in

bankruptcy, or within four months before the filing thereof, with

a view to its use for the purpose of set-off, with knowledge or
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notice that the bankrupt was insolvent or had committed an act

of bankruptcy. Obviously, the - present case does not come

within the exceptions to the general rule made by subdivision b.

It cannot be doubted that, except under special circumstances,

or where there is a statute to the contrary, a deposit of money

upon general account with a bank creates the relation of debtor

and creditor. The money deposited becomes a part of the gen-

eral fund of the bank, to be dealt with by it as other moneys, to

be lent to customers, and parted with at the will of the bank,

and the right of the depositor is to have this debt repaid in

whole or in part by honoring checks drawn against the deposits.

It creates an ordinary debt, not a privilege or right of a fiduciary

character. National Bank v. Millard, 10 Wall. 152, 19 L. ed.

S97. Or, as defined by Mr. Justice White, in the case of Davis

v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U. S. 288, 40 L. ed. 702, 16 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 505: "The deposit of money by a customer with his

hanker is one of loan, with the superadded obligation that the

money is to be paid, when demanded, by a check." Scammon v.

Kimball, 92 U. S. 369, 23 L. ed. 485. It is true that the findings

the filing of the petition or within four months before sueh filing,
with a view to such use and. with knowledge or notice that such
bankrupt was insolvent or had committed an act of bankruptcy. n
§ 60 provides (prior to the amendment of February 5, 1903):
'' § 60. Preferred creditors: a. A person shall be deemed to
have given a preference if, being insolvent, he has • • •
made a transfer of any of his property, and the effect of the
• • • transfer will be to enable any one of his creditors to
obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any other of such
creditors of the same class. ''
§ 57g provides (prior to amendment of February 5, 1903) :
'' Clnims of creditors who have received preferences shall not be
allowed unless such creditors shall surrender their preferences. ''
Considering, for the mom1mt, § 68, apart from the other sections, subdivisions a contemplates a set-off of mutual debt.s or
credits between the estate of the bankrupt and the creditor, with
an account to be stated and the balance only to be allowed and
paid. Subdivision b makes certain specific exceptions to this
allowance of set-off, and provides that it shall not be allowed in
favor of the debtor of the bankrupt upon an unproved claim or
one transferred to the debtor after the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy, or within four months before the filing thereof, with
a view to its use f-0r the purpose of set-off, with knowledge or
notice that the bankrupt was insolvent or had committed an act
of bankruptcy. Obviously, the, present case does not come
within the exceptions to the general rule made by subdivision b.
It cannot be doubted that, except under special circumstances,
or where there is a statute to the contrary, a deposit of money
upon general account with a bank creates the relation of debtor
and creditor. The money deposited becomes a part of the general fund of the bank, to be dealt 'Vith hy it as other moneys, to
be lent to customers, and parted with at the will of the bank,
and the right of the depositor is to have this debt repaid in
whole or in part by honoring checks drawn against the deposit.a.
It creates an ordinary debt, not a privilege or right of a fiduciary
character. National Bank v . .Milla.rd, 10 Wall. 152, 19 t. ed.
897. Or, as defined by Mr. Justice White, in the case of Davis
v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U. S. 288, 40 L . ed. 702, 16 Sup. Ct.
Hep. 505: "The deposit of money by a customer with bis
hanhr is one of loan, with the superadded obligation that the
monry is to be paid, when demanded, by a check." Scammon v.
Kimball, 92 U. S. 369, 23 L. ed. 485. It is true that the findings
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of fact in this case establish that at the time these deposits were

made the assets of the depositors were considerably less than

their liabilities, and that they were insolvent, but there is noth-

ing in the findings to show that the deposit created other than

the ordinary relation between the bank and its depositor. The

check of the depositor was honored after this deposit was made,

and for aught that appears Stege Brothers might have required

the amount of the entire account without objection from the

bank, notwithstanding their financial condition.

We are to interpret statutes, not to make them. Unless other

sections of the law are controlling, or, in order to give a har-

monious construction to the whole act, a different interpretation

is required, it would seem clear that the parties stood in the

relation defined in § 68a, with the right to set off mutual debts,

the creditor being allowed to prove but the balance of the debt.

§ 68a of the bankruptcy act of 1898 is almost a literal repro-

duction of § 20 of the act of 1867. [14 Stat. at L. 526, c. 176.]

So far as we have been able to discover the holdings were uniform

under that act that set-off should be allowed as between a bank

and a depositor becoming bankrupt. Re Petrie, 7 Nat. Bankr.

Beg. 332, 5 Ben. 110, Fed. Cas. No. 11,040; Blair v. Allen, 3 Dill.

101, Fed. Cas. No. 1,483; Scammon v. Kimball, 92 U. S. 362, 23
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L. ed. 483. In Traders' Nat. Bank v. Campbell, 14 Wall. 87, 20

L. ed. 832, the right of set-off was not relied upon, but a deposit

was seized on a judgment which was a preference.

But it urged that under § 60a this transaction amounts to

giving a preference to the bank, by enabling it to receive a

greater percentage of its debts than other creditors of the same

class. A transfer is denned in § 1 (25) of the act to include the

sale and every other and different method of disposing of or

parting with property, or the possession of property, absolutely

or conditionally, as a payment, pledge, mortgage, gift, or se-

curity. While these sections are not to be narrowly construed so

as to defeat their purpose, no more can they be enlarged by

judicial construction to include transactions not within the scope

and purpose of the act. This section, 1 (25), read with §§ 57g

and 60a, requires the surrender of preferences having the effect

of transfers of property "as payment, pledge, mortgage, gift,

or security which operate to diminish the estate of the bankrupt

and prefer one creditor over another."

The law requires the surrender of such preferences given to

the creditor within the time limited in the act before he can

of fact in this case establish that at the time these deposits were
made the assets of the depositors were considerably less thaJJ
their liabilities, aud that they were insolvent, but there is nothing in the findings to show that the deposit created other than
the ordinary relation between the bank and its depositor. The
eheck of the depositor was honored after this deposit was made,
a.nd for aught that appears Stege Brothers might have required
the amount of the entire account. without objection from the
bank, notwithstanding their financial condition.
\Ve are to interpret statutes, not to make them. Unless other
sections of the law are controlling, or, in order to give a harmonious construction to the whole act, a different interpretation
is required, it would seem cle.ar that the parties stood in the
relation defined in § 6Ba, with the right to set off mutual debts,
the creditor being allowed to prove but the balance of the debt.
§ 68a of the bankruptcy act of 1898 is almost a literal reproduction of § 20 of the act of 1867. (14 Stat. at L. 526, c. 176.]
So far as we have been able to discover the holdings were uniform
under that act that set-off should be allowed as between a bank
and a depositor becoming bankrupt. Re Petrie, 7 Nat. Bankr.
Reg. 332, 5 Ben. 110, Fed. Cas. No. 11,040; Blair v. Allen, 3 Dill.
101, Fed. Cas. No. 1,483; Scammon v. Kimball, 92 U. S. 362, 23
L. ed. 483. In Traders' Nat. Bank v. Campbell, 14 Wall. 87, 20
L. ed. 832, the right of set-off was not relied upon, but a deposit
was seized on a judgment which was a preference.
But it urged th.at under § 60a this transaction amounts to
giving a preference to the bank, by enabling it to receive a
greater percentage of its debts than other creditors of the same
class. A transfer is defined in § 1 (25) of the act to include the
sale and every other and different method of disposing of or
parting with property, or the possession of property, absolutely
or conditionally, as a payment, pledge, mortgage, gift, or security. While these sections are not to be narrowly construed so
as to df'feat their purpose, no more can they be enlarged by
judicial construction to include transactions not within the scope
and purpo~e of the act. This section, 1 (25}, read ·with §§ 57 g
and 60a, requires the surrender of preferences having the effect
of transfers of property ''as payment, pledge, mortgage, gift,
or s••cu ri ty which operate to diminish the estate of the bankrupt
and prefer one creditor over another.''
The law requires the surrender of such preferences given to
the creditor within the time limited in the act before he can
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prove his claim. These transfers of property, amounting to

preferences, contemplate the parting with the bankrupt -s prop-

erty for the benefit of the creditor, and the consequent diminu-

tion of the bankrupt's estate. It is such transactions, operating

to defeat the purposes of the act, which, under its terms, are

preferences.

As we have seen, a deposit of money to one's credit in a bank

does not operate to diminish the estate of the depositor, for when

he parts with the money he creates at the same time, on the

part of the bank, an obligation to pay the amount of the deposit

as soon as the depositor may see fit to draw a check against it.

It is not a transfer of property as a payment, pledge, mortgage,

gift, or security. It is true that it creates a debt, which, if the

creditor may set it off under § 68, amounts to permitting a

creditor of that class to obtain more from the bankrupt's estate

than creditors who are not in the same situation, and do not

hold any debts of the bankrupt subject to set-off. But this does

not, in our opinion, operate to enlarge the scope of the statute

defining preferences so as to prevent set-off in cases coming

within the terms of § 68a. If this argument were to prevail, it

would, in cases of insolvency, defeat the right of set-off recog-

nized and enforced in the law, as every creditor of the bankrupt

holding a claim against the estate subject to reduction to the full
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amount of a debt due the bankrupt receives a preference in the

fact that, to the extent of the set-off, he is paid in full.

It is insisted that this court in the case of Pirie v. Chicago

Title & T. Co., 182 U. S. 438, 48 L. ed. 1171, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep.

906, held a payment of money to be a transfer of property within

the terms of the bankrupt act, and when made by an insolvent

within four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,

to amount to a preference, and that case is claimed to be de-

cisive of this. In the Pirie Case the turning question was

whether the payment of money was a transfer within the mean-

ing of the law, and it was held that it was. There the payment

of the money within the time named in the bankrupt law was a

parting with so much of the bankrupt's estate, for which he re-

ceived no obligation of the debtor but a credit for the amount

on his debt. This was held to be a transfer of property within

the meaning of the law. It is not necessary to depart from the

ruling made in that case, that such payment was within the

operation of the law, while a deposit of money upon an open

account subject to check, not amounting to a payment, but

prove his claim. ThcSt: tra11sfers of property. amounting to
pre:ferenccs, coutemplatc the parting with the bankrupt ·s property for the benefit of the creditor, and the consequ1~11t dimi11ution of the bankrupt's estate. It is such transactious, opernting
to defeat the purposes of the act, which, under its terms, arc
'
preferences.
As we have seen, a deposit of money to one's credit in a Lank
does not operate to diminish the estate of the depositor, for when
he parts with the money he creates at the same time, 011 tht'
part of the bank, an obligation to pay the amount of the deposit
as soon as the depositor may see fit to draw a check against it.
It is not a transfer of property as a payment, pledge, mortgage,
gift, or security. It is true that it creates a debt, which, if the
creditor may set it off under § 68, amounts to permitting a
creditor of that class to obtain more from the bankrupt's estate
than creditors who are not in the same situation, and do not
hold any debts of the bankrupt subject to set-off. But this does
not, in our opinion, operate to enlarge the scope of the statute
defining preferences so as to prevent set-off in cases coming
within the terms of § 68a. If this argument were to prevail, it
would, in cases of insolvency, defeat the right of set-off recogni~ed and enforced in the law, as every creditor of the bankrupt
holding a claim against the estate subject to reduetion to the full
amount of a debt due the bankrupt receives a preference in the
fact that, to the extent of the set-off, he is paid in full.
It is insisted that this court in the case of Pirie v. Chicago
Title & T. Co., 182 U. S. 438, 48 L. ed. 1171, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep.
906, held a payment of money to be a transfer of property within
the terms of the bankrupt act, and when made by an insolvent
withiu four months of the filing of the petition in bankrnph·y,
to amount to a preference, and that case is claimed to bt: de('.isive of this. In the Pirie Case the turning questin11 was
whether the payment of money was a transfer within the meaning of the law, and it was held that it was. There the payment
of the money within the time named in the bankrupt law was a
parting with so much of the bankrupt's estate, for which he received no obligation of the debtor but a credit for the amount
on his debt. This was held to be a transfer of property within
the meaning of the law. It is not nece~ry to depart from the
ruling made in that case, that such payment was within the
operation of the law, while a deposit of money upon an open
ut·eount subject to check, not amounting to a payment, but
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crt-ating an obligation upon the part of the bank to repay upon

the order of the depositor, would not be. Of the ease of Pirie

v. Chicago Title & T. Co., it was said in Jaquith v. Alden, 189

n1·ati11g an obligation upon the part of the bank to repay upon
the order of the depositor, would not be. Of the case of Pirie
\'. Chicago Title & T. Co., it was said in Jaquith v. Alden, 189

U. S. 78, 82, 47 L. ed. 717, 719, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 649,650: "The

judgment below was affirmed by this court, and it was held that

a payment of money was a transfer of property, and when made

on an antecedent debt by an insolvent was a preference within

| 60a, although the creditor was ignorant of the insolvency, and

had no reasonable cause to believe that a preference was intended.

The estate of the insolvent, as it existed at the date of the in-

solvency, was diminished by the payment, and the creditor who

received it was enabled to obtain a greater percentage of his

debt than any other of the creditors of the same class.''

In other words, the Pirie Case, under the facts stated, shows

a transfer of property to be applied upon the debt, made at the

time of insolvency of the debtor, creating a preference under

the terms of the bankrupt law. That case turned upon entirely

different facts, and is not decisive of the one now before us.

It is true, as we have seen, that in a sense the bank is permitted

to obtain a greater percentage of its claim against the bankrupt

than other creditors of the same class, but this indirect result is

not brought about by the transfer of property within the mean-
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ing of the law. There is nothing in the findings to show fraud

or collusion between the bankrupt and the bank with a view to

create a preferential transfer of the bankrupt's property to the

bank, and in the absence of such showing we cannot regard the

deposit as having other effect than to create a debt to the bank-

rupt, and not a diminution of his estate.

In our opinion the referee and the District Court were right

in holding that the amount of the deposit could be set off against

the claim of the bank, allowing it to prove for the balance, and

the Circuit Court of Appeals, in holding that this deposit

amounted to a preference, to be surrendered before proving the

debt, committed error.

Judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and that

of the District Court affirmed; cause remanded to latter court.

Mr. Justice McKENNA dissents.84

34—See Studley v. Boylston Nat

Bank, 229 U. S. 523, where the de-

positor paid the notes by checks

drawn on the account.

Cf. In re Starkweather & Albert,

206 Fed. 797; In re National Lum-

ber Co., 212 Fed. 928; Merchants'

Nat. Bank v. Ernst, 231 U. S. 60.

U. S. 78, 82, 47 L. ed. 717, 719, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 649,650: "'l'hPjudgment below was affirmed by this court, and it was held that
a payment of money was a transfer of property, and when made
on an antecedent debt by an insolvent was a preference within
§ 60a, although the creditor was ignorant of the insolvency, and
had no reasonable cause to believe that a preference was iuteu<led.
The estate of the insolvent, as it existed at the date of the insolvency, was diminished by the payment, and the creditor who
received it was enabled to obtain a greater percentage of his
debt than .any other of the creditors of the same class.''
In other words, the Pirie Case, under the facts stated, shows
a transfer of property to be applied upon the debt, made at the
time of insolvency of the debtor, creating a preference under
the terms of the bankrupt law. That case turned upon entirely
dilferent facts, and is not decisive of the one now before us.
It is true, as we have seen, that in a sense the bank is permitted
to obtain a greater percentage of its claim against the bankrupt
than other creditors of the same class, but this indirect result is
not brought about by the transfer of property within the meaning of the law. There is nothing in the findings to show fraud
or collusion between the bankrupt and the bank with a view to
create a preferential transfer of the bankrupt's property to the
bank, an<l in the absence of such showing we cannot regard the
deposit as having other effect than to create a debt to the bankrupt, and not a diminution of his estate.
In our opinion the referee and the District Court were right
in holding that the amount of the deposit could be set off against
the claim of the bank, allowing it to prove for the balance, and
the Circuit Court of Appeals, in hokli11g that this deposit
amounted to a preference, to be surrendered before proving the
debt, committed error.
Judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and that
of the District Court affirmed; cause remanded to latter court.
Mr. Just.ice McKENNA dissents.u
34---See Studley v. Boylston Nat.
Bank, 229 U. 8. 523, where the depositor paid the notes by checks
drawn on the account.

Cf. In re Starkweather & Albert,
206 Fed. 797; In re National Lumber Co., 212 Fed. 928; Merchants'
Nat. Bank v. Ernst, 231 U. 8. 80.
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THOMPSON v. FAIRBANKS

THOMPSON v. FAIRBANKS

196 U. S. 516, 49 L. ed. 577, 25 Sup. Ct. 306

(United States Supreme Court. February 20, 1905)

196 U. S. 516, 49 L. ed. 577, 25 Sup. Ct. 306

The plaintiff in error, by this writ, seeks to review a judgment

of the Supreme Court of the State of Vermont in favor of the

defendant in error. 75 Vt. 361, 56 Atl. 11. The facts upon

(United Stat.es Supreme Court. February 20, 1905)

which the judgment rests are as follows: On the 30th day of

June, 1900, Herbert E. Moore, of St . Johnsbury, in the State of

Vermont, filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy in the United

States District Court for the District of Vermont, and on the

3d day of July, 1900, Moore was by the court duly adjudged a

bankrupt, and on the 15th of September, 1900, the plaintiff in

error was appointed a trustee in bankruptcy of Moore's estate,

and duly qualified. He commenced this action in the County

Court of Caledonia County, in the State of Vermont, on the first

Tuesday of June, 1901, against the defendant Fairbanks, to

recover from him the value of certain personal property alleged

to have belonged to the bankrupt Moore on the 16th day of

May, 1900, and which was, as alleged, sold and converted by

Fairbanks, on that day, to his own use, the value of the property

being $1,500, as averred in the declaration. The defendant filed

his plea and gave notice that upon the trial of the case he would
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give in evidence and rely upon, in defense of the action, certain

special matters set up in the plea. The case was, by order of

the County Court, and by the consent of the parties, referred

to a referee to hear the cause and report to the court. It was

subsequently hoard before the referee, who filed his report, find-

ing the facts upon which the decision of the"case must rest. He

found that before June, 1886, the bankrupt Moore bought a

livery stock and business in St. Johnsbury village, in the State

of Vermont. At the time of this purchase the defendant was

the lessor of the buildings in which the business was conducted,

and it continued to be carried on in those buildings. Moore, in

making the purchase, had assumed a mortgage then outstanding

on the property, and a short time before March 1, 1888, the

defendant assisted him to pay this mortgage by signing a note

with him for $1,425, payable to the Passumpsic Savings Bank of

St. Johnsbury. Subsequently defendant signed notes, which,

with accrued interest, were merged in one, dated March 1, 1900.

for $2,510.75, due on demand to said savings bank, signed by

The plaintiff in error, by this writ, seeks to review a judgment
of the Supreme Court of the State of Vermont in favor of the
defendant in error. 75 Vt. 361, 56 Atl. 11. The facts upon
which the judgment rests are as follows: On the 30th day c,f
June, 1900, Herbert E. :Moore, of St. Johnsbury, in the State of
Vermont, filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy in the United
States District Court for the District of Vermont, and on th,,
3d day of July, 1900, Moore was by the court duly adjudged a
bankrupt, and on the 15th of September, 1900, the plaintiff in
error was appointed a trustee in bankruptcy of Moore's estate,
and duly qualified. He commenced this 11.ctiou in the County
Court of Caledonia County, in the State of Vermont, on the first
Tuesday of June, 1901, against the defendant 1'~airbanks, to
recover from him the value of certain personal property alleged
to have belonged to the bankrupt .Moore on the 16th day of
May, 1900, and which was, as alleged, sold and converted by
Fairbanks, on that day, to his own use, the value of the property
being $1,500, as averred in the declaration. The defendant filed
his plea and gave notice that upon the trial of the case he would
give in evidence and rely upon, in defense of the action, certain
special matters set up in the plea. The case was, by order of
the County Court, and by the consent of the parties, referred
to a referee to hear the cause and report to the court. It was
subsequently hoard before the referee, who filed his report, finding the facts upon which the decision of the ·case must rest. He
found that before June, 1886, the bankrupt :\loore bought a
livery stock and business in St. Johnsbury vilh1ge, in the State
of Vermont. At the time of this purchase the defendant was
the lessor of the buildings in which the business was conducted,
and it eontiHued to be carried on in those buildings. l\Ioort•. in
making the purchase, had assumed a mortgage then outstanding
on the property, and a short time before March 1, 1888, th~
defendant a~isted him to pay this mortgage by signing a note
with him for $1,425, payable to the Passumpsic Savings Bank of
St. Johnsbury. Subsequently defendant signed notes, whid1.
with accrued intere!'.1, were merged in one, dated Mareh 1, 1900.
for $2,510.75, due on demand to said savings bank, signed hy
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the bankrupt and by the defendant as his surety. This note had

not been paid when the case was referred to the referee. The

defendant also signed other notes payable to the First National

Bank of St. Johnsbury, which were merged into one, and, by

various payments made by Moore, it was reduced to $525, and

on June 4, 1900, it was paid by the defendant. All these notes

had been signed by the defendant to assist Moore in carrying

on, building up, and equipping his livery stable and livery busi-

ness, and as between them the notes belonged to Moore to pay.

On April 15, 1891, Moore gave the defendant a chattel mort-

gage on the livery property to secure him for these and other

debts and liabilities. The property was described in the mort-

gage as follows: "All my livery property, consisting of horses,

wagons, sleighs, vehicles, harnesses, robes, blankets, etc., also all

horses and other livery property that I may purchase in my

business or acquire by exchange."

The condition contained in the mortgage was, that if Moore

should '' well and truly pay, or cause to be paid, to the said Henry

Fairbanks all that I now owe him, or may owe him hereafter by

note, book account, or in any other manner, and shall well and

truly save the said Henry Fairbanks harmless, and indemnify

him from paying any commercial paper on which he has become
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or may hereafter become holden in any manner for my benefit

as surety, indorser, or otherwise, then this deed shall be void;

otherwise of force."

This mortgage was acknowledged, and the affidavit, as pro-

vided by the Vermont statute, was appended, showing the justice

of the debt and the liability contemplated to be secured by the

mortgage, and the mortgage was duly recorded on the 18th day

of April, 1891, in the St. Johnsbury clerk's office, by the town

clerk thereof. On March 5, 1900, Moore gave the defendant an-

other chattel mortgage on this livery stock, which, on March 23,

1900, defendant assigned to the Passumpsic Savings Bank, and

that bank has ever since been its holder and owner. This mort-

gage was given to secure defendant against all his liabilities for

Moore.

On the 7th of May, one John Ryan sued out a writ in assump-

sit against Moore to recover some $500, and an attachment on

the livery stock was levied in that suit by the deputy sheriff.

This attachment remained in force until dissolved by the bank-

ruptcy proceedings, and the suit is still pending in the State

Court of Vermont.

the bankrupt and by the defendant as his surety. This note had
not been paid when the case was referred to the referee. The
defeudant also signed other notes payable to the Virst National
Bank of St. Johnsbury, which were merged into one, and, by
various payments made by Moore, it was reduced to $525, and
on June 4, 1900, it was paid by the defendant. All these notes
had been signed by the defendant to assist Moore iu carryiug
on, building up, and equipping his livery stable and livery business, and as between them the notes belonged to Moore to pay.
On April 15, 1891, Moore gave the defendant a chattel mortgage on the livery property to secure him for these and other
debts and liabilities. The property was described in the mortgage as follows : ''All my livery property, consisting of horses,
wagons, sleighs, vehicles, harnesses, robes, blankets, etc., also all
horses and other livery property that I may purchase in my
business or acquire by exchange. ''
The condition contained in the mortgage was, that if Moore
should'' well and truly pay, or cause to be paid, to the said Henry
Fairbanks all that I now owe him, or may owe him hereafter by
note, book account, or in any other manner, and shall well and
truly save the said Henry Fairbanks harmless, and indemnify
him from paying any commercial paper on which he has become
or may hereafter become holden in any manner for my benefit
as surety, indorser, or otherwise, then this deed shall be void;
otherwise of force. ''
This mortgage was acknowledged, and the affidavit, as provided by the Vermont statute, was appended, showing the justice
of the debt and the liability contemplated to be secured by the
mortgage, and the mortgage was duly recorded on the 18th day
of April, 1891, in the St. Johnsbury clerk's office, by the town
clerk thereof. On March 5, 1900, Moore gave the defendant another chattel mortgage on this livery 1:1tock, which, on March 2:3,
1900, defendant assigned to the Passumpsic Savings Bank, and
that bank lias ever since been its holder and owner. This mortgage was given to secure defendant against all his liabilities for
Moore.
On the 7th of May, one John Ryan sued out a writ in assnmpsit against Moore to recover some $500, and an attachmt'nt on
the livery stock was levied in that suit by the deputy shC'riff.
This attachment remained in force until dissolved by the hnnJ, _
ruptcy proceedings, and the suit is still pending in the State
Court of Vermont.
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Under the agreement contained in the chattel mortgage of

April, 1891, Moore made sales, purchases, and exchanges of

livery stock to such an extent that on March 5, 1000. there only

remained of the livery property on hand April 15, 1891, two

horses. These sales, exchanges, and purchases were sometimes

made by Moore without communication with or advice from the

defendant, and frequently after consultation with him. The

livery stock, as it existed on May 16, 1900, was all acquired by

exchange of the original stock, or with the avails of the old

stock, or from the money derived from the business. Some years

after the execution of the chattel mortgage of April 15, 1891,

Moore became embarrassed, and finally, shortly prior to March

5, 1900, he became and continued wholly insolvent. On May

16, 1900, the defendant, acting under the advice of counsel, and

with the consent of Moore, took possession, under the mortgage

of April 15, 1891, of all the livery property then on hand, and

on June 11, 1900, caused the same to be sold "at public auction

by the sheriff. It is for the net avails of this sale, amounting to

$922.08, which the sheriff paid over to the defendant, that this

suit is brought. The Passumpsic Savings Bank on September

15, 1900, proved its note of $2,510.75 as an unsecured claim

against the bankrupt estate of Moore, as the mortgage held by

the bank as security had been given by Moore in March, 1900, to
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defendant, and by him assigned to the bank within four months

of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.

For the purpose of defeating the effect of the defendant taking

possession of the livery property under his chattel mortgage of

April, 1891, the trustee in bankruptcy presented a petition to

the United States District Court of Vermont for leave to inter-

vene as plaintiff in the Ryan attachment suit, and to have the

lien of Ryan's attachment preserved for the benefit of the gen-

eral creditors. This petition was dismissed by that court. The

referee found that the defendant and his counsel knew, when he

took possession of the livery property, under his mortgage, that

Moore was insolvent, and was considering going into bankruptcy.

The referee also found that he did not intend to perpetrate any

actual fraud on the other creditors, or any of them, but he did

intend thereby to perfect his lien on the livery property, and

make it available for the payment of his debt before other com-

plications by way of attachment or bankruptcy arose, and he

understood at that time that it was probable that the Ryan at-

tachment would hold good as against his mortgage. All the prop-

Under the agreement contained in the chattel mortgage of
.April, 1891, Moore made sales, purchases, and exchanges of
Jivery stock to such an extent that on March 5, 1900. there only
remained of the livery property on hand April 15, 1891, two
horses. These sales, exchanges, and purchases were somt>times
made by Moore without communication with or advice from the
defendant, and frequently after consultation with him. Thelivery stock, as it existed on May 16, 1900, was all acquired hy
exchange of the original stock, or with the avails of the olrl
stock, or from the money derived from the business. Some y~ars
after the execution of the chattel mortgage of April 15, 18~1,
Moore became embaITassed_, and finally, shortly prior to ~f areh
5, 1900, he became and continued wholly insolvent. On May
16, 1900, the defendant, acting under the advice of counsel. and
with the consent of Moore, took possession, under the ~ortgage
of April 15, 1891, of all the livery property then on hand, and
oo June 11, 1900, caused the same to be sold 'at public auction
by the sheriff. It is for the net avails of this sale, amounting to
$922.08, which the sheriff paid over to the defendant, that this
suit is brought. The Passumpsic Savings Bank on September
15, 1900, proved its note of $2,510.75 as an unsecured claim
against the bankrupt estate of l\foore, as the mortgage held by
the bank as security had been given by .Moore in March, 1900, to
defendant, and by him assigned to the bank within four months
of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
For the purpose of defeating the effect of the defendant taking
possession of the livery property under his chattel mortgage of
April, 1891, the trustee in bankruptcy presented a petition to
the Unit11d States District Court of Vermont for leave to intervene as plaintiff in the Ryan attachment suit, and to have the
lien of Ryan's attachment preserved for the benefit of the gen- eral creditors. This petition was dismissed by that court. The
referee found that the defendant and his counsel knew, whtn he
took possessi<>n of the livery property, under his mortgage, that
Moore was insolvent, and was considering going into bankruptcy.
The referee also found that he did not intend to perpetrate any
actual fraud on the other creditors, or any of them, but be did
intend thereby to perfect his lien on the livery property, and
make it available for the payment of his debt before other complications by way of attachment or bankruptcy arose, and he
understood at that time that it was probable that the Ryan attachment would hold good as against his mortgage. All the prop,,
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erty of which defendant took possession was acquired by Moore

with the full understanding and intent that it should be covered

by the defendant's mortgage of April 15, 1891.

Mr. Justice PECKHAM, after making the foregoing state-

erty of which defendant took possession was acquired by Moore
with the full understanding and intent that it should be covered
by the defendant's mortgage of April 15, 1891.

ment of facts, delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a contest between a trustee in bankruptcy representing

the creditors of the bankrupt, and the defendant, the mortgagee

in a chattel mortgage dated and executed April 15, 1891, and

duly recorded April 18 of that year. The defendant has paid

some $500 of the indebtedness of the bankrupt for which de-

fendant was liable as indorser on a note, and he remains liable

to pay the note of $2,510.75, held by the Passumpsic Savings

Bank, which was signed by him as surety.

The property taken possession of by the defendant under the

chattel mortgage was sold by a deputy sheriff on the 11th of

June, 1900, and the net avails of the sale, amounting to $922.08,

have been paid over by the officer who made the sale, to the

defendant. ,

This suit is brought by the trustee to recover from the defend-

ant those net avaijs on the theory that the action of the defend-

ant in taking possession and making the sale of the property

was unlawful under the provisions of the bankrupt act.
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The defendant had assisted the bankrupt in the purchase of

the property and had indorsed notes for him in order to enable

him to carry on the business of conducting a livery stable. This

mortgage, to secure him for these payments and liabilities, was

given some seven years before the passage of the bankrupt act,

and at the time it was given it was agreed by the parties to it that

the bankrupt might sell or exchange any of the livery stock cov-

ered by it, as he might desire, and should, by purchase or ex-

change, keep the stock good, so that the defendant's security

should not be impaired, and it was also agreed that all after-

acquired livery property should be covered by the mortgage as

security for the debts specified therein.

•••

There is no pretense of any actual fraud being committed or

contemplated by either party to the mortgage. Instead of tak-

ing possession at the time of the execution of the mortgage, the

defendant had it recorded in the proper clerk's office, and the

record stood as notice to all the world of the existence of the hen

as it stood when the mortgage was executed, and that the de-

Mr. Justice PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court:
This is a contest between a trustee in bankruptcy representing
the creditors of the bankrupt, and the defendant, the mortgagee
in a chattel mortgage dated and executed April 15, 1891, and
duly recorded April 18 of that year. The defendant has paid
some $500 of the indebtedness of the bankrupt for which defendant was liable as in<lorser on a note, and he remains liable
to pay the note of $2,510.75, held by the Passumpsic Savings
Bank, which was signed
by him as surety.
I
The property taken possession of by the defendant under the
chattel mortgage was sold by a deputy sheriff on the 11th of
June, 1900, and the net avails of the sale, amounting to $922.08,
have been paid over by the officer who made the sale, to the
defendant.
This suit is brought by the trustee to recover from the defendant those net avaijs on the theory that the action of the defendant in taking possession and making the sale of the property
was unlawful under the provisions of the bankrupt act.
The defendant had assisted the bankrupt in the purchase of
the property and had indorsed notes for him in order to enable
him to carry on the business of conducting a livery stable. This
mortgage, to secure him for these payments and liabilities, was
given some seven years before the passage of the bankrupt act,
and at the time it was given it was agreed by the parties to it that
the bankrupt might sell or exchange any of the livery stock covered by it, as he might desire, and should, by purchase or exchange, keep the stock good, so that the defendant's seeurity·
should not be impaired, and it was also agreed that all after·
~cquired livery property should be covered by the mortgage as
security for the debts specified therein.

• • •

There is no pretense of any actual fraud being committed or
contemplated by either party to the mortgage. Instead of taking possession at the time of the execution of the mortgage, thf'
defendant had it recorded in the proper clerk's office, and the
record stood as notice to all the world of the existence of the lien
as it stood when the mortgage was executed, and that the de-
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fendant would have the right to take possession of property sub-

sequently acquired, as provided for in the mortgage. The bank-

rupt was, therefore, not holding himself out as unconditional

owner of the property, and there was no securing of credit by

reason of his apparent unconditional ownership. The record

gave notice that he was not such unconditional owner. There

was no secret lien, and if defendant cannot secure the benefit

of this mortgage, which he obtained in 1891, as a lien upon the

after-acquired property, yet prior to the title of the trustee for

the benefit of creditors, it must be because of some provision of

the bankruptcy law, which we think the court ought not to con-

strue or endeavor to enforce beyond its fair meaning.

In Vermont it is held that a mortgage such as the one in

question is good. The Supreme Court of that state has so held

in this case, and the authorities to that effect are also cited in

the opinion of that court. And it is also there held that when

the mortgagee takes possession of after-acquired property, as

provided for in this mortgage, the lien is good and valid as

against every one but attaching or judgment creditors prior to

the taking of such possession.

At the time when the defendant took possession of this after-

acquired property, covered by the mortgage, there had been a

breach of the condition specified therein, and the title to the
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property was thereby vested in the mortgagee, subject to the

mortgagor's right in equity to redeem. This has been held to

be the law in Vermont (aside from any question as to the effect

of the bankrupt law), both in this case and in the cases also

cited in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Vermont. The

taking of possession of the after-acquired property, under a

mortgage such as this, is held good, and to relate back to the

date of the mortgage, even as against an assignee in insolvency.

Peabody v. Landon, 61 Vt. 318, 15 Am. St. Rep. 903, 17 Atl. 781,

and other cases cited in the opinion of the Supreme Court.

Whether and to what extent a mortgage of this kind is valid

is a local question, and the decisions of the state court will be

followed by this court in such case. Dooley v. Pease, 180 U. S.

126, 45 L. ed. 457, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308.

The question that remains is whether the taking of possession,

after condition broken, of these mortgaged chattels before al-

though within four months of filing the petition in bankruptcy,

was a violation of any of the provisions of the bankrupt act.

The trustee insists that such taking possession of the after-

fendant would have the right to take possession of property subsequently acquired, as provided for in the mortgage. The bankrupt was, therefore, not holding himself out as unconditional
owner of the property, and there was no securing of credit by
reason of his apparent unconditional ownership. The record
gave notice that he was not such unconditional owner. There
was no secret lien, and if defendant cannot se<>ure the benefit
of this mortgage, which he obtained in 1891, as a lien upon the
after-acquired property, yet prior to the title of the trusteE> for
the benefit of creditors, it must be because of some provi.~ion of
the bankruptcy law, which we think the court ought not to con.strue or endeavor to enforce beyond its fair meaning.
In Vermont it is held that a mortgage such as the one in
questio11 is good. The Supreme Court of that state has so held
in this case, and the authorities to that effect are also cited in
the opinion of that court. And it is also there held that when
the mortgagee takes posse,ssion of after-acquired property, as
provided for in this mortgage, the lien is good and valid as
against every one but attaching or judgment creditors prior to
the taking of such possessioo.
At the time when the defendant took possession of this afteracquired property, covered by the mortgage, there had been a
breach of the condition specified therein, and the title to the
property was thereby vested in the mortgagee, subject to the
mortgagor's right in equity to redeem. This has been held to
be the law in Vermont (aside from any question as to the effect
of the bankrupt law), both in this case and in the cases also
cited in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Vermont. The
taking of posse.ssion of the after-acquired property, under a
mortgage such as this, is held good, and to relate back to the
date of the mortgage, even ss against an assignee in insolvency.
Peabody v. Landon, 61 Vt. 318, 15 Am. St. Rep. 903, 17 Atl. 781,
and other cases cited in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
\Vhether aud to what extent a mortgage of this kind is valid
is a local question, and the decisions of the state court will be
followed by this court in such case. Dooley v. Pease, 180 U. S
126, 45 L. ed. 457, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308.
The question that remains is whether the taking of possession,
after condition broken, of these mortgaged chatrels before although within four months of filing the petition in bankruptcy,
was a violation of any of the provisioDB of the bankrupt act.
The trustee insists that such taking poeaesaion of the after-
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acquired property, under the mortgage of 1891, constituted a

preference under that act. He contends that the defendant did

not have a valid lien against creditors, under that act; that his

lien might, under other circumstances, have been consummated

by the taking of possession, but, as that was done within four

months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the lien was

not valid.

Did this taking of possession constitute a preference within

the meaning of the act?

It was found by the referee that when the defendant took

possession of the property he knew that the mortgagor was in-

solvent and was considering going into bankruptcy, but that he

did not intend to perpetrate any actual fraud on the other cred-

itors, or any of them, but did intend thereby to perfect his lien

on the property, and make it available for the payment of his

debts before other complications, by way of attachment or bank-

ruptcy, arose. He then understood that Ryan's attachment would

probably hold good against his mortgage. The question whether

any conveyance, etc., was in fact made with intent to defraud

creditors, when passed upon in the state court, is not one of a

Federal nature. McKenna v. Simpson, 129 U. S. 506, 32 L. ed.

771, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365; Cramer v. Wilson, 195 U. S. 408, 25
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Sup. Ct. Rep. 95, 49 L. ed. 256. It can scarcely be said that the

enforcement of a lien by the taking possession, with the consent

of the mortgagor, of after-acquired property covered by a valid

mortgage, is a conveyance or transfer within the bankrupt act.

There is no finding that, in parting with the possession of the

property, the mortgagor had any purpose of hindering, delay-

ing, or defrauding his creditors, or any of them. Without a find-

ing to the effect that there was an intent to defraud, there was

no invalid transfer of the property within the provisions of

§ 67e of the bankruptcy law. Sabin v. Camp, 98 Fed. 974.

In the case last cited the court, upon the subject of a prefer-

ence, held that though the transaction was consummated within

the four months, yet it originated in October, 1897, and there

was no preference under the facts of that case. "What was done

was in pursuance of the pre-existing contract, to which no ob-

jection is made. Camp furnished the money out of which the

property, which is the subject of the sale to him, was created.

He had good right, in. equity and in law, to make provision for

the security of the money so advanced, and the property pur-

chased by his money is a legitimate security, and one frequently

acquired property, under the mortgage of 1891, constituted a
preference under that act. He contends that the defendant did
not have a valid lien against creditors, under that act; that his
lien might, under. other circumstances, have been consummated
by the taking of possession, but, as that was done within four
months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the lien was
not valid.
Did this taking of possession constitute a preference within
the meaning of the act?
It was found by the referee that when the defendant took
possession of the property he knew that the mortgagor wus insolvent and was considering going into bankruptcy, but that he
did not intend to perpetrate any actual fraud on the other creditors, or any of them, but did intend thereby to perfect his lien
on the property, and make it available for the payment of his
debts before other complications, by way of attachment or bankruptcy, arose. He then understood that Ryan's attachment would
probably hold good against his mortgage. The question whether
any conveyance, etc., was in fact mnde with intent to defraud
creditors, when passed upon in the state court, is not one of a
Federal nature. McKenna v. Simpson, 129 U. S. 506, 32 IJ. ed.
771, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365; Cramer v. Wilson, 195 U. S. 408, 25
8up. Ct. Rep. 95, 49 L. ed. 256. It can scarcely be said that the
enforcement of a lien by the taking possession, with the consent
of the mortgagor, of after-acquired property covered by a valid
mortgage, is a conveyance or transfer within the bankrupt act.
There is no finding that, in parting with the posses.'3ion of the
property, the mortgagor had any purpose of hindering, delaying, or defrauding his creditors, or any of them. Without a finding to the effect that there was an intent to defraud, there was
no invalid transfer of the property within the provisions of
§ 67e of the bankruptcy law. Sabin v. Camp, 98 Fed. 974.
In the case last cited the court, upon the subject of a prefcreuce, held that though the transaction was consummated within
the four months, yet it originated in October, 1897, and there
was no preference under the facts of that case. ''What was done
was in pursuance of the pre-existing contract, to which no obj1:1ction is made. Camp furnished the money out of which the
property, which is the subject of the sale to him, was created.
He had good right, in. equity and in law, to make provision for
the security of the money so advanced, and the property pnr·
<:based by his money is a legitimate security, and one frequently
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employed. There is always a strong equity in favor of a lien

by one who advances money upon the property which is the

product of the money so advanced. This was what the parties

intended at the time, and to this, as already stated, there is,

aud can be, no objection in law or in morals. And when,

at a later date, but still prior to the filing of the petition in

bankruptcy, Camp exercised his rights, under this valid and

equitable arrangement, to possess himself of the property, and

make sale of it in pursuance of his contract, he was not guilty

of securing a preference under the bankruptcy law.''

The principle that the taking possession may sometimes be

held to relate back to the time when the right so to do was

created is recognized in the above case. So in this case, although

there was no actual existing lien upon this after-acquired prop-

erty until the taking of possession, yet there was a positive

agreement, as contained in the mortgage and existing of record,

under which the inchoate lien might be asserted and enforced,

and when enforced by the taking of possession, that possession

under the facts of this case, related back to the time of the

execution of the mortgage of April, 1891, as it was only by vir-

tue of that mortgage that possession could be taken. The Su-

preme Court of Vermont has held that such a mortgage gives

an existing lien by contract, which may be enforced by the
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actual taking of possession, and such lien can only be avoided

by an execution or attachment creditor whose lien actually

attaches before the taking of possession by the mortgagee. Al-

though this after-acquired property was subject to the lien of

an attaching or an execution creditor, if perfected before the

mortgagee took possession under his mortgage, yet, if there

were no such creditor, the enforcement of the lien by taking

possession would be legal, even if within the four months pro-

vided in the act. There is a distinction between the bald crea-

tion of a lien within the four months, and the enforcement of

one provided for in a mortgage executed years before the pas-

sage of the act by virtue of which mortgage, and because of

the condition broken, the title to the property becomes vested

in the mortgagee, and the subsequent taking possession becomes

valid, except as above stated. A trustee in bankruptcy does not,

in such circumstances, occupy the same position as a creditor

levying under an execution, or by attachment, and his rights,

in this exceptional case, and for the reasons just indicated, are

employed. There is always a strong e<1uity in favor of a lien
by one who advances money upon the property which is the
product of the money so advanced. This was what the parties
intended at the time, and to this, as already stated, there is,
and can be, no objection in law or in morals. And when,
at a later date, but still prior to the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy, Camp exercised his rights, under this valid and
equitable arrangement, to possess himself of the property, and
make sale of it in pursuance of his contract, he was not guilty
of securing a preference under the bankruptcy law."
The principle that the taking possession may sometimes be
held to relate back to the time when the right so to do was
created is recognized in the above case. So in this case, although
there was no actual existing lien upon this after-acquired property until the taking of possession, yet there was a positive
agreement, 88 contained in the mortgage and existing of record,
under which the inchoate lien might be asserted and enforced,
and when enforced by the taking of possession, that possession
under the fact.s of this case, related back to the time of the
execution of the mortgage of April, 1891, 88 it was only by virtue of that mortgage that possession could be taken. The Supreme Court of Vermont has held that such a mortgage gives
an existing lien by contract, which may be enforced by the
actual taking of po~ssion, aud such lien can only be avoided
by an execution or attachment creditor whose lien actually
attaches before the taking of possession by the mortgagee. Although this after-acquired property was subject to the lien of
an attaching or an execution creditor, if perfected before the
mortgagee took possession under his mortgage, yet, if there
were no such creditor, the enforcement of the lien by taking
possession would be legal, even if within the four months provided in the act. There is a distinction between the bald crea.
tion of a lien within the four months, and the enforcement of
one provided for in a mortgage executed years before the passage of the act by virtue of which mortgage, and because of
the condition broken, the title to the property becomes vested
in the mortgagee, and the subsequent taking possession becomes
valid. except as above stated. A tM.18tee in bankruptcy does not,
in such circumstances, occupy the same position as a creditor
levying under an execution, or by attachment, and his right8,
in this exceptional case, and for the reasons just indicated 1 are

PEEFERENCES

PREFERENCES

289

289

somewhat different from what they are generally stated. Muel-

ler v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1, 46 L. ed. 405, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269.

It is admitted on the part of the counsel for the plaintiff in

error that the rule in Vermont, in cases of chattel mortgages of

after-acquired property (where possession by the mortgagee

is necessary to perfect his title as against attaching or execu-

tion creditors), is that, although such possession be not taken

until long after the execution of the mortgage, yet the posses-

sion, when taken (if it be before the lien of the attaching or

execution creditor), brings the property under the cover and

operation of the mortgage as of its date,—the time when

the right of possession was first acquired. It was also admitted

that the Supreme Court of Vermont has held that when a

chattel mortgage requiring possession of the mortgaged prop-

erty to perfect it as to third persons was executed more than

four months before the commencement of insolvency proceed-

ings, the taking of actual possession of the mortgaged property

within the four months' period brought that property under

the mortgage as of its date, and so did not constitute a pref-

erence voidable by the trustee, although the other elements con-

stituting a preference were present. Many decisions of the

Supreme Court of Vermont are cited to this effect. It will be
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observed, also, that the provisions of the state insolvency law in

regard to void and voidable preferences and transfers were

identical with similar provisions of the bankruptcy act of 1867.

Gilbert v. Vail, 60 Vt. 261, 14 Atl. 542.

Under that law it was held that the assignee in bankruptcy

stood in the shoes of the bankrupt, and-that "except where,

within a prescribed period before the commencement of pro-

ceedings in bankruptcy, an attachment has been sued out against

the property of the bankrupt, or where his disposition of his

property was, under the statute, fraudulent and void, his as-

signees take his real and personal estate, subject to all equities,

liens, and encumbrances thereon, whether created by his act or

by operation of law." Yeatman v. New Orleans Sav. Inst., 95

U. S. 764, 24 L. ed. 589. See also Stewart v. Piatt, 101 U. S.

731, 25 L. ed. 816; Hauselt v. Harrison, 105 U. S. 401, 26 L. ed.

1075. Under the present bankrupt act, the trustee takes the

property of the bankrupt, in cases unaffected by fraud, in the

same plight and condition that the bankrupt himself held it, and

subject to all the equities impressed upon it in the hands of the

bankrupt, except in cases where there has been a conveyance or

B" * A. Bankruptcy—19

somewhat different from what they are generally stated. Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1, 46 L. ed. 405, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269.
It is admitted on the part of the counsel for the plaintiff in
error that the rule in Vermont, in cases of chattel mortgages of
after-acquired property (where possession by the mortgagee
is necessary to perfect his title as against attaching or execution ereditors), is that, although such possession be not taken
until long after the execution of the mortgage, yet the possession, when taken (if it be before the lien of the attaching or
execution creditor), brings the property under the cover and
operation of the mortgage as of its date,-the time when
the right of possession was first acquired.. It was also admitted
that the Supreme Court of Vermont has held that when a
chattel mortgage requiring possession of the mortgaged property to perfect it as to third persons was executed more than
four months before the commencement of insolvency proceedings, the taking of actual posseseion of the mortgaged property
within the four months' period brought th.at property under
the mortgage as of its date, and so did not constitute a preference voidable by the trustee, although the other elements constituting a preference were present. :Many decisions of the
Supreme Court of Vermont are cited to this effect. It will be
observed, also, that the provisions of the state insolvency law in
regard to void and voidable preferences and transfers were
identical with similar provisions of the bankruptcy act of 1867.
Gilbert v. Vail, 60 Vt. 261, 14 Atl. 542.
Under that law it was held that the assignee in bankruptcy
stood in the shoes of the bankrupt, and· .that "except where,
within a prescribed period before the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, an attachment has been sued out against
the property of the bankrupt, or where his disposition of his
property was, under the statute, fraudulent and void, his assignees take his real and personal estate, subject to all equities,
liens, and encumbrances thereon, whether created by his act or
by operation of law." Yeatman v. New Orleans Sav. Inst., 95
U. S. 764, 24 L. ed. 589. See also Stewart v. Platt, 101 U. S.
731, 25 L. ed. 816; Hauselt v. Harrison, 105 U.S. 401, 26 L. ed.
1075. Under the present bankrupt act, the trustee takes the
property of the bankrnpt, in cases unaffected by fraud, in the
oame plight and condition that the bankrupt himself held it, and
suhject to all the equities impressed upon it in the hands of the
bankrupt, except in cases where there has been a conveyance or
H. • A. BankruptC1'-1 II
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trustee by some positive provision of the act. Re Garcewich, 53

C. C. A. 510, 115 Fed. 87, 89, and cases cited.

It is true that in the case in 95 U. S. 764, 24 L. ed. 589, the

savings institution had a special property in the certificates

which were the subject of dispute, and had possession of them

at the time of the bankruptcy proceedings, and it was held that

the institution was not bound to return them, either to the bank-

rupt, the receiver, or the assignee in bankruptcy, prior to the

time of the payment of the debt for which the certificate was

held. So the state court held in this case, where the defendant

took possession under the circumstances detailed, by virtue of

his mortgage, and where he had the legal title to the property

mortgaged, after condition broken, that the possession thus taken

related back to the date of the giving of the mortgage, and in

thus enforcing his lien there was not a violation of any of the

provisions of the bankruptcy act.

In Wilson Bros. v. Nelson, 183 U. S. 191, 46 L. ed. 147, 22

Sup. Ct. Rep. 74, it was held that the bankrupt had committed

an act of bankruptcy, within the meaning of the bankrupt law,

by failing, for at least five days before a sale on the execution

issued upon the judgment recovered, to vacate or discharge the

judgment, or to file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. The
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judgment and execution were held to have been such a prefer-

ence, "suffered or permitted" by the bankrupt, as to amount to

a violation of the bankrupt act. Although the judgment was

entered upon the power of attorney given years before the pass-

age of the bankrupt act, it was nevertheless regarded as "suffer-

ing or permitting" a preference, within that act. This is not

such a case. As we have said, there is no finding that the de-

fendant had reasonable cause to believe that by the change of

possession it was intended to give a preference. As the state

court has said, it was rather a recognition of what was regarded

as a right under the previous agreement contained in the

mortgage.

Nor does the existence of the Ryan attachment, or the chattel

mortgage of March 5, 1900, executed by the bankrupt, and de-

livered to the defendant, and by him assigned, on the 23d of

March, 1900, to the bank, create any greater right or title in

the trustee than he otherwise would have. The trustee moved

under §67/, [30 Stat. at L. 565, c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat.

1901, p. 3450], on notice to the defendant, for an order that the

encumbrance of the property which is void as against the
trustee by some positive provision of the act. Re Garcewich, 53
C. C. A. 510, 115 Fed. 87, 89, and cases cited.
It is true that in the case in 95 U. S. 764, 24 L. ed. 589, the
savings institution had a special property in the certific.ates
which were the subject of dispute, and had possession of them
at the time of the bankruptcy proceedings, and it was held that
the institution was not bound to return them, either to the bankrupt, the receiver, or the assignee in bankruptcy, prior to the
time of the payment of the debt for which the certificate was
held. So the state court held in this case, where the defendant
took possession under the circumstances detailed, by virtue of
his mortgage, and where he had the legal title to the property
mortgaged, after condition broken, that the possession thus taken
related back to the date of the giving of the mortgage, and in
thus enforcing his lien there was not a violation of any of t.he
provisions of the bankruptcy act.
In Wilson Bros. v. Nelson, 183 U. S. 191, 46 L. ed. 147, 22
Sup. Ot. Rep. 74, it was held that the bankmpt had committed
an act of bankruptcy, within the meaning of the bankrupt law,
by failing, for at least five days before a sale on the execution
issued upon the judgment recovered, to vacate or discharge the
judgment, or to file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. The
judgment and execution were held to have been such a preference, '' ~uffered or permitted'' by the bankrupt, as to amount to
a violation of the bankrupt act. Although the judgment was
entered upon the power of attorney given years before the passage of the bankrupt act, it was nevertheless regarded as ''suffering or permitting" a preference, within that act. This is not
such a case. As we have said, there is no finding that the defendant had reasonable cause to believe that by the change of
possession it was intended to give a preference. As the state
court has said, it was rather a recognition of what was regarded
as a right under the previous agreement contained in the
'
mortgage.
Nor does the existence of the Ryan attachment, or the chattel
mortgage of March 5, 1900, executed by the bankrupt, and delivered to the defendant, and by him assigned, on the 23d of
1\farch, 1900, to the bank, create any greater right or title in
the trustee than he otherwise would have. The trustee moved
under § 67/, f30 Stat. at L. 565, c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat.
1901, p. 3450], on notice to the defendant, for an order tkat the
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Tight or lien under the Ryan attachment should be preserved,

so that the same might pass to the trustee for the benefit of the

estate, as provided for in that section. This was denied. And

unless such permission had been granted, the lien of the attach-

ment was not preserved by the act, but, on the contrary, it was

dissolved under § 67c. i

The mortgage assigned to the bank, and the attachment ob-

tained by Ryan, having been dissolved by the bankrupt proceed-

ings, the defendant's rights under his mortgage of April 15,

1891, stood the same as though there had been no subsequent

mortgage given, or attachment levied. This is the view taken

by the state court of the effect of the dissolution of the mort-

gage and attachment liens under the bankrupt act, and we think

it is the correct one. It is stated in the opinion of the state

court as follows:

"It is urged that with the annulment of the attachment, the

property affected by it passed to the trustee as a part of the

estate of the bankrupt under the express provisions of § 67/.

There would be more force in this contention were it not for the

provision that, by order of the court, an attachment lien may be

preserved for the benefit of the estate. If there is no other

lien on the property, there can be no occasion for such order;

for, on the dissolution of the attachment, the property, unless
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exempt, would pass to the trustee anyway. It is only when the

property for some reason may not otherwise pass to the trustee

as a part of the estate that such order is necessary. We think

such is the purpose of that provision, and that unless the lien

is preserved, the property, as in the case at bar, may be held

upon some other lien, and not pass to the trustee. Re Sentenne

& Green Co., 120 Fed. 436."

We think the judgment of the Supreme Court of Vermont

was right, and it is affirmed.35

In re CUTTING

145 Fed. 388

(District Court, W. D. New York. May 7, 1906)

HA-ZEL, District Judge. The report of the special master

herein finds that the alleged bankrupt, Benjamin W. Cutting,

35 Cf. In re Beynolds, 153 Fed. v. Hand, 206 U. 8. 415, 423; Taney

295. See Security Warehousing Co. v. Penn Nat Bank, 232 XJ. S. 174.

right or lien under the Ryan attachment should be preserved,
so that the same might pass to the trustee for the benefit of the
estate, as provided for in that section. This was denied. And
unless such pennission had been granted, the )ien of the attachment was not preserved by the act, but, on the contrary, it was
dissolved under § 67c.
The mortgage assigned to the bank, and the attachment obt.ained by Ryan, having been dissolved by the bankrupt proceedings, the defendant's rights under his mortgage of April 15,
1891, stood the same as though there had been no subsequent
mortgage given, or attachment levied. This is tlte view taken
by the state court of the effect of the dissolution of the mortgage and attachment liens under the bankrupt act, and we think
it is the correct one. It is stated in the opinion of the state
court as follows:
"It is urged that with the annulment of the attachment, the
property affected by it passed to the trustee as a part of the
estate of the bankrupt under the express provisions of § 67/.
There would be more f<>f'ce in this contention were it not for the
provision th.at, by order of the court, an attachment lien may be
preserved for the benefit of the estate. If there is no other
lien on the property, there can be no occasion for such order;
for, on the dissolution of the attachment, the property, unless
exempt, would pass to the trustee anyway. It is only when the
property for some reason may not otherwise pass to the trus~ee
as a part of the estate that such order is necessary. We think
such is the purpose of that provision, and that unless the lien
is preserved, the property, as in the case at bar, may be held
upoo some other lien, and not pass to the trustee. Re Sentenne
& Green Co., 120 Fed. 436. ''
We think the judgme-nt of the Supreme CO'Url of Verm.ont
was right, a.nd it is affirmed.35
In re CUTTING

145 Fed. 388
(District Court, W. D. New York. May 7, 1906)
HAZEL, District Judge. The report of the special master
herein finds that the alleged bankrupt, Benjamin W. Cutting,
35-Cf. In re Reynolds, 153 Fed.
See Security Warehousing Co.

295.

v. Hand, 206 U. S. 415, 423; Taney
v. Penn Nat. Bank, 232 U. S. 174.
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committed an act of bankruptcy in transferring, while insolvent,

certain personal property, by executing and delivering chattel

mortgages thereon, with intent to create an unlawful preference

under the bankrupt act. The undisputed facts are as follows:

The opposing creditors, Lazell & Co., at different times, begin-

ning in the year 1899, loaned and advanced money to the bank-

rupt, accepting as security therefor a chattel mortgage upon

specified personal property. Such chattel mortgage was exe-

cuted and delivered on April 24, 1901, and on February 8, 1902,

another mortgage was given in renewal thereof to secure amounts

due and to become due covering the property specified in the

former mortgage. Subsequently, on March 12 and 13, 1903, re-

spectively, the debtor gave to said secured creditors two chattel

mortgages to secure the sum of about $3,000, the amount then

due, as appears by the testimony of Cutting, which mortgages

covered the property theretofore mortgaged to them, and in

addition a so-called Hartman machine, not enumerated in the

prior incumbrance. The mortgage liens were duly recorded or

filed in the town clerk's office, as required by the statute of the

state. It is claimed, however, that the mortgages of March 12

and 13, 1903, were not continued of force against the creditors
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of the mortgagor or subsequent purchasers or mortgagees in

good faith, in that c. 528, p. 460, of the Laws of 1896, which

requires that a statement describing the mortgage, and the

time and place of its filing, be filed within the 30 days, was

not complied with. There exists some contrariety of decisions

in relation to the effect of an omission to strictly comply with

the provisions of the statute as to whether a mortgage ceased to

be valid against a creditor at large of the mortgagor, or if a cred-

itor must be in a situation to seize the mortgaged property pur-

suant to a lien upon it. This proposition I conceive to be

definitely decided in the Matter of New York Economical Print-

ing Co., 110 Fed. 514, 49 C. C. A. 133, where the state court

authorities are cited and examined by the Circuit Court of Ap-

peals for this circuit, and which holds that:

"Only such creditors can take advantage of it [the statute]

as are armed with some legal process authorizing the seizure

of the mortgaged property, and are thereby in a position to

enforce a lien upon it."

The cases hold that a trustee in bankruptcy takes the property

in the same plight and condition that the bankrupt himself held

it, assuming the transaction free from fraud and subject to

committed an act of bankruptcy in transferring, while insolvent.
certain personal property, by executing and delivering chattel
mortgages thereon, with intent to create an unlawful preference
under the bankrupt act. The undisputed facts are as follows:
The opposing creditors, Lazell & Co., at different times, l>eginning in the year 1899, loaned and advanced money to the bankrupt, accepting as security therefor a chattel mortgage upon
specified personal property. Such chattel mortgage was executed and delivered on April 24, 1901, and on February 8, 1902,
another mortgage was given in renewal thereof to secure amounts
due and to become due covering the property specified in the
former mortgage. Subsequently, on March 12 and 13, 1903, respectively, the debtor gave to said secured creditors two chattel
mortgages to secure the sum of about $3,000, the a.mount then
due, as appears by the testimony of Cutting, which mortgages
covered the property theretofore mortgaged to them, and in
addition a so-called Hartman machine, not enumerated in the
prior incumbrance. The mortgage liens were duly recorded or
filed in the town clerk's office, as required by the statute of the
state. It is claimed, however, that the mortgages of March 12
and 13, 1903, were not continued of force against the creditors
of the mortgagor or subsequent purchasers or mortgagees in
good faith, in that c. 528, p. 460, of the Laws of 1896, which
requires that a statement describing the mortgage, aml the
time and place of its filing, be filed within the 30 days, wa.s
not complied with. There exists some contrariety of decisions
in ·relation to the effect of an omission to strictly comply with
the provisions of the statute as to whether a mortgage ceased to
be valid against a creditor at large of the mortgagor, or if a creditor must be in a situation to seize the mortgaged property pursuant to a lien upon it. This proposition I conceive to be
definitely decided in the Matter of New York E~onomical Printing Co., 110 Fed. 514, 49 C. C. A. 133, where the state court
authorities are cited and examined by the Circuit Court of Appeals for this circuit, and which holds that:
'' Onl,v such creditors can take advantage of it [the statute]
as are al'Jlled with some legal process authorizing the seizure
of the mortgaged property, and are thereby in a position to
enforce a lien upon it.''
The cases hold that a trustee in bankruptcy takes the property
in the same plight and condition that the bankrupt himself held
it, assuming the transaction free from fraud and subject to
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t\\e existing equities. Hewit v. Berlin Machine Works. 194 U. S.

296, 24 Sup. Ct. 690, 48 L. ed. 986; Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196

U. S. 516, 25 Sup. Ct. 306, 49 L. ed. 577. And as between the

alleged bankrupt- and the mortgagees, giving due consideration

to the facts of this case, it is thought that the mortgages in

question were neither void nor fraudulent. The contesting cred-

itors contend that such mortgages were practically renewals

and covered the identical property; that they were not void as

against the mortgagees, though given as collateral security for a

pre-existing debt owing from the bankrupt, and no statement

having been filed in accordance with the state enactment men-

tioned. .The evidence satisfies me that the transaction was not in

Lad faith, and that no intention existed to defeat the operation

of the bankrupt act. Hence, it is immaterial that Cutting was,

»r that the mortgagees had reason to believe him, insolvent. The

bankrupt act does not forbid the giving of other or different

security within the four months period to replace security pre-

viously given, if such security is a valid one and of equal value

as that previously given. The mortgagor might have surren-

dered the possession of the property of the mortgagees just prior

to making the new mortgages. Indeed, the mortgagees could

legally have taken possession thereof in payment of their lien,
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though there had been no compliance with the statute regard-

ing refiling. As said in Sawyer v. Turpin, 91 U. S. 114, 23 L. ed.

235:

'' The mortgage covered the same property. It embraced noth-

ing more. It withdrew nothing from the control of the bank-

rupt, or from the reach of the bankrupt's creditors, that had

not been withdrawn by the bill of sale. Giving the mortgage in

lieu of the bill of sale, as was done, was therefore a mere ex-

change in the form of the security. In no sense can it be re-

garded as a new preference. The preference, if any, was

obtained on the 15th of May, when the bill of sale was given,

more than four months before the petition in bankruptcy was

filed. It is too well settled to require discussion that an exchange

of securities within the four months is not a fraudulent pref-

erence within the meaning of the bankrupt law, even when the

creditor and the debtor know that the latter is insolvent, if the

security given up is a valid one when the exchange is made, and

if it be undoubtedly of equal value with the security substituted

for it."

This language, in a case where the facts were only slightly

the existing equities. Hewit v. Berlin Machine \Yorks, 194 U. S.
'2.96, 24 Sup. Ct. 690, 48 L. ed. 986; Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196
U. ~. 516, 25 Sup. Ct. 306, 49 L. ed. 577. And as between the
alleged bankrupt. and the mortgagees, giving due consideration
to the facts of this case, it is thought that the mortgages in
<1uestion were neither void nor fraudulent. The contesting creditors contend that such mortgages were practically renewals
and covered the identical property; that they were not void as
against the mortgagees, though given as collateral security for a
pre-existing debt owing from the bankrupt, and no statement
haviug been filed in accordance with the state enactm®t mentioned. .'l'he evidence satisfies me that the transaction was not in
Lad faith, and that no intention existed to defeat the operation
of the ba.ukrnpt act. Hence, it is immaterial. that Cutting was,
or that the mortgagees had reason to believe him, insolvent. The
bankrupt act does not forbid the giving of other or different
s·_·1:urity within the four months period to replace security pre,.iously given, if such security is a valid one and of equal value
as that previously given. The mortgagor might have surrenderecl the possession of the property of the mortgagees just prior
to making the new mortgages. Indeed, the mortgagees could
ll.'gally have taken possession thereof in payment of their lien,
though there had been no compliance with the statute regardi11g refiling. As said in Sawyer v. Turpin, 91 U. S. 114, 23 L. ed.
235:
''The mortgage covered the same property. It embraced nothi 11~ more. It withdrew nothing from the control of the bankrupt, or from the reach of the bankrupt's creditors, that had
11ot been withdrawn by the bill of sale. Giving the mortgage in
lieu of the bill of sale, as was done, was therefore a mere exd1 a1 i ge in the form of the security. In no sense can it be re.
garded as a new preference. The preference, if any,' was
<Jhtaine<l on the 15th of :\lay, when the bill of sale was given,
ruore than four months before the petition in bankruptcy was
filed. '" It is too well settled to require discussion that an exchange
of securities within the four months is not a fraudulent pref.
t:rence witJ1in the meaning of the bankrupt law, even when the
creditor and the debtor know that the latter is insolvent, if the
security given up is a valid one when the exchange is made, and
if it be undoubtedly of equal value with the security substituted
for it.''
This language, in a case where the facts were only slightly
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different, is not thought inapplicable here. It was held in Re

Shepherd, 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 725, that where a new chattel

mortgage, which was duly recorded, was given within four

months of filing the petition, in place of a prior mortgage and

for a valuable consideration, the new mortgage operates as a

continuance of the prior incumbrance, and, as no lien inter-

vened before the bankruptcy, there was no illegal preference. In

Asbury Park Building & Loan Association v. Shepherd, 6 Am.

Bankr. Rep. 725, it is stated that:

"The mere exchange of securities within four months is not

a preference within the meaning of the bankrupt law; the rea-

sons being that the change takes nothing from the other

creditors.''

There a new mortgage was substituted for a prior security

within four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptey.

The facts of that case are similar to those here presented. See,

also, Stewart v. Piatt, 101 U. S. 731, 25 L. ed. 816. In this case

the same property was included in the mortgages given by

Cutting to replace prior ones to secure an indebtedness already

existing, and, as already stated, in addition thereto the Hart-

man machine, which inclusion was warranted by a present con-

sideration of $125, subsequently used by the bankrupt in pay-

ment of insurance. True, the referee found that the later
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mortgage included property not enumerated in the earlier, but

a careful comparison of the two instruments indicates otherwise.

Various of the items were a little differently described, but the

schedule of personal property attached to the mortgage reason-

ably identifies the articles as practically the same, with the ex-

ception of the Hartman machine and the offspring of the stock

mentioned in the earlier mortgage.

*#•t

The mortgages to Taylor & Wakeman, claimed to have been

unlawful transfers in contravention of the bankrupt act, were

also executed and delivered by the bankrupt as substitutes for

prior unpaid mortgage liens, and come under the views herein

expressed.

•••

The petition for adjudication of Benjamin W. Cutting as a

bankrupt is therefore dismissed. So ordered.30

36—Cf. Becker Co. v. GUI, 206

Fed. 36.

different, is not thought inapplicable here. It was held in Be
Shepherd, 6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 725, that where a new chattel
mortgage, which was duly recorded, was given within four
months of filing the petition, in place of a prior mortgage and
for a valuable consideration, the new mortgage operates as a
continuance of the prior incumbrance, and, as no lien intervened before the bank~uptcy, there was no illegal preference. In
Asbury Park Building & Loan Association v. Shepherd, 6 Am.
Bankr. Rep. 725, it is stated that:
''The mere exchange of securities within four months is not
a preference within the meaning of the bankrupt law; the re&·
sons being that the change takes nothing from the other
creditors.''
There a new mortgage WWI substituted for a prior security
within four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
The facts of that case are similar to those here presented. See,
also, Stewart v. Platt, 101 U. S. 731, 25 L. ed. 816. In this case
the same property was included in the mortgages given by
Cutting to replace prior ones to secure an indebtedness already
existing, .and, as already stated, in addition thereto the Hartman machine, which inclusion was warranted by a present con·
sideration of $125, subsequently used by the bankrupt in payment of insurance. True, the referee found that the later
mortgage included property not enumerated in the earlier, but
a careful comparison of the two instruments indicates otherwise.
Various of the items were a little differently described, but the
schedule of personal property attached to the mortgage reason·
ably identifies the articles WI practically the same, with. the ex·
ception of the Hartman machine and the offspring of the stock
mentioned in the earlier mortgage.

• • •

,

The mortgages to Taylor & Wakeman, claimed to have been
unlawful transfers in contravention of the bankrupt act, were
also executed and delivered by the bankrupt as substitutes for
prior unpaid mortgage liens, and come under th.e views herein
expressed.

• • •

The petition for adjudication of Benjamin W. Cutting as a
bankrupt is therefore dismissed. So ordered.Ill
36-Cf.

Fed. 36.
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In re GREAT WESTERN MFG. CO.

152 Fed. 123, 81 C. C. A. 341

In re GREAT WESTERN l\IFG. CO.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. March 4, 1907)

SANBORN, Circuit Judge. The J. T. Royston Milling Com-

152 Fed. 123, 81 C. C. A. 341

pany, a corporation, was adjudged a bankrupt upon a petition

filed on January 6, 1905. Prior to September 6, 1904, the Great

Western Manufacturing Company, a corporation, had sold, in-

stalled, and put in operation in the Royston Company's mill at

Fremont, in the state of Nebraska, certain machinery and ma-

terial, for which at the time of their final acceptance it gave its

promissory notes for $10,034.60 and an agreement that the title

and the right to the possession of the machinery and material

should remain in the vendor until the notes were paid, notwith-

standing any agreement or security that was or might be taken

for the performance of the agreement, and that the payment of

the notes should be secured by a mortgage on the mill and its

appurtenances, or equivalent security, at the election of the Great

Western Company. This agreement was first filed in the proper

county clerk's office on October 8, 1904. On October 10, 1904,

the vendee made a mortgage on the mill and its appurtenances

which was recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the

proper county on the same day. The mill and its appurtenances,
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including the machinery and material sold by the Great Western

Manufacturing Company, were sold by order of the court below

for $16,400. The Great Western Company immediately there-

after filed its claim, and asked that it be paid in full out of the

proceeds of the sale in preference to the claims of other creditors.

The referee allowed the claim for $10,532.50, and denied it any

preference. The District Court reversed this order, held that the

agreement was valid and the mortgage a voidable preference,

and directed that the vendor should be paid in preference to the

other creditors such a proportion of the $16,400 as the value of

the machinery and material it sold bore to the value of the mill

and appurtenances at the time of the sale of the latter. It now

presents its petition to revise this order because the court below

did not uphold the mortgage and sustain its claim for a pref-

erence thereunder for the entire amount of the bankrupt's debt

to it. The trustee moves to dismiss the petition because it was

filed more than 10 days after the order assailed was made, and

because it involves disputed questions of fact which it is alleged

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. March 4, 1907)

SANBORN, Circuit Judge. The J. T. Royston l\Iilling Company, a corporation, was adjudged a bankrupt upon a petition
filed on January 6, 1905. Prior to September 6, 1904, the Great
Western Manufacturing Company, a corporation, had solJ, installed, and put in operation in the Royston Company's mill at
Fremont, in the state of Nebraska, certain machinery and material, for which at the time of their final acceptance it gave its
promissory notes for $10,034.60 and an agreement that the title
and the right to the possession of the machinery and material
should remain in the vendor until the notes were paid, notwithstanding any agreement or security that was or might be taken
for the performance of the agreement, and that the payment of
the notes should be secured by a mortgage on the mill and its
appurtenances, or equivalent security, at the election of the Great
Western Company. This agreement was first filed in the proper
county clerk's office on October 8, 1904. On October 10, 1904,
the vendee made a mortgage on the mill and its appurtenances
which was recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the
proper county on the same day. The mill and its appurtenances,
including the machinery and material sold by the Great Western
:Manufacturing Company, were sold by order of the court below
for $16,400. The Great Western Company immediately thereafter filed its claim, and asked that it be paid in full out of the
proceeds of the sale in preference to the claims of other creditors.
The referee allowed the claim for $10,532.50, and denied it any
preference. The District Court reversed this ·order, held that the
agreement was valid and the mortgage a voidable preference,
and directed that the vendor should be paid in preference to the
other creditors such a proportion of the $16,400 as the value of
the machinery and material it sold bore to the value of the mill
a.n<l appurtenances at the time of the sale of the latter. It now
presents its petition to revise this order because the court below
did not uphold the mortgage and sustain its claim for a preference thereunder for the entire amount of the bankrupt's debt
to it. The trustee moves to dismiss the petition because it was
filed more than 10 days after the order assailed was made, and
because it involves disputed questions of fact which it is alleged
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can only be determined by appeal, and the trustee prays that if

the merits of the case are considered the petitioner be denied

any preference whatever.

While it is true that counsel do not agree upon the facts, the

record fairly establishes those which have been stated, and upon

them the case will be determined. The agreement of conditional

sale whereby the vendor retained the title to the machinery and

material until its purchase price was paid did not create a pref-

erence voidable under the bankruptcy law because it was given

for a present consideration, for the machinery and material

which were and continued to be the property of the vendor, and

because it was made more than four months before the petition

in bankruptcy was filed. Agreements of this nature which are

not filed or recorded in the proper public office are voidable by

purchasers, attaching creditors, and judgment creditors only, un-

der the statutes of Nebraska (Comp. St. 1901, Neb. c. 32, §26;

Campbell Printing, etc., Co. v. Dyer, 46 Neb. 830, 836, 65 N. W.

904; McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Callen, 48 Neb. 849,

67 N. W. 863), and there was none of either class when the peti-

tion in bankruptcy was filed in this case. The contract was there-

fore valid and enforceable against the bankrupt and against his

ordinary creditors, and hence against the trustee, for he had no

better right or title to the property than they, and he suffered
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no prejudice from the order of the court. Hewit v. Berlin Ma-

chine Works, 194 U. S. 296, 297, 303, 24 Sup. Ct. 690, 48 L. ed.

986; Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516, 25 Sup. Ct. 306,

49 L. ed. 577; York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U. S. 344, 352, 26

Sup. Ct. 481, 50 L. ed. 782.

The Great Western Company insists, however, that it was en-

titled to payment of the entire amount of its claim out of the

proceeds of the trustee's sale of the mill and machinery, be-

cause the proportion of those proceeds which the value of the

machinery and material bore to the value of the mill and its

appurtenances was but one-third, and under the order of the

court it will sustain a heavy loss, and because it had a mortgage

upon the entire property given in execution of an agreement

made more than four months before the petition in bankruptcy

was filed. The vendor had the right to take the machinery and

material out of the mill and dispose of it as it saw fit. If it had

applied to the court to do so and its application had been denied,

it would have been entitled to recover of the trustee the value of

its right. But it presented no such claim and made no applica-

can only be determined by appeal, and the trustee prays that if
the merits of the case are considered the petitioner be denied
any preference whatever.
\\"hile it is true that counsel do not agree upon the facts, the
record fairly establishes those which have been stated, and upon
them the case will be determined. The agreement of couditional
sale whereby the vendor retained the title to the machinery and
material until its purchase price was paid did not create a preference voidable under the bankruptcy law because it was given
for a present consideration, for the machinery and material
which were and co11ti11ued to be the property of the vendor, and
because it was made more than four months before the petition
iu bankruptcy was filed. Agreements of this nature which are
not filed or recorded in the proper public office are voidable by
purchasers, attaching creditors, and judgment creditors only, un·
<lt!r the statutes of Nebraska (Comp. St. 1901, Neb. c. 32, § 26:
Campbell Printing, etc., Co. v. Dyer, 46 Neb. 830, 836, 65 N. W.
904; McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Callen, 48 Neb. 849,
67 N. \V. 863), and there was none of either class when the petition in bankruptcy was filed in this case. The contract was therefore valid and enforceable against the bankrupt and against his
Ol'dinary creditors, and hence against the trustee, for he had no
better right or title to the property than they, and he suffered
no prejudice from the order of the court. Hewit v. Berlin :\lachine Works, 194 U. S. 296, 297, 303, 24 Sup. Ct. 690, 48 L. ed.
986; Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516, 25 Sup. Ct. 306,
49 L. ed. 577; York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U. S. 344, 352, 26
Sup. Ct. 481, 50 L. ed. 782.
The Great Western Company insists, however, that it was entitled ·to payment of the entire amount of its claim out of the
proceeds of the trustee's sale of the mill and machinery, because the proportion of those proceeds which the value of the
machinery and material bore to the value of the mill and its
appurtenances was but one-third, and under the order of the
court it will sustain a heavy loss, and because it had a mortgage
upon the entire property given in execution of an agreement
made more than four months before the petition in bankruptcy
was filed. The vendor had the right to take the machinery and
material out of the mill and dispose of it as it saw fit. If it had
applied to the court to do so and its application had been denied,
it would have been entitled to recover of the trustee the value of
its right. But it presented no such claim and made no applic&·

PREFERENCES

PREFERENCES

297

297

tion of that nature. The proceedings in bankruptcy were pend-

ing from January 6, 1905, until May 25, 1905, before the sale

was made. It was ordered on May 12, 1905, and the first act of

the Great Western Company was the filing of a claim for a pref-

erence in payment out of the proceeds after the sale had been

made. Its acquiescence in the sale of its property in the mill with

that of the bankrupt estopped it from receiving out of the pro-

ceeds of the sale of the entire lot any larger proportion than the

value of its property bore to the value of the entire property sold.

The mortgage was executed and recorded on October 10, 1904,

within the four months prior to the filing of the petition in bank-

ruptcy. The mortgagor was then hopelessly insolvent. The

effect of the enforcement of the mortgage will be to enable the

mortgagee to obtain a greater percentage of its debt than any

of the bankrupt's other creditors of the same class can obtain,

and the referee and the court were of the opinion, in which we

concur, that the mortgagee had reasonable cause to believe when

the mortgage was made that it was intended to give a preference

thereby. But counsel persuasively argue that this mortgage

escapes the ban of § 60 of the bankruptcy law (Act July 1,

1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 562 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3445]), be-

cause it was made in the performance of the provision of the
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agreement of conditional sale that the notes of the vendee should

"be secured by first mortgage on said premises and appurten-

ances (the mill site and mill), or equivalent security, at the

first party'8 (the vendor's) election," and the question arises,

is a mortgage or other transfer of an insolvent's property within

the four months which is otherwise voidable as a preference pro-

tected by an agreement to make it executed prior to the four

months? The statutes regarding the filing and recording of

mortgages and transfers do not condition this issue in the case

before us, and their effect will not be farther noticed, because"

the statutes of Nebraska do not avoid mortgages as against the

mortgagors and their ordinary creditors for failure to file or

record them. They make them voidable against attaching and

judgment creditors only. Comp. St. Neb. 1901, c. 32, § 14; For-

rester v. Bank, 49 Neb. 655, 68 N. W. 1059; Lancaster County

Bank v. Gillilan, 49 Neb. 165, 68 N. W. 352.

Argument by analogy in support of an affirmative answer to

the question here at issue may well be drawn from In re J. F.

Grandy & Son (D. C.) 146 Fed. 318, Wilder v. Watts (D. C.)

138 Fed. 426, McDonald v. Daskam, 53 C. C A- 554, 116 Fed.

tion of that nature. The proceedings i11 bankruptcy were pend ing from January 6, 1905, until May 25, 1905, before the sale
was made. It was ordered on May 12, 1905, and the first act of
the Great Western Company was the tiling of a claim for a preference in payment out of the proceeds after the sale had been
made. Its acquiescence in the sale of its property in thl' mill with
that of the bankrupt estopped it from receiving out of the proceeds of the sale of the entire lot any larger proportion than the
value of its property bore to the value of the entire property sold. '
The mortgage was executed and recorded on October 10, 1904,
within the four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. The mortgagor was then hopelessly insolvent. The
effect of the enforcement of the mortgage will be to enable the
mortgagee to obtain a greater percentage of its debt than any
of the bankrupt's other creditors of the same class can obtain,
and the referee and the court were of the opinion, in which we
concur, that the mortgagee had reasonable cause to believe when
the mortgage was made that it was intended to give a preference
thereby. But counsel persuasively argue that this mortgage
escapes the ban of § 60 of the bankruptcy law (Act July 1,
1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 562 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3445] ), because it was made in the performance of the provision of the
agreement of conditional sale that the notes of the vendee should
"be secured by first mortgage _on said premises and appurtenances (the mill site and mill), or equivalent security, at the
first party's (the vendor's) election," and the question arises,
is a mortgage or other transfer of an insolvent's property within
the four months which is otherwise voidable as a. preference pr~
teeted by an agreement to make it executed prior to the four
months T The statutes regarding the filing and recording of
mortgages and transfers do not condition this issue in the case
before us, and their effect will not be farther noticed, because
the statutes of Nebraska do not avoid mortgages as against the
mortgagors and their ordinary creditors for failure to file or
reeord them. They make them voidable against attaching and
judgment creditors only. Comp. St. Neb. 1901, c. 32, § 14; Forrester v. Bank, 49 Neb. 655, 68 N". W. 1059; Lancaster County
Bank v. Gillilan, 49 Neb. 165, 68 N. W. 352.
Argument by analogy in support of an affirmative answer to
the question here at issue may well be drawn from In re J. F.
Grandy & Son (D. C.) 146 Fed. 318, Wilder v. Watts (D. C.)
138 Fed. 426, McDonald v. Daskam, 53 C. C. A. 554, 116 Fed.
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276, and In re Wittenberg Veneer & Panel Co. (D. C.) 108 Fed.

593, 595, in which assignments of policies of insurance within

the four months pursuant to agreements to make them, executed

prior to the four months, were sustained under peculiar circum-

stances and from Sabin v. Camp (C. C.) 98 Fed. 974, in which

a conveyance within the four months upon a payment of the

balance of the purchase price was sustained where it had been

made in performance of a contract executed prior to the four

months to the effect that the creditor should advance money to

purchase the property, should have a lien upon it, and the option,

which he exercised, to buy it at a specified price for the amount

of the money he had advanced and the cash balance requisite to

aggregate the required amount.

But the theory and purpose of the bankruptcy act were to dis-

tribute the unexempt property which the bankrupt owned four

months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy against

him, share and share alike, among his creditors of the same class.

To this end every judgment procured or suffered against him,

every transfer by an insolvent of any of his property, every con-

ceivable way of depleting it after the commencement of the four

months the effect of which is "to enable any one of his creditors

to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any other of such

creditors of the same class," is declared to be a voidable pref-
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erence if the creditor has reason to believe that a preference is

intended thereby. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, and Act, Feb. 5,

1903, c. 487, 30 Stat. 562, 32 Stat. 799 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901,

p. 3445; U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1905, p. 689]; Swarts v. Fourth

National Bank, 54 C. C. A. 387, 389, 117 Fed. 1, 3. An agree-

ment to mortgage or to transfer is not a mortgage or a transfer.

The title remains in the owner unincumbered by the mortgage

until the mortgage or transfer is effected. When the agreement

is made before, and the mortgage or transfer within, the four

months, the title stands unincumbered by the latter at the com-

mencement of the four months, and the proceeds of that title are

pledged under the bankruptcy law for the benefit of all the

creditors pro rata. Any subsequent mortgage or transfer with-

draws that title or a portion of its value from these creditors,

and a just and fair interpretation and execution of the act de-

mauds that such a mortgage or transfer should be adjudged

voidable if it is otherwise so, and that the mortgagee or trans-

feree should be remitted to his original agreement. In this way

the property at the commencement of the four months and its

276, and In re Wittenberg Veneer & Panel Co. (D. C.) 108 F'ed.
593, 595, in which assignments of policies of insuran<'e within
the four months pursuant to agreements to make them, executed
prior to the four months, were sustained under peculiar circumstances and from Sabin v. Camp (C. C.) 98 Fed. 974, in whieh
a conveyance within the four months upon a payment of the
balance of the purchase price was sustained where it had bt'cn
marle in performance of a contract executed prior to the four
months to the effect that the creditor should advance money to
purchase the property, should have a lien upon it, and the option.
which he exercised, to buy it at a specified price for the amount
of the money he had advanced and the cash balance requisite to
aggregate the required amount.
But the theory and purpose of the bankruptcy a.ct were to distribute the unexempt property which the bankrupt owned four
months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy against
him, share and share alike, among his creditors of the same class.
To this end every judgment procured or suffered against him,
every transfer by an insolvent of any of his property, every conceivable way of depleting it after the commencement of the four
months the effect of which is ''to enable any one of his creditors
to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any other of such
creditors of the same class,'' is declared to be a voidable preference if the creditor has reason to believe that a preference is
intended thereby. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, and Act, Feb. 5,
1903, c. 487, 30 Stat. 562, 32 Stat. 799 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901,
p. 3445; U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1905, p. 689); Swart.s v. Fourth
National Bank. 54 C. C. A. 387, 389, 117 Fed. 1, 3. An agreement to mortgage or to tran!Jfer is not a mortgage or a transfer.
The title remains in the owner unincumbered by the mortgage
until the mortgage or transfer is effected. When the agreement
is made before, and the mortgage or transfer within, the four
months, the title stands unincumbered by the latter at the commencenlent of the four months, and the proceeds of that title
pledged under the bankruptcy law for the benefit of all the
creditors pro rata. Any subsequent mortgage or transfer withdraws that title or a portion of its value from these creditors,
and a just and fair interpretation and execution of the a.ct deIIU1.nds that such a mortgage or transfer should be adjudged
voidable if it is otherwise so, and that the mortgagee or trans.f eree should be remitted to bis original ~greement. In this way
the property at the commencement of the four months and its
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value may be preserved for the general creditors, and the mort-

gagee or transferee may retain every lawful advantage his earlier

contract confers upon him. Any other course of decision opens

a new and enticing way to secure preferences, nullifies every

provision of the law to prevent them, and invites fraud and per-

jury. Hold that transfers within four months in performance

of agreements to make them before that time do not constitute

voidable preferences, and honest debtors would agree with their (

favored creditors before the four months that they would subse-

quently secure them by mortgages or transfers of their property,

and just before the petitions in bankruptcy were filed they would

perform their agreements. Dishonest men who made no such

contracts might falsely testify that they had done so and thus

by fraud and perjury sustain preferential transfers and mort-

gages made within the four months to relatives or friends. The

great body of the creditors would be left without share in the

property of their debtor and without remedy, and a law con-

ceived and enacted to secure a fair and equal distribution of the

property of debtors among their creditors would fail to accom-

plish one of its chief objects. This court will hesitate long before

it approves a rule so fatal to the most salutary provisions of the

bankruptcy law, and our conclusion is:
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A mortgage or transfer of his property by an insolvent debtor

within four months of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy

against him, which otherwise constitutes a voidable preference,

is not deprived of that character or made valid by the fact that

it was executed in performance of a contract to do so made

more than four months before the filing of the petition. Wilson

v. Nelson, 183 U. S. 191, 198, 22 Sup. Ct. 74, 46 L. ed. 147; In re

•Sheridan (D. C.) 98 Fed. 406; In re Dismal Swamp Co. (D. C.)

135 Fed. 415, 417, 418; In re Ronk (D. C.) 11l Fed. 154; Pol-

lock v. Jones, 124 Fed. 163, 61 C. C. A. 555; Anniston Iron &

Supply Co. v. Anniston Rolling Mill Co. (D. C.) 125 Fed. 974;

Johnston v. Huff, Andrews & Moyler Co., 133 Fed. 704, 66 C. C.

A. 534; In re Mandel (D. C.) 127 Fed. 863." In Wilson v.

Nelson, 183 U. S. 191, 198, 22 Sup. Ct. 74, 46 L. ed. 147, the

debtor had given an irrevocable power of attorney to the creditor

to confess judgment many years before. Judgment was con-

fessed under it within the four months, and the Supreme Court

37—Citizens' Trust Co. v. Tilt,

200 Fed. 410, ace.

value may be preserved for the general creditors, and the mortgagee or transferee may retain every lawful advantage his earlier
contract confers upon him. Any other course of decision opens
a new and enticing way to secure preferences, nullifies every
provision of the law to prevent them, and invites fraud an<l perjury. Hold that transfers within four months in performance
of agreements to make them before that time do not constitute
voidable preferences, and honest debtors would agree with their 1
favored creditors before the four months that they would subsequently secure them by mortgages or transfers of their property,
and just before the petitions in bankruptcy were filed they would
perform their agreements. Dishonest men who made no such
contracts might falsely testify that they had done so and thus
by fraud and perjury sustain preferential transfers and mortgages made within the four months to relatives or friends. The
great body of the creditors would be left without share in the
property of their debtor and without remedy, and a law conceived and enacted to secure a fair and equal distribution of the
property of debtors among their creditors would fail to accomplish one of its chief objects. This court will hesitate long before
it approves a rule so fatal to the most salutary provisions of the
bankruptcy law, and our conclusion is:
A mortgage or transfer of his property by an insolvent debtor
within four months of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy
against him, which otherwise constitutes a voidable preference,
is not deprived of that character or made- valid by the fact that
it was executed in performance of a contract to do so made
more than four months before the filing of the petition. Wilson
v. Nelson, 183 U. S. 191, 198, 22 Sup. Ct. 74, 46 L. ed. 147; In re
81wridan (D. C.) 98 Fed. 406; In re Dismal Swamp Co. (D. C.)
135 Fed. 415, 417, 418; In re Ronk (D. C.) 111 Fed. 154; Pollock v. Jones, 124 Fed. 163, 61 C. C. A. 555; Anruston Iron &
Supply Co. v. Anniston Rolling Mill Co. (D. C.) 125 Fed. 974;
Johnston v. Huff, Andrews & Moyler Co., 133 Fed. 704, 66 C. C.
A. 534; In re Mandel (D. C.) 127 Fed. 863. 37 In Wilson v.
~elson, 183 U. S. 191, 198, 22 Sup. Ct. 74, 46 L. ed. 147, the
debtor had given an irrevocable power of attorney to the creditor
to confess judgment many years before. Judgment was confe~d under it within the four months, and the Supreme Court
37-Citizens' Trust Co. v. Tilt,
200 Fed. 410, acc.
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held it to be a voidable preference. In re Sheridan (D. C.)

98 Fed. 406, In re Ronk (D. C.) 11l Fed. 154, and In re Dis-

mal Swamp Co. (D. C.) 135 Fed. 415, 417, 418, mortgages'ex-

ecuted within the four months in performance of agreements

to give them made more than four months before the filing of

the petitions in bankruptcy were held to be voidable prefer-

ences, and this view seems to be sustained by the terms of the

bankruptcy act, by the more cogent reasons, aoid by the weight

of authority. There was therefore no error in the decision below

that the mortgage constituted a voidable preference, and that the

limit of the vendor's preferential right was to receive the pro-

portion of the proceeds of the sale justly attributable to the

machinery and the material the ownership of which it retained.38

•••

RICHARDSON v. SHAW

209 U. S. 365, 52 L. ed. 835, 28 Sup. Ct. 512

(United States Supreme Court. April 6, 1908)

Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the court:

This case comes here upon a writ of certiorari to the United

States Circuit Court of Appeals for the second circuit . The

held it to be a voidable preference. In re Sheridan (D. C.)
98 Fed. 406, In re Ronk (D. C.) 111 Fed. 154, and In re Dismal Swamp Co. (D. C.) 135 Fed. 415, 417, 418, mortgagesi executed within the four months in performance of agreements
to give them made more than four months before the filing of
the petitions in bankruptcy were held to be voidable prefrr
.ences, and this view seems to be sustained by the terms of thtbankruptcy act, by the more cogent reasons, and by the weight
of authority. There was therefore no error in the decision below
that the mortgage constituted a voidable preference, and that th~
limit of the vendor's preferential right was to receive the proportion of the proceeds of the sale justly attributable to tht'
machinery and the material the ownership of which it retained.38

• • •

petitioner, Richardson, brought suit in the District Court of

the United States for the southern district of New York, as

RICHARDSON v. SHAW

trustee in bankruptcy of J. Francis Brown, against John It
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Shaw and Alexander Davidson, respondents, to recover certain

209 U. S. 365, 52 L. ed. 835, 28 Sup. Ct. 512

alleged preferences.

Brown, the bankrupt, was a stockbroker transacting business

(United States Supreme Court. April 6, 1908}

in Boston. The respondents, John M. Shaw and Alexander Da-

vidson, were partners and stockbrokers, transacting business in

New York as John M. Shaw & Company, and, as customers of

Brown, they transacted business with him on speculative account

for the purchase and sale of stocks on margin. The account was

carried on in Brown's books in the name of "Royal B. Young,

Attorney," as agent of Shaw & Company.

The transactions between Brown and Shaw & Company were

carried on for several months, from February to June, 1903. A

debit and credit account was opened February 10, when Shaw

& Company deposited with Brown $500 as margin, which was

38—See Tomlinson v. Bank of

Lexington, 145 Fed. 824.

Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the court:
This case comes here upon a writ of certiorari to the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the second circuit. The
petitioner, Richardson, brought suit in the District Court of
the United States for the southern district of New Yorlr, as
trustee in bankruptcy of J. Francis Brown, against John M.
Shaw and Alexander Davidson, respondents, to recover certain
alleged preferences.
Brown, the bankrupt, was a stockbroker transacting business
in Boston. The respondents, John M. Shaw and Alexander Davidson, were partners and stockbrokers, transacting business in
New York as John M. Shaw & Company, and, as customers of
Brown, they transacted business with him on speculative account
for the purchase and sale of stocks on margin. The account was
carried oo in Brown's books in the name of ''Royal B. Young,
Attorney," as agent of Shaw & Company.
The transactions between Brown and Shaw & Company were
carried on for several months, from February to June, 1903. A
debit and credit account was opened February 10, when Shaw
& Company deposited with Brown $500 as margin, which was
38-See Tom.lineon v. Bank of
Lexington, 145 Fed. 824.
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credited to them on the account, and Brown purchased for them

certain securities at a cost of $3,987.50, which was charged to

them on the account.

By agreement between the parties it was understood and

agreed that all securities carried on the account or deposited

to secure the same might be carried in Brown's general loans

and might he sold or bought at public or private sale, without

notice, if Brown deemed such sale or purchase necessary for his

protection. On the accounts rendered by Brown the following

memorandum was printed: "It is understood and agreed that

all securities carried in this account or deposited to secure the

same may be carried in our general loans and may be sold or

bought at public or private sale, without notice, when such sale

or purchase is deemed necessary by us for our protection."

Until the account was closed, on June 26, 1903, Shaw & Com-

pany from time to time paid to Brown various other sums of

money as margins, which were credited to them. They also

transferred to him various securities as margins in place of cash.

They were charged with interest upon the gross amount of the

purchase price, and credited with interest upon the margins they

had deposited with Brown. If at any time the total amount

of margins in securities or money exceeded 10 per cent, they had
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the right to withdraw the excess. Brown was at no time left

with a margin less than 10 per cent. Shaw & Company kept a

"liberal margin," at times rising to 23% per cent.

According to the agreement the securities carried in this ac-

count or deposited to secure the same might be carried in

Brown's general loans, and such securities were so pledged by

him, and Young, as agent of Shaw & Company, was informed

of the fact. The stocks were figured at the market price every

day and statements rendered to Young.

The bankrupt, Brown, transacted much of his general busi-

ness with Brown, Riley & Company, of Boston. He pledged his

general securities with that company.

On June 24, 1903, Young, the agent of Shaw & Company, as

above stated, learned of Brown's precarious financial condition,

and demanded payment of $5,000 cash from Brown's agent,

Fletcher. At that time the margins already paid by Shaw &

Company exceeded the agreed 10 per cent, and Fletcher returned

to them $5,000 of such margin.

On the following day, June 25, Young demanded a final set-

tlement f no til Brown. At that time Brown was insolvent within

credited to them on the account, and Brown purchased for them
certain securities at a cost of $3,987.50, which was charged to
them on the account.
By agreement between the parties it was understood and
agreed that all securities carried on the account or deposited
to secure the same might be carried in Brown's general loans
and might be sold or bought at public or private sale, without
notice, if Brown deemed such sale or purchase necessary for his
protection. On the account.R rendered by Brown the following
memorandum was printed: "It is understood and agreed that
all securities carried in this account or deposited to se<!ure the
same may be carried in our general loans and may be sold or
bought at public or private sale, without notice, when such sale
or purchase is deemed necessary by us for our protection. ''
Until the account was closed, on June 26, 1903, Shaw & Company from time to time paid to Brown various other sums of
money as margins, which were credited to them. They also
transferred to him various securities as margins in place of cash.
They were charged with interest upon the gross amount of the
purchase price, and credited with interest upon the margins they
bad deposited with Brown. If at any time the total amount
of margins in securities or money exceeded 10 per cent, they had
the right to withdraw the excess. Brown was at no time left
with a margin less than 10 per cent. Shaw & Company kept a
''liberal margin,'' at times rising to 23% per cent.
According to the agreement the securities carried in this account or deposited to secure the same might be carried in
Brown's general loans, and such securities were so pledged by
him, and Young, as agent of Shaw & Company, was informed
of the fact. The stocks were figured at the market price every
day and statements rendered to Young.
The bankrupt, Brown, transacted much of his general business with Brown, Riley & Company, of Boston. He pledged his
general securities with that company.
On June 24, 1903, Young, the agent of Shaw & Company, as
abo\·e stated, learned of Brown's precarious financial condition,
and demanded payment of $5,000 cash from Brown's agent,
Fletcher. At that time the margins already paid by Shaw &
Company exceeded the ~i:rreed 10 per cent, and Fletcher returned
to them $5,000 of such margin.
On the following day, June 25, Young demanded a final settlement from Brown. At that time Brown was insolvent within

302 PREREQUISITES TO ADJUDICATION

the meaning of the bankrupt law, and had been for the two pre-

302

PREREQUISITES TO ADJUDICATION

ceding months. On June 26 the liquidation of this account was

effected as follows: Brown, the bankrupt, indorsed to Brown,

Riley & Company, a note of $5,000, made by one of his debtors,

and gave them a check for $1,200, thereby increasing his margin

on the general loan, and agreed that $10,664.13 should be charged

against his margin and credited to Shaw & Company, and a

check was given by them, through the Beacon Trust Company, to

the order of Brown, Riley & Company, for $34,919.62, and the

securities to the value of $45,583.75 were turned over to them.

None of the certificates of stock which Brown delivered to Shaw

& Company were the identical certificates which they had deliv-

ered to Brown as margain. Two certain bonds, known as the

"Shannon bonds," had been deposited with Brown.

Among the creditors (customers) of Brown on the final day

of settlement there were a number of general customers upon

transactions in purchase and sale of stocks by Brown as "broker,

similar to the transactions in the purchase and sale of stocks by

Brown as broker for Shaw & Company.

On July 27, 1903, Brown made an assignment, and was ad-

judicated a bankrupt within four months, and petitioner in this

case, Henry Arnold Richardson, was elected trustee.

It was conceded by plaintiff's counsel that it was the custom
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of the market to deliver shares from broker to customer of the

same amount without regard to whether they were the identical

shares received.

This suit was brought to recover the $5,000 paid to Shaw &

Company June 24, 1903, which sum, it is alleged, was paid to

them as excessive margins, and, it is alleged, enabled them to

obtain a preference as one of the creditors of Brown. The second

cause of action in the suit states that Shaw & Company are in-

debted to Brown's estate in the sum of $10,664.13, being the

amount he transferred for their benefit, as above set forth.

At the close of the plaintiff's case he requested to go to the

jury upon the issue of defendant's knowledge of Brown's in-

solvency. The court held that no preference was shown, and

directed a verdict for defendants. The judgment was affirmed.

77 C. C. A. 643, 147 Fed. 659, 665.

The ground on which the counsel for the petitioner predicates

the alleged preferences in this case is that when the stockbroker

Brown was approached for the settlement of the transaction with

Shaw & Company, being insolvent and dealing with several ens-

the meaning of the bankrupt law, and had been for the two preceding months. On June 26 the liquidation of this account wn!!
effected as follows: Brown, the bankrupt, indorsed to Brown,
Riley & Company, a note of $5,000, ma<le by one of his debtors,
and gave them a check for $1,200, th('reby increasing his margin
on the general loan, and agreed that $10,664.13 should be charged
against bis margin and credited to Shaw & Company, and a
check was given by them, through the Beacon Trust Company, to
the order of Brown, Riley & Company, for $34,919.62. and the
securities to the value of $45,583.75 were turned o\•rr to them.
None of the certificates of stock which Brown delivered to Shaw
& Company were the identical certificates which they had delivered to Brown as margain. Two certain bonds, known as the
''Shannon bonds," had been deposited with Brown.
Among the creditors (customers) of Brown on the final day
of settlement there were a number of general customers upon
transactions in purchase and sale of stocks by Brown as broker,
similar to the transactions in the purchBBe and sale of stocks by
Brown as broker for Shaw & Company.
On July 27, 1903, Brown made an assignment, and was adjudicated a bankrupt within four months, and petitioner in this
case, Henry Arnold Richardson, was elected trustee.
It was conceded by plaintiff's counsel that it was the cu.stor1
of the market to deliver shares from broker to customer of the
same amount without regard to whether they were the identical
shares received.
This suit was brought to recover the $5,000 paid to Shaw &
Company June 24, 1903, which sum, it is alleged, was paid to
them as excessive margins, and, it is alleged, enabled them to
obtain a preference as one of the creditors of Brown. The second
cause of action in the suit states that Shaw & Company are indebted to Brown's estate in the sum of $10,664.13, being the
amouut he transferred for their benefit, as a hove set forth.
At the close of the plaintiff's case he requested to go to the
jury upon the issue of defendant's knowledge of Brown's insolvency. The court held that no preference was shown, and
directed a verdict for defendants. The judgment was affirmed.
77 C. C. A. 643, 147 Fed. 659, 665.
The ground on which the counsel for the petitioner predicates
the alleged preferences in this case is that when the stockbroker
Brown was approached for the settlement of the transaction with
Shaw & Company, being insolvent and dealing with several cus-
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tomers, as to each of whom he had pledged the stocks carried

for them, and, under the understanding of the parties, being

under obligation to each of them to redeem the stocks from the

loan for which they were pledged, this obligation created a right

of demanding the pledged stocks and securities on the part of

each of the customers, which put the broker in the debtor class

and the customers into the creditor class, so that, if the broker

used his assets to carry out such obligation to a particular cus-

tomer, whereby the latter was able to redeem his stock from such

pledge upon payment only of the amount of his indebtedness to

the broker, with the result that the broker could not carry out

similar obligations to other customers in like situation, a pref-

erence is created under § 60 of the bankrupt act, and this, says

the learned counsel in his brief, under any theory concerning

the relation of broker and customer, is "the main proposition

upon which .we hang our appeal."

This case, therefore, requires an examination of the relations

of customer and broker under the circumstances disclosed in

this record; at least, so far as it is necessary to determine the

question of preference in bankruptcy upon which the case turns.

•••

The rule thus established by the courts of the state where such

transactions are the most numerous, and which has long been
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adopted and generally followed as a settled rule of law, should

not be lightly disturbed, and an examination of the cases and

the principles upon which they rest lead us to the conclusion

that in no just sense can the broker be held to be the owner of

the shares of stock which he purchases and carries for his cus-

tomer. While we recognize that the courts of Massachusetts have

reached a different conclusion, and hold that the broker is the

owner, carrying the shares upon a conditional contract of sale,

imd, while entertaining the greatest respect for the supreme judi-

cial court of that state, we cannot accept its conclusion as to

the relation of broker and customer under the circumstances

developed in this case. We say this, recognizing the difficulties

which can be pointed out in the application of either rule.

At the inception of the contract it is the customer who wishes

to purchase stocks, and he procures the broker to buy on his

account. As was said by Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the

court in Galigher v. Jones, 129 U. S. 193-198, 32 L. ed. 658, 659,

9 Supt. Ct. Rep. 335, a broker is but an agent, and is bound to

tomers, as to each of whom he had pledged the stocks carried
for them, and, under the understanding of the parties, being
under obligation to each of them to redeem the stocks from the
loan for which they were pledged, this obligation created a right
of demanding the pledged stocks and securities on the part of
each of the customers, which put the broker in the debtor class
and the cw;tomers into the creditor class, so that, if the broker
used his assets to carry out such obligation to a particular customer, whereby the latter was able to redeem his stock from such
pledge upon payment only of the amount of his indebtedness to
the broker, with the result that the broker could not carry out
similar obligations to other customers in like situation, a preference is created under § 60 of the bankrupt act, and this, says
the learned counsel in his brief, under any theory concerning
the relatfon of broker and customer, is "the main proposition
upon which. we bang our appeal. ''
This case, therefore, requires an examination of the relations
<>f customer and broker under the circumstances disclosed in
this record; at least, so far as it is necessary to determine the
question of preference in bankruptcy upon which the case turns.

• • •

The rule thus established by the courts of the state where such
transactions are the most numerous, and which has long been
adopted and generally followed as a settled rule of law, should
not be lightly disturbed, and an examination of the cases and
the principles upon which they rest lead us to the conclusion
that in no just sense can the broker be held to be the owner of
the shares of stock which he purchases and carries for his customer. While we recognize that the courts of Massachusetts have
reaehed a different conclusion, and hold that the broker is the
uwuer, carrying the shares upon a conditional contract of sale,
:rnd, while entertaining the greatest respect for the supreme judieial court of that state, we cannot accept its conclusion as to
tbe relation of broker and customer under the circumstances
Je~eloped in this case. We say this, recognizing the difficulties
which can be pointed out in the application of either rule.
At the inception of the contract it is the customer who wishes
to purchase stocks, and he procures the broker to buy on his
account. As was said by l\fr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the
court in Galigher v. Jones, 129 U. S. 193-198, 32 L. ed. 658, 659,
9 Supt. Ct. Rep. 335, a broker is but an agent, and is bound to
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follow the directions of his principal, or give notice that he

declines the agency.

The dividends on the securities belong to the customer. The

customer pays interest upon the purchase price, and is credited

with interest upon the margins deposited. He has the right at

any time to withdraw his excess over 10 per cent deposited as

margin with the broker. Upon settlement of the account he re-

ceives the securities. In this case the broker assumed to pledge

the stocks, not because he was the owner thereof, but because,

by the terms of the contract, printed upon every statement of

account, he obtained the right from the customer to pledge the

securities upon general loans, and in like manner he secured the

privilege of selling when necessary for his protection.

The risk of the venture is entirely upon the customer. He

profits if it succeeds; he loses if it fails. The broker gets out of

the transaction, when closed in accordance with the understand-

ing of the parties, his commission and interest upon the advances,

and nothing else. That such was the arrangement between the

parties is shown in the testimony of the broker's agent, who testi-

fied: "If these stocks carried for J. M. Shaw & Company made

a profit, that profit belongs to Shaw & Company over and above

what he owed us."

When Young, the agent of Shaw & Company, demanded the
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stocks, their right of ownership in them was recognized, and,

while pledged, they were under the control of the broker, were

promptly redeemed, and turned over to the customer. Con-

sistently with the terms of the contract, as understood by both

parties, the broker could not have declined to thus redeem and

turn over the stock, and, when adjudicated a bankrupt, his

trustee had no better rights, in the absence of fraud or prefer-

ential transfer, than the bankrupt himself. Security Warehous-

ing Co. v. Hand, 206 U. S. 415, 423, 51 L. ed. 1117, 1122, 27

Sup. Ct. Rep. 720; Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516, 526,

49 L. ed. 577, 586, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 306, Humphrey v. Tatmau,

198 U. S. 91, 49 L. ed. 956, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 567; York Mfg. Co.

v. Cassell, 201 U. S. 344, 352, 50 L. ed. 782, 785, 26 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 481.

It is objected to this view of the relation of customer and

broker that the broker was not obliged to return the very stocks

pledged, but might substitute other certificates for those received

by him, and that this is inconsistent with ownership on the part

of the customer, and shows a proprietary interest of the broker

follow the directions of his principal, or give notice that he
declines the agency.
The dividends on the securities belong to the customer. The
customer pays interest upon the purchase price, and is credited
with interest upon the margins deposited. He has the right ;:t
any time to withdraw his excess over 10 per cent deposited us
margin with the broker. Upon settlement of the account he receives the securities. In this case the broker assumed to pledge
the stocks, not because he wa.s the owner thereof, but because,
by the terms of the contract, printed upon every statement of
account, he obtained the right from the customer to pledge the
securities upon general loans, and in like manner he secured the
privilege of selling when necessary for his protection.
The risk of the venture is entirely upon the customer. He
profits if it succeeds; he loses if it fails. The broker gets out of
the transaction, when closed in accordance with the understanding of the parties, his commission and interest upon the advances,
and nothing else. That such was the arrangement between the
parties is shown in the testimony of the broker's agent, who testified: "If these stocks carried for J. l\l. Shaw & Company made
a profit, that profit belongs to Shaw & Company over and above
what he owed us.''
\Vhen Young, the agent of Shaw & Company, demanded the
stocks, their right of ownership in them was recognized, and,
while pledged, they were under the control of the broker, were
promptly redeemed, a.nd turned over to the customer. Consistently with the terms of the contract, as understood by both
parties, the broker could not have declined to thus redeem and
turn over the stock, and, when adjudicated a bankrupt, his
trustee had no better rights, in the absence of fraud or preferential transfer, than the bankrupt himself. Security \Varehousing Co. v. Hand, 206 U. S. 415, 423, 51 L. ed. 1117, 1122, 27
Sup. Ct. Rep. 720; Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516, 526,
49 L. ed. 577, 586, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 306; Humphrey v. Tatman,
198 U. S. 91, 49 L. ed. 956, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 567; York Mfg. Co.
v. Cassell, 201 U. S. 344, 352, 50 L. ed. 782, 785, 26 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 481.
It is objected to this view of the relation of customer and
broker that the broker was not obliged to return the very stocks
pledged, but might substitute other certificates for those received
by him, and that this is inconsistent with ownership on the part
of the customer, and shows a proprietary interest of the broker
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in the shares; but this contention loses sight of the fact that the

certificate of shares of stock is not the property itself, it is but

the evidence of property in the shares. The certificate, as the

term implies, but certifies the ownership of the property and

rights in the corporation represented by the number of shades

named.

A certificate of the same number of shares, although printed

upon different paper and bearing a different number, repre-

sents precisely the same kind and value of property as does

another certificate for a like number of shares of stock in the

same corporation. It is a misconception of the nature of the

certificate to say that a return of a different certificate or the

right to substitute one certificate for another is a material change

in the property right held by the broker for the customer. Hor-

ton v. Morgan, 19 N. Y. 170, 75 Am. Dec. 311; Taussig v. Hart,

58 N. Y. 425; Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 198, 218, 21 L. R. A.

102, 26 Atl. 874, 28 Atl. 104. As was said by the Court of Ap-

peals of New York in Caswell v. Putnam, 120 N. Y. 153, 157,

24 N. E. 287, "one share of stock is not different in kind or value

from every other share of the same issue and company. They

are unlike distinct articles of personal property which differ in

kind and value, such as a horse, wagon, or harness. The stock
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has no earmark which distinguishes one share from another, so

as to give it any additional value or importance; like grain of

a uniform quality, one bushel is of the same kind and value as

another."

Nor is the right to repledge inconsistent with ownership of

the stock in the customer. Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 216, 219,

21 L. R. A. 102, 26 Atl. 874, 28 Atl. 104; Ogden v. Lathrop, 65

N. Y. 158. It was obtained in the present case by a contract

specifically made, and did not affect the right of the customer,

upon settlement of the accounts, to require of the broker the

redemption of the shares and their return in kind.

It is true that the right to sell, for the broker's protection,

which was not exercised in this case, presents more difficulty, and

is one of the incongruities. in the recognition of ownership in

the customer; nevertheless it does not change the essential rela-

tions of the parties, and certainly does not convert the broker

into what he never intended to be and for which he assumes no

risk, and takes no responsibility in the purchase and carrying

of shares of stock.

The broker cannot be converted into an owner without a per-

il. * A. Bankruptcy—20

in the shares; but this coutcution loses sight of the fact that the
certificate of shares of stock is not the property itself, it is but
the evidence of property in the shares. The certificate, as the
term implies, but rertifies the ownership of the property a11d
rights in the corporation represented by the number of sha:i;es
named.
A certificate of the same number of shares, although printed
upon different paper and bearing a different number, represents precisely the same kind and value of property as does
another certificate for a like number of shares of stock in the
same corporation. It is a misconception of the nature of the
certificate to say that a return of a different certificate or the
right to substitute one certificate for another is a material change
in the property right held by the broker for the customer. Horton v. Morgan, 19 N. Y. 170, 75 Am. Dec. 311; Taussig v. Hart,
58 N. Y. 425; Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 198, 218, 21 L. R. A.
102, 26 Atl. 874, 28 Atl. 104. · As was said by the Court of Appeals of New York in Caswell v. Putnam, 120 N. Y. 153, 157,
24 N. E. 287, "one share of stock is not different in kind or value
from every other share of the same issue and company. They
are unlike distinct articles of personal property which differ in
kind and value, such as a horse, wagon, or harness. The stock
has no earmark which distinguishes one share from another, so
as to give it any additional value or importance; like grain of
a uniform quality, one bushel is of the same kind and value as
another.''
Nor is the right to repledge inconsistent with ownership of
the st~k in the customer. Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 216, 219,
21 L. R. A. 102, 26 Atl. 874, 28 Atl. 104; Ogden v. Lathrop, 65
N. Y. 158. It was obtained in the present case by a contract
specifically made, and did not affect the right of the customer,
upon settlement of the accow1ts, to require of the broker the
redemption of the shares and their return in kind.
It is true that the right to sell, for the broker's protection,
which was not exercised in this case, presents more difficulty, and
is one of the incongruities . in the recognition of ownership in
the customer; nevertheless it does not change the essential relations of the parties, and certainly does not convert the broker
into what he never intended to be and for which he assumes no
risk, and takes no responsibility in the purchase and carrying
of shares of stock.
The broker cannot be converted into an owner without a pera. •
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version of the understanding of the parties, as was pertinently

observed in the very able discussion already referred to in Skiff

v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 216, 21 L. R. A. 11l, 26 Atl. 879: "So

long as the interpretation of the contract preserves as its dis-

tinctive feature the principal proposition that the customer pur-

chases merely the right to have delivery to him in the future,

at his option, of stocks or securities at the price of the day of

the agreement, and its corollary that the customer derives no

right, title, or interest in the stocks or securities until final per-

version of the understanding of the parties, as was pertinently
c1hserved in the very able discu.ssion already referred to in Skiff
v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 216, 21 L. R. A. 111, 26 Atl. 879: "So
long as the interpretation of the contract preserves as its distinctive feature the principal proposition that the customer purrhases merely the right to have delivery to him in the future
at his option, of stocks or securities at the price of the day of
the agreement, and its corollary that the customer derives no
right, title, or interest in the stocks or securities until final performance, the difficulties in the way of harmonizing the situation
are bound to exist. The fundamental difficulty grows out of the
uecessary attempt in some way to transform the customer, who
enjoys all the incidents and assumes all the risks of ownership,
into a person who in fact has no right, title, or interest, and to
create out of the broker, who enjoys none of the incidents of
ownership, and assumes not a particle of its responsibility, a
person clothed with a full title and an absolute ownership.''
We reach the conclusion, therefore, that, although the broker
may not be strictly a pledgee, as understood at common law, he
is essL•ntially a pledgee, and not the owner of the stock, and turning it over upon demand to the customer does not create the
relation of a preferred creditor, within the meaning of the bankrupt law.
We cannot consent to the contention of the learned couDBel.
for the petitioner, that the insolvency of the broker at once converts every customer having the right to demand pledged stocks,
into a creditor who becomes a preferred creditor when the contract with him is kept and the stocks are redeemed and turned
over to him.
In the absence of fraud or preferential transfer to a creditor
the broker had a right to continue to use his estate for the redt•mption of the pledged stocks. As this court said in Cook v.
Tullis, 18 \Vall. 332.340, 21 L. ed. 933-937 :
''There is nothing in the bankruptcy act, either in its language
or ohjed, which prevents an insolvent from dealing with his
propnty. selling or exchanging it for other property at any time
hefore prore«:>dings in bankruptcy are taken by or against him,
J)J'OYilled sueh dealings be conducted without any purpose to·
ddraud or delay his creditors or give preference to anyone, and
d0t·s not impair the value of his estate. An insolvent is not
h11nnd, in the misfortune of his insolvency, to abandon all dealing with bis property; his creditors can only complain if he waste
7

formance, the difficulties in the way of harmonizing the situation

are bound to exist. The fundamental difficulty grows out of the

necessary attempt in some way to transform the customer, who

enjoys all the incidents and assumes all the risks of ownership,

into a person who in fact has no right, title, or interest, and to

create out of the broker, who enjoys none of the incidents of

ownership, and assumes not a particle of its responsibility, a

person clothed with a full title and an absolute ownership.''

We reach the conclusion, therefore, that, although the broker

may not be strictly a pledgee, as understood at common law, he

is essentially a pledgee, and not the owner of the stock, and turn-

ing it over upon demand to the customer does not create the

relation of a preferred creditor, within the meaning of the bank-

rupt law.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

We cannot consent to the contention of the learned counsel

for the petitioner, that the insolvency of the broker at once con-

verts every customer having the right to demand pledged stocks,

into a creditor who becomes a preferred creditor when the con-

tract with him is kept and the stocks are redeemed and turned

over to him.

In the absence of fraud or preferential transfer to a creditor

the broker had a right to continue to use his estate for the re-

demption of the pledged stocks. As this court said in Cook v.

Tullis, 18 Wall. 332-340, 21 L. ed. 933-937:

'' There is nothing in the bankruptcy act, either in its language

or object, which prevents an insolvent from dealing with his

property, selling or exchanging it for other property at any time

before proceedings in bankruptcy are taken by or against him,

provided such dealings be conducted without any purpose to

defraud or delay his creditors or give preference to anyone, and

does not impair the value of his estate. An insolvent is not

bound, in the misfortune of his insolvency, to abandon all deal-

ing with his property; his creditors can only complain if he waste
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his estate or give preference in its disposition to one over another.

His dealing will stand if it leave his estate in as good plight

and condition as previously."

The bankrupt act, in § 60a, provides: "A person shall be

deemed to have given a preference if, being insolvent, he has,

within four months before the filing of the1 petition, or after the

filing of the petition and before the adjudication, procured or

suffered a judgment to be entered against himself in favor of

any person, or made a transfer of any of his property, and the

effect of the enforcement of such judgment or transfer will be

to enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage

of bis debt than any other of such creditors of the same class.''

A creditor is defined to include anyone who owns a demand

or claim provable in bankruptcy. § 1, sub. 9, Bankruptcy Act

1898 (30 Stat. at L. 544, c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p.

3419). It is essential, therefore, in order to set aside the alleged

preference, that Shaw & Company, at the time of the transfer,

should have stood in the relation of creditor to the bankrupt.

Of course, if the New York rule based upon Markham v.

Jaudon is correct, and the broker was the pledgee of the cus-

tomer's stock, there can be no rniestion that, in redeeming these

stocks for the purpose of satisfying the pledge, no preferential

transfer under the bankruptcy act resulted.
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In our view we think no different result is reached, so far as

a preference in bankruptcy is concerned, if the Massachusetts

cases could be taken to lay down the correct rule of the rela-

tions between broker and customer.

That rule is said to have its origin in Wood v. Hayes, 15 Gray,

375, decided in 1860, in which the opinion, though by Chief

Justice Shaw, is very brief. It was therein held that the broker

was a holder of the shares upon conditional contract to deliver

them to the customer upon the payment of so much money, and

until the money was paid the right to have performance did not

accrue.

In Covell v. Loud, 135 Mass. 41, 46 Am. Rep. 446, the right

of the broker was considered after the customer had refused to

pay the necessary margin, and after the customer had requested

the broker to do the best he could for him and to sell the stock

at the broker's board without notice, and it was held that under

such circumstances the broker was not liable for conversion.

In Weston v. Jordan, 168 Mass. 401, 47 N. E. 133, the question

was as to the relation between customer and broker after the

his estate or give preference in its disposition to one over another.
His dealing will stand if it leave his estate in as good plight
and condition as previously. ''
The bankrupt act, in § 60a, provides : ''A person slulll be
deemed to have given a preference if, being insolvent, he has,
within four months before the filing of the petition, or after the
filing of the petition and before the adjudication, procured or
suffered a judgment to be entered against himself in favor of
any person, or made a transfer of any of his property, and the
effect of the enforcement of such judgment or transfer will be
to enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage
of his debt than any other of such creditors of the same class.''
A creditor is defined to include anyone who owns a demand
or claim provable in bankruptcy. § 1, sub. 9, Bankruptcy Act
1898 (30 Stat. at L. 544, c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p.
3419). It is essential, therefore, in order to set aside the alleged
preference, that Shaw & Company, at the time of the transfer,
should have stood in the relation of creditor to the bankrupt.
Of course, if the New York rule based upon Markham v.
Jaudon is correct, and the broker was the pledgee of the customer's stock, there can be no question that, in redeeming these
stocks for the purpose of satisfying the pledge, no preferential
transfer under the bankruptcy act resulted.
In our view we think no different result is reached, so far as
a preference in bankruptcy is concerned, if the Massachusetts
cases could be taken to lay down the correct rule of the relations between broker and customer.
That rule is said to have its origin in Wood v. Hayes, 15 Gray,
375, decided in 1860, in which the opinion, though by Chief
Justice Shaw, is very brief. It was therein held that the broker
was a holder of the shares upon conditional contract to deliver
them to the customer upon the payment of so much money, and
until the money was paid the right to have performance did not
accrue.
In Covell v. JJoud, 135 Mass. 41, 46 Am. Rep. 446, the right
of the broker was considered after the customer had refused to
pay the necessary margin, and after the customer had ret1urstecl
the broker to do the best he could for him and to sell the stock
at the broker's board without notice, and it was held that under
· su"h circumstances the broker was not liable for conversion.
In Weston v. Jordan, 168 Mass. 401, 47 N. E. 133, the question
was as to the relation between customer and broker after the
1
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broker had parted with the shares after repeated demands by the

customer and refusal by the broker to deliver the shares, and

it was held that a valid cause of action arose in favor of the

customer, whether for breach of contract, or for conversion, it

matters not.

In Chase v. Boston, 180 Mass. 459, 62 N. E. 1059, the opinion

is by Chief Justice Holmes, and the question directly decided

is whether a broker who held shares of stock in his own name,

and which he carried for his customer on margin, was required

to pay a city tax upon the value. It was held that he was. In

that case the learned justice said:

"No doubt, whichever view be taken, there will be anomalies,

and no doubt it is possible to read into either a sufficient number

of implied understandings to make it consistent with itself. Pur-

chases on margin certainly retain some of the characteristics of

ordinary single purchases by an agent, out of which they grew.

The broker buys and is expected to buy stock from third persons

to the amount of the order. Rothschild v. Brookman, 5 Bligh,

N. R. 165, 2 Dow & C. 188; Taussig v. Hart, 58 N. Y. 425. He

charges his customer a commission. He credits him with divi-

dends and charges him with assessments on stock. However the

transaction is closed, the profit or loss is the customer's. But
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none of these features is decisive."

And while the rule dating back to the decision of Chief Justice

Shaw in 15 Gray was recognized as the law of Massachusetts,

there is nothing in the case decisive of the question now before us.

The case most relied upon as showing the preference is Weston

v. Jordan, supra. It was held in that case that Wheatland, the

broker (Weston was his assignee in insolvency) had become a

debtor to the customer Jordan, having parted with the control of

the shares and substituting none others for them after repeated

demands for them by the customer. And it was held that when

the insolvent broker went into the street and bought that kind of

stocks with his own money, and the customer took the stocks,

knowing of such purchase, the transaction amounted to a pref-

erence; and in course of the discussion Mr. Justice Allien,

referring to the contention of counsel that the Massachusetts rule

should be reconsidered in view of the rules adopted in New York

and other states, said:

"The defendant seeks to have these decisions reconsidered;

but the facts of the present case do not call for such reconsid-

eration of the general doctrine. Even if at the outset Jordan

broker had parted with t'ne shar~ after repeated demands by the
customer and refusal by the broker to deliver the shares, and
it was held that a valid cause of action arose in favor of the
customer, whether for breach of contract, or for conversion, it
matters not.
In Chase v. Boston, 180 Mass. 459, 62 N. E. 1059, the opinion
is by Chief Justice Holmes, and the question directly decided
is whether a broker who held shares of stock in his own name,
and which he carried for his customer on margin, was required
to pay a city tax upon the value. It was held that he was. In
,/
that case the learned justice said :
"No doubt, whichever view be taken, there will be anomalies,
and no doubt it is possible to read into either a sufficient number
of implied understandings to make it consistent with itself. Purchases on margin certainly retain some of the characteristics of
ordinary single purchases by an agent, out of which they grew.
The broker buys and is expected to buy stock from third persons
to the amount of the order. Rothschild v. Brookman, 5 Bligh,
N. R. 165, 2 Dow & C. 188; 'l'aussig v. Hart, 58 N. Y. 425. He
charges his customer a commission. He'credit.s him with dividends and charges him with assessment.a on stock. However the
transaction is closed, the profit or loss is the customer's. But
none of these features is decisive.''
And while the rule dating back to the decision of Chief Justice
Shaw in 15 Gray was recognized 88 the law of Massachusetts,
there is nothing in the case decisive of the question now before us.
The case most relied upon as showing the preference is Weston
v. Jordan, supra. It was held in that case that Wheatland, the
broker CW eston was his assignee in insolvency) had become a
debtor to the customer Jordan, having parted with the control of
the shares and substituting uone others for them after repeated
demands for them by the customer. And it was held that when
the insolvent broker went into the street and bought that kind of
stocks with his own money, and the customer took the stocks,
knowi11g of such purchase, the transaction amounted to a preference; and in course of the discussion Mr. Justice Alllen,
referring to the contention of counsel that the Massachusetts rule
should be reconsidered in view of the rules adopted in New York
and other states, said:
''The defe11dant seeks to have these dedsions recousidert:d ;
but the facts of the present case do not call for such reconsiJeration of the general doctrine. Even if at the outset Jordan
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were to be deemed a pledgor, and Wheatland a pledgee, of the

shares, that relation was changed by what happened after-

wards. * * • After Wheatland had parted with the control

of the shares, and after repeated demands for tliem by Jordan,

and refusals by Wheatland to, deliver them, Jordan had a valid

ground of action against "\Yheatland, either for breach of con-

tract or for a conversion; it matters not which."

The facts in the present case are entirely different from those

disclosed in the case just cited. In the present case there was

no demand for the return of the stocks which was refused by

the broker; but, recognizing the obligation of the contract, when

the stocks were demanded the broker proceeded to redeem them

from the pledge which he had made of them under the right

given by the contract between the parties, and turned them over

to the customer. In such case the relation of debtor and creditor

did not arise as it might upon the refusal, as in Weston v.

Jordan, to turn over the stocks upon demand.

After an examination of the Massachusetts cases, Judge Lowell

held In re Swift, 105 Fed. 493, while following the Massachu-

setts rule as between broker and customer, that no cause of action

arose until after demand by the customer. And the same view

was taken in the same case upon review in the Court of Appeals
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for the first circuit in an opinion by Judge Putnam, 50 C. C. A.

264, 112 Fed. 315. While both courts held that under the law,

as defined in the Massachusetts cases, bankruptcy excused de-

mand, they held that the customer did not become a creditor

upon insolvency, but only after demand and refusal or its

equivalent.

How then stood the parties at the time of the demand for

the return of these shares of stock? They were held upon a

contract, which required the broker, upon demand, to turn over

the shares purchased, or similar shares, to the customer upon

payment of advancements, interest, and commissions. These

stocks were redeemed and turned over to him; as a consequence

the relation of debtor and creditor as between the broker and

customer did not arise.

Upon the principles heretofore discussed, we think the pay-

ment of the $5,000, on June 24, was not a preferential payment

to a creditor. The customer had demanded settlement, the

broker had paid the $5,000, and on the following day this sum

was taken into account in settling the account before turning over

were to be deemed a pledgor, and Wheatland a pledgee, of the
shares, that relation was changed by what happened afterwards. • • • After Wheatland had parted with the control
of the shares, and after repeated demands for them by Jord<111,
ar&d refusals by ll'keatland to. deliver them, Jordan had a valid
ground of actim1 again.st lVheatland, ~ither for breach of co1itract or for a C01wersio11; it matte1·s not which."
The facts in the present case are entirely different from those
disclosed, in the cnse just cited. In the present case there was
no demand for the return of the stocks which was refused by
the broker; but, recognizing the obligation of the contract, when
the stocks were demanded the broker proceeded to redeem them
from the pledge which he had made of them under the right
given by the contract between the parties, and turned them over
to the customer. In such case the relation of debtor and creditor
did not arise as it might upon the refusal, as in Weston v.
Jordan, to turn over the stocks upon demand.
After an examination of the Massachusetts cases, Judge Lowell
held In re Swift, 105 Fed. 493, while following the :\Iassachusetts rule as between broker and customer, that no cause of action
arose until after demand by the customer. And the same view
was taken in the same case upon review in the Court of Appeals
for the first circuit in an opinion by Judge Putnam, 50 C. C. A.
264:, 112 Fed. 315. While both courts held that under the lnw,
as defined in the Massachusetts cases, bankruptcy excused demand, they held that the customer did not become a creditor
upon insolvency, but only after demand and refusal or it8
equivalent.
How then stood the parties at the time of the demand for
the return of these shares of stock T They were held upon a
contract, which required the broker, upon demand, to turn over
tb.e shares purchased, or similar shares, to the customer upon
payment of advancements, interest, and commissions. These
stocks were redeemed and turned over to him ; as a consequenec
the relation of debtor and creditor as between the broker and
customer did not arise.
Upon the principles heretofore discussed, we think the payment of the $5,000, on June 24, was not a preferential payment
to a creditor. The customer had demanded settlement, the
broker had paid the $5,000, and on the following day this sum
was taken into account in settling the account before turning over
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to the customer the stock belonging to him, according to the

understanding of the parties.

We find no error in the judgment of the Court of Appeals,

and the same is affirmed.39

Mr. Justice HOLMES:

If I had been left to decide this case alone I should have

to the customer the s~k belonging to him, according to the
understanding of the parties.
We find no error in the judgment of the Court of Appeal&,
and the same is affi.rmed.39

adhered to the opinion which, upon authority and conviction,

I helped to enforce in another place. I have submitted a mem-

orandum of the reasons that prevailed in my mind to my breth-

ren, and, as it has not convinced them, I presume that I am

wrong. I suppose that it is possible to say that, after a purchase

of stock is announced to a customer, he becomes an equitable

tenant in common of all the stock of that kind in the broker's

hands; that the broker's powers of disposition, extensive as they

are, are subject to the duty to keep stock enough on hand to

satisfy his customers' claims; and that the nature of the stock

identifies the fund as fully as a grain elevator identifies the grain

for which receipts are out. It would seem to follow that the

customer would have a right to demand his stock of the trustee

himself, as well as to receive it from the bankrupt, on paying

whatever remained to be paid. A just deference to the views of

my brethren prevents my dissenting from the conclusion reached,

although I cannot but feel a lingering doubt.
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CLARKE v. ROGERS

228 U. S. 534, 57 L. ed. 953, 33 Sup. Ct. 587

(United States Supreme Court. May 5, 1913)

Mr. Justice McKENNA delivered the opinion of the court:

Petition by appellee as trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of

John O. Shaw to recover a preference.

The facts are these: The bankrupt, John 0. Shaw, was, for

a long time prior to the adjudication in bankruptcy, trustee

under the will of Samuel Parsons, late of Newton, in the county

of Middlesex, Massachusetts, of two trusts; one for the benefit

of Charles A., James H., and Henry B. Parsons, and the other

Mr. Justice HOLMES:
If I had been left to decide this case alone I should have
adhered to the opinion which, upon authority and conviction,
I helped to enforce in another place. I have submitted a mem·
orandum of the reasons that prevailed in my mind to
breth·
ren, and, as it has not convinced them, I presume that I am
wrong. I suppose that it is possible to say that, after a purchase
of stock is announced to a customer, he becomes an equitable
tenant in common of all the stock of that kind in the ,broker's
hands; that the broker's powers of disp~ition, extensive as they
are, are subject to the duty to keep stock enough on hand to
satisfy his customers' claims; and that the nature of the stock
identifies the fund as fully as a grain elevator identifies the grain
for which receipts are out. It would seem to follow that the
customer would have a right to demand his stock of the trustee
himself, as well as to receive it from the bankrupt, on paying
whatever remained to be paid. A just deference to the views of
my brethren prevents my dissenting from the conclusion reached,
although I cannot but feel a lingering doubt.

my

for the benefit of E. F. and E. A. Parsons.

39—See Sexton v. Kessler, 225 kiss, 231 U. S. 50; In re Hollins 4

U. S. 90; Gorman v. Littlefield, 229 Co., 212 Fed. 317; Sharp v. Simo-

CLARKE v. ROGERS

U. S. 19; Nat City Bank v. Hotch- nitsch, 107 Minn. 133.

228 U. S. 534, 57 L. ed. 953, 33 Sup. Ct. 587
(United States Supreme Court. May 5, 1913)
Mr. Justice McKENNA delivered the opinion of the court:
Petition by appellee as trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of
John 0. Shaw to recover a preference.
The facts are these: The bankrupt, John 0. Shaw, was, for
a long time prior to the adjudication in bankruptcy, trustee
under the will of Samuel Parsons, late of Newton, in the county
of Middlesex, Massachusetts, of two trusts; one for the benefit
of Charles A., James H., and Henry B. Parsons, and the other
for the benefit of E. F. and E. A. Parsons.
39-See Sexton v. Kessler, 225
U. S. 90; Gorman v. Littlefield, 229
U. B. 19; Nat. City Bank v. Hoteh-

kiss, 231 U. S. 50; In re Hollins &
Co., 212 Fed. 317; Sharp v. Simo·
nitscb, 107 Minn. 133.
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After proceedings in bankruptcy had been commenced, Shaw

resigned the trusts, and his resignation was accepted by the

Probate Court of Middlesex county on the 25th of March, 1908,

and appellant, George Lemist Clarke, was appointed trustee of

the trusts and duly qualified.

In the month of January, 1908, and within four months before

the filing of the petition in bankruptcy against him, and whilst

he was insolvent, Shaw was largely indebted to each of the trusts

and to himself as trustee, and transferred from himself individu-

ally to the trusts and to himself as trustee thereof as follows-

To the trust for C. A. Parsons et al., seven of the $1,000 col-

lateral trust 4 per cent bonds of the American Telephone & Tele-

graph Company (numbers specified) and two $1,000 Chicago,

Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company 3y2 per cent Illinois

Division (numbers specified): to the trust of E. F. and E. A.

Parsons, twelve $1,000 Northern Pacific-Great Northern 4 per

cent joint bonds, Chicago, Burlington & Quincy collateral.

The transfers were made by Shaw with knowledge of bis

insolvency, and with intent to prefer the trusts and himself as

trustee, and the effect (it is alleged) of such preference, if not

avoided, will be to enable the trust estates and himself as trustee

thereof (being one of his individual creditors) to obtain a greater
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percentage of his debts than any other of his creditors of the

same elass.

The petition prayed that the bonds be declared to be the bonds

of petitioner, appellee here, and that Clarke, appellant here, be

ordered to execute such instruments as might be necessary to

transfer the title to and possession of all the bonds to petitioner.

The answer of appellant denied only that the transfers were

made within four months of the bankruptcy, that Shaw was, at

the time of the transfer, insolvent, that all the trusts were his

creditors then or have become so since, within the meaning of

the statute, and denies that he intended by the transfers to give

a preference, or that they constitute a preference.

The decree of the district judge was that five of the seven

Telephone and twelve of the Northern Pacific-Great Northern

Railroad Company 4 per cent joint bonds, and all of the cou-

pons thereon payable after January, 1908, were the property

of the trustee in bankruptcy, appellee here.

It was further adjudged that the American Telephone & Tele-

graph Company collateral trust 4 per cent bonds (numbered

20,818 and 20,819) were in part the property of the appellant

After proceedings in bankruptcy had been commenced, Shaw
resigned the trusts, and his resignation was accepted by the
Probate Court of Middlesex county on the 25th of :March, 1908,
and appellant, George Lemist Clarke, was appointed trustee of
the tMlSts and duly qualified.
In the month of January, 1908, and within four months before
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy against him, and whilst
he was insolvent, Shaw was largely indebted to each of the trusts
and to himself as trustee, and transferred from himself individually to the trusts and to himself as trustee thereof as follows·
To the trust for C. A. Parsons et al., seven of the $1,000 collateral trust 4 per cent bonds of the American Telephone & Telegraph Company (numbers specified) and two $1,000 Chicago,
Burlingtoo & Quincy Railroad Company 3% per ceht Illinois
Division (numbers specified): to the trust of E. F. and E. A.
Parsons, twelve $1,000 Northern Paeific-Great Northern 4 per
cent joint bonds, Chicago, Burlington & Quincy collateral. '
The transfers were made by Sh.aw with knowledge of his
insolvency, and with intent to prefer the trusts and himself as
trustee, and the effect (it is alleged) of such preference, if not
avoided, will be to enable the trust estates and himself as trustee
thereof (being one of his individual creditors) to obtain a greater
percentage of his debts than any other of his creditors of the
same class.
The petition prayed that the bonds be declared to be the bonds
of petitioner, appellee here, and that Clarke, appellant here, be
ordered to execute such instruments as might be necessary to
transfer the title to and possession of all the bonds to petitioner.
'The answer of appellant denied only that the transfers were
made within f0tfr months of the bankruptcy, that Shaw was, at
the time of the transfer, insolvent, that all the trusts were his
creditors then or have become so since, within the meaning of
the statute, and denies that he intended by the transfers to give
a preference, or that they constitute a preference.
The decree of the district judge was that five of the seven
Telephone and twelve of the Northern Pacific-Great Northern
Railroad Company 4 per cent joint bonds, and all of the coupons thereon payable after January, 1908, were the property
or the trustee in bankruptcy, appellee here.
It was further adjudged that the American Telephone & Telegl'll.ph Company collateral trust 4 per cent bonds (numhered
20,818 and 20,819) were in part the property of the appellant
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as trustee and of appellee as trustee. The bonds were directed

to be sold. The decree was afiirmed by the Circuit Court of

Appeals. [183 Fed. 518, 106 C. C. A. 64.]

The District Court found the facts. They are summarized in

its opinion as follows:

"The bankrupt, being insolvent, and knowing himself to be

insolvent, was discovered by the surety on his bond as trustee

under the Parsons will, not to be in possession of some of

the securities which formed a part of the trust estate, and which

should have been in his possession as trustee. He was being

urged by the surety to make good this shortage. For the pur-

pose of doing so, he placed the bonds in question in a safe-deposit

box, taken and agreed on by himself and the surety as a separate

place of deposit for the securities belonging to this trust. In

the box were placed also those securities belonging to the trust

funds which had not gone out of his possession. All the securi-

ties thus placed in the box and held as constituting the trust

funds have since remained there. The bankrupt has been re-

moved as trustee, and the respondent, his successor in the trust,

has at present the possession and control of the contents of

the box, including the bonds in question.

"The bankrupt had at the time more than twenty-five other

trust estates in his charge as trustee. There was, in the case of
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each, a shortage for which he was responsible, and he knew the

fact to be so. The total amount of these shortages exceeded

$350,000.

"It has not been shown that any of the bonds used as above

to make good the shortage in the Parsons trust estate, or that

any of the money wherewith the bankrupt purchased those

bonds, can be identified as belonging to any one of the other

trust estates in the bankrupt's charge. He drew out and used

to purchase certain of the bonds a savings bank deposit of $1,500

belonging to one of the Parsons trust funds; but with that ex-

ception the money wherewith the bonds were bought as well as

the bonds themselves must, for the purposes of the questions to

be decided, be regarded as the bankrupt's individual property

at the time he set them apart in the manner stated, to be there-

after held as trust property.''

The question in the case is, Do these facts show a preference

within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Lawt

Putting to one side the identity of Shaw as an individual and

Shaw as the trustee of the trusts, there are the elements of a

as trustee and of appdlee M tru.stce. The bonds were diredeJ
to be sold. 'l'he decree was affirmed by the Circuit Cour:. of
Appeals. [183 F'ed. 518, 106 C. C. A. 64.)
The District Court fouu<l the facts. They are summarized i.IJ
it.a opinion as follows:
"The bankrupt, being insolvent, and knowing himself to Lt:
insolvent, was discovered by the surety on his bond as trustet.'
under the Parsons will, not to be in possession of some of
the securities which formed a part of the trust estate, aud whid1
should have been in his ·possession as trustee. He was Leiug
urged by the surety to make good this shortage. For the purpose of doing so, he placed the bonds in question in a safe-deposit
box, taken and agreed on by himself and the surety as a separate
place of deposit for the securities belonging to this trust. 111
the box were placed also th08e securities belonging to the trust
funds which had not gone out of his possession. All the securities thus placed in the box and held as constituting the trust
funds have since remained there. The bankrupt has been removed as trustee, and the respondent, his successor in the trust,
has at present the possession and control of the content.a of
the box, including the bonds in question.
"The bankrupt had at the time more than twenty-five other
trust estates in his charge as trustee. There was, in the case of
each, a shortagt. for which he was responsible, and he knew the
fact to be so. The total amount of these shortages exceeded
$350,000.
''It has not been shown that any of the bonds used as above
to make good the shortage in the Parsons trust estate, or that
any of the money wherewith the bankrupt purchased those
bonds, can be identified as belonging to any one of the other
trust estates in the bankrupt's charge. He drew out and used
to purchase certain of the bonds a savings bank deposit of $1,500
belonging to one of the Parsons trust funds; but with that exception the money wherewith the bonds were bought as well as
the bonds themselves must, for the purJ>oses of the questions to
be decided, be regarded as the bankrupt's individual property
at the ti.me he set them apart in the manner stated, to be thereafter held as trust property.''
The question in the case is, Do these fact.a show a preference
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Law f
Putting to one side the identity of Shaw as an individual and
Shaw as the trustee of the trust.a, there are the elements of a
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preference. In other words, there is indebtedness; Shaw is in-

debted to all of the estates of which he was trustee. He used

his individual property to pay the indebtedness to the Parsons

trust, and he thus gave that trust a preference over the others.

It was enabled to the extent of the property transferred to obtain

a greater percentage of its debts than the other trusts. What,

then, stands in the way of setting the transfer aside? The debt

was not a provable one in bankruptcy, it is contended, and on

that contention the case is rested, and to it we may direct our

considerations, and in that the provisions of the statute become

necessary elements.

Section 60a, as amended, is as follows:

"A person shall be deemed to have given a preference, if,

being insolvent, he has, within four months before the filing of

the petition, * • • made a transfer of any of his property,

and the effect of the enforcement of such • • * transfer

will be to enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater

percentage of his debt than any other of such creditors of the

same class."

A creditor is defined to be "anyone who owns a demand or

claim provable in bankruptcy [and] may include his duly au-

thorized agent, attorney, or proxy."
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Debt includes any debt, demand, or claim provable in bank-,

ruptcy. Transfer includes the sale and every other and differ J

ent mode of disposing of or parting with property, or the pos-

session of property, absolutely or conditionally, as a payment

pledge, mortgage, gift, or security.

Appellant deduces from these definitions that no question or

a preference can arise except when the transfer is made to the

owner of a provable claim, or to his agent, and that no claim is

provable except when enumerated in § 63a, and none other can

be liquidated under paragraph b. Of the claims enumerated in

§ 63a, the fourth is the only one with which we are concerned.

It is as follows: "(4) Founded on an open account, or upon a

contract, express or implied.'' The final contention of appellant

is that one, to receive a preference, must be a creditor of the

bankrupt upon a contract, express or implied. It is not enough

that there be some kind of legal or equitable claim against the

bankrupt. These postulates laid down, he builds upon them an

argument of great technicality to show that the trusts of Shaw

were not his creditors, and therefore could not receive from him

a preference. An obligation to the trusts is not denied, but it is

prefere nee. In other words, there is indebtedness; Shaw is indebted to all of the estates of which he was trustee. He used
his individual property to pay the indebtedness to the Parsous
trust, and he thus gave that trust a preference over the others.
It was enabled to the extent of the property transferrl'd to obtain
a greater percentage of its debts than the other trusts. Whllt,
then, stands in the way of setting the transfer aside Y 'l'hc debt
was not a provable one in bankruptcy, it is contended, aml on
that contention the case is rested, and to it we may direct our
coDBiderations, and in that the provisions of the statute become
Ut'cessary element.a.
Section 60a, as amended, is as follows:
''A person shall be deemed to have given a preference, if,
being insolvent, he has, within four months before the :filiug of
the petition, ., • • made a transfer of any of his p1;opercy,
and the etfect of the enforcement of such • • • transfer
will be to enable auy one of his creditors to obtain a greater
percentage of his debt than any other of such creditors of the
same cl888."
A creditor is defined to be ''anyone who owns a demand. or
claim provable in bankruptcy [and] may include his duly authorized agent, attorney, or proxy."
Debt includes any debt, demand, or claim provable in bankruptcy. Transfer includes the sale and every other and differ
ent mode of disposing of or parting with property, or the pos
session of property, absolutely or conditionally, as a payment
pledge, mortgage, gift, or security.
Appellant deduces from these definitions that no lJ.Uestion o
a preference can arise except when the transfer is made to the
owner of a provable claim, or to his agent, and that no claim is
provable except when enumerated in § 63a, and none other can
he liquidated under paragraph b. Of the claims enumerated in
§ 63a, the fourth is the only one with which we are concerned.
It is 88 follows: " ( 4) Founded on an open account, or upon a
contract, express or implied." The final contention of appellant
is that one, to receive a preference, must be a creditor of the
bankrupt upon a contract, express or implied. It is not enough
that there be some kind of legal or equitable claim against the
bankrupt. These postulates laid down, he builds upon them an
argument of great technicality to show that the trusts of Sh.aw
were not his creditors, and therefore could not receive from him
a preference. An obligation to the trusts is not denied, but it is
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an obligation, it is asserted, which was represented entirely by

his bond, and had no remedy but by a suit on the bond. The

liability of Shaw, it is further contended, considered inde-

pendently of the bond, was in the nature of a pure tort liability

which could not be waived and the remedies of a contract

availed of.

That some torts may be waived and be the bases of provable

claims is decided in Crawford v. Burke, 195 U. S. 176, 187, 49

h. ed. 147, 151, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9. Crawford and one Valeiitine

were stockbrokers and dealers in investments. They had in their

possession certain shares of stock which they held as a pledge

and security for the amount due them by Burke on the stock.

They sold Burke's reversionary interest in the stock, whereby

it was wholly lost. He sued them in trover. They set up their

discharge in bankruptcy. It was held, the court speaking

through Mr. Justice Brown, to be clear that the debt of Burke

was embraced within the provisions of paragraph a, as one

"founded upon an open account, or upon contract, express or

implied," and might have been proven had he chosen to waive

the tort and take his place with other creditors of the estate.

The discharge in bankruptcy was held on other provisions of

the act to be a defense. The case was applied and followed

in Tindle v. Birkett, 205 U. S. 183, 186, 51 L. ed. 762, 764, 27
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Sup. Ct. Rep. 493, in an action to recover damages claimed to

have been sustained by false and fraudulent representations.

It was decided that the claim was one provable under § 63a as

'' founded upon an open account or upon a contract, express or

implied." It is, however, said that these cases are explained

and limited in Frederic L. Grant Shoe Co. v. W. M. Laird Co.,

212 U. S. 445, 53 L. ed. 591, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 332, to instances

'' where there is a claim arising out of a contract, but of such a

nature that there is at the same time an independent remedy in

tort.'' To make this distinction available, appellant must es-

tablish his contention that there was no contractual relation,

either between Shaw and his trusts or the cestuis que trust of

the trusts; in other words, that the sole liability was upon Shaw s

bond. There is no other remedy, is the repeated insistence, and

that only after a final accounting has been had in the Probate

Court, showing a liquidated balance due from the acc«untant'

Then, and not until then, as we understand appellant, a creditor

emerges with a provable claim. Appellant, however, haL ts some-

what at the logic of his argument, and ventures to say that a

an obligation, it is asserted, which was represented entirely by
his bond, and had no remedy but by a suit on the bond. The
liability of Shaw, it is further contended, considered independently of the bond, was in the nature of a pure tort liability
which could not be waived and the remedies of a contract
availed of.
That some torts may be waived and be the bases of provable
claims is decided in Crawford v. Burke, 195 U. S. 176, 187, 49
I.... ed. 147, 151, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9. Crawford and one Valentine
were stockbrokers and dealers in investments. They had in their
possession certain shares of stock which they held as a pledge
and security for the amount due them by ·B urke on the stock.
They sold Burke's reversionary interest in the stock, whereby
it was wholly lost. He sued them in trover. They set up their
discharge in bankruptcy. It was held, the court speaking
through Mr. Justice Brown, to be clear that the debt of Burke
was embraced within the provisions of paragraph a, as one
''founded upon an open account, or upon contract, express or
implied,'' and might have been proven had he chosen to waive
the tort and take his place with other creditors of the estate.
The discharge in bankruptcy was held on other provisions of
the act to be a defense. The case was applied and followed
in Tindle Y. Birkett, 205 U. S. 183, 186, 51 L. ed. 762, 764, 27
Sup. Ct. Rep. 493, in an action to recover damages claimed to
have been sustained by false and fraudulent representations.
It was decided that the claim was one provable under § 63a as
''founded upon an open account or upon a contract, express or
implied." It is, however, said that these cases are explained
and limited in Frederic L. Grant Shoe Co. v. W. M. Laird Co.,
212 U. S. 445, 53 L. ed. 591, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 332, to instanoos
"where there is a claim a.rising out of a. contract, but of such a
nature that there is at the same time an independen~ remedy in
tort.'' To make this distinction available, appellant must establish his contention th.at there was no contractual relation,
either between Shaw and his trusts or the cestu.is que tru.st of
the trusts; in other words, that the sole liability was upon Shaw's
bond. There is no other remedy, is the repeated insiste1-1ce, and
that only after a final accounting has been had in the Probate
Court, showing a liquidated balance due from the acce>untant.
Then, and not until then, as we understand appellant, a creditor
emerges with a provable claim. Appellant, however, halts somewhat at the logic of his argument, and ventures to say that a
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decision in his favor does not necessarily involve a decision that

a claim upon the bond of the defaulting trustee could not be

proved for a dividend in the name of the probate judge. But is

not this concession in opposition to the relation asserted to exist

between a provable debt and a transfer of property on account

of it being a preference?

We have considered the contentions of appellant somewhat

minutely, so as to fully present them. The lower courts, while

giving attention to the technical elements of appellant's argu-

^ nients, cut through them to apply the fundamental purpose of

the Bankruptcy Law; that is, equality between creditors. The

District Court, following Bush v. Moore, 133 Mass. 198, decided

in 1882 under a provision of the Massachusetts insolvency law

which was similar to the provision in the Bankruptcy Act of the

United States, found no difficulty in the same person, considered

in different capacities, acting as giver and receiver of a fraudu-

lent preference. The Court of Appeals met the contention of

appellant that there must be a contractual relation, and decided

that it existed, both on account of the bond and independently

of the bond. The court said: "It is true that, in the ordinary

course, enforcing the bond would be at the end of the proceed-

ings, and not at the beginning. Notwithstanding, as the equita-
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ble rules which govern bankrupts always look to the end, and

disregard the intervening details as only steps to reach the end,

there was in this case a contract from the beginning,—that is,

the bond,—which was capable of liquidation on the rules ex-

plained in Tindle v. Birkett, 205 U. S. 183, 51 L. ed. 762, 27

Sup. Ct. Rep. 496. • • • Aside from this and independently

of the bond, we believe there is an obligation resting on a de-

faulting testamentary trustee to restore the value of the assets

embezzled, which is of contractual character."

But this, appellant contends, is to evolve "two moral persons

out of one embezzler.'' The criticism only can be made by put-

ting out of view what the "one embezzler" represents. He is

one being, but acts in more than one capacity, and in all of his

capacities he has duties and obligations. The relation of a trustee

to the trust property is not the same as his relation to his in-

dividual property. He certainly may incur obligations to the

trust. He can only satisfy the obligations out of his individual

property, and by doing so may deplete it, make it deficient, to

satisfy its obligations. These are realities, not fictions. We must

overlook essential things to disregard them, and hence the de-

decision in his favor does not necessarily involve a decision that
a claim upon the bond of the defaulting trustee could not be
proved for a dividend in the name of the probate judge. But is
not this concession in opposition to the relation asserted to exist
between a provable debt and a kansfer of property on account
of it being a preference T
We have considered the contentions of appellant somewhat
minutely, so as to fully present them. The lower courts, while
giving attention to the technical elements of appellant's arguments, cut through them to apply the fundamental purpose of
the Bankruptcy Law; that is, equality between creditors. The
District Court, following Bush v. Moore, 133 Mass. 198, decided
in 1882 under a provision of the Massachusetts insolvenc:· law
which was similar to the provision in the Bankruptcy Act of the
United States, found no difficulty in the same person, considered
in different capacities, acting as giver and receiver of a fraudulent preference. The Court of ;Appeals met the contention of
appellant that there must be a contractual relation, and decided
that it existed, both on account of the bond and independently
of the bond. The court said: ''It is true that, in the ordinary
course, enforcing the bond would be at the end of the proceedings, and not at the beginning. Notwithstanding, as the equitable rules which govern bankrupts always look to the end, and
disregard the intervening details as only steps to reach the end,
there was in this case a contract from the beginning,-that is,
the bond,-which was capable of liquidation on the rules explained in Tindle v. Birkett, 205 U. S. 183, 51 L. ed. 762, 27
Sup. Ct. Rep. 496. • • • · Aside from this and independently
of the bond, we believe there is an obligation resting on a defaulting testamentary kustee to restore the value of the assets
embezzled, which is of contractual character.''
But this, appellant contends, is to evolve ''two moral persons
out of one embezzler." The criticism only can be made by putting out of view what the ''one embezzler'' represents. He is
one being, but acts in more than one capacity, and in all of his
capacities he has duties and obligations. The relation of a trustee
to the trust property is not the same as his relation to his individual property. He certainly may incur obligations to the
trust. He can only satisfy the obligations out of his individual
property, and by doing so may deplete it, make it deficient, to
satisfy its obligations. These are realities, not fictions. We must
overlook essential things to disregard them, and hence the de-
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cision in Bush v. Moore, supra, Moore was the guardian of his

son, and wrongfully appropriated to his own use the moneys of

his ward. Within six mouths preceding his insolvency, and

being insolvent, intending to restore the funds he had appro-

priated, he deposited in the defendant bank the necessary sum

derived from his private property. His assignees in insolvency

sued in equity to recover the sum as a preference, alleging that

he at the time was insolvent, and acted in contemplation of in-

solvency. The Massachusetts statute made void any payment or

conveyance of property by an insolvent "to any creditor or

person having a claim against him" and gave power to the

assignee to recover the property.

These contentions were made: (1) The ward was not a

creditor of the guardian or a person having a claim against him.

(2) The act of the guardian did not constitute a preference which

was avoidable by reason of his insolvency. (3) Had the mis-

appropriation continued, there would have been no claim by

the ward which could have been the foundation of a suit.

(4) His remedy was to summons the guardian into the Probate

Court, and then, upon adjudication there, or if he failed to

account, there would have been only the remedy for failure to

account or to comply with the decree of the court.

The contentions, it will be observed, were like those made in
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the case at bar. They were all rejected. It was held that the

title to the property continued in the ward, the guardian having

its custody only, and, he having wrongfully used it, there was a

just claim on the part of the ward that the integrity of the fund

should be restored. The court said: '' The title to the property

of one under guardianship continues always in the ward; the

guardian has its custody merely. If, availing himself of that

custody, he wrongfully uses it, there is a just claim on the part

of the ward that the integrity of the fund shall be restored. It

is not important in what form the ward is compelled to seek

his remedy, or that the wrongful act of the guardian will not

immediately afford a ground of action against him. Even if,

upon a settlement in the Probate Court, it might have been held

that the lawful and proper charges of the guardian would ex-

ceed the amount of his spoliations, there was not the less a just

claim that the ward's property which had been unlawfully dealt

with should be replaced."

To the contention that two persons were necessary to consum-

mate a preference, one to transfer and the other to receive the

cision in Bush v. l\loore, supra. )loore was. the guardian of hia
son, and wrongfully appropriated to his own use the moneys of
his ward. Within six months preceding his insolvency, and
being insolvent, intending to restore the funds he had appropriated, he deposited in the defendant bank the uecessary sum
derived from his private property. His assignees in insolvency
sued in equity to recover the sum as a prefer~nce, alleging that
he at the time was insolvent, and acted in contemplation of insolvency. The Massachusetts statute made void any payment or
conveyance of property by an insolvent ''to any creditor or
person having a claim against him" and gave power to the
assignee to recover the property.
These contentions were made: (1) The ward was not a
creditor of the guardian or a person having a claim against him.
(2) The act of the guardian did not constitute a preference which
was avoidable by reason of his insolvency. (3) Had the misappropriation continued, there would have been no claim by
the ward which could have been the foundation of a suit.
( 4) His remedy was to summons the guardian into the Probate
Court, and then, upon adjudication there, or if he failed to
account, there would have been only the remedy for failure to
account or to comply with the decree of the court.
The contentions, it will be observed, were like those made in
the case at bar. They were all rejected. It was held that the
title to the property continued in the ward, the guardian having
its custody only, and, he having wrongfully used it, there was a
just claim on the part of the ward that the integrity of the fund
should be restored. The court saM : ''The title to the property
of oue under guardianship continues always in the ward; the
guardian has its custody merely. If, availing himself of that
custody, he wrongfully uses it, there is a just claim on the part
of the ward that the integrity of the fund shall be restored. It
is not important in what form the ward is compelled to seek
his remedy, or that the wrongful act of the guardian will not
immediately afford a ground of action against him., Even if,
upon a settlement in the Probate Court, it might have been held
that the lawful and proper charges of the guardian would exceed the amount of his spoliations, there was not the less a just
claim that the ward's property which had been unlawfully dealt
with should be replaced.''
To the contention that two persons were necessary to consummate a preference, one to transfer and the other to receive the
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property, the court answered: "But where the same person

acts as the giver and receiver of the security, the concurrence

and participation of two parties to the fraudulent preference

exists. * * * One individual acting in two capacities, as

debtor and on behalf of the creditor, may constitute the two per-

sons contemplated by the statute." And, supplying the element

of knowledge of the insolvency and the preference required by

the statute, the court said that the ward was bound by the knowl-

edge of his guardian.

The case is certainly determinative of appellant's contention

that accounting in the Probate Court was necessary as a condi-

tion to a provable claim, or that a suit on a bond was the only

remedy available for the misappropriation of the funds by a

guardian. This applies as well to a trustee; and that there may

be a contractual obligation of one trust to another under the

laws of Massachusetts is decided in Bremer v. Williams, 210

Mass. 256, 96 N. E. 687. In that case a person who was the sole

trustee of two separate estates paid the taxes due from one of

them with money embezzled from the other. It was held that

the new trustee of the latter could maintain suit in equity to

recover from another unjustly enriched by the embezzlement.

The liability of the latter to the former, the court said, grew out

of an implied or constructive obligation, and did not rest upon
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an express trust; and, being such, the statute of limitations

would be a bar in equity as well as in law. In other words, the

court recognized that from the misuse of the funds the law would

imply an obligation to repay. This ruling brings the case at

bar within Crawford v. Burke and Tindle v. Birkett, even if

their application be as limited as appellant contends. It may

be questioned if they are so limited. They recognize the rela-

tion of § 63a to § 17. § 17 excludes certain debts from discharge;

among others, those created by the bankrupt's "fraud, em-

bezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an

officer or in any fiduciary capacity." It was said in Crawford v.

Burke: "If no fraud could be made the basis of a provable

debt, why were certain frauds excepted from the operation of

the discharge ?'' The question was pertinent in view of the lan-

guage of the section. It provides that "a discharge in bank-

ruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts,

except such as," etc. The relation of the section was also recog-

nized in Friend v. Talcott, 228 U. S. 27, 57 L. ed. 718, 33 Sup.

Ct. Rep. 505. It is there declared that § 17 enumerates the

property, the court answered: ''But where the same person
acts as the givi>r and receiver of the security, the coucurreuce
and participation of two parties to the fraudulent preference
exists. • • • One individual acting in two capacities, as
debtor and on behalf of the creditor, may constitute the two persons contemplated by the statute.'' And, supplying the element
of knowledge of the insolvency and the preferen~e required by
the statute, the court. said that the ward was bound by the knowledge of his guardian.
The case is certainly determinative of appellant's contention
that accounting in the Probate Court was necessary as a condition to a provable claim, or that a suit on a bond was the only
remedy available for the misappropriation of the funds by a
guardian. This applies as well to a trustee; and that there may
be a contractual obligation of one trust to another under the
laws of l\fassachusetts is decided in Bremer v. Williams, 210
Mass. 256, 96 N. E. 687. In that case a person who was the sole
trustee of two separate estates paid the taxes due from one of
them with money embezzled from the other. It was held that
the new trustee of the latter coukl maintain suit in equity to
recover from another unjustly enrichcd by the embezzlement.
The liability of the latter to the former, the court said, grew out
of an implied or constructive obligation, and did not rest upon
an express trust; and, being such, the statute of limitations
would be a bar in equity as well as in law. In other words, the
court recognized that from the misuse of the funds the law would
imply an obligation to repay. This ruling brings the case at
bar within Crawford v. Burke and Tindle v. Birkett, even if
their application be as limited as appellant contends. It may
be questioned if they are so limited. They recognize the relation of § 63a to § 17. § 17 excludes certain debts from discharge;
among others, those created by the bankrupt's ''fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an
officer or in any fiduciary capacity." It was said in Crawford v.
Burke: "If no fraud could be made the oosis of a provable
debt, why were certain frauds excepted from the operation of
the dischargef" The question was pertinent in view of the language of the section. It provides that ''a discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts,
except such as," etc. The relation of the section was also recognized in Friend v. Talcott, 228 U. S. 27, 57 J,. ed. 718, 33 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 505. It is there declared that § 17 enumerates the
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debts provable under § 63a which are not discharged. Among

them, we have seen, are those created by fraud, embezzlement,

misappropriation, or defalcation in any fiduciary capacity. It

would seem, therefore, to follow that the conversion of trust

funds creates a liability provable in bankruptcy.

The Court of Appeals expressed the hardship of a contrary

conclusion. "Moreover," the court said, "it will be a great

hardship if the various estates of which Shaw was trustee can-

not recover any part of their loss of about $350,000 by sharing

in his bankrupt estate. This might, of course, in this instance,

be but a very small dividend; but in another instance it might

be very near the face of the default. Any construction which

would leave such a result as that cannot, of course, be accepted

unless fairly forced upon us." [106 C. C. A. 69, 183 Fed. 523.]

In this, we think, the court was right. Equality between credit-

ors is necessarily the ultimate aim of the Bankrupt Law, and to

obtain it we must regard the essential nature of transactions,

not their forms or accidents. As we have said, there may be

an unity of the person in the individual and the trustee, of the

individual and the guardian; we must look beyond it to the

difference in his capacities and the duties and obligations result-

ing from it. These duties and obligations are as distinct and

insistent as though exercised by different individuals, and have
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the same legal consequences. The unity of the person has, of

course, an effect. It constitutes such relationship between the

different capacities exercised as to impute knowledge of their

exercise and for what purpose exercised. Bush v. Moore, 133

Mass. 198; Atlantic Cotton Mills v. Indian Orchard Mills, 147

Mass. 282, 9 Am. St. Rep. 698, 17 N. E. 496; Rogers v. Palmer,

102 U. S. 263, 26 L. ed. 164; Atlantic Bank v. Merchants' Bank,

10 Gray, 532, cited in United States v. State Nat. Bank, 96 U. S.

30, 36, 24 L. ed. 647, 648.

Decree affirmed.

Mr. Justice HOLMES concurs in the result.

IN RE BANKS

207 Fed. 662

(District Court, N. D. New York. September 15, 1913)

RAY, D. J. The referee has allowed the claim of John

Quencer at the sum of $792.03 and the claim of Philip Quencer

at the sum of $701.26. The allowance of these claims is chal-

debts provable under § 63a which are not discharged. Among
them, we have seen, are those created by fraud, embezzlement,
misappropriation, or defalcation in any fiduciary capacity. It
would seem, therefore, to follow that the conversion of trust
funds creates a liability provable in bankruptcy.
The Court of Appeals expressed the hardship of a contrary
conclusion. "Moreover," the court said, "it will be a great
hardship if the various estates of which Shaw was trustee cannot recover any part of their loss of about $350,000 by sharing
in his bankrupt estate. This might, of course, in this instance,
'
be but a very small
dividend ; but in another instance it might
be very near the face of the default. Any construction which
would leave such a result as that cannot, of course, be accepted
unless fairly forced upon us." (106 C. C. A. 69, 183 Fed. 523.]
In this, we think, the court was right. Equality between creditors is necessarily the ultimate aim of the Bankrupt Law, and to
obtain it we must regard the essential nature of transactions,
not their forms or accidents. As we have said, there may be
an unity of the person in the individual and the trustee, of the
individual and the guardian; we must look beyond it to the
difference in his capacities and the duties and obligations resulting from it. These duties and obligations are as distinct and
insistent as though exercised by different individuals, and have
the same legal consequences. The unity of the person has, of
course, an effect. It constitutes such relationship between the
different capacities exercised as to impute knowledge of their
exercise and for what purpose exercised. Bush v. Moore, 133
Mass. 198; Atlantic Cotton Mills v. Indian Orchard .Mills, 147
Mass. 282, 9 Am. St. Rep. 698, 17 N. E. 496; Rogers v. Palmer,
102 U. S. 263, 26 L. ed. 164; Atlantic Bank v. Merchants' Bank,
10 Gray, 532, 'cited in United States v. State Nat. Bank, 96 U. S.
30) 36, 24 L. ed. 647, 648.
l)ecree affirmed.
Mr. Justice HOLMES concurs in the result.
IN RE BANKS
207 Fed. 662
(l)istrict Court, N. l). New York. September 15, 1913)
RAY, l). J. The referee bas allowed the claim of John
Quencer at the sum of $792.03 and the claim of Philip Quencer
at the sum of $701.26. The allowance of these claims is cbal-
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lenged on the ground that they were barred by the six years'

statute of limitations at the time the petition in bankruptcy was

filed, and that the bar of the statute had not been removed by

part payment or by an acknowledgment of the debt in writing, as

provided by § 395 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the state of

New York, which provides that:

'' An acknowledgment or promise contained in a writing, signed

by the party to be charged thereby, is the only competent evi-

dence of a new or continuing contract, whereby to take a case

out of the operation of this title. But this section does not alter

the effect of a payment of principal or interest."

On the 7th day of September, 1912, the bankrupt, Ira 0.

Banks, signed and verified his petition and schedules in voluntary

bankruptcy, which were filed September 12, 1912, and adjudi-

cation made. In the schedules of debts owing the bankrupt

listed, "Philip Quencer, Watertown, N. Y., note, $250," and

"John Quencer, Perch River, N. Y., note, $250," and no men-

tion was made therein of any other debt owing them or either

of them or of the consideration for the note, if there was one.

After the trustee was appointed and qualified, and September

25, 1912, Philip Quencer filed his verified claim for:

71 tons of hay at $9.50 $674.50

September, 1904, by cash 200.00
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$474.50

Interest for 8 years 227.76

$702.26

1912. Received 1.00

Balance due $701.26

October 14, 1912, John Quencer filed his claim with the referee

for:

lenged on the ground that they were barred by the six years'
statute of limitations at the time the petition in bankruptcy was
filed, and that the bar of the statute had not been removed by
part payment or by an acknowledgment of the debt in writing, as
provided by § 395 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the state of
New York, which provides that:
''An acknowledgment or promise contained in a writing, signed
by the party to be charged thereby, is the only competent evidence of a new or continuing contract, whereby to take a case
out of the operation of this title. But this section does not alter
the effect of a payment of principal or interest.''
On the 7th day of September, 1912, the bankrupt, Ira 0.
Banks, signed and verified his petition and schedules in voluntary
bankruptcy, which were filed September 12, 1912, and adjudication made. In the schedules of debts owing the bankrupt
listed, "Philip Quencer, Watertown, N. Y., note, $250," and
"John Quencer, Perch River, N. Y., note, $250," and no mention was made therein of any other debt owing them or either
of them or of the consideration for the note, if there was one.
After the trustee was appointed and qualified, and September
25, 1912, Philip Quencer filed his verified claim for:

66 tons of hay at $11 $726.00

Interest to April 1, 1905 23.23

$749.23

April 1, 1905, cash 200.00

71 tons of hay at $9.50 .............................. $674.50
September, 1904, by cash. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200.00

$549.23

' for 8 years ............... . ............... .
Interest

$474.50
227.76

1912. Received ... . ................................ .

$702.26
1.00

Balance due . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $701.26
October 14, 1912, John Quencer filed his claim with the referee
for:
66 tons of hay at $11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $726.00
Interest to April 1, 1905. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
23.23

April 1, 1905, cash.. . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . .

$749.23
200.00
$549.23
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Interest to September 1,1912

Interest to September 1, 1912. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

244.40

September, 1912, cash .......... ~...................

$793.68
1.00

244.40

September, 1912, cash

$793.68

1.00

I
r

$792.63

—with interest from September 1, 1912.

In the verified claims filed there is no mention of or reference

to a note or notes. The claims state:

"That the consideration of said debt is as folllows: 'Goods,

wares and merchandise sold and delivered to the said bankrupt

at his special instance and request.' * • • Nor has any note

or other evidence of said debt been received except as herein

stated."

As stated no note is mentioned in the claim. The total of all

claims of other creditors proved is $721.69.

As to the claim of Philip Quencer it is asserted that on the

10th or 11th of September, 1912, some five days after the petition

was verified and one or two days before it was filed, Banks paid

to Quencer the sum of $1 and stated to him that he wanted to

pay him the dollar to renew the debt. As to the claim of John
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Quencer, it is asserted that on the 10th or 11th day of Septem-

ber, 1912, Banks paid to him the sum of $1 and stated that he

paid it to him for the purpose of renewing the debt. What debt

was not mentioned.

It is, of course, true that until a bankrupt files his petition in

bankruptcy, he is the owner of all his property and may sell or

incumber it, except in fraud of creditors or in violation of some

provision of law, as he sees fit. Even after the petition is filed

and down to the time of the adjudication, the title remains in

the bankrupt, but during that time he holds in a sort of trust

capacity for creditors.

A debtor as a general rule may at any time acknowledge a

debt against which the statute of limitations has run and renew

same by a promise in writing which identifies the debt or by a

partial payment of the specific debt. A recognition of the debt

by a part payment thereof operates as a new promise to pay the

remainder. If, as against the trustee and the creditors, this

renewal of the debt cannot be effected by an acknowledgment of

the debt made in the schedules and filed with the petition, still

if the acknowledgment in writing is made before the petition is

filed or a part payment of the specific debt is made before the

$792.63
-with interest from September 1, 1912.
In the verified claims filed there is no mention of or reference
to a note or notes. The claims state:
''That the consideration of said debt is as folllows: 'Goods,
wares and merchandise sold and delivered to the said bankrupt
at his special instance and request.' • • • Nor has any note
or other evidence of said debt been received except as herein
stated."
As stated no note is mentioned in the claim. The total of all
claims of other creditors proved is $721.69.
As to the claim of Philip Quencer it is 888erted that on the
10th or 11th of September, 1912, some five days after the petition
was verified and one or two days before it was filed, Banks paid
to Quencer the sum of $1 and stated to him that he wanted to
pay him the dollar to renew the debt. As to the claim of John
Quencer, it is asserted that on the 10th or 11th day of September, 1912, Banks paid to him the sum of $1 and stated that he
paid it to him for the purpose of renewing the debt. What debt
was not mentioned.
It is, of course, true that until a bankrupt files his petition in
bankruptcy, he is the owner of all his property and may sell or
incumber it, except in fraud of creditors or in violation of some
provision of law, as he sees fit. Even after the petition is filed
aud down to the time of the adjudication, the title remains in
the bankrupt, but during that time he holds in a sort of trust
capacity for creditors.
A debtor as a general rule may at any time acknowledge a
debt against which the statute of limitations has run and renew
same by a promise in writing which identifies the debt or by a
partial payment of the specific debt. A recognition of the debt
by a part payment thereof operates as a new promise to pay the
remainder. If, as against the trustee and the creditors, this
renewal of the debt cannot be effected by an acknowledgment of
the debt made in the schedules and filed with the petition, still
if the acknowledgment in writing is made before the petition is
filed or a part payment of the specific debt is made before the
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filing of the petition, in the absence of fraud on the law or col-

lusion, I see no reason why the transaction is not valid, unless

made under such circumstances as to amount to a preference.

If within four months of filing a petition the debtor makes a

payment on an outlawed debt intending at the time to go into

bankruptcy knowing his insolvency, and the person receiving

the payment knows the insolvency and has reasonable cause to

believe that a preference is intended, it would not be such a pay-

ment as would renew the debt. The transaction would be in

fraud of the Bankruptcy Act. The transaction could be repu-

diated by the trustee and the payment recovered.

By § 60a of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended, it is provided

that -.

'' A person shall be deemed to have given a preference if, being

insolvent, he has, within four months before the filing of the

petition • • • or made a transfer of any of his property,

and the effect of the enforcement of such • • • transfer

will be to enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater

percentage of his debt than any other of such creditors of the

same class."

And § 60b provides that:

"If a bankrupt shall * • * have made a transfer of any

of his property, and if, at the time of the transfer, * * *
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the bankrupt be insolvent and • • • the transfer then

operates as a preference, and the person receiving it or to be

benefited thereby, or his agent acting therein, shall then have

reasonable cause to believe that the enforcement of such * * •

transfer would effect a preference, it shall be voidable by the

trustee and he may recover the property or its value from such

person.''

§ 57g of the act provides that:

'' The claims of creditors who have received preferences, void-

able under § 60, subdivision b, • • • shall not be allowed

unless such creditors shall surrender such preferences, convey-

ances, transfers, assignments, or incumbrances."

If, then, the payment to renew a debt be made on the eve of

bankruptcy (that is, the filing of a petition) and be made under

such circumstances and with such knowledge as to constitute the

giving and receipt of a preference, the claim cannot be allowed

unless the preference is surrendered. The amount of the pay-

ment is immaterial. If the payment is recovered (that is, was
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filing of the petition. in the absence of fraud on the law or collusion, I see no reason why the transaction is not valid, unleBB
made under such circumstances as to amount to a preference.
If within four months of filing a petition the debtor makes a
payment on an outlawed debt intending at the time to go into
hankruptcy knowing his insolvency, and the person r.'.)ceiving
the payment knows the iDBolvency and has reasonable cause to
believe that a preference is intended, it would not be such a payment as would renew the debt. The transaction would be in
fraud of the Bankruptcy Act. The transaction could be repudiated by the trustee and the payment recovered.
By § 60a of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended, it is provided
that:
''A person shall be deemed to have given a preference if, being
insolvent, he has, within four months before the filing of the
petition • • • or made a transfer of any of his property,
and the effect of the enforcement of such • • • transfer
will be to enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater
pE>rcentage of his debt than any other of such creditors of the
same clB&CJ. ''
And § 60b provides that:
"If a bankrupt shall • • • have made a transfer of any
of his property, and if, at the time of the transfer, • • •
the bankrupt be insolvent and • • • the transfer then
operates as a preference, and the person receiving it or to be
benefited thereby, or his agent acting therein, shall then have
reasonable cause to believe that the enforcement of such • • •
tran.sfer would effect a preference, it shall be voidable by the
trustee and he may recover the property or its value from such
person.''
§ 57g of the act provides that:
''The claims of creditors who have received preferences, voidable under § 60, subdivision b, • • • shall not be allowed
unless such creditors shall surrender such preferences, conveyances, transfers, assignments, or incumbrances."
If, then, the payment to renew a debt be made on the eve of
bankruptcy (that is, the filing of a petition) and be made under
such circumstances and with such knowledge as to constitute the
giving and receipt of a preference, the claim cannot be allowed
unless the preference is surrendered. The amount of the payment is immaterial. If the payment is recovered (that is, was
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in fraud of the law), then how can it operate to renew the debtf

It leaves the whole matter as if no payment had been made.

It is plain that Banks knew his insolvency and intended to

prefer both John and Philip Quencer. What knowledge did

they have? So far as appears, these claimants had not taken

any proceedings to collect or reduce their claims to judgment,

except one of them says he had spoken of the debt, we may

infer, when he met Banks. All deny that the claimants had any

knowledge of the contemplated bankruptcy proceedings prior to

the filing of the petition. All fail to remember anything that

was said at the time the $1 payments were made, except the

statement of Banks that he wanted to pay the $1 to renew the

debt.

The alleged renewal of the debts by listing claims in the

schedules, "creditors whose claims are unsecured, • • *

Philip Quencer, Watertown, N. Y., note, $250; John Quencer,

Perch River, N. Y., note, $250"—cannot be held to renew these

claims on accounts two years outlawed when it appears that no

note whatever was given. It appears in such case that the debtor

had notes in mind, not an account for goods, wares, and mer-

chandise sold and delivered. If he intended to renew a note, he

certainly did not intend to renew an account for hay for which

no note had been given.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:53 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

'' The general rule is that a new promise, whether made before

or after the bar is complete, will avoid the operation of the

statute of limitations." 25 Cyc. 1328; Winchell v. Hicks, 18

N. Y. 558; Esselstyn v. Weeks, 12 N. Y. 635; Wright v. Par-

menter, 23 Misc. Rep. 629, 52 N. Y. Supp. 99.

See the many cases cited in note, 25 Cyc. 1328.

"The general rule is that an acknowledgment or promise to

pay, in order to take the debt out of the statute, must satisfac-

torily and certainly appear to refer to the very debt in ques-

tion." Stafford v. Bryan, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 532; Clark v.

Dutcher, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 674; 25 Cyc. 1330, and cases there cited.

In re Currier (D. C.) 27 Am. Bankr. Rep. 597, 601, 602, 192

Fed. 695, the bankrupt filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy

not knowing that he had sufficient property to pay all his debts

when in fact he did have. He scheduled the valid existing

claims against him and included and scheduled an outlawed

claim. This was duly approved and allowed. Later the bank-

rupt discovered that he had property more than sufficient to pay

all his debts, and he (the bankrupt) then moved to expunge the

in fraud of the law), then how can it operate t-0 renew the debt f
It leaves the whole matter as if no payment had been made.
It is plain that Banks knew his insolvency and intended to
prefer both John and Philip Quencer. What knowledge did
they have? So far as appears, these claimants had not taken
any proceedings to collect or reduce their claims to judgment,
except one of them says he had spoken of the debt, we may
infer, when he met Banks. All deny that the claimants had any
knowledge of the contemplated bankruptcy proceedings prior to
the filing of the petition. All fail to remember anything that
was said at the time the $1 payments were made, except the
statement of Banks that he wanted to pay the $1 to renew the
debt.
The alleged renewal of the debts by listing claims in the
schedules, ''creditors whose claims are unsecured, • • •
Philip Quencer, Watertown, N. Y., note, $250; John Quencer,
Perch River, N. Y., note, $250"-cannot be held to renew these
daims on accounts two years outlawed when it appears that no
uote whatever was given. It appears in such case that the debtor
had notes in mind, not an account for goods, wares, and merchandise sold and delivered. If he intended to renew a note, he
certaiuly did not intend to renew an account for hay for which
no note had been given.
"The general rule is that a new promise, whether made before
or after the bar is complete, will avoid the operation of the
statute of limitations.'' 25 Cyc. 1328; 'Winchell v. Hicks, 18
N. Y. 558; Esselstyn v. Weeks, 12 N. Y. 635; ·wright v. Parmenter, 23 l\lisc. Rep. 629, 52 N. Y. Supp. 99.
See the mauy cases cited in note, 25 Cyc. 1328.
''The general rule is that an acknowledgment or promise to
pay, in order to take the debt out of the statute, must satisfactorily and certainly appear to refer to the very debt in que.stion." Stafford v. Bryan, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 532; Clark v.
Dutcher, 9 Cow. (N. Y.). 674; 25 Cyc. 1330, and cases there cited.
In re Currier (D. C.) 27 Am. Bankr. Rep. 597, 601, 602, 192
Fed. 695, the bankrupt filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy
uot knowing that he had sufficient property to pay all his debts
when in fact he did have. He scheduled the valid existing
claims against him and included and scheduled an outlawed
claim. This was duly approved and allowed. Later the bankrupt discovered that he had property more than sufficient to pay
all his debts, and he (the bankrupt) then moved to expunge the
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scheduled outlawed claim and that it be disallowed. No creditor

objected or had objected to the proof and allowance of that

claim, nor did the trustee in their behalf. This court discussed

the whole situation, but all that it decided was that under such

circumstances the bankrupt himself, and wholly in his own

interest and in order to secure for himself the balance of his

owu estate after paying the claims which were not outlawed prior

to making his schedules, could not allege that a claim which he

scheduled as valid and subsisting was outlawed and barred by

the statute; and that under the circumstances the creditor whose

claim was barred when the petition was filed could share in dis-

tribution only after the others were paid in full.

Here creditors are objecting through the trustee who repre-

sents them. Here the question of the effect of a partial pay-

ment on an outlawed claim on the eve of filing a voluntary peti-

tion in bankruptcy as between creditors, those whose claims were

and those whose claims were not barred by the statute of limi-

tations at that time, is in question. In re Currier the question

was between a solvent but alleged bankrupt in his own interest

and his creditors.

There are very substantial reasons why an insolvent person

on the eve of going into voluntary bankruptcy should not be
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permitted, as against his creditors whose claims are not barred

by the statute of limitations, to renew by a small partial pay-

ment thereon those claims which are barred by the statute.

Creditors whose claims are barred by the statute usually do not

seek to enforce them by suit and judgment as they feel assured

the debtor will plead the statute. If, then, a person who has

been out of business seven or eight or more years, and who has

no judgments against him arid no claims against him which have

accrued due within six years but does owe debts to a large

amount barred by the statute, starts in business and obtains

credit and purchases and has in possession a large amount of

property recently purchased on credit, but finds himself unable

to meet his obligations, he may make a small payment on each

of his outlawed debts and then go into bankruptcy and both

ancient and modern creditors, so to speak, will share in the dis-

tribution of the proceeds of such recently acquired property.

This would operate as a fraud on his creditors whose claims were

not barred by the statute. Still if there was no collusion and

no reasonable cause on the part of the creditors receiving the

payments to believe that a preference was intended, and the

scheduled outlawed claim and that it be disallowed. No creditor
objected or had objected to the proof and allowance of that
claim, nor did the truste~ in their behalf. This court discussed
the whole situation, but all that it decided was that under such
circumstances the bankrupt himself, and wholly in his own
interest and in order to secure for himself the balauce of his
owu estate after paying the claims which were not outlawed prior
to making his schedules, could not allege that a claim which he
~cheduled as valid and subsisting was outlawed and barred by
the statute; and that under the circUlllStances the creditor whose
~ lai m was barred when the petition was filed could share in distribution only after the others were paid in full.
Here creditors are objecting through the trustee who represeuts them. Here the question of the effect of a partial paymcut on an outlawed claim on the eve of filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy as between creditors, those whose claims were
and those whose claims were not barred by the statute of limitations at that time, is in question. In re Currier the question
was between a solvent but alleged bankrupt in his own interest
and his creditors.
There are very substantial reasons why an insolvent person
on the eve of going into voluntary bankruptcy should not be
permitted, as against his creditors whose claims are not barred
by the statute of limitations, to renew by a small partial payment thereon those claims which are barred by the statute.
Creditors whose claims are barred by the statute usually do not
seek to enforce them by suit and judgment as they feel assured
the debtor will plead the statute. If, then, a person who has
been out of business seven or eight or more years, and who has
no judgments against him arid no claims against him which have
accrued due within six years but does owe debts to a large
a.mount barred by the statute, starts in business and obtains
credit and purchases and has in possession a large amount of
property recently purchased on credit, but finds himself unable
to meet his obligations, he may make a small payment on each
of his outlawed debts and then go into bankruptcy and both
ancient afld modern creditors, so to speak, will share in the distribution of the proceeds of such recently acquired property.
This would operate as a fraud on his creditors whose claims were
not barred by the statute. Still if there was no collusion and
no reasonable cause on the part of the creditors receiving the
payments to believe that a preference was intended, and the
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defense of the statute is personal to the creditor until after a

petition is filed, how can the court hold that such renewal by

part payment is forbidden by any law? § 67e of the bankruptcy

act provides that:

"All • • • transfers • • * of his property or any

part thereof made, or given by a person adjudged a bankrupt

under the provisions of this act subsequent to the passage of this

act and within four months prior to the filing of the petition

with the intent and purpose on his part to hinder, delay, or

defraud his creditors, or any of them, shall be null and void as

against the creditors of such debtor, except," etc.

And the property so transferred remains a part of the bank-

rupt's estate. It would seem, not from direct evidence but from

some statement or question asked, that some person had obtained

a judgment against Banks, and we may infer that this was the

reason of his going into bankruptcy. This is surmise, however.

Assume this to be the case, we further infer that Banks made

up his mind that all his creditors should share in his estate, those

whose claims were barred by the statute and those whose claims

were not so barred, and hence he made the payments referred

to after the execution of, but before filing, his petition. Assume

this to have been his purpose, was the transfer of the $1 on the
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occasion in question one "with the intent and purpose on his part

(Banks) to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors or any of

them V I am not prepared so to hold. So far as this court is

informed, it has not been held that a payment made ou account

or on a note for the express purpose of renewing an outlawed

claim of itself is or operates as a fraud on creditors within the

meaning of the statute.

Suppose we take the position that the payment of the $1 on

each of these claims, after the petition was verified but before it

was filed, was the creation of new debts or obligations, and I

am not able to find any law which will prevent their proof and

allowance. The status of the claim must be determined as it

existed at the time the petition was filed. Suppose the parties

had figured up the accounts and Banks had given promissory

notes intermediate the verification of the petition in bankruptcy

and its filing, would or would not the claim be provable? I am

of the opinion that Banks, as against his other creditors, in the

absence of fraud and collusion, had the right to renew these

claims at any time before he filed his petition. It does not ap-

pear that the Quencers, or either of them, knew Banks was

defense of the statute is personal to the creditor until after a
petition is filed, how can the court hold that such reuewal by
part payment is forbidden by any lawT § 67c of the bankruptcy
act provides that:
' 'All • • • transfers • • • of his property or any
part thereof made, or given by a person adjudged a bankrupt
under the provisions of this act subsequent to the passage of this
act and within four months prior to the filing of the petition
with, the intent and purpose o;n his part to hinder, delay, or
defraud his creditors, or any of them, shall be null and voiJ as
agaiust the creditors of such debtor, except," etc.
And the property so transferred remains a part of the bankrupt's estate. It would seem, not from direct evidence but from
some statement or question asked, that some person had obtained
a judgment against Banks, and we may infer that this was the
reason of his going into bankruptcy. This is surmise, however.
Assume this to be the case, we further infer that Banks made
up his mind that all his creditors should share in his estate, those
whose claims were barred by the statute and those whose claims
were not so barred, and hence he made the payments referred
to after the execution of, but before filing, his petition. Assume
this to have been bis purpose, was the transfer of the $1 on tlle
occasion in question one "with the intent and purpose on ltis part
(Banks) to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors or any of
them?'' I am not prepared so to hold. So far as this court is
informed, it has not been held that a payment made 011 account
or on a note for the express purpose of renewing an outlawe<l
claim of itself is or operates as a fraud on creditors within the
meaning of the statute.
Suppose we take the position that the payment of the $1 on
each of these claims, after the petition was verified but before it
was filed, was the creation of new debts or obligations, and I
am not able to find any law which will prevent their proof and
allowance. The status of the claim must be determined as it
existed at the time the petition was filed. Suppose the parties
had figured up the accounts and Banks had given promissory
notes intermediate the verification of the petition in bankruptcy
and its filing, would or would not the claim be provable f I am
of the opinion that Banks, 88 against his other creditors, in the
absence of fraud and collusion, had the right to renew these
claims at any time before he filed his petition. It does not appear that the Quencers, or either of them, knew Banks was
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insolvent. It seems to me that the law has not prohibited the

renewal of outlawed claims under such circumstances.

It is contended that there is nothing to show that the bank-

rupt intended to pay anything on an account or debt due for

hay sold and delivered, but that the evidence discloses an intent

to make a payment on a promissory note. A few days before

the payments were made, the bankrupt made up his schedules

of indebtedness which were attached to and formed a part of his

petition in bankruptcy. Here he stated that he owed to John

Quencer a note of $250 and to Philip Quencer a note of $250;

that is, debts evidenced by such notes. The consideration of

these notes is not mentioned in the schedules. It is evident that

Banks at that time had in mind claims against himself in favor

of the Quencers evidenced by notes, $250 to each. The date of

the notes was not given. So far as appears, this was his state of

mind and these the debts he had in mind when he went to the

Quencers on the occasions mentioned. There was no conversa-

tion as to any indebtedness except Banks handed to each $1 and

said he wanted to pay or paid the dollar to renew Uie debt. In

fact, so far as the proof goes, no note had been given to one of

the Quencers, but a note of $400 had been given to the other

which he had handed back, under what conditions and for what
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reason does not appear. In fact, as the referee finds, Banks

owed a balance to each of the Quencers for hay sold and de-

livered and nothing else; the claim, however, being barred by

the statute. The contention is, nothing having been said regard-

ing the nature or character of the debt, that Banks had notes in

mind and intended to make a payment on notes and not on an

account or claims for hay sold and delivered. But if there was

only one claim or debt, and that for hay, is it material that

Banks supposed he had given a note for the debt when in fact

he had not? It is only material that a specific indebtedness was

reeo°mized and a payment made to apply on it as a partial pay-

ment of a greater indebtedness. If it was stated that the dollar

was paid to renew the debt, a larger debt than $1, and there

was but one debt, here is a plain recognition of a larger sum

due than the amount paid and an implied promise to pay the

remainder. If the debt was for hay, is it material that it was

not evidenced by a promissory note as Banks supposed? On

this subject see Crow v. Gleason, H1 N. Y. 489, 493, 494, 36 N.

E. 497. This case is cited and approved Brooklyn Bank v.

Barnaby, 197 N. Y. 210, 90 N. E. 834, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 843.

insolvent. .It seems to me that the law has not prohibited the
rt>newal of outlawed claims under such circumstances.
It is contended that there is nothing to show that the bankintended to pay anything on an account or debt due for
hay sold and delivered, but that the evidence discloses an intent
to make a payment on a promissory note. A few days before
the payments were made, the bankrupt made up his schecfoles
of indebtedness which were attached to and formed a part of his
petition in bankruptcy. Here he stated that he owed to John
Quencer a note of $250 and to Philip Quencer a note of $250;
that is, debts evidenced by such notes. The consideration of
these notes is not mentioned in the schedules. It is evident that
Banks at that time had in mind claims against himself in favor
of the Quencers evidenced by notes, $250 to each. The date of
the notes was not given. So far as appears, this was his state of
mind and these the debts he had in mind when he went to the
Quencers on the occasions mentioned. There was no conversation as to any indebtedness except Banks handed to each $1 and
said he wanted to pay or paid the dollar to renew the debt. In
fact, so far as the proof goes, no note had been given to one of
the Quencers, but a note of $400 had been given to the other
which he had banded back, under what conditions and for what
reason does not appear. In fact, as the referee finds, Banks
owed a balance to each of the Quencers for hay sold and delivered and nothing else; the claim, however, being barred by
the statute. The contention is, nothing having been said regarding the nature or character of the debt, that Banks bad notes in
mind and intended to make a payment on notes and not on an
account or claims for hay sold and delivered. But if there was
only one cJ.aim or debt, and that for hay, is it material that
Banks_supposed he had given a note for the debt when in fact
ht> had not T lt is only material that a specific indebtedness was
rreognized and a payment made to apply on it as a partial payment of a greater indebtedness. If it was stated that the dollar
was paid to renew the debt, a larger debt than $1, and there
was but one debt, here is a plain recognition of a larger sum
due than the amount paid and an implied promise to pay the
remainder. If the debt was for hay, is it material that it was
not evidenced by a promissory note as Banks supposed Y On
this subject see Crow v. Gleason, 141 N. Y. 489, 493, 494, 36 N.
E. 497. This case is cited and approved Brooklyn Bank v.
Barnaby, 197 N. Y. 210, 90 N. E. 834, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 843.

rupt

326 PREREQUISITES TO ADJUDICATION

326

PREREQUISITES 1'0 ADJUDICATION

See, also, Hughes v. Eddy Valve Co., 147 App. Div. 356, 131

N. Y. Supp. 744, and Murphy v. Walsh, 113 App. Div. 428, 99

N. Y. Supp. 346. I think the claimants brought themselves

within the principles enunciated in the cases cited.

I cannot hold that a payment made immediately before bank-

ruptcy, or filing a petition in bankruptcy, to renew an outlawed

debt and to enable the creditor to come in and share in the dis-

tribution, the one receiving it having no reasonable cause to be-

lieve it will operate as a preference, is a fraud on creditors or

the law. * * *

On the whole, I am of the opinion that the order of the referee

allowing the claims should be affirmed. So ordered.

(e) Enabling Creditor to Obtain Greater Percentage Than

Others of Same Class*0

SWARTS v. FOURTH NAT. BANK OF ST. LOUIS

117 Fed. 1, 54 C. C. A. 387

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. July 21, 1902)

See, also, Hughes v. Eddy Valve Co., 147 App. Div. 356, 131
N. Y. Supp. 744, and l\Iurphy v. 'Valsh, 113 App. Div. 428, 99
N. Y. Supp. 346. I think the claimant8 brought themselves
within the principles enunciated in the cases cited.
I cannot hold that a payment made immediately before bankruptcy, or filing a petition in bankruptcy, to renew an outlawed
debt and to enable the creditor to come in and share in the diltribution, the one receiving it having no reasonable cause to believe it will operate as a preference, is a fraud on credit.ors or
the law. • • •
On the whole, I am of the opinion that the order of the referee
allowing the claims should be affirmed. So ordered.

On February 6, 1900, the Siegel-Hillman Dry Goods Company,

a corporation, was adjudged a bankrupt on the petition of its

creditors, which was filed on December 30, 1899. Four months

before the tiling of the petition, the Fourth National Bank of

St. Louis held a claim of $60,000 against this corporation, which

was evidenced by a series of promissory notes signed by the

( e) · Enabling Creditor 'to Obtain Greater Percentage TluM
Otkers of Same Class •o
I

SWARTS v. FOURTH NAT. BANK OF ST. Loms
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company, and indorsed by H. A. Loeb and B. Hillman, which

amounted to $35,000, and by another series of promissory notes

117 Fed. 1, 54 C. C. A. 387

signed by the corporation, and indorsed by H. A. Loeb, B. Hill-

man, L. Regenstein, and F. Siegel & Bro., which aggregated

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. July 21, 1902)

$25,000. All the indorsements were placed upon these notes

before they were discounted for the accommodation of the cor-

poration, and for the purpose of giving credit to the notes, so

that the indorsers stood in the relation of makers to the bank,

and of accommodation makers or sureties to the dry goods com-

pany. Within four months preceding the filing of the petition

in bankruptcy, the dry goods company, while it was insolvent,

paid to the bank, which did not have reasonable cause to believe

that it was intended thereby to give a preference, the sum of

40—As to who is a "creditor"

see infra, Tit. Provable Claims, pp.

384-476.

On February 6, 1900, the Siegel-Hillman Dry Goods Company,
a corporation, was adjudged a bankrupt on the petition of ita
creditors, which was filed o-n December 30, 1899. Four months
before the filing of the petition, the Fourth National Bank of
St. Louis held a claim of $60,000 against this corporation, which
was evidenced by a series of promissory notes signed by the
company, and indorsed by H. A. Loeb and B. Hillman, which
amounted to $35,000, and by another series of promissory notes
signed by the corporation, and indorsed by H. A. Loeb, B. Hillman, L. Regeustein, and F. Siegel & Bro., which aggregated
$25,000. All the indorsements were placed upon these notes
before they were discounted for the accommodation of the corporation, and for the purpose of giving credit to the notes, so
that the indorsers stood in the relation of makers to the bank,
and of accommodation makers or sureties to the dry goods company. Within four months preceding the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy, the dry goods company, while it was insolvent,
paid to the bank, which did not have reasonable cause to believe
that it was intended thereby to give a preference, the sum of
40-As to who is a '• creditor ''
see infra, Tit. Provable Claim.a, pp.
384-476.
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$14,600 upon some of the notes which were indorsed by Siegel

& Bro. On February 21, 1900, Siegel & Bro. paid the $10,400

and interest which remained unpaid upon the notes which they

had indorsed, and subsequently proved up this payment as a

claim against the estate of the bankrupt. The bank proved its

claim against the bankrupt's estate for $35,000 and interest,

based upon the notes which had been indorsed by Loeb and Hill-

man, but which did not bear the names of Regenstein or Siegel

& Bro. The trustee moved to expunge the claim of the bank

unless it surrendered the $14,600 which it had received from

the estate of the bankrupt within four months preceding the

tiling of the petition. The referee granted the motion. The Dis-

trict Court reversed this decision, and directed the referee to

deny the motion. From the decree to this effect, the trustee has

..ppealed to this court.

SANBORN, C. J., after stating the case as above, delivered

the opinion of the court. ,

May a creditor of a bankrupt whose claim is evidenced by

numerous promissory notes secured by different indorsers or

accommodation makers accept from the insolvent, within four

months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy against him,

payment in part of the notes secured by the solvent indorsers,

$14,600 upon some of the notes which were indorscd by Siegel
& Bro. On February 21, 1900, Siegel & Bro. paid the $10,400
and interest which remained unpaid upon the notes which they
had indorsed, and subsequently proved up this payment as a
<.:laim against the estate of the bankrupt. The bank proved its
daim against the bankrupt's estate for $35,000 and interest,
based upon the notes which had been indorsed by Loeb and Hill1nan, but which did not bear the names of Regenstein or Siegel
& Bro. The trustee moved to expunge the claim of the ba11k
unless it surrendered the $14,600 which it h.ad received from
the estate of the bankrupt within four months preceding the
tiling of the petition. The referee granted the motion. The Dis·
trid Court reversed this decision, and directed the referee to
tlt>ny the motion. From the decree to this effect, the trustee has
;.ppeuled to this court.
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and then obtain the allowance of that portion of his claim

against the bankrupt upon which the solvent indorsers were not

liable, without a surrender of the payment he has thus obtained?

This is the primary question which this case presents.

Xo one can become familiar with the bankrupt law of 1898

without a settled conviction that the two dominant purposes of

the framers of that act were: (1) The protection and discharge

of the bankrupt; and (2) the distribution of the uncxempt

property which the bankrupt owned four months before the

filing of the petition in bankruptcy against him, share and share

alike, among his creditors. All the earlier sections of the act

are devoted to the security and relief of the bankrupt, and, when

the distribution of his property is reached, the provisions relat-

ing to it are all drawn from the standpoint of the insolvent, and

not from that of his creditors. The rights and privileges of the

bankrupt, and the equal distribution of his property, dominate

every provision, while the rights, wrongs, benefits, and injuries

of his creditors are always incidental, and secondary to these

controlling purposes. § 60a contains the legal and controlling

SANBORN, C. J., after stating the case as above, deliverl'd
the opinion of the court.
,
.May a creditor of a bankrupt whose claim is evidenced by
numerous promi~ory notes secured by different indorscrs or
accommodation makers accept from the insolvent, within fo11r
months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy against hilll,
payment in part of the notes secured by the solvent indorsers,
and then obtain the allowance of that portion of his clai111
against the bankrupt upon which the solvent indorsers were not
liable, without a surrender of the payment he has thus obtained ?
This is the primary question which this case presents.
Xo one can become familiar with the bankrupt law of 1898
without a settled conviction that the two dominant purposes of
the framers of that act were: (1) The protection and discharge
of the bankrupt; and (2) the distribution of the uncxempt
property which the bankrupt owned four months before the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy against him, share and share
~like, among his creditors. All the earlier sections of the act
are d~rnted to the security and relief of the bankrupt, and, when
the distribution of his property is reached, the provisions relating to it are all drawn from the standpoint of the insolvent, and
not from that of his creditors. The rights and privileges of the
bankrupt, and the equal distribution of his property, dominate
every provision, while the rights, wrongs, benefits, and injuries
of his creditors are always incidental, and secondary to these
controlling purposea. § 60a contains the legal and controlling
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of the bankrupt act. 30 Stat. c. 541, pp. 562, 560; Kimball v.

E. A. Rosenham Co. (C. C. A.) 114 Fed. 85, 7 Am. Bankr. R.

718, 719; Pirie v. Trust Co., 182 U. S. 438, 21 Sup. Ct. 906, 45

L. ed. 1171. But this definition of a preference was not written

from the station of the creditor, but from that of the debtor.

It is not the act of the creditor, but the act of the debtor, which

gives it,—which produces it. The controlling thought is not

the benefit or injury to the creditor, but the equal distribution

of the property of the bankrupt among the holders of the prov-

able claims against him.

It is contended that there was no preference by the payment

by the bankrupt of the $14,600 to the bank on the notes of its

solvent indorsers, because the bank derived no benefit there-

from. It is said that the bank would have received the full pay-

ment of these notes from the indorsers of the bankrupt if noth-

ing had been paid upon them by the corporation. The argu-

ment assumes a fact which does not really exist, for the pre-

sumption always is that cash in hand is more valuable and useful

than the legal liability of any party to pay it. But, if the bank

had derived no benefit from this payment, its legal effect would

not have been different. When the authors of paragraph 60a

prepared the legal definition of a preference, they were neither
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considering nor dealing with the promises, liabilities, payments,

or acts of others than the bankrupt. They were treating of his

property, and of the claims of his creditors against that prop-

erty. The dominant purpose of the prohibition of a preference

was not to benefit or injure, or to prevent the benefit or injury,

of any creditor or class of creditors, but to prevent the debtor

from making any disposition of his property which would pre-

vent its equal distribution,—to prevent him from doing anything

which would result in the payment out of his property of a

larger percentage upon any claim than others of the same class

would receive. The plain intention of Congress, and the legal

effect of the paragraph, were to make every transfer of any of

the insolvent's property, by means of which a larger percentage

would be paid out of his estate to any creditor, or on any claim,

than every other creditor and every other claim of the same

class would receive, a preference to be surrendered or avoided

under the other provisions of the statute. The meaning and

effect of § 60a are the same as though it declared every transfer

of his property by an insolvent to be a preference which has the

definition of the preference specified in § 57g and the other parts
of the bankrupt act. 30 Stat. c. 541, pp. 562, 560; Kimball ,..
E. A. Rosenham Co. (C. C. A.) 114 Fed. 85, 7 .Am. Banltr. R.
718, 719; Pirie v. Trust Co., 182 U. S. 438, 21 Sup. Ct. 906, 45
L. ed. 1171. But this definition of a preference was not written
from the station of the creditor, but from that of the debtor.
It is not the act of the creditor, but the act of the debtor, which
gives it,-which produces it. The controlling thought is not
the benefit or injury to the creditor, but the equal distribution
of the property of the bankrupt among the holders of the provable claims against him.
It is contended that there was no preference by the payment
by the bankrupt of the $14,600 to the bank on the notes of it.a
solvent indorsers, because the bank derived no benefit therefrom. It is said that the bank would have received the full payment of these notes from the indorsers of the bankrupt if nothing had been paid upon them by the corporation. The argument assumes a fact which does not really exist, for the pre·
sumption always is that cash in hand is more valuable and useful
than the legal liability of any party to pay it. But, if the bank
had derived no benefit from this payment, its legal effect would
not have been different. When the authors of paragraph 60a
prepared the legal definition of a preference, they were neitb1.•r
considering nor dealing with the promises, liabilities, payments,
or acts of others than the bankrupt. They were treating of bis
property, and of the claims of his creditors against that property. The dominant purpose of the prohibition of a preference
was not to benefit or injure, or to prevent the benefit or injury,
of any creditor or class of creditors, but to prev.e nt the debtor
from making any disposition of his property which would prevent its equal distribution,-to prevent him from doing anything
which would result in the payment out of his property of a
larger percentage upon any claim than others of the same class
would receive. The plain intention of Congress, and the legal
effect of the paragraph, were to make every transfer of any of
the in~olvent 's property, by means of which a larger percentage
would be paid out of his estate to any creditor, or on any claim,
than every other creditor and every other claim of the same
class would receive, a preference to be surrendered or avoided
under the other provisio\is of the statute. The meaning and
effect of § 60a are the same as though it declared every transfer
of his property by an insolvent to be a preference which has the
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percentage of his debt" out of the property of the insolvent

"than any other of such creditors of the same class." The test

of a preference, under the act, is the payment, out of the bank-

rupt's property, of a larger percentage of the creditor's claim

than other creditors of the same class receive, and not the benefit

or injury to the creditor preferred. Marshall v. Lamb, 5 Q. B.

115, 126, 127.

Four months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,

the bank had a claim against the estate of the insolvent for

$60,000. Within that four months, it received $14,600 out of

his estate, so that, when the petition in bankruptcy was filed,

instead of a claim for $60,000 against the insolvent, it held $14,-

600 of his money, and a claim against him for $45,400. The

statement of these facts is itself a demonstration that if the bank

can retain this money, and procure the allowance of the balance

of its claim, it will receive a greater percentage of its debt out

of the estate of the insolvent than other creditors of the same

class who receive no such payments. The insolvent has in-

creased the funds of the bank $14,600, and it has diminished by

$14,600 the property to be distributed among its creditors; and

it is the depletion of the estate, to pay a larger percentage upon

one claim against it than others of the same class will receive,
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against which the provisions of § 60a and § 57g are specifically

leveled. The conclusion is irresistible that the payment to the

bank of the $14,600 gave it a preference over the other creditors

of the bankrupt of the same class.

It is, however, strenuously argued that, if the payment of this

$14,600 created a preference, the bank should not be required to

surrender it, because, after the adjudication in bankruptcy,

Siegel & Bro., the solvent indorsers, paid the $10,400 remaining

unpaid on the notes which they had indorsed, and proved this

payment as a part of their claim against the estate of the bank-

rupt, while the claim which the bank has presented consists en-

tirely of notes upon which Siegel & Bro. are not indorsers. But

how does the fact that, since the filing of the petition in bank-

ruptcy, the bank has assigned a portion of its claim to Siegel &

Bro., by operation of law or otherwise, relieve it from its dis-

ability to prove any of its claim until it surrenders its prefer-

ence? The bankrupt act prohibits the allowance of any claim

of a creditor who has received a preference unless he has sur-

rendered that preference. "The claims of creditors who have

effect to "enable any one of his ereditors to obtain a greater
percentage of his debt" out of the property of the insolvent
"than any other of such creditors of the same class." The test
of a preference, under the act, is the payment, out of the bankrupt's property, of a larger percentRge of the creditor's claim
than other creditOl'S of the same class receive, and not the benefit
or injury to the creditor preferred. :Marshall v. Lamb, 5 Q. B.
115, 126, 127.
Four months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,
the bank had a claim against the estate of the insolvent for
$60,000. Within that four months, it received $14,600 out of
his estate, so that, when the petition in bankruptcy was filed,
instead of a claim for $60,000 against the insolvent, it held $14,600 of his money, and a claim against him for $45,400. The
statement of these facts is itself a demonstration that if the bank
can retain this money, and procure the allowance of the balance
of its claim, it will receive a greater percentage of its debt out
of the estate of the insolvent than other creditors of the same
class who receive no such payments. The insolvent has increased the funds of the bank $14,600, and it has diminished by
$14,600 the property to be distributed among its creditors; and
it is the depletion of the estate, to pay a larger percentage upon
one claim against it than others of the same class will receive,
~inst which the provisions of § 60a and § 57g are specifically
leYeled. The conclusion is irresistible that the payment to the
bank of the $14,600 gave it a preference over the other creditors
of the bankrupt of the same class.
It is, however, strenuously argued that, if the payment of this
$14,600 created a preference, the bank should not be required to
surrender it, because, after the adjudication in bankruptcy,
Siegel & Bro., the solvent indorsers, paid the $10,400 remaining
un}l6id on the notes which they had indorsed, and proved this
j)6yment as a part of their claim against the estate of the bankrupt, while the claim which the bank has presented consists entirely of notes upon which Siegel & Bro. are not indorsers. But
how does the fact that, since the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the bank bas assigned a portion of its claim to Siegel &
Bro., by operation of law or otherwise, relieve it from its disability to prove any of its claim until it surrenders its preference 1 The bankrupt act prohibits the allowance of any claim
of a creditor who has received a preference unless he has surrendered that preference. "The claims of creditors who have
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received preferences shall not be allowed unless such creditors

shall surrender their preferences.'' § 57g. The unequivocal

language and the unquestionable legal effect of this section are

to prohibit the allowance of any claim of a creditor who has

received a preference, either upon that or upon any other claim

he holds against the estate of the bankrupt, unless he has first

surrendered his preference. Strobel & Wilken Co. v. Knost (D.

C.) 99 Fed. 409; Electric Corp. v. Worden, 39 C. C. A. 582, 99

Fed. 400; In re Conhaim (D. C.) 97 Fed. 924; In re Rogers

Milling Co. (D. C.) 102 Fed. 687; Collier, Bankr. (3d ed.) pp.

318, 319.

Under the act of 1898, the rights of claimants to share in the

distribution of the estate of the bankrupt are fixed by the status

of their claims at the time of the filing of the petition in bank-

ruptcy. § 63; In re Bingham (D. C.) 94 Fed. 796. The petition

in this case was filed on December 30, 1899. At that time the

bank held a claim against the estate of the dry goods company

for $45,400, $35,000 of which was evidenced by the notes of the

bankrupt indorsed by Loeb and Hillman, while $10,400 was evi-

denced by the notes of the bankrupt indorsed by Loeb. Hillman,

Regeustein, and Siegel & Bro. Siegel & Bro. were the only sol-

vent indorsers. Our attention is here challenged to a late de-

cision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit in
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Doyle v. Bank, 24 Nat. Corp. Rep. 406, 116 Fed. 295, in which

it is held that a creditor who holds a promissory note of the

bankrupt, secured by an indorser, is in a different class from

one who holds the bankrupt's note without any indorser, within

the meaning of paragraph 60a, so that the bankrupt may pay

the former's note without creating any preference which must

be surrendered by the creditor before his claim based upon the

unindorsed note can be allowed. This decision is cited to sup-

port the position that the bank is in a different class with its

claim upon the $35,000, from that in which it is with its claim

for $10,400. It must be conceded that, if a creditor holding the

bankrupt's note with no indorser is in a different class from one

holding it with onr indorser, one holding his note with two in-

dorsers must be in a different class from either of the others,

because the third note is marked by exactly the same difference

from the second note as the second is from the first, the differ-

ence of one indorser,—while the difference between the first note

and the third note is twice as great. Nor, if it be conceded that

a creditor with one indorser is in a different class from one with

{

received preferences shall not be allowed unless such creditors
shall surrender their preferences." § 51g. The unequivocal
language and the unquestionable legal effect of this section are
to prohibit the allowance of any claim of a creditor who has
r~·ceived a preference, either upon that or upon any other daim
he holds against the estate of the bankrupt, unless he has first
sdrrendered his preference. Strobel & Wilken Co. v. Knost ( D.
C.) 99 Fed. 409; Electric Corp. v. \Vorden, 39 C. C. A. 582, 99
!<~ed. 400; In re Conhaim (D. C.) 97 Fed. 924; In re Rogers
~Iilli11g Co. (D. C.) 102 Fed. 687; Collier, Bankr. (3d ed.) pp.
318, 319.
Under the act of 1898, the rights of claimant.a to share in the
distribution of the estate of the bankrupt are fixed by the status
of their claims at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. § 63; In re Bingham (D. C.) 94 Fed. 796. The petition
in this case was filed on December 30, 1899. At that time the
hai:k held a claim against the estate of the dry goods company
for $45,400, $35,000 of which was evidenced by the notes of the
bankrupt indorsed by Loeb and Hillman, while $10,400 was evidL"nced by the notes of the bankrupt indorsed by Loeb. Hillman.
Hegeustein, and Siegel & Bro. Siegel & Bro. were the only solvent indorsers. Our attention is here challenged to a late decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit in
Doyle v. Bank, 24 Nat. Corp. Rep. 406, 116 Fed. 295, in which
it is held that a creditor who holds a promissory note of the
bankrupt, secured by an indorser, is in a different class from
one who holds the bankrupt's note without any indorser, within
the meaning of par~a-raph 60a, so that the bankrupt may pay
the former's note without creating any prefc>rence which must
be surrendered by the creditor before his claim based upon the
unin<lorsed note can be allowed. This decision is cited to support the position that the ba.nk is in a different class with its
claim upon the $35,000, from that in which it is with its claim
for $10,400. It must be conceded that, if a creditor holding the
bankrupt's note with no indorser is in a different class from one
holding it with on• indorser, one holding his note with two indorsers must be in a different class from either of the others,
because the third note is marked by exactly the same difference
from the second note as the second is from the first, the difference of one indorser,-while the difference between the first note
and the third note is twice as great. Nor, if it be conceded that
a creditor with one indorser is in a different cl888 from one with
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no indorser, can it be successfully contended that a creditor with

four indorsers, some of whom, are solvent, as is the case i,i

respect to the $10,400 here in question, is in a diffei-ent class fro.n

one with two indorsers who are insolvent, as in the case of the

notes for $35,000 under consideration. The character of the

court which rendered this decision, the learning and ability of

the judges who compose it, and the great respect its opinions

always command, have impelled us to a careful consideration of

the conclusion it announces, and of the opinion which supports

it. But their logical effect is to create such a multitude of classes

of creditors, to so confuse the administration of that portion of

the bankrupt law which treats of preferences, and to open so

plain a way to the nullification of paragraph 57g of the bank-

rupt act, that we hesitate to follow them. If a debtor may pay

his indorsed paper within four months of the filing of the peti-

tion in bankruptcy against him, without creating a preference

of the creditor so paid, that will bar the allowance of his claim

on open account or on unindorsed paper, the way to payments

and transfers by a bankrupt which will actually prefer credi-

tors, but which will not fall under the ban of the bankrupt law,

is plain and smooth. All that the debtor needs to do, to evade

the provisions of this act for the surrender of preferences, is to
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give indorsed paper for the part of his debts which he proposes

to pay, and the creditor may then receive the actual, and escape

the legal, preference with impunity. We are not yet prepared

to adopt a rule fraught with such consequences.

While it is true that the bankrupt act does not define the word

"class," nor in terms state what creditors are in the same class,

it creates some classes, and specifies others, and it seems to us

that the meaning of the word "class" in the act should, if pos-

sible, be derived from the statute itself. § 64, after directing the

payment of certain expenses of administration, creates three

classes of creditors,—parties to whom taxes are owing, employes

holding claims for certain wages, and those who, by the laws of

the states or of the United States, are entitled to priority.

5§ 56Z», 57e, and 57h provide for the treatment and disposition

of claims secured by property, and of claims which have priority.

The creditors who hold these various claims, and the general

creditors of the estate, constitute the classes of creditors of which

the bankrupt act treats. Now, if any one of these various classes

is taken by itself and examined, it will be seen that each one of

ihe creditors in the same class always receives the same per-

no indorser, can it be successfully contended that a creditor with
four indorsers, some of whom, are solvent, as is the caS'.°' i.1
respect to the $10,400 here in question, is in a different class f~o.11
one with two indorsers who are insolvent, as in the case of thP
notes for $35,000 under consideration. The character of the
C"ourt which rendered this decision, the learning and ability or
the judges who compose it, and the great respect its opinions
always command, have impelled us to a careful cousideration of
the conclusion it announces, and of the opinion which supports
it. But their logical effect is to create such a multitude of classes
of creditors, to so confuse the administration of that portion of
the bankrupt law which treats of preferences, and to open so
plain a way to the nullification of paragraph 57g of the bankrupt act, that we hesitate to follow them. If a debtor may pay
his indorsed paper within four months of the filing 9f the petition in bankruptcy against him, without creating a preference
of the creditor so paid, that will bar the allowance of his claim
on open account or on unindorsed paper, the way to payments
and transfers by a bankrupt which will actually prefer creditors, but which will not fall under the ban of the bankrupt law,
is plain and smooth. All that the debtor needs to do, to evade
the provisions of this act for the surrender of preferences, is to
give indorsed paper for the part of his debts which he proposes
to pay, and the creditor may then receive the actual, and escape
the legal, preference with impunity. We are not yet prepared
to adopt a rule fraught with such consequences.
While it is true that the bankrupt act does not define the word
"class," nor in terms state what creditors are in the same class,
it creates some classes, and specifies others, and it seems to us
that the meaning of the word "class" in the act should, if possible, be derived from the statute itself. § 64, after directing the
payment of certain expenses of administration, creates three
classes of creditors,-parties to whom taxes are owing, employes
holding claims for certain wages, and those who, by the laws of
the st ates or of the United States, are entitled to priority.
~§ 56b, 57e, and 57h provide for the treatment and disP.osition
of claims secured by property, and of claims which have priority.
The creditors who hold these various claims, and the general
('r11ditors of th6 estate, constitute the classes of creditors of which
the b:wkrnpt act treats. Now, if any one of these various classes
i.~ taken by itself and examined, it will be seen that each one of
the creditors in the same class always receives the same per-
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centage upon his claim, out of the estate of the bankrupt, that

every other creditor of his class receives. Where the estate is

insufficient to pay the claims of different classes in full, the

classes receive, out of the bankrupt estate, different percentages

of their claims, but creditors of the same class receive the same

percentage. The test of classification is the percentage paid upon

the claims out of the estate of the bankrupt.

Here, again, in considering this question of classification, it is

well to bear in mind that this act was drawn from the station of

the bankrupt, and that its primary purposes were to relieve the

bankrupt, and to distribute his property equally among his

creditors. The test of a preference, as we have seen, is whether

or not a transfer or payment will have the effect to pay on one

claim a larger dividend, out of the estate of the bankrupt than

that estate will pay on other claims of the same class. It is its

effect upon the equal distribution of the estate of the bankrupt,

not its effect upon the creditor, that determines the preference.

The same dominant thought controls and determines the classifi-

cation of the creditors. Those creditors who are entitled to re-

ceive out of the estate of the bankrupt the same percentage of

their claims are in the same class, however much their owners

may have the right to collect from others than the bankrupt.

Their relations to third parties, their right to collect of others,
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the personal security they may have through indorsements or

guaranties, receive no consideration, no thought. It is the rela-

tion of their claims to the estate of the bankrupt, the percentages

their claims are entitled to draw out of the estate of the bank-

rupt, and these alone, that dictate the relations of the creditors

to the estate, and fix their classification and their preferences.

Now take the case in hand, or the simpler ease of a creditor

who has one of the bankrupt's notes with a solvent indorser and

another without any indorser. He is entitled to receive the same

percentage out of the estate of the bankrupt on his indorsed note

that he is on that which is not indorsed. It is true that he has

the right to collect the former of the indorser. But, if he does,

the indorser may prove the note, and receive exactly the same

percentage upon the claim that the original creditor would re-

ceive upon the note which was not indorsed. § 57t. The two

notes bear exactly the same relation to the estate of the bank-

rupt whether indorsed or not,—whether paid by the indorser or

not,—and for this reason they and their holders stand in the

same class. They are in the same class because it is the relation

centage upon his claim, out of the estate of the bankrupt, that
every other creditor of his cl888 receives. Where the estate is
insufficif'nt to pay the claims of different classes in full, the
classes receive, out of the bankrupt estate, different percentages
of their claims, but creditors of the same cl888 receive the same
percentage. The test of classification is ,the percentage paid upon
the claims out of the estate of the bankrupt.
Here, again, in considering this question of classification, it i1
well to bear in mind that this act was drawn from the station of
the bankrupt, and that its primary purposes were to relieve the
bankrupt, and to distribute his property equally among his
creditors. The test of a preference, as we have seen, is whether
or not a transfer or payment will have the effect to pay on one
claim a larger dividend, out of the estate of the bankrupt than
that estate will pay on other claims of the same class. It is its
effect upon the equal distribution of the estate of the bankrupt,
not its effect upon the creditor, that determines the preference.
The same dominant thought controls and determines the classification of the creditors. Those creditors who are entitled to :receive out of the estate of the bankrupt the same percentage of
their claims are in the same class, however much their owners
may have the right to collect from others than the bankrupt.
Their relations to third parties, their right to collect of othel"B,
the personal security they may have through indorsements or
guaranties, receive no consideration, no thought. It is the relation of their claims to the estate of the bankrupt, the percentages
their claims are entitled to draw out of the est.ate of the bankrupt, and these alone, that dictate the relations of the creditors
to the estate, and fix their classification and their preferences.
Now take the case in hand, or the simpler case of a creditor
who has one of the bankrupt's notes with a solvent indorser and
another without any indorser. He is entitled to receive the same
percentage out of the estate of the bankrupt on his indorsed note
that he is on that which is not indorsed. It is true that he has
the right to collect the former of the indorser. But, if he does>
the indorser may prove the note, and receive exactly the same
percentage upon the claim that the original creditor would rec·eive upon the note which was not indorsed. § 57i. The two
notes bear exactly the same relation to the estate of ihe bankrupt whether indors('d or not,-whether paid by the indorser or
not,-and for this reason they and their holders stand in the
same class. They are in the same class because it is the relation
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oi the creditors, and their claims to the estate of the bankrupt,

and not their relation to third parties, that determines their

rights, and fixes their status, under the bankrupt act of 1898.

We are not persuaded that a creditor who holds an indorsed note

of a bankrupt is in a different class from one who holds his note

without an indorsement, under § 60a of the bankrupt act, be-

cause the legal result of such a conclusion would lead to the

creation of new and numerous classes of creditors not specified

in the bankrupt act; because that conclusion would open a plain

way to evade the provisions of § 57g; because the definition of

the term "class" as used in the bankrupt act should be derived

from that statute itself; and because the true test of the classifi-

cation of creditors under that act is the percentage which, in

the absence of preferences, their claims are entitled to draw out

of the estate of the bankrupt, and the holder of an unindorsed

note is entitled to the same percentage from the estate as the

holder of an indorsed note. Creditors who, in the absence of

preferences, are entitled to receive the same percentage upon

their claims out of the estate of the bankrupt, are members of

the same class. Those who are entitled to different percentages

are of different classes. The result is that the bank as holder of

the notes for $10,400, upon which there were four indorsers,

was in the same class as it was as the holder of the notes for
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$35,000, on which there were but two indorsers. On December

30, 1899, it had received a preference of $14,600, and it was

forbidden to prove any part of its claim until it surrendered this

preference.

These facts fastened upon the entire claim of the bank an

attribute of disqualification for allowance. The ban of the

statute was upon the claim. The act declares that the claims of

creditors who have received preferences shall not be allowed un-

less the creditors surrender their preferences. This disqualifica-

tion inheres in every part, every dollar, of the claim of the bank.

The holder of this claim could not qualify it for allowance by

transferring the whole or a part of it to another, nor could

Siegel & Bro. accomplish this result by paying the notes on

which they were indorsers, and becoming their owners by subro-

gation. Every part of the claim, whether retained by the bank

or assigned to another, remained, and will remain, disqualified

for allowance until the $14,600 whose payment constitutes the

preference is surrendered. The claim of the bank, therefore,

must be expunged unless it repays to the trustee the $14,600

ot the creditors, and their claims to the estate of the bankrupt,
and not their relation to third parties, that determines their
rights, and fixes their status, under the bankrupt act of 1898.
'\\-re are not persuaded that a creditor who holds an indorsed note
of a bankrupt is in a different class from one who holds his note
without an indorsement, under § 60a of the bankrupt act, because the legal result of such a conclusion would lead to the
ereation of new and numerous classes of creditors not specified
in the bankrupt act; because that conclusion would open a plain
way to evade the provisions of § 57g; because the definition of
the term "class" as used in the bankrupt act should be derived
from that statute itself; and because the true test of the classification of creditors under that act is the percentage which, in
the absence of preferences, their claims are entitled to draw out
of the estate of the bankrupt, and the holder of an unindorsed
note is entitled to the same percentage from the estate as the
holder of an indorsed note. Creditors who, in the absence of
preferences, are entitled to receive ihe same percentage upou
their claims out of the estate of the bankrupt, are members of
the same class. Those who are entitled to different percentages
are of different classes. The result is that the bank as holder of
the notes for $10,400, upon which there were four indorsers,
was in the same class as it was as the holder of the notes for
$35,000, on which there were but two indorsers. On December
30, 1899, it had received a preference of $14,600, and it was
forbidden to prove any part of its claim until it surrendered this
preference.
These facts fastened upon the entire claim of the bank an
attribute of disqualification for allowance. The ban of the
statute was upon the claim. The act declares that the claims of
creditors who have received preferences shall not be allowed unless the creditors surrender their preferences. This disqualification inheres in every part, every dollar, of the claim of the bank.
The holder of this claim could not qualify it for allowance by
transferring the whole or a part of it to another, nor could
Siegel & Bro. accomplish this result by paying the notes on
which they were indorsers, and becoming their owners by subrogation. Every part of the claim, whether retained by the bank
or assigned to another, remained, and will remain, disqualified
for allowance until the $14,600 whose payment constitutes the
preference is surrendered. The claim of the bank, therefore,
must be expunged unless it repays to the trustee the $14,600
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which it received from the insolvent within four months prior to

the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. • • •

(f) Intent to Prefer

TOOF v. MARTIN

which it received from the insolvent within four months prior to
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. • • •

13 Wall. 40

(United States Supreme Court. December Term, 1871)

(f) In.tent to Prefer

Error to the Circuit Court for the District of Arkansas; the

case being thus:

TOOF v. MARTIN

The 35th section of the bankrupt act of 1867, thus enacts:

"That if any person, being insolvent, or in contemplation of

insolvency, with a view to give a preference to any creditor or

person having a claim against him • • * makes any as-

signment, transfer, or conveyance of any part of his property

13 Wall. 40
(United States Supreme Court.

December Term, 1871)

• • • (the person receiving such assignment, transfer, or

conveyance, having reasonable cause to believe such person is

insolvent, and that such assignment or conveyance is made in

fraud of the provisions of this act), the same shall be void, and

the assignee may recover the property, or the value of it, from

the person so receiving it or so to be benefited."

With this enactment in force, Martin, assignee in bankruptcy

of Haines and Chetlain, filed a bill in the District Court for the

Eastern District of Arkansas, against J. S. Toof, C. J. Phillips,

and P. M. Mahan, trading as Toof, Phillips & Co. (Haines and
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Chetlain being also made parties), to set aside and cancel cer-

tain conveyances alleged to have been made by these last in

fraud of the above-quoted act.

Haines and Chetlain were, in February, 1868, and had been

for some years before, merchants, doing business under the firm

name of W. P. Haines & Co., at Augusta, Arkansas. On the

29th of that month they filed a petition for the benefit of the

bankrupt act, and on the 28th of May following were adjudged

bankrupts, and the complainant was appointed assignee of their

estates. On the 18th of the previous January, which was about

six weeks before the filing of their petition, they conveyed an

undivided half-interest in certain parcels of land owned by

them at Augusta, to Toof, Phillips & Co., who were doing busi-

ness at Memphis, in Tennessee, for the consideration of $1,876,

which sum was to be credited on a debt due from them to that

firm. At the same time they assigned to one Mahan, a member

Error to the Circuit Court for the District of Arkansas ; the
case being thus:
The 35th section of the bankrupt act of 1867, thus enacts:
''That if any person, being insolvent, or in contemplation of
insolvency, with a view to give a preference to any creditor or
person having a claim against him • • • makes any assignment, transfer, or conveyance of any part o~ his property
• • • (the person receiving such assignment, transfer, or
conveyance, having reason.able cause to believe such person is
insolvent, and that such assignment or conveyance is made in
fraud of the provisions of this act), the same shall be void, and
the assignee may recover the property, or the value of it, from
the person so receiving it or so to be benefited.''
With this enactment in force, Martin, assignee in bankruptcy
of Haines and Chetlain, filed a bill in the District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas, against J. S. Toof, C. J. Phillip~
and F. M. l\Iahan, tr.a.ding as Toof, Phillips & Co. (Haines and
Chetlain being also made parties), to set aside and cancel certain conveyances alleged to have been made by these last in
fraud of the above-quoted act.
Haines and Chetlain were, in February, 1868, and had been
for some years before, merchants, doing business under the firm
name of \Y. P. Haines & Co., at Augusta, Arkansas. On the
29th of that month they filed a petition for the benefit of the
bankrupt act, and on the 28th of May following were adjudged
bankrupts, and the complainant was appoint'ed assignee of their
estates. On the 18th of the previous January, which was about
six weeks before the filing of their petition, they conveyed an
undivided half-interest in certain parcels of land owned by
them at Augusta, to Toof, Phillips & Co., who were doing business at Memphis, in Tennessee, for the consideration of $1,876.
which sum was to be credited on a debt due from them to that
firm. At the same time they assigned to one Mahan, a member
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of that firm, a title-bond which they held for certain other real

property at Augusta, upon which they had made valuable im-

provements. The consideration of this assignment was two drafts

of Mahan on Toof, Phillips & Co., each for $3,034, one drawn

to the, order of Haines, and the other to the order of Chetlaiu.

The amount of both drafts was credited on the debt of Haines

& Co. to Toof, Phillips & Co., pursuant to an understanding to

that effect made at the time. There was then due of the pur-

chase-money of the property, for which the title-bond was given,

about $700. This sum Mahan paid, and took a conveyance to

himself from the obligor who held the fee.

The bill charged specifically that at the time these conveyances

were made the bankrupts were insolvent or in contemplation of

insolvency; that the conveyances were made with a view to give

a preference to Toof, Phillips & Co., who were the creditors of

the bankrupts; that Toof, Phillips & Co. knew, or had reason-

able cause to believe, that the bankrupts were then insolvent,

and that the conveyances were made in fraud of the provisions

of the bankrupt act.

It also charged that the assignment of the title-bond to Mahan

was in fact for the use and benefit of Toof, Phillips & Co., for

the purpose of securing the property or its value to them in

fraud of the rights of the creditors, and that this purpose was
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known and participated in by Mahan.

The answer, admitting a large amount of debts at the time

of the conveyances in question, denied that the bankrupts were

then "insolvent," asserting, on the contrary, "that at the time

aforesaid said Haines & Co. had available assets in excess of

their indebtedness to the extent of $16,000." It also denied

that there was a purpose to give a preference; asserting that the

conveyances of the land were made because Haines & Co., not

having cash to pay the debt due Toof, Phillips & Co., were will-

ing to settle in property; and it denied that the title-bond was

assigned to Mahan for the benefit of Toof, Phillips & Co., or

that they paid for the same; but on the contrary averred that

Mahan bought the property and paid for it himself, and for his

own use and benefit, out of his own funds.

Appended to the bill were several interrogatories, the first of

which inquired whether at the time of making the transfers to

Toof, Phillips & Co. the indebtedness of W. P. Haines & Co. was

not known to be greater than their immediate ability to pay;

and to this Toof, Phillips & Co. answered that at the time of

of that firm, a title-bo11d which they held for certain other real
property at Augusta, upon which they had IIUl.de valuable improvements. The consideration of this assignment was two drafts
of Mahan on Toof, Phillips & Co., each for $3,034, one drawn
to the, order of Haines, and the other to the order of Chetlain.
The amount of both drafts was .credited on the debt of Haines
& Co. to Toof, Phillips & Co., pursuant to an understanding to
that effect made at the time. There was then due of the purchase-money of the property, for which the title-bond was given,
about $700. This sum Mahan paid, and took a conveyance to
himself from the obligor who held the fee.
The bill charged specifically that at the time these conveyances
were made the bankrupts were insolvent or in contemplation of
insolvency; that the conveyances were made with a view to give
a preference to Toof, Phillips & Co., who were the creditors of
the bankrupts; that Toof, Phillips & Co. knew, or had reasonable cause to believe, that the bankrupts were then insolvent,
and that the conveyances were made in fraud of the provisions
of the bankrupt act.
It also charged that the assignment of the title-bond to Mahan
was in fact for the use and benefit of Toof, Phillips & Co., for
the purpose of securing the property or its value to them in
fraud of the rights of the creditors, and that this purpose was
known and participated in by Mahan.
The answer, admitting a large amount of debts at the time
of the conveyances in question, denied that the bankrupts were
then "in.solvent," asserting, on the contrary, "that at the time
aforesaid said Haines & Co. had available assets in excess of
their indebtedness to the extent of $16,000." It also denied
that there was a purpose to give a preference; asserting that the
conveyances of the land were made because Haines & Co., not
having cash to pay the debt due Toof, Phillips & Co., were willing to settle in property; and it denied that the title-bond was
assigned to Mahan for the benefit of Toof, Phillips & Co., or
that they paid for the same; but on the contrary averred that
Mahan bought the property and paid for it himself, and for his
own use and benefit, out of his own funds.
Appended to the bill were several interrogatories, the first of
which inquired whether at the time of making the transfers to
Toof, Phillips & Co. the indebtedness of W. P. Haine~ & Co. was
not known to be greater than their immediate ability to pay;
and to this Toof, Phillips & Co. answered that at the time of
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making these transfers they did not believe Haines & Co. were

able to pay their debts in money, but that they were able to do

so on a fair market valuation of the property they owned, and

of their assets generally.

Chetlain, one of the bankrupts, testified that on the 18th of

January, 1868, Haines & Co. could not pay their notes as they

came due; that previous to this time they had contemplated

bankruptcy, and that he had had several conversations with

Mr. F. M. Mahan, relative to their finances, and had told him

the amount, or near the amount, of their debts. His advice was

to get extensions, and he would help them get through; that

after his promises to advance them more goods, they concluded

not to go into bankruptcy, but to go on in business; that he told

Mahan that Haines & Co. could not pay out; and in a conversa-

tion with him previous to the transfer of the real estate, he,

Chetlain, told Mahan that such was the state of the finances of

Haines & Co. that if he would assume their liabilities, and give

them a receipt, Haines & Co. would turn over all their assets to

him. He did not accept.

He also testified that about the 1st of January, 1868, the

sheriff levied on the goods belonging to Haines & Co., in their

storehouse in Augusta, on an execution in favor of one Weghe,
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which caused them to suspend business for a few days, until the

levy was dissolved by order of the sheriff, at or about the 15th

day of January, 1868. Mahan was in Augusta at the time of

this levy, and Haines & Co. had an interview with him in regard

to it.

During the entire autumn and winter preceding these trans-

fers, Haines & Co. did not pay, except to Toof, Phillips & Co.,

more than $500 on all their debts; and in the latter part of

December, 1867, and the first part of January, 1868, some of

the creditors sent agents to collect money from them, but got

none, because Haines & Co. had no funds to pay them.

A witness, Frisbee, testified that he had assisted Mr. Haines

in making up his balance-sheet "about the 1st of January, 1868,

and that the result was that their available assets were not

sufficient to pay their debts."

Another witness, an agent for an express company, testified

that he received, about the last of December, 1867, or January,

1868, notes from Toof, Phillips & Co. and another firm, against

Haines & Co. for collection; that he presented them for payment

to Haines & Co., and that they said they could not pay them at

making these transfers they did not believe Haines & Co. were
able to pay their debts iu nwney, but that they were able to do
so on a fair market valuation of the property they owned, an<l
of their assets generally.
Chetlain, one of the bankrupt.s, testified that on the 18th of
January, 1868, Haines & Co. could not pay their uotes as they
1·ame due; that previous to this time they had contempl.a.te<l
bankruptcy, and that he had had several conversations with
~lr. F. M. Mahan, relative to their finances, and had told him
the amount, or near the amount, of their debts. His advice was
to get extensions, and he would help them get through; that
after his promises to advance them more goods, they concluded
not to go into bankruptcy, but to go on in business; that he told
Mahan that Haines & Co. could not pay out; and in a conversation with him previous to the transfer of the real estate, he,
Chetlain, told l\Iahan that such waa the state of the finances of
Haines & Co. that if he would assume their liabilities, and give
them a receipt, Haine.a & Co. would turn over all their assets to
him. He did not accept.
He also testified that about the lst of January, 1868, the
sheriff levied on the goods belonging to Haines & Co., in their
storehouse in Augusta, on an execution in favor of one Weghe,
which caused them to suspend business for a few days, until the
levy was dissolved by order of the sheriff, at or a.bout the 15th
day of January, 1868. Mahan was in Augusta at the time of
this levy, and Haines & Co. had an interview with him in regard
to it.
During the entire autumn and winter preceding these transfers, Haines & Co. did not pay, except to Toof, Phillips & Co.,
more than $500 on all their debts; and in the latter part of
December, 1867, and the first part of January, 1868, some of
the creditors sent agent.s to collect money from them, but got
none, because Haine.a & Co. had no funds to pay them.
A witness, Frisbee, testified that he had assisted :\Ir. Haines
in making up his balance-sheet "about the 1st of January, 1868,
and that the result was that their available assets were not
sufficient to pay their debts.''
Another witness, an agent for an express company, te.stified
that he received, about the last of December, 1867, or January,
1868, notes from Toof, Phillips & Co. and another firm, against
Haines & Co. for collection; that he presented them for payment
to Haines & Co., and that they said they could not pay them at
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that time. They did not pay them to him. He knew something

of the financial condition of Haines & Co., and of their debt to

Toof, Phillips & Co., and of complaints of other parties, and

something of their business through the country, and from all

these facts he thought it doubtful about their being able to pay

their debts. This was during the months of December, 1867,

and January, 1868; and he wrote to Toof, Phillips & Co. that he

thought they had better look to their interests, as his conviction

was that it was doubtful about their being able to collect their

debt from Haines & Co. Shortly after writing this letter Mahan

came round to look after the matter.

The property described in the title-bond assigned to Mahan,

which he stated that he purchased as an investment on private

account for $7,000, was shown by the testimony of Chetlain to

have been worth only $4,000, and by the testimony of a witness,

Hamblet, to have beei^ worth only $3,500, and it was valued by

the bankrupts in their schedules at $4,000. Both of the bank-

rupts testified that it was understood at the time the title-bond

was assigned to Mahan, that the amount of the two drafts given

by him on Toof, Phillips & Co. for it, should be credited to

Haines & Co. on their indebtedness to that firm.

The schedules of the bankrupts annexed to their petition
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showed that their debts at the time of their transfers to Toof,

Phillips & Co., exceeded $59,000, while their assets were less

than $32,000.

On the other hand there was some testimony to show that

some persons thought that they could get through, etc., etc.

The District Court decreed the conveyances void, and that the

title of the property be vested in the assignee, the latter to refund

the amount of the purchase-money advanced by Mahan to obtain

the deed of the land described in the title-bond, less any rents

and profits received by him or Toof, Phillips & Co., from the

property. This decree the Circuit Court affirmed.

In commenting upon the answer of Toof, Phillips & Co., al-

ready mentioned, which, in reply to the interrogatory, "whether

at the time of the transfer to them the indebtedness of Haines &

Co. was not greater than their ability," admitted that they did

not believe Haines & Co. "able to pay their debts in money,"

the Circuit Court said:

"Here is a direct confession of a fact that in law constitutes

insolvency, and it is idle for the defendants to profess ignorance

of the insolvency of the bankrupts in face of such a confession.

H. & A. Bankruptcy—22

that time. They did not pay them to him. Ile knew something
of the financial condition of Haines & Co., and of their dl'bt to
Toof, Phillips & Co., and of complaints of other parties, a11d
something of their bUBiness through the country, and from all
these facts he thought it doubtful about their being able to pay
their debts. This was during the months of DecemLer, 186i,
and January, 1868; and he wrote to Toof, Phillips & Co. that he
thought they had better look to their interests, as his conviction
was that it was doubtful about their being able to collect their
debt from Haines & Co. Shortly after writing this letter Mahan
came round to look after the matter.
The property described in the title-bond assigned to Mahan,
which he stated that he purchased as an investment on private
account for $7,000, was shown by the testimony of Chetlain to
have been worth only $4,000, and by the testimony of a witness,
Hamblet, to have been, worth only $3,500, and it was valued by
the bankrupts in their schedules at $4,000. Both of the bankrupts testified that it was understood at the time the title-bond
was assigned to Mahan, that the amount of the two drafts given
by him on Toof, Phillips & Co. for it, should be credited to
Haines & Co. on their indebtedness to that firm.
The schedules of the bankrupts annexed to their petition
showed that their debts at the time of their tra.nsfers to Toof,
Phillips & Co., exceeded $59,000, while their assets were less
than $32,000.
On the other hand there was some testimony to show that
some persons thought that they could get through, etc., etc.
The District Court decreed the conveyances void, and that the
title of the property be vested in the assignee, the latter to refund
the amount of the purchase-money advanced by Mahan to obtain
the deed of the land described in the title-bond, less any rents
and profits received by him or Toof, Phillips & Co., from the
property. This decree the Circuit Court affirmed.
In commenting upon the answer of Toof, Phillips & Co., already mentioned, which, in reply to the interrogatory, "whether
at the time of the transfer to them the indebtedness of Haines &
Co. was not greater than their ability," admitted that they did
not believe Haines & Co. "able to pay their debts in money,"
the Circuit Court said:
''Here is a direct confession of a fact that in law constitutes
insolvency, and it is idle for the defendants to profess ignorance
of the insolvency of the bankrupts in face of such a confession.
H. & A. Ba.nkruptcy-22
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If the bankrupts could not pay their debts in the ordinary course

of business, that is, in money, as they fell due, they were in-

solvent, and if the defendants did not know that this consti-

tuted insolvency within the meaning of the bankrupt act, it was

because they were ignorant of the law."

But that court examined all the testimony, and in affirming

the decree of the District Court, rested the case upon it, as well

as upon this answer. From the decree of the Circuit Court,

Toof, Phillips & Co., brought the case here.

Mr. Justice FIELD "delivered the opinion of the court.

The bill presents a case within the provisions of the first

clause of the thirty-fifth section of the bankrupt act. That clause

was intended to defeat preferences to a creditor, made by a

If the bankrupts could not pay their debts in the ordinary COW'Be
of bus.in~, that is,' in m011ey, as they fell due, they were in·
solvent, and if the defendants did not know that this eonsti. tuted insolvency within the meaning of the bankrupt act, it was
because they were ignorant of the law.''
But that court ex.a.mined all the testimony, and in affirming
the decree of the District Court, rested the ease upon it, as well
as upon this answer. From the decree of the Circuit Court,
Toof, Phillips & Co., brought the case here.

debtor when insolvent or in contemplation of insolvency. It de-

clares that any payment or transfer of his property made by

Mm whilst in that condition, within four months previous to the

filing of his petition, with a view to give a preference to a credi-

tor, shall be void if the creditor has at the time reasonable cause

to believe him to be insolvent, and that the payment or transfer

was made in fraud of the provisions of the bankrupt act. And

it authorizes in such case the assignee to recover the property or

its value from the party who receives it.

Under this act it is incumbent on the complainant, in order to
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maintain the decree in his favor, to show four things:

1st. That at the time the conveyances to Toof, Phillips & Co.

and Mahan were made the bankrupts were insolvent or con-

templated insolvency;

2d. That the conveyances were made with a view to give a

preference to these creditors;

3d. That the creditors had reasonable cause to believe the

bankrupts were insolvent at the time; and,

4th. That the conveyances were made in fraud of the pro-

visions of the bankrupt act.

1st. The counsel of the appellants have presented an elaborate

argument to show that inability to pay one's debts at the time

they fall due, in money, does not constitute insolvency, within

the provisions of the bankrupt act. The argument is especially

addressed to language used by the district judge when speaking

of the statement of the appellants in answer to one of the in-

terrogatories of the bill, to the effect that at the time the trans-

fers were made they did not believe the bankrupts were able to

Mr. Justice 11~1ELD •delivered the opinion of the court.
The bill presents a case within the provisions of the first
clause of the thirty-fifth section of the bankrupt act. That clause
was intended to defeat preferences to a creditor, made by a
debtor when insolvent or in contemplation of insolvency. It declares that any payment or transfer of his property made by
him whilst in that condition, within four ~nths previous t.o the
filing of his petition, with a view to give a preference to a creditor, shall be void if the creditor has at the time reasonable cause
to believe him to be insolvent, and that the payment or transfer
was made in fraud cU the provisions of the bankrupt act. And
it authorizes in such case the a.ssignee to recover the property or
its value from the party who receives it.
Under this act it is incumbent on the complainant, in order to
maintain the decree in his favor, to show four things:
1st. That at the time the conveyances to Tool, Phillips & Co.
and Mahan were made the bankrupts were insolvent or contemplated insolvency;
2d. That the conveyances were made with a view to give a
preference to these creditors~
3d. That the creditors had reasonable cause to believe the
bankrupts were insolvent at the time; and,
4th. That the conveyances were made in fraud of the provisions of the bankrupt act.
1st. The counsel of the appellants have presented an elaborate
argument to show that inability to pay one's debts at the time
they fall due, in m<>ney, does not constitute insolvency, within
the provisions of the bankrupt acl The argument is especially
addressed to language used by the district judge when speaking
of the statement of the appellants in answer to one of the interrogatories of the bill, to the effect that at the time the transf l'rs were made they did not believe the bankrupts were able to
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pay their debts in money, but were able to do so on a fair

market valuation of their property and assets. The district

judge held that this was a direct confession of a fact which in

law constitutes insolvency, and observed that "if the bankrupts

could not pay their debts in the ordinary course of business,

that is, in money, as they fell due, they were insolvent.''

The rule thus laid down may not be strictly correct as applied

to all bankrupts. The term insolvency is not always used in

the same sense. It is sometimes used to denote the insufficiency

of the entire property and assets of an individual to pay his

debts. This is its general and popular meaning. But it is also

used in a more restricted sense, to express the inability of a

party to pay his debts, as they become due in the ordinary

course of business. It is in this latter sense that the term is

used when traders and merchants are said to be insolvent, and

as applied to them it is the sense intended by the act of Con-

gress. It was of the bankrupts as traders that the district judge

was speaking when he used the language which is the subject of

criticism by counsel.

With reference to other persons not engaged in trade or com-

merce the term may perhaps have a less restricted meaning.

The bankrupt act does not define what shall constitute insol-

vency, or the evidence of insolvency, in every case.
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In the present case the bankrupts were insolvent in both senses

of the term at the time the conveyances in controversy were

made. They did not then possess sufficient property, even upon

their own estimation of its value as given in their schedules, to

pay their debts. These exceeded the estimated value of the

property by over twenty thousand dollars. And for months

previous the bankrupts had failed to meet their obligations as

they matured. Creditors had pressed for payment without suc-

cess; their stock of goods had been levied on, and their store

closed by the sheriff under an execution on a judgment against

one of them. It would serve no useful purpose to state in detail

the evidence contained in the record which relates to their con-

dition. It is enough to say that it abundantly establishes their

hopeless insolvency.

2d. That the conveyances to Toof, Phillips & Co. were made

with a view to give them a preference over other creditors hardly

admits of a doubt. The bankrupts knew at the time their in-

solvent condition. A month previous they had made up a bal-

ance sheet of their affairs which showed that their assets were

pay their debts in money, but were able to do so on a fair
market valuation of their property and assets. The district
judge held that this was a direct confession of a fact which iu
law constitutes insolvency~ and observed that ''if the bankrupts
could not pay their debts in the ordinary course of busi11ess,
that is, in money, as they fell due, they were insolvent.''
The rule thus laid down may not be strictly correct as applied
to all bankrupts. The term insolvency is not always used in
the same sense. It is sometimes used to denote the insufficiency
of the entire property and assets of an individual to pay his
debts. This is its genera.I and popular meaning. But it is also
used in a more restricted sense, to express the inability of a
party to pay his debts, as they become due in the ordinary
course of business. It is in this latter sense that the term is
used when traders and merchants are said to be insolvent, and
as applied to them it is the sense intended by the act of Congress. It was of the bankrupts as traders that the district judge
was speaking when he used the language which is the subject of
criticism by counsel.
·
With reference to other persons not engaged in trade or commerce the term may perhaps have a less restricted meaning.
The bankrupt act does not define what shall constitute insolvency, or the evidence of insolvency, in every case.
In the present case the ba11krupts were insolvent in both sell8es
of the term at the time the conveyances in controversy were
made. They did not theQ possess sufficient property, even upon
their own estimation of its value as given in their schedule.a, to
pay their debts. These exceeded the estimated value of the
property by over twenty thousand dollars. And for months
previous the bankrupts had failed to meet their obligations as
they matured. Creditors had pressed for payment without succeSB; their stock of goods had been levied on, and their store
closed by the sheriff under an execution on a judgment against
one of them. It would serve no useful purpose to state in detail
the evidence contained in the record which relates to their condition. It is enough to say that it abundantly establishes their
hopeless insolvency.
2d. That the conveyances to Toof, Phillips & Co. were made
with a view to give them a preference over other creditors hardly
admits of a doubt. The bankrupts knew at the time their insolvent condition. A month previous they had made up a balance sheet of their affairs which showed that their assets were
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insufficient to pay their debts. They had contemplated going

into bankruptcy in December previous, and were then pressed

by numerous creditors for payment. Their indebtedness at the

time exceeded $50,000, and except to Toof, Phillips & Co. they

did not pay upon the whole of it over $500 during the previous

fall and winter. Making a transfer of property to these credi-

tors, under these circumstances, was in fact giving them a pref-

erence, and it must be presumed that the bankrupts intended

this result at the time. It is a general principle that every one

must be presumed to intend the necessary consequences of his

acts. The transfer, in any case, by a debtor, of a large portion

of his property, while he is insolvent, to one creditor, without

making provision for an equal distribution of its proceeds to all

his creditors, necessarily operates as a preference to him, and

must be taken as conclusive evidence that a preference was in-

tended, unless the debtor can show that he was at the time

ignorant of his insolvency, and that his affairs were such that

he could reasonably expect to pay all his debts. The burden of

proof is upon him in such case, and not upon the assignee or

contestant in bankruptcy.

No such proof was made or attempted in this case. But, on

the contrary, the evidence shows that the conveyances were
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executed upon the expectation of the bankrupts, and upon the

assurance of Toof, Phillips & Co., that in consequence of them

they would continue to sell the bankrupts goods on credit, as

they had previously done; and that no arrangement was made

by the bankrupts with any other of their creditors, either for

payment or security, or for an extension of credit.

The fact that the title-bond was assigned, and the property

for which it was given was conveyed to Mahan alone, and not

to Toof, Phillips & Co., does not change the character of the

transaction. Mahan was a member of that firm, and the con-

veyance was made to him with the understanding that |he sum

mentioned as its consideration should be credited on the in-

debtedness of the bankrupts to them. Both of the bankrupts

testified that such was the understanding at the time. The pre-

tense that Mahan bought the lots as an investment on private

account will not bear the slightest examination. It is in proof

that the lots at the time were only worth $4,000 at the outside,

yet the consideration given was nearly $7,000. Toof, Phillips &

Co. might well have been willing to credit this amount on their

claim against insolvent traders in consideration of obtaining

insufficient to pay their debts. They had contemplated going
into bankruptcy in December previous, and were then pressed
by numerous creditors for payment. Their indebtedness at the
time exceeded $50,000, and except to Toof, Phillips &. Co. they
did not pay upon the whole of it over $.500 during the previous
fall and winter. Making a transfer of property to these credi·
tors, under these circumstances, was in fact giving them a preference, and it must be presumed that the bankrupts intended
this result at the time. It is a general principle that every one
must be presumed to intend the necessary consequences of his
acts. The transfer, in any case, by a debtor, of a large portion
of his property, while he is insolvent, to one creditor, without
making provision for an equal distribution of its proceeds to all
his creditors, nec~rily_ operates as a preference to him, and
must be taken as conclusive evidence that a preference was intended, unless the debtor can show that he waa at the time
ignorant of his insolvency, and that his affairs were such that
he could reasonably expect to pay all his debts. The burden of
proof is upon him in such case, and not upon the assignee or
contestant in bankruptcy.
No such proof was made or attempted in this case. But, on
the contrary, the evidence shows that the conveyances were
executed upon the expectation of the bankrupts, and upon the
assurance of Toof, Phillips & Co., that in consequence of them
they would continue to sell the bankrupts goods on credit, as
they had previously done; and that no arrangement was made
by the bankrupts with any other of their creditors, either for
payment or security, or for an extension of credit.
The fact that the title-bond was assigned, and the property
for which it was given was conveyed to Mahan alone, and not
to Toof, Phillips & Co., does not change the character of the
transaction. Mahan was a member of that firm, and the conveyance was made to him with the understanding that the sum
mentioned as its consideration should be credited on the indebtedness of the bankrupts to them. Both of the bankrupts
testified that such was the understanding at the time. The pretense that Mahan bought the lots as an investment on private
account will not bear the slightest examination. It is in proof
that the lots at the time were only worth $4,000 at the outside,
yet the consideration given was nearly $7,000. Toof, Phillips &
Co. might well have been willing to credit this amount on their
claim against insolvent traders in consideration of obtaining
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from them the possession of property of much less value, but it

is incredible that an individual, seeking au investment of his

money, would be careless as to the difference between the actual

value of the property and the amount paid as a consideration

for its transfer to him.41

3d. From what has already been said it is manifest not only

that the bankrupts were insolvent when they made the con-

veyances in controversy, but that the creditors, Toof, Phillips

& Co., had reasonable cause to believe that they were insolvent.

The statute, to defeat the conveyances, does not require that the

creditors should have had absolute knowledge on the point, nor

even that they should, in fact, have had any belief on the sub-

ject. It only requires that they should have had reasonable

cause to believe that such was the fact. And reasonable cause

they must be considered to have had when such a state of facts

w as brought to their notice in respect to the affairs and pecuniary

condition of the bankrupts as would have led prudent business

men to the conclusion that they could not meet their obligations

as they matured in the ordinary course of business. That such

a state of facts was brought to the notice of the creditors is

plainly shown. Chetlain, one of the bankrupts, testifies that

previous to the execution of the conveyances he had several con-
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versations with Mahan respecting their finances, and told him

the amount or near the amount of their indebtedness, and that

they could not pay it. Mahan advised them to get extensions,

and said that he would help them to get through. Chetlain also

testifies that such was the state of the finances of the bankrupts

that on one occasion, in conversation with Mahan, they offered

to turn over to him their entire assets if he would assume their

liabilities and give them a receipt, and that he declined the offer.

It also appears in evidence that the levy by the sheriff upon

the stock of goods of the bankrupts, already mentioned, which

was made in January, 1868, caused a temporary suspension of

thei'- business, and that Mahan was in Augusta at the time and

had an interview with the bankrupts on the subject of the levy.

It also appears that about the last of December, 1867, or the

first of January, 1868, Toof, Phillips & Co. sent notes of the

41—See Wager v. Hall, 16 Wall.

584, 602; Western Tie & Timber

Co. v. Brown, 196 U. S. 502; Nay-

Ion & Co. v. Christiansen Harness

Mfg. Co-> 158 Fed- 2905 In re Mc"

Donald & Sons, 178 Fed. 487; Kim-

merle v. Farr, 189 Fed. 295.

See also First Nat. Bank v. Jones,

21 Wall. 325.

from them the possession of property of much less value, but it
is incredible that an individual, seeking an investment of his
money, would be careless as to the difference between the actual
value of the property and the amount paid as a consideration
for its transfer to him.4 1
3d. From what has already been said it is manifest not only
that the bankrupts were insolvent when they made the conveyances in controversy, but that the creditors, Toof, Phillips
& Co., had reasonable cause to believe that they were insolvent.
The statute, to defeat the conveyances, does not rec1uire that the
ereditors should have had absolute knowledge on the point, nor
even that they should, in fact, have had any belief on the subject. It only requires that they should have had reasonable
cause to believe that such was the fact. And reasonable cause
they must be considered to have had when such a state of facts
was brought to their notice in respect to the affairs and pecuniary
condition of the bankrupts as would have led prudent business
men to the conclusion that they could not meet their obligations
as they matured in the ordinary course of business. That such
a state of facts was brought to the notice of the creditors is
plainly shown. Chetlain, one of the bankrupts, t.er:Jtifies that
previous to the execution of the conveyances he had several conwrsations with Mahan respecting their finances, and told him
the amount or near the amount of their indebtedness, and that
they could not pay it. Mahan advised th~m to get extensions,
and said that he would help them to get through. Chetlain also
testifies that such was the state of the finances of the bankrupts
that on one occasion, in conversation with Mahan, they offered
to turn over to him their entire assets if he would assume their
liabilities and give them a receipt, and that he declined the offer.
It also appears in evidence that the levy hy the sheriff upon
the stock of goods of the bankrupts, aJrea<ly mentioned, which
was made in January, 1868, caused a temporary suspension of
thei•· business, and that Mahan was in Augusta at the time and
bad an interview with the bankrupts on the subject of the levy.
It also appears that about the last of December, 1867, or the
first of January, 1868, Toof, Phillips & Co. sent notes of the
41-See Wager v. Hall, 16 Wall.
584, 602; Western Tie & Timber
Co. ~·. Brown, 196 U. 8. 502; Nay·
Jon & Co. v. Christiansen Harness
lflg. Co., 158 Fed. 290; In re Mc·

Donald & Sons, 178 Fed. 487; Kim·
merle v. Farr, 189 Fed. 295.
See also First Nat. Bank v. Jones,
21 Wall. 325.
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bankrupts which they held to an agent in Augusta for collec-

tion. The agent presented the notes for payment to the bank-

rupts and was told by them that they could not pay the notes at

that time. The agent then wrote to Toof, Phillips & Co., that

they had butter look to their interests, as his conviction was that

it was doubtful whether they would be able to collect their debts.

Shortly after this Mahan went to Augusta to look after the mat-

ter, and whilst there the conveyances in controversy were made.

It is impossible to doubt that Mahan ascertained, while thus

in Augusta, the actual condition of the affairs of the bankrupts.

The facts recited were sufficient to justify the conclusion that

they were insolvent, or at least furnished reasonable cause for a

belief that such was the fact.

4th. It only remains to add that the creditors, Toof, Phillips

& Co., had also reasonable ground to believe that the conveyances

were made in fraud of the provisions of the bankrupt act. This,

indeed, follows necessarily from the facts already stated. The

act of Congress was designed to secure an equal distribution of

the property of an insolvent debtor among his creditors, and any

transfer made with a view to secure the property, or any part

of it, to one, and thus prevent such equal distribution, is a

transfer in fraud of the act. That such was the effect of the

conveyances in this case, and that this effect was intended by
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both creditors and bankrupts, does not admit, upon the evi-

dence, of any rational doubt. A clearer case of intended fraud

upon the act is not often presented.

Decree affirmed.

GOODLANDER-ROBERTSON LUMBER CO. et al . v.

ATWOOD

152 Fed. 978, 82 C. C. A. 109

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. April 9, 1907)

McDOWELL, D. J. On March 27, 1906, three of the creditors

of W. J. Atwood, a dealer in lumber in Norfolk, Va., filed a

petition, praying that Atwood be adjudicated an involuntary

bankrupt. The alleged act of bankruptcy was the payment by

Atwood to the Hardwood Lumber Company, a creditor, of $160

on February 27, and of $121.15 on March 6, 1906, being then

insolvent, with intent to prefer the said lumber company over

bankrupts which they held to an agent in Augusta for collec.tion. The. agent presented the notes for payment to the bankrupts and was told by them that they could not pay the not.es at
that time. The agent then wrote to Toof, Phillips & Co., that
they had better look to their interests, as his conviction was that
it was doubtful whether they would be able to collect their debt.a.
Shortly after this Mahan went to Augusta to look after the matter, and whilst there the conveyances in controversy were made.
It is impossible to doubt that Mahan ascertained, while thus
in Augusta, the actual condition of the affairs of the bankrupts.
The facts recited were sufficient to justify the conclusion that
they were insolvent, or at ·least funiished reasonable cause for a
belief that such was the fact.
4th. It only remains to add that the creditors, Toof, Phillips
& Co., had also reasonable ground to believe that the conveyances
were made in fraud of the provisions of the bankrupt act. This,
indeed, follows necessarily from the facts already stated. The
act of Congress was designed to secure an equal distribution of
the property of an insolvent debtor among his creditors, and any
transfer made with a view to secure the property, or any part
of it, to one, and thus prevent such equal distribution, is a
transfer in fraud of the act. That such was the effect of the
conveyances in this c~ and that this effect was intended by
both creditors and bankrupts, does not admit, upon the evidence, of any rational doubt. A clearer case of intended fraud
upon the act is not often presented.
Decree affirmed.

his other creditors. The plea of the bankrupt to the petition

GOODLANDER-ROBERTSON LUMBER CO. et al v.
ATWOOD
152 Fed. 978, 82 C. C. A. 109
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. April 9, 1907)
McDOWELL, D. J. On March 27, 1906, three of the creditol'I
of W. J. Atwood, a dealer in lumber in Norfolk, Va., filed a
petition, praying that Atwood be adjudicated an involuntary
bankrupt. The alleged act of bankruptcy was the payment by
Atwood to the Hardwood Lumber Company, a creditor, of $160
on February 27, and of $121.15 on March 6, 1906, being then
insolvent, with intent to prefer the said lumber company over
his other creditors. The plea of the bankrupt to the petition
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consisted of a denial of the commission of the act of bankruptcy

alleged in the petition. A jury trial was not demanded, and the

evidence was adduced orally before the trial court, whereupon

an order was entered dismissing the petition. The petitioning

creditors have appealed.

It appears that the Hardwood Lumber Company sustained no

relation to the alleged bankrupt other than that of one of sev-

eral creditors, and that no sort of reason existed why Atwood

should have desired or intended to prefer such creditor to any

other creditors. The collections were made by an attorney, and

the payments were made in the ordinary course of business and

to avoid suit. At the time the payments were made Atwood was

insolvent in the sense in which the word is used in the bank-

rupt act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544, § 1, cl. 15 [U. S.

Comp. St. 1901, p. 3419]). He was indebted to about the sum

of $20,000—but much of this was not then due, and his salable

property did not exceed $1,500. He did have, however, a knowl-

edge of a rather technical and not easily learned business and

a custom or '' good will'' which has been apparently disregarded

by counsel for appellants. The question in the case is whether

or not the payments were made (Bankr. Act. § 3, cl. 2) with

intent to prefer. From a careful reading of the evidence we

are satisfied that Atwood did not regard himself as insolvent;
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that he made the two payments in question, as he had been doing

previously, in the ordinary course of business, and without intent

to prefer the creditor. He did know that his cash receipts were

not at all times sufficient to enable him to meet the bills against

him promptly. But he did not regard himself as doomed to fail-

ure. In fact the evidence leads us to believe that he expected

to continue in business, to meet his obligations as they fell due

and that he had by no means lost hope of ultimate success. The

sums which he paid were just debts, then due, rather trifling in

amount when considered in connection with the business he was

doing, and they were paid in order to be able to continue in busi-

ness and to avoid suit. If Congress had intended that a payment

made under such circumstances as we have here should be an

act of bankruptcy, the language of § 3, cl. 2, of the act would

have been very different. As it is written, the law makes such

payments acts of bankruptcy only when made with "intent to

prefer.''

It is argued that every man is presumed to intend the neces-

sary consequences of his acts. But the defendant had no reason

consisted of a deuial of the commission of the act of bankruptcy
alleged in the petition. A jury trial was not demanded, and the
evidence was adduced orally before the trial court, whereupon
an order was entcTed dismissing the petition. The petitioniug
creditors have appealed.
It appears that the Hardwood Lumber Company sustained no
relation to the alleged bankrupt other than that of one of s•~V·
eral creditors, and that no sort of reason existed why Atwood
should have desired or intended to prefer such creditor to auy
other creditors. The collections were made by an attorney, and
the payments were made in the ordinary course of business and
to avoid suit. At the time the payments were made Atwood was
insolvent in the sense in which the word is used in the bankrupt act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544, § 1, cl. 15 [U. S.
Comp. St. 1901, p. 3419]). He was indebted to about the sum
of $20,0~but much of this was not then due, and his salable
property did not exceed $1,500. He did have, however, a knowledge of a rather technical and not easily learned business and
a custom or "good will" whieh has been apparently disregarded
by counsel for appellants. The question in the case is whether
or not the payments were made (Bankr. Act. § 3, cl. 2) with
intent to prefer. From a careful reading of the evidence we
are satisfied that Atwood did not regard himself as insolvent;
that he made the two payments in question, wi he had been doing
previously, in the ordinary course of business, and without intent
to prefer the creditor. He did know that his cash receipts ware
not at all times sufficient to enable him to meet the bills against
him promptly. But he did not regard himself as doomed to failure. In fact the evidence leads us to believe that he expected
to continue in business, to meet his obligations as they fell due
&nd that he had by no means lost hope of ultimate success. The
sums which he paid were just debts, then due, rather trifling in
amount when considered in connection with the business he was
doing, and they were paid in order to be able to continue in business and to avoid suit. If Congress had intended that a payment
made under such circumstances as we have here should be an
act of bankruptcy, the language of § 3, cl. 2, of the act would
have been very different. As it is written, the law makes such
payments acts of bankruptcy only when made with ''intent to
prefer.''
It is argued that every man is presumed to intend the necessary consequences of his acts. But the defendant had no reason
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to suppose that such consequences would be an involuntary peti-

tion in bankruptcy, the seizure of his property by a receiver

and the consequent ruin of his credit and destruction of his

business. The consequences of making the payments in ques-

tion reasonably to be expected were a continuance in business

with the prospect of an ultimate payment of all of the creditors

in full. An intent to prefer is an intent that some particular

creditor shall receive a greater percentage of his debt than the

other creditors of the same class. In the case at bar the evidence

negatives the existence of such intent.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

MACON GROCERY CO. et al. v. BEACH

156 Fed. 1009

(District Court, S. D. Georgia, N. D. October 1, 1907)

SPEER, District Judge. The Macon Grocery Company and

to suppose that such couscq uences wouJJ be a 11 i11volu11 ta ry p<.•t ition in bankruptcy, thP seizurt' of his property hy a reL•,.j ,.,.r
and the consequent :ruin of his credit and destructiou of his
business. The consequences of making the payments in question reasonably to be expected were a continuance in busir.t>s.s
with the prospect of an ultimate payment of all of the creditors
in full. An intent to prefer is an intent that some particuliir
creditor shall receive a greater percentage of his debt tha11 the
other creditors of the same class. In the case at bar the e\·i<lt•11ct·
negatives the existence of such intent.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

other creditors made petition, by which it was sought to obtain

an adjudication of involuntary bankruptcy against Asa N.

Beach. The indebtedness of Beach amounted to about $13,000.

MACON GROCERY CO. et al. v. BEACH

The amount of his assets is not stated, and the proceeding is

obviously brought as a basis for an equitable application to the

156 Fed. 1009

bankruptcy court, designed to subject large values which in one

way and another had been conveyed by Beach to a Miss Julia

Dixon, whose agent for a long time he had been. Miss Dixon is

(Di.strict Court, S. D. Georgia, N. D. October 1, 1907)
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an aged and infirm lady, and Beach was the adopted child of

her parents. Her property consisted of plantations, other real

estate, and money. It is contended by the petitioning creditors

that, while Beach pretended to be the agent for Miss Dixon, they

both entered into a general scheme to defraud his creditors.

This, it is insisted, was evidenced through the execution by Beach

of mortgages to Miss Dixon to secure an alleged indebtedness to

her of $11,817. To give the court jurisdiction to make a de-

cree or decrees canceling the conveyances of Beach to Miss Dixon,

and recovering for the benefit of creditors the property he con-

veyed, it must first be made to appear that Beach is a bankrupt

as alleged.

To accomplish this, the plaintiffs make four averments of

bankruptcy. The first is that Beach, while insolvent, drew a

draft on Little, Williams & Co., cotton brokers, in favor of the

Louisville Drug Company, for $19.85, and that this payment was

SPEER, District Judge. The Macon Grocery Company and
other creditors made petition, by which it was sought to obtain
an adjudication of involuntary bankruptcy against Asa N_
Beach. The indebtedness of Beach amounted to about $13,000.
The amount of his assets is not stated, and the proceeding is
obviously brought as a basis for an equitable application to the
bankruptcy court, designed to subject large values which in one
way and another had been conveyed by Beach to a l\Iiss Julia
Dixon, whose agent for a long time he had been. Miss Dixon is
an aged and infirm lady, and Beach was the adopted child of
her parents. Her property consisted of plantations, other real
estate, and money. It is contended by the petitioning creditors
that, while Beach pretended to be the agent for :Miss Dixon, they
both entered into a general scheme to defraud his creditors_
This, it is insisted, was evidenced through the execution by Beach
of mortgages to Miss Dixon to secure an alleged indebtedness to
her of $11,817. To give the court jurisdiction to make a decree or decrees canceling the conveyances of Beach to l\Iiss Dixon,
and recovering for the benefit of creditors the property he conveyed, it must" first be made to appear that Beach is a bankrupt
as alleged.
To accomplish this, the plaintiffs make four averments of
bankruptcy. The first is that Beach, while insolvent, drew a
draft on Little, Williams & Co., cotton brokers, in favor of the
Louisville Drug Company, for $19.85, and that this payment was
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made on October 1, 1901, with intent to prefer the drug company

over other creditors. The second is that the defendant did on

the same date pay to J. J. Keith, one of his creditors, the sum

of $2.75, with intent to give him a preference. The third is an

alleged preference given to R. L. Bostick, by draft on Little,

Williams & Co. for $100. This was paid on September 17, 1901.

The fourth is an alleged preference in favor of the Bank of

Louisville by the payment of $500. To these charges Beach

made answer. The answer did not admit insolvency; but this

was admitted in judicio by his attorney, and also by his brief

presented to the court. He denied that the acts specified were

acts of bankruptcy. The first, third, and fourth payments, he

alleged, were made by him as the agent of Miss Dixon, and with

her means. As to the second charge, he admitted the payment

of the $2.75 to Keith, but denied that this was done with intent

to give him a preference. He also answered that he was chiefly

engaged in farming and the tillage of the soil, and for this reason

insisted that he could not, in terms of the law, be adjudged an

involuntary bankrupt.

On the issues thus made much testimony was taken by the con-

tending parties. Finally, by agreement and consent of counsel,

the evidence and the issues presented were referred to J. N.
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Talley, Esq. (who is the standing master in chancery), as special

master, with direction to report "his findings and the conclu-

sions upon the law and the evidence, for such action of the court

in the premises as shall seem proper." In an elaborate report,

scrutinizing every phase of the controversy, the master finds,

first, that Beach is not entitled to exemption from the operation

of the bankruptcy law and that he is not chiefly engaged in agri-

culture. He then sustains the contentions of Beach as to the

first, third, and fourth alleged acts of bankruptcy, and finds that

such payments were made in behalf of Miss Dixon, and not by

Beach from his own assets. The counsel for both parties prob-

ably recognizing that by their consent reference they have desig-

nated a tribunal whose findings on the facts will rarely be dis-

turbed by the court (Chicago Motor Vehicle Co. v. American

Oak Leather Co., 141 Fed. 520, 72 C. C. A. 576, Kimberly v.

Arms, 129 U. S. 512, 9 Sup. Ct. 355, 32 L. ed. 764), no excep-

tion is made by the defendant to the finding that Beach is not

r xernpt from the operation of the law because of his contention

that bis chief pursuit is agriculture, and none by the petitioners

made on October 1, 1901, with intent to prefer the drug company
over other creditors. The second is that the defendant did 011
the same date pay to J. J. l(cith, one of his creditors, the sum
of $2.75, with iuteut to give him a preference. The third is an
alleged preference given to R. L. Bostick, by draft on Little,
'Villiams & Co. for $100. 'fhis was paid on September 17, 1901.
The fourth is an alleged prefere11ce in favor of the Bank of
I...1ouisville by the payment of $500. To these charges Bca~h
1nade answer. The answer did not admit insolvency; but this
was admitted in judicio by bis attorney, and also by his brief
presented to the court. He denied that the acts specified were
acts of bankruptcy. The first, third, and fourth payments, he
alleged, were made by him as the agent of .Miss Dixon, and with
her means. As to the second charge, he admitted the payment
of the $2.75 to Keith, but denied that this was done with intent
to give him a preference. He also answered that he was chiefly
engaged in farming and the tillage of the soil, and for this reason
insisted that he could not, in terms of the law, be adjudged an
involuntary bankrupt.
On the issues thus made much testimony was taken by the contending parties. Finally, by agreement and consent of counsel,
the evidence and the issues presented were r~ferred to J. N.
Talley, Esq. (who is the standing master in chancery), as special
master, with direction to report ''his findings and the conclusions upon the law and the evidence, for such action of the court
in the premises as shall seem proper.'' In an elaborate report,
scrutinizing every phase of the controversy, the master finds,
first, that Beach is not entitled to exemption from the operation
of the bankruptcy law and that he is not chiefly engaged in agriculture. He then sustains the contentions of Beach as to the
first, third, and fourth alleged acts of baukruptcy, and finds that
such payments were made in behalf of )Iiss Dixon, and not by
Beach from his own assets. The counsel for both parties probably recognizing that by their consent reference they have designated a tribunal whose findings on the facts will rarely be disturbed by t.he court (Chicago Motor Vehicle Co. v. American
Oak Leather Co., 141 Fed. 520, 72 C. C. A. 576, Kimberly v.
~\nus, 129 U. S. 512, 9 Sup. Ct. 355, 32 L. ed. 764), no except ;on is made by the defendant to the finding that Beach is not
. xempt from the operation of the law because of his contention
:!lat his chief pursuit is agriculture, and none by the petitioners
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to the findings on the first, third, and fourth grounds, that the

several payments were made as agent for Miss Dixon.

The master, however, finds that Beach, while insolvent, com-

mitted an act of bankruptcy, as set forth in the second charge,

for the reason that while insolvent, and within four months prior

to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, he paid the sum of

$2.75 to J. J. Keith, one of his creditors. This payment is not

denied. It is evidenced by the receipt from Keith, which recites

the items of the account. This is as follows:

"Louisville, Ga., Jan. 22, 1902.

"Mr. A. N. Beach, to J. J. Keith, Dr. Fancy Groceries, Finest

Soda Water and Cream.

1901.

to the findings on the first, third, and fourth grounds, that the
several payments were made as agent for Miss Dixon.
The master, however, finds that Beach, while insolvent, committed an act of bankruptcy, as set forth in the second charge,
for the reason that while insolvent, and within four months prior
to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, he paid the sum of
$2.75 to J. J. Keith, one of his creditors. This payment is not
denied. It is evidenced by the receipt from Keith, which recites
the items of the account. This is as follows:

June

13

To Soda Water

$ .05

22

u

Bar Soap

05

"Louisville, Ga., Jan. 22, 1902.
"Mr. A. N. Beach, to J. J. Keith, Dr. Fancy Groceries, Finest
Soda Water and Cream.
1901.
June 13

July

22

6

05

M

II
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Soda

05

9

II

05

1i

II

Soda

05

20

II

05

(i

II

05

24

"

05

August

26

II

>i

05

Sept.

5

II

((

05

6

II

it

05

7

II

1 Dressed Doll

2.15

$2.75

'' Received from A. N. Beach cash for above acct.

"Oct. 7th, 1901. J. J. Keith, Jne."

The question to be determined, then, is: Does this payment

by Beach, while insolvent, constitute an act of bankruptcy T

The oral evidence in the record with regard to this alleged pref-

July

6

"
9

"
20

"
24

To
''
"
''
''
''
''
''
''

Soda Water ........................... $
Bar Soap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
!Jemona.de . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lemonade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lemonade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Coca Cola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lemonade

.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05
.05

.05
.05
.05
August 26 "
"
.05
Sept.
5 "
"
.05
6 "
"
7 ' ' 1 Dressed Doll ........................ . 2.15
$2.'15
''Received from A. N. Beach cash for above acct.
"Oct. 7th, 1901.
J. J. K'eith, Jne."

The question to be determined, then, is: Does this payment
by Beach, while insolvent, constitute an act of bankruptcy T
The oral evidence in the record with regard to this alleged preference is found solely in the testimony of Beach himself, as
follows:
"On October 7, 1901, I paid $2.75 to J. J. Keith. It was my
debt. The consideration of the debt is shown by the items on
the receipted bill. • • • I got the dressed doll for a present.
When I paid this little bill to J. J. Keith on October 7, 1901, I
owed for mercantile debts something like $13,000, including the
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debts due the petitioning creditors. In addition to those of

petitioning creditors, I owed several thousand dollars of other

debts. When I paid this debt to J. J. Keith, I did not have in

mind any of my mercantile and other creditors. I did not pay

this debt to J. J. Keith in order to prefer him over my other

creditors. In paying this account, it was not my purpose to give

J. J. Keith an advantage over my creditors. I did not consider

the amount paid Keith a debt."

The relating statutory clause is § 3a (2) of the bankruptcy

act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 546 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901,

p. 3422]), as follows:

"Acts of bankruptcy by a person shall consist of his having

• * * (2) transferred, while insolvent, any portion of his

property to one or more of his creditors, with intent to prefer

such creditors over his other creditors."

Can it be, in view of the trivial amount paid by Beach, the

character of his purchases, and the general aspect of the trans-

action, that this must be regarded as a transfer of a portion of

his property to a creditor, with intent to prefer such creditor

over his other creditors, which will cast his entire estate into

bankruptcy. Very great respect should be accorded to the find-

ing of the master, who resolved this question in the affirmative.
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His report was thoroughly considered, and his reasoning is im-

pressive. It is also true that to adopt literally the deliverances

of many courts of acknowledged authority would be to sustain

his finding. The strong consensus of opinion on this topic among

the courts is clearly stated in Webb v. Sachs, 15 N. B. R. 171,

Fed. Cas. No. 17,325. The decision is by the District Court of

Oregon. There it was held that:

"If a debtor, with knowledge of his insolvency, does an act

which operates as a preference to one of his creditors, he is pre-

sumed to have so intended, as that is the necessary consequence

of his act; and the additional fact that such debtor was really

moved to give such preference for any other or particular rea-

son, such as to save costs or satisfy the solicitations of an im-

portunate creditor, or preserve his good will, or keep up his

business, does not affect such presumption. Whatever the

debtor's motive may be, he is presumed to intend the natural

and necessary consequences of his acts.''

See, also, Johnson v. Wald, 93 Fed. 640, 35 C. C. A. 522, 2

Am. Bankr. Rep. 84 (opinion by Circuit Judge Shelby of the

Fifth Circuit); Morgan & Co. v. Mastick, 2 N. B. R. 521, Fed.

debts due the petitioning creditors. In addition to those of
petitioning creditors, I owed several thousand dollars of other
debts. When I paid this debt to J. J. Keith, I did not have in
mind any of my mercantile and other creditors. I did not pay
this debt to J. J. Keith in order to prefer him OVt'r my other
creditors. In paying this account, it was not my purpose to give
J. J. Keith an advantage over my creditors. I did not consider
the amount paid Keith a debt.''
The relating statutory clause is § 3a (2) of the bankruptcy
act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 546 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901,
p. 3422] ) , as follows:
''Acts oi. bankruptcy by a person shall consist of his having
• • • (2) transferred, while insolvent, any portion of his
property to one or more of his creditors, with intent to prefer
such creditors over his other creditors.''
Ca.n it be, in view of the trivial amount paid by Beach, the
character of his purchases, and the general aspect of the transaction, that this must be regarded as a transfer of a portion of
his property to a creditor, with intent to prefer such creditor
over his other creditors, which will cast his entire estate into
bankruptcy. Very great respect should be accorded to the finding of the master, who resolved this question in the affirmative.
His report was thoroughly considered, and his reasoning is impressive. It is aiso true that to adopt literally the deliverances
of ma.ny courts of acknowledged authority would be to sustain
his finding. The strong consensus of opinion on this topic .among
the courts is clearly stated in Webb v. Sachs, 15 N. B. R. 171,
Fed. Cas. No. 17,325. The decision is by the District Court of
Oregon. There it was held that :
'' If a debtor, with knowledge of his insolvency, does an act
which operates as a preference to one of his creditors, he is preswned to have so intended, as that is the necessary consequence
of his act; and the additional fact that such debtor was really
moved to give such preference for any other or particular reason, such as to save costs or satisfy the solicitations of an importunate creditor, or preserve his good will, or keep up his
busines..'i, does not affect such presumption. Whatever the
debtor's motive may be, he is presumed to intend the natural
aud necessary consequences of his acts.''
See, also, Johnson v. Wald, 93 Fed. 640, 35 C. C. A. 522, 2
Am. Bankr. Rep. 84 (opinion by Circuit Judge Shelby of the
Fifth Circuit); Morgan & Co. v. Mastick, 2 N. B. R. 521, Fed.
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Cas. No. 9,803; Miller v. Keys, 3 N. B. R. 224, Fed. Cas. No.

9,578; In re Smith, 3 N. B. R. 377, Fed. Cas. No. 12.974: In re

Silverman, 4 N. B. R. 523, Fed. Cas. No. 12,855; In re Oregon

Printing Co., 13 N. B. R. 503, Fed. Cas. No. 10,559.

It is also held, with strong reason, that the testimony of a

party himself that he had not a preferential intent is entitled

to very little weight, where such intent is plainly presumable.

Oxford Iron Co. v. Slafter, 13 Blatch. 455, 14 N. B. R. 380, Fed.

Cas. No. 10,637; In re Wright Lumber Co. (D. C.) 114 Fed. 1011.

Many other authorities might be cited to the same tenor and

effect. It will be found, however, that in each of these eases a

substantial preference had been made, that the preferential

intent was always inferable, and that the consequent injury to

other creditors was significant and distinct. The basic reason

upon which all of these determinations are founded is substan-

tially that every person of a sound mind is presumed to intend

the necessary, natural, and legal consequences of his deliberate

acts. In each case the insolvency of the bankrupt was conceded

or proven. Then, when he has made a payment to a particular

creditor, he is presumed to have the intent to prefer him, as it

will enable that creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his

debt than will inure to others. But if the payment on the debt

is of that infinitesimal sort that it can have no perceptible con-
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sequence, is an intent to prefer a necessary, natural, and legal

consequence of such payment? It would seem that the substan-

tial or important character of a payment or transfer must ex

necessitate possess large evidential effect to show the intent to

prefer. This may be gathered from the statement of Mr. Justice

Field, in Toof v. Martin, 13 Wall. 40, 20 L. ed. 481. Speaking

for the court in that case, that great jurist declares:

"It is a general principle that every one must be presumed

to intend the necessary consequences of his act. The transfer

in any case by the debtor of a large part or all his property while

he is insolvent to one creditor, without making provision for an

equal distribution of its proceeds to all his creditors, necessarily

operates as a preference to him. * • •"

If this is true, the converse would seem also true. If the al-

leged bankrupt, although aware of his insolvency, should make

a payment of an amount not a large part of his means, but utterly

trivial—a payment to which no creditor, in the absence of liti-

gation, would possibly object—it is at least debatable whether

such payment must necessarily demonstrate the unlawful intent

Cas. No. 9,803; Miller v. Keys, 3 N. B. R. 224, Fed. Cas. ~I).
9,578; In re Smith, 3 N. B. R. 377, Fed. Cas. No. 12.974: !n r•'
Silverman, 4 N. B. R. 523, Fed. Cas. No. 12,855; In rt· Or•·gon
Priuting Co., 13 N. B. R. 503, Fed. Cas. No. 10,559.
It is also held, with strong reason, that the testimony of a
party himself that he had not a preferential intent is entitled
t.o very little weight, where such intent is plainly presum'ihle.
Oxford Iron Co. v. Slafter, 13 Blatch. 455, 14 N. B. R. 380, F·'<i
Cas. No. 10,637; In re Wright Lumber Co. (D. C.) 114 Fed. 1011.
h~any other authorities might be cited to the same tenor and
effect. It will be found, however, that in each of these cases a
substantial preference had been made, that the preferential
intent was always inferable, and that the consequent injury to
other creditors was significant and distinct. The basic reason
upon which all of these determinations are founded is substantially that every person of a sound mind is presumed to intend
the necessary, natural, and legal consequences of his deliberate
acts. In each case the insolvency of the bankrupt was conceded
or proven. Then, when he has made a payment to a particular
creditor, he is presumed to have the intent to prefer him, as it
will euable that creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his
debt than will inure to others. But if the payment on the debt
is of that infinitesimal sort that it can have no perceptible consequence, is an intent to prefer a necessary, natural, and legal
consequence of such payment T It would seem that the sub.stantial or important character of a payment or transfer must ez
necessitate possess large evidential effect to show the intent to
prefer. This may be gathered from the statement of l\Ir. Justice
Field, in Toof v. Martin, 13 'Vall. 40, 20 L. ed. 481. SpN1king
for the court in that CBSe, that great jurist declares:
"It is a general principle that every one must be presumed
t.o _intend the necessary consequences of his act. The transfer
in any case by the debtor of a large part or all his property while
he is insoh·ent to one creditor, without making provision for an
equal distribution of its proceeds to all his creditors, necessarily
operates as a preference to him. • • •"
If this is true, t.he converse would seem also true. If the alleged bankrupt, although aware of his insolvency, should make
a payment of an amount not a large part of his means, but utterly
trivial-a payment to which no creditor. in the absence of litigation, woul<l possibly ohject-it is at least debatable whether
such payment must necessarily demonstrate the unlawful intent
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to give a preference to one creditor tc the injury of others llie

doctrine which we are discussing, and which the courts have so

strongly stated, presupposes that the payment is injurious to the

other creditors. But where the facts show that no injury, of

which the law would or could take an account, would result,

the reason of the rule ceasing, it seems that the rule itself would

cease. This is illustrated hy the remarks of Judge Bellinger in

Re Gilbert, 112 Fed. 951, 8 Am. Bankr. Rep. 101, in the District

Court of Oregon, decided in 1902. The case was a petition for

involuntary bankruptcy, and the learned judge observed:

"The presumption arising from the transfer of property ia

affected by the amount of such transfer. Thus, where the trans-

fer was of all one's property, this was held to afford a violent—

almost conclusive—presumption of an intent to prefer, where

other creditors were unprovided for. • * * In this case the

transfer was of a comparatively small part of the property of

A. T. Gilbert—so small that the expediency of resorting to a

bankruptcy court, rather than permit a distribution of the assets

of the bank through the pending proceedings in the State Court,

may be doubted. If the preferences complained of are set aside,

it will add not more than 1 per cent. to the dividends to be paid

the general creditors."
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Again, in Re Douglass Coal & Coke Co. (D. C.) 131 Fed. 769,

it was held that the small size of the payment may be looked to

as a circumstance, in connection with others, to justify the con-

clusion that no preference was intended. The language of the

court is as follows:

"Payments of comparatively small sums of money by an in-

solvent corporation to each of a number of its creditors, made in

the usual course of business, do not raise a presumption of an

intent to prefer such creditor over it3 other creditors, so as to

establish an act of bankruptcy by a transfer of property with

intent to prefer, within [the] bankruptcy act. * *

A fortiori, would one trifling payment to one creditor fail

to evoke such presumption. The ruling in that case was by the

referee, but the District Court of the Eastern District of Ten-

nessee, in affirming the referee, while recognizing the insolvency

of the defendant, observed:

"I nevertheless do not think that a presumption of intent to

prefer should be indulged against an insolvent debtor by the

mere act of paying certain creditors small sums in the usual

course of business, and apparently iA ttlB. effort to keep its busi-

to brive a prefen:1we to ouc creditor tc the injury of other:; l 'lw
doctrine which we are discussing, and which the courts h.1Ye so
strongly stated, presupposes that the payment is injurious to the
other creditors. But where the facts show that no injury, of
which the law would or could tnke an account, would result,
the reason of the rule ceJl.Sing, it seems that the rule itsdf vmulil
cease. This is illustrated by the remarks of Judge Belling€l" in
Re Gilbert, 112 Fed. 951, 8 Am. Bankr. &p. 101, in the Di3+..i.ict
Court of Oregon, decided in 1902. The case was a petitfon for
involuntary bankruptcy, and ilw learned judge observed:
''The presumption ariaing from the transfer of pro1>ei1.y is
a.ffeeted by the amount of such transfer. Thus, where the transfer was of all one's property, this was held to afford a violentalmost conclusive-presumption of an intent to prefer, where
other creditors were unprovided for. • • • In this case the
transfer was of a comparatively small part of the property of
A. •r. GilbeMi--eo small that the expediency of resorting to a
ba.nkr-uptcy court, rather than permit a distribution of the asset.a
of the bank through the pending proceedings in the State Court,
may be doubted. If the preferences complained of are set aside,
it will add not more than 1 pE;r cent. t.o the dividends t-0 be paid
the general creditors. ''
Again, in Re Douglass Coal & Coke Co. ( D. C.) 131 ~\~d. . 769,
it was held that the small size of the payment may be looked to
as a circumstance, in connection with others, to justify the conclusion that no preference was intended. The language of the
court is as follows:
"Payments of cornparathely small sums of money by an inaolvent corporation to each of a number of its creditors, made in
the usual course of business, do not raise a presumption of a.n
intent to prefer such creditcr onr its other creditors, so as to
establish an act of bankruptcy hy a transfer of property with
intent to prefer, within [the] bankruptcy act. • • • ''
A fortiori, would one trifling payment to one creditor- fail
to evoke such presumption. The ruling in that case was by the
referee, but the District Court of the Ea.stern District of Tennessee, in affirming the referee, while recognizing the insolvency
of the defendant, observed :
"I nevertheleea do not think that a presumption of intent to
prefer should be indulged against an insolvent debtor by the
mere act of paying certain creditors small sums in the usual
oourse of business, and apparently W..t.M. effort to keep i~ busi-
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ness going, unless there is other and further evidence showing

a specific intent to thereby give such creditors an undue pref-

erence over others, although such might be the effect of the

payment.''

Again, in Driggs v. Moore, 3 N. B. R. 602, Fed. Cas. No. 4,083,

it was held that payments, made in the usual and ordinary course

of trade, and at the time the debt matures, and in the usual

mode of paying debts, are prima facie valid.

These citations are perhaps ample to show that the authorities

are not in entire accord upon this question. From their consid-

eration we have reached the conclusion that even though a bank-

rupt has knowledge of his insolvency, if the payment is trivial

and is made for the current and obvious expenses of one's daily

life and habits, there is no hard and fast rule which will oblige

the court to regard the transaction inimical to the bankruptcy

law; nor, by parity of reasoning, do we deem the court obliged

to conclude, because the other creditors might each have received

an infinitesimal benefit, if the payment had not been made, that

such payment necessarily, naturally, and logically shows an

intent to prefer such creditor over the other creditors. Indeed,

the payment here upon which the creditors rely seems to afford

a fit occasion for the application of the maxim, "De minimis

non curat lex." Since the debts of Beach amounted to $13,000,
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and since his payment to Keith was of only $2.75, the disad-

vantage which each creditor suffered because of such payment

was less than 1/4000 of his debt. For instance, one of the peti-

tioning creditors, whose claim amounts to $84, would receive but

a fraction over 1 cent. Can such a payment, then, justify the

presumption that Beach intended a preference? We do not

think so. The transaction was a bagatelle. It was neither im-

moral nor fraudulent. To apply the general presumption here

would make it dangerous for a person in insolvent circumstances

to buy and pay for a sack of flour, a flitch of bacon, or a bag

of potatoes. To avoid bankruptcy, his family must starve. The

soda water and lemonade to the value of 50 cents, with which

Beach allays the thirst proper to his clime, were inexpensive

refreshments, as innocuous as the "cup which cheers, but not

inebriates." More debatable is the effect of coca cola. But his

purchase of this mysterious elixir amounted to only 5 cents. The

bar of soap, worth five cents, is without the pale of judicial dis-

cussion. It is true that there was a dressed doll, the price of

which was more extravagant. This was $2.15. Beach testifies

ness going, unless there is other and further evidence showing
a specific intent to thereby give such creditors an undue preference over others, although sn<'h might be the effect of the
payment."
Again, in Driggs v. Moore, 3 N. B. R. 602, Fed. Cas. No. 4,083,
it was held that payments, made in the usual and ordinary coui:-se
of trade, and at the time the deht matures, and in the usual
mode of paying debts. are prima f acie valid.
These citations are perhaps ample to show that the authorities
are not in entire accord upon this question. From their consideration we have reached the conclusion that even though a bankrupt has knowledge of his insolvency, if the payment is trh·ial
and is made for the current and obvious expenses of one's daily
life and habits, there is no hard and fast rule which will oblige
the court to regard the transaction inimical to the bankruptcy
law; nor, by parity of reasoning, do we deem the court obliged
to conclude, because the other creditors might each have received
an infinitesimal benefit, if the payment had not been made, that
such payment necessarily, naturally, and logically shows an
intent to prefer such creditor <?Ver the other creditors. Indeed,
the payment here upon which the creditors rely seems to afford
a fit occasion for the application of the maxim, "De minimis
non cu rat lex." Since the debts of Beach amounted to $13,000,
and since his payment to Keith was of only $2.75, the disadvantage which each creditor suffered because of such payment
was less than 1/4000 of his debt. For instance, one of the petitioning creditors, whose claim amounts to $84, would receive but
a fraction over 1 cent. Can such a payment, then, justify the
presumption that Beach intended a preference T We do not
think so. The transaction was a bagatelle. It was neither immoral nor fraudulent. To apply the general presumption here
would make it dangerous for a person in insolvent circumstances
to buy and pay for a sack of flour, a fiitch of bacon, or a bag
of potatoes. To avoid bankrnptcy, his family must starve. The
soda water and lemonade to the value of 50 cents, with which
Beach allays the thirst proper to his clime, were inexpensive
refreshments, aa innocuous as the ''cup which cheers, but not
inebriates." Mor~ debatable is the effect of coca cola. But his
purchase of this mysterious elixir amounted to only 5 cents. The
bar of soap, worth five cents, is without the pale of judicial discussion. It is true that there was a dressed doll, the price of
which was more extravagant. This was $2.15. Beach testifies
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that it was '' for a present.'' The evidence fails to disclose upon

whom this marvel of art and fashionable millinery was bestowed.

It, however, appears that Beach is a bachelor—an "old bach-

elor," we may presume—and perhaps the "dressed doll" made

happy the heart of some tiny maiden, whose lovely face and

graceful form brought back to the veteran and hapless heart of

the alleged bankrupt the memory of features which "love used

to wear," in the words of Ossian, "sweet and sad to the soul,

like the memory of joys that are gone."

We conclude, therefore, that the payment of 60 cents for soda

water, coca cola, and one bar of soap, and $2.15 for a dressed

doll, in the absence of all other evidence to that end, does not

raise the presumption of an intent to give to the creditor paid a

preference over his other creditors. Since it appears from the

record that this is the only transaction upon which bankruptcy

is now charged or assigned, the finding of the master ou the

second alleged ground of bankruptcy, namely, the payment to

Keith of $2.75, is overruled.

A decree will be entered accordingly.

(g) Reasonable Cause to Believe that a Preference Would be

Effected

In re F. M. & S. Q. CARLILE
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(District Court, D. North Carolina. September 30, 1912)

CONNOR, District Judge. The controversy presented by the

record relates to the validity of the transfer of certain choses

in action made to the receiver of the Bank of Tarboro by the

that it was ''for a present.'' The evidence fails to disclose upon
whom this marvel of art and fashionable millinery was bestowed.
It, however, appears that Beach is a bachelor-an "old bachelor,'' we may presume--and perhaps the ''dressed doll'' made
happy the heart of some tiny maiden, whose lovely face and
graceful form brought back to the veteran and hapless heart of
the alleged bankrupt the memory of features which "love used
to wear," in the words of Ossian, "sweet and sad to the soul,
like the memory of joys that are gone."
We conclude, therefore, that the payment of 60 cents for soda
water, coca cola, and one bar of soap, and $2.15 for a dressed
doll, in the absence of all other evidence to that end, does not
raise the presumption of an intent to give to the creditor paid a
prefercnce over his other creditors. Since it appears from the
record that this is the only transaction upon which bankruptcy
is now charged or assigned, the finding of the master on the
second alleged ground of bankruptcy, namely, the payment to
Keith of $2. 75, is overrn.led.
A decree will be entered accordingly.

bankrupts within four months prior to the institution of pro-

ceedings in bankruptcy, to secure an overdraft due the bank.

•••

(g) Reasmable Cause

to Beliet:e that a Preference Would be
Effected

Proceeding, therefore, to a disposition of the case as disclosed

by the transcript, I note that the referee bases his conclusion upon

In re F. M. & S. Q. CARLILE

the language of § 60a, quoting it in his opinion. The solution

of the question presented by the contention made by the trustee

199 Fed. 612

is dependent upon the construction of § 606. A preference under

§ 60a is not voidable, nor does it, under § 57g, as amended by the

act of 1903, prevent the preferred creditor from proving his

(District Court, D. North Carolina. September 30, 1912)

claim for any balance remaining due after exhausting the prop-

erty transferred. It will be noted that § 57a, as originally en-

CONNOR, District Judge. The controversy presented by the
record relates to the validity of the transfer of certain choses
in action made to the receiver of the Bank of Tarboro by the
bankrupts within four months prior to the institution of proceedings in bankruptcy, to secure an overdraft due the bank.

• • •

Proceeding, therefore1 to a disposition of the case as disclosed
by the transcript, I note that the referee bases his conclusion upon
the language of § 60a, quoting it in his opinion. The solution
of the question presented by the contention made by the trustee
is dependent upon the construction of§ 60b. A preference under
§ 60a is not voidable, nor does it, under§ 51g, as amended by the
act of 1!:>03, prevent the preferred creditor from proving his
claim for any balance remaining due after exhausting the property transferred. It will be noted that § 57g, as originally en-
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defined by § 60a, from proving his debt until he had surrendered

the property transferred. Subsequent to, and by reason of, the

decision in Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U. S. 438,

21 Sup. Ct. 906, 45 L. ed. 1171, Congress amended § 57a, so that

only a preference as defined by § 606 prevented the creditor from

proving the balance of his debt without surrendering his pref-

erence.

At no time did the Bankrupt Act of 1898 give to the trustee

the right to recover property transferred within four months

prior to proceedings in bankruptcy, unless the elements pre-

scribed by § 606 were shown to exist. A preference, as denned by

§ 60a, is without any effect upon the right of the creditor, since

the amendment of 1903 to § 57a. It would be a strange conclusion

that a simple preference under § 60a entitled the trustee to

recover the property transferred, when, under § 57a, as amended,

he can prove his debt without surrendering the preference.

We are thus brought to inquire whether, under the provisions

of § 606, the testimony before the referee entitles the trustee to

recover the property transferred by the bankrupt on August 11,

1911; that is, does the testimony establish the allegation that the

transfer constituted a voidable preference? § 606 defines such

a preference, so far as applicable to this case, as (1) a transfer
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of property, (2) within four months before the filing of the peti-

tion in bankruptcy, (3) by a person who is insolvent, (4) when

the person to whom the transfer is made shall then have reason-

able cause to believe that the enforcement of such transfer will

effect a preference. When these essential elements are found in a

transaction between a bankrupt and his creditor, it is provided

that—

"it shall be voidable by the trustee and he may recover the prop-

erty or its value."

For the definition of the word '' preference,'' as used in § 60!),

recourse must be had to § 60a. We there find that, in order that

a transfer, etc., shall operate as a preference, within the meaning

of the act, it must—

'' enable the creditor, to whom the transfer is made, to obtain a

greater percentage of his debt than any other such creditors of

the same class."

Thus it is seen that § 60a defines a "preference," §606 a

"voidable preference," § 67e a "fraudulent preference," under

the Bankrupt Act, and § 70e a "transfer of property," fraudu-

acted, precluded a creditor, who had received a preference as
defined by § 60a, from proving his debt until he had surrendered
the property transferred. Subsequent to, and by reason of, the
decision in Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U. S. 438,
21 Sup. Ct. 906, 45 L. ed. 1171, Congress amended § 57g, so that
only a preference as defined by § 60b prevented the creditor from
proving the balance of his debt without surrendering his preference.
At no time did the Bankrupt Act of 1898 give to the trustee
the right to recover property transferred within four months
prior to proceedings in bankruptcy, unleBB the elements prescribed by § 60b were shown to exist. A preference, 88 defined by
§ 60a, is without any effect upon the right of the creditor, since
the amendment of 190!j to§ 57g. It would be a strange conclusion
that a simple preference under § 60a entitled the trustee to
recover the property transferred, when, under§ 51g, as amended,
he can prove his debt without surrendering the preference.
We are thus brought to inquire whether, under the provisions
of § 60b, the testimony before the referee entitles the trustee to
recover the property transferred by the bankrupt on August 11,
1911; that is, does the testimony establish the allegation that the
transfer constituted a voidable preference T § 60b defines such
a preference, so far as applicable to this case, 88 (I) a transfer
of property, (2) within four months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, ( 3) by a person who is insolvent, (4) when
the person to whom the transfer is made shall then have reasonable cause to believe that the enforcement of such transfer will
effect a preference. When these essential elements are found in a
transaction between a bankrupt and his creditor, it is provided
that'' it shall be voidable by the trustee and he may recover the prop·
crty or its value."
For the definition of the word ''preference,'' as used in § 60b,
recourse must be had to § 60a. We there find that, in order that
a transfer, etc., shall operate as a preference, within the meaning
of the act, it must'~ enable the creditor, to whom the transfer is made, to obtain a
greater percentage of his debt than any other such creditors of
the same class."
Th us it is seen that § 60a defines a "preference," § 60b a
"Yoidable preference," § 67e a "fraudulent preference," under
the Ba~krupt Act, and § 70e a "transfer of property," fraudu·
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lent under the state law. For the definition of a preference,

which is declared to be an act of bankruptcy, see § 3. Without

question, the evidence before the referee establishes a preference

within the terms of § 60a, leaving in controversy the sole ques-

tion whether it brings such preference within the terms of § 606.

The burden of proof is upon the trustee. Loveland on Bank-

ruptcy (4th ed.) § 544; Barbour v. Priest, 103 U. S. 293, 26 L.

ed. 478. Judge Sanford in Kimmerle v. Farr, 189 Fed. 295, 111

C. C. A. 27 (Sixth Circuit), says that the burden of proof is on

the trustee in bankruptcy, seeking to avoid as a preference a

transfer of property made by a bankrupt, to prove by sufficient

evidence all of the essential elements of a voidable preference.

The question discussed in that case, whether it is essential to

show that the creditor knew of the debtor's intention to create

a preference, is eliminated by the amendment of 1910; the words

inserted in § 606 by the amendment of 1903, '' had reasonable

cause to believe that it was intended thereby to give a prefer-

ence," being stricken out. Loveland on Bankruptcy (4th ed.)

§ 492.

Did Pennington, or his attorney, who drew and took the trans-

fer, have reasonable cause to believe that the effect of the

transfer would be to give a preference, as defined by § 60a?
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F. M. Carlile was the only witness examined before the referee.

He says that, when Pennington was appointed receiver of the

Bank of Tarboro, in June, 1911, the firm of F. M. & S. Q. Carlile

was overdrawn $1,263.78; that they owed the bank $700 by note,

and another note of $1,000 secured by mortgage on real estate;

that they executed the transfer to Pennington in the office of

Mr. Gilliam, one of his attorneys, for notes and accounts amount-

ing to about $1,050, and a promise to deliver in ten days there-

after $300 more; that at the time he executed the transfer he

thought his firm was entirely solvent, and so represented to Mr.

Gilliam; that he stated to Mr. Gilliam that they had $1,000 sol-

vent accounts, $570 notes secured by mortgages, $1,700 cash ac-

count (about), $5,000 stock (about), $800 hearse and wagon

(about), and at the same time represented that the liabilities of

said firm, other than its indebtedness to the Bank of Tarboro,

did not exceed $3,000; that at that time he had no idea that the

firm would go into bankruptcy within four months from said

date; that he assured Mr. Gilliam that, by giving them the ex-

tension, they would be able to liquidate all of the firm's obliga-

tions; that Mr. Pennington asked him about securing the

H. & A. Bankruptcy—28

lent under the state law. For the definition of a preference,
which is declared to be an act of bankruptcy, see § 3. Without ,
question, the evidence before the referee establishes a preference
within the terms of § 60a, leaving in controversy the sole question whether it brings such preference within the terms of § 60b.
The burden of proof is upon the trustee. Loveland on Bankruptcy (4th ed.) § 544; Barbour v. Priest, 103 U. S. 293, 26 L.
ed. 478. Judge Sanford in Kimmerle v. Farr, 189 Fed. 295, 111
C. C. A. 27 (Sixth Circuit), says that the burden of proof is 011
the trustee in bankruptcy, seeking to avoid as a preference a
transfer of property made by a bankrupt, to prove by sufficient
evidence all of the essential elements of a voidable preference.
The question discussed in that case, whether it is essential to
show that the creditor knew of the debtor's intention to create
a preference, is eliminated by the amendment of 1910; the words
insert€d in § 60b by the amendment of 1903, ''had reasonable
cause to believe that it was intended thereby to give a preference,'' being stricken out. Loveland on Bankruptcv (4th ed.)
§ 492.
Did Pennington, or his attorney, who drew and took the transfer, have reasonable cause to believe that the effect of the
transfer would be to give a preference, as defined by § 60a !
F. l\f. Carlile was the only witness examined before the referee.
He says that, when Pennington was appointed receiver of the
Bank of Tarboro, in June, 1911, the firm of F. M. & S. Q. Carlile
wa.~ overdrawn $1,263.78; that they owed the hank $700 by note,
and another note of $1,000 secured by mortgage on real estate;
that they executed the transfer to Pennington in the office of
Mr. Gilliam, one of his attorneys, for notes and accounts amounting to about $1,050, and a promise to deliver in ten days thereafter $300 more; that at the time he executed the transfer he
thought his firm was entirely solvent, and so represented to Mr.
Gilliam; that he stated to Mr. Gilliam that they had $1,000 solvent accounts, $~70 notes secured by mortgages, $1,700 cash account (about), $5,000 stock (about), $800 hearse and wagon
(&bout), and at the same time represented that the liabilities of
said firm, other than its indebtedness to the Bank of Tarboro,
did not exceed $3,000; that at that time he had no idea that the
finn would go into bankruptcy within four months from said
date; that he assured Mr. Gilliam that, by giving them the extension, they would be able to liquidate all of the firm's obligations; that Mr. Pennington asked him about securing the
H.
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overdraft—said he would grant the extension if the collaterals

were put up. This is all that was said about it. He did not say

that if they were not put up he would '' push them for it.'' Their

purpose in making the transfer was not to give the bank a pref-

erence, but to secure the overdraft. There is no evidence that

Pennington had any information in regard to the financial con-

dition of Carlile.

The only other evidence introduced was the schedule, filed by

the bankrupts, October 14, 1911, from which it appears that they

owed debts, secured, $5,305 (it appears that the property mort-

gaged was of sufficient value to pay these debts), and $5,627.04

unsecured debts. The schedules show stock valued at $4,000, notes

secured by title retained to furniture purchased $1,300, notes

for pianos, title retained, $670, hearse and wagon $515, and debts

due on open accounts $1,500. It does not appear that either Mr.

Pennington or Mr. Gilliam had any knowledge of, or information

in regard to, the indebtedness of the firm, other than that due

the bank, or any other knowledge or information in regard to

the character, etc., of the property other than that given by

bankrupts. Certainly, if they were justified in accepting that

information—that is, if they had no good and sufficient reason to

doubt the truth of it—there was nothing in the statement calcu-

lated to create a reasonable belief that the firm was insolvent;
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that is, that the bankrupts were making false statements, and

that, in accepting the transfer, they were receiving a preference.

The referee finds, I presume, from the account of the trustee,

that he has not, after diligent effort, been able to realize more

than $3,624 cash from the property. This finding, however, is

of little probative value in ascertaining what information Mr.

Pennington or his attorney had on the subject on August 11,

1911. There is no evidence in the record in respect to the moral

character of the bankrupts, the manner in which they had been

conducting business, or their commercial credit. Nor is there any

evidence in regard to the extent or character of their dealings

with the bank—whether their account was frequently overdrawn,

or how long the overdraft had existed. There is nothing to

indicate that the receiver had been, prior to his appointment,

connected with the bank, or was acquainted with the relations

existing between the bank and the bankrupts. It does not appear

that the receiver did anything more than a prudent and faithful

discharge of his duty demanded. While the overdraft was large

for men of their worth, we may take notice of the fact that, for

overdraft-said he would grant the extension if the collaterals
were put up. This is all that was said about it. He did not say
that if they were not put up he would ''push them for it. '' Their
purpose in making the transfer was not to give the bank a preference, but to secure the overdraft. There is no evidence that
Pennington had any information in regard to the financial condition of Carlile.
The only other evidence introduced was the schedule, filed by
the bankrupts, October 14, 1911, from which it appears that they
owed debts, secured, $5,305 (it appears that the property mortgaged was of sufficient value to pay these debts), and $5,627.04
unsecured debts. The schedules show stock valued at $4,000, notes
secured by title retained to furniture purchased $1,300, notes
for pianos, title retained, $670, hearse and wagon $515, and debts
due on open accounts $1,500. It does not appear that either Mr.
Pennington or Mr. Gilliam had any knowledge of, or information
in regard to, the indebtedness of the firm, other than that due
the bank, or any other knowledge or information in regard to
the character, etc., of the property other than that given by
bankrupts. Certainly, if they were jUBtified in accepting that
information-that is, if they had no good and sufficient reason to
doubt the truth of it-there was nothing in the statement calculated to create a reasonable belief that the firm was insolvent;
that is, that the bankrupts were making false statements, and
that, in accepting the transfer, they were receiving a preference.
The referee finds, I presume, from the account of the trustee,
t lrnt he has not, after diligent effort, been able to realize more
than $3,624 cash from the property. This finding, however, is
of little probative value in ascertaining what information Mr.
Pen11ingto11 or his attorney had on the subject on August 11,
1911. There is no evidence in the record in respect to the moral
character of the bankrupts, the manner in which they had been
conducting business, or their commercial credit. Nor is there any
evidence in regard to the extent or character of their dealings
with the bank-whether their account was frequently overdrawn,
or how long the overdraft had existed. There is nothing to
indicate that the receiver had been, prior to his appointment,
eonnected with the bank, or was acquainted with the relations
existing between the bank and the bankrupts. It does not appear
that the receiver did anything more than a prudent and faithful
discharge of his duty dPmanded. While the overdraft was large
for men of their worth, we may take notice of the fact that, for
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some reason, the bank went into the hands of the receiver in mid-

summer, at a season when, in this section, cash business is dull

and money scarce. While prudent banking would suggest that

customers be called upon to either cover the overdraft or give

security, yet the mere fact that a customer of a bank, carrying

a stock of $4,000, etc., has overdrawn for $1,263, would not, of

itself, be calculated to create a reasonable apprehension of in-

solvency.

The correct rule is well stated by Mr. Justice Bradley in Grant

v. National Bank, 97 U. S. 80, 24 L. ed. 971, in which he says:

"Some confusion exists in the cases as to the meaning of the

phrase 'having reasonable cause to believe such a person is insol-

vent.' Dicta are not wanting which assumes that it has the same

meaning as if it had read 'having reasonable cause to suspect

such person is insolvent.' But the two phrases are distinct in

meaning and effect. It is not enough that a creditor has some

cause to suspect the insolvency of his debtor; but he must have

such a knowledge of facts as to induce a reasonable belief of

his debtor's insolvency, in order to invalidate a security taken

for his debts. To make mere suspicion a ground of nullity in

such a case would render the business transactions of the com-

munity altogether too insecure. It was never the intention of the
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framers of the act to establish any such rule. A man may have

many grounds of suspicion that his debtor is in failing circum-

stances, and yet have no cause for a well-grounded belief of the

fact. He may be unwilling to trust him further, he may feel

anxious about his claim, and have a strong desire to secure it, and

yet such belief as the act requires may be wanting. Obtaining

additional security, or receiving payment of a debt, under such

circumstances, is not prohibited by the law. • • • The

debtor is often buoyed up by the hope of being able to get

through with his difficulties long after his case is, in fact, des-

perate, and his creditors, if they knew anything of his embarrass-

ments, either participate in the same feeling, or at least are

willing to think that there is a possibility of his succeeding. To

overhaul and set aside all his transactions with his creditors,

under such circumstances, because there may exist some grounds

of suspicion of his inability to carry himself through, would make

the bankrupt law an engine of oppression and injustice.''

In the language of Mr. Justice Bradley in the opinion cited,

the evidence before the referee falls far short of establishing that

the receiver had reasonable cause to believe that Carlile was in-

some reason, the bank went iuto the hands of the receiver in midsummer, at a se880n when, in this section, cash business is dull
and money scarce. While prudent banking would suggest that
customers be called upon to either cover the overdraft or give
security, yet the mere fact that a customer of a bank, carrying
a stock of $4,000, etc., has overdrawn for $1,26:3, would not, of
itself, be calculated to create a reasonable apprehension of insolvency.
The correct rule is well stated by Mr. Justice Bradley in Grant
v. National Bank, 97 U. S. 80, 24 L. ed. 971, in which he says:
''Some confusion exists in the cases as to the meaning of the
phrase 'having reasonable cause to believe such a person is insolvent.' Dicta are not wanting which assumes that it has the same
meaning as if it had read 'having reasonable cause to suspect
such person is insolvent.' But the two phrases are distinct in
meaning and effect. It is not enough that a creditor has some
cause to suspect the insolvency of his debtor; but he must have
such a knowledge of facts as to induce a re880nable belief of
his debtor's insolvency, in order to invalidate a security taken
for his debts. To make mere suspicion a ground of nullity in
such a case would render the business transactions of the community altogether too insecure. It was never the intention of the
framers of the act to establish any such rule. A man may have
many grounds .o f suspicion that his debtor is in failing circumstances, and yet have no cause for a well-grounded belief of the
fact. He may be unwilling to trust him further, he may feel
anxious about his claim, and have a strong desire to secure it, and
yet such belief as the act requires may be wanting. Obtaining
additional security, or receiving payment of a debt, under such
circumstances, is not prohibited by the law. • • • The
debtor is often buoyed up by the hope ·of being able to get
through with his difficulties long aftrr his case is, in fact, desperate, and his creditors, if they knew anything of his embarrassments, either participate in the same feeling, or at least are
willing to think that there is a possibility of his succeeding. To
overhaul and set aside all his transactions with his creditors,
under such circumstances, because there may exist some grounds
of suspicion of his inability to carry himself through, would make
the bankrupt law an engine of oppression and injustice.''
In the language of Mr. Justice Bradley in the opinion cited,
the evidence before the referee falls far short of establishing that
the receiver had reasonable cause to believe that Carlile was in-
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solvent at the time the transfer was executed. Mr. Collier, in his

excellent work on Bankruptcy, at p. 669, says:

"It has been held that it is not necessary for a creditor to

know, or have reasonable cause to believe, that the debtor is

insolvent when a mortgage or pledge is made within the four

months period to secure an antecedent debt.''

In support of this guarded statement the author cites In re

Mills (D. C.) 162 Fed. 42, 20 Am. Bankr. Rep. 501. An exami

nation of the "headnote" (No. 4) sustains the statement of Mr.

Collier and the referee's conclusion in this case. An examina-

tion of the case, as reported, explains how the error found its

way into the "headnote." The referee, in an elaborate report,

finds as a fact that the creditor had, not only reasonable cause

to believe that the debtor was insolvent, but that the officers of

the trust company well knew that he was insolvent. On p. 48 of

162 Fed. the referee says:

"The referee further holds that, when a mortgage or pledge

is made to secure an antecedent debt, within four mouths of

the filing of petition in bankruptcy against him, it is not neces-

sary that the creditor should have reasonable cause to believe

that the debtor was then insolvent; a different rule applying to

such a case from that which governs when there is an absolute

payment of a pre-existing debt"—saying that the law is "di-
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rectly so held by the Circuit Court of Appeals in this (the

Fourth) circuit, in Farmers' Bank v. Carr, 127 Fed. 690 [62

C. C. A. 446]."

An examination of the case does not sustain the construction

put upon it. It does not very clearly appear from the report

how the question arose, but it is manifest, from Judge Simon-

tou"s opinion, that the conclusion reached by the court was based

upon the fact that the preferred creditor had notice of such

facta as should have created a reasonable belief of the debtor's

insolvency. It will be found that the cases cited by the referee

(McNair v. Mclntyre, 113 Fed. 113, 51 C. C. A. 89; In re Hill

[D. C] 140 Fed. 984; In re Pease [D. C] 129 Fed. 446) do not

sustain his conclusion. So much of the report (p. 48) as dis-

cusses this question is entirely unnecessary and surplusage, be-

cause he had found the fact of actual notice of insolvency upon

which the ultimate conclusion was based. It will be noted that,

when the report came before Judge Purnell, District Judge, he

wrote no opinion, simply stating that "the findings of fact are

supported by ample proof" and "are in all respects confirmed."

solvent at the time the transfer was executed. Mr. Collier, in his
excellent work on Bankruptcy, at p. 669f says:
"It has been held that it is not necessary for a creditor to
know, or have reasonable cause to believe, that the debtor is
insolvent when a mortgage or pledge is made within the four
months period to secure an antecedent debt.''
In support of this guarded statement the author cites In re
Mills (D. C.) 162 Fed. 42, 20 Am. Bankr. Rep. 501. An examination of the "headnote" (No. 4) sustains the statement of :Mr.
Collier and the referee's conclusion in this case. An examination of the case, as reported, explains how the error fouud its
way into the ' 'headnote.'' The referee, in an elaborate report,
finds as a fact that the creditor had, not only reasonable cause
to believe that the debtor was insolvent, but that the officers of
the trust company well knew that he was insolvent. On p. 48 of
162 Fed. the referee says:
''The referee further holds that, when a mortgage or pledge
is made to secure an antecedent debt, within four months of
the filing of petition in bankruptcy against him, it is not necessary that the creditor should have reasonable cause to believe
that the debtor was then insolvent; a different rule applying to
such a case from that which governs when there is an absolute
payment of a pre-existing debt"~aying that the law is "directly so held by the Circuit Court of Appeals in this (the
Fourth) circuit, in Farmers' Bank v. Carr, 127 Fed. 690 [62
C. C. A. 446]!'
An examination of the case does not sustain the construction
put upon it. It does not very clearly appear from the report
hllw the question arose, but it is manifest, from Judge Simonton 's opinion, that the conclusion reached by the court Wll.8 based
upon the fact that the preferred creditor had notice of such
fa<'ts as should have created a reasonable belief of the debtor's
insolvency. It will be found that the cases cited by the referee
(McNair v. Mcintyre, 113 Fed. 113, 51 C. C. A. 89; In re Hill
[D. C.] 140 Fed. 984; In re Pease [D. C.] 129 Fed. 446) do not
sustain his conclusion. So much of the report ( p. 48) as discusses this question is entirely unnecessary and surplusage, because he had found the fact of actual notice of insolvency upon
which the ultimate conclusion was based. It will be noted that,
when the report came before Judge Purnell, District Judge, be
wrote no opinion, simply stating that ''the findings of fact are
supported by ample proof" and" are in all respects confirmed."
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It is true that he also says that the conclusions of law are also

confirmed; but a reasonable construction of the last words used

by the judge restricts the conclusion of law to such as are applic-

able to the findings of fact. The case, as thus explained, is in

harmony with the uniform current of authority and the mamfest

meaning of the statute.'

I have deemed it proper to make this reference to the error

into which one, following the "headuote" and the language of

the referee in that case, may be led because of the fact that the

case is from this district. In view of the fact that the parties

have submitted to the jurisdiction, and by their actions waived

all questions of regularity of procedure, I have discussed and

decided the questions presented, thus saving time and expense

in the final settlement of the estate. The error into which the

referee fell is the result of supposing that the case was governed

by § 60a, instead of § 606. He does not find, because in his view

of the law it was not material to inquire, whether the receiver

or his attorney had a reasonable ground to believe that Carlile

was insolvent. I am of the opinion that he was correct in finding

that the transfer operated as a preference as defined by § 60a,

but was in error in holding that this entitled the trustee to re-

cover the property. I am further of the opinion that the evidence
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does not establish a voidable preference within the definition of

§ 606. There is no suggestion that the transfer was void under

S 67c. The trustee, therefore, is not entitled to recover the prop-

erty in controversy.

The order of the referee is reversed.

HEWITT v. BOSTON STRAW BOARD CO.

214 Mass. 260, 101 N. E. 424

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. April 1,1913)

Contract by the trustee in bankruptcy of the Corperdix Paper

Tube Company2 a corporation, for the amount of a preference

alleged to have been paid to the defendant by the bankrupt.

•••

BRALEY, J. It having appeared that at a fair valuation the

bankrupt's property at the date of transfer was insufficient in

amount to pay its debts, the judge was warranted in finding it

lt is true th.at he also says that the conclusions of law are also
confirmed; but a reasonable coustruction of the last ·words used
by the judge restricts the conclusion of law to sueh as are applica~le to the findings of fact. The case, as thus explained, is in
harmony with the uniform current of authority and the mau.ifest
meaning of the statute.
I have deemed it proper to make this refcreuce to the error
i uto which one, following the "headuote" and the language of
the referee in that case, may be led because of the fact that the
case is from this district. In view of the fact that the parties
have submitted to the jurisdiction, and by their actions waived
all questions of regularity of procedure, I have discussed and
decided the questions presented, thus saving time and expense
in the final settlement of the estate. The error into which the
referee fell is the result of supposing that the case was governed
by § 60a, instead of § 60b. He does not find, because in his view
of the law it was not material to inquire, whether the receiver
or his attorney had a reasonable ground to believe tha! Carlile
was insolvent. I am of tl1e opinion that he was correct in finding
that the transfer operated as a preference as defined by § 60a,
but was in error in holding that this entitled the trustee to reCO\'er the property. I am further of the opinion that the evidence
does not establish a voidable preference within the definition of
§ 60b. There is no suggestion that the transfer was void under
~ 67e. The trustee, therefore, is not entitled to recover the property in controversy.
The order of the referee is reversed.

to have been insolvent as defined by the act itself. A>ct 1898,

HEWITT v. BOSTON STRAW BOARD CO.
214 l\'Iass. 260, 101 N. E. 424
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. April 1, 1913)
Contract by the trustee in bankruptcy of the Corperdix Paper
Tube Company1 a corporation, for the amow1t of a preference
a1leged to have been paid to the defendant by the bankrupt.

• • •

BRALEY, J. It having appeared that at a fair valuation the
bankrupt's property at the date of transfer was insufficient in
amount to pay its debts, the judge was warranted in finding it
t.o have been insolvent as defined by thP. act itself. l\ct 1898,
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e. 541, § 1, subsec. 15; Eau Claire Nat. Bank v. Jackman, 204

U. S. 522, 532, 27 Sup. Ct. 391, 51 L. ed. 596. See Bailey v.

Wood, 211 Mass. 37, 44, 45, 97 N. E. 902, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 950.

But even if the corporation was insolvent, the plaintiff must

show that "the person receiving it or to be benefited thereby, or

his agent acting therein, shall then have reasonable cause to be-

lieve that the enforcement of such * * • transfer would

effect a preference. • • •" Act 1898, c. 541, §606, as

amended by Act 1910, c. 412, § 11; Kaufman v. Tredway, 195

U. S. 271, 25 Sup. Ct. 33, 49 L. ed. 190; Beals v. Quiim, 101

Mass. 262; Otis v. Hadley, 112 Mass. 100. The bankrupt's prop-

erty had been attached by the defendant to enforce payment of

an antecedent unsecured indebtedness for goods sold and deliv-

ered, and after effecting a sale of nearly one-half of the manu-

facturing plant, the bankrupt transferred within four months

prior to the date of adjudication, and in part satisfaction of the

debt, three promissory notes received in part payment from the

purchaser.

Where there is reasonable cause to believe, that at the date

of transfer within the statutory period the debtor is insolvent,

and payment is accepted of a debt overdue, it is immaterial

whether the creditor actually believes what may have been dis-

closed as to the true state of affairs. If he prefers to draw in-
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ferences favorable to himself, and to ignore information which

would have led to knowledge that his debtor was in failing cir-

cumstances, he cannot set up his own judgment to the contrary

even if honestly entertained, as a reason why he should be per-

mitted to retain a prohibited advantage. Forbes v. Howe, 102

Mass. 427, 3 Am. Rep. 475; Whipple v. Bond, 164 Mass. 182, 41

N. E. 203; In re George, 1 Lowell, 409, 411, Fed- Cas. No. 5,325;

Toof v. Martin, 13 Wall. 40, 20 L. ed. 481.

By the express words of the amendatory act, which are merely

declaratory of the rule of law, that knowledge possessed by an

agent may be imputed to his principal, the defendant is bound

by the information acquired by its attorney who made the attach-

ment and acted for it in effecting the settlement. Rogers v.

Palmer, 102 U. S. 263, 26 L. ed. 164; Sartwell v. North, 144 Mass.

188, 10 N. E. 824. The judge from the statements of the bank-

rupt's officers well might find that the defendant's attorney upon

being fully informed as to the impaired resources of the bankrupt

company, and understanding the object as well as the legal

c. 541, § 1, subsec. 15; Eau Claire Nat. Bank v. Jackman, 204
U. S. 522, 532, 27 Sup. Ct. 391, 51 L. ed. 596. See Bailey v.
Wood, 211 M.ass. 37, 44, 45, 97 N. E. 902, Ann. Cas. 1913.A, 950.
But even if the corporation was insolvent, the plaintiff must
show that "the person receiving it or to be benefited thereby, or
his agent acting therein, shall then have reasonable cause to believe that the enforcement of such • • • tr&nSfer would
effect a preference. • • •" Act 1898, c. 541, § 60b, as
amended by Act 1910, c. 412, § 11; Kaufman v. Tredway, 195
U. S. 271, 25 Sup. Ct. 33, 49 L. ed. 190; Beals v. Quinn, 101
Mass. 262; Otis v. Hadley, 112 Mass. 100. The bankrupt's property had been attached by the defendant to enforce payment of
au antecedent unsecured indebtedness for goods sold and delivered, and after effecting a sale of nearly one-half of the manufacturing plant, the bankrupt transferred within four months
prior to the date of adjudication, and in part satisfaction of the
debt, three promissory notes received in part payment from the
purchaser.
Where there is reasonable cause to believe, that at the date
of transfer within the statutory period the debtor is insolvent,
and payment is accepted of a debt overdue, it is immaterial
wheth~r the creditor actually believes what may have been disclosed as to the true state of affairs. If he prefers to draw inferences favorable to himself, and to ignore information which
would have led to knowledge that his debtor was in failing circumstances, he cannot set up his own judgment to the contrary
even if honestly entertained, as a reason why he should be permitted to retain a prohibited advantage. Forbes v. Howe, 102
Mass. 427, 3 Am. Rep. 475; Whipple v. Bond, 164 Mass. 182, 41
N. E. 203; I~ re George, 1 Lowell, 409, 411, Fed. Cas. No. 5,325;
'l'oof v. Martin, 13 Wall. 40·, 20 L. ed. 481.
By the express words of the amendatory act, which are merely
declaratory of the rule of law, that knowledge possessed by an
agent may be imputed to his principal, the defendant is bound
by the information acquired by its attorney who made the attachment and acted for it in effecting the settlement. Rogers v.
Palmer, 102 U. S. 263, 26 L. ed. 164; Sartwell v. North, 144 Mass.
188, 10 N. E. 824. The judge from the statements of the bankrupt's officers well might find that the defendant's attorney upon
being fully informed as to the impaired resources of the bankrupt
company, and understanding the object as well as the legal
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effect of the transfer, expressed himself as willing to take the

hazard of a recovery back by the trustee, if bankruptcy inter-

vened. The bankrupt and the defendant must be presumed to

have known that what had been done resulted in a preference,

even if the form of transfer consisted of securities received by

the bankrupt from a third party. Sawyer v. Turpin, 2 Lowell,

29, Fed. Cas. No. 12,410; Western Tie & Lumber Co. v. Brown,

196 U. S. 502, 509, 25 Sup. Ct. 339, 49 L. ed. 571; Dickinson v.

National Security Bank of Richmond, 110 Fed. 353, 49 C. C. A.

84; Bankr. Act 1898, c. 541, §60, subsecs. "a" and "b," as

amended by Act 1903, c. 487, § 13, and Act 1910, c. 412, § 11.

It is maintained, however, that the evidence does not disclose

the class of creditors to which the defendant belonged, and there

is no preference, because it cannot be determined whether a

greater percentage of its debt had been obtained than the amount

which other creditors of the same class would receive. Act 1898,

c. 541, §60, subsec. "a." The defendant at the date of the

transaction ranked with the class of unsecured creditors shown

by the list of accounts payable, which apparently were provable

debts. It is not even suggested that they could have been paid

in full by the bankrupt, although entitled to share equally with

the defendant in the distribution of its property. Nor is it con-
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tended that the trustee has received sufficient assets to enable

him to satisfy fully the claims which have been allowed. Kim-

ball v. Dresser, 98 Me. 519, 57 Atl. 787. A transfer of the char-

acter shown materially diminished the bankrupt's estate. If

allowed to stand it would defeat the purpose of the Bankruptcy

Act, which, after priorities are satisfied, is the distribution of

the bankrupt's property equally among all his creditors, whether

secured or unsecured. Act 1898, c. 541, §§ 63, 64, 67 and the

several subsections; In re Hapgood, 2 Lowell, 200, Fed. Cas. No.

6,044; Swarts v. Fourth Nat. Bank of St. Louis, 117 Fed. 1, 54

C. C. A. 387; Jackman v. Eau Claire Nat. Bank, 125 Wis. 465,

479, 104 N. W. 98,115 Am. St. Rep. 955; Nat. Bank of Newport

v. Nat. Herkimer County Bank, 225 U. S. 178, 32 Sup. Ct. 633,

56 L. ed. 1042.

The plaintiff accordingly can recover the amount of the notes

with interest from the date of the preferential payment. Clarion

First Nat. Bank v. Jones, 21 Wall. 325, 22 L. ed. 542.

Exceptions overruled.

efteet of the transfer, expressed himself as willing to take the
hazard of a recovery back by the trustee, if bankruptcy intervened.

The bankrupt and the defendaut must be presumed to
have known that what had been done resulted in a preference,
even if the form of transfer consisted of securities received by
the bankrupt from a third party. Sawyer v. Turpin, 2 Lowell,
29, 'Fed. Cas. No. 12,410; Western Tie & Lumber Co. v. Brown,
196 U. S. 502, 509, 25 Sup. Ct. 339, 49 L. ed. 571; Dickinson v.
X ational Security Bank of Richmond, 110 Fed. 353, 49 C. C. A.
8-l; Bankr. Act 1898, c. 541, § 60, subsecs. "a" and "b," as
amended by Act 1903, c. 487, § 13, and Act 1910, c. 412, § 11.
It is maintained, however, that the evidence does not disclose
the class of creditors to which the defendant belonged, and there
is no preference, because it cannot be determined whether a
greater percentage of its debt had been obtained than the amount
which other creditors of the same class would receive. Act 1898,
c. 541, § 60, subsec. "a." The defendant at the date of the
transaction ranked with the class of unsecured creditors shown
by the list of accounts payable, which apparently were provable
debts. It is not even suggested that they could have been paid
in full by the bankrupt, although entitled to share equally with
the defendant in the distribution of its property. Nor is it contended that the trustee has received sufficient assets to enable
him to satisfy fully the claims which have been allowed. Kimball v. Dresser, 98 Me. 519, 57 Atl. 787. A transfer of the character shown materially diminished the bankrupt's estate. If
allowed to stand it would defeat the purpose of the Bankruptcy
Act, which, after priorities are satisfied, is the distribution of
the bankrupt's property equally among all his creditors, whether
secured or unBecured. Act 1898, c. 541, §§ 63, 64, 67 and the
St~veral subsections; In re Hapgood, 2 Lowell, 200, Fed. Cas. No.
6,044; Swarts v. Fourth Nat. Bank of St. Louis, 117 Fed. 1, 54
C. C. A. 38i; Jackman v. Eau Claire Nat. Bauk, 125 \Vis. 465,
479. 104 X W. 98, 115 Am. St. Rep. 955; Nat. Bank of Newport
v. Nat. Herkimer County Bank, 225 U. S. 178, 32 Sup. Ct. 633,
56 L. ed. 1042.
The plaintiff accordingly can recover the amount of the notes
with interest from the date of the preferential payment. Clarion
First Xat. Bank v. Jones, 21 Wall. 325, 22 L. ed. 542.
Exceptions overruled.
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(h) Surrender of Preference

( k) Surrender of Prefere nee

KEPPEL v. TIFFIN SAVINGS BANK

197 U. S. 356, 49 L. ed. 790, 25 Sup. Ct. 443

KEPPEL v. TIFFIN SAVINGS BANK

(United States Supreme Court. April 3, 1905)

Charles A. Goetz became a voluntary bankrupt on Oetober 12,

197 U. S. 356, 49 L. ed. 790, 25 Sup. Ct. 443

1900. George B. Keppel, the trustee, sued the Tiffin Savings

Bank in an Ohio court to cancel two real-estate mortgages exe-

(United States Supreme Court. April 3, 1905)

cuted by Goetz, one to secure a note for $4,000 and the other a

note for $2,000. The mortgage to secure the $4,000 note was

made more than four months before the adjudication in bank-

ruptcy. The mortgage securing the $2,000 note was executed a

few days before the bankruptcy, the mortgagor being at the

time insolvent and intending to prefer the bank. The bank de-

fended the suit, averring its good faith and asserting the validity

of both the securities. In a cross petition the enforcement of

both mortgages was prayed. The court held the mortgage secur-

ing the $4,000 note to be valid, and the mortgage securing the

$2,000 note to be void. The trustee appealed to a circuit court,

where a trial de novo was had. At such trial the attorney for

the bank stated to the court that the bank waived any claim

to a preference as to the $2,000 note, but that he could not assent

to a judgment to that effect. A judgment was entered sustain-

ing the security for the $4,000 note and avoiding that for the
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$2,000 note.

The bank subsequently sought to prove that it was a creditor

of the estate upon the note for $2,000, and upon two other unse-

cured notes, aggregating $835. The referee refused to allow

the proof, upon the ground that, as the bank had compelled the

trustee to sue to cancel the security, and a judgment nullifying

it had been obtained, the bank had lost the right to prove any

claim against the estate. The district judge, upon review, re-

versed this ruling. The Circuit Court, of Appeals to which the

issue was taken, after stating the case as above recited, certified

questions for our determination.

Mr. Justice WHITE, after making the foregoing statement,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The following are the questions asked by the Court of Appeals:

"First. Can a creditor of a bankrupt, who has received a

merely voidable preference, and who has in good faith retained

•

Charles A. Goetz became a voluntary bankrupt on October 12,
1900. George B. Keppel, the trustee, sued the Tiffin Savings
Bank in an Ohio court to cancel two real-estate mortgages executed by Goetz, one to secure a note for $4,000 and the other a
note for $2,000. The mortgage to secure the $4,000 note was
made more than four months Lefore the adjudication in bankruptcy. The mortgage securing the $2,000 note was executed a
few days before the bankruptcy, the mortgagor being at the
time insolvent and intending to prefer the bank. The bank defended the suit, averring its good faith and asserting the validity
of both the securities. In a cross petition the enforcement of
both mortgages was prayed. The court held the mortgage securing the $4,000 note to be valid, and the mortgage securing the
$2,000 note to be void. The trustee appealed to a circuit court.
where a trial de novo was had. At such trial the attorney for
the bank stated to the court that the bank waived any claim
to a preference as to the $2,000 note, but that he could not assent
to a judgment to that effect. A judgment was entered sustaining the security for the $4,000 note and avoiding that for the
$2,000 note.
The bank subsequently sought to prove that it was a creditor
of the estate upon the note for $2,000, and upon two other unsecured notes, aggregating $835. The referee refused to allow
the proof, upon the ground that, as the bank had compelled the
trustee to sue to cancel the security, and a judgment nullifying
it had been obtained, the bank had lost the right to pro\•e any
claim against the estate. The district judge, upon review, reversed this ruling. The Circuit Court. of Appeals to which the
issue was taken, after stating the case as above recited, certified
questions for our determination.
!\fr. Justice WHITE, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The following are the questions asked by the Court of Appeals:
''First. Can a creditor of a bankrupt, who has received a
merely voidable preference, and who has in good faith retained
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such preference until deprived thereof by the judgment of a

court upon a suit of the trustee, thereafter prove the debt so

void ably preferred?

"Second. Upon the issue as to the allowance of the bank's

claims, was it competent, in explanation of the judgment of the

Ohio Circuit Court in favor of the trustee and against the bank

in respect to its $2,000 mortgage, to show the disclaimer made in

open court by the attorney representing the bank, of any claim

of preference, and the grounds upon which the bank declined to

consent to a judgment in favor of the trustee?

"Third. If the failure to 'voluntarily' surrender the mort-

gage given to secure the $2,000 note operates to prevent the allow-

ance of that note, does the penalty extend to and require the

disallowance of both the other claims?"

Before we develop the legal principles to the solution of the

first question, it is to be observed that the facts stated in the

certificate and implied by the question show that the bank acted

in good faith when it accepted the mortgage and when it subse-

quently insisted that the trustee should prove the existence of the

facts which, it was charged, vitiated the security. It results

that the voidable nature of the transaction alone arose from

§ 67e of the act of 1898, invalidating "conveyances, transfers,
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or encumbrances of his property made by a debtor at any time

within four months prior to the filing of the petition against him,

and while insolvent, which are held null and void as against the

creditors of such debtor by the laws of the state, territory, or

district in which such property is situate" [30 Stat. at L. 565,

c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3449], and giving the assignee

a right to reclaim and recover the property for the creditors of

the bankrupt estate.

On the one hand, it is insisted that a creditor who has not

surrendered a preference until compelled to do so by the decree

of a court cannot be allowed to prove any claim against the

estate. On the other hand, it is urged that no such penalty is

imposed by the bankrupt act, and hence the creditor, on an

extinguishment of a preference, by whatever means, may prove

his claims. These contentions must be determined by the text,

originally considered, of § 57g of the bankrupt act, providing

that "the claims of creditors who have received preferences shall

not be allowed unless such creditors shall surrender their pref-

erences. '' We say by the text in question, because there is no-

where any prohibition against the proof of a claim by a creditor

such preference until deprived thereof by the judgment of a
court upon a suit of the trustee, thereafter prove the debt so
void ably preferred f
''Second. Upon the issue as to the allowance of the bank's
claims, was it competent, in explanation of the judgment of the
Ohio Circuit Court in favor of the trustee and against the bank
in respect to its $2,000 mortgage, to show the disclaimer made in
open court by the attorney representing the bank, of any claim
of preference, and the grounds upon which the bank declined to
consent to a judgment in favor of the trustee Y
••Third. If the failure to 'yoluntarlly' surrender the mortgage given to secure the $2,000 note operates to prevent the allow~
ance of that note, does the penalty extend to and require the
disallowance of both the other claims 1"
Before we develop the legal principles to the solution of the
first question, it is to be observed that the facts stated in the
certificate and implied by the question show that the bank acted
in good faith when it accepted the mortgage and when it subsequently insisted that the trustee should prove the existence of the
facts which, it was charged, vitiated the security. It results
that the voidable nature of the transaction alone arose from
§ 67e of the act of 1898, invalidating "conveyances, transfei:s,
or encumbrances of his property made by a debtor at any time
within four months prior to the filing of the petition against him,
and while insolvent, which are held null and void as against the
creditors of such debtor by the laws of the state, territory, or
district in which such property is situate'' [30 Stat. at L. 565,
c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3449], and giving the assignee
a right to reclaim and recover the property for the creditors of
the bankrupt estate.
Ou thP. one hand, it is insisted that a creditor who has not
surreudered a preference until compelled to do so by the decree
of a court cannot be allowed to prove any claim against the
estate. On the other hand, it is urged that no such penalty is
imposed by the bankrupt act, and hence the creditor, on an
extinguishment of a preference, by whatever means, may prove
his claims. These contentions must be determined by the text,
origin.ally considered, of § 57g of the bankrupt act, providing
that "the claims of creditors who have received preferences shall
not be allowed unless such creditors shall surrender their preferences. '' "Te say by the text in question, because there is nowhere any prohibition against the proof of a claim by a creditor
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who has had a preference, where the preference has disappeared

as the result of a decree adjudging the preferences to be void,

unless that result arises from the provision in question. "We say

also from the text as originally considered, because, although

there are some decisions, under the act of 1898, of lower Fedora]

courts, which are referred to in the margin,42 denying the right

of a creditor to prove his claim, after the surrender of a prefer-

ence by the compulsion of a decree or judgment, such decisions

rest not upon an analysis of the text of the act of 1898 alone con-

sidered, but upon what were deemed to have been analogous pro-

visions of the act of 1867 and decisions thereunder. We omit,

therefore, further reference to these decisions, as we shall here-

after come to consider the text of the present act by the light

thrown upon it by the act of 1867 and the judicial interpretation

which was given to that act.

The text is, that preferred creditors shall not prove their claims

unless they surrender their preferences. Let us first consider

the meaning of this provision, guided by the cardinal rule which

requires that it should, if possible, be given a meaning in accord

with the general purpose which the statute was intended to

accomplish.

We think it clear that the fundamental purpose of the provi-

sion in question was to secure an equality of distribution of the
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assets of a bankrupt estate. This must be the case, since, if a

creditor having a preference retained the preference, and at the

same time proved his debt and participated in the distribution

of the estate, an advantage would be secured not contemplated

by the law. Equality of distribution being the purpose intended

to be effected by the provision, to interpret it as forbidding a

creditor from proving his claim after a surrender of his prefer-

ence, because such surrender was not voluntary, would frustrate

the object of the provision, since it would give the bankrupt

estate the benefit of the surrender or cancellation of the prefer-

ence, and yet deprive the creditor of any right to participate,

thus creating an inequality. But it is said, although this be

true, as the statute is plain, its terms cannot be disregarded by

allowing that to be done which it expressly forbids. This rests

upon the assumption that the word "surrender" necessarilv

"42—Be Greth, 112 Fed. 978; Be

Keller, 109 Fed. 118, 126, 127; Be

Ownings, 109 Fed. 623.

who bas had a prefe~nce, where the preference has disappeared
as the result of a decree adjudging the preferences to be void.
unless'" that result arises from the provision in question. We say
also from the text as originally considered, because, although
there are some decisions, under the act of 1898, of lower Fed.:.·ral
courts, which are referred to in the margin," 2 denying the right
of a creditor to prove his claim, after the surrender of a preference by the compulsion of a decree or judgment, such decisions
rest not upon an analysis of the text of the act of 1898 alone considered, but upon what were deemed to have been analogous p~
visions of the act of 1867 and decisions thereunder. 'Ve omit,
therefore, further reference to these decisions, as we shall hereafter come to consider the text of the present act by the light
t.hrown upon it by the act of 1867 and the judicial interpretation
which was given to that act.
The text is, that preferred creditors shall not prove their claims
unless they surrender their preferences. Let us first consider
the meaning of this provision, guided by the cardinal rule which
requires that it should, if possible, be given a meaning in accord
with the general purpose which the statute was intended to
accomplish.
We think it clear that the fundamental purpose of the provisfon in question was to secure an equality of distribution of the
assets of a bankrupt estate. This must be the case, since, if a
creditor having a preference retained the preference, and at the
same time proved his debt and participated in the distribution
of the estate, an advantage would be secured not co~templated
by the law. Equality of distribution being the purpose intended
to be effected by the provision, to interpret it as forbidding a
creditor from proving his claim after a surrender of his preference, because such surrender was not voluntary, would frustrate
the object of the provision, since it would give the bankrupt
estate the benefit of the surrender or cancellation of the preference, and yet deprive the creditor of any right to participate,
thus creating an inequality. But it is said, although this be
true, as the statute is plain, its terms cannot be disregarded by
allowing that to be done which it expressly forbids. This rests
upon the assumption that the word ''surrender'' necessarily
~ 42-Re Greth, 112 Fed. 978; Re
Keller, 109 Fed. 118, 126, 127; Re
Ownings, 109 Fed. 623.

PREFERENCES

PREFERENCES

363

363

\tnp\ies only voluntary action, and hence excludes the right to

prove where the surrender is the result of a recovery compelled

by judgment or decree.

The word '' surrender," however, does not exclude compelled

action, but, to the contrary, generally implies such action. ,That

this is the primary and commonly accepted meaning of the word

is shown by the dictionaries. Thus, the Standard Dictionary

defines its meaning as follows: "1. To yield possession of to

another upon compulsion or demand, or under pressure of a su-

perior force; give up, especially to an enemy in warfare; as, to

surrender an army or a fort." And in Webster's International

Dictionary the word is primarily defined in the same way. The

word, of course, also sometimes denotes voluntary action. In the

statute, however, it is unqualified, and generic, and hence em-

braces both meanings. The construction which would exclude

the primary meaning, so as to cause the word only to embrace

voluntary action, would read into the statute a qualification, and

this in order to cause the provision to be in conflict with the pur-

pose which it was intended to accomplish,—equity among cred-

itors. But the construction would do more. It would exclude

the natural meaning of the word used in the statute, in order

to create a penalty, although nowhere expressly or even by clear
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implication found in the statute. This would disregard the ele-

mentary rule that a penalty is not to be readily implied, and, on

the contrary, that a person or corporation is not to be subjected

to a penalty unless the words of the statute plainly impose it.

Tiffany v. National Bank, 18 Wall. 409, 410, 21 L. ed. 862, 863.

If it had been contemplated that the word "surrender" should

entail upon every creditor the loss of power to prove his claims

if he submitted his right to retain an asserted preference to the

courts for decision, such purpose could have found ready expres-

sion by qualifying the word "surrender" so as to plainly convey

such meaning. Indeed, the construction which would read in the

qualification would not only create a penalty alone by judicial

action, but would necessitate judicial legislation in order to de-

fine what character and degree of compulsion was essential to

prevent the surrender in fact from being a surrender within the

meaning of the section.

It is argiied, however, that courts of bankruptcy are guided

by equitable considerations, and should not permit a creditor

who has retained a fraudulent preference until compelled by a

court to surrender it, to prove his debt, and thus suffer no other

implies only ''oluutary action, and hence excludes the right to
prove where the surrender is the result of a recovery compelled
hy judgxnent or decree.
The "-'Oru ''surrender,'' however, does not exclude compellPtl
ac-tion. but, to the contrary, generally implies such action . .That
this is the primary and commonly accepted meaniug of the word
is shown by the dictionaries. Thus, the Standard Dictionary
defi nC's its meaning as follows: "1. To yield possession of to
snot.her upon compulsion or demand, or under pressure of a superior force; give up, especially to an enemy in warfare; as, to
surrender an army or a fort." And in 'Vebster 's International
Dict.ionary the word is primarily defined in the same way. The
word, of course, also sometimes denotes voluntary action. In the
statute, however, it is unquali°fied, and generic, and hence embraces both meanings. The construction which would exclude
the primary meaning, so as to cause the word only to embrace
voluntary action, would read into the statute a qualification, and
this in order to cause the provision to be in conflict with the purpose which it was intended to accomplish,-equity among creditors. But the construction would do more. It would exclude
the natural meaning of the word used in the statute, in order
to <:reate a penalty, although nowhere expressly or even by clear
implication found in the statute. This would disregard the elementary rule that a penalty is not to be readily implied, an<l, on
the contrary, that a person or corporation is not to be subjected
to a penalty unless the words of the statute plainly impose it.
Tiffany v. National Bank, 18 w·au. 409, 410, 21 L. ed. 862, 863.
If it had been contemplated that the word "surrender" should
entail upon every creditor the loss of power to prove his claims
if he submitted his right to retain an asserted preference to the
courts for decision, such purpose could have found ready expression by qualifying the word "surrender" so as to plainly convey
such meaning. Indeed, the construction which would read in the
•.Jualification would not only create a penalty alone by judicial
action, but would necessitate judicial legislation in order to define what character and degree of compulsion was essential to
prevent the surrender in fact from being a surrender within the
meaning of the section.
It is argued, however, that courts of bankruptcy are guided
by equitable consideratiorui, and should not permit a creditor
H·ho has retained a fraudulent preference until compelled by a
court to surrender it, to prove his debt, and thus suffer no other
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loss than the costs of litigation. The fallacy lies in assuming that

the courts have power to inflict penalties, although the law has

not imposed them. Moreover, if the statute be interpreted as it

is insisted it should be, there would be no distinction between

honest and fraudulent creditors, and therefore every creditor who

in good faith had acquired an advantage which the law did not

permit him to retain would be subjected to the forfeiture simply

because he had presumed to submit his legal rights to a court for

determination. And this accentuates the error in the construc-

tion, since the elementary principle is that courts are created to

pass upon the rights of parties, and that it is the privilege of the

citizen to submit his claims to the judicial tribunals,—especially

in the absence of malice and when acting with probable cause,—

without subjecting himself to penalties of an extraordinary

character. The violation of this rule, which would arise from

the construction, is well illustrated by this case. Here, as we

have seen, it is found that the bank acted in good faith, without

I knowledge of the insolvency of its debtor and of wrongful intent

on his part, and yet it is asserted that the right to prove its law-

ful claims against the bankrupt estate was forfeited simply be-

cause of the election to put the trustee to proof, in a court, of

the existence of the facts made essential by the law to an invali-
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dation of the preference.

We are of opinion that, originally considered, the surrender

clause of the statute was intended simply to prevent a creditor

from creating inequality in the distribution of the assets of the

estate by retaining a preference, and at the same time collecting

dividends from the estate by the proof of his claim against it,

and consequently that whenever the preference has been aban-

doned or yielded up, and thereby the danger of inequality has

been prevented, such creditor is entitled to stand on an equal

footing with other creditors and prove his claims.

Is the contention well founded that this meaning which we de-

duce from the text of the surrender clause of the present act is

so in conflict with the rule generally applied in bankruptcy acts,

and is, especially, so contrary to the act of 1867 and the con-

struction given to it, that such meaning cannot be considered to

have been contemplated by Congress in adopting the present

act, and hence a contrary interpretation should be applied!

•*•

It follows that the construction which we at the outset gave

to the text of the act of 1898, instead of being weakened, is abso-

loss than the costs of litigation. The fallacy lies in assuming that
the courts have power to inflict penalties, although the law bi
not imposed them. Moreover, if the statute be interpreted 11 it
is insisted it should be, there would be no distinction betwt't'n
honest and fraudulent creditors, and therefore every creditor who
in good faith had acquired an advantage which the law did not
permit him to retain would be subjected to the forfeiture simply
because be had presumed to submit his legal rights to a court for
determination. And this accentuates the error in the constrnetion, since the elementary principle is that courts are created to
pass upon the rights of parties, and that it is the privilege of the
citizen to submit his claims to the judicial tribunals,--especially
in the absence of malice and when acting with probable cause,without subjecting himself to penalties of an extraordinary
character. The violation of this rule, which would arise from
the construction, is well illustrated by this case. Here, as we
have seen, it is found that the bank acted in good faith, without
) knowledge of the insolvency of its debtor and, of wrongful intent
on his part, and yet it is asserted that the right to prove its law. ful claims against the bankrupt estate was forfeited simply because of the election to put the trustee to proof, in a court, of
the existence of the facts made essential by the law to an invali·
dation of the preference.
We are of opinion that, originally considered, the sunender
clause of the statute was intended simply to prevent a creditor
from creating inequality in the distribution of the assets of the
estate by retaining a preference, and at the same time collecting
dividends from the estate by the proof of his claim against it,
and consequently that whenever the preference has been ab&n·
doned or yielded up, and thereby the danger of inequality has
been prevented, such creditor is entitled to stand on an equal
footing with other creditors and prove his claims.
Is the contention well founded that this meaning which we deduce from the text of the surrender clause of the present act is
so in conflict with the rule generally applied in bankruptcy acta,
and is, e.specially, so contrary to the act of 1867 and the con·
struction given to it, that such meaning cannot be considered to
have been contemplated by Congress in adopting the present
act, and hence a contrary interpretation should be applied T

• • •

It folJows that the construction which we at the outset gave
to the text of the act of 1898, instead of being weakened, is ah»
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lately sustained by a consideration of the act of 1867, both be-

fore and after the amendment of 1874, and the decisions con-

struing the same, since in the present act, as we have said, there

is nowhere found any provision imposing even the modified pen-

alty which was expressed in the amendment of 1874. The con-

tention that, because the act of 1898 contains a surrender clause,

therefore it must be assumed that Congress intended to inflict the

penalty originally imposed by § 39 of the act of 1867, must rest

upon the erroneous assumption that that penalty was the result

of the surrender clause alone. But this, as we have seen, is a

misconception, since from the great weight of judicial authority

under the act of 1867, as well as by the express enactment of

Congress in the amendment of 1874 and the decisions which con-

strued that amendment, it necessarily results that the penalty

enforced under the act of 1867 arose not from the surrender

clause standing alone, but solely from the operation upon that

clause of the express prohibition contained in § 39 of that act.

When, therefore, Congress in adopting the present act omitted

to re-enact the provision of the act of 1867, from which alone the

penalty or forfeiture arose, it cannot in reason be said that the

omission to impose the penalty gives rise to the implication that

it was the intention of Congress to re-enact it. In other words,

it cannot be declared that a penalty is to be enforced because the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

statute does not impose it.

And, irrespective of this irresistible implication, a general con-

sideration of the present act persuasively points out the purpose

contemplated by Congress in refraining from re-enacting the

penalty contained in § 39 of the act of 1867. Undoubtedly the

preference clauses of the present act, differing in that respect

from the act of 1867, as is well illustrated by the facts of this

case, include preferences where the creditor receiving the same

acted without knowledge of any wrongful intent on the part of

the debtor, and in the utmost good faith. Pirie v. Chicago Title

& T. Co., 182 U. S. 454, 45 L. ed. 1179, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 906.

Having thus broadened the preference clauses so as to make

them include acts never before declared by Congress to be illegal,

it may well be presumed that Congress, when it enacted the sur-

render clause in the present act, could not have contemplated

that that clause should be construed as inflicting a penalty upon

creditors coming within the scope of the enlarged preference

clauses of the act of 1898, thereby entailing an unjust and

unprecedented, result.

lately sustained by a consideration of the act of 1867, both before and after the amendment of 1874, and the decisions construing the same, since in the present act, as we have said, there
is nowhere found any provision imposing even the modified penalty which was expressed in the amendment of 1874. The contention that, because the act of 1898 contains a surrender clause,
the refore it must be assumed that Congress intended to inflict thP.
penalty originally imposed by § 39 of the act of 1867, must rest
upon the erroneous assumption that that penalty was the result
of the surrender clause alone. But this, as we have seen, is a
misconception, since from the great weight of judicial authority
under the act of 1867, as well as by the express enactment of
Congress in the amendment of 1874 and the decisions which construed that amendment, it necessarily results that the penalty
~nforced under the act of 1867 arose not from the surrender
dause standing alone, but solely from the operation upon that
dause of the express prohibition contained in § 39 of that act.
When, therefore, Congress in adopting the present act omitted
to re-enact the provision of the act of 1867; from whi~h alone the
penalty or forfeiture arose, it cannot in reason be said that the
omission to impose the penalty gives rise to the implication that
it was the intention of Congress to re-enact it. In other words,
it cannot be declared th.at a penalty is to be enforced because the
statute does not impose it.
And, irrespective of this irresistible implication, a general consideration of the present act persuasively points out the purpose
contemplated by Congress in refraining from re-enacting the
penalty contained in § 39 of the act of 1867. Undoubtedly the
preference clauses of the present act, differing in that respect
from the act of 1867, as is well illustrated by the facts of this
case, include preferences where the creditor receiving the same
acted without knowledge of any wrongful intent on the part of
the debtor, and in the utmost good faith. Pirie v. Chicago Title
& T. Co., 182 U. S. 454, 45 L. ed. 1179, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 906.
Having thus broadened the preference clauses so as to make
them include acts never before declared by Congress to be illegal,
it may well be presumed that Congress, when it enacted the sur1\'uder clause in the present act, could not have contemplated
that that clause should be construed as inflicting a penalty upon
rrt>ditors coming within the scope of the enlarged preference
dauses of the act of 1898, thereby entailing an ~njust and
unpre<:edented result.
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Our conclusion, therefore, is that the first question propounded

must be answered in the affirmative, and that the two other ques-

tions require no response.

And it is ordered accordingly.43

3. ASSIGNMENTS FOB BENEFIT OF CBEDITOBS

WEST CO. v. LEA

174 U. S. 590, 43 L. ed. 1098, 19 Sup. Ct. 836

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the first question propounded
must be answered in the affirmative, and that the two other questions require no response.
And it is ordered accordingly. 43

[See this case given ante, p. 104]

MISSOURI-AMERICAN ELECTRIC CO. v. HAMILTON-

BROWN SHOE CO.

3.

ASSIGNMENTS FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS

165 Fed. 283, 91 C. C. A. 251

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. November 16,1908)

WEST CO. v. LEA

SANBORN, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal from an adjudi-

cation in bankruptcy of the Missouri-American Electric Com

174 U. S. 590, 43 L. ed. 1098, 19 Sup. Ct. 836

pany, a corporation of the state of Missouri, upon a creditors'

petition filed February 16, 1907, upon the grounds (1) that on

[See this case given ante, p. 104]

October 7, 1906, the corporation, while insolvent, made a general

assignment of all its property to the American Electric Company,

a corporation of the state of New Jersey, and (2) that on October

17, 1906, the Missouri Company, while insolvent, paid to the

American Company, one of its creditors, $18,000, with intent to

prefer the latter to its other creditors, and that the latter com-

MISSOURI-AMERICAN ELECTRIC CO. v. HAMILTONBROWN SHOE CO.
165 Fed. 283, 91 C. C. A. 251

pany at that time had reasonable cause to believe that it was in-
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tended to give it a preference over other creditors similarly

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. November 16, 1908)

situated by this payment. There was no evidence of any pay-

ment of $18,000 or any like sum to the American Company

within four months of the filing of the petition, except the trans-

fer of the money and property which was subject to the written

instruments executed on October 17, 1906, which the appellees

insist constitute a general assignment for the benefit of the credit-

ors of the Missouri Company under § 3a (4) of the bankruptcy

law of 1898 (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 546 [U. S. Comp.

St. 1901, p. 3422]). The decision of the merits of the case turns

upon the legal effect of those writings. The charges of the com-

43—The dissenting opinion of Mr. and Mr. Justice Brown concurred

Justice Day is omitted. Mr. Jus- in the dissent,

tice Harlan, Mr. Justice Brewer,

SANBORN, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal from an adjudication in bankruptcy of the Missouri-American Electric Company, a corporation of the stat~ of Missouri, upon a creditors'
petition filed February 16, 1907, upon the grounds ( 1) that on
October 7, 1906, the c.orporation, while insolvent, made a general
assignment of all its property to the American Electric Company,
a corporation of the state of New Jersey, and (2) that on October
17, 1906, the Missouri Company, while insolvent, paid to the
American Company, one of its creditors, $18,000, with intent to
prefer the latter to its other creditors, and that the latter com·
pany at that time had reasonable cau~ to believe that it was intended to give it a preference over other creditors similarly
situated by this payment. There was no evidence of any payment of $18,000 or any like sum to the American Company
within four months of the filing of the petition, except the transfer of the money and property which was subject to the written
instruments executed on October 17, 1906, which the appellees
insist constitute a general assignment for the benefit of the creditors of the Missouri Company under § 3a ( 4) of the bankruptcy
law of 1898 (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 546 [U.S. Comp.
St. 1901, p. 3422)). The decision of the merits of the case turns
upon the legal effect of those writings. The charges of the com·
43- Tbe dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice DAY is omitted. Mr. Justice HARLAS, Mr. Justice B~vu,

and Mr. Justice BROWN concurred
in the dissent.
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mission of the acts of bankruptcy were denied by the Missouri

Company, the issues were tried by the District Court, evidence

which fills more than 200 pages of the printed transcript was

adduced, the court closed the hearing while the Missouri Com-

pany was still introducing its evidence in defense and before it

had rested, that company excepted to this premature closing of

the case, and the court rendered a decree adjudging it a bank-

rupt. • • •

"Was the assignment of October 17, 1906, a general assignment

for the benefit of the creditors of the Missouri Company within

the meaning of § 3a(4) of the bankruptcy act of 1898 and hence

an act of bankruptcy? A general assignment conveys all or

substantially all the property of the debtor, while an assignment

which conveys but a portion of it is a partial assignment, and not

a general assignment. United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch, 73, 90,

2 L. ed. 370; Bock v. Perkins, 139 U. S. 628, 641, 11 Sup. Ct.

677, 35 L. ed. 314; United States v. Howland, 4 Wheat. 108, 114,

4 L. ed. 526; United States v. Langton, 26 Fed. Cas. 862, 864,

No. 15,560; United States v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 447, 451, No.

14,807; Mussey v. Noyes, 26 Vt. 462, 474, 475. This assignment

did not convey the real estate of the assignor, which was about

one-fourth of its property in value after the amount of the in-
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cumbrance upon the real estate had been deducted from its total

value. It is true that the assignment transferred the proceeds

of any sale of this real estate that had been made, or that should

be made, but none had been made, and the Missouri Company

retained the absolute possession, use, control, and power of dis-

position of it. Notwithstanding the assignment the assignor re-

tained the right and the power to use, to rent, and never to sell

the real estate. An absolute transfer by a debtor of both the

legal and the equitable titles to the assignee in trust for his

creditors, so that the grantor retains no control of its use and no

power to dispose of it, is indispensable to a valid assignment of

such property for the benefit of creditors. Sandmeyer v. Dakota

Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2 S. D. 346, 352, 50 N. W. 353, and cases

there cited; Smith & Keating Imp. Co. v. Thurmarf, 29 Mo. App.

186,191. The conveyance here in question made no such transfer

of the real estate of the debtor.

A general assignment for the benefit of creditors is ordinarily

a conveyance by a debtor without consideration from the grantee

of substantially all his property to a party in trust to collect the

amounts owing to him, to sell and convey the property, to dis-

mission of the acts of bankruptcy were denied by the Missouri
Company, the issues were tried by the District Court, evidence
which fills more than 200 pages of the printed transcript was
adduced, the court closed the hearing while the Missouri Company was still introducing its evidence in defense and before it
had rested, that company excepted to this premature closing of
the case, and the court rendered a decree adjudging it a bank:ru pt. • • •
""'"r as the assignment of October 17, 1906, a general assignment
for the benefit of the creditors of the Missouri Company within
the meaning of § 3a ( 4) of the bankruptcy act of 1898 and hence
an act of bankruptcy T A general assignment conveys all or
substantially all the property of the debtor, while an assignment
which conveys but a portion of it is a partial assignment, and not
a general assignment. United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch, 73, 90,
2 L. ed. 370; Bock v. Perkins, 139 U. S. 628, 641, 11 Sup. Ct.
677, 35 L. ed. 314; United States v. Howland, 4 Wheat. 108, 114,
4 L. ed. 526; United States v. Langton, 26 Fed. Cas. 862, 864,
No. 15,560; United States v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 447, 451, No.
14,807; Mussey v. Noyes, 26 Vt. 462, 474, 475. This assignment
did not convey the real estate of the assignor, which was about
one-fourth of its property in value after the amount of the incumbrance upon the real estate had been deducted from its total
value. It is true that the assignment transferred the proceeds
of any sale of this real estate that had been made, or that should
be made, but none had been made, and the Missouri Company
retained the absolute posses.5ion, use, control, and power of disposition of it. Notwithstanding the assignment the assignor retained the right and the power to use, to rent, and never to sell
the real estate. An absolute transfer by a debtor of both the
legal and the equitable titles to the assignee in trust for his \
ereditors, so that the grantor retains no control of its use and no
power to dispose of it, is indispensable to a valid assignment of
such property for the benefit of creditors. Sandmeyer v. Dakota
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2 S. D. 346, 352, 50 N. W. 353, and caseR 1
there cited; Smith & Keating Imp. Co. v. Thurma:d, 29 Mo. App. /
186, 191. The conveyance here in question made no such transfer
of the real estate of the debtor.
.A general assignment for the benefit of creditors is ordinarily
a conveyance by a debtor without consideration from the grantee
of substantially all his property to a party in trust to collect the
amounts owing to him, to sell and convey the property, to dis-
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tribute the proceeds of all the property among his creditors, and

to return the surplus, if any, to the debtor. A conveyance of

his property by a debtor directly to his creditor, or to his credit-

ors, for their benefit, is not a general assignment for the benefit

of creditors because it raises no trust. Mussey v. Noyes, 26 Vt.

462, 474, 475; Anniston Iron & Supply Co. v. Anniston Rolling

Mill Co. (D. C), 125 Fed. 974. This conveyance is an assign-

ment by a debtor to its largest creditor in payment of the latter"s

debt of a part of the debtor's property in consideration of the

release of its debt by this creditor and of the latter's agreement

to pay all other creditors of the grantor out of the proceeds of

the property assigned. The apparent purpose and effect of it is

a sale of the remainder of the part of the debtor's property de-

scribed in the assignment after all its other debts have been paid

out of it to the debtor's chief creditor in consideration of the

latter's release and discharge of its claim against the debtor.

The controlling rule for the interpretation of written instru-

ments is that the intention of the parties should be adduced from

them and given effect. Bock v. Perkins, 139 U. S. 628, 635, 11

Sup. Ct. 677, 35 L. ed. 314. In the courts of the state of Mis-

souri, of the state under whose laws the grantor in this convey-

ance was organized and in which its real estate and its place of

business were situated, it is an established rule of construction
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that no instrument shall be held to constitute an assignment for

the benefit of creditors unless it clearly appears either that the

grantor intended that it should so operate or that such was its

necessary legal effect. Dry Goods. Co. v. Grocer Co., 68 Mo. App.

290, 295; Haase v. Distilling Co., 64 Mo. App. 131, 135; Harga-

dine v. Henderson, 97 Mo. 375, 387, 11 S. W. 218; Jaffrey v.

Mathews, 120 Mo. 317, 328, 25 S. W. 187; Brookshier v. Mutual

Fire Ins. Co., 91 Mo. App. 599, 605.

In Becker v. Rardin, 107 Mo. 11l, 117, 17 S. W. 892, a debtor

had conveyed to one of his creditors his stock of goods, the cred-

itor had satisfied his claim, and had agreed to pay the claims of

certain other creditors in consideration of that conveyance. The

parties further agreed in the instrument of conveyance that the

goods should be invoiced, a part at first cost and a part at their

then cash value, that, if the invoice value proved to be less than

the aggregate amount agreed to be paid by the grantee to the

creditors named therein the debtor would assign accounts re-

ceivable sufficient in amount to make up that aggregate, and

that if the invoice value should prove to be more than that aggre-

tribute the proceeds oif all the property among his creditors, and
to return the surplus, if any, to the debtor. A conveyance of
his property by a debtor directly to his creditor, or to his crt.·Jitors, for their benefit, is not a general assignment for the benerit
of creditors because it raises no trust. Mussey v. Noyl~s, 26 Vt.
462, 474, 475; Anniston Iron & Supply Co. v. Anniston Rolli1Jg
l\lill Co. (D. C.), 125 Fed. 974. This conveyance is an assignment by a debtor to its largest creditor in payment of the latt~r ·s
debt of a part of the debtor's property in consideration of the
rcl.ease of its debt by this creditor and of the latter's agreement
to pay all other creditors of the gra.ntor out of the proceeds of
the property BBsigned. The apparent purpose and effect of it is
a sale of the remainder of the part of the debtor's property described in the assignment after all its other debts have been paid
out of it to the debtor's chief creditor in consideration of the
latter's release and discharge of its claim against the debtor.
The controlling rule for the interpretation of written instruments is that the intention of the parties should be adduced from
them and given effect. Bock v. Perkins, 139 U. S. 628, 635, 11
Sup.· Ct. 677, 35 L. ed. 314. In the courts of the state of Missouri, of the state under whose laws the grantor in this conveyance was organized and in which its real estate and its place of
business were situated, it is an established rule of construction
that no instrument shall be held to constitute an assignment for
the benefit of creditors unless it clearly appears either that the
gra.ntor intended that it should so operate or that such was its
necessary legal effect. Dry Goods. Co. v. Grocer Co., 68 M:o. App.
290, 295; Haase v. Distilling Co., 64 Mo. App. 131, 135; Hargadine v. Henderson, 97 Mo. 375, 387, 11 S. W. 218; Jaffrey v.
Mathews, 120 l\fo. 317, 328, 25 S. W. 187; Brookshier v. Mutual
Fire Ins. Co., 91 Mo. App. 599, 605.
In Becker v. Rardin, 107 Mo. 111, 117, 17 S. W. 892, a debtor
had conveyed to one of his creditors his stock of goods, the creditor had satisfied his claim, and had agreed to pay the claims of
certain other creditors in consideration of that conveyance. The
parties further agreed in the instrument of conveyance that the
goods should be invoiced, a part at first cost and a part .at their
then cash value, that, if the invoice value proved to be less than
the aggregate amount agreed to be paid by the grantee to the.
creditors named therein the debtor would assign accounts receivable sufficient in amount to make up that aggregate, and
that if the invoice value should prove to be more than that aggre\
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gate, then the balance above that amount should be paid to a

third party for the benefit of other parties not named in the

instrument. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the con-

veyance did not constitute a voluntary assignment for the benefit

of creditors.

Because the assignment of October 17, 1906, did not convey

substantially all but only a portion of the property of the Mis-

souri Company, because it did not transfer the title to its real

estate to the assignee, but left the real estate, its use, control, and

power of disposition in the grantor, because it was the intention

of the grantor when it made the instrument to sell the remainder

of a part of its property after its other debts had been paid out

of the proceeds of that part to its chief creditor in consideration

of a discharge of its obligation to it, and it was not its purpose,

nor was it the legal effect of the assignment of October 17, 1906,

to make a general assignment of the property of the debtor for

the benefit of its creditors, our conclusion is that that instrument

was not such an assignment and its execution was not an act of

bankruptcy. The result is that the creditors failed to establish

the averments of acts of bankruptcy contained in their petition,

and the adjudication in bankruptcy must be reversed, and the

case must be remanded to the court below with directions to dis-
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miss the petition.

It is so ordered.44

COURTENAY MERCANTILE CO. v. PINCH

194 Fed. 368, 114 C. C. A. 328

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. March 7, 1912)

WM. H. MUNGER, D. J. The Courtenay Mercantile Com-

pany, a corporation, becoming insolvent in November, 1910, exe-

cuted and delivered the following instrument:

"Minneapolis, Minn., March 3, 1911.

"Assignment, Courtenay Mercantile Co. to P. S. Preston.

"This agreement, made this 10th day of November, 1910, by

and between Courtenay Mercantile Company, a corporation, of

gate, then the balance above that amou:1t should be paid to a
third party for the benefit of other parties uot named iu the
instrument. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the conveyance did not constitute a voluntary assignment for the benefit
of creditors.
Because the assignment of October 17, 1906, did uot convey
substantially all but only a portion of the property of the Hissouri Company, because it did not transfer the title to its real
estate to the assignee, but left the real estate, its use, control, and
power of disposition iii the grantor, because it was the intention
of the grantor when it made the instrument to sell the remainder
of a part of its property after its other debts had been paid out
of the proceeds of that part to its chief creditor in consideration
of a discharge of its obligation to it, and it was not its purpose,
11or was it the legal effect of the assignment of October 17, 1906,
to make a general assignment of the property of the debtor for
the benefit of its creditors, our conclusion is that that instrument
was not such an assignment and its execution was not an act of
bankruptcy. The result is that the creditors failed to establish
the averments of acts of bankruptcy contained in their petition,
and the adjudieation in bankruptcy must be r~versed, and the
case must be remanded to the court below with directions to dismiss the petition.
It is so ordered.u

Courtenay, in the county of Stutsman, state of North Dakota,

party of the first part, and Percival S. Preston, of the city of

COURTENAY MERCANTILE CO. v. FINCH

Minneapolis, county of Hennepin, and state of Minnesota, party

44—See In re Heleker Bros. Mer-

194 Fed. 368, 114 C. C. A. 328

cantile Co., 216 Fed. 963.

H. & A. Bankruptcy—24

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. March 7, 1912)
WM. H. MUNGER, D. J. The Courtenay Mercantile Company, a corporation, becoming insolvent in November, 1910, executed and delivered the following instrument:
''Minneapolis, :Minn., March 3, 1911.
Assignment, Courtenay Mercantile Co. to P. S. Preston.
' 1 This agreement, made this 10th day of November, 1910, by
and between Courtena;r Mercantile Company, a corporation, of
Courtenay, in the county of Stutsman, state of North Dakotn.
party of the first part, and Percival S. Preston, of the city of
Minneapolis, county of Hennepin, and state of Minnesota, party
11

«--See In re Heleker Bros. Merca.ntile Co., 216 Fed. 963.
B.. A .A. Bankruptc:r-2'6
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of the second part, witnesseth: That the party of the first part,

in consideration of the premises and the mutual promises herein

contained and the sum of one dollar to it in hand paid by the

party of the second part, has granted, bargained, sold, conveyed,

and assigned, and by these presents does bargain, grant, sell, con-

vey, and assign, unto said party of the second part, his succes-

sors and assigns, forever, all and singular its stock of goods,

wares, and merchandise, book accounts, notes and all claims de-

mands, and choses in action, with all evidences thereof and

securities thereto pertaining, and all its lands, tenements, and

hereditaments, wherever situate, to have and to hold the same

unto the said party of the second part, his successors and assigns,

forever, in trust, nevertheless, for the uses and purposes follow-

ing, which the second party agrees to fulfill, to wit:

"(1) To take possession of said property, and to sell and dis-

pose of same at public or private sale, with all reasonable dili-

gence, and to convert the same into money; also to collect all

claims, demands, and bills receivable hereby assigned, or to set-

tle, compromise, and compound any thereof that are doubtful,

or to sell and dispose of the same and reduce them to money as

soon as may be, and with and out of the proceeds of such sales

and collections:
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"(2) To pay and discharge all the just and reasonable ex-

penses, costs, and charges of executing and carrying into effeet

the trust hereby created, including reasonable compensation to

the party of the second part for his services and expenses paid

or incurred (including counsel fees) in executing the same.

"(3) To pay and discharge in full, if the residue of such pro-

ceeds be sufficient, all the debts and liabilities due or owing by

the party of the first part, including interest thereon, to those of

his creditors who shall become parties hereto by signing this

agreement or copy thereof, and who shall in consideration of the

premises undertake and agree, upon payment made, whether in

whole or in part, as herein provided, to fully release, discharge,

and absolve the party of the first part from and of all indebted-

ness to them, or either of them, now due or owing.

"And if the residue of said proceeds shall not be sufficient to

pay said debts and liabilities and interest in full, then to apply

the same so far as they will extend pro rata to the payment of

said debts and liabilities and interest. And if, after payment as

aforesaid^ there shall be any surplus, to pay such surplus to the

party of the first part, his executors, administrators, or assigns.

of the secomJ part, witnesseth: That the party of the first part,
in consi<lc:ration of the premises and the mutual promises hereiu
coutaiued and the sum of one dollar to it in hand paid by the
party of the second part, has granted, bargained, sold, conveyed,
an<l assigned, and by these presents does bargai~ grant, sell, couvey, and assign, unto said party of the second part, his successors and assigns, forever, all and singular its stock of gOO<is,
wares, and merchandise, book accounts, notes and all claims demands, and choses in action, with all evidences thereof anJ
securities thereto pertaining, and all its lands, tenements, and
hereditaments, wherever situate, to have and to hold the same
unto the said party of the second part, his successors and assigns,
forever, in trust, nevertheless, for the uses and purposes following, which the second party agrees to fulfill, to wit:
" ( 1) To take possession of said property, and to sell and dispose of sallle at public or private sale, with all reasonable diligence, and ' to convert the same into money; also to collect all
claims, demands, and bills receivable hereby assigned, or to settle, compromise, and compound any thereo.£ that are doubtful,
or to sell and dispose of the same and reduce them to money as
soon as may be, and with and out of the proceeds of such sales
and collections:
"(2) To pay and discharge all the just and reasonable expenses, costs, and charges of executing and carrying into effect
the trust hereby created, including reasonable compensation to
the party of the second part for his services and expenses paid
or incurred (including counsel fees) in executing the same.
"(3) To pay and discharge in full, if the residue of such proceeds be sufficient, all the debts and liabilities due or owing by
the party of the first part, including interest thereon, to those of
his creditors who shall become parties hereto by signing this
agreement or copy thereof, and who shall in consideration of the
premises undertake and agree, upon payment made, whether in
whole or in part, as herein provided, to fully release, discharge,
and absolve the party of the first part from and of all indebtedness to them, or either of them, now due or owing.
''And if the residue of said proceeds shall not be sufficient to
pay said debts and liabilities and interest in full, then to apply
the same so far as they will extend pro rata to the payment of
said debts nnd liabilities and interest. And if, after payment as
aforesaid: there shall be any surplus, to pay such surplus to the
party of the first part, his executors, administrators, or assigns.
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The words 'party of the first part' herein shall be construed to

mean parties of the first part.

'' In witness whereof, the said party of the first part has here-

unto set his hand and seal the day and year first above written.

"Courtenay Mercantile Co.,

"[Corporate Seal.] By J. B. Durkee, President."

This instrument was duly acknowledged and filed for record.

Thirty-eight creditors, whose claims aggregated a little over

The words 'party of the first part' herein shall be construed to
mean parties of the first part.
''In witness whereof, the said party of the first part has hereunto set his hand and seal the day and year first above written.
''Courtenay l\lercantile Co.,
" [Corporate Seal.]
By J. B. Durkee, President."

$7,000, accepted the terms of the instrument. Twenty-four cred-

itors, whose claims aggregated a little over $40,000, either refused

or failed to signify their acceptance. On the 30th of January,

1911, certain creditors filed a petition in bankruptcy, praying

that the said Mercantile Company be adjudged bankrupt, charg-

ing as the act of bankruptcy that on the 10th day of November,

1910, it made a general assignment for the benefit of its creditors

to one Percival S. Preston, being the instrument heretofore men-

tioned. The Courtenay Mercantile Company filed its answer to

the petition in involuntary bankruptcy, denying that it com-

mitted the act of bankruptcy alleged, or that it was insolvent.

The case came on for trial, and was heard upon a stipulation as

to the facts—the stipulation showing that, by the instrument

above mentioned, the Courtenay Mercantile Company conveyed
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to Preston all of its property of every kind and nature; that the

above-mentioned instrument was executed by the Courtenay Mer-

cantile Company and delivered to Preston pursuant to a resolu-

tion of the board of directors of the Courtenay Mercantile Com-

pany; that Preston accepted the trust, and entered upon the

discharge of his duties as trustee. The court held that the fore-

going instrument was a general assignment within the meaning

of the bankrupt law, and hence an act of bankruptcy, and ad-

judged the company a bankrupt. The Courtenay Mercantile

Company brings the case here on appeal, and the single question

is presented as to whether the above agreement was a general

assignment within the meaning of the bankrupt law.

It is first to be observed that the instrument conveyed all of

the property of the alleged bankrupt to a trustee, who was not

a creditor, and for the benefit of creditors. No right of redemp-

tion remained, and bankrupt retained no interest, excepting to

receive whatever property, if any, should remain after the entire

payment of its indebtedness. In re Thomlinson Company, 154

Fed. 834, 83 C. C. A. 550, this court, passing upon the question

This instrument was duly acknowledged and filed for record.
Thirty-eight creditors, whose claims aggregated a little over
$7,000, accepted the terms of the instrument. Twenty-four creditors, whose claims aggregated a little over $40,000, either refused
or failed to signify their acceptance. On the 30th of January,
1911, certain creditors filed a petition in bankruptcy, praying
that the said Mercantile Company be adjudged bankrupt, charging as the act of bankruptcy that on the 10th day of November,
1910, it made a general assignment for the benefit of its creditors
to one Percival S. Preston, being the instrument heretofore mentioned. The Courtenay Mercantile Company filed it.s answer to
the petition in involuntary bankruptcy, denying that it committed the act of bankruptcy alleged, or that it was insolvent.
The case came on for trial, and was heard upon a stipulation as
to the f.acUr--the stipulation showing that, by the instr'ument
above mentioned, the Courtenay l\Icrcantile Company conveyed
to Preston all of its property of every kind and nature; that the
above-mentioned instrument was executed by the Courtenay Mercantile Company and delivered to Preston pursuant to a resolution of the boord of directors of the Courtenay Mercantile Company; that Preston accepted the trust, and entered upon the
discharge of his duties as trustee. The court held that the foregoing instrument was a general assignmeut within the meaning
of the bankrupt law, and hence an act of bankruptcy, and adjudged the company a bankrupt. The Courtenay Mercantile
Company brings the case here on appeal, and the siugle question
is presented as to whether the above agreement was a general
assignment within the meaning of the bankrupt law.
It is first to be observed that the instrument conveyed all of
the property of the alleged bankrupt to a trustee, who was not
a creditor, and for the benefit of creditors. No right of redemption remained, and bankrupt retained no interest, excepting to
receive whatever property, if any, should remain after the entire
payment of its indebtedness. In re Thomlinson Company, 154
Fed. 834, 83 C. C. A. 550, this court, passing upon the question
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as to what was a general assignment within the meaning of the

bankrupt law, said:

"The 'general assignment' there contemplated is to be taken

in its generic sense, and embraces any conveyance at common

law or by statute by which the parties intend to make an absolute

and unconditional appropriation of the property conveyed to

raise funds to pay the debts of the vendor, share and share alike.

Appolos v. Brady, 1 C. C. A. 299, 49 Fed. 401; Bartlett v. Teah

(C. C), 1 Fed. 768; In re Gutwillig (D. C), 90 Fed. 475; Id.,

34 C. C. A. 377, 92 Fed. 337; In re Sievers (D. C), 91 Fed. 366;

Davis v. Bohle, 34 C. C. A. 372, 92 Fed. 325. Such a conveyance

inevitably thwarts operation of the bankruptcy act. * * *

The instrument in question does not contain any of the elements

of a mortgage, as insisted upon by bankrupt's counsel. The idea

that it was intended as a security for the ultimate payment of

the debts of the vendor, or that a reservation of a right to redeem

whenever the vendor shall pay its debts was intended, is not

remotely suggested by any of the terms of the instrument; in

other words, there is no right of redemption reserved. The pro-

vision at the end of the instrument, requiring a surplus, if any,

to be paid to the vendor, cannot be regarded as such reservation.

It is nothing more than an expression of what the law implies.

If, after all the property had been disposed of, and all the
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creditors had been fully paid, and all the expenses satisfied, any

surplus remained, it belonged as a matter of law to the debtor,

and no formal statement to that effect can change the legal and

obvious import of the instrument from a general assignment for

the payment of debts to a provision for their security in the

nature of a chattel mortgage."

The rule thus announced is entirely applicable to the instru-

ment executed by the Courtenay Mercantile Company; the only

difference between the two being that, in the instrument of the

Courtenay Mercantile Company, there was a provision that the

proceeds should be distributed among the creditors who accepted

the terms of the instrument. This certainly did not change its

character. So far as the Courtenay Mercantile Company was

concerned, they conveyed all their property to the trustee for

the benefit of their creditors, and the instrument speaks of the

date of its execution and delivery. It could not be known at

that time but that all of the creditors would accept its provisions.

Had all the creditors accepted, it certainly would have operated

as a general assignment. We do not think that the question as

to whether an instrument of that character constitutes a general

as to what was a general 888ignment with~ the meaning of the
bankrupt law, said:
''The 'general assi~ment' there contemplated is to be taken
in its generic sense, and embraces any conveyance at common
law or by statute by which the parties intend to make an absolute
and unconditional appropriation of the property comreyed to
raise funds to pay the debts of the vendor, share and share 1like.
Appoloe v. Brady, 1 C. C. A. 299, 49 Fed. 401; Bartlett v. Teah
( C. C.), 1 Fed. 768 ; In re Gutwillig ( D. C.), 90 Fed. 4 7 5 ; Id.,
34 C. C. A. 377, 92 Fed. 337; In re Sievers (D. C.), 91 Fed. 366;
Davis v. Bohle, 34 C. C. A. 372, 92 Fed. a25. Such a conveyance
inevitably thwarts operation of the b&nkruptcy act. • • •
The instrument in que.stion does not contain any of the elements
of a mortgage, as insisted upon by bankrupt's counsel. 1'he idea
that it was intended as a security for the ultimate payment of ,
the debts of the vendor, or that a reservation of a right to redeem
whenever the vendor shall pay its debts was intended, is not
remotely suggested by any of the terms of the instrument; in
other words, there is no right of redemption reserved. 'l'he provision at the end of the instrument, requiring a surplus, if any,
to be paid to the vendor, cannot be regarded as such r~rvation.
It is nothing more than an expression of what the law implies.
If, after all the property had been disposed of, and all the
creditors had been fully paid, and all the expenses satisfied, any
surplus remained, it belonged as a matter of law to the debtor,
and no formal statement to that effect can ch&nge the legal and
obvious import of the instrument from a general assignment for
the payment of debts to a provision for their security in the
nature of a chattel mortgage.''
The rule thus announced is entirely applicable to the instrument executed by the Courtenay Mercantile Company; the only
difference between the two being that, in the instrument of the
Courtenay :\lercantile Company, there was a provision that the
proceeds should be distributed among the creditors who accepted
the terms of the instrument. This certainly did not change its
character. So far as the Courtenay Mercantile Company was
concerned, they conveyed. all their property to the trustee for
the benefit of their creditors, and the instrument speaks of the
date of its execution and delivery. It could not be known at
that time but that all of the creditors would accept its provisions.
Had all the creditors accepted, it certainly woul<l have op;.·r~kd
as a general assignment. We do not think that the qH<'Stio11 as
to whether an instrument of that character constitutes a general
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assignment or a mortgage is dependent upon the subsequent event

of its acceptance by each and all of the debtor's creditors. In

Griffin v. Dutton, 165 Fed. 626, 91 C. C. A. 614, the Court of

Appeals of the First Circuit, said:

"Nor is it necessary that the assignment should be valid for

all purposes; as, for instance, that the creditors should assent

thereto. The language of the bankruptcy act is general. It

makes no distinction between strictly valid instruments and those

which may be invalid for certain purposes. To limit its opera-

tion to those assignments which are in all respects valid would

be contrary to the intent and purpose of the act."

To the same effect, see In re Meyer, 98 Fed. 976, 39 C. C. A.

368.

It is established by the foregoing authorities that a general

assignment for the benefit of creditors, within the inhibition of

the bankrupt law, need not necessarily be one which is valid

according to the state law. If its legal effect is a transfer of all

the debtor's property to a trustee for the benefit of all creditors,

share and share alike, who shall come in and prove their claims,

and thus accept its terms, it constitutes a general assignment.

We are cited to the case of Joas v. Jordan, 21 S. D. 379, 113

N. W. 73, where the Supreme Court of South Dakota, construing

a similar instrument, held that it was not an assignment, but a t
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mere security, as it was for the benefit only of those creditors

who assented to its conditions. The court in that case was con-

struing an instrument with reference to the statutory laws of-that

state, and was not dealing with the question of an assignment

under the bankrupt law. Our attention has not been called to

any case by the Supreme Court of North Dakota holding that

such an instrument is a security in the nature of a chattel

mortgage.

We are clearly of the opinion that the instrument in question

was a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, within the

purview of the bankrupt law, and the decree is affirmed.

4. APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER

IN RE SPALDING

139 Fed. 244, 71 C. C. A. 370

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. June 10, 1905)

WALLACE, C. J. This is an appeal from an adjudication of

bankruptcy, and is brought by a creditor who interposed an an-

assignment or a mortgage is dependent upon thP. suLseQuent eveut
of its acceptance by each and all of the debtor 's creditors. In
Griffin v. Dutton, 165 Fed. 626, 91 C. C. A. 614, the Court of
.Appeals of the First Circuit, said:
"Nor is it necessary that" the assignment should be valid for
all purposes; as, for instance, that the creditors should assent
thereto. The language of the bankruptcy act is general. It
makes 110 distinction between strictly valid instruments and those
which may be invalid for certain purposes. To limit its operation to those assignments which are in all respects valid would
be contrary to the intent and purpose of the act.''
To the same effect, see In re .Meyer, 98 Fed. 976, 39 C. C. A.
368.
It is established by the foregoing authorities that a general
assignment for the benefit of creditors, within the inhibition of
the bankrupt law, need not necessarily be one which is valid
according to the state law. If its legal effect is a transfer of all
the debtor's property to a trustee for the benefit of all creditors,
share and share alike, who shall come in and prove their claims,
and thus accept its terms.,it constitutes n general assignment.
\Ve are cited to the case of Joas"· Jordan, 21 S. D. 379, 1 la
N. \\". 73, where the Supreme Court of South Dakota, construiug
a similar instrument, held that it was not an assignment, but a
mere security, as it was for the benefit only of those creditors
who assented to its conditions. The court in that case was construing an instrument with reference to the statutory laws of •that
state, and was not dealing with the question of an assignment
under the bankrupt law. Our attention has not been called to
any case by the Supreme Court of North Dakota holding that
sueh an instrument is a security in the nature of a chattel
mortgage.
We are clearly of the opinion that the instrument in question
was a general assignment for tlw benefit of creditors, within the
purview of the bankrupt law, and the decree is affirmed.

4.

APPOINTMENT OF ..\ RECEIVER

IN RE SPALDING
139 Fed. 244, 71 C. C. A. 370
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. June 10, 1905)
WALLA CE, C. J. This is an appeal from an adjudication of
bankruptcy, and is brought by a creditor who interposed an an-
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swer to the petition .and contested the proceeding and by the

executor of Spalding. The acts of bankruptcy upon which the

adjudication was based were the appointment and putting in

charge of a receiver of the property of the alleged bankrupt by

the Supreme Court of the state of New York. The petition for

the adjudication alleged the commission of several other acts of

bankruptcy of Spalding, but none of the averments in respect

thereto were sufficient in form and substance. The referee in

bankruptcy by whom the proceeding was heard found that they

had not been proved. His findings in this respect were not over-

ruled by the District Court, and we have not been able to find

in the record sufficient evidence to support the averments.

We are unable to agree with the court below that the proofs

establish the commission by Spalding of the acts of bankruptcy

particularly referred to. These acts of bankruptcy are those

enumerated by subdivision a(4) of § 3 of the bankrupt act (Act

July 1,1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 546 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3422]).

§ 3 provides that acts of bankruptcy by a person '' shall consist

of his having • • • o(4), made a general assignment for

the benefit of his creditors; or being insolvent applied for a re-

ceiver or trustee for his property; or because of insolvency a

receiver or trustee has been put in charge of his property under

the laws of a state, of a territory, or of the United States.''

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Until the amendments of 1903 to the bankrupt act, the appoint-

ment of a receiver of the property of an insolvent, whether an

individual or a corporation, was not of itself an act of bank-

ruptcy; and this was so whether the appointment was made upon

the application of the insolvent or upon the application of credit-

ors. The making of a general assignment for the benefit of

creditors was an act of bankruptcy by the terms of subdivision

o(4), and upon the theory that the appointment of a receiver

was equivalent in its results to a general assignment made by the

insolvent to a trustee the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts

had been sought occasionally by creditors who petitioned for an

adjudication of bankruptcy alleging such appointment to have

been a general assignment for the benefit of creditors;

but it was decided that § 3 did not include as one of

the enumerated acts of bankruptcy the appointment by a court

of a receiver or trustee of the property of an insolvent, and that

the "general assignment" of subdivision a(4) meant the ordi-

nary common-law general assignment made voluntarily by the

swer to the petition .and contested the proceeding and by the
executor of Spalding. The acts of bankruptcy upon which the
adjudication was based were the appointment and putting in
charge of a receiver of the property of the alleged bankrupt by
the Supreme Court of the state of New York. The petition for
the adjudication alleged the commission of several other acts of
bankruptcy of Spalding, but none of the averments in respect
thereto were sufficient in form and substance. The referee in
bankruptcy by whom the proceeding was heard found that they
had not been proved. His findings in this respect were not overruled by the District Court, and we have not been able to find
in the record sufficient evidence to support the averments.
We are unable to agree with the court below that the proofs
establish the commission by Spalding of the acts of bankruptcy
particularly referred to. These acts of bankruptcy are those
enumerated by subdivision a(4) of§ 3 of the bankrupt act (Act
July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 546 [ U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3422] ).
§ 3 provides that acts of bankruptcy by a person "shall consist
of his having • • • a ( 4), made a general assignment for
the benefit of his creditors; or being insolvent applied for a receiver or trustee for his property; or because of insolvency a
receiver or trustee has been put in charge of his property under
the laws o.f a state, of a territory, or of the United States."
Until the amendments of 1903 to the bankrupt act, the appointment of a receiver of the property of an insolvent, whether an
individual or a corporation, was not of itself an act of bankruptcy; and this was so whether the appointment was made upon
the application of the insolvent or upon the application of creditors. The making of a general assignment for the benefit of
creditors was an act of bankruptcy by the terms of subdivision
a{4), and upon the theory that the appointment of a receiver
was equivalent in its results to a general assignment made by the
insolvent to a truatee the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts
had been sought occasionally by creditors who petitioned for an
adjudication of bankruptcy alleging such 'ppointment to have
been a general assignment for the benefit .of creditors;
but it was decided that § 3 did not include as one of
the enumerated acts of bankruptcy the appointment by a court
of a receiver or trustee of the property of an insolvent, and that
the "general assignment" of subdivision a(4) meant the ordinary common-law general assignment made voluntarily by the
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grantor, and those which in many of the states, being regulated

by statute, are known as "statutory general assignments." Re

Empire Metallic Bedstead Company, 98 Fed. 981, 39 C. C. A.

372; Vaccaro v. Security Bank of Memphis, 103 Fed. 436, 43

C. C. A. 279. In the former of these cases this court held that

the procurement by an insolvent of the appointment of a receiver

of his property by a state court could not be held to be an act

of bankruptcy upon the ground that it produces results equiva-

lent to those brought about by a general assignment for the

benefit of creditors, and that the acts of bankruptcy enumerated

by the statute could not be enlarged by construction so as to

include transactions similar or analogous to, but not identical

with, those specified. Doubtless these decisions were influential

in leading to the amendments of 1903. It is significant that

these amendments are ingrafted upon original subdivision a (4),

thus indicating that what was in the mind of Congress was a

transfer which was equivalent in its results to a general assign-

ment by operating to transfer to a trustee all of the property

of an insolvent for the benefit of his creditors. The making of

a general assignment by a debtor was always regarded as a con-

fession of his iusolvency, and it has sometimes been decided that

such an assignment made by a person who was not insolvent at

the time, or did not suppose himself to be insolvent, was void, as
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manifesting an intent to hinder and delay creditors in the col-

lection of their debts. Some of these decisions are referred to

in Van Nest v. Yoe, 1 Sandf. Ch. 4. Apparently what Congress

intended by the amendment was to place a receivership, whether

the appointment was procured by the initiation of the insolvent

or whether it was procured by the application of his creditors,

upon the same footing as a general assignment by an insolvent,

and, when it had occurred, to permit the courts of bankruptcy

to administer the estate, and have it distributed conformably

with all the provisions of the bankrupt act. It will be observed

that the first of the amendatory provisions confines the act of

bankruptcy to the appointment of a receiver or trustee upon the

application of the insolvent, while the second is a broader pro-

vision, and applies whenever a receiver or trustee has been put

in charge of the insolvent's property "because of insolvency."

The petition for an adjudication did not allege such an act of

bankruptcy as is enumerated in the first of these provisions, and

the question to be considered consequently, is whether the proofs

grantor, and those which in many of the states, being regulated
by statute, are known as "statutory general assignments." He
Empire Metallic Bedstead Company, 98 F'ed. 981, 39 C. C. .A.
372; Vaccaro v. Security Bauk of Memphis, 103 Fed. 436, 43
C. C. A. 279. In the former of these cases this court held that
the procurement by an insolvent of the appointment of a receiver
of his property by a state court could not be held to be an act
of bankruptcy upon the ground that it produces results equiva- _
lent to those brought about by a general assignment for the
benefit of creditors, and that the acts of bankruptcy enumerated
by the statute could not be enlarged by construction so as to
include transactions similar or analogous to, but not identical
with, those specified. Doubtless these decisions were influential
in leading to the amendments of 1903. It is significant that
these amendments are in grafted upon original subdivision a ( 4),
thUB indicating that what was in the mind of Congress was a
transfer which was equivalent in its results to a general assignment by operating to transfer tJ a trust.ee all of the property
of an insolvent for the benefit of his creditors. The making of
a general assignment by a d~btor was always regarded es a confession of his insolvency, an<l it has sometimes been decided that
mch an assignment made by a person who was not insolvent at
the time, or did not suppose himself to be insolvent, was void, as
manifesting an intent to hinder and delay creditors in the collection of their debts. Some of these decisfons are referred to
in Van Nest v. Yoe, 1 Sandf. Ch. 4. Apparently what Congress
intended by the amendment was to place a receivership, whether
the appointment was procured by the initiation of the insolvent
or whether it was procured by the application of his creditors,
upon the same footing as a general assignment by an insolvent,
and, when it had occurred, to permit the courts of bankruptcy
to administer the estate, and have it distributed conformably
with all the provisions of the bankrupt act. It will be observed
that the first of the arnendatory provisions confines the act of
bankruptcy to the appointmeut of a receiver or trustee upon the
application of the insolvent, while the second is a broader provision, and applies whenever a receiver or trustee has been put
in charge of the insolvent's property "because of insolvency."
The petition for an adjudication did not allege such an act of
bankruptcy as is enumerated in the first of these provisions, and
the question to be considered consequently, is whether the proofs
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sustain the averment of the petition that a receiver had been put

in charge of Spalding"s property "because of his insolvency."

It appeared by the proofs that the receiver was appointed in an

action brought by the corporation W. & J. Sloane, a creditor of

Spalding, to set aside a conveyance and transfer of certain real

and personal property of Spalding, made, as was alleged, with

intent to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors, and particu-

larly the plaintiff. The plaintiff made application to the Su-

preme Court for the appointment of a receiver pendente lite,

and the order appointing the receiver, in granting the applica-

tion, recites"the ground for the appointment as follows:

"That the plaintiff is a judgment creditor of the defendant,

Robert H. Spalding, and that its executions against his property

issued by its judgments have been returned wholly unsatisfied;

that the defendant, Robert H. Spalding, has been conveying,

mortgaging, and otherwise disposing of his property in fraud of

the plaintiff's rights and just demands, and is threatening to

make further conveyances and dispositions thereof in fraud of

the rights and just demands of the plaintiff."

Giving subdivision o(4) the construction which its language

demands, we are of the opinion that it does not make a receiver-

ship an act of bankruptcy unless it was procured upon the appli-

cation of the insolvent himself, and while insolvent; and does not

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

make the putting a receiver in charge of the property of an in-

solvent an act of bankruptcy unless this was done because of

insolvency; and if the latter provision applies to any case where

the trustee has not been put in charge pursuant to some statute

of the state, or a receiver put in charge by a court acting under

statutory authority, it certainly applies only when this has been

done because of insolvency. In most of the states statutory

provisions exist conferring jurisdiction upon designated courts

for the appointment of receivers. The statutes of New York

authorize the appointments of receivers of corporations in cases

of insolvency, but there is no statute authorizing the appoint-

ment by any court of a receiver of the property of an individual

merely upon the ground of his insolvency. The appointment in

the present case was doubtless made pursuant to § 713 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the appointment of a

receiver of "the property which is the subject of the action,"

upon the application of a party who establishes an "apparent

right to or interest in the property, where it is in the possession

sustain the avermeut of the petitio~1 t:1at a rel'eiv...r had Leeu put
in charge of Spalding's property '·because of his iusoh-ency. '·
It appeared by the proofs that the receiver was appointed in an
action brought by the corporation W. & J. Sloane, a creditor of
Spalding, to set aside a conveyance and transfer of certain rt:!al
and personal property of Spalding, made, as was alleged, with
intent to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors, and particularly the plaintiff. The plaintiff made application to the Supreme Court for the appointment of a receiver pendente lite,
and the order appointing the receiver, in granting the application, recites'the ground for the appointment as follows:
''That the plaintiff is a judgment creditor of the defendant,
Robert II. Spalding, and that its executions against his property
issued by its judgments have been returned wholly unsatisfied ;
that the defendant, Robert H . Spalding, has been conveying,
mortgaging, and otherwise disposing of his property in fraud of
the plaintiff 's rights and just demands, and is threatening to
make further conveyances and dispositions thereof in fraud of
the rights and just demands of the plaintiff.''
Giving subdivision a(4) the construction which its language
demands, we are of the opinion that it does not make a receivership a11 act of bankruptcy unless it was procured upon the application of the insolvent himself, and while insolvent; and does not
\ make the putting a receiver in charge of the property of an in~
solvent an act of bankruptcy unless this was done because of
, insolvency; and if the latter provision applies to any case where
the trustee has not been put in charge pursuant to some statute
of the state, or a receiver put in charge by a court acting under
statutory authority, it certainly applies only when this has been
done because of insolvency. In most of the states statutory
provisions exist conferring jurisdiction upon designated courts
for the appointment of receivers. The statutes of New York
authorize the appointments of receivers of corporations in cases
of insolvency, but there is no statute authoriziug the appointment by any court of a receiver of the property of an individual
merely upon the ground of his insolvency. The appointment in
the present case was doubtless made pursuant to § 713 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the appointment of a
receiver of "the property which is the subject of the action,"
upon the application of a party who establishes an ·'apparent
right to or interest in the property, where it is in the possession
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of an adverse party" and when its custody by a receiver becomes

expedient.

Inasmuch as in the present case the receiver was not appointed

upon the application of Spalding, it is immaterial whether

Spalding was at the time insolvent. It is also immaterial that

the plaintiff in the action may have alleged as one of the evi-

dential facts of fraud that Spalding was insolvent. It suffices

that the court in exercising its authority did not purport to do

so upon that ground, and that the order appointing the receiver

and reciting the grounds for the action of the court is conclusive

to the contrary. The receiver was appointed because the court

found that Spalding had disposed and was threatening to dis-

pose of his property with intent to defraud the plaintiff in the

action and other creditors, and assigned this as the only ground

for its action in putting a receiver in charge of his property.

If the court had merely appointed a receiver, without reciting

the grounds of its judgment, the record could have been referred

to, or the grounds shown by evidence aliunde. Russell v. Place,

94 U. S. 608, 24 L. ed. 214; Davis v. Brown, 94 U. S. 428, 429, 24

L. ed. 204. But, having recited the grounds, the recitals cannot

be contradicted without impeaching the record; and this is in-

admissible. In re Watts, 190 U. S. 35, 23 Sup. Ct. 718, 47 L.
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ed. 933. That the appointment of a receiver under the circum-

stances of this case is not such an act of bankruptcy as is con-

templated by subdivision a(4) is enforced by the consideration

that such acts as led to the appointment are of themselves acts

of bankruptcy by the terms of subdivision a(l) of §3. It is

not to be presumed that Congress intended to amend the section

so as to create as an additional act of bankruptcy, one which was

already included in the section. * • *

The adjudication of bankruptcy is reversed, with costs, and

with instructions to dismiss the petitions of the original and in-

tervening creditors for an adjudication of bankruptcy.

5. ADMISSION IN WRITING

IN RE WILMINGTON HOSIERY CO.

120 Fed. 179

(District Court, D. Delaware. January 12, 1903)

BRADFORD, D. J. This is a motion to dismiss a petition in

involuntary bankruptcy filed against the Wilmington Hosiery

of an adverse party" and when its custody by a receiver becomes
expedient.
Inasmuch as in the present case the receiver was not appointed
upon the application of Spalding, it is immaterial whether
Spalding was at the time insolvent. It is also immaterial that
the plaintiff in the action may have alleged as one of the evidential facts of fraud that Spalding was insolvent. lt suffices
that the court in exercising its authority did not purport to do
so upon that ground, and that the order appointing the receiver
and reciting the grounds for the action of the court is conclusive
to the contrary. The receiver was appointed because the court
found that Spalding had disposed and was threatening to dispose of his property with intent to defraud the plaintiff in the
action and other creditors, and assigned this as the ~y ground
for its action in putting a receiver in charge of his property.
If the court had merely appointed a receiver, without reciting
the grounds of its judgment, the record could have been referred
to, or the gTOunds shown by evidence aliunde. Rllilsell v. Place,
94 U. S. 608, 24 L. ed. 214; Davis v. Brown, 94 U. S. 428, 429, 24
L. ed. 204. But, having recited the grounds, the recitals cannot
be contradicted without impeaching the record; and this is inadmissible. In re Watts, 190 U. S. 35, 23 Sup. Ct. 718, 47 L.
ed. 933. That the appointment of a receiver under the circumstances of this case is not such an act of bankruptcy as is contemplated by subdivision a(4) is enforced by the consideration
that such acts .as led to the appointment are of themselves acts
of be.nkruptcy by the terms of subdivision a ( 1) of § 3. It is
not to be presumed that Congress intended to amend the section
so as to create as an additional act of bankruptcy, one which was
already included in the section. • • •
The adjudication of bankruptcy is reversed, with costs, and
with instructions to dismiss the petitions of the original and interyening creditors for an adjudication of bankruptcy.
5.

ADMISSION IN WRITING

IN RE WILMINGTON HOSIERY CO.
120 Fed. 179
(District Court, D. Delaware.

January 12, 1903)

BRADFORD, D. J. This is a motion to dismiss a petition i!1
involuntary bankruptcy filed against the Wilmington Hosh•r::
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Company, a corporation of Delaware. Only one alleged act of

bankruptcy is set forth. It is as follows:

"That said Wilmington Hosiery Company is insolvent and

that within four months next preceding the date of this petition

the said Wilmington Hosiery Company .committed an act of

bankruptcy in that it did heretofore, to-wit, on the 28th day of

August, A. D. 1902, upon petition to the chancellor of the state

of Delaware, praying for the appointment of receiver for said

Wilmington Hosiery Company, on the ground of insolvency,

acknowledged under the oath of its president that said insolvency

existed, and consented to the appointment of such receiver on

the ground of said insolvency, a certified copy of which petition

with the answer thereto and the order of the chancellor thereon

is hereunto annexed, and your petitioners pray may be taken as

a part of this petition."

The petition or bill in chancery contains the following aver-

ment:

"That said respondent corporation has become, and is now, in-

solvent and unable to pay its debts, and that it will be for the

benefit of the stockholders and creditors of the said corporation,

that a receiver be appointed for the purpose of preserving its

assets, and properly adjusting its business and liabilities."

It then prays for the appointment of such receiver. The com-
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pany in its answer admitted the truth of the above averment,

and the chancellor thereupon appointed a receiver as prayed.

It is properly conceded by the counsel for the petitioners that

the petition in bankruptcy in its present form cannot be sus-

tained unless what is alleged as an act of bankruptcy can be

regarded as an admission by the company in writing of its in-

ability to pay its debts and its willingness to be adjudged a

bankrupt on that ground. But such a conclusion is wholly in-

admissible. While the company admitted in writing its insol-

vency it did not expressly or by implication admit its willing-

ness to be adjudged a bankrupt. In fact, although admitting the

truth of the averment of insolvency, it did not allege a willing-

ness to have a receiver appointed; but, if its admission of in-

solvency carried with it implied consent to the appointment of

a receiver, the aspect of the case would not be materially dif-

ferent. A written admission of insolvency and consent to have

a receiver appointed by the chancellor cannot be regarded as a

written admission of inability to pay debts and willingness to be

adjudged bankrupt. No doctrine of equivalency is applicable in

Company, a corporation of Delaware. Only one alleged act of
hankruptcy is set forth. It is as follows:
''That said 'Vilmington Hosiery Company is insolvent and
that within four months next preceding the date of this petition
the said Wilmington Hosiery Company .committed an act of
bankruptey in that it did heretofore, to-wit, on the 28th day of
AugUBt, A. D. 1902, upon petition to the chancellor of the state
of Delaware, praying for the appointment of receiver for said
Wilmington Hosiery Company, on the ground of insolveney,
acknowledged under the oath of its president that said insolvency
existed, and consented to the appointment of such receiver on
the ground of said insolvency, a certified copy of which petition
with the answer thereto and the order of the chancellor thereon
is hereunto annexed, and your petitioners pray may be taken as
a part of this petition.''
The petition or bill in chancery contains the following aver·
ment:
"That said respondent corporation has become, and is now, insolvent and unable to pay its debts, and that it will be for the
benefit of the stockholders and creditors of the said corporation,
that a receiver be appointed for the purpose of preserving its
assets, and properly adjusting its business and liabilities.''
It then prays for the appointment of such receiver. The company in its answer admitted the truth of the above averment,
and the chancellor thereupon appointed a receiver as prayed.
It is properly conceded by the counsel for the petitioners that
the petition in bankruptcy in its present form cannot be sustained unless what is alleged as an act of bankruptcy can be
regarded as an admission by the company in writing of its inability to pay its debts and its willingness to be adjudged a
bankrupt on that ground. But such a conclusion is wholly inadmissible. While the company admitted in writing its insolvency it did not expressly or by implication admit its willing11ess to be adjudged a bankrupt. In fact, although admitting the
truth of the averment of insolvency, it did not allege a willingness to have a receiver appointed; but, if its admission of insolvency carried with it implied consent to the appointment of
a receiver, the aspect of the case would not be materially different. A written admission of insolvency and consent to have
a receiver appointed by the chancellor cannot be regarded as a
written admission of inability to pay debts and willingness to be
adjudged bankrupt. No doctrine of equivalency is applicable in

.
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this connection. Further, to hold the one equivalent to and of

the same effect as the other not only would be unwarranted by

the language and meaning of the bankruptcy act, but would be

calculated as a precedent to produce uncertainty and confusion

in its administration. * • • The petition will be dismissed

with costs.
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this connection. , Further, to hold the one equivalent to and of
the same effect as the other not only would be unwarranted by
the language and meaning of the bankruptcy act , but would be
calculated as a precedent to produce uncertainty and confusion
in its administration. • • • The petition will be dismissed
with costa.

1

CHAPTER III

ADMINISTRATION

SECTION I

RECEIVER

BOONVILLE NAT. BANK v. BLAKEY

107 Fed. 891, 47 C. C. A. 43

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. April 9, 1901)

On February 2, 1899, an involuntary petition in bankruptcy

was filed against M. Falson, and on February 28th he was ad-

CHAPTER III

judged a bankrupt. On March 7th (no trustee having been

selected) the petitioning creditors asked for the appointment of

ADMINISTRATION

a receiver upon three grounds: (1) That it was necessary for

some person to take charge of the bankrupt's books, etc., to pre-

pare a list of creditors; (2) that the estate included realty need

ing immediate care and attention; (3) that the bankrupt had

preferred certain creditors, and that the preferences should be

SECTION I
RECEIVER

recovered by a trustee or receiver. The court thereupon ap-

pointed Blakey as receiver, who filed a bill in equity against

BOONVILLE NAT. BANK v. BLAKEY

several parties (including the Boonville National Bank and the

People's State Bank) seeking to recover alleged preferences.

107 Fed. 891, 47 C. C. A. 43

The banks were decreed to pay certain sums to the receiver and

appeal from the decree. See 95 Fed. 267.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. April 9, 1901)

JENKINS, Circuit Judge [after discussing the timeliness of
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the appeal]. * * *

The case involves the important question, patent upon the face

of the bill, whether a receiver in bankruptcy, appointed before

the selection of a trustee, can maintain suit to recover the

amount of a preferential payment made by the debtor prior to

the bankruptcy. * • •

The authority for the appointment of a receiver in bankruptcy

proceedings comes from the act and is limited by the act. The

order of the court appointing him cannot be broader than the

statute. The receiver is a statutory receiver, and not a general

380

.On February 2, 1899, an involuntary petition in bankruptcy
was filed against 1\1. Falson, and on February 28th he .was ad. judged a bankrupt. On March 7th (no trustee having been
selected) the petitioning creditors asked for the appointment of
a receiver upon three grounds: ( 1) That it was necessary for
some person to take charge of the bankrupt's books, etc., to prepare a list of creditors; (2) that the estate included realty need·
ing immediate care and attention; (3) that the bankrupt had
preferred certain creditors, and that the preferences should be
recovered by a trustee or receiver. The court thereupon appointed Blakey as receiver, who filed a bill in equity against
several parties (including the Boonville National Bank and the
People's State Bank) seeking to recover alleged preferences.
'l'he banks were decreed to pay certain sums to the receiver and
appeal from the decree. See 95 Fed. 267.
J E~KINS, Circuit Judge [after discussing the timeliness of
the appeal] . • • •
·
The case involves the important question, patent upon the face
of the bill, whether a receiver in bankruptcy, appointed before
the ~election of a trustee, can maintain suit to recover the
amount of a preferential payment made ey the debtor prior to
the bankruptcy. • • •
The authority for the appointment of a receiver in bankruptcy
proceedings comes from the aet and is limit.ed by the act. The
order of the court appointing him cannot be broader than the
statute. The receiver is a statutory receiver, and not a general
380
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receiver. The latter is appointed by a court of chancery by

virtue of its inherent power, independent of any statute. His

authority is derived from, and his duty prescribed by, the order

of appointment, and he is called a common-law receiver. Herring

v. Railroad Co., 105 N. Y. 340, 12 N. E. 763. A statutory re-

ceiver is one appointed in pursuance of special statutory pro-

visions. He derives his power from the statute, and to it must

look for the duty imposed upon him. He possesses such power

only as the statute confers, or such as may be fairly inferred

from the general scope of the law of his appointment. We are

therefore referred to the bankrupt act (30 Stat. c. 541) to as-

certain the power of the bankruptcy court to appoint a receiver,

and the extent of the power which the act confers upon him.

By § 2, cl. 3, the courts of bankruptcy are invested with authority

to '' appoint receivers or the marshals upon application of parties

in interest, in case the court shall find it absolutely necessary for

the preservation of estates, to take charge of the property of

the bankrupts after the filing of the petition and until it is dis-

missed or the trustee is qualified," and to (§ 2, cl. 5) authorize

the business of the bankrupts to be conducted for limited periods

by receivers and marshals or trustees, if necessary, in the best

interests of the estates. These are the sole provisions of the act
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which authorize a receiver and define his duties. There is, how-

ever, another provision which may properly be considered in

this connection. In § 69 it is provided that before adjudication

upon an involuntary petition, when it shall appear to the judge

that the property of the alleged bankrupt is being neglected, so

that it will deteriorate in value, a warrant may be issued to the

marshal to seize and hold the property subject to further order,

upon the petitioning creditors giving bond to indemnify the

alleged bankrupt for the damages he shall sustain if such seizure

shall be proved to have been wrongfully obtained, and the prop-

erty, when seized, shall be released upon bond filed by the alleged

bankrupt conditioned to turn over the property or its value in

mouey to the trustee in the event of adjudication of bankruptcy.

What, then, is the intent of the law with respect to the rights

and powers of the receiver? The statute requires (§55) thv.t

the court shall cause the first meeting of creditors to be held not

more than 30 days after the adjudication, and if, through mis-

chance, the meeting should not be held within that time, the

court shall fix the date as soon as may be thereafter when it shall

be held. § 44 provides that creditors at their first meeting after

receiver. The Jatter is appointed by a court of chancery by
vii tue of its inherent power, independent of any statute. Hi.s
m1thority is derived from, and his duty prescribed by, the order
of appoiutment, a11d he is calJed a common-Jaw receiver. Herring
v. Railroad Co., 105 N. Y. 340, 12 .N. E. 763. A statutory receiver is one appointed in pursuance of special statutory provisions. He derives his power from the statute, and to it must
look for the duty imposed upon him. He possesses such power
only as the statute confers, or such as may be fairly inferred
from the general scope of the law of his appointment. We are
thr.reforc referred to the bankrupt act ( 30 Stat. c. 541) to ascertain the power of the bankruptcy court to appoint a receiver,
and the extent of the power which the act confers upon him.
I3y § 2, cl. 3, the courts of bankruptcy are invested with authority
to ''appoint receivers or the marshals upon application of parties
in interest, in case the court shall find it absolutely necessary for
the preservation of estates, to take charge of the property of
the bankrupts after the filing of the petition and until it is dismissed or the trustee is qualified," and to ( §' 2, cl. 5) authorize
the business of the bankrupts to be conducted for limited periods
by receivers and marshals or trustees, if necessary, in the best ·
interests of the estates. These are the so]e provisions of the act
which authorize a receiver and define his duties. There is, however, another provision which may properly oo considered in
this connection. In § 69 it is provided that before adjudication
upon an involuntary petition, when it shall appear to the judge
that the property of the alleged bankrupt is being neglected, so
that it will deteriorate in value, a warrant may be issued to the
marshal to seize and hoJd the property subject to further order,
upon the petitioning creditors giving bond to indemnify the
alleged bankrupt for the damages he shall sustain if such seizure
shall be proved to have been wrongfully obtained, and the property, when seized, shall be released upon bond filed by the alleged
bankrupt conditioned to turn over the property or its· value iu
mouey to the trustee in the event of adjudication of bankruptcy.
What. then, is the intent of the law with respect to the rights
and powers of the receiver? The statute requires (§ 55) tL;.;.t
tht• court shall cause the first meeting of creditors to be held not
more than 30 days after the adjudication, and if, through mischance, the meeting should not be held within that time, the
r•ourt shall fix the date as soon as may be thereafter when it shall
be held. § 44 provides that creditors at their first meeting after
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adjudication shall appoint a trustee, and, failing therein, the

court shall do so. He is by § 70a vested by operation of law

with the title as of the date of adjudication, except exemptions,

to the property of the bankrupt, with power of sale and disposi-

tion. Subdivision "e" authorizes the trustee to avoid any trans-

fer by the bankrupt of his property which any creditor might

have avoided, and to recover the property so transferred or its

value. § 60a defines a preference, and § 606 provides that a

preference within four months of the filing of the petition to one

having reasonable cause to believe that it was intended thereby

to give a preference shall be voidable by the trustee, and he may

recover the property so transferred or its value. We can now

discover, as we think, the general purpose of this law. It was

that the property of the bankrupt should be vested in a trustee,

to be selected by creditors; that such officer should have the

general control and management of the estate, and the right to

recover for the benefit of creditors all property transferred in

\ fraud of the act. It contemplated that between the filing of the

petition and the adjudication of bankruptcy an emergency might

arise with respect to the care of the bankrupt's property; and,

in involuntary cases, for the protection of the property in the

interval between the filing of the petition and the adjudication,
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the bankruptcy court was authorized to direct the marshal to

seize and hold the property pending adjudication. So, also, in

voluntary or involuntary cases, when it was found absolutely

necessary for the preservation of an estate, the court should

appoint a receiver or the marshal to take charge of the property

of the bankrupt until the petition is dismissed or the trustee is

qualified. It plainly was not contemplated that the receiver or

the marshal so designated should supersede the trustee or exer-

cise the general powers conferred upon a trustee. There is no

such power specifically conferred or any provision in the act

from which such power can reasonably be implied. Such tempo-

rary receiver, whether he be the marshal or another, is not a trus-

tee for the creditors, but is a caretaker and custodian of the

visible property pending adjudication and until a selection of a

trustee. If in any sense a trustee, he is trustee for the bankrupt,

in whom is the title to the property until it passes by operation

of law as of the date of adjudication to the trustee selected by

the creditors. The duty required and the power conferred clearly

are that the receiver or the marshal should take possession of

property that would otherwise go to waste, and hold it and pre-

adjudication shall appoint a trustee, and, failing therein, the
court shall do so. He is by § 70a vested by operation of law
with the title as of the date of adjudication, except exemptions,
to the property of the bankrupt, with power of sale and disposition. Subdivision "e" authorizes the trustee to avoid any transfer hy the bankrupt of his property which any creditor might
have avoided, and to recover the property 80 transferred or its
value. § 60a defines a preference, and § 60b provides that a
preference within four months of the filing of the petition to one
having reasonable cause to believe that it was intended thereby
to give a preference shall be voidable by the trustee, and he may
recover the property 80 transferred or its value. We can now
discover, as we think, the general purpose of this law. It WBB
that the property of the bankrupt should be vested in a trustee,
to be selected by creditors; that such officer should have the
general control and management of the estate, and the right to
recover for the benefit of creditors all property transferred in
fraud of the act. It contemplated that between the filing of the
petition and the adjudication of bankruptcy an emergency might
arise with respect to the care of the bankrupt's property; a.nd,
in involuntary cases, for the protection of the property in the
interval between the filing of the petition and the adjudication,
the bankruptcy court was authorized to direct the marshal to
seize and hold the property pending adjudication. So, also, in
voluntary or involuntary cases, when it was found absolutely
necessary for the preservation of an estate, the court should
appoint a receiver or the marshal to take charge of the property
of the bankrupt until the petition is dismissed or the trustee is
qualified. It plainly was not contemplated that the receiver or
the marshal so designated should supersede the trustee or exercise the general powers conferred upon a trustee. There is no
sucli power specifically conferred or any provision in the act
from which such power can reasonably be implied. Such temporary receiver, whether he be the marshal or another, is not a trustee for the creditors, but is a caretaker and custodian of the
visible property pending adjudication and until a selection of a
trustee. If in any sense a trust~e. he is trustee for the bankrupt,
in whom is the title to the property until it passes by operation
of law as of the date of adjudication to the trustee selected by
the creditors. The duty required and the power conferred clearly
are that the receiver or the marshal should take possession of
property that would otherwise go to waste, and hold it and pre-
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serve it, so that it might come to the trustee, when selected, with-

out needless injury. There might also be an occasion when the

business of the bankrupt ought not, in the interest of the credit-

ors, to be temporarily suspended, as for example in the case of a

hotel or other business, where the value of the good will required

that it should be kept a going concern until the trustee should

be appointed, and for a limited time after the trustee was ap-

pointed, that he might dispose of it profitably for the creditors.

"We fail to find any provision in this law which sanctions the

bringing of a suit by a receiver to recover a preferential pay-

ment to a creditor. Such a right does not come within the pur-

pose for which a receiver is authorized, and is neither expressly

nor impliedly sanctioned. A preferential payment to a creditor

could not be recovered back by the bankrupt. It could not be

gainsaid by a creditor, unless through the trustee and under the

bankrupt act. The transaction is not void even under the act.

It is voidable merely, and voidable only by the trustee. The

payment is not inherently wrong, being in discharge of an honest

debt. The trustee, as representative of and in the interest of all

the creditors, and not of the petitioning creditors alone, is to

determine in the first instance whether the payment was made

with a view to give a preference, and whether the creditor re-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ceiving payment had reasonable cause to believe that it was so

and if proof is forthcoming. He is to ascertain the facts and to

determine the probability of successful litigation, and whether

the creditor sought to be pursued is responsible, so that the

estate should not be mulcted in unnecessary litigation and costs.

The receiver or marshal is, in the contemplation of the act,

merely the temporary custodian selected to take possession of

visible property liable to waste, and to conserve it until the

trustee shall be selected by the creditors within the 30 days

limited, or appointed by the court; but he is vested with no right

to avoid a transaction which by the act is specifically given to

the trustee, and which, but for the act, would npt exist. It is

not within the spirit or letter of the law that the necessity of a

trustee should be superseded. It is required that at the earliest

opportunity—at the first meeting of creditors—he should be

selected. If the creditors therein fail, the duty upon the court

is imperative—not permissive—to appoint one. The receiver or

marshal takes possession of the visible property of the bankrupt

for delivery to the trustee,—not to pursue the debtors of the

serve it, so that it might come to the trustee, when selected, without needless injury. There might also be an occasion when the
business of the bankrupt ought not, in the interest of the creditors, to be temporarily suspended, as for example in the case of a
hotel or other business, where the value of the good will reituire<l
that it should be kept a going concern until the trustee should
be appointed, and for a limited time after the trustee was appointed, that he might dispose of it profitably for the creditors.
\Ve fail to find any provision in this law which sanctions the
bringing of a suit by a receiver to recover a preferential payment to a creditor. Such a right does not come within the purpose for which a receiver is authorized, and is neither expressly
nor impliedly sanctioned. A preferential payment to a creditor \
could not be recovered back by the bankrupt. It could not be
gainsaid by a creditor, unless through the trustee and under the
bankrupt act. The transaction is not void even under the act. \
It is voidable merely, and voidable only by the trustee. The \
payment is not inherently wrong, being in discharge of an honest
debt. The trustee, as representative of and in the interest of all
the creditors, and not of the petitioning creditors alone, is to
determine in the first instance whether the payment was made
with a view to give a preference, and whether the creditor receiving payment had reasonable cause to believe that it was so
and if proof is forthcoming. He is to ascertain the facts and to
determine the probability of successful litigation, and whether
the creditor sought to be pursued is responsible, so that the
estate should not be mulcted in uunecessary litigatioµ and costs.
The receiver or marshal is, in the contemplation of the act,
merely the temporary custodian selected to take possession of
visible property liable to waste, and to conserve it until the
trustee shall be selected by the creditors within the 30 days
limited, or appointed by the court; but he is vested with no right
to avoid a transaction which by the act is specifically given to
the trustee, and which, but for the act, would npt exist. It is
not within the spirit or letter of the law that the necessity of a
trustee should be superseded. It is required that at the earliest
opportunity-at the first meeting of creditors-be should be
selected. If the creditors therein fail, the duty upon the court
is imperative-not permissive-to appoint on_e. The receiver or
marshal takes possession of the visible property of the bankrupt
for delivery to the trustee,-not to pursue the debtors of the
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estate, not to enforce rights of action vested in the trustee alone,

not to involve the estate in possibly unnecessary litigation.

We think we should do violence to both the letter and the

spirit of the act to enlarge the functions of a mere temporary

custodian, and to construe the law as vesting him with functions,

powers, and duties which are clearly not contemplated by the

act. It follows, therefore, that the receiver had no right to de-

clare void the payments in question and no right to recover the

sums demanded. That can only be done by the trustee; for in

no other officer is the right vested. We do not say that the re-

ceiver may not, by suit or otherwise, assert or defend his pos-

session of the visible property which the law has placed in his

custody. That question is not before us. But he cannot usurp

the functions of a trustee and avoid payments to creditors when

no right so to do is conferred by the law.

* * * the decree is reversed and the cause is remanded,

with directions to dismiss the bill. • • •

SECTION II

PROVABLE CLAIMS

A. In General

WETMORE v. MARKOE (formerly Wetmore)

196 U. S. 68, 49 L. ed. 390, 25 Sup. Ct. 172
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(United States Supreme Court. December 19, 1904)

estate, not to enforce rights of action vested in the trustee alone,
not to involve the estate in possibly unnecessary litigation.
\Ve think we should do violence to both the letter and the
spirit of the act to enlarge the functions of a mere temporary
custodian, and to construe the law as vesting ·him with fWJctions.
powers, and duties which are clearly not contemplated by the
act. It follows, therefore, that the receiver had no right to declare void the payments in question and no right to recover the
sums demanded. That can only' be done by the trust.ee ; for in
no other officer is the right vested. We do not say that the receiver may not, by suit or otherwise, assert or defend bis possession of the visible property which the law has placed in his
custody. That question is not before us. But he cannot usurp
the functions of a trustee and avoid payments to creditors when
no right so to do is conferred by the law.
• • • the decree is reversed and the cause is remanded,
with directions to dismiss the bill. • • •

On June 12, 1890, an action for divorce and alimony was

begun by Annette B. W. Wetmore, wife of the plaintiff in error,

in the Supreme Court of the state of New York, and on April 1,

1892, at special term, the plaintiff in error was found guilty of

SECTION II

adultery as charged in the complaint, and a divorce was granted

upon that ground to the defendant in error. The divorce was

PROVABLE CLAIMS

Ancillary Receiverships.—Before

the amendment of 1910 the courts

A.

IN GENERAL

were not agreed as to the ju-

risdiction of bankruptcy courts to

WETMORE v. MARKOE (formerly Wetmore)

appoint ancillary receivers or to en-

tertain ancillary proceedings gener-

196 U. S. 68, 49 L. ed. 390, 25 Sup. Ct. 172

ally. See Collier on Bankruptcy,

(10th ed.), 26. 5 2, clause 20, of

the bankruptcy act now invests the

courts of bankruptcy with jurisdic-

tion to "exercise ancillary jurisdic-

tion over persons or property within

their respective territorial limits in

aid of a receiver or trustee ap-

pointed in any bankruptcy proceed-

ings pending in any other court of

bankruptcy.'' The amendment would

(United States Supreme Court.

D~cember

19, 1904)

/

On June 121 1890, an action for divorce and alimony was
begun by Annette B. W. Wetmore, wife of the plaintift' in error,
in the Supreme Court of the state of New York, and on April 1,
1892, at special term, the plaintiff in error was found guilty of
adultery as charged in the complaint, and a divorce was granted
upon th.at ground to the defendant in error. The divorce was

seem to settle the controversy.

...t11ctllary Beclrit1erships.-Before courts of bankruptcy with jurisdic·
the amendment of 1910 the courts tion to ' ' exerciae ancillary j urilldic·
were not agreed as to the ju- tion over persons or property within
risrliction of bankruptcy courts to their respective territorial limits in
aid of a receiver or trustee apappoint ancillary re<'eivers or to en·
pointed in any bankn1ptcy proceed·
tertain anciJlary pro<'eedings gener·
ally. See Collier on Bankn1ptcy, inga pending in any other court of
(10th ed.), 26. § 2, clause 20, of . bankruptcy.'' The amendment would
the bankruptcy act now invests the seem to settle the controveJ"l1.
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estate, not to enforce rights of action vested in the trustee alone,

not to involve the estate in possibly unnecessary litigation.

We think we should do violence to both the letter and the

spirit of the act to enlarge the functions of a mere temporary

custodian, and to construe the law as vesting him with functions,

powers, and duties which are clearly not contemplated by the

act. It follows, therefore, that the receiver had no right to de-

clare void the payments in question and no right to recover the

sums demanded. That can only be done by the trustee; for in

no other officer is the right vested. We do not say that the re-

ceiver may not, by suit or otherwise, assert or defend his pos-

session of the visible property which the law has placed in his

custody. That question is not before us. But he cannot usurp

the functions of a trustee and avoid payments to creditors when

no right so to do is conferred by the law.

* * * the decree is reversed and the cause is remanded,

with directions to dismiss the bill. • • •
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PROVABLE CLAIMS

A. In General

WETMORE v. MARKOE (formerly Wetmore)

196 U. S. 68, 49 L. ed. 390, 25 Sup. Ct. 172
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estate, not to enforce rights of action vested in the trustee alone,
not to involve the estate in possibly unnecessary litigation.
\Ve think we should do violence to both the letter and the
spirit of the act to enlarge the functions of a mere temporary
custodian, and to construe the law as vesting ·him with fWJctions.
powers, and duties which are clearly not contemplated by the
act. It follows, therefore, that the receiver had no right to declare void the payments in question and no right to recover the
sums demanded. That can only' be done by the trust.ee ; for in
no other officer is the right vested. We do not say that the receiver may not, by suit or otherwise, assert or defend bis possession of the visible property which the law has placed in his
custody. That question is not before us. But he cannot usurp
the functions of a trustee and avoid payments to creditors when
no right so to do is conferred by the law.
• • • the decree is reversed and the cause is remanded,
with directions to dismiss the bill. • • •

On June 12, 1890, an action for divorce and alimony was

begun by Annette B. W. Wetmore, wife of the plaintiff in error,

in the Supreme Court of the state of New York, and on April 1,

1892, at special term, the plaintiff in error was found guilty of
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adultery as charged in the complaint, and a divorce was granted

upon that ground to the defendant in error. The divorce was
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ally. See Collier on Bankruptcy,

(10th ed.), 26. 5 2, clause 20, of

the bankruptcy act now invests the

courts of bankruptcy with jurisdic-

tion to "exercise ancillary jurisdic-

tion over persons or property within

their respective territorial limits in

aid of a receiver or trustee ap-

pointed in any bankruptcy proceed-

ings pending in any other court of

bankruptcy.'' The amendment would

(United States Supreme Court.
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19, 1904)
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On June 121 1890, an action for divorce and alimony was
begun by Annette B. W. Wetmore, wife of the plaintift' in error,
in the Supreme Court of the state of New York, and on April 1,
1892, at special term, the plaintiff in error was found guilty of
adultery as charged in the complaint, and a divorce was granted
upon th.at ground to the defendant in error. The divorce was

seem to settle the controversy.

...t11ctllary Beclrit1erships.-Before courts of bankruptcy with jurisdic·
the amendment of 1910 the courts tion to ' ' exerciae ancillary j urilldic·
were not agreed as to the ju- tion over persons or property within
risrliction of bankruptcy courts to their respective territorial limits in
aid of a receiver or trustee apappoint ancillary re<'eivers or to en·
pointed in any bankn1ptcy proceed·
tertain anciJlary pro<'eedings gener·
ally. See Collier on Bankn1ptcy, inga pending in any other court of
(10th ed.), 26. § 2, clause 20, of . bankruptcy.'' The amendment would
the bankruptcy act now invests the seem to settle the controveJ"l1.
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absolute, and awarded to the wife the custody and care of the

three minor children of the marriage, and also, as alimony, the

sum of $3,000 per annum so long as she should live, to be paid

in quarterly instalments of $750 each on the first day of the

months of July, October, January, and April of each year.

There was also granted to the wife the sum of $3,000 annually,

being $1,000 for the education and maintenance of each of the

three minor children, to be paid in quarterly instalments, until

such children should arrive at the age of twenty-one years re-

spectively. Plaintiff in error was also required to give security

for the payment of the alimony awarded. The decree did not

reserve any right of subsequent modification or amendment. On

January 13, 1899, there was due to the wife from the plaintiff

in error, for arrears in alimony and allowance under the decree,

the sum of $19,221.60. Upon that day, upon application to the

District Court of the United States for the eastern district of

Pennsylvania, the plaintiff in error was adjudicated a bankrupt.

The defendant in error made no proof of her claim for alimony

in the bankrupt proceedings. On June 21, 1900, the plaintiff

in error was granted a discharge from all debts and claims

provable under the bankruptcy act. On December 12, 1901,

plaintiff in error sued out a writ in the Supreme Court of the
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state of New York for an order enjoining and restraining all

proceedings on behalf of the defendant in error for the collec-

tion of the arrears of alimony and allowance aforesaid. This

application was denied, upon the ground, as it appears from

the memorandum of the judge who rendered the decision, that

the arrears of alimony were not discharged in bankruptcy.

From the order denying the application an appeal was taken by

the plaintiff in error to the appellate division of the Supreme

Court of the state of New York, where the order below was

affirmed, 72 App. Div. N. Y. 620. The plaintiff in error there-

upon appealed to the Court of Appeals of the state of New York,

and on June 27,1902, the appeal was dismissed for want of juris-

diction, without any judgment of affirmance or reversal upon the

merits, 171 N. Y. 690. A writ of error was sued out seeking in

this court a reversal of the judgment of the Supreme Court of

the state of New York.

Mr. Justice DAY, after making the foregoing statement, de-

livered the opinion of the court:

It is conceded in argument by counsel for the plaintiff in

H. A A. Bankruptcy—25

absolute, and awarded to the wife the custody and care of the
three minor children of the marriage, and also, as alimony, the
sum of $3,000 per annum so long as she should live, to be paid
in quarterly instalments of $750 each on the first day of the
months of July, October, January, and April of each year.
There wus also granted to the wife the sum of $3,000 annually,
being $1,000 for the education and maintenance of each of the
three minor ehildren, to be paid in quarterly instalments, until
such children should arrive at the age of twenty-one years respectively. Plaintiff in error was also required to give security
for the payment of the alimony awarded. The decree did not
reserve any right of subsequent modification or amendment. On {
January 13, 1899, there was due to the wife from the plaintiff
in error, for arrears in alimony and allowance under the decree,
the sum of $19,221.60. Upon that day, upon application to the
District Court of the United States for the eastern district of
Pennsylvania, the plaintiff in error was adjudicated a bankrupt.
The defendant in error made no proof of her claim for alimony
in the bankrupt proceedings. On June 21, 1900, the plaintiff
in error was granted a discharge from all debts and claims
provable under the bankruptcy act. On December 12, 1901,
plain tiff in error sued out a writ in the Supreme Court of the
state of New York for an order enjoining and restraining all
proeeedi11gs on behalf of the defend.ant in error for the collection of the arrears of alimony and allowance aforesaid. This
application was denied, upon the ground, as it appears from
the memorandum of the judge who rendered the decision, that
the arrears of alimony were not discharged in bankruptcy.
From the order denying the application an appeal was taken by
the plaintiff in error to the appellate division of the Supreme
Court of the state of New York, where the order below was
affirmed, 72 App. Div. N. Y. 620. The plaintiff in error thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals of the state of New York,
and on June 27, 1902, the appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, without. any judgment of affirmance or reversal upon the
merits, 171 N. Y. 690. A writ of error was sued out seeking in
this court a reversal of the judgment of the Supreme Court of
the state of New York.
l\Ir. Justice DAY, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:
It is conceded in argument by counsel for the plaintllI in
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error that this case would be within the decision of this court

in Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575, 45 L. ed. 1010, 21 Sup.

Ct. Rep. 735, if the judgment for alimony had been rendered

in a court having control over the decree with power to amend

or alter the same. It is insisted, however, that, there being in

this case no reservation of the right to change or modify the

decree, it has become an absolute judgment, beyond the power

of the court to alter or amend, and is therefore discharged by

the bankruptcy proceedings. Walker v. Walker, 155 N. Y. 77,

49 N. E. 663; Livingston v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377, 61 L. R

A. 800, 93 Am. St. Rep. 600, 66 N. E. 123. It may be admitted

to be the effect of these decisions of the New York Court of

Appeals that, in the absence of any reservation of the right to

modify or amend, the judgment for alimony becomes absolute.

The question presented for decision, in view of this state of the

law is, Has the decree become a fixed liability evidenced by a

judgment, and therefore provable against the estate of the bank-

rupt, within the protection of the discharge in bankruptcy?

§ 63 of the act of 1898 provides:

'- § 63. Debts which may be proved:

"a Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against

his estate which are (1) a fixed liability as evidenced by a. judg-
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ment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the time

of the filing of the petition against him, whether then payable

or not, with any interest thereon which would have been re-

coverable at that date, or with a rebate of interest upon such

as were not then payable and did not bear interest." [30 Stat,

at L. 562, c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3447.] .

. It is not contended that this section includes instalments of

alimony becoming due after the adjudication, but the conten-

tion is that prior instalments have become an existing liability,

evidenced by the judgment, and therefore a provable debt.

While this section enumerates under separate paragraphs the

kind and character of claims to be proved and allowed in bant

ruptcy, the classification is only a means of describing "debts"

of the bankrupt which may be proved and allowed against his

estate.

The precise question, therefore, is, Is such a judgment as the

one here under consideration a debt -within the meaning of the

act? The mere fact that a judgment has been rendered does

not prevent the court from looking into the proceedings with a

view of determining the nature of the liability which has been

error that this case would be within the decision of this court
in Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575, 45 L. ed. 1010, 21 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 735, if the judgment for alimony had been rendered
in a court having control over the decree with power to amend
or alter the same. It is insisted, however, that, there being in
this case no reservation of the right to change or modify the
decree, it has become an absolute judgment, beyond the power
of the court to alter or amend, and is therefore discharged by
the bankruptcy proceedings. Walker v. Walker, 155 N. Y. 7i,
49 N. E. 66a; Livingston v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377, 61 L. R.
A. '800, 93 Am. St. Rep. 600, 66 N. E. 123. It may be admitted
to be the effect of these decisions of the New York Court of
Appeals that, in the absence of any reservation of the right to
modify or amend, the judgment for alimony becomes absolute.
The question presented for decision, in view of this state of the
law is, Has the decree become a fixed liability evidenced by a
judgment, and therefore provable against the estate of the bank·
rupt, within the protection of the discharge in bankruptcy f
§ 63 of the act of 1898 provides :
'· § 63. Debts which may be proved:
"a Debts of the bsnkrupt may be proved and allowed against
his estate which are (1) a fixed liability as evidenced by a.judg·
ment or an instrument in writing, a1Jsolu\elY owing at the time
of the tiling of the petition against him, whether then payable
or not, with any interest thereon which would have been recoverable at that date, or with a rebate of interest upon such
ns were not then payable and did not bear interest." [30 Stat.
at L. 562, c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3447.]
~ It is not contended that this section includes instalments of
alimony becoming due after the adjudication, but the conten·
tion is that prior instalments have become an existing liability,'
evidenced by the judgment, and therefore a provable debt.
While this section enumerates under separate paragraphs the
kind and character of claims to be proved and allowed in bankruptcy; the classific~tio;1 is only a means of describing "debts;;
of the bankrupt which may be proved and allowed against his
estate.
The precise question, therefore, is, Is such a judgment as the
one here under consideration a· debt within the meaning of the
act Y The mere fact that a judgment has been rendered does
not prevent the court from looking into the proceedings with a
view of determining the nature of the liability whieh has been
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reduced to judgment. Boynton v. Ball, 121 U. S. 457, 466, 30

L. ed. 985, 987, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 981. The question presented is

not altogether new in this court. In the case of Audubon v.

Shixfeldt, 181 U. S. 577, 45 L. ed. 1010, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 736,

jVIr. Justice Gray, delivering the opinion of the court said:

*' Alimony does not arise from any business transaction, but

from the relation of marriage. It is not founded on contract,

express or implied, but on the natural and legal duty of the hus-

band to support the wife. The^general obligation to support is

made specific by the decree of the court of appropriate juris-

diction. Generally speaking, alimony may be altered by that

court at any time, as the circumstances of the parties may re-

quire. The decree of a court of one state, indeed, for the present

payment of a definite sum of money as alimony, is a record

which is entitled to full faith and credit in another state, and

may, therefore, be there enforced by suit. Barber v. Barber

(1858), 21 How. 582, 16 L. ed. 226; Lynde v. Lynde (1901),

181 U. S. 183, 45 L. ed. 810, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 555. But its

obligation in that respect does not affect its nature. In other

respects, alimony cannot ordinarily be enforced by action at law,

but only by application to the court which granted it, and sub-

ject to the discretion of that court. Permanent alimony is re-
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garded rather as a portion of the husband's estate to which the

wife is equitably entitled than as strictly a debt; alimony from

time to time may be regarded as a portion of his current income

or earnings; and the considerations which affect either can be

better weighed by the court having jurisdiction over the rela-

tion of husband and wife than by a court of a different juris-

diction."

In the same opinion Mr. Justice Gray quoted from Barclay v.

Barclay, 184 Ill. 375, 51 L. R. A. 351, 56 N. E. 636, in which

ease it was adjudged that alimony could not be regarded as a

debt owing from husband to wife, which might be discharged

by an order in bankruptcy, whether the alimony accrued before

or after the proceedings in bankruptcy:

"The liability to pay alimony is not founded upon a contract,

but is a penalty imposed for a failure to perform a duty. It is

not to be enforced by an action at law in the state where the

decree is entered, but is to be enforced by such proceedings as

the chancellor may determine and adopt for its enforcement.

• • • It may be enforced by imprisonment for contempt,

without violating the constitutional provision prohibiting impris-

reduced to judgment. Boynton v. Ball, 121 U. S. 457, 466, 30
L. ed. 985, 987, 7 Sup. Ct. Hep. 981. 'l'he question presented is
not altogether new in this court. In the case of Audubon v.
Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 577, 45 L. ed. 1010, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 736,
Mr. Justice Gray, delivering the opinion of th~ court said:
' • Alimony docs not arise from any business transaction, but
fron1 the relation of marriage. It is not founded on contract,
express or implied, but on the natural and legal duty of the husband to support the wife. The 8Cneral obligation to support is
made specific by the decree of the court of appropriate jurisdiction. Generally speaking, alimony may be altered by that
court at any time, as the circumstances of the parties may require. The decree of a court of one state, indeed, for the present
payment of a definite sum of money as alimony, is a record
which is entitled to full faith and credit in another state, and
rnay, therefore, be there enforced by suit. Barber v. Barber
(1858), 21 How. 582, 16 L. ed. 226; Lynde v. Lynde (1901),
181 U. S. 183, 45 L. ed. 810, 21 Sup. Ct. Hep. 555. But its
obligation in that respect does not affect its nature. In other
respects, alimony cannot ordinarily be enforced by action at law, \
but only by application to the court which granted it, and subject to the discretion of that court. Permanent alimony is regarded rather as a portion of the husband's estate to which the
wife is equitably entitled than as strictly a debt; alimony from
time to time may be regarded as a portion of his current income
or earnings; and the cousideratious which affect either can be
better weighed by the court having jurisdiction over the relation of husband and wife than by a court of a different jurisdiction. ''
In the same opinion Mr. Justice Gray quoted from Barclay v.
Barclay, 184 Ill. 375, 51 L. R. A. 351, 56 N. E. 636, in which
case it was adjudged that alimony could not be regarded as a
debt owing from husband to wife, which might be discharged
by an order in bankruptcy, whether the alimony accrued before
or after the proceedings iu bankruptcy :
''The liability to pay alimony is not founded upon a contract,
but is a penalty imposed for a failure to perform a duty. It is
not to be enforced by an action at law in the state where the
decree is entered, but is to be enforced by such proceedings as
the chancellor may determine and adopt for its enforcement.
• • • It may be enforced by imprisonment for contempt,
without violating the constitutional provision prohibiting impris-
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onment for debt. The decree for alimony may be changed from

time to time by the chancellor, and there may be such circum-

stances as would authorize the chancellor to even change the

amount to be paid by the husband, where he is in arrears in pay-

ments required under the decree. Hence, such alimony cannot

be regarded as a debt owing from the husband to the wife, and,

not being so, cannot be discharged by an order in the bankruptcy

court.''

It is true that, in the cases referred to, the decrees were ren-

dered in courts having continuing control over them, with power

to alter or amend them upon application; but this fact does not

change the essential character of the liability, nor determine

whether a claim for alimony is, in its nature, contractual so as

to make it a debt. The court having power to look behind the

judgment, to determine the nature and extent of the liability,

the obligation enforced is still of the same character notwith-

standing the judgment. We think the i reasoning of the Audu-

bon Case recognizes the doctrine that a decree awarding alimony

to the wife or children, or both, is not a debt which has been

put in the form of a judgment, but is rather a legal means of

enforcing the obligation of the husband and father to support

and maintain his wife and children. He owes this duty, not

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

because of any contractual obligation, or as a debt due from

him to the wife, but because of the policy of the law which im-

poses the obligation upon the husband. The law interferes

when the husband neglects or refuses to discharge this duty, and

enforces it against him by means of legal proceedings.

It is true that in the state of New York at the time this decree

was rendered there was no power to modify or alter the decree

for alimony and allowance in the absence of special reservation.

But this does not change the grounds upon which the courts of

the state proceeded in awarding the alimony and allowances.

In the case of Romaine v. Chaur.cey, 129 N. Y. 566, 14 L. R. A.

712, 26 Am. St. Rep. 544, 29 N. E. 826, it was held that alimony

was awarded, not in the payment of a debt, but in the per-

formance of the general duty of the husband to support the

wife. This case was quoted with approval by Mr. Justice Gray

in Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575, 45 L. ed. 1009, 21 Sup.

Ct. Rep. 735.

In Walker v. Walker, 155 N. Y. 77, 49 N. E. 663, and Living-

ston v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377, 61 L. R. A. 800, 93 Am. St

Rep. 600, 66 N. E. 123, the effect of the holdings is that a judg-

onment for debt. The decree for alimony may be changed from
time to time by the chancellor, and there may be such circumstances as would authorize the chancellor to even change the
amount to be paid by the husband, where he is in arrears in payments required under the decree. Hence, such alimony cannot
be regarded as a debt owing from the husband to the wife, and,
not being so, cannot be discharged by an order in the bankruptcy
court.''
It is true that, in the cases referred to, the decrees were rendered in courts having continuing control over them, with power
to alter or amend them upon application; but this fact does not
change the essential character of the liability, nor determine
whether a claim for alimony is, in its nature, contractual so as
to make it a debt. The court having power to look behind the
judgment, to determine the nature and extent of the liability,
the obligation enforced is still of the same character notwithstanding the judgment. We think the• reasoning of the Audubon Case recognizes the doctrine that a decree awarding alimony
to the wife or children, or both, is not a debt which has been
put in the form of a judgment, but is rather a legal means of
enforcing the obligation of the husband and father to support
and maintain his wife and children. He owes this duty, not
because of any contractual obligation, or as a debt due from
him to the wife, but because of the policy of the law which imposes the obligation upon the husband. The law interferes
when the husband neglects or refuses to discharge this duty, and
enforces it against him by means of legal proceedings.
It is true that in the state of New York at the time this decree
was rendered there was no power to modify or alter the decree
for alimony and allowance in the absence of special reservation.
llut this does not change the grounds upon which the courts of
the state proceeded in awarding the alimony and allowances.
In the case of Romaine v. Chaur.cey, 129 N. Y. 566, 14 L. R. A.
712, 26 Am. St. Rep. 544, 29 N. E. 826, 'it was held that alimony
was awarded, not in the payment of a debt, but i.p the performance of the general duty of the husband to support the
wife. This case was quoted with approval by Mr. Justice Gray
in Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575, 45 L. ed. 1009, 21 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 735.
In Walker v. Walker, 155 N. Y. 77, 49 N. E. 663, and Livingston v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377, 61 L. R. A. 800, 93 Am. St.
Rep. 600, 66 N. E. 123, the effect of the holdings is that a JUdg-
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ment for alimony, in the absence of reservation, is a fixed and

unalterable determination of the amount to be contributed to the

wife's support after the decree, and is beyond the power of the

court to change even under the authority of subsequent legis-

lation. These cases do not modify the grounds upon which ali-

mony is awarded, and recognize that an alimony decree is a

provision for the support of the wife, settled and determined by

the judgment of the court.

In the ease of Dunbar v. Dunbar, decided by this court at the

October term, 1902 (190 U. S. 340, 47 L. ed. 1084, 23 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 757), it was held that a contract made after divorce be-

tween husband and wife, by which the former agreed to pay the

latter a certain sum of money annually for her support during

her life, or so long as she remained unmarried, and also to pay

a certain sum of money to her annually for the support of the

minor children of the marriage, whose custody was awarded to

the mother, was not discharged by a subsequent proceeding and

discharge in bankruptcy. It was further held that the sum

agreed to be paid for the support of the minor children was but

a recognition of the liability of the father for their support, and

that the fact that the annual instalments were made payable to

the wife made no difference in the character of the obligation.

Of this feature of the contract the court, speaking by Mr. Jus-
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tice Peckham, said:

"In relation to that part of the husband's contract to pay for

the support of his minor children until they respectively be-

come of age, we also think that it was not of a nature to be

proved in bankruptcy. At common law, a father is bound to

support his legitimate children, and the obligation continues

during their minority. We may assume this obligation to exist

in all the states. In this case the decree of the court provided

that the children should remain in the custody of the wife, and

the contract to contribute a certain sum yearly for the support

of each child during his minority was simply a contract to do

that which the law obliged him to do; that is, to support his

minor children. • • • "We think it was not the intention of

Congress, in passing a bankruptcy act, to provide for the release

of the father from his obligation to support his children by his

discharge in bankruptcy, and if not, then we see no reason why

his contract to do that which the law obliged him to do should

be discharged in that way. As his discharge would not in any

event terminate his obligation to support his children during

ment for alimony, in the absence of reservation, is a fixed and
u11alterable determination of the amount to be contributed to the
wife ·s support after the decree, and is beyond the power of the
court to change even under the authority of subsequent legislation. These cases do not modify the grounds upon which alimony is awarded, and recognize that an alimony decree is a
pro\'isiou for the support of the wife, settled an<l determined by
the judgment of the court.
In the case of Dunbar v. Dunbar, decided by this court at the
October term, 1902 (190 U. S. 340, 47 L. ed. 1084, 23 Sup. Ct.
Rt~p. 757), it was held that a contract made after divorce betweeu husband and wife, by which the former agreed to pay the
latter a certain sum of money annually for her support during
her life, or so long as she re!nained unmarried, and also to pay
a certain sum of money to her annually for the support of the
minor children of the marriage, whose custody was awarded to
the mother, was not discharged by a subsequent proceeding and
discharge in bankruptcy. It was further held that the sum
agreed to be paid for the support of the minor children was but
a recognition of the liability of the father for their support, and
that the fact that the annual instalments were made payable to
the v.·ife made no difference in the character of the obligation.
Of this feature of the contract the court, speaking by Mr. Justice Peckham, said:
''In relation to that part of the husband's contract to pay for
the support of his minor children until they respectively become of age, we al.so think that it was not of a nature to be
proved in bankruptcy. At common law, a father is bound to
support his legitimate children, and the obligation continues
during their minority. We may assume this obligation to exist
in all the states. In this case the decree of the court provided
that the children should remain in the custody of the wife, and
the contract to contribute a certain sum yearly for the support
of each child during his minority was simply a contract to do
that which the law obliged him to do; that is, to support his
minor children. • • • \Ve think it was not the intention of
Congress, in passing a bankruptcy act, to provide for the release
of the father from his obligation to support his children by his
<liseharge in bankruptcy, and if not, then we see no reason why
his contract to do that which the law obliged him to do should
be discharged in that way. As his discharge would not in any
event terminate his obligation to support his children during
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their minority, we see no reason why his written contract

acknowledging such obligation and agreeing to pay a certain

sum (which may be presumed to have been a reasonable one) in

fulfilment thereof should be discharged. It is true his prom-

ise is to pay to the mother; but on this branch of the contract it

is for the purpose of supporting his two minor children, and he

simply makes her his agent for that purpose."

We think this language is equally applicable to the present

ease in that aspect of the decree which provides for the support

of the minor children. The obligation continues after the dis-

charge in bankruptcy as well as before, and is no more than the

duty devolved by the law upon the husband to support his

children, and is not a debt in any just sense.

It is urged that the amendment of the law made by the act

of February 5, 1903 [32 Stat. at L. 797>. 487], excepting from

the operation of a discharge in bankruptcy a decree for alimony

due or to become due, or for the maintenance and support of

the wife and minor children, is a legislative recognition of the

fact that, prior to the passage of the amendment, judgments for

alimony would be discharged. In Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S.

340, 47 L. ed. 1084, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 757, it was said that this

amendment, while it did not apply to prior cases, may be referred
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to for the purpose of showing the legislative trend in the direc-

tion of not discharging an obligation of the bankrupt for the

support and maintenance of wife and children. The amendment

may also have been passed with a view to settling the law upon

this subject, and to put at rest the controversies which had arisen

from the conflicting decisions of the courts, both state and Fed-

eral, upon this question. Indeed, in view of the construction

of the act in this court in Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575,

45 L. ed. 1009, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 735, it may be said to be merely

declaratory of the true meaning and sense of the statute. United

States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556, 11 L. ed. 724; Bailey v. Clark,

21 Wall. 284, 288, 22 L. ed. 651, 653; Cope v. Cope, 137 U. S.

682, 684, 34 L. ed. 832, 834, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 222. The bank-

ruptcy law should receive such an interpretation as will effectuate

its beneficent purposes, and not make it an instrument to deprive

dependent wife and children of the support and maintenance

due them from the husband and father, which it has ever been

the purpose of the law to enforce. Systems of bankruptcy are

designed to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of in-

debtedness which has become oppressive, and to permit him to

their minority, we see no reason why his written contract
acknowledging such obligation and agreeing to pay a certain
sum (which may be presumed to have been a reasonable one) in
fulfilment thereof should be discharged. It is true his promise is to pay to the mother; but on this branch of the contract it
is for the purpose of supporting his two minor children, and he
simply makes her his agent for that purpose."
We think this language is equally applicable to the present
case in th.at aspect of the decree which provides for the support
of the minor children. The obligation continues after the discharge in bankruptcy as well as before, and is no more than the
duty devolved by the law upon the husband to support his
children, and is not a debt in any just sense.
It is urged that the amendment of the law made by the act
of February 5, 1903 [32 Stat. at L. 797 ,' c. 487], excepting from
the operation of a discharge in bankruptcy a decree for alimony
due or to become due, or for the maintenance and support of
the wife and minor children, is a legislative recognition of the
fact that, prior to the passage of the amendment, judgments for
alimony would be discharged. In Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S.
340, 47 L. ed. 1084, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 757, it was said that this
ameudmcut, while it did not apply to prior cases, may be referred
to for the purpose of showing the legislative trend in the direc·
tion of not diseharging an obligation of the bankrupt for the
support and maintenance of wife and children. The amendment
may also have been passed with a view to settli11g the law upon
this subject, aud to put at rest the controversies which had arisen
from the couflicting decisions of the courts, both state and Fed·
eral, upon this question. Indeed, in view of the construction
of the act in this court in Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575,
45 L. ed. 1009, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 735, it may be said to be merely
decla1·atory of the true meaning and sense of the statute. Unit~
States v. J<,reeman, 3 How. 556, 11 L. ed. 724; Bailey v. Clark,
21 Wall. 284, 28S, 22 L. ed. 651, 653; Cope v. Cope, 137 U. S.
682, 684, 34 L. ed. 832, 834, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 222. The bank·
ruptcy law should receive such an interpretation as will effectuate
its beneficent purposes, and not make it an instrument to deprive
dependent wife and children of the support and maintenance
due them from the husband and father, which it has ever been
the purpose of the law to enforce. Systems of bankruptcy are
designed to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of indebtedness which has become oppressive, and to permit him to
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have a fresh start in business or commercial life, freed from the

obligation and responsibilities which may have resulted from

business misfortunes. Unless positively required by direct enact-

ment the courts should not presume a design upon the part of

Congress, in relieving the unfortunate debtor, to make the law

a means of avoiding enforcement of the obligation, moral and

legal, devolved upon the husband to support his wife and to

maintain and educate his children. While it is true in this case

the obligation has become fixed by an unalterable decree so far

as the amount to be contributed by the husband for the support

is concerned, looking beneath the judgment for the foundation

upon which it rests, we find it was not decreed for any debt of

the bankrupt, but was only a means designed by the law for

carrying into effect, and making available to the wife and chil-

dren, the right which the law gives them as against the husband

and father.

We find no error in the judgment of the Supreme Court of

the state of New York, and the same is affirmed.1

ZAVELO v. REEVES et al.

227 U. S. 625, 57 L. ed. 676, 33 Sup. Ct. 365

(United States Supreme Court. February 24, 1913)

Mr. Justice PITNEY delivered the opinion of the court:
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Defendants in error sued plaintiff in error November 22, 1907,

in the City Court of Birmingham, Alabama, declaring upon the

common counts for moneys due December 10, 1906, and Febru-

ary 19, 1906, and by an amendment declared upon a promissory

have a fresh start in business or commercial life, freed from the
obligation and responsibilities which may have resulted from
business misfortunes. Unless positively required by direct enactL1ent the courts should not presume a design upon the part of
Cougress, in relieving the unfortunate debtor, to make the law
a mt!aUB of avoiding enforcement of the obligation, moral and
legal, devolved upon the husband to support his wife and to
inaintain and educate his children. While it is true in this case
the obligation has become fixed by an unalterable decree so far
as the amount to be contributed by the husband for the support
is concerned, looking beneath the judgment for the foundation
upon which it rests, we find it was not decreed for any debt of
the bankrupt, but was only a means designed by the law for
carrying into effect, and making available to the wife and children, the right which the law gives them as again.st the husband
and father.
\Ve find no error in the judgment of the Supreme Court of
the state of New York, and the same is affirmed. 1

note for about $250, which was a part of a claim of the defend-

ants in error that antedated the bankruptcy of the plaintiff in

error. The defendant (now plaintiff in error) pleaded that on

ZAVELO v. REEVES et al.

November 22, 1905, he filed in the District Court of the United

States for the northern district of Alabama, his petition in bank-

227 U. S. 625, 57 L. ed. 676, 33 Sup. Ct. 365

ruptcy; that said court had jurisdiction of said bankruptcy pro-

ceedings, and duly adjudicated him a bankrupt on that date;

(United States Supreme Court. February 24, 1913)

that subsequently he offered a composition to his creditors, and

the offer was accepted and a composition made in said proceed-

ings and duly confirmed by said District Court February 6, 1906,

1—See In re Moore, 111 Fed. Co., 188 Fed. 861; James v. Gray,

145; In re Southern Steel Co., 183 131 Fed. 401.

Fed. 498; In re Spot-Cash Hooper

Mr. Justice PITNEY delivered the opinion of the court:
Defepdants in error sued plaintiff in error November 22, 1907,
in the City Court of Birmingham, Alabama, declaring upon the
common counts for moneys due December 10, 1906, and February 19, 1906, and by an amendment declared upon a promissory
note for about $250, which was a part of a claim of the defendants in error that antedated the bankruptcy of the plaintiff in
t>rror. The defendant (now plaintiff in error) pleaded that on
November 22, 1905, he filed in the District Court of the United
States for the northern district of Alabama, his petition in bankruptcy; that said court had jurisdiction of said bankruptcy proceedings. and duly adjudicated him a bankrupt on that date;
that subsequently he offPred a composition to his rreditors, and
the offer was accepted and a composition made in said proceedings and duly confirmed by said District Court February 6, 1906,
1-See In re Moore, 111 Fed.
145; In re Southern Steel Co., 183
Fed. •98 ; In re Spot·Caah Hooper

Co., 188 Fed. 861; James v. Gray,
131 Fed. 401.

\
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a certified copy of the decree of confirmation being attached to
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and made a part of the plea; that the plaintiffs were then cred-

itors of the bankrupt, and as such accepted tke offer of compo-

sition and were paid a dividend thereon; that the claim sued

on herein is a part of and was included in said claim on which

said dividend was paid, and the claim herein is barred by said

proceedings and discharged by said composition. The plaintiffs

replied, (a) that on January 1, 1906 (which date was after the

adjudication and before the discharge), defendant promised that

if plaintiffs would lend him $500 for use in paying the considera-

tion of a composition with his creditors in said bankruptcy pro-

ceedings, he, defendant, when said composition was confirmed,

would pay plaintiffs the balance of the demand sued on, after

deducting therefrom plaintiffs' share of the consideration of such

composition; and plaintiffs averred that they accepted defend-

ant's said offer and promise, and did so lend him the said sum

of $500 for the said purpose; and (b) for further replication,

that after the filing of defendant's said petition in bankruptcy,

and after he had been adjudged a bankrupt, defendant promised

plaintiffs that he would pay what he owed them, being the same

demand sued on herein, when his composition in bankruptcy was

confirmed, and that plaintiffs accepted said promise. To these

replications the defendant demurred. The City Court overruled
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the demurrers and proceeded to a trial of the issues of fact, which

resulted in favor of the plaintiffs upon both the common counts

and the note. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of

Alabama, which affirmed the judgment. 171 Ala. 401, 54 So. 654.

Whereupon he sued out the present writ of error.

The case is brought here under § 709, Rev. Stat. (TJ. S. Comp.

Stat. 1901, p. 575), the contention being that a right or immunity

set up and claimed by the plaintiff in error under the Federal

bankruptcy act was denied by the State Court. See Linton v.

Stanton, 12 How. 423, 13 L. ed. 1050; Mays v. Fritton, 131 U. S.

cxiv, Appx. and 21 L. ed. 127; Hill v. Harding, 107 U. S. 631,

27 L. ed. 493, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 404; Rector v. City Deposit Bank,

200 U. S. 405, 50 L. ed. 527, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289.

It is not contended that the record imports a secret or fraudu-

lent agreement between the bankrupt and the plaintiffs at the

expense of other creditors. The State Court construed the repli-

cations as not averring secrecy or fraud, saying (171 Ala. 408):

'' That an advantage accrued to plaintiffs as the result of the loan

is true; but that it came as a result of fraud, collusion, or extor-

a certified copy of the decree of confirmation being attached to
anrl made a part of the plea; that the plaintiffs were then creditors of the baHkrnpt, and as such accepted tk'e offer of composition and were paid a dividend thereon; that the claim sued
on herein is a part of and was included in said claim on which
said dividend was paid, and the claim herein is bnrrl'<l by said
proceedings and discharged by said composition. The plaintiff&
replied, (a) that on January 1, 1906 (which date was after the
adjudication 11nd before the discharge), defendant promised that
if plaintiffs would lend him $500 for use in paying the considt>ration of a composition with his creditors in said bankruptcy proceedings, he, defendant, when said composition was confirmed,
would pay plaintiffs the balance of the demand sued on, after
deducting therefrom plaintiffs' share of the consideration of such
composition ; and plaintiffs averred that they accepted defendant's said offer and promise, and did so lend him the said sum
of $500 for the said purpose; and ( b) for further replication,
that after the filing of defendant's said petition in bankruptcy,
and after he had been adjudged a bankrupt, defendant promised
plaintiffs that he would pay what he owed them, being the same
demand sued on herein, when his composition in bankruptcy was
confirmed, and that plaintiffs accepted said promise. To these
replications the defendant demurred. The City Court overruled
the demurrers and proceeded to a trial of the issues of fact, which
resulted in favor of the plaintiffs upon both the common counts
and the note. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of
. Alabama, which affirmed the judgment. 171 Ala. 401, 54 So. 654.
Whereupon he sued out the present writ of error.
The case is brought here under § 709, Rev. Stat. (U. S. Comp.
Stat. 1901, p. 575), the contention being that a right or immunity
set up and claimed by the plaintiff in error under the Federal
bankruptcy act was denied by the State Court. See Linton v.
Stanton, 12 How. 423, Ia L. ed. 1050; l\lays v. Fritton, 131 U. S.
cxiv, Appx. and 21 L. ed. 127; Hill v. Harding, 107 U. S. 631,
27 L. ed. 493, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 404; Rector v. City Deposit Bank,
200 U. S. 405, 50 L. ed. 527, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289.
It is not contended that the record imports a secret or fraudulent agreement between the bankrupt and the plaintiffs at the
expense of other creditors. The State Court construed the replications as not averring secrecy or fraud, saying (171 Ala. 408):
''That an advantage accrued to plaintiffs as the result of the loan
is true; but that it came as a result of fraud, collusion, or extor-
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tion, cannot be read from these replications. Ou the contrary,

the advantage, so far as the pleadings show, was the result of

the advancement made by way of the loan described. There is

nothing in the replications on which to rest a conclusion that any-

thing other than the loan induced the promise relied on for recov-

ery here."

This construction of the pleadings is not disputed here. We

therefore are not in this case concerned with the general equi-

table principle that composition agreements are invalid if based

upon or procured by a secret arrangement with one or more fa-

vored creditors, in violation of the equality and reciprocity upon

which such an agreement is avowedly based. Story, Eq. Jur. 9th

ed. §§ 378, 379; Clarke v. White, 12 Pet. 178, 199, 9 L. ed. 1046,

1055; Wood v. Barker, L. R. 1 Eq. 139, 35 L. J. Ch. N. S. 276,

11 Jur. N. S. 905,13 L. T. N. S. 318,14 Week. Rep. 47; McKewan

v. Sanderson, L. R. 20 Eq. 65, 44 L. J. Ch. N. S. 447, 32 L. T.

N. S. 385, 23 Week. Rep. 607; Bissell v. Jones, L. R. 4 Q. B. 49,

9 Best & S. 884, 38 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 2, 19 L. T. N. S. 262, 17

Week. Rep. 49; Ex parte Nicholson, L. R. 5 Ch. 332, 22 L. T. N.

S. 286, 18 Week. Rep. 411; Crossley v. Moore, 40 N. J. L. 27, 34;

Feldman v. Gamble, 26 N. J. Eq. 494; Dicks v. Andrews, 132

Ga. 601, 604, 64 S. E. 788, 16 Ann. Cas. 1070.
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Of the questions raised, only three deserve notice.

(1) It is contended that the transaction set up in the former

of the two replications mentioned was in violation of the prohibi-

tion of § 296, cl. 5 of the bankruptcy act (30 Stat. at L. c. 541,

pp. 544, 554, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 3418, 3433), which de-

clares that "a person shall be punished, by imprisonment for

a period not to exceed two years, upon conviction of the offense

of having knowingly and fraudulently * * * extorted or

attempted to extort any money or property from any person as

a consideration for acting or forbearing to act in bankruptcy

proceedings." It is sufficient to say that we are unable to see

in this record anything of extortion or attempted extortion.

(2) It is contended as to both replications that although a

debt barred by discharge in bankruptcy may be revived by a

new promise made after the discharge, this cannot be done by

a new promise made in the interim between the adjudication

and the discharge.

It is settled, however, that a discharge, while releasing the

bankrupt from legal liability to pay a debt that was provable in

the bankruptcy, leaves him under a moral obligation that is

tion, cannot be read from these rt>plications. On the contrary,
the advantage, so far as the pleadings show, was thP result of
the advancement made by way of the loan described. There is
nothing in the replications on which to rest a conclusion that anything other than the loan induced the promise relied on for recovery here."
This construction of the pleadings is not disputed here. We
therefore are not in this case concerned with the general equitable principle that composition agreements are invalid if based
upon or procured by a secret arrangement with one or more favored creditors, in violation of the equality and reciprocity upon
which such an agreement is avowedly based. Story, Eq ..Jur. 9th
ed. §§ 378, 379; Clarke v. White, 12 Pet. 178, 199, 9 L. ed. 1046, ·
1055; Wood v. Barker, L. R. 1 Eq. 139, 35 L. J. Ch. N. S. 276,
11 Jur. N. S. 905, 13 L. T. N. S. 318, 14 Week. Rep. 47; McKewan
v. Sanderson, L. R. 20 Eq. 65, 44 L. J . Ch. N. S. 447, 32 L. T.
N. S. 385, 23 Week. Rep. 607; Bissell v. Jones, L. R. 4 Q. B. 49,
9 Best & S. 884, 38 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 2, 19 L. T. N. S. 262, 17
Week. Rep. 49; Ex parte Nicholson, L. R. 5 Ch. 332, 22 L. T. N.
S. 286, 18 Week. Rep. 411; Crossley v. Moore, 40 N. J. L. 27, 34;
Feldman v. Gamble, 26 N. J. Eq. 494; Dicks v. Andrews, 132
Ga. 601, 604, 64 S. E . 788, 16 Ann. Cas. 1070.
Of the questions raised, only three deserve notice.
( 1) It is contended that the transaction set up in the former
of the two replications mentioned was in violation of the prohibition of § 29b, cl. 5 of the bankruptcy act (30 Stat. at L. c. 541,
pp. 544, 554, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 3418, 3433), whieh declares that ''a person shall be punished, by imprisonment for
a period not to exceed two years, upon conviction of the offense
of having knowingly and fraudulently • • • extorted or
attempted to extort any money or property from any person as
a consideration for acting or forbearing to act in bankruptcy
proceedings." It is sufficient to say that we are unable to see
in this record anything of extortion or attempted extortion.
(2) It is contended as to both replications that although a
debt barred by discharge in bankruptcy may be revived by a
new promise made after the discharge, this cannot be done by
a new promise made in the interim between the adjudication
and the discharge.
It is settled, however, that a discharge, while releasing the
bankrupt from legal liability to pay a debt that was provable in
the bankruptcy, leaves him under a moral obligation that is
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sufficient to support a new promise to pay the debt, ^nd in

reason, as well as by the greater weight of authority, the date

of the new promise is immaterial. The theory is that the dis-

charge destroys the remedy, but not the indebtedness: that, gen-

erally speaking, it relates to the inception of the proceedings, aud

the transfer of the bankrupt's estate for the benefit of creditors

takes effect as of the same time; that the bankrupt becomes a free

man from the time to which the discharge relates, and is as com-

petent to bind himself by a promise to pay an antecedent obliga-

tion, which otherwise would not be actionable because of the

discharge, as he is to enter into any new engagement. And so,

under other bankrupt acts, it has been commonly held that a

promise to pay a provable debt, notwithstanding the discharge,

is as effectual when made after the filing of the petition and

before the discharge as if made after the discharge. Kirkpatrick

v. Tattersall, 13 Mees. & W. 766, 1 Car. & K. 577, 14 L. J. Exch.

N. S. 209, 9 Jur. 214; Otis v. Gazlin, 31 Me. 567; Hornthal v.

McRae, 67 N. C. 21; Fraley v. Kelly, 67 N. C. 78; Hill v. Trainer,

49 Wis. 537, 5 N. W. 926; Knapp v. Hoyt, 57 Iowa, 591, 42 Am.

Rep. 59, 10 N. W. 925; Lanagin v. Nowland, 44 Ark. 84; Wiggin

v. Hodgdon, 63 N. H. 39; Oriel v. Solomon, 82 Ala. 85, 60 Am.

Rep. 733, 2 So. 322; Jersey City Ins. Co. v. Archer, 122 N. Y.
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376, 25 N. E. 338.

Our attention is not called to any decision in point arising

under the present bankruptcy act; but we deem it clear that the

same rule should be applied. If there is any distinction between

this and former acts that would require a different rule, it must

arise from the time to which the discharge is made to relate.

As to this, § 17 of the act of 1898 declares that "a discharge in

bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts,''

with certain exceptions not now pertinent. For the definition of

"provable debts" we are referred to §63, which is set forth

in full in the margin.2 Of the several classes of liabilities, those

2—§ 63. Debts Which May be

Proved.—a Debts of the bankrupt

which may be proved and allowed

against his estate which are (1) a

fixed liability, as evidenced by a

judgment or an instrument in writ-

ing, absolutely owing at the time

of the filing of the petition against

him, whether then payable or not,

with any interest thereon which

would have been recoverable at that

date or with a rebate of interest

upon such as were not then payable

sufficient to support a new promise to pay the debt. ~nd in
reason, as well as by the greater weight of au~hority. the dat•:
of the new promise is immaterial. The theory is that thl' discharge destroys the remedy, but not the indebteduess: that, ge::crally S,l)(:alting, it relates to the inception of the proceedin~s , auJ
the transfer of the bankrupt's estate for the benefit of cre·litors
takes effect as of the same time; that the bankrupt becomes a free
man from the time to which the discharge relates, and is as competent to bind himself by a promise to pay an antecedent obligation, which otherwise would not be actionable because of the
discharge, as he is to enter into any new engagement. Ar:od so,
under other bankrupt acts, it has been commonly held that a
. promise to pay a provable debt, notwithstanding the discharge,
is as effectual when made after the filing of the petition and
before the discharge as if made after the discharge. Kirkpatrick
v. Tattersall, 13 :Mees. & W. 766, 1 Car. & K. 577, 14 L. J. Exch. _
N. S. 209, 9 Jur. 214; Otis v. Gazlin, 31 Me. 567; Hornthal v.
McRae, 67 N. C. 21; Fraley v. Kelly, 67 N. C. 78; Hill v. Trainer,
49 Wis. 537, 5 N. \V. 926; Knapp v. Hoyt, 57 Iowa. 591, 42 Am.
Rep. 59, 10 N. W. 925; Lanagin v. Nowland, 44 Ark. 84; Wiggin
v. Hodgdon, 63 N. H. 39; Griel v. Solomon, 82 Ala. 85, 60 Am_
IWp. 733, 2 So. 322; Jersey City Ins. Co. v. Archer, 122 N. Y.
376, 25 N. E. 338.
Our attention is not called to any decision in point arising
under the present bankruptcy act; but we deem it clear that the
same rule should be applied. If there is any distinction between
this and former acts that would require a different rule, it must
arise from the time to which the discharge is made · to relate.
As to this, § 17 of the a.ct of 1898 declares that ''a discharge in
bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts,''
with certain exceptions not now pertinent. For the definition of
''provable debts'' we are referred to § 63, which is set forth
in full in the margin. 2 Of the several classes of liabilities, those

j

and did not bear interest; (2) due

as costs taxable against an involun-

2-§ 63.

Debts

Which

May

be

tary bankrupt who was at the time

of the filing of the petition against

him plaintiff in a cause of action

which would pass to the trustee and

which the trustee declines to prose-

Pr01:ed.-a Debts of the bankrupt
which may be proved and allowed
against his estate which are ( 1) a
fixed liability, as evidenced by a
judgment or an instrument in writ·
ing, absolutely owing at the time
of the filing of the petition against
him, whether then payable or not,
with any intereet thereon which

would have been recoverable at that
date or with a rebate of interest
upon such aa were not then payable
and did not bear interest; (2) due
as costs taxable against an involuntary bankrupt who waa at the time
of the filing of the petition against
him plaintiff in a cause of action
which would pasa to the trust.ee and
which the trustee declinee to proee-
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in clauses 1, 2, and 3 are in terms described as existing at or

before the filing of the petition. Clause 5 relates to liabilities

'' founded upon provable debts reduced to judgment after the fil-

ing of the petition," etc.; plainly meaning that they arose before

its filing. Clause 4 describes simply debts that are "founded

upon an open account, or upon a contract, express or implied,"

not in terms referring to the time of the inception of the indebt-

edness. But, reading the whole of § 63, and considering it in

connection with the spirit and purpose, of the act, we deem it

plain that the debts founded upon open account or upon con-

tract, express or implied, that are provable under § 63a, cl. 4,

include only such as existed at the time of the filing of the peti-

tion in bankruptcy. This court in effect adopted that construc-

tion when, in promulgating the General Orders and Forms in

Tiankruptey, 1898, under the authority conferred by § 30, a form

of discharge was prescribed (Forms in Bankruptcy, No. 59), by

which it is ordered that the bankrupt "be discharged from all

debts and claims which are made provable by said acts against

his estate, and which existed on the — day of , A. D. ,

on which day the petition for adjudication was filed—him; ex-

cepting such debts as are by law excepted from the operation of

a discharge in bankruptcy." And the forms prescribed for proof
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of debts all declare that the indebtedness existed '' at and before

the filing of the said petition." Forms 31 to 36, inclusive. The

General Orders and Forms, etc., are to be found in 172 U. S.

700-704, 43 L. ed. 1217, 1218, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. xxxii.-xxxv.; 32

C. C. A. lxvi.-lxix., 89 Fed. xlii.-xlv.; 3 Foster, Fed. Pr. 4th ed.

2526, 2559, 2572.

The view above expressed as to clause 4 of § 63a is the same

that has been generally adopted in the Federal District Courts.

Re Burka, 104 Fed. 326; Re Swift, 50 C. C. A. 264, 112 Fed.

315, 321; Re Adams, 130 Fed. 381; Coleman Co. v. Withoft, 195

cute after notice; (3) founded upon

a claim for taxable costs incurred

in good faith by a creditor before

the filing of the petition in an ac-

tion to recover a provable debt;

(4) founded upon an open account,

or upon a contract express or im-

plied; and (5) founded upon prov-

able debts reduced to judgments

after the filing of the petition and

before the consideration of the bank-

rupt's application for a discharge,

in clauses 1, 2, and 3 are in terms described as existing at or
b~·fore the filiug of the petition. Clause 5 rdatC's to liabilities
·'founded upon provable debts reduced to judgment after the filiug of the petition," etc.; plainly meaning that they arose before
its filing. Clause 4 describes simply debts that are ''founded
upon an open account, or upon a contract, express or implied,"
uot in terms referring to the time of the inception of the indebtedness. But, reading the whole of § 63, and considering it in
connection with the spirit and purpose of the act, we deem it
plain that the debts founded upon open account or upon cont ruct, express or implied, that a.re provable under § 63a, cl. 4,
iIJclude only such as existed at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. This court in effect adopted that construct ion when, in promulgating the General Orders and Forms in
Bankruptcy, 1898, under the authority conferred by § 30, a form
of discharge was prescribed (Forms in Bankruptcy, No. 59), by
which it is ordered that the bankrupt "be discharged from all
debts and claims which are made provable by said acts against
his estate, and which existed on the - day of
, A. D. - - ,
on which day the petition for adjudication was filed-him; exCf'pting such debts as are by law excepted from the operation of
a discharge in bankruptcy.'' And the forms prescribed for proof
of debts all declare that the indebtedness existed ''at and before
the filing of the said petition." Forms 31 to 36, inclusive. The
General Orders and Forms, etc., are to be found in 172 U. S.
700-704, 43 L. ed. 1217, 1218, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. xxxii.-xxxv.; 32
C. C. A. lxvi.-lxix., 89 Fed. xlii.-xlv.; 3 Foster, Fed. Pr. 4th ed.
2526, 2559, 2572.
The view above expressed as to clause 4 of § 63a is the same
thnt has been generally adopted in the Federal District Courts.
Re Burka, 104 Fed. 326; Re S"'ift, 50 C. C. A. 264. 112 Fed.
:315, 321; Re Adams, 130 Fed. 381; Coleman Co. v. Withoft, 195

less costs incurred and interests ac-

crued after the filing of the petition

and up to the time of the entry of

such judgments.

b Unliquidated claims against the

bankrupt may, pursuant to applica-

tion to the Court, be liquidated in

such manner as it shall direct, and

may thereafter be proved and al

lowed against his estate.

cute after notice; (3) founded upon
a claim for taxable costs incurred
in good faith by a creditor before
tbe filing of the petition in an ae·
tion to rer.o'l"er a provable debt;
( 4) founded upon an open account,
or upon a <'ontract express or im·
plier!; nn<l ( !) ) founded upon prov·
ahle debts reduced to judgments
after the filinl! of the petition and
before the consideration of the bank·

rupt 's application for a dischargr,
Jess costs incurred and interests a<'·
crued after the filing of the petition
and up to the time of the entry of
sncb judgments.
b Unliquidated claims against the
bankrupt may, pursuant to nppJir~i·
tion to the Court, be liqnidaterl in
such manner as it shall direct, nnrl
may thereafter be pro\'ed and ;i)
lowed against his estate.
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Fed. 250, 252; and see Re Roth, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 270, 104

C. C. A. 649, 181 Fed. 667, 673.

And so, upon the whole matter, we conclude that under the

present act an express promise to pay a provable debt is good

although made after the filing of the petition and before

discharge.

(3) What has been said disposes at the same time of the conten-

tion that the promises set up in the two replications under con-

sideration were discharged by the confirmation of the composition.

As these obligations were entered into after the adjudication of

bankruptcy, they were, of course, not provable under § 63, and

only provable debts are discharged.

With respect to the money loaned to the bankrupt for use in

paying the consideration of the composition, it is perhaps worth

while to remark that § 12 of the act, in prescribing the time and

mode of offering terms of composition, plainly contemplates that

a composition in money may be offered, and expressly prescribes

that an application for the confirmation of a composition may be

made after, but not before, '' the consideration to be paid by the

bankrupt to his creditors, and the money necessary to pay all

debts which have priority, and the cost of the proceedings, have

been deposited in such place as shall be designated by, and sub-
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ject to the order of, the judge." And the same section provides

that "upon the confirmation of a composition the consideration

shall be distributed as the judge shall direct, and the case dis-

missed."

The act, of course, contemplates that the bankrupt may acquire

the money required for the purposes of the composition by the

use of his credit.

Judgment affirmed.3

B. Tort Claims

CRAWFORD et al. v. BURKE

195 U. S. 176, 49 L. ed. 147, 25 Sup. Ct . 9

(United States Supreme Court. November 7, 1904)

This was an action in trover instituted September 10, 1897, in

the Circuit Court of Cook county, Illinois, by Burke against

3—See In re Swift, 112 Fed. 315; Duquesne Incandescent Light Co.,

In re Neff, 157 Fed. 57; In re 176 Fed. 785.

Fed. 250, 252; and see Re Roth, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 270, 104
C. C. A. 649, 181 Fed. 667, 673.
And so, upon the whole matter, we conclude that under the
present act an express promise to pay a provable debt is good
although made after the filing of the petition and before
discharge.
(3) What has been said disposes at the same time of the contention that ~he promises set up in the two replications under consideration were discharged by the confirmation of the composition.
As these obligations were entered into after the adjudication of
bankruptcy, they were, of course, not provable under § 63, and
only provable debts are discharged.
With respect to the money loaned to the bankrupt for use in
paying the consideration of the composition, it is perhaps worth
while to remark that § 12 of the act, in prescribing the time and
mode of offering terms of composition, plainly contemplates that
a composition in money may be offered, and expressly prescribes
that an application for the confirmation of a composition may be
made after, but not before, ''the consideration to be paid by the
bankrupt to his creditors, and the money necessary to pay all
debts which have priority, and the cost of the proceedings, have
been deposited in such place as shall be designated by, and subject to the order of, the judge. '' And the same section provide.s
that "upon the confirmation of a composition the consideration
shall be distributed as the judge shall direct, and the case dismissed.''
The act, of course, contemplates that the bankrupt may acquire
the money required for the purposes of the composition by the
use of his credit.
Judgment affirmed.a
B.

TORT

CLAIHS

CRAWFORD et al. v. BURKE
195 U. S. 176, 49 L. ed. 147, 25 Sup. Ct. 9
(United States Supreme Court. November 7, 1904)
This was an action in trover instituted September 10, 1897, in
the Circuit Court of Cook county, Illinois, by Burke against
3-See In re Swift, 112 Fed. 315;
In re Neff, 157 Fed. 57; In re

Duquesne lncandeecent Light Co.,
176 Fed. 785.
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Crawford & Valentine, plaintiffs in error, to recover damages for

the wilful and fraudulent conversion of certain reversionary

interests of the plaintiff in 550 shares of Metropolitan Traction

stock.

There were ten counts in the declaration. In each of the first

five counts it was alleged that the defendant firm of Crawford &

Valentine were stock brokers and dealers in investment securi-

ties; that plaintiff employed the defendants as his brokers and

agents to buy, hold, and carry stocks for him, subject to his

order; that defendants had in their possession, or under their

control, certain shares of the capital stock of the Metropolitan

Traction Company, which they were holding as a pledge and se-

curity for the amount due them from the plaintiff on said stock;

that defendants wrongfully, wilfully, and fraudulently, and with-

out his knowledge or consent, sold said shares of stock, and wil-

fully and fraudulently, and with intent to cheat and defraud the

plaintiff, converted plaintiff's reversionary interest in said stock

to their use, whereby it was wholly lost.

In each of the last five counts it was alleged that after defend-

ants had wrongfully and fraudulently, and without plaintiff's

knowledge or consent, sold the plaintiff's stock, and converted

the proceeds of such sales to their own use, they falsely and
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fraudulently represented to him that they still had the stock on

hand and were carrying it for him; that their correspondents in

Philadelphia, where the stock had been bought, were calling upon

them for further demands or margins, and that it therefore be-

came necessary to call upon the plaintiff to make further pay-

ments on the stock in order to comply with their correspondents'

demands and to be secured against loss. It was averred in each

of said counts that such representations were false and fraudu-

lent, and by means thereof defendants obtained from the plain-

tiff the aggregate sum of $10,800.

To this declaration defendants pleaded not guilty, upon which

issue was joined January 4, 1900, and on May 12, 1900, a jury

trial was waived in writing. The case rested without action

until January 3, 1901, when defendants filed their separate pleas

of puis darrein continuance, setting up that on April 5. 1900, the

defendants had received their discharge in bankruptcy, in the

District Court for the northern district in Illinois, and that plain-

tiff's claims were provable and not excepted from the operation

of such discharge. The plaintiff replied, denying that his claim

Crawford & Valentine, plaintiffs fo error, to recover damages for
the wilful and fraudulent conversion of certain reversionary
interests of the plaintiff in 550 shares of Metropolitan Traction
stock.
There were ten counts in the declaration. In each of the first
f.ve counts it was alleged that the defendant firm of Crawford &
Yalentine were stock brokers and dealers in investment securities: that plaintiff employed the defendants as his brokers and
agents to buy, hold, and carry stocks for him, subject to his
order; that defendants had in their possession, or under their
<'ontrol, certain shares of the capital stock of the Metropolitan
Traetion Company, which they were holding as a pledge and sceurity for the amount due them from the plaintiff on said stock;
that defendants wrongfully, wilfully, and fraudulently, and without his knowledge or consent, sold said shares of stock, and wilfully and fraudulently, and with intent to cheat and defraud the
plaintiff, converted plaintiff's reversionary irtterest in said stock
to their use, whereby it was wholly lost.
In each of the last five counts it was alleged that after defendants had wrongfully and fraudulently, and without plaintiff's
knowledge or consent, sold the plaintiff's stock, and converted
the proceeds of such sales to their own use, they falsely and
fraudulently represented to him that they still had the stock on
hand and were carrying it for him ; that their correspondents in
Philadelphia, where the stock had been bought, were calling upon
them for further demands or margins, and that it therefore became necessary to call upon the plaintiff to make further payments on the stock in order to comply with their correspondents'
demands and to be secured against loss. It was averred in each
of said counts that such representations were false and fraudulent, and by means thereof defendants obtained from the plaintiff the aggregate sum of $10,800.
To this declaration defendants pleaded not guilty, upon which
issue was joined January 4, 1900, and on May 12, 1900, a jury
trial was waived in writing. The case rested without action
until January 3, 1901, when defendants filed their separate pleas
of puis da,.rein continuance, setting up that on April 5, 1900, the
ddendants had received their discharge in bankruptcy, in the
District Court for the northern district in Illinois, and that plaintiff's claims were provable and not excepted from the operation
of such discharge. The plaintiff replied, denying th.at his claim
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was provable, and averred that the same was excepted from such

operation.

Notwithstanding the plea of puis darrein continuance, the

plaintiff introduced evidence and proved the allegations in his

declaration, and the amount of damages he had sustained. De-

fendants were found guilty upon all the counts, and judgment

entered against them.

The case was taken to the Appellate Court, where, it appear-

ing that one of the justices had taken part in the trial of the

case below, and that the two remaining justices were unable to

agree upon the case, the judgment of the Circuit Court was

affirmed. The judgment of the Appellate Court was also affirmed

by the Supreme Court of Illinois (201 Ill. 581, 66 N. E. 833),

to review which judgment this writ of error was sued out

.

Mr. Justice BROWN, after making the foregoing statement,

delivered the opinion of the court:

A year after this case was put at issue, and upon the opening

of the trial, defendants filed their separate pleas puts darrein

was provable, and averred that the same was excepted from such
operation.
Notwithstanding the plea of puis darrein continuence, the
plaintiff introduced evidence and proved the allegations in his
declaration, and the amount of damages he had sustained. Defendant.a were found guilty upon all the counts, and judgment
entered against them.
The case was taken to the Appellate Court, where, it appearing that one of the justices had taken part in the trial of the
case below, and that the two remaining justices were unable to
agree upon the c.ase, the judgment of the Circuit Court was
affirmed. The judgment of the Appellate Court was also affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Illinois (201 Ill. 581, 66 N. E. 833),
to review which judgment this writ of error was sued out.

continuance, setting up their discharge in bankruptcy, and aver-

ring that plaintiff's claim was a provable debt, and the discharge

a complete defense.
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But notwithstanding this, plaintiff was permitted to introduce

evidence in proof of the fraud alleged in his declaration; and

upon the conclusion of the trial the court found there had been

a conversion of plaintiff's reversionary interest in the stock, for

which he '' had a right to recover in trover,'' and that it was not

such a debt as was barred by the bankruptcy act. Upon appeal

to the Supreme Court it was held that it was not necessary to the

judgment to decide whether the allegations of the declaration

were admitted by the pleadings, as they were established by the

proof which had been adduced by plaintiff, "and, the proposi-

tions held as law on that branch of the case being correct, judg-

ment for plaintiff necessarily follows.'' That court also held that

the case, being one of fraud, was not covered by the defendants'

discharge in bankruptcy.

The only Federal question involved in the case is whether the

Supreme Court of Illinois gave the proper effect to the dis-

charge pleaded by the defendants. If plaintiff's claim was not

a provable debt, or was expressly excepted from the operation

of the discharge the decision of that court was right; but if it

Mr. Justice BROWN, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the court:
A year after this case was put at issue, and upon the opening
of the trial, defendants filed their separate pleas puis darrein
c011tinuance, setting up their discharge in bankruptcy, and averring that plaintiff's claim was a provable debt, and the discharge
a complete defell86.

• • •

But notwithstanding this, plaintiff was permitted to introduce
evidence in proof of the fraud alleged in his declaration; and
upon the conclusion of the trial the court found there had been
a conversion of plaintiff's reversionary interest in the stock, for
which he "haµ a right to recover in trover," and that it was not
such a debt as was barred by the bankruptcy act. Upon appeal
to the Supreme Court it was held that it was not necessary to the
judgment to decide whether the allegations of the declaration
were admitted by the pleadings, as they were established by the
proof which had been adduced by plaintiff,. "and, the propositions held as law on that branch of the case being correct, judg·
ment for plaintiff necessarily follows." That court also held that
the case, being one of fraud, was not covered by the di>fendants'
discharge in bankruptcy.
The only Federal question involved in the case is whether the
Supreme Court of IUinois gave the proper effect t.o the discharge pleaded by the defendant.a. If plaintitf 's claim was not
a provable debt, or was expressly excepted from the operation
of the discharge the decision of that court was right; but if it
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was covered by the discharge, such discharge was a complete

defense.

§ 17 of the bankruptcy act of 1898 contains, among other

things, the following provisions:

"§ 17. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release the bankrupt

from all of his provable debts, except such as * * * (2) are

judgments in actions for frauds, or obtaining property by false

pretenses or false representations, or for wilful and malicious

injuries to the person or property of another, * * * or (4)

were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or

defalcation while acting as an officer, or in any fiduciary ca-

pacity." [30 Stat. at L. 550, c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901,

p. 3428.]

Under this section, whether the discharge of the defendants

in bankruptcy shall operate as a discharge of plaintiff's debt, it

not having been reduced to judgment, depends upon the fact

whether that debt was '' provable'' under the bankruptcy act,—

that is, susceptible of being proved; second, whether it was or was

not created by defendant's fraud, embezzlement, misappropria-

tion, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary

capacity.

1. Provable debts are defined by § 63, a copy of which appears

in the margin.4 Paragraph a of this section includes debts aris-
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ing upon contracts, express or implied, and open accounts, as

well as for judgments and costs. As to paragraph b, two con-

structions are possible: It may relate to all unliquidated de-

mands, or only to such as may arise upon such contracts, express

or implied, as are covered by paragraph a.

Certainly paragraph b does not embrace debts of an unliqui-

dated character and which in their nature are not susceptible

of being liquidated. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, 350, 47

L. ed. 1084, 1092,"\23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 757. Whether the effect of

paragraph b is to cause an unliquidated claim which is suscept-

ible of liquidation, but is not literally embraced by paragraph a,

to be provable in bankruptcy, we are not called upon to decide,

as we are clear that the debt of the plaintiff was embraced within

the provision of paragraph a, as one "founded upon an open

account, or upon a contract, express or implied,'' and might have

been proved under § 63a had plaintiff chosen to waive the tort,

and take his place with the other creditors of the estate. He

4—See note 2, supra.

was covered by the discharge, such discharge was a complete
defense.
§ 17 of the bankruptcy act of 1898 contains, among other
things, the following provisions:
'' § 17. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release the bankrupt
from all of his provable debts, except such as • • • ( 2) are
judgments in actions for frauds, or obtaining property by false
pretenses or f.alse representations, or for wilful and malicious
injuries t.o the person or property of another, • • • or ( 4)
were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or
defalcation while acting as an officer, or in any fiduciary capacity." [30 Stat. at L. 550, c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901,
p. 3428.]
Under this section, whether the discharge of the defendants
in bankruptcy shall operate as a discharge of plaintiff's debt, it
not having been reduced to judgment, depends upon the fact ·
whether that debt was ''provable'' under the bankruptcy act,that is, susceptible of being proved; second, whether it was or was
not created by defendant's fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary
capacity.
1. Provable debts are defined by § 63, a copy of which appears
in the margin:' Paragraph a of this section includes debts arising upon contracts, express or implied, and open accounts, as
well as for judgments and costs. As to paragraph b, two constructions are possible: It may relate to all unliquidated demands, or only to such as may arise upon such contracts, express
or implied, as are covered by paragraph a.
Certainl.v paragraph b does not embrace debts of an unliqui-\
dated character and which in their nature are not susceptible
of being liquidated. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, 350, 47
L. ed. 1084, 1092;'-23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 757. Whether the effect of
paragraph b is to cause an unliquidated claim which is susceptible of liquidation, but is not literally embraced by paragraph a,
to be provable in bankruptcy, we are not called upon to decide,
as we are clear that the debt of the plaintiff was embraced within
the provision of paragraph a, as one ''founded upon an OJ>€n
account, or upon a contract, express or implied,'' and might have
been proved under § 63a had plaintiff chosen to waive the tort,
and take his place with the other creditors of the estate. He
4-See note 2, aupra.
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did not elect to do this, however, but brought an action of trover,

setting up a fraudulent conversion of his property by defendants.

In the first five counts of his declaration he charges a fraudu-

lent conversion of his interest in the stock, and, in the last five

counts, that the defendants had induced him to make further

payments on such stock in the way of margins, by false and fradu-

lent representations.

The question whether the claim thus set forth is barred by

the discharge depends upon the proper construction of § 17,

which declares that the discharge in bankruptcy relieves the bank-

rupt from all of his "provable debts," except such as "• • *

(2) are judgments in actions for frauds, or obtaining property

by false pretenses, or false representations, or for wilful and

malicious injuries to the person or property of another, • • •

or (4) were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropri-

ation, or defalcation while acting as an officer, or in any fiduciary

capacity.''

•••

2. But it is strenuously insisted by the plaintiff that a claim

for the conversion of personal property is not within the scope of

§ 17, because it is not a "provable debt" within the definition of

§ 63a. Did the latter section stand alone, there would be some
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ground for saying that a claim, though '' founded upon an open

account, or upon a contract, express or implied," would not be

a provable debt, if plaintiff elected to treat the conversion as

fraudulent, and sue in trover, though he might have chosen to

waive the tort, and bring an action for a balance due on account.

An early English case (Parker v. Crole, 5 Bing. 63, 2 Moore &

P. 150) is cited to the effect that the operation of the discharge

is determined by the election of the creditor to sue in assumpsit

or case. A like ruling was made in certain cases under the bank-

ruptcy acts of 1841 and 1867. Williamson v. Dickens, 27 N. C.

(15 Ired. L.) 259; Hughes v. Oliver, 8 Pa. 426; Bradner v.

Strang, 89 N. Y. 299-307.

But we think that § 63a, defining provable debts, must be read

in connection with § 17, limiting the operation of discharges, in

which the provable character of claims for fraud in general is

recognized, by excepting from a discharge claims for frauds

which have been reduced to judgment, or which were commit-

ted by the bankrupt while acting as an officer, or in a fiduciary

capacity. If no fraud could be made the basis of a provable debt,

why were certain frauds excepted from the operation of a dis-

did not elect to do this, however, but brought an action of trover,
setting up a fraudulent conversion of his property by defendants.
In the first five counts of his declaration he charges a fraudulent conversion of his interest in the stock, and, in the last five
eouuts, that the defendants had induced him to make further
payments on such stock in the way of margins, by false and fraduJ,•nt representations.
The question whether the claim thus set forth is barred by
the discharge depends upon the proper construction of § 17,
which declares that the discharge in bankruptcy relieves the bankrupt from all of his "provable debts," except such as "• • •
( 2) are judgments in actions for frauds, or obtaining property
Ly false pretenses, or false representations, or for wilful and
malicious inJuries to the person or property of another, • • •
or ( 4) were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer, or in any fiduciary
capacity."

• • •

2. But it is strenuously insisted by the plaintiff that a claim
for the conversion of personal property is not within the scope of
§ 17, because it is not a "provable debt" within the definition of
§ 63a. Did the latter section stand alone, there would be some
ground for saying that a claim, though ·'founded upon an open
account, or upon a contract, express or implied,'' would not be
a provable debt, if plaintiff elected to treat the conversion as
fraudulent, and sue in trovcr, though he might have chosen to
waive the tort, and bring an action for a balance due on account.
An early English case (Parker v. Crole, 5 Bing. 63, 2 Moore &
P. 150) , is cited to the effect that the operation of the discharge
is determined by the election of the creditor to sue in asszonpsit
or case. A like ruling was made in certain cases under the bankruptcy acts of 1841 and 1867. Williamson v. Dickens, 27 .N. C.
(15 Ired. L.) 259; Hughes v. Oliver, 8 Pa. 426; Bradner v.
Strang, 89 N. Y. 299-307.
But we think that § 63a, defining provable debts, must be read
in connection with § 17, limiting the operation of discharges, in
which the provable character of claims for fraud in general is
recognized, by excepting from a discharge claims for frauds
which have been reduced to judgment, or which were <'Ommitted by the bankrupt while acting as an officer, or in a fiduciary
capacity. If no fraud could be made the basis of a provable debt,
why were certain frauds excepted from the operation of a dis-
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charge? We are, therefore, of opinion that if a debt originates

or is founded upon an open account or upon a contract, ex-

press or implied," it is provable against the bankrupt's estate,

though the creditor may elect to bring his action in trover, as

for a fraudulent conversion, instead of in assumpsit, for a bal-

ance due upon an open account. It certainly could not have

been the intention of Congress to extend the operation of the

discharge under § 17 to debts that were not provable under

§ 63a. It results from the construction we have given the latter

section that all debts originating upon an open account or upon

a contract, express or implied, are provable, though plaintiff

elect to bring his action for fraud.

In the case under consideration defendants purchased, un-

der the instructions of the plaintiff, certain stocks, and opened

an account with him, charging him with commission and inter-

est, and crediting him with amounts received as margins. Sub-

sequently, and without the knowledge of the plaintiff, they sold

these stocks, and thereby converted them to their own use. With-

out going into the details of the facts, it is evident that the plain-

tiff might have sued them in an action on contract, charging them

with the money advanced and with the value of the stock; or in

an action of trover, based upon their conversion. For reasons
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above given, we do not think that his election to sue in tort de-

prived his debt of its provable character, and that, as there is no

evidence that the frauds perpetrated by the defendants were com-

mitted by them in an official or fiduciary capacity, plaintiff's

claim against them was discharged by the proceedings in bank-

ruptcy.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is therefore

reversed, and the case remanded to that court for further pro-

ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.5

BROWN & ADAMS v. UNITED BUTTON CO.

149 Fed. 48, 79 C. C. A. 701

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. November 10, 1906)

ARCHBALD, District Judge. The question is whether a claim

for unliquidated damages, resulting from injury to the property

5—See Clarke v. Kogers, 228 U. S.

534, 543, et seq.; Beynolds v. N. Y.

Trust Co., 188 Fed. 611, 615.
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charge 'I 'Ve are, therefore, of opinion that if a debt originates
or is ·' fouHded upon an open account or upon a co11trad, express or implied," it is provable against the baukrupt 's t•stat<>,
though the creditor may elect to bring his action in lrover, as
for a fraudulent conversion, instead of in assumpsit, for a balance due upon an open account. It certainly could not have
been the intention of Congress to extend the operation of the
discharge under § 17 to debts that were not provable un<ler
§ 63a. It results from the construction we have given the latter
section that all debts originating upon an open account or upon
a contract, express or implied, are provable, though plaiutiff
elect to briug his action for fraud.
In the case under consideration defen<lauts purchased, uuder the instructions of the plaintiff, certain stocks, and opened
an account with him, charging him with commission aud interet!lt, and crediting him with amounts received as margins. Subsequently, and without the knowledge of the plaintiff, they sold
these stocks, and thereby converted them to their own use. Without going into the details of the facts, it is evident that the plaintiff might have sued them in an action on contract, charging them
with the money advanced and with the value of the stock; or in
an action of trover, based upon their conversion. For reasons
above given, we do not think that his election to sue in tort deprived his debt of its provable character, and that, as there is no
evidence that the frauds perpetrated by the defendants were committed by them in an official or fiduciary capacity, plaintiff's
claim against them was discharged by the proceedings in bankruptcy.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is therefore
reversed, and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.~
BROWN & ADAMS v. UNITED BUTTON CO.
149 Fed. 48, 79 C. C. A. 701
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. November 10, 1906)
ARCHBALD, District Judge. The question is whether a claiin
for unliquidated damages, resulting from injury to the property
5--See Clarke v. Rogers, 228 U. 8.
534, 543, et seq.; Reynolds v. N. Y.
Trust Co., 188 Fed. 611, 615.
H. A A. Bankruptc,.-2e
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of another, not connected with or growing out of any con-

tractual relation, is provable in bankruptcy. The appellants,

Brown & Adams, are wool dealers in Boston, Mass., and have a

warehouse there for the storage of wool which adjoins a building

formerly used for a number of years by the United Button Com-

pany, bankrupt, as a factory; the two being simply separated

by a party wall. Wool in storage needs to be kept at a cool

and even temperature; and the charge is that, by reason of

excessive heat from the furnaces of the button company which

penetrated through the party wall, the wool of the appellants

was dried out and damaged, losing weight and depreciating in

price in consequence, to the extent of some $12,000. The button

company was put into bankruptcy in August, 1904. Just when,

prior to this time, the damages which are claimed accrued, is

not made clear, but it is fair to assume that some at least was

within the year, and the case will be disposed of upon that basis.

Claiming that the button company is liable for this loss, treat-

ing it either as the result of negligence or nuisance, proof is

sought to be made for it against the estate, liquidation of the

damages being suggested through the medium of a bill in equity,

now pending in the Superior Court for the county of Suffolk,

Mass., brought by the appellants against the button company
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and its trustee. The claim was rejected by the District Court

without passing upon the merits, upon the ground that it was

not provable, and the propriety of that ruling is the question

here.

Bankruptcy is supposedly concerned only with commercial

matters, and was early confined to traders. Loveland, § 3. And,

while it has been gradually extended and enlarged, the original

idea has not been altogether departed from. Its purpose is to

free a person from his debts or to subject him to proceedings on

account of them. This may not be controlling, but it is sug-

gestive; and a construction which goes outside of it has certainly

to be justified.

By the bankruptcy act at present in force it is provided:

"§63. Debts Which May Be Proved.—a. Debts of the bank-

rupt may be proved and allowed against his estate which are

(1) a fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an instru-

ment in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the

petition against him, whether then payable or not, with any

interest thereon which would have been recoverable at that

date or with a rebate of interest upon such as were not then

of another, uot connected with or growing out of any COD·
tractual relation, is provable in bankruptcy. The appellilntB,
Brown & Adams, are wool dealers in Boston, Mass., and have a
warehouse there for the storage of wool which adjoill8 a building
formerly used for a number of years by the United Button Company, bankrupt, as a factory; the two being simply separated
by a party wall. Wool in storage needs to be kept at a cool
and even temperature; and the charge is that, by reason of
excessive heat from the furnaces of t~e button company which
penetrated through the party wall, the wool of the appellants
was dried out and damaged, losing weight and depreciating in
price in consequence, to the extent of some $12,000. 'fhe button
company was put into bankruptcy in August, 1904. Just when,
prior to this tirqe, the damages which are claimed accrued, is
not made clear, but it is fair to assume that some at least was
within the year, and the case will be disposed of upon that basis.
Claiming that the button company is liable for this loss, treating it either as the result of negligence or nuisance, proof is
sought to be made for it against the estate, liquidation of the
damages being suggested through the medium of a bill in equity,
now pending in the Superior Court for the county of Suffolk,
Mass., brought by the appellants against the button company
and its trustee. The claim was rejected by the District Court
without passing upon the merits, upon the ground that it was
not provable, and the propriety of that ruling is the question
here.
Bankruptcy is supposedly concerned only with commercial
matters, and was early coufiued to traders. Loveland, § 3. And,
while it has been gradually extended and enlarged, the original
idea has not been altogether departed from. Its purpose is t-0
free a person from his debts or to subject him to proceedings on
account of them. This may not be controlling, but it is suggestive; and a construction which goes outside of it has certainly
to be justified.
By the bankruptcy act at present in force it is provided:
'' § 63. Debts Which May Be Proved.-a. Debts of the bank·
rupt may be proved and allowed against his estate which are
(1) a fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an instru·
ment in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the
petition against him, whether then payable or not, \\·; th any
inforest thereon which would have been recoverable at that
date or with a rebate of interest upon such as were not then
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payable and did not bear interest; (2) due as costs taxable

against an involuntary bankrupt who was at the time of the

filing of the petition against him plaintiff in a cause of action

which would pass to the trustee and which the trustee declines

to prosecute after notice; (3) founded upon a claim for taxable

costs incurred in good faith by a creditor before the filing of a

petition in an action to recover a provable debt; (4) founded

upon an open account, or upon a contract express or implied;

and (5) founded upon provable debts reduced to judgments after

the filing of the petition and before the consideration of the

bankrupt's application for a discharge, less costs incurred and

interest accrued after the filing of the petition and up to the

time of the entry of such judgments." Act July 1, 1898, c. 541,

30 Stat. 562 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3447].

This to all intents is complete in itself, being given up to an

enumeration and specification of the debts which may be proved.

It is, however, further provided in this same section:

"b. Unliquidated claims against the bankrupt may, pursu-

ant to application to the court, be liquidated in such manner

as it shall direct, and may thereafter be proved and allowed

against his estate."

As contradistinguished from the paragraph which precedes
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it, this subsection seems to be concerned with a mere matter of

procedure, directing how a claim which is open and unsettled—

such for instance as one "(4) founded upon an open account,

or upon a contract express or implied" precedently specified—

may be liquidated and made certain. And whether taken by

itself, or with reference to the immediate context, this is the

natural, if not the only, construction to be given to it.

It is contended, however, by the appellants, that it is in fact

intended to cover an additional and distinct class of claims, the

whole section, as indicated by its title, being devoted to the

general subject of debts which are provable; the one subsection

(a) dealing with those which are of a fixed and more or less

absolute character, such as judgments, costs, bills, notes, and ac-

counts, and the other (b) with those which require to be liqui-

dated, such as damages for torts; the word "debt," as defined

by the act—§1 (11)—including a "demand or claim," and

being thus broad enough to embrace both. This construction,

moreover, is made necessary, as it is said, in order to bring the

section into harmony with other parts of the act.

To the contrary of this, however, it is declared in Dunbar v.

payable and did not bear interest; (2) due as costs taxable
against an involuntary bankrupt who was at the time of the
filing of the petition against him plaintiff in a cause of action
which would pass to the trustee and which the trustee declines
to prosecute after notice; ( 3) founded upon a claim for taxable
costs incurred in good faith by a creditor before the filing of a
petition in an action to recover a provable debt; (4) founded
upon an open account, or upon a contract express or implied;
and ( 5) founded upon provable debts reduced to judgments after
the filing of the petition and before the consideration of the
bankrupt's application for a discharge, less costs incurred and
interest accrued after the filing of the petition and up to the
time of the entry of such judgments." Act July 1, 1898, c. 541,
30 Stat. 562 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3447].
This to all intents is complete in itself, being given up to an
enumeration and specification of the debts which may be proved.
It is, however, further provided in this same section:
'' b. Unliquidated claims against the bankrupt may, pursuant to application to the court, be liquidated in such manner
as it shall direct, and may thereafter be proved and allowed
against his estate.''
As contradistinguished from the paragraph which precedes
it, this subsection seems to be concerned with a mere matter of
procedure, directing how a claim which is open and unsettledsuch for instance as one " ( 4) founded upon an open account,
or upon a contract express or implied" preccdently specifiedmay be liquidated and made certain. And whether taken by
it.self, or with reference to the immediate context, this is the
natural, if not the only, construction to be given to it.
It is contended, however, by the appellants, that it is in fact
intended to cover an additional and distinct class of claims, the
whole section, as indicated by its title, being devoted to the
general subject of debts which are provable; the one subsection
(a) dealing with those which are of a fixed and more or less
absolute character, such as judgments, costs, bills, notes, and accounts, and the other (b) with those which require to be liqui- •
dated, such as damages for torts; the word "debt," as defined
by the act-§ 1 ( 11 )-including a "demand or claim," and
being thus broad enough to embrace both. This construction,
moreover, is made necessary, as it is said, in order to bring the
section into harmony with other parts of the act.
To the contrary of this, however, it is declared in Dunbar v.
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Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, 350, 23 Sup. Ct. 757, 761, 47 L. ed. 1084,

that:

"This paragraph, 'b,' * * * adds nothing to the class of

debts which might be proved under paragraph 'a' of the same

section. Its purpose is to permit an unliquidated cLaim, com-

ing within the provisions of § 63a, to be liquidated as the court

should direct."

It is true that this is somewhat aside from the immediate

question before the court, which was whether a discharge in

bankruptcy operated to release a contingent liability, such as

an annuity, which a husband upon his divorce agreed to pay to

his wife for the support of herself and their minor children

But it is not to be assumed that a construction deliberately an-

nounced in this way was not considered by the whole court, or

went out unadvisedly, so as to stand as mere dictum. The law-

is as it is declared to be by the Supreme Court speaking by one

or the other of its judges, and is not to be put aside upon any

such suggestion, except as there is no other alternative. That

the question is still open and undisposed of, however, notwith-

standing what is so held, is confidently affirmed upon the

strength of Crawford v. Burke, 195 U. S. 176, 25 Sup. Ct. 9, 49

L. ed. 147, where in discussing this section of the act it is said:
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"Paragraph 'a' • * * includes debts arising upon con-

tracts, express or implied, and open accounts, as well as for judg-

ments and costs. As to paragraph 'b,' two constructions are

possible: It may relate to all unliquidated demands, or only

to such as may arise upon such contracts, express or implied, as

are covered by paragraph 'a.'"

It is upon the latter expression that the appellants particu-

larly rely. But whatever encouragement, standing by itself, it

may seem to lend, the court is careful to add:

"Whether the effect of paragraph 'b' is to cause an unliqui-

dated claim, which is susceptible of liquidation, but is not liter-

ally embraced by paragraph 'a,' to be provable in bankruptcy,

we are not called upon to decide, as we are clear that the debt of

the plaintiff was embraced within the provisions of paragraph

'a' as one 'founded upon an open account, or upon a contract ex-

press or implied-,' and might have been proved under § 63a had

plaintiff chosen to waive the tort, and take his place with the

other creditors of the estate."

Taking it altogether, therefore, this utterance does not seem

to carry us very far.

Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, 350, 23 Sup. Ct. 757, 761, 47 L. e<L 1084,
that:
''This paragraph, 'b,' • • • adds nothing to the class of
debts which might be proved under paragraph 'a' of the same
section. I ts purpose is to permit an unliquidated claim, coming within the provisions of § 63a, to be liquidated as the court
should direct. ''
It is true that this is somewhat aside from the immediate
·question before the court, which was whether a discharge in
bankruptcy operated to release a contingent liability, such as
an annuity, which a husband upon his divorce agreed to pay to
his wife for the support of herself and their minor children
But it is not to be assumed that a construction deliberately announced in this way was not considered by the whole court, or
went out unadvisedly, so as to stand as mere dictum. The law
is as it is declared to be by the Supreme Court speaking by one
or the other of its judges, and is not to be put aside upon any
such suggestion, except as there is no other alternative. That
the question is still open and undisposed of, however, notwithstanding what is so held, is confidently affirmed upon the
strength of Crawford v. Burke, 195 U. S. 176, 25 Sup. Ct. 9, 49
L. ed. 147, where in discussing this section of the act it is said:
''Paragraph 'a' • • • includes 'debt.a arising upon contracts, express or implied, and open accounts, as well as for judgments and cost.a. As to paragraph 'b,' two constructions are
possible: It may relate to all unliquidated demands, or only
to such as may arise upon such contract.a, express or implied, as
are covered by paragraph 'a.' ''
It is upon the latter expression that the appellant.a particularly rely. But whatever encouragement, standing by itself, it
mny seem to lend, the court is careful to add:
'' \Vhether the effect of paragraph 'b' is to cause an unliquidateu claim, which is susceptible of liquidation, but is not lit.erally embraced by paragraph 'a,' to be provable in bankruptcy,
we are not called upon to decide, as we are clear that the debt of
the plaintiff was embraced within the provisions of paragraph
'n' as one 'founded upon an open account, or upon a contrnct express or implied,' and might have been proved under § 63a had
plaintiff chosen to waive the tort, and take his place with the
other cr<'ditors of the estate."
Taking it altogether, therefore, this utterance does not seem
to carry us very far.
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Assuming, however, that the question is an open one, let us

see to what an independent consideration of it leads. The argu-

ment is that the right to prove must, in justice, be coextensive

with the release to be obtained, and that, as it is plainly pro-

vided (§17) that the bankrupt shall be discharged from lia-

bility for all but certain excepted torts, it must be that all

which are not so excepted are entitled to come in. As said by

Mr. Justice Brown, in Crawford v. Burke, supra:

"It certainly could not have betn the intention of Congress

to extend the operation of the discharge under § 17 to debts that

were not provable under § 63a."

The one section, according to this, is to be read in the light of

the other, and that construction adopted which will consist with

both.

Care is to be taken, however, in this comparison, not to reverse

the order of importance in which they are to be considered. Nor

in case of conflict to press the argument too far. If any sec-

tion is controlling in this regard, it is the section which declares

what debts are provable, and not the contrary. It is not so much,

in other words, that a tort of the character which we have here

is discharged by the one, as that it is made provable by the other,

that gives it a standing against the estate. Even if the one were

true of it and not the other, the right to come in would not be
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established, it being possible that there is a lapse in the law in

this respect, the result of imperfect adjustment, upon amend-

ment; a conclusion to be avoided, if it can be, but not at the

expense of that part of the statute which must necessarily

govern.

The strength of the argument in favor of claims for torts be-

ing provable, as is thus intimated, resides in the section with

regard to discharges, where it is provided:

''§17. Debts not Affected by a Discharge.—a. A discharge in

bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable

debts, except such as (1) are due as a tax levied by the United

States, the state, county, district, or municipality in which he re-

sides; (2) are liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses

or false representations, or for wilful and malicious injuries to

the person or property of another, or for alimony due or to be-

come due, or for maintenance or support of wife or child, or for

seduction of an unmarried female, or for criminal conversation;

(3) have not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allow-

ance, with the name of the creditor if known to the bankrupt,

Assuming, however, that the question is an open one, let us
The argu·
ment is that the right to prove must, in justice, be coextensive
with the release to be obtained, and that, as it is plaiuly provided ( ~ 17) that the bankrupt shall be discharged from liability for all but certain excepted torts, it must he that all
which are not so excepted are entitled to come in. As said by
:\Ir. Justice Brown, in Crawford v. Burke, supra:
''It certainly could not have b~n the intentiou of Congress
to extend the operation of the discharge under § 17 to debts that
were not provable under § 63a."
The one section, according to this, is to be read in the light of
the other, and that construction adopted which will consist with
both.
Care is to be taken, however, in this comparison, not to reverse
the> order of importance in which they are to be considered. Nor
in case of conflict to press the argument too far. Jf any sect ion is controlling in this regard, it is the section which declares
what debts are provable, and not the contrary. It is not so much,
in other words, that a tort of the character which we have here
is discharged by the one, as that it is made provable by the other,
that gives it a standing against the estate. Even if the one were
true of it and not the other, the right to come in would not be
established, it being possible that there is a lapse in the law in
this respect, the result of imperfect adjustment, upon amendment; a conclusion to be avoided, if it can be, but not at the
expense of that part of the statute which must necessarily
govern.
The strength of the argument in favor of claims for torts being provable, as is thus intimated, resides in the section with
regard to discharges, where it is provided :
'' § 17. Debts not Affected by a Discharge.-a. A discharge in
bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable
debts, except such as (1) are due as a tax levied by the United
States, the state, county, district, or municipality in which he resides: (2) are liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses
or false representations, or for wilful and malicious injuries to
the . person or property of another, or for alimony due or to become due, or for m.ainteuance or support of wife or child, or for
seduction of an unmarried female, or for criminal conversation:
(3) have not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name of the creditor if known to the .bankrupt,

see to what an independent consideration of it leads.

406

406

ADMINISTRATION

ADMINISTRATION

unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the pro-

ceedings in bankruptcy; or (4) were created by his fraud, em-

bezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an

officer or in any fiduciary capacity."

As originally passed, instead of the word ' liabilities," in

clause 2, were the words "judgments in actions"; and after the

word "for" were the words "frauds, or"; while nothing what-

ever was said as to alimony, maintenance, seduction, or criminal

conversation. Claims grounded in fraud or the other causes

of action specified had, therefore, as the law then stood, to be

reduced to judgment in order to be saved from the effect of a

discharge. Crawford v. Burke, 195 U. S. 176, 25 Sup. Ct. 9,

49 L. ed. 147; Bullis v. O'Beirne, 195 U. S. 606, 25 Sup. Ct

.

118, 49 L. ed. 340. The reason why this distinction was made

is not clear, but it was probably, as suggested, in order to avoid

the temptation to claimants to try and bring their cases within

the exception, and to do away with the necessity for going into

conflicting evidence in order to do so. Other cases of false pre-

tense, misrepresentation, or willful and malicious injury, not

so protected, were thus apparently left to be released by a dis-

charge. And, as the distinction is now removed by the substitu-
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tion of the word "liabilities" for "judgments," and the excep-

tion still further enlarged by the addition of seduction and

criminal conversation, the argument is that all torts not so ex-

cepted, being left to be operated upon by a discharge, must have

the reciprocal right to come in and be proved against the estate,

if a manifest inconsistency, not to say injustice, is to be avoided.

It must be confessed that this is not easy to meet. Seduction

and criminal conversation are torts, pure and simple, and can-

not be resolved away, like some, as being possibly tied up to a

contract. And if it was considered necessary to except these

by name, without which a discharge would release them, why are

not other torts such as the one which we have here, growing out

of negligence or nuisance, in the same situation f Slightly modi-

fying the words of Mr. Justice Brown in Crawford v. Burke,

supra: If no tort could be made the basis of a provable debt,

why were certain torts excepted? Nor is the force of this weak-

ened by the fact that, according to the decision in Tinker v. Col-

well, 193 U. S. 473, 24 Sup. Ct. 505, 48 L. ed. 754, criminal con-

versation, at least when reduced to judgment, was already taken

care of, the same as maintenance and alimony, as to which, to

that extent, the amendment of 1903 may be regarded as merely

unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy; or ( 4) were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an
officer or in any fiduciary capacity."
As originally passed, instead of the word ''liabilities,'' in
clause 2, were the words ''judgments in actions''; and after the
word ''for'' were the words ''frauds, or''; while nothing whatever was said as to alimony, maintenance, seduction, or criminal
conversation. Claims grounded in fraud or· the other causes
of action specified had, therefore, as the law then stood, to be
reduced to judgment in order to be saved from the effect of a
discharge. Crawford v. Burke, 195 U. S. 176, 25 Sup. Ct. 9,
49 L. ed. 147; Bullis v. O'Beirne, 195 U. S. 606, 25 Sup. Ct.
118, 49 L. ed. 340. The reason why this distinction was made
is not clear, but it was probably, as suggested, in order to avoid
the temptation to claimants to try and bring their cases within
the exception, and to do away with the necessity for going into
conflicting evidence in order to do so. Other cases of false pretense, misrepresentation, or willful and malicious injury, not
so protected, were thus apparently left to be released by a discharge. And, as the distinction is now removed by the substitution of the word "liabilities" for "judgments," and the exception still further enlarged by the addition of seduction and
criminal conversation, the argument is that all torts not so excepted, being left to be operated upon by a discharge, must have
the reciprocal right to come in and be proved against the estate,
if a manifest inconsistency, not to say injustice, is to be avoided.
It must be confessed that this is not easy to meet. Seduction
anrl criminal conversation are torts, pure and simple, and cannot be resolved away, like some, as being possibly tied up to a
contract. And if it was considered necessary to except these
by name, without which a discharge would release them, why are
11ot other torts such as the one which we have here, growing out
of negligence or nuisance, in the same situation T Slightly modifying the words of l\Ir. Justice Brown in Crawford v. Burke,
supm: If no tort could be made the basis of a provable debt,
why were certain torts excepted T Nor is the force of this weakened by the fact that, according to the decision in Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, 24 Sup. Ct. 505, 48 L. ed. 754, criminal conversation, at least when reduced to judgment, was already taken
care of, the same as maintenance and alimtmy, as to which, to
that extent, the amendment oi. 1903 may be regarded as merely
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declaratory. Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575, 21 Sup. Ct.

735, 45 L. ed. 1009; Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, 23 Sup.

Ct. 757, 47 L. ed. 1084; Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U. S. 68, 25

Sup. Ct. 172, 49 L. ed. 390.

It is to be observed, however, that the construction which is

contended for grows out, not ofS positive, but exceptive, legis-

lation. It is not declared what debts shall be released, but what

shall not be. And they must, in terms, be first provable, in order |

to be excepted, and not the contrary. The only difficulty that is

experienced, also, is with regard to the changes introduced by

the amendment of 1903, in part, as we have seen, unnecessary; as

to which, it may well be that in providing, out of extra caution,

that certain things should not be discharged, care was not taken

to note the possible effect upon other parts of the law, or to

adjust them to this, producing the present want of harmony.

For, after all has been said, it must be recognized that there is

a want of harmony between these two different parts of the stat-

ute, not, indeed, as originally enacted, but now, as they stand,

after amendment. The one section (17) with regard to the

effect of a discharge assumes that torts generally are provable

and proceeds accordingly; while the other (63) makes no pro-

vision for anything of the kind, except by a construction which
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it is safe to say was not in contemplation when it was passed,

and cannot consistently be read into it. The true view to be

taken of it has been already indicated. The first of the two para-

graphs into which it is divided is given up to an enumeration

of the debts which are entitled to be proved against the estate,

among which is to be found everything in the way of a fixed

obligation, or which, as being of a commercial character, a

bankrupt could expect to be relieved from; and, complete in it-

self, it is not to be added to. The other paragraph plainly has

to do with a mere matter of procedure; how unliquidated

claims founded upon open account or contract, specified in the

preceding paragraph, may be liquidated or settled. Nor can it

properly be made to serve any other purpose. Argument may

amplify this, but cannot make it clearer. And as so interpreted

a claim for damages, such as the one before us, is not included

among debts which are made provable. This, if not the latest

deliverance of the statute (the amendment of 1903 having to be

accorded that position), as the one devoted specifically to the

subject, must control. 26 Am. & Eng. Encycl. Law (2d ed.) 68.

It may be that the conclusion which is so reached, if it is to

declaratory. Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575, 21 Sup. Ct.
735, 45 L. ed. 1009; Dunbar v. Du11bar, 190 U. S. 340, 23 Sup.
Ct. 757, 4 7 L. ed. 1084; Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U. S. 68, 25
Sup. Ct. 172, 49 L. ed. 390.
It is to be observed, however, that the construction which iR
contended for grows out, not of\ positive, but exceptive, legis·
lation. It is not declared what debts shall be released, but what
shall not be. And they must, in terms, be first provable, in order
to be excepted, and not the contrary. The only difficulty that is
experienced, also, is with regard to the changes introduced by
the amendment of 1903, in part, as we have seen, unnecessary; as
to which, it may well be that in providing, out of extra caution,
that certain things should not be discharged, care was not taken
to note the possible effect upon other parts of the law, or to
adjust them to this, producing the present want of harmony.
For, after all has been said, it must be recognized that there is
a want of harmony between these two different parts of the stat·
ute, not, indeed, as originally enacted, but now, as they stand,
after amendment. The one section (17) with i:egard to the
effect of a discharge assumes that torts generally are provable
and proceeds accordingly; while the other (63) makes no provision for anything of the kind, except by a construction which
it is safe to say was not in contemplation when it was passed,
and cannot consistently be read into it. The true view to be
taken of it has been already indicated. The first of the two para·
graphs into which it is divided is given up to an enumeration
of the debts which are entitled to be proved against the estate,
among which is to be found everything in the way of a fixed
obligation, or which, as being of a commercial character, a
bankrupt could expect to be relieved from; and, complete in itself, it is not to be added to. The other paragraph plainly has
to do with a mere matter of procedure; how unliquidated
claims founded upon open account or contract, specified in the
preceding paragraph, may be liquidated or settled. Nor can it
properly be made to serve any other purpose. Argument may
amplify this, but caJJnot make it clearer. And as so interpreted
a claim for damages, such as the one before us, is not included
among debts which are made provable. This, if not the latest
deliverance of the statute (the amendment of 1903 having to be
accorcJed that position), as the one devoted specifically to the
subject, must control. 26 Am. & Eng. Encycl. Law (2d ed.) 68.
It may be that the conclusion which is so reached, if it is to

408

ADMINISTRATION

408

ADMINISTRATION

abridge correlatively the effect of a discharge, is not altogether

favorable to the bankrupt, who is interested in being relieved

from his liabilities to the fullest extent possible. But this ques-

tion is not before the court, and it will be time enough to meet

it when it is.

There was no error, therefore, in the rejection of the appel-

lants' claim, and the judgment is affirmed.

GRAY, Circuit Judge (concurring). While concurring in

abridge correlatiwly the effect of a discharge, is not altogether
fa Yora ble to the hankrupt, who is intereste1l i 11 b~--i ng rt·lien-<l
from bis liabilities to the fullest extent possible. But this question is not before the court, and it will be time enough to meet
it when it is.
There was no error, therefore, in the rejection of the appdlants' claim, and the judgment is affirmed.

the result reached by the majority of the court, and to some

extent in the reasoning employed in reaching that result, I am

constrained to think that the ratio decidendi of the court be-

low is that upon which our decision should rest. "Without

attempting to amplify or paraphrase the opinion of the learned

judge of that court (In re United Button Co. [D. C] 140 Fed.

495), it is sufficient, in referring to § 17, to again note that the

debts which "a discharge in bankruptcy shall release," are

such debts only as are provable under § 63, and the debts which

are excepted from discharge, being among others liabilities for

certain torts, are also necessarily provable debts. If it be said

that'' wilful and malicious injuries to the person or property of

another," and "seduction" or "criminal conversation" are

torts, pure and simple, and as such incapable of liquidation and
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proof under § 63, it may be replied that liabilities for such torts,

when reduced to judgment, are provable, and come within the

classification of § 17a (2) as "liabilities" for certain torts. Be

this as it may, it is true, however, that even if, out of abundant

caution, certain of the torts which are included in the excepting

clause could not have been liquidated and proven under § 63,

still the fact that the excepting clause in this respect overlaps

provable debts and includes some that are not provable, does not

nullify the qualifying effect of the word "provable," as limiting

the debts to be excepted, as well as these which are discharged by

§ 17, and, as said in the majority opinion of this court, cannot

serve to abrogate or qualify the description of provable debts

as contained in § 63.

In this view, the two sections, 63 and 17, are not necessarily

irreconcilable.8

6—As to provability of claim for Works, 23 Fed. 880. But ef. In

profits for infringement of patent ro Pavement Co., 156 Fed. 583; In

see In re Boston & Fairbaven Iron re Awning Hood Co., 187 Fed. 611.

GRAY, Circuit Judge (concurring).

While coneurring in
the result reached by the majority of the court, and to somt>
extent in the reasoning employed in reaching that result, I am
<'Onstrained to think that the ratio decidendi of the court Jx>.
low is that upon which our decision should rest. ·without
attempting to amplify or paraphrase the opinion of the learned
judge of that court (In re United Button Co. [D. C.] 140 Fed.
495), it is sufficient, in referring to § 17, to again note that the
debts 'which ''a discharge in bankruptcy shall release,'' are
such debts only as are provable under § 63, and the debts which
are excepted from discharge, being among others liabilities for
certain torts, are also necessarily provable debts. If it be said
that ''wilful and malicious injuries to the person or property of
another,'' and ''seduction'' or ''criminal conversation'' are
torts, pure and simple, and as such incapable of liquidation and
proof under § 63, it may be replied that liabilities for such torts,
when reduced to judgment, are provable, and come within the
classification of § l 7a (2) as "liabilities" for certain torts. Be
this as it may~ it is true, however, that even if, out of abundant
caution, certain of the torts which are included in the excepting
clause could not have been liquidated and proven under § 63.
still the fact that the excepting clause in this respect overlaps
provable debts and includes some that are not provable, does not
nullify the qualifying effect of the word "provable," as limiting
the debts to be excepted, as well as these which are discharged by
§ 17, and, as said in the majority opinion of this court, cannot
serve to abrogate or qualify the description of provable debts
as contained in § 63.
In this view, the two sections, 63 and 17, are not neceMBl'ilY
irreconcilable.8
6-As to provability of claim for
profits for infringement of patent
~ce In re Boston & Fairhaven Iron

Works, 23 Fed. 880. But cf. In
ro Pavement Co., 156 Fed. 583; In
re Awning Hood Co., 187 Fed. 611.
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GRANT SHOE CO. v. LAIRD CO.

1. Unliquidated Cla.irns

212 U. S. 445, 53 L. ed. 591, 29 Sup. Ct. 332

(United States Supreme Court. February 23, 1909)

GRANT SHOE CO. v. LAIRD CO.

Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court:

This case comes up on a certificate concerning the jurisdiction

212 U. S. 445, 53 L. ed. 591, 29 Sup. Ct. 332

off the District Court on the following facts: The W. M. Laird

Company filed a petition in bankruptcy against the Frederic L.

Grant Shoe Company, alleging acts of bankruptcy, and setting

(United States Supreme Court. February 23, 1909)

up a claim for $3,732.80 for the breach of an express warranty

of shoes sold to it by the latter. The shoe company answered,

denying the foregoing allegations, and denying that the claim

alleged was a provable claim. The case coming on to be tried

before a jury, it moved the court to dismiss the proceeding for

want of jurisdiction. The motion was denied, and insolvency

and acts of bankruptcy being admitted, the claim was liquidated

at $3,454, the shoe company offering no evidence. The shoe com-

pany was adjudged a bankrupt, and, at the same time, the judge

certified that the jurisdiction of the court to make such an adju-

dication on a claim for unliquidated damages was the only ques-

tion in issue. Afterwards this writ of error was brought, the

taking of jurisdiction being the only error assigned.
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Coming to the question certified, we are of opinion that the

decision of the courts below was right. The argument to the

contrary is based on the letter of the statute, and is easily stated

and understood. By § 596 petitions to have a debtor adjudged

a bankrupt may be filed only by creditors who have provable

claims. By § 636, "Unliquidated claims against the bankrupt

may, pursuant to application to the court, be liquidated in such

manner as it shall direct, and may thereafter be proved and

allowed Against his estate.'' The word '' thereafter'' shows, it

is said, that they are not yet proved to exist when merely pre-

sented and sworn to. Therefore it does not yet appear that there

is any foundation for the proceeding, in the requisite amount

or even the existence of the claim. But there must be a proceed-

ing in court before a liquidation can take place, and, therefore,

the claim cannot be liquidated until a proceeding is started in

l\lr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court:
This case comes up on a certificate concerning the jurisdiction
<•f the District Court on the following facts: The ,V. l\L ].;aird
Company filed a petition in bankruptcy against the l<,rcdnic L.
Grant Shoe Company~ allegiugt acts of bankruptC)', and setting
up a claim for $3,732.80 for the breach of an express warranty
of shoes sold to it by the latter. The shoe company answered,
denying the foregoing allegations, and denying that the claim
alleged was a provable claim. The case coming on to be tried
before a jury, it moved the coort to dismiss the proceeding for
want of jurisdiction. The motion was denied, and insolvency
und acts of bankruptcy being admitted, the claim was liquidated
at $3,454, the shoe company offering no evidence. The shoe company was adjudged a bankrupt, and, at the same time, the judge
certified that the jurisdiction of the court to make such an adjudication on a claim for unliquidated damages was the only question in issue. Afterwards this writ of error was brought, the
taking of jurisdiction being the only error assigned .

•

•

•

•

•

•
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Coming to the question certified, we are of opinion that the
decision of the courts below was right. The argument to the
contrary is based on the letter of the statute, and is easily stated
and understood. By § 59b petitions to have a debtor adjudged
a bankrupt may be filed only by creditors who have provable
claims. By § 63b, "Unliquidated claims against the bankrupt
may, pursuant to application to the court, be liquidated in such
manner as it shall direct, and may thereafter be proved and
allowed 1lgainst his estate.'' The word ''thereafter'' shows, it
is said, that they are not yet proved to exist when merely presented and sworn to. The~efore it does not yet appear that there
is any foundation for the proceeding, in the requisite amount
or even the existence of the claim. But there must be a proceeding in court before a liquidation can take place, and, therefore,
tbe claim cannot be liquidated until a proceeding is started in
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some other way. In short, the claim upon which the petition

is based must be provable when the petition is filed, and this

claim was not provable then, since, by the express words of the

act, it had to be liquidated before it could be proved.

On the other hand, by the equally express words of § 63a,

among the debts that may be proved are those founded upon a

contract, express or implied. Again, by § 17, the discharge is

of all "provable debts" with certain exceptions, and it would

not be denied that this claim would be barred by a dischar^t.

Tindle v. Birkett, 205 U. S. 183, 51 L. ed. 762, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep.

493. If the argument for the plaintiff in error is sound, a cred-

itor for goods sold on a quantum valebant would be as badly

off as the petitioner, and both of them might be postponed in

reducing their claims to judgment until it was too late. The in-

timation in Tindle v. Birkett, supra, and Crawford v. Burke,

195 U. S. 176, 49 L. ed. 147, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9, are adverse to

such a result. The whole argument from the letter of the statute

depends on reading "provable claims" in §596 as meaning

claims that may be proved then and there when the petition is

filed. But, if it can be seen then and there that the claims are

of a kind that can be proved in the proceedings, the words are

satisfied; and further, no reason appears why a liquidation may
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not be ordered on the filing of the petition, to ascertain whether

it is filed rightly or not.

It is said that an unfounded claim of this sort might be used

as a weapon to enforce an unjust demand or to make a solvent

but struggling debtor bankrupt. Re Big Meadows Gas Co., 113

Fed. 974. But an unjust demand may be made for a liquidated

sum, also, and we have mentioned the injustice on the other side.

Again, it has been suggested that a cause of action for a breach

of warranty really is for deceit, and sounds in tort, claims for

torts not being mentioned among the "debts which may be

proved" in § 63a. Re Morales, 105 Fed. 761. No doubt at com-

mon law a false statement as to present facts gave rise to an

action of tort, if the statement was made at the risk^ of the

speaker, and led to harm. But ordinarily the risk was not taken

by the speaker unless the statement was fraudulent; and it was

precisely because it was a warranty,—that is, an absolute un-

dertaking by contract that a fact was true,—that, if a warranty

was alleged, it was not necessary to lay the scienter. Schuch-

ardt v. Allen, 1 Wall. 350, 17 L. ed. 642; Norton v. Doherty, 3

Gray, 372, 63 Am. Dec. 758. In other words, a claim on a war-

some other way. In short, the claim upon which the petition
is based must be provable when the petition is filed, and this
claim was not provable then, since, by the express words of the
act, it had to be liquidated before it could be proved.
On the other hand, by the equally express words of § 63a,
among the debts that may be proved are those foUlided upon a
contract, express or implied. Again, by § 17, the discharge is
of all ''provable debts'' with certain exceptions, aud it would
not be denied that this claim would be barred by a disdiar,,•\:
'rindle v. Birkett, 205 U. S. 183, 51 L. ed. 762, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep.
493. If the argument for the plaintiff in error is sounJ, a creditor for goods sold on a quamtu>N. valebant would be as badly
off as the petitioner, and both of them might be postponed in
reducing their claims to judgment until it was too late. The intimation in Tindle v. Birkett, supra, and Crawford v. Burke,
19:1 U. S. 176, 49 L. ed. 147, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9, are adverse to
such a result. The whole argument from the letter of the statute
depends on reading "provable claims" in § 59b as meaning
claims that may be proved then and there when the petition is
filed. But, if it can be seen then and there that the claims are
of a kind that can be proved in the proceedings, the words are
satisfied; and further, no reason appears why a liquidation may
not be ordered on the filing of the petition, to ascertain whether
it is filed rightly or not.
It is said that an unfounded claim of this sort might be used
as a weapon to enforce an unjust demand or to make a solvent
hut struggling debtor bankrupt. Re Big Meadows Gas Co., 113
Fed. 97 4. But an unjust demand may be made for a liquidated
sum, also, and we have mentioned the injustice on the other side.
Again, it has been suggested that a cause of action for a breach
of warranty really is for deceit, and sounds in tort, claims for
torts not being mentioned among the ''debts which may be
proved'' in § 63a. Re Morales, 105 Fed. 761. No doubt at common law a false statement as to present' facts gave rise -to an
aetio11 of tort, if the statement was made at the risk., of the
speaker , a11cl led to harm. But ordinarily the risk was not taken
by the speaker unless the statement was fraudulent; and it was
precisely because it was a wa:rranty,-that is, an absolute undertaking by contract that a fact was true,-that, if a warranty
was alleged, it was not necessary to lay the scienter. Schuch·
ardt v. Allen, 1 Wall. 350, 17 L. ed. 642; Norton v. Doherty, 3
Gray, 372, 63 Am. Dec. 758. In other words, a claim on a war-

CONTINGENT CLAIMS

CONTINGENT CLAIMS

411

411

ranty, as such, necessarily was a claim arising out of a con-

tract, even if, in case of actual fraud, there might be an inde-

pendent claim purely in tort.

Judgment affirmed.7

2. Contingent Claims

ranty, as such, necessarily was a claim arising out of a contract, even if, in case of actual fraud, there might be an independent claim purely in tort.
Judgment affirmed.7

MOCH v. MARKET ST. NAT. BANK

In re GERSON

107 Fed. 897, 47 C. C. A. 49

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. April 22, 1901)

2 . . Contingent Claims

ACHESON, Circuit Judge. The question presented by this

appeal is whether the liability of a bankrupt indorser of commer-

MOCH v. MARKET ST. NAT. BANK

cial paper, whose liability did not become absolute until after the

filing of the petition in bankruptcy, may be proved against his

In re GERSON

estate after such liability has become fixed, and within the time

limited for proving claims. By the first section of the bankrupt

law,—the act of July 1, 1898,—it is declared that the word

107 Fed. 897, 47 C. C. A. 49

"debt," as used in the act, shall include "any debt, demand, or

claim provable in bankruptcy." §63 declares what debts of

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. April 22, 1901)

the bankruptcy may be proved and allowed against his estate,

and ranges the provable debts in five subdivisions, numbered

from 1 to 5, inclusive. For present purposes we need quote only

two of those subdivisions, namely:
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"(1) A fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an in-

strument in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the filing

of the petition against him, whether then payable or not, with

any interest thereon which would have been recoverable at that

date or with a rebate of interest upon such as were not then pay>

able and did not bear interest;" "(4) founded upon an open

account, or upon a contract express or implied."

Clearly the liability of an indorser is within the very words

of this fourth subdivision. As was said by the Supreme Court

in Martin v. Cole, 104 U. S. 30, 37, 26 L. ed. 647, the contract

created by the indorsement of commercial paper is an "express

7—As to provability of claim for v. Magwire, 15 Wall. 549; B«ed v.

damages for breaches of covenants Pierce, 36 Me. 455.

for title in deed of land see Riggin

ACHESON, Circuit Judge. The question presented by this
appeal is whether the liability of a bankrupt indorser of commercial paper, whose liability did not become absolute until after the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy, may be proved against his
estate after such liability has become fixed, and within the time
limited for proving claims. By the first section of the bankrupt
law,-the act of July 1, 1898,-it is declared that the word
"debt," as used in the act, sh.all include "any debt, demand, or
claim provable in bankruptcy." § 63 declares what debts of
the bankruptcy may be proved and allowed against his estate,
and ranges the provable debts in five subdivisions, numbered
from 1 to 5, inclusive. For present purposes we need quote ouly
two of those subdivisions, namely :
" ( 1) A fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the filing
of the petition against him, whether then payable or not, with
any interest thereon which would have been recoverable at that
date or with a rebate of interest upon such as were not then pay,.
able and did not bear interest;" " ( 4) founded upon an open
account, or upon a contract express or implied.''
Clearly the liability of an indorser is within the very words
of this fourth subdivision. As was said by the Supreme Court
in Martin v. Cole, 104 U. S. 30, 37, 26 L. ed. 647, the contract
created by the indorsement of commercial paper is an ''express
7-As to provability of claim for
damages for breaches of covenants
for title in deed of land aee Riggin

,.. Magwire, 15 Wall. 549; Reed v.
Pierce, 36 Me. 455.
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contract,'' and '' its terms are certain, fixed, and definite.'' The

indorser's engagement is to pay a sum certain at a fixed date,

to wit, the amount of the bill or note at its maturity, if it is

not paid upon due presentment by the party primarily liable,

upon due notice of its dishonor being given to the indors-er. if

it can be affirmed that such an unmatured liability is not a

"debt," in a technical sense, certainly it is a "demand"' or

"claim," and comes, it seems to us, within the scope of flu

fourth subdivision of § 63 of the act. The primary purpoj»;- of

the bankrupt act was to relieve insolvent debtors from th-.-u

pecuniary liabilities, and to secure ratable distribution of their

estates among their creditors. It is not, then, to be lightly be-

lieved that congress intended to exclude from the operation and

benefits of the act unmatured indorsements of commercial paper,

which in every commercial community so often constitute a large

proportion of the indebtedness of failing debtors. Of course, if

not provable, such liabilities are not discharged. Now, a con-

struction leading to results so foreign to the general purpose

of the law is not to be adopted unless plainly required by the

language of the act. We cannot see that such an interpretation

is demanded by anything contained in the act. The first and

fourth subdivisions of § 63 are distinct provisions, and are, we
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think, independent of each other. We are unable to agree to

the proposition that subdivision 1 qualifies, and is to be carried

down and read into, subdivision 4. On the face of the act they

are distinct. Moreover, reasonable effect can be given to both

by treating them as separate and independent clauses. There

are well-known instruments—for example, surety bonds—under

which the liability is contingent on future defaults, and where

the amount of liability is wholly uncertain, depending on the

nature of the default. To instruments of this character, where

the liability is remote and is uncertain in amount and other-

wise, subdivision 1 is fairly referable; but we think, with the

court below, that the contract created by the indorsement of com-

mercial paper is not governed by that subdivision, but falls

within subdivision 4, which embraces debts, claims, or demands

founded upon contracts, express or implied. Accordingly the

order of the District Court allowing the claim of the Market

Street National Bank against the estate of the bankrupt, Joel

J. Gerson, is affirmed.

contract,'' and ''its terms are certain, fixed, and definite. '' Th~
indorser's engagement is to pay a sum certain at a fixed date.
to wit, the amount of the bill or note at its maturit~·, if it il'
not paid upon due presentment by the party primarily liable,
upon due notice of its dishonor being given to the imlor~er. If
it can be affirmed that such an umnatured liability is not .1
''debt,'' in a technical sense, certainly" it is a ··demand·· t; r
''claim,'' ai1d comes, it seems to us, within the scope of r I!,
fourth subdivision of § 63 of the act. The primary purpe;::..· Ll
the bankrupt act was to relieve insolvent debtors from tl1 . ~:
pecuniary liabilities, and to secure ratable distribution of thcjr
estates among their creditors. It is not, then, to be lightly believed that congress intended to exclude from the operation and
benefits of the act w1matured indorsements of commercial paper,
which in every commercial community so often constitute a large
proportion of the indebtedness of failing debtors. Of course, if
not provable, such liabilities are not discharged. Now, a construction leading to results so foreign to the general purpose
of the law is not to be adopted unless plainly required by the
language of the act. We cannot see that such an interpretation
is demanded by anything contained in the act. The first aud
fourth subdivisions of § 63 are distinct provisions, and are, we
think, independent of each other. We are unable to agree to
the proposition that subdivision 1 qualifies, and is to be carried
down and .read into, subdivision 4. On the face of the net they
are distinct. Moreover, reasonable effect can be given to both
by treating them as separate and independent clauses. There
are well-known instruments-for example, surety bonds-under
which the liability is contingent on future defaults, and where
the amount of liability is wholly uncertain, depending on the
nature of the default. To instruments of this character, where
the liability is remote and is uncertain in amount and otherwise, subdivision 1 is fairly referable; but we think, with the
court below, that the contract created by the indorsernent of commercial paper is not governed by that subdivision, but falls
within subdivision 4, which embraces debts, claims, or demands
founded upon contracts, express or implied. Accordingly the
order of the District Court allowing the claim of the Market
Street National Bank against the estate of the bankrupt, Joel
J. Gerson, is affirmed.
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PHILLIPS et al. v. DREHER SHOE CO.

112 Fed. 404

PHILLIPS et al. v. DREHER SHOE CO.

(District Court, M. D. Pennsylvania. January 9, 1902)

ARCHBALD, District Judge. On September 16, 1901, H. L.

112 Fed. 404

Phillips and nine others, all of Selins Grove, Pa., filed a cred-

itors' petition against W. A. Dreher and Floyd A. Wetherby,

(District Court, M. D. Pennsylvania. January 9, 1902)

trading as the Dreher Shoe Company, of the same place, to have

them declared bankrupts on the ground that they were insolvent,

and had made an assignment for the benefit of creditors. In

the petition they set forth that they were creditors of the said

company having provable claims amounting in the aggregate to

$1,000, each of the petitioners being an indorser or surety upon

one of a series of ten notes for $100 each, signed by the Dreher

Shoe Company, dated May 1, 1901, and payable in one year from

date; these notes having been discounted by the First National

Bank of Selins Grove, and then held by it. On this showing a

subpoena and order to show cause were issued, returnable Oc-

tober 26th, and duly served. No response was made at the return

day by the alleged bankrupts, but on October 28th Fr. Otto

Muller and two other creditors came in and obtained a rule to

show cause why the proceedings should not be dismissed be-

cause the petitioners did not hold provable claims, and in this,
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on November 19th, the alleged bankrupts and two other creditors

joined. A copy of one of the notes—which are all alike—was

produced at the argument, and shows that the petitioners are

not indorsers, but joint makers with the Dreher Shoe Company.

But, however that may be, they were at the time of filing the

petition, and still are, sureties, and no more. The bank holds

the notes, by which they, as well as the principal debtors, are

bound; and, while it declines to move, and has at the same time

notified the sureties that they will be looked to, nothing has been

done to enforce the obligations, which are, in fact, not yet due;

nor have the sureties paid or been called upon to pay them. Un-

der such circumstances it is difficult to see how the proceedings

ean be maintained. On each of the notes referred to the debt

or claim is that of the holder of the obligation to whom it is due,

the surety having no direct interest in it, being only secondarily

or contingently liable. He may pay the debt, and become the

holder, with all the rights incident thereto; but unless and until

he does he occupies a secondary and subordinate position. The

ARCHBALD, District Judge. On September 16, 1901, H. L.
Phillips and nine others, all of Selins Grove, Pa., filed a creditors' petition against W. A. Dreher and Floyd A. Wetherby,
trad.ing as the Dreher Shoe Company, of the same place, to have
them declared bankrupts on the ground that they were insolvent,
and had made an assignment for the benefit of creditors. In
the petition they set forth that they were creditors of the said
compauy having provable claims amounting in the aggregate to
$1,000, each of the petitioners being an indorser or surety upon
one of a series of ten notes for $100 each, signed by the Dreher
Shoe Company, dated May 1, 1901, and payable in one year from
date; these notes having been discounted by the First National
Bank of Selins Grove, and then held · by it. On this showing a
subpoena and order to show cause were issued, returnable Qc.
tober 26th, and duly served. No response was made at the return
day by the alleged bankrupts, but on 0('.tober 28th Fr. Otto
~lullcr and two other creditors came in and obtained a rule to
show cause why the proceedings should not be dismissed because the petitioners did not hold pr9vable claims, and in this,
on November 19th, the alleged be.nkrupts and two other creditors
joined. A copy of one of the notes-which are all alike-was
produced at the argument, and shows that the petitioners are
not indorsers, but joint makers with the Dreher Shoe Company.
But, however that may be, they were at the time of filing the
petition, and still are, sureties, and no more. The bank holds
the notes, by which they, as well as the principal debtors, are
bound ; and, while it declines to move, and has at the same time
notified the sureties that they will be looked to, nothiug has been
done to enforce the obligations, which are, in fact, not yet due;
nor have the sureties paid or been called upon to pay them. Under such circumstances it is difficult to see how the proceedings
ran be maintained. On each of the notes referred to the deht
or claim is that oi the holder of the obligation to whom it is due,
the: surety having no direct interest in it, being only secondarily
or eontiugently liable. He may pay the debt, and become thE>
holder, with all the rights incident thereto; but unless and until
lie does he occupies a secondary and subordinate position. The
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right to move is, in the first instance, lodged in the one who is

actually possessed of the obligation of the debtor. The surety

has, however, an interest to protect, which the bankruptcy law

recognizes; and, in order to accord him what it considers a proper

measure of relief, it provides in § 57t that'' whenever a creditor,

whose claim against a bankrupt estate is secured by the indi-

vidual undertaking of any person, fails to prove such claim, such

person may do so in the creditor's name, and if he discharge

such undertaking in whole or in part, he shall be subrogated to

that extent to the rights of the creditor." No one has any rights

under the bankrupt law outside of what it gives him, and those

of a surety are defined by this section, beyond which he cannot

go. By it he has the right to prove, in case the principal cred-

itor fails to do so. He does not, indeed, have to discharge the

obligation in order to have this privilege, but, in case he does

do so, in whole or in part, he becomes entitled to that extent

to the right of subrogation, and, in any event, when he proves

the debt, he proves it not in his own name, but in that of the

original holder. In re Christensen, 2 Nat. Bankr. N. 1094. The

particular point to be noticed in the present connection with

regard to the position of the surety is that he only has a right

to prove in case the principal creditor fails to do so, and the
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latter cannot be said to fail until he has had an opportunity and

passed it by, which can only occur when, by proceedings duly

instituted, the estate of the debtor has been drawn into the bank-

ruptcy court to be there administered, and all parties have been

called upon to make known their claims. When that has been

done, and he neglects to act, the surety, so as not to be preju-

diced, may himself prove the debt in his stead. This, so far as

I can see, is all the relief given by the act, and, whether adequate

or inadequate, it must suffice. It follows from this that at the

outstart the surety who has not taken up the obligation has

no provable claim, and therefore has no standing to petition. It

is not provided in the law that at that stage he can intervene,

either in his own name or in the name of the creditor, and in-

stitute involuntary proceedings. All that he can do is to prove

the claim later on, if the creditor fails to do so after somebody

else has moved. This is the view taken by In re Riker, 18 Nat.

Bankr. R. 393, Fed. Cas. No. 11,833, a case arising under the

act of 1867, where the provisions were fully as favorable to the

surety as here. Two of the petitioners there were indorsers on

notes of the debtor, which had been turned over for value to a

right to move is, in the first instance, lodged in the one who is
actually possessed of the obligation of the debtor. The surety
has, however, an interest to protect, which the bankruptcy law
recognizes; and, in order to accord him what it considers a proper
measure of relief, it provides in § 57i that "whenever a creditor,
whose claim against a bankrupt estate is secured by the iudividual undertaking of any person, fails to prove such claim. sueh
person may do so in the creditor's name, and if he discharge
such undertaking in whole or in part, he shall be subrogated to
that extent to the rights of the creditor." No one has any rights
under the bankrupt law outside of what it gives him, and those
of a surety are defined by this section, beyond which he cannot
go. By it he has the right to prove, in cue the principal cred. itor fails to do so. He does not, indeed, have to discharge the
obligation in order to have
this privilege, but, in case he does
I
do so, in whole or in part, he becomes entitled to that extent
to the right of subrogation, and, in any event, when he proves
the debt, he proves it not in his own name, but in that of the
original holder. In re Christensen, 2 Nat. Bankr. N. 1094. The
particular point to be noticed in the present connection with
regard to the position of the surety is that he only has a right
to prove in case the principal creditor fails to do so, and the
latter cannot be said to fail until he has had an opportunity and
passed it by, which can only occur when, by proceedings duly
instituted, the estate of the debtor has been drawn into the bankruptcy court to be there administered, and all parties have been
called upon to make known their claims. When that has been
done, and he neglects to act, the surety, so as not to be prejudiced, mAy himself prove the debt in his stead. This, so far as
I can see, is all the relief given by the act, and, whether adequate
or inadequate, it must suffice. It follows from this that at the
outstart the surety who has not taken up the obligation bas
no provable claim, and therefore has no standing to petition. It
is not provided in the law that at that stage he can intervene,
either in his own name or in the name of the creditor, and institute involuntary proceedings. All that be can do is to prove
the claim later on, if the creditor fails to do so after somebody
else has moved. This is the view taken by In re Riker, 18 Nat.
Bankr. R. 393, Fed. Cas. No. 11,833, a case arising under the
act of 1867, where the provisions were fully as favorable to the
surety as here. Two of the petitioners there were indorsers on
notes of the debtor, which had been turned over for value to a
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third party, in whose hands they had been dishonored at ma-

turity, and the indorsers notified that they would be held; and,

notwithstanding that their liability was so fixed, it was decided

that they were not entitled to petition. "It seems," says

Choate, J., "the notes objected to were not demands due abso-

lutely to the petitioning creditors, but ou which, in case the

holders should not prove, they could make proof * * * in

the creditor's name or otherwise. The holder is the creditor,

who, in the first instance, has exclusively the right to prove;

and the liability of the maker to the indorsers is only contingent

in its nature, and his claim is only provable in a certain event,

which cannot happen until after the adjudication, viz., the

neglect of the holder to prove." This is squarely to the point,

and confirms my own reading of the law. Nor do I find anything

to contravene it in Mace v. Wells, 7 How. 272, 12 L. ed. 698, or

In re Nickodemus, 3 Nat. Bankr. R. 230, Fed. Cas. No. 10,254,

relied on by counsel for the petitioners. I am forced, therefore,

to conclude that the sureties had no standing to institute the

present proceedings, which must accordingly fall.

The rule is made absolute, and the petition and all proceed-

ings thereunder are dismissed.8

SWARTS v. SIEGEL et al.
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117 Fed. 13, 54 C. C. A. 399

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. July 21, 1902) .

SANBORN, Circuit Judge. These are appeals from the decree

of the District Court directing that the claim of F. Siegel &

Bro. against the estate of the Siegel-Hillman Dry Goods Com-

pany, a corporation and a bankrupt, be disallowed unless the

claimants repay to the trustee the sums of $14,600 and $5,219.63,

third party, in whose hands they had been dishonored at maturity, and the indorsers notified that they would be held ; and,
notwithstanding that their liability was so fixed, it waa decided
that they were not entitled to petition. "It seems," says
Choate, J ., ''the notes objected to were not demands due absolu tely to the petitioning creditors, but on which, in case the
holders should not prove, they could make proof • • • in
the creditor's name or otherwise. The holder is the creditor,
who, in the first instance, baa exclusively the right to prove;
and the liability of the maker to the indorsers is only contingent
in its nature, and his claim is only provable in a certain event,
which cannot happen until after the adjudication, viz., the
neglect of the holder to prove.'' This is squarely to the point,
and confirms my own reading of the law. Nor do I find anything
to contravene it in Mace v. Wells, 7 How. 272, 12 L. ed. 698, or
In re Nickodemus, 3 Nat. Bankr. R. 230, Fed. Cas. No. 10,254,
relied on by counsel for the petitioners. I am forced, therefore,
to conclude that the sureties had no standing to institute the
present proceedings, which must accordingly fall.
The rule is made absolute, and the petition and all proceedings thereunder are dismissed.8

which the court held to constitute preferences given to the

claimants which they were required to surrender under § 57g

of the bankrupt act of 1898. The claimants appealed from this

decree because it required them to restore the $14,600 and the

SWARTS v. SIEGEL et al.

$5,219.63 as a condition of the allowance of their claim. The

trustee appealed from it because it did not require the claimants

117 Fed. 13, 54 C. C. A. 399

8—See Inaley v. Garside, 121 Fed.

699; In re Dr. Vorhees Co., 187

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. July 21, 1902)

Fed. 611, 629, 633.

SANBORN, Circuit Judge. These are appeals from the decree
of the District Court directing that the claim of F. Siegel &
Bro. against the estate of the Siegel-Hillman Dry Goods Company, a corporation and a bankrupt, be disallowed unless the
claimants repay to the trustee the sums of $14,600 and $5,219.63,
which the court held to constitute preferences given to the
daimants which they were required to surrender under § 57g
of the bankrupt act of 1898. The claimants appealed from this
decree because it required them to restore the $14,600 and the
$5,219.63 as a condition of the allowance of their claim. The
trustee appealed from it because it did not require the claimants
8-See Inllley v. Garside, 121 Fed.
699; In re Dr. Vorhees Co., 187
Fed. 611, 629, 633.
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to repay to him $20,000 more as a condition of the allowance' of

their claim.

1. • • * Four months prior to February 6, 1900, when

the dry goods company was adjudicated a bankrupt, the Fourth

National Bank of St. Louis held the promissory notes of this

corporation for $25,000 upon which the claimants, F. Siegel &

Bro., had indorsed their names before the notes were discounted

for the purpose of giving them credit, so that they became

accommodation makers thereon. Within four months preceding

the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the dry goods company,

while it was insolvent, paid to the bank $14,600 on some of these

notes, and the bank innocently received these payments. On

December 30, 1899, when the petition in bankruptcy was filed,

the bank held a claim against the corporation for $10,600 and

interest upon some of these notes which had been indorsed by

the claimants, and for $35,000 upon other notes of the bankrupt

which had not. been so indorsed. After the adjudication in

bankruptcy Siegel & Bro. paid $10,535.46, the amount which

remained due upon some of these notes which they had indorsed,

and one of the items of their claim against the estate of the bank-

rupt is the amount which they so paid. Their claim consists of

various items aggregating about $35,000. The court below di-
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rected the disallowance of their claim unless they refunded the

$14,600 which the bank had received on the notes which Siegel &

Bro. had indorsed.

• ••••••••

[After discussing the question of subrogation, the court con-

tinued]:

There is another reason why Siegel & Bro. are not entitled to

the allowance of their claim unless the $14,600 is repaid. It is

that they were creditors of the dry goods company when that

amount was paid to the bank. A creditor is "one who gives

credit in business transactions." Cent. Diet. p. 1341, tit. "Cred-

itor. '' Siegel & Bro. gave credit to the dry goods company in a

business transaction. They signed its notes, became absolutely

liable to pay them, and thereby gave it credit. If they had simply

indorsed them, and thus become only contingently liable, the same

result would have followed. One who loans his credit to another

is as much his creditor as one who loans his money to him. A

creditor is "one who has the right to require the fulfillment of

an oMigation or contract." Bouv. Law Diet. p. 435. An in-

dorser, an accommodation maker, or a surety on an obligation

to repay to him $20,000 more as a condition of the allowance- of
their claim.
1. • • • Four months prior to February 6, 1900, when
the dry goods company wa.s adjudicated a bankrupt, the Fourth
National Bank of St. Louis held the promissory notes of this
corporation for $25,000 upon which the claimants, F. Siegel &
Bro., had indorsed their names before the notes were discounted
for the purpose of giving them credit, so that they became
accommodation makers thereon. Within four months preceding
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the dry goods company,
while it wa.s insolvent, paid to the bank $14,600 on some of these
notes, and the bank innocently received these payments. On
December 30, 1899, when the petition in bankruptcy was filed,
the bank held a claim against the eorporation for $10,600 and
interest upon some of these notes which had been indorsed by
the claimants, and for $35,000 upon other notes of the bankrupt
which had not. been so indorsed. After the adjudication in
bankruptcy Siegel & Bro. paid $10,535.46, the amount which
remained due upon some of these notes which they had indorsed,
and one of the items of their claim against the estate of the baukru pt is the amount which they so paid. Their claim consists of
various items aggregating about $35,000. The court below di·
rected the disallowance of their claim unless they refunded the
$14,600 which the bank had received on the notes which Siegel &
Bro. bad indorsed.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

[After discussing the question of subrogation, the court continued]:
There is another reason why Siegel & Bro. are not entitled to
the allowance of their claim unless the $14,600 is repaid. It is
that they were creditors of the dry goods company when that
amount was paid to the bank. A creditor is ''one who gives
credit in business transactions.'' Cent. Diet. p. 1341, tit. '' Creditor.'' Siegel & Bro. gave credit to the dry goods company in a
business transaction. They signed its notes, became absolutely
liable to pay them, and thereby gave it credit. If they had simply
indorsed them, and thus become only contingently Jiable, the,.same
result would have followed. One who loans his credit to another
is as much bis creditor as one who loans his money to him. A
creditor is ''one who has the right to require the fulfillment of
an obligation or contract.'' Bouv. Law Diet. p. 435. An indorser, an accommodation maker, or a surety on an obligation
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of a debtor has a right to require the fulfillment of the obliga-

tion or contract of that debtor. "'Creditor' shall include any

one who owns a demand or claim provable in bankruptcy." § 1,

subd. 9, Bankr. Law 1898. '' Debts of a bankrupt may be proved

and allowed against his estate which are (1) a fixed liability

• * * (4) founded upon an open account or upon a con-

tract express or implied." § 63. Provision is here made for the

proof of two classes of debts,—those which evidence fixed liabili-

ties of the debtor, and those founded upon contracts which evi-

dence contingent or uncertain liabilities. The debt of a principal

debtor to his indorser, his accommodation maker, or his surety

before the latter has paid the obligation is a contingent liability

founded upon contract, and falls directly within the terms and

meaning of subdivision 4 of this section. To make assurance

doubly sure, however, congress expressly provided that "when-

ever a creditor, whose claim against a bankrupt estate is se-

cured by the individual undertaking of any person, fails to

prove such claim, such person may do so in the creditor's name,

and if he discharge such undertaking in whole or in part he shall

be subrogated to that extent to the rights of the creditor.'' § 57t.

An indorser, an accommodation maker, or a surety on the obliga-

tion of a bankrupt is a person whose individual undertaking
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secures the claim against the bankrupt estate of the holder of that

obligation, and by the terms of this section he may prove that

claim whenever the creditor fails to do so. The language is

broad, comprehensive, and without exception. He has the same

right to prove it before as after he discharges the obligation in

whole or in part, and if he is an indorser he has the same right

to make his proof before as after his liability ceases to be con-

tingent and becomes fixed. The last clause of the paragraph,

"and if he discharge such undertaking in whole or in part he

shall be subrogated to that extent to the rights of the creditor,''

neither limits the class who may prove their claims under this

paragraph to those who have discharged their undertakings

entirely or partly, nor in any way restricts the class which the

earlier portion of the paragraph permits to establish their de-

mands against the estate of the bankrupt. On the other hand, it

adds emphasis and certainty to the patent meaning of the earlier

portion of the paragraph that the indorser or surety may prove

the claim in the name of the holder of the bankrupt's obligation

whenever the creditor fails to do so, and before, as well as

after, the surety discharges his undertakings, because, while such

a & A. Bankruptcy—27

of a debtor has a right to require the fulfillment of the obligation or contract of that debtor. " 'Creditor' shall include any
one who owns a demand or claim provable in bankruptcy." § 1,
subd. 9, Bankr. Law 1898. ''Debts of a bankrupt may be proved
and allowed against his estate which are (1) a fixed liability
• • • ( 4) fmmded upon an open account or upon a contract express or implied.'' § 63. Provision is here made for the
proof of two classes of debts,-those which evidence fixed liabilities of the debtor, and those founded upon contracts which evidence contingent or uncertain liabilities. The debt of a principal
debtor to his indorser, his accommodation maker, or his surety
before the latter has paid the obligation is a contingent liability
founded upon contract, and falls directly within the terms and
meaning of subdivision 4 of this section. To make assurance
doubly sure, however, congress expressly provided that "whenever a creditor, whose claim against a bankrupt estate is secured by the individual undertaking of any person, fails to
prove such claim, such person may do so in the creditor's name,
and if he discharge such undertaking in whole or in part he shall
be subrog,ated to that extent to the rights of the creditor." § 57i.
An indorser, an accommodation maker, or a surety on the obligation of a bankrupt is a person whose individual undertaking
secures the claim against the bankrupt estate of the holder of that
obligation, and by the terms of this section he may prove that
claim whenever the creditor fails to do so. The language i8
broad, comprehensive, and without exception. He has the same
right to prov~ it before as after he discharges the obligation in
whole or in part, and if he is an indorser he has the same right
to make his proof before as after his liability ceases to be contingent and becomes fixed. The last clause of the paragraph,
''and if he discharge such undertaking in whole or in part he
shall be subrogated to that extent to the rights of the creditor, ' '
neither limits the class who may prove their claims under this
paragraph to those who have discharged their undertakings
entirely or partly, nor in any way restricts the class which the
earlier portion of the paragraph permits to establish their demands against the estate of the bankrupt. On the other hand, it
adds emphasis and certainty to the patent meaning of the earlier
portion of the paragraph that the indorser or surety may prove
the claim in the name of the holder of the bankrupt's obligation
whenever the creditor fails to do so, and before, as well as
after, the surety discharges his undertakings, because, while sucli
H.
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proof in the name of the creditor would send the dividends to

the original holder of the claim, the latter portion of the para-

graph adds the provision that if the surety discharges his un-

dertaking he shall then be subrogated to the rights of the original

holder, and hence to the right to receive the dividends. §§ 57*

and 63 (4) were obviously intended to prevent the injustice that

would be inflicted upon indorsers and sureties for the bankrupt

whenever the holders of their obligations should elect to make no

proof of their claims against the bankrupt estates, and to rely

exclusively upon the liabilities of the sureties if the latter were

not allowed to prove the claims. These sections have accom-

plished their purpose. The remedy they provided is as broad

and comprehensive as the evil which they were passed to pre-

vent, and an indorser or a surety has a provable claim against

the estate of a bankrupt, and is his creditor under the act of

1898 before, as well as after, his liability becomes fixed.

An indorser, an' accommodation maker, or a surety on the

obligation of a bankrupt is a creditor under the act of 1898,

and a payment on such an obligation by the principal debtor

while insolvent to the innocent holder of the contract within

four months before the filing of the petition for adjudication in

bankruptcy will constitute a preference which will debar the

indorser, accommodation maker, or surety from the allowance
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of any claim in his favor against the estate of the bankrupt

unless the amount so paid is first returned to that estate. Bankr.

Act 1898 (30 Stat. 544) §§ 1 (9), 57i, 63a (1, 4); Landry v.

Andrews, 6 Am. Bankr. R. 281, 284, 48 Atl. 1036; In re Rea, 82

Iowa, 231, 239, 48 N. W. 78; Cutler v. Steele, 85 Mich. 627, 632,

48 N. W. 631; Dunnigan v. Stevens, 122 Ill. 396, 401, 404, 13

N. B. 651, 3 Am. St. Rep. 496; Ahl v. Thornor, 1 Fed. Cas. 220,

222 (No. 103); Sill v. Solberg (C. C), 6 Fed. 468, 474, 477;

Scammon v. Cole, 21 Fed. Cas. 627, 628 (No. 12,432); Cooking-

ham v. Morgan, 6 Fed. Cas. 454, 455 (No. 3,183) ; In re Gerson

(D. C), 105 Fed. 891; Bartholow v. Bean, 18 Wall. 635, 21 L.

ed. 866; In re Waterbury Furniture Co. (D. C), 114 Fed. 255.

This conclusion has not been reached without a careful com-

parison of the pertinent provisions of §§38 and 39 of the bank-

rupt act of 1867 (14 Stat. 535, 536), and a thoughtful perusal

of the opinions in Singer v. Sloan, Fed. Cas. No. 12,899; Thomas

v. Woodbury, Fed. Cas. No. 13,916; Bean v. Laflin, Fed. Cas.

No. 1,172; Corbett v. Woodward, Fed. Cas. No. 3,223; and

proof in the name of the creditor would send the dividends to
the original holder of the claim, the latter portion of the paragraph adds the provision that if the surety discharges his undertaking he shall then be subrogated to the rights of the original
holder, and hence to the right to receive the dividends. §§ 57i
and 63 ( 4) were obviously intended to prevent the injustice that
would be inflicted upon indorsers and sureties for the bankrupt
whenever the holders of their obligations should elect to make no
proof of their claims against the bankrupt estates, and to rely
exclusively upon the liabilities of the sureties if the latter were
not allowed to prove the claims. These sections have accomplished their purpose. The remedy they provided is as broad
and comprehensive as the evil which they were p888ed to prevent, and an indorser or a surety has a provable claim against
the estate of a bankrupt, and is his creditor under the act of
1898 before, as well as after, his liability becomes fixed.
An indorser, an' accommodation maker, or a surety on the
obligation of a ba11krupt is a creditor under the act of 1898,
and a payment on such an obligation by the principal debt.or
while insolvent to the innocent holder of the contract within
four months before the filing of the petition for adjudication in
bankruptcy will constitute a preference which will debar the
indorser, accommodation maker, or surety from the allowance
of any claim in his faYor against the estate of the bankrupt
unless the amount so paid is first returned to that estate. Bankr.
Act 1898 (30 Stat. 544) §§ 1 (9), 57i, 63a (1, 4); Landry v.
Andrews, 6 Am. Bankr. R. 281, 284, 48 Atl. 1036; In re Rea, 82
Iowa, 231, 239, 48 N. W. 78; Cutler v. Steele, 85 Mich. 627, 632,
48 N. \V. 631; Dunnigan v. Stevens, 122 Ill. 396, 401, 404, 13
N. E. 651, 3 Am. St. Rep. 496; Ahl v. Thornor, 1 Fed. Cas. 220,
222 (No. 103); Sill v. Solberg (C. C.), 6 Fed. 468, 474, 477;
Scammon v. Cole, 21 Fed. Cas. 627, 628 (No. 12,432) ; Cookingham v. Morgan, 6 Fed. Cas. 454, 455 (No. 3,183); In re Gerson
(D. C.), 105 Fed. 891; Bartholow v. Bean, 18 Wall. 635, 21 L.
ed. 866; In re Waterbury Furniture Co. (D. C.), 114 Fed. 255.
This conclusion has not been reached without a careful comparison of the pertinent provisions of §§ 38 and 39 of the bankrupt act of 1867 ( 14 Stat. 535, 536), and a thoughtful perusal
of the opinions in Singer v. Sloan, Fed. Cas. No. 12,899; Thomas
v. \\<·oodhury, Fed. Cas. No. 13,916; Bean v. Laflin, Fed. Cas.
No. 1,172; Corbett v. Woodward, Fed. Cas. No. 3,223; and
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Swarts v. Siegel (C. C), 114 Fed. 1001. This portion of our

labors, however, has been fruitless chiefly for the reason that

the language of the act of 1898 upon this subject appears to us

to be too plain for exegesis or interpretation. Attempted judicial

construction of the unequivocal language of a statute or of a

contract serves only to create doubt and to confuse the judgment.

There is no safer or better settled canon of interpretation than

that when language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to

mean what it plainly expresses, and no room is left for con-

struction. Knox Co. v. Morton, 15 C. C. A. 671, 673, 68 Fed.

787, 789; Railway Co. v. Sage, 17 C. C. A. 558, 565, 71 Fed. 40,

47; U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 399, 2 L. ed. 304; Railway

Co. v. Phelps, 137 U. S. 528, 536, 11 Sup. Ct. 168, 34 L. ed. 767.

The accepted and customary definition of the term '' creditor,''

its definition in the act of 1898, the clear terms and patent

meaning of the provisions of that act upon the subject under

discussion, the better reasons and the greater weight of authority,

all converge to establish and sustain the conclusion that an in-

dorser, an accommodation maker, or a surety for a bankrupt is

his creditor; and the result is that whether we are governed by

the general definition of the term, or by the specific provisions

of the statute, Siegel & Bro. held a provable claim against the
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estate of the dry goods company, and were its creditors when

the $14,600 was paid to the bank; and as that payment depleted

the estate, and its enforcement will enable Siegel & Bro. to ob-

tain a larger percentage of their claim out of the estate of the

bankrupt than other creditors of the same class will receive,

their claim against the estate cannot be allowed unless the $14,600

is first returned to the trustee.

•••

The result is that the claim of F. Siegel & Bro. against the

estate of the bankrupt cannot be lawfully allowed unless before

its allowance * • • the sum of $14,600 is paid back to the

trustee either by the Fourth National Bank of St. Louis or by

Siegel & Bro. * * • The decree which is challenged by these

appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court be-

low, with directions to enter orders and take further proceed-

ings herein not inconsistent with the views expressed in this

opinion and in the opinion in the case of Swarts v. Fourth Nat.

Bank, which is filed herewith.

Swarts v. Siegel {C. C.), 114 Fed. 1001. This portion of our
labors, however, has been fruitless chiefly for the reason that
the language of the act of 1898 upon this subject appears to us
to be too plain for exegesis or interpretation. Attempted judicial
construction .of the unequivocal language of a statute or of a
contract serves only to create doubt and to confuse the judgment.
There is no safer or better settled canon of interpretation than
that when language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to
mean what it plainly expresses, and no room is left for construction. Knox Co. v. :Morton, 15 C. C. A. 671, 673, 68 Fed.
787, 789; Railway Co. v. Sage, 17 C. C. A. 558, 565, 71 Fed. 40,
47; U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 399, 2 L. ed. 304; Railway
Co. v. Phelps, 137 U.S. 528, 536, 11 Sup. Ct. 168, 34 L. ed. 767.
The accepted a.nd customary definition of the term ''creditor,''
its definition in the act of 1898, the clear terms a.nd patent
meaning of the provisions of that act upon the subject under
discussion, the better reasons and the greater weight of authority,
all converge to E>.stablish and sustain the conclusion that an indorser, an accommodation maker, or a surety for a bankrupt is
his creditor; and the result is that whether we are governed by
the general definition of the term, or by the specific provisions
of the statute, Siegel & Bro. held a provable claim against the
estate of the dry goods company, and were its creditors when
the $14,600 was paid to the bank ; and as that payment depleted
the estate, and its enforcement will enable Siegel & Bro. to obtain a larger percentage of their claim out of the estate of the
bankrupt than other creditors of the same class will receive,
their claim agaiust the estate cannot be allowed unless the $14,600
is first returned to the trustee.

• • •

The result is that the claim of F. Siegel & Bro. against the
estate of the bankrupt cannot be lawfully allowed unless before
its allowance • • • the sum of $14,600 is paid back to the
trustee either by the Fourth National Bank of St. Louis or by
Siegel & Bro. • • • The decree which is challenged by these
appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below, with directions to enter orders and take further proceedings herein not inconsistent with the views expressed in this
opinion and in the opinion in the case of Swarts v. Fourth Nat.
Bank, which is filed herewith.
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GODING v. ROSCENTHAL

GODING v. ROSCENTHAL

180 Mass. 43, 61 N. E. 222

/

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. October 18, 1901)

180 Mass. 43, 61 N. E. 222

BARKER, J. By the execution of the bond of March 29, 1898,

to Aug, in which the present plaintiff was a surety for the

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. October 18, 1901)

present defendant, the latter incurred an obligation to the pres-

ent plaintiff to reimburse him any amount which he might be

BARKER, J. By the execution of the bond of March 29, 1898,

compelled as surety to pay upon the bond. This obligation was

to Aug, in which the present plaintiff was a surety for the

in force when, on February 13, 1900, the present defendant-s

petition in bankruptcy was filed. It was an obligation founded

upon an implied contract, and it was evidenced by an instrument

in writing, and in one sense it was a fixed liability. But no debt

was absolutely owing at the time of the petition. The obliga-

tion was contingent upon the happening of a breach of the bond

and a payment by the surety. The payment by the surety was

not until June 12, 1900, and there seems to have been no breach

of the bond before that date. Therefore neither the obligee in

the bond nor the surety could prove in the bankruptcy proceed-

ings a claim founded upon the bond, unless merely contingent

claims are provable under the bankruptcy act of 1898. The ulti-

mate decision of that question is yet to be made by the Supremo

Court of the United States. But in Morgan v. Wordell, 178 Mass.
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350, 59 N. E. 1037, this court assumed that such claims were

not provable under the act, and we follow that view in the

present case.

Exceptions sustained.8

HAYER v. COMSTOCK

115 Iowa 187, 88 N. W. 351

(Supreme Court of Iowa. December 20, 1901)

GIVEN, C. J. 1. The agreed statement of facts is as follows:

"On May 26, 1900, the following agreed statement of facts was

filed with the clerk of the Wright County District Court, to-wit:

'It is hereby agreed by and between the plaintiff and the de-

fendant in the above-entitled action that on December 2, 1893,

9—Smith v. McQuillin, 193 Mass. Hams & Co. v. U. S. Fidelity, etc.,

£89; Ogilby v. Munro, 101 N. Y. Co., 11 Ga. App. 635, 75 S. E.

Supp. 753, 52 Misc. 170; B. P. Wil- 1067, aoc.

1

present defendant, the latter incurred an obligation to the present plaintiff to reimburse him any amount which he might be
compelled as surety to pay upon the bond. This obligation l\'as
in force when, on February 13, 1900, the present defendaut 's
petition in bankruptcy was filed. ft was an obligation founded
upon an implied contract, and it was evidenced by an instrument
in writiug, and in one sense it was a fixed liability. But no debt
was absolutely owing at the time of the petition. The obligation was contingent upon the happening of a breach of the bond
and a payment by the surety. The payment by the surety was
not until June 12, 1900, and there seems to have been no breach
of the bond before that date. Therefore neither the obligee in
the bond nor the surety could prove in the bankruptcy proceedings. a claim founded upon the bond, unless merely contingent
claims are provable under the bankruptcy act of 1898. The ulti·
mate decision of that question is yet to be made by the Supremo
Court of the United States. But in :Morgan v. Wordell, 178 Mass.
350, 59 N. E. 1037, this court assumed that such claims were
not provable under the act, and we follow that view in the
present case.
Exceptions sustained.9

HAYER v. COMSTOCK
115 Iowa 187, 88 N. W. 351
(Supreme Court of Iowa. December 20, 1901)
GIVEN, C. J. 1. The agreed statement of fact.a is as follows:
''On May 26, 1900, the following agreed statement of facts was
filed with the clerk of the Wright County District Court, t0-wit:
'It is hereby agreed by and between the plaintiff and the de·
fendant in the above-entitled action that on December 2, 1893,
9-Smith v. McQuillin, 193 Mass.
Ogilby v. Munro, 101 N. Y.
Supp. 753, 52 Misc. 170; R. P. Wil·
~89;

Iiams & Co. v. U. S. Fidelity, ete.,
Co., 11 Ga. App. 635, 75 S. E.
1067, GOO.
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the plaintiff, C. F. Hayer, signed the note attached to this state-

ment as surety for the defendarit; that the defendant failed and

neglected to pay said note; that on April 1, 1899, the plaintiff

had to, and did, pay the full amqunt of said note, to-wit, $193.60,

to the State Bank of Eagle Grove, Iowa, and that no part of

said amount has been repaid him; that in December, 1898, the

defendant filed his petition in the District Court of the United

States for the Northern District of Iowa, and was duly and

legally adjudged a voluntary bankrupt under the acts of Con-

gress relating to bankruptcy; that said note was duly scheduled

in said bankruptcy proceedings as one of defendant's liabilities;

that in such schedule the State Bank of Eagle Grove, Iowa,

payee of said note, was named as the owner and holder thereof,

and was duly notified of each step in said bankruptcy proceed-

ings as required by law; that in December, 1898, plaintiff, C. F.

Hayer, was informed by others of the pendency of said bank-

ruptcy proceedings, and had actual knowledge thereof after the

filing of the petition, although he was not listed as a creditor

therein; that on April 3, 1899, this defendant was by the judg-

ment of said United States Court discharged from all his debts;

that a certificate of such discharge was issued by said court and

delivered to defendant, a copy of which certificate is attached

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

to defendant's answer herein, and is hereby made a part of this

statement of facts.'" The certificate of discharge is: "Prom

all debts and claims which existed on the 6th day of December,

A. D. 1898, on which day the petition for adjudication was filed

by him, except such debts as are by law excepted from the

operation of such discharge in bankruptcy." This claim is not

of the class excepted by law. The plaintiff claims that as he

had not, as surety, paid the note at the time the petition for

adjudication in bankruptcy was filed, there was no debt then

due to him, and he could not have his claim scheduled against

the bankrupt's estate; that he had no provable claim; and that

the discharge does not apply to his claim; while the defendant

contends that under the facts the discharge does apply, and

that therefore the court erred in rendering judgment against

him.

§ 17 of the bankruptcy law of 1898, under which this pro-

ceeding was had, provides that '' a discharge in bankruptcy shall

release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts," except cer-

tain debts of which this is not one. § 63, in specifying debts

which may be proved and allowed, names the following, among

the plaintiff, C. F. Hayer, sig11ed the note attached to this stnteme11t as surety for the defenda1it; that the defcndaut failed and
neglected to pay said note; that on April 1, 1899, the plaiu1 iff
had to, and did, pay the full am'\unt of said note, to-wit, $193.66,
to the State Bank of Eagle Grove, Iowa, and that no part of
said amount has been repaid him; that in December, 1898, the
defendant filed his petition in the District Court of the United
~itates for the Northern District of Iowa, and was duly and
legally adjudged a voluntary bankrupt under the acts of Congrt'ss r1~lating to bankruptcy; that said note was duly scheduled
in said bankruptcy proceedings as one of ddendant 's liabilities;
that in such schedule the State Ba11k of Eagle Grove, Iowa,
payee of said note, was named as the owner and holder thereof,
and was duly notified of each step in said bankruptcy proceedings as required by law; that in December, 1898, plaintiff, C. F.
Hayer, was informed by others of the pendency of said bankruptcy proceedi1;gs, and had actual knowledge thereof after the
filing of the petition, although he was not listed as a creditor
thereiu; that on April 3, 1899, this defendant was by the judgme!1t of said United States Court discharged from all his debts;
that a certificate of such discharge was issued by saicl court and
delivered to defendant, a copy of which certificate is attached
to defendant's answer herein, and is hereby made a part of this
statemeut of facts.' " The certificate of discharge is: "From
all debts and claims which existed on the 6th day of Deceml~er,
A. D. 1898, on which day the petition for adjudication was filed
by him, except such debts as are by law excepted from the
operation of such discharge in bankruptcy." This claim is not
of the class excepted by law. The plaintiff claims that as he
had not, as surety, paid the note at the time the petition for
adjudication in bankruptcy was filed, there was no debt then
due to him, and he could not have his claim scheduled against
the bankrupt's estate ; th.at he had no provable claim; and that
the discharge does not apply to his claim; while the defendant
contends that under the facts the discharge does apply, and
that therefore the ~ourt erred in rendering judgment against
him.
§ 17 of the baukruptcy law of 1898, under which this proceeding was had, provides th.at ''a discharge in bankruptcy shall
release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts,'' except certain debts of which this is not one. § 63, in specifying debts
which may be proved and allowed, names the following, among
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others: "(1) A fixed liability as evidenced by judgment or an

instrument in writing absolutely owing at the time of the filing

of the petition against him, whether then payable or not, with

any interest thereon which would have been recoverable at that

date or with a rebate of interest upon such as were not then

payable and did not bear interest. • • • (4) Founded upon

an open account, or upon a contract express or implied." §16

provides that the liability of the surety for a bankrupt shall not

be altered by the discharge of such bankrupt, and paragraph

"i" of § 57 is as follows: "Whenever a creditor, whose claim

a gainst a bankrupt estate is secured by the individual under-

taking of any person, fails to prove such claim, such person may

do so in the creditor's name, and if he discharge such undertak-

ing in whole or in part he shall be subrogated to that extent to

the rights of the creditor." Paragraph 4 of order No. 21 of

"General Orders and Forms in Bankruptcy Established by the

Supreme Court of the United States" (18 Sup. Ct. vii.) is as

follows: "(4) The claims of persons contingently liable for

the bankrupt may be proved in the name of the creditor when

known by the party contingently liable. When the name of the

creditor is unknown such claim may be proved in the name of

the party contingently liable; but no dividend shall be paid
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upon such claim, except upon satisfactory proof that it will

diminish the pro tanto original debt."

This debt was a fixed liability evidenced by an instrument in

writing, and absolutely owing by the defendant at the time of

the filing of the petition" in bankruptcy, and therefore might be

proved against the estate as it was. It is the fact that the bank-

rupt absolutely owed this fixed liability, evidenced in writing, at

the time of the filing of the petition, that made it provable,

regardless of the person to whom it was owing. If the creditor

had failed to prove the claim, the plaintiff could have done so

in its name, not because the debt was then due to him, but be-

cause it was a fixed liability, evidenced in writing, and abso-

lutely owing by the defendant. Being proved as it was by the

creditor, it was not required that the surety should take any

further steps. We do not overlook the distinctions that exist as

between liability of the debtor to the creditor and his liability

to his surety, but we emphasize the fact that it was the fixed

liability, evidenced in writing, "absolutely owing" by the de-

fendant, that made this a provable claim against his estate. Said

paragraphs in § 57 and in the general orders of the Supreme

others : '' ( 1) A fixed liability as evidenced by judgment or an
instrument in writing absolutely owing at the time of the filing
of the petition against him, whether then payable or not, with
any interest thereon which would have been recoverable at that
date or with a rebate of interest upon such as were not then
payable and did not bear interest. • • • ( 4) Founded upon
an open account, or upon a contract express or implied.'' § 16
provides that the liability of the surety for a bank:ruP.t shall not
be altered by the discharge of such bankrupt, and paragraph
"i" of § 57 is as follows: "Whenever a creditor, whose claim
ugainst a bankrupt estate is secured by the individual under·
taking of any person, fails to prove such claim, such person may
do so in the creditor's name, and if he discharge such undertakiIJ g in whole or in part he shall be subrogated to that extent to
the rights of the creditor." Paragraph 4 of order No. 21 of
''General Orders and Forms in Bankruptcy Established by the
Supreme Court of the United States" (18 Sup. Ct. vii.) is &a
follows : " ( 4) The claims of persons contingently liable for
the bankrupt may be proved in the name of the creditor when
known by the party contingently liable. When the name of the
creditor is unknown such claim may be proved in the name of
the party contingently liable; but no dividend shall be paid
upon such claim, except upon satisfactory proof that it will
diminish the pro tanto original debt.''
This debt was a fixed liability evidenced by an instrument in
writing, and absolutely owing by the defendant at the time of
the filing of the petition· in bankruptcy, and therefore might be
proved against the estate as it was. It is the fact that the bank·
rupt absolutely owed this fixed liability, evidenced in writing, at
the time of the filing of the petition, that made it provable,
regardless of the person to whom it was owing. If the creditor
had failed to prove the claim, the plaintiff could have done so
in its name, not because the debt was then due to him, but because it was a fixed liability, evidenced in writing, and abso·
lutely owing by the defendant. Being proved as it was by the
creditor, it was not required that the surety should take any
further steps. We do not overlook the distinctions that exist as
between liability of the debtor to the creditor and his liability
to his surety, but we emphasize the fact that it was the fixed
liability, evidenced in writing, "absolutely owing" by the defendant, that made this a provable claim against his estate. Said
paragraph.s in § 57 and in the general orders of the Supreme
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Court recognize the right of the surety to protect himself before

payment, and when his liability is contingent, ami to share in

the dividends of the estate after payment. Mace v. Wells, 7

How. 275, 12 L. ed. 698, decided under the bankruptcy law of

1841, is quite identical in its facts with this case, and it was

there held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The

fourth section of the law provided that "a discharge and certi-

ficate, when duly granted, shall in all courts of justice be deemed

a full and complete discharge of all debts, contracts and other

engagements of such bankrupt which are provable under this

act," etc. By the fifth section, "endorsers, bail, or other per-

sons having uncertain or contingent demands against such bank-

rupt, shall be permitted to come in and prove such debts or

claims under this act, and shall have a right whenever debts and

claims become absolute to have the same allowed them," etc.

The court says: '' Wells, as surety, was within this section, and

might have proved his demand against the bankrupt. He had

not paid the last note, but he was liable to pay it as surety, and

that gave him a right to prove the claim under the fifth section.

And the fourth section declares that from all such demands the

bankrupt shall be discharged. This is the whole case. It seems

to he clear of doubt." See, also, Crafts v. Mott, 4 N. Y. 604.
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We may say as to these sections, and the sections of the present

law quoted" above, as is said in the recent case of In re Dillon

(D. C), 100 Fed. 627—that "the provisions of the two acts,

though quite differently worded, yet reach in most respects the

same results." Under both cases the surety can get nothing by

way of dividend unless he pays the original debt, in whole or

in part. If he discharges the whole debt, then, under the clause

above quoted of § 19 of the Acts of 1867, and under § 57, par.

"i," of the bankrupt act of 1898, he stands in the place of the

original creditor, or is subrogated to his rights. This is true

whether the payment be made before or after the bankruptcy.

Plainly, the words "if he discharge such undertaking," in § 57,

par. "i," are not limited to the time before adjudication. In

this Case of Dillon it is said "That if Claffin, the creditor, had

proved the original debt to him at the time of the bankruptcy,

as he might ordinarily have done, McGuire [the surety], on his

subsequent payment of a part of the Claffin's debt, would be

subrogated to that extent to Claffin's rights. It follows, also,

that, since Claffin has not proved the debt, McGuire must, if he

wishes to prove, do so in Claffin's name. As he has not done

Court recognize the right of the surety to protect himself before
payment, and when his liability is contingeut, aDid to share iu
the dividends of the estate after payment. Mace v. Wells, 7
How. 275, 12 L. ed. 698, decided under the ba.ukrnptcy law of
1841, is quite identical in its facts with this case, and it was
there held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The
fourth section of the law provided that ''a discharge and certificate, when duly granted, shall in all courts of justice be deemPd
a full and complete discharge of all debts, contracts and othl'r
engagements of such bankrupt which are provable under this
act,'' etc. By the fifth section, ''endorsers, bail, or other persons having uncertain or contingent demands against such bankrupt, shall be permitted to come in and prove such debts or
claims under this act, and shall have a right whenever debts and
claims become absolute to have the same allowed them,'' etc.
The court says: "Wells, as surety, was within this section, and
might have proved his demand against the bankrupt. He had
not paid the last note, but he was liable to pay it as surety, ·and
that gave him a right to prove the claim under the fifth section.
And the fourth section declares that from all such demands the
bankrupt shall be discharged. This is the whole case. It seems
to be clear of doubt." See, also, Crafts v. Mott, 4 N. Y. 604.
We may say as to these secticms, and the sections of the present
law quoted" above, as is said in the recent case of In re Dillon
(D. C.), 100 Fed. 627,-that ''the provisions of the two acts,
though quite differently worded, yet reach in most respects the
same results.'' Under both cases the surety can get nothing by
way of dividend unless he pays the original debt, in whole or
in part. If he discharges the whole debt, then, under the clause
above quoted of § 19 of the Acts of 1867, and under § 57, par.
'' i," of the bankrupt act of 1898, he stands in the place of the
original creditor, or is subrogated to his rights. This is true
whether the payment be made before or after the bankruptcy.
Plainly, the words "if he discharge such undertaking," in § 57,
par. '' i,'' are not limited to the time before adjudication. In
this Case of Dillon it is said ''That if Claffin, the creditor, had
proved the original debt to him at the time of the bankruptcy,
as he might ordinarily have done, l\foGuire [the surety], on his
subsequent payment of a part of the Claffin 's debt, would be
subrogated to that extent to Claffin 's rights. It follows, also,
that, since Claffin has not proved the debt, McGuire must, if he
wishes to prove, do so in Claflin 's name. As he has not done

424

424

ADMINISTRATION

ADMINISTRATION

this, his claim must be disallowed, without any question of set-off,

and the referee's judgment is therefore affirmed." In this case

the creditor had proved the claim, and nothing further was re-

quired of the surety to entitle him to share in the dividends in

case of payment by him. Defendant cites In re Burka (D. G),

104 Fed. 326, which holds that the rights of creditors generally

relate to the date of the filing of the petition, and that a claim

for legal services not then in existence cannot be proved against

the estate, and is not released by discharge. As already said,

this was a fixed liability, evidenced in writing, and absolutely

owing by the defendant at the time of the filing of the petition;

and these facts render it a provable claim, regardless of whether,

by transfer or otherwise, the person to whom he owed it was

changed or not. Such, we think, is the plain intent of the law,

and the discbarge of the defendant operated to defeat the plain-

tiff's action.

It follows from this view of the law and facts that the judg-

ment of the District Court must be reversed.10

DUNBAR v. DUNBAR

190 U. S. 340, 47 L. ed. 1084, 23 Sup. Ct. 757

(United States Supreme Court. June 1. 1903)

The defendant in error, being the plaintiff below, brought her
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action in October, 1899, against the plaintiff in error, in the

Municipal Court of Boston, to recover moneys alleged to be due

upon a contract. which was set forth in the complaint. Issue

this, his claim must be disallowed, without any question of set-off,
and the referee's judgment is therefore affirmed.'' In this case
the creditor had proved the claim, and nothing further was required of the surety to entitle him to share in the dividends in
case of payment by him. Defendant cites In re Burka (D. C.),
104 Fed. 326, which holds that the rights of creditors generally
relate to the date of the filing of the petition, and that a claim
for legal servil'es not then in existence cannot be proved against
the estate, and is not released by discharge. As already said,
this was a fixed liability, evidenced in writing, and absolutely
owing by the defendant at the time of the filing of the petition;
and the5e facts render it a provable claim, regardless of whether,
by transfer or otherwise, the person to whom he owed it wu
changed or not. Such, we think, is the plain intent of the law,
and the discharge of the defendant operated to defeat the plaintiff's action.
It follows from this view of the law and facts that the judgment of the District Court must be reversed. 10

was joined and the case tried before a single justice, and judg-

ment ordered for the defendant, with costs. An appeal was

taken to the Superior Court of the county of Suffolk, and that

DUNBAR v. DUNBAR

court ordered judgment for the plaintiff for one branch only

of her claim. The case was reported to the Supreme Judicial

190 U. S. 340, 47 L. ed. 1084, 23 Sup. Ct. 757

Court for the commonwealth, and that court ordered the court

below to enter judgment for the plaintiff for both branches of

(United States Supreme Court. June 1, 1903)

her claim (180 Mass. 170, 62 N. E. 248), and the case was re-

manded to the Superior Court for the purpose of entering such

judgment. Pursuant to the directions of the Supreme Court,

10—Smith v. Wheeler, 66 N. Y. See generally 60 U. of P. Law

Supp. 780, 55 App. Div. 170; Bev. 482.

Sweaney v. Baugher, 166 Ind. 557,

occ.

The defendant in error, being the plaintiff below, brought her
action in October, 1899, against the plaintiff in error, in the
Municipal Court of Boston, to recover moneys alleged to be due
upon a contract, which was set forth in the complaint. Issue
was joined and the case tried before a single justice, and judgment ordered for the defendant, with costs. An appeal was
taken to the Superior Court of the county of Suffolk, and that
court ordered judgment for the plaintiff for one branch only
of her claim. The case was reported to the Supreme Judicial
Court for the commonwealth, and that court ordered the court
below to enter judgment for the plaintiff for both branches of
her claim (180 Mass. 170, 62 N. E. 248), and the case was remanded to the Superior Court for the purpose of entering such
judgment. Pursuant to the directions of the Supreme Court,
10-Smitb v. Wheeler, 66 N. Y.
Snpp. 780, 55 App. Div. 170;
Sweaney v. Baugher, 166 Ind. 557,
acc.

Bee generally 60 U. of P. Law
Rev. 482.
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the Superior Court did enter judgment against the defendant

for both branches of her claim, for the sum of $851.60 and costs.

The defendant then obtained a writ of error from this court,

directed to the Superior Court of Massachusetts, where the record

remained.

The case shows these facts: The parties were husband and

wife, who, in 1889, were living apart, the husband in Ohio and

the wife in Massachusetts. In May, 1889, the attorney for her

husband came to Massachusetts and saw Mrs. Dunbar, and told

her that her husband was about to seek a divorce from her. The

wife at this time had no means, and the two sons of the marriage,

then respectively nine and twelve years old, were living with

her. The purpose of the visit of the attorney was to obtain

some assurance from her that she would not contest the case,

and, if she did not, that the husband would make provision for

aiding in the support of herself and her sons until they arrived

of age. The wife denied any intended desertion of her husband,

but the result of the negotiations after the wife had taken

counsel of friends was to give assurance to the attorney that no

defense would be interposed if he made some suitable provision

for herself and her children.

Upon the return of the attorney to Ohio, a suit for divorce was
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commenced by the husband, and the summons served by publi-

cation. No appearance was made and there was no opposition

to the decree of divorce, which was obtained in July, 1889. It

adjudged .that the marriage contract theretofore existing be-

tween the parties was thereby dissolved, and both parties released

from the obligation of the same, and "that the custody of the

children of such marriage, one boy, Harry H. Dunbar, aged

twelve years, and Willie W. Dunbar, aged nine years, be, and

the same are, to remain in charge and under the control of the

said Lottie E. Dunbar, the said Horace B. Dunbar to have the

privilege of seeing said children at all reasonable times."

The ground of divorce was stated, and the court found '' upon

the evidence adduced that the defendant has been guilty of

wilful absence for more than three years last past from plaintiff,

and that, by reason thereof, the plaintiff is entitled to a divorce

as prayed for."

After the divorce the husband sent to a friend of his wife, to

be delivered to her in performance of his agreement, a written

contract, in which he bound himself to pay to Lottie E. Dunbar,

of Ash burn ham, Mass., $500 yearly, so long as she remained un-

the Superior Court did enter judgment against the defendant
for both branches of her claim, for the sum of $851.60 and costs.
The defendant then OQtained a writ of error from this court,
directed to the Superior Court of Massachusetts, where the record
remained.
The case shows these facts: The parties were husband and
wife, who, in 1889, were living apart, the husband in Ohio and
the wife in Massachusetts. In May, 1889, the attorney for her
husband came to Massachusetts and saw l\Irs. Dunbar, and told
her that her husband was about to seek a divorce from her. The
wife at this time had no means, and the two sons of the marriage,
then respectively nine and twelve years old, were living with
her. The purpose of the visit of the attorney was to obtain
some assurance from her that she would not contest the case,
and, if she did not, that the husband would make provision for
aiding in the support of herself and her sons until they arrived
of age. The wife denied any intended desertion of her husband,
but the result of the negotiations after the wife had taken
counsel of friends was to give assurance to the attorney that no
defense would be interposed if he made some suitable provision
for herself and her children.
Upon the return of the attorney to Ohio, a suit for divort:e was
commenced by the husband, and the summons served by publication. No appearance was made and there was no opposition
to the decree of divorce, which was obtained in July, 1889. It
adjudged _that the marriage contract theretofore existing between the parties was thereby dissolved, and both parties released
from the obligation of the se.me, and "that the custody of the
children of such marriage, one boy, Harry H. Dunbar, aged
tweh·e years, and Willie W. Dunbar, aged nine years, be, and
the same are, to remain in charge and under the control of the
said Lottie E. Dunbar, the said Horace B. Dunbar to have the
privilege of seeing said children at all reasonable times.''
The ground of divorce was stated, and the court found ''upon
the evidence adduced that the defendant has been guilty of
wilful absence for more th.an three years last past from plaintiff,
and that, by reason thereof, the plaintiff is entitled to a divorce
as prayed for. ''
After the divorce the husband sent to a friend of bis wife, to
be delivered to her in performance of his agreement, a written
contract, in which be bound himself to pay to Lottie E. Dunbar,
of Ashburnham, Mass., $500 ye.arly, so long as she remained un-
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married, in monthly, instalments. In that contract he also

agreed to pay "to our children, Harry H. Dunbar and Willie

Dunbar, the sum of $250 each, yearly, until they each attain the

age of fourteen years; after that age they are to be paid by me

such extra allowance as will give them a good and sufficient edu-

cation befitting their station in life, and a suitable maintenance

until each attains the age of twenty-one years." This writing

was signed by the .husband and acknowledged before a notary

public of Hamilton, Ohio.

Payments upon this contract were made by the husband, but

in 1896 they had become somewhat in arrears, and disputes arose

as to the validity of the agreement. Thereafter another contract

was entered into and payments were made as called for in that

contract until some months prior to December 2, 1898. On such

last-named date the defendant was adjudged a~bankrupt, on

his voluntary petition in bankruptcy, in the United States Dis-

trict Court in bankruptcy, southern district of Ohio, western

division, and on April 24, 1899, was discharged from all debts

and claims provable, under the act of Congress relating to bank-

ruptcy, against his estate, existing on the 2d day of December,

1898.

In the schedule of the defendant it appeared that he named

the plaintiff as a creditor, as follows:
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Lottie E. Dunbar, Charlestown, Mass $ 540

Alimony due up to present time.

Lottie E. Dunbar, Charlestown, Mass 1,300

Alimony payable yearly.

The plaintiff, at the first meeting of the creditors in bank-

ruptcy proceedings, which was held before a referee appointed

therein, appeared by an attorney, who produced and filed his

power of attorney, and filed her claim for $691.63, for instalments

on the contract due to December 2, 1898. The husband had paid

nothing on the contract since some time before December 2,1898,

and finally the wife commenced an action to recover the amounts

due therefrom.

The following is a copy of the contract sued on:

"Controversies having arisen concerning the agreement here-

tofore made between Horace B. Dunbar and Lottie E. Dunbar

in September, 1889, in consideration of said Lottie E. Dunbar's

married, in monthly , imrtalments. In that contract he also
agreed to pay ''to our children, Harry H. Dunbar and '\illie W.
Dunbar, the sum of $250 each, yearly, until they each attain thf
age of fourteen years; after that age they are to be paid by me
such extra allowance 88 will give them a good and sufficient (:'Ju.
cation befitting their station in life, and a suitable maint~nawe
until each attains the age of twenty-one years.'' This writing
was signed by the .husband and acknowledged before a notary
puhlic of Hamilton, Ohio.
Paymcuts upon this contract were made by the husband, but
in 1896 they had become somewhat in arrears, and disputes arose
88 to the validity of the agreement. Thereafter another eontraet
was entered into and payments were made as called for in that
contract until some months prior to December 2, 1898. On such
last-named date the defendant was adjudged a ""bankrupt, on
his voluntary petition in bankruptoy, in the United States District Court in bankruptcy, southern district of Ohio, western
division, and on April 24, 1899, was discharged from all debts
and claims provable, under the act of Congress relating to bankruptcy, against his estate, existing on the 2d day of December,
1898.
In the schedule of the defendant it appeared that he named
the plaintiff as a creditor, 88 follows:
Lottie E. Dunbar, Charlestown, Mass .................. . $ 540
Alimony due up to present time.
Lottie E. Dunbar, Charlestown, Mass .................. 1,300
Alimony payable yearly.

forbearance of suit on such controversies, and in settlement of

all such controversies, and in substitution of said agreement of

The plaintiff, at the first meeting of the creditors in bank·
ruptcy proceedings, which was held before a referee appointed
therein, appeared by an attorney, who produced and filed his
power of attorney, and filed her claim for $691.63, for instalments
on the contract due to December 2, 1898. The husband had paid
nothing on the contraet since some time before December 2, 1898,
and finally the wife commenced an action to recover the amounts
due therefrom.
The following is a copy of the contract sued on:
''Controversies having arisen concerning the agreement here·
tofore made between Horace B. Dunbar and Lottie E. Dunbar
in September, 1889, in consideration of said Lottie E. Dunbar's
forbearance of suit on such controversies, and in settlement of
all ~uch controversies, and in substitution of said agreement of
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September, 1889, and in further consideration of the release by

Lottie E. Dunbar and in satisfaction of all claims under said

original agreement, Horace B. Dunbar agrees with the said Lot-

tie E. Dunbar as follows:

"' That said Horace B. Dunbar will pay to Lottie E. Dunbar

during her life, or until she marries, for her maintenance and

support, yearly, the sum of $500, and will pay to her yearly for

the support and maintenance of her child, Harry H. Dunbar,

the sinn of $400 until he shall attain the age of twenty-one years;

and shall pay to her yearly for the support and maintenance of

her child, Willie W. Dunbar, the sum of $400 until he shall attain

the age of twenty-one years, all said sums to be paid in equal

monthly instalments between the 1st and 10th of each and every

month,—the first instalment being for the month of May, 1896,

shall be paid between the 1st and 10th of June, 1896.

"And, in addition to the foregoing, said Horace B. Dunbar

agrees to pay the further sum of $100 between the 1st and 10th

of July, 1896, over and above the instalment otherwise due for

said" month.

"And the said Lottie E. Dunbar hereby agrees that she has

not, nor shall she have, any other claim or demand against Horace

B. Dunbar for contribution to her support and maintenance, or
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for the support, maintenance, or education of said children, save

and except as fixed and limited by this agreement."

Properly signed by both parties and witnessed.

The particulars of her claim were stated as follows:

Horace B. Dunbar to Lottie E. Dunbar, Dr.

1. To instalments due under covenant for alimony from

December, 1898, to October 1, 1899, ten months, at

$41.66 a month . .$416.60

2. To monthly allowance due her for support and main-

tenance of Willie W. Dunbar, from December,

1898, to October 1, 1899, ten months, at $33.33 a

month 333.30

$749.90

The defendant pleaded his discharge in bankruptcy as a bar,

September, 1889, and in further consjderation of the release by
Lottie E. Dunbar and in satisfaction of all dairns under said
original agreement, Horace B. Dw1bar agrees with the said Lottie E. Dunbar as follows:
·•That said Horace B. Dunbar will pay to Lottie E. Dunbar
during her life, or until she marries, for her maintenance and
support, yearly, the sum of $500, and will pay to her yearly for
the support and maintenance of her child, Harry H. Dunbar,
the sum of $400 until he shall attai~ the age of tweuty-one years;
and shall pay to her yearly for the support and maintenance of
her child, Willie W. Dunbar, the sum of $400 until he shall attai11
the age of twenty-one years, all said sums to be paid in equal
monthly instalments between the 1st and 10th of each and every
month,-the first instalment being for the month of May, 1896,
shall be paid between the 1st and 10th of June, 1896.
''And, in addition to the foregoing, said Horace B. Dunbar
agrees to pay the further sum of $100 between the 1st and 10th
of July, 1896, over and above the instalment otherwise due for
said· mooth.
''And the said Lottie E. Dunbar hereby agrees that she has
not, nor shall she have, any other claim or demand against Horace
B. Dunbar for contribution to her support and maintenance, or
for the support, n;i.aintenance, or education of said children, save
and except as fixed and limited by this agreement.' '
Properly signed by both parties and witnessed.
The particulars of her claim were stated as follows:

and the Supreme Judicial Court of the state held that it was

not good.

Horace B. Dunbar to Lottie E. Dunbar, Dr.
1. To instalments due under covenant for alimony from
December, 1898, to October 1, 1899, ten months, at
$41.66 a month .............................. ,,. $416.60
2. To monthly allowance due her for support and maintenance of Willie W. Dunbar, from December,
1898, to October 1, 1899, ten months, at $33.33 a
month . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333.30
$749.90
The defendant pleaded his discharge in bankruptcy as a bar,
and the Supreme Judicial Court of the state held that it was
not good.
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Mr. Justice PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement

of facts, delivered the opinion of the court:

Had the provisions of this contract, so far as contracting to

pay money for the support of his wife is concerned, been em-

bodied in the decree of divorce which the husband obtained from

his wife in Ohio on the ground of desertion, the liability of the

husband to pay the amount as alimony, notwithstanding his

discharge in bankruptcy, cannot be doubted. Audubon v. Shu-

feldt, 181 U. S. 575, 45 L. ed. 1009, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 735. We

are not by any means clear that the same principle ought not

to govern a contract of this nature when, although the judgment

of divorce is silent upon the subject, it is plain that the eon-

tract was made with reference to the obligations of the husband

to aid in the support of his wife, notwithstanding the decree.

The facts appearing in this record do not show a case of any

moral delinquency on the part of the wife, and the contract,

considering the circumstances, might possibly be held to take

the place of an order or judgment of the court for the payment

of the amount, as in the nature of a decree for alimony. We do

not find it necessary, however, to decide that question in this

case, because, in any event, we think the contract as to the

support of the wife is not of such a nature as to be discharged
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by a discharge in bankruptcy.

Conceding that the bankruptcy act provides for discharging

some classes of contingent demands or claims, this is not, in our

opinion, such a demand. Even though it may be that an annuity

dependent upon life, is a contingent demand within the mean-

ing of the bankruptcy act of 1898 (30 Stat. at L. 544, c. 541, U. S.

Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3418), yet this contract, so far as regards

the support of the wife, is not dependent upon life alone, but is

to cease in case the wife remarries. Such a contingency is not

one which, in our opinion, is within the purview of the act, be-

cause of the innate difficulty, if not impossibility, of estimating

or valuing the particular contingency of widowhood. A simple

annuity which is to terminate upon the death of a particular per-

son may be valued by reference to the mortality tables. Mr.

Justice Bradley, in Riggin v. Magwire, 15 Wall. 549, 21 L. ed.

232, speaking for the court, said that so long as it remained un-

certain whether a contract or engagement would ever give rise

to an actual duty or liability, and there was no means of remov-

ing the uncertainty by calculation, such contract or engagement

was not provable under the bankruptcy act of 1841 [5 Stat, at

Mr. Justice PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement
of facts, delivered the opinion of the court :
Had the provisions of this contract, so far as contracting to
pay money for the support of his wife is concerned, been em·
bodied in the decree of divorce which the husband obtained from
his wife in Ohio on the ground of desertion, the liability of the
husband to pay the amount as alimony, notwithstanding his
discharge in bankruptcy, cannot be doubted. Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575, 45 L. ed. 1009, 21 Sup. Ct. '.Rep. 735. We
are not by any means clear that the same principle ought not
to govern a contract of this nature when, although the judgment
of divorce is silent upon the subject, it is plain that the contract was made with reference to the obligations of the husband
to aid in the support of his wife, notwithstanding the decree.
The facts appearing in this record do not show a case of a.ny
moral delinquency on the part of the wife, and the contract,
considering the circumstances, might possibly be held to take
the place of an order or judgment of the court for the payment
of the amount, as in the nature of a decree for alimony. We do
not find it necessary, however, to decide that question in this
case, because, in any event, we think the contract a.s to the
support of the wife is not of such a nature as to be discharged
by a discharg\! in bankruptcy.
Conceding that the bankruptcy act provides for discharging
some classes of contingent demands or claima, this is not, in our
opinion, such a demand. Even though it may be that an annuity
dependent upon life. is a contingent demand within the mean·
ing of the bankruptcy act of 1898 ( 30 Stat. at L. 544, c. 541, U. S.
Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3418), yet this contract, so far as regards
the support of the wife, is not dependent upon life alone, but is
to cease in case the wife remarries. Such a contingency is not
one which, in our opinion, is within the purview of the act, because of the innate diffieulty, if not impossibility, of estimating
or valuing the particular contingency of widowhood. A simple
annuity which is to terminate upon the death of a particular per·
son may be valued by reference to the mortality tables. Mr.
Justice Bradley, in Riggin v. .Magwire, 15 Wall. 549, 21 L. ed.
232, speaking for the court, said that so long as it remained uncertain whether a contract or engagement would ever give rise
to an actual duty or liability, and there was no means of removing the uncertainty by calculation, such contract or engagement
was not provable under the bankruptcy act of 1841 [5 St&t. at
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L. 445, c. 9]. The 5th section of that act gave the right to prove

''uncertain and contingent demands," but it was held that a

contract such as above described was not within that section.

It was remarked by the justice in that case that, if the con-

tract had come within the category of annuities and debts pay-

able in future, which are absolute and existing claims, that the

value of the wife's probability of survivorship after death of her

husband might have been calculated on the principle of life

annuities.

But how can any calculation be made in regard to the continu-

ance of widowhood when there are no tables and no statistics by'

which to calculate such contingency? How can a valuation of

a probable continuance of widowhood be made? Who can say

what the probability of remarrying is in regard to any particu-

lar widow f We know what some of the factors might be in the

question: inclination, age, health, property, attractiveness, chil-

dren. These would, at least, enter into the question as to the

probability of continuance of widowhood, and yet there are no

statistics which can be gathered which would tend in the slightest

degree to aid in the solving of the question.

In many cases where actions are brought for the violation of

contracts, such as Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, I. & R. Co., 173 U. S.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

1, 43 L. ed. 591, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 335; Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S.

1, 44 L. ed. 953, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 780, and Schell v. Plumb, 55

N. Y. 592, it is necessary to come to some conclusion in regard

to the damages which the party has sustained by reason of the

breach of the contract, and in such cases resort may be had to

the tables of mortality, and to other means of ascertaining as

nearly as possible what the present damages are for a failure to

perform in the future; but we think the rules in those cases are

not applicable to cases like this, under the bankruptcy act.

Taking the liability as presented by the contract, if the mor-

tality tables were referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the

value so far as it depended upon life, the answer would be no

answer to the other contingency of the continuance of widow-

hood; and if, having found the value as depending upon the

mortality tables, you desire to deduct from that the valuation of

the other contingency, it is pure guesswork to do it.

It is true that this has been done in England under the Eng-

lish bankruptcy act of 1869 [32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, § 31]. In Ex

parte Blakemore (1877) L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 372, it was held by the

Court of Appeal that the value of the contingency of a widow's

L. 445, c. 9]. The 5th section of that act gave the right to prove
''uncertain and contingent demands,'' but it was held that a
contract such as above described was not within that section.
It was remarked by the justice in that case that., if the contract had come within the category of annuities and debts payable in future, which are absolute and exmting claims, that the
,·alne of the wife's probability of survivorship after death of her
husband might have been calculated on the principle of life
annuities.
But how can any calculation be made iu regard to the continuance of widowhood when there are no tables and no statistics by /
which to calculate such contingency T How can a valuation of
a probable continuance of widowhood be made? ·who can say
what the probability of remarrying is in regard to any particular widow T We know what some of the factors might be in the
question: inclination, age, health, property, attractiveness, children. 'l'hcse would, at least, enter into the question as to the
probability of continuance of widowhood, and yet there are no
statistics which can be gathered which would ~end in the slightest
degree to aid in the solving of the question.
In many cases where actions are brought for the violation of
contracts, such as Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, I. & R. Co., 173 U. S.
1, 43 L. ed. 591, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 335; Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S.
1, 44 L. ed. 953, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 780, and Schell v. Plumb, 55
N. Y. 592, it is necessary to c~me to some conclusion in regard
to the damages which the party has sustained by reason of the
breach of the contract, and in such cases resort may be had to
the tables of mortality, and to other means of ascertaining as
nearly as possible what the present damages are for a failure to
perform in the future; but we think the rules in those cases are
not applicable to cases like this, under the bankruptcy act.
Taking the liability as presented by the contract, if the mortality tables were referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the
value so far as it depended upon life, the answer would be no
answer to the other contingency of the eontinuanee of widowhood; and if, having found the value as depending upon the
mortality tables, you df:'sire to deduct from that the valuation of
the other contingency, it is pure guesswork to do it.
It is true that this has been done in Eugland under the English bankruptcy act of 1869 r32 & :3:3 Vil't. c. 71, § 31]. In Ex
parte Blakemore (1877) L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 372, it was held by the
Court of Appeal that the value of the continge11cy of a widow's
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marrying again was capable of being fairly estimated, and that

proof must be admitted for the value of the future payments as

ascertained by an actuary. That decision was made under the

31st section of the bankruptcy act of 1869. James, Lord Justice,

said:

"No doubt it is uncertain whether the appellant will marry

again, just as the duration of any particular life is uncertain.

But, though the duration of any particular life is uncertain,

the expectation of life at a given age is reduced to a certainty

when we have regard to a million of lives. The value of the

expectation of life is arrived at by an average deduced from

practical experience."

Although the English statute makes it necessary to arrive at

a conclusion upon this point, yet there is no "practical expe-

rience" as to the chances of the continuance of widowhood, such

as may be referred to where the probable continuance of life is

involved. In the latter case we have the experience tables in

regard to millions of lives, and, under such circumstances, there

is, as Lord Justice James said, almost a certainty as to the valua-

tion to be put on such a contingency. But under the English

statute, the 31st section makes every kind of debt or liability

provable in bankruptcy except demands in the nature of unliqui-
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dated damages arising otherwise than by reason of a contract or

promise, so long as the value of the liability is '' capable of being

ascertained by fixed rules, or assessable only by a jury, or as

matter of opinion.1' So, under that act, in Ex parte Neal, L. R.

14 Ch. Div. 579, there was a separation deed between husband

and wife, and the husband was to pay an annuity to the wife,

which was terminable '' in case the wife should not lead a chaste

life; in case the husband and wife should resume cohabitation;

and in case the marriage should be dissolved in respect of any-

thing done, committed, or suffered by" the other party, after

the date of the deed. The annuity was also to be proportionately

diminished in the event of the wife's becoming entitled to any

income independent of the husband, exceeding a certain amount

a year. After the execution of the deed the husband went

through bankruptcy, and it was held that the value of the annu-

ity was capable of being fairly estimated and was provable in

the liquidation. In that case, speaking of the 31st section of the

act of 1869, it was stated that "words more large and general

it is impossible to conceive; they cover every species of contin-

gency. '' It was also stated that it was '' difficult to see how any

marrying again was capable of being fairly estimated, and that
proof must be admitted for the value of the future payments as
ascertained by an actuary. That decision was made under the
31st section of the bankruptcy act of 1869. James, Lord Justice,
said:
"No doubt it is uncertain whether the appellant will marry
again, just as the duration of any particular life is uncertain.
But, though the duration of any particular life is uncertain,
the expectation of life at a given age is reduced to a certainty
when we have regard to a million of lives. The value of the
expectation of life is arrived at by an average deduced from
practical experience. ''
Although the English statute makes it necessary to arrive at
a conclusion upon this point, yet there is no ''practical expe·
rience'' as to the chances of the continuance of widowhood, such
as may be referred to where the probable continuance of life is
involved. In the latter case we have the experience tables in
regard to millions of lives, and, under such circumstances, there
is, as Lord Justice James said, almost a certainty as to the valua·
tion to be put on such a contingency. But under the English
statute, the 31st section makes every kind of debt or liability
provable in bankruptcy except demands in the nature of unliqui·
dated damages arising otherwise than by reason of a contract or
promise, so long as the value of the liability is ''capable of bt'ing
ascertained by fixed rules, or assessable only by a jury, or as
matter of opinion." So, under that act, in Ex parte Neal, L. R.
14 Ch. Div. 579, there was a separation deed between husband
and wife, and the husband was to pay an annuity to the wife,
which was terminable ''in case the wife should not lead a chaste
life; in case the husband and wife should resume cohabitation;
and in case the marriage should be dissolved in respect of anything done, committed, or suffered by'' the other party, after
the date of the deed. The annuity was also to be proportionately
dimillished in the event of the wife's becoming entitled to any
income independent of the husband, exceeding a certain amount
a ~·ear. After the execution of the deed the husband went
through bankruptcy, and it was held that the value of the annu·
ity was capable of being fairly estimated and was provable in
the liquidation. In that case, speaking of the 31st sectiou of the
act of 1869, it was stated that ''words more large and general
it is impossible to c.onceive; they cover every species of contin·
gency." It was also stated that it was "difficult to see how any
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case could arise which would not come within" the language of

this act. Bramwell, Lord Justice, said: "But for the present

bankruptcy act, our decision must have been the same as that in

Mudge v. Rowan" (1868) L. R. 3 Exch. 85; but he said that the

present bankruptcy act was very different in its terms from the

act which was in force when that case was decided.

In the case of Mudge v. Rowan, L. R. 3 Exch. 85, there was

a deed of separation between husband and wife, in which the

husband covenanted to pay an annuity to his wife by quarterly

instalments, the annuity to cease in the event of future cohabi-

tation by mutual consent. It was held that this was not an an-

nuity provable under the bankruptcy act of 1849, 12th and 13th

Vict. c. 106, § 175; nor a liability to pay money under the 24th

and 25th Vict . c. 134, § 154.

The 175th section of the act of 1849 expressly provided that

the creditor might prove for the value of any annuity, which

value the court was to ascertain. Kelly, Chief Baron, said:

'' The annuity seems to me to be so uncertain in its nature as

to be impossible to be valued. In many cases the commissioner

of bankruptcy may have to deal with contingencies the value

of which depends on a variety of considerations, and where the

valuation is very difficult. But here I am at a loss to see any

single circumstance upon which a calculation of any kind could
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be based."

Martin, Baron, said:

"This contingency depends on an infinite variety of circum-

stances, into which it is idle to suppose a commissioner could

inquire."

Channell, Baron, concurring, said:

"The tendency of recent legislation, and the course of recent

decisions, has been to free a debtor who becomes a bankrupt,

from all liability of every kind; but I do not think an order of

discharge a bar to such a claim as the present. • • • I quite

admit that, to bring an annuity within the act of 1849, it is not

necessary to have any actual pecuniary consideration. I also

feel that in many cases the difficulty of calculating the present

value of contingencies may be very great, and yet they may be

within the acts. But here it appears to me that the difficulty is

insuperable."

In Parker v. Ince (1859) 4 Hurlst. & N. 52, there was a bond

conditioned to pay an annuity during the life of the obligor's

wife, provided that if the obligor and his wife should at any

case could arise which would not come within'' the la11guage of
this act. Bramwell, Lord Justice, said: "But for the present
bankruptcy act, our decision must have been the same as that in
:\Iudge v. Rowan" (1868) L. R. 3 Exch. 85; but he said that the
present bankruptcy act was very different in its terms from the
act which was in force when that case was decided.
In the case of Mudge v. Rowan, L. R. 3 Exch. 85, therf. was
a deed of separation between husband and wife, in which the
husband covenanted to pay an annuity to his wife by quarterly
instalments, the annuity to cease in the event of future cohabitation by mutual consent. It was held that this was not an annuity provable under the bankruptcy act of 1849, 12th and 13th
Viet. c. 106, § 175; nor a liability to pay money under the 24th
and 25th Viet. c. 134, § 154.
The 175th section of the act of 1849 expressly provided that
the creditor might prove for the value of any annuity, which
value the court was to ascertain. Kelly, Chief Baron, said:
'' The annuity seems to me to be so uncertain in its nature as
to be impossible to be valued. In many cases the commissioner
of bankruptcy may have to deal. with contingencies the value
of which depends on a variety of considerations, and where the
valuation is very difficult. But here I am at a loss to see any
single circumstance upon which a calculation of any kind could
be based.''
Martin, Baron, said:
''This contingency depends on an infinite variety of circumstances, into which it is idle to suppose a commissioner could
inquire.''
Channell, Baron, concurring, said :
''The tendency of recent legislation, and the course of recent
de-eisions, has been to free a debtor who becomes a bankrupt,
from all liability of every kind; but I do not think an order of
discharge a bar to such a claim as the present. • • • I quit:e
admit that, to bring an annuity within the act of 1849, it is not
necessary to have any actual pecuniary consideration. I also
feel that in many cases the difficulty of calculating the present
value of contingencies may be very great, and yet they may be
within the acts. But here it appears to me that the difficulty is
insuperable."
In Parker v. Ince (1859) 4 Hurlst. & N. 52, there was a bond
conditioned to pay an annuity during the life of the obligor's
wife, provided that if the obligor and his wife should at any
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time thereafter cohabit as man and wife the annuity should

cease, and it was held that the annual sum thus covenanted to

be paid by the defendant was not an annuity within the 175th

section of the bankruptcy law or consolidation act of 184!), nor

a debt payable upon a contingency within the 177th section, nor

a liability to pay money upon a contingency within the 17Sth

suction, and consequently the discharge in bankruptcy was no

bar to an action for a recovery of a quarterly payment due on

the bond. Martin, Baron, said:

"That cannot be such an annuity as would fall within the

175th section, because a value cannot be put upon it. How is

it possible to calculate the probability of a man and his wife,

who are separated, living together again? Their doing so de-

pends on their character, temper, and disposition, and, it may

be, a variety of other circumstances. Then, is it money payable

upon a contingency within the 178th section? I think it is not."

It is only, therefore, by reason of the extraordinarily broad

language contained in the 31st section of the English bankruptcy

act of 1869 that the English courts have endeavored to make a

fair estimate of the value of a contract based on the continuance

of widowhood, even though the value was not capable of being

ascertained by fixed rules, nor assessable by a jury, but was
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simply to be estimated by the opinion of the court or of some

one intrusted with the duty.

In the Blakemore Case, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 372, after the an-

nouncement of the judgment, the report states that it was then

arranged that it should be referred to an actuary to ascertain

the annuity as a simple life annuity, and to deduct from that

value such a sum as he should estimate to be the proper deduc-

tion for the contingency of widowhood. In other words, it was

left to the actuary to guess the proper amount to be deducted.11

No such broad language is found in our bankruptcy act of

1898. § 63a provides for debts which may be proved, which,

among others, are: (1) "A fixed liability, as evidenced by a

judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the

time of the filing of the petition against him, whether then pay-

able or not, with any interest thereon which would have been

recoverable at that date, or with a rebate of interest upon such

11—In Victor v. Victor [1912], provision in the agreement that the

1 K. B. 247, it was held that an an- annuity should cease upon the par-

nuity provided for in a separation ties resuming cohabitation. See 10

agreement was provable deepite a Mich. L. Rev. 476.

time thereafter cohabit as man and wife the annuity should
cease, and it was held that the annual sum thus covenanted to
be paid by the defendant was not an annuity within the 175th
section of the bankruptcy law or con&0lidation act of 1849, nor
a debt payable upon a contingency within the 177th section, nor
a liability to pay money upon a contingency within the 17.Stb
section, and consequently the discharge in bankruptcy was no
bar to an aetion for a recovery of a quarterly payment due on
the oond. Martin, Baron, said:
''That cannot be such an annuity as would f&ll within the
175th llection, because a value cannot be put upon it. How is
it possible to calculate the probability of a man and his wife,
who are separated, living together again f Their doing so depends on their character, temper, and disposition, and, it may
be, a variety of other circumstances. Then, is it money payable
upon a contingency within the 178th section f I think it is not."
It is only, therefore, by reason of the extraordinarily broad
language contained in the 31st section of the English bankruptcy
act of 1869 that the English courts have endeavored to make a
fair e.stimate of the value of a contract based on the continuance
of widowhood, even though the value was not capable of being
ascertained by fixed rules, nor assessable by a jury, but wu
simply to be estimated by the opinion of the court or of some
one intrusted with the duty.
In the Blakemore Case~ L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 372, after the anuouncement of the judgment, the report states that it was then
arranged that it should be referred to an actuary to ascertain
the annuity as a simple life annuity, and oo deduct from that
value such a sum as he should estimate to be the proper deductioH for the contingency of widowhood. In other words, it was
left to the actuary to guess the proper amount to be deducted. 11
Xo such broad language is found in our bankruptcy act of
1808. § 63a provides for debts which may be proved, which,
among others, are: (1) "A fixed liability, as evidenced by a
judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the
time of the filing of the petition against him, whether then payable or not, with any interest thereon which would have been
recoverable at that date, or with a rebate of interest upon such
11-In Victor v. Victor (1912],
1 K. B. 24 7, it was held that an annuity provided for in a eeparation
agreement was provable deepite a

provision in the agreement that the
annuity should ceaae upon the par·
tiea resuming cohabitation. See 10

Mich. L. Rev. 476.
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as were not then payable and did not bear interest." (4)

"Founded upon an open account or upon a contract, express or

implied."

In § 636, provision is made for unliquidated claims against

the bankrupt, which may be liquidated upon application to the

court in such manner as it shall direct, and may thereafter be

proved and allowed against his estate. This paragraph b, how-

ever, adds nothing to the class of debts which might be proved

under paragraph a of the same section. Its purpose is to permit

an unliquidated claim, coming within the provisions of § 63a, to

be liquidated as the court should direct.

We do not think that by the use of the language in § 63a it

was intended to permit proof of contingent debts or liabilities

or demands the valuation or estimation of which it was substan-

tially impossible to prove.

The language of § 63a of the act of 1898 differs from that con-

tained in the bankruptcy act of 1867, and also from that of 1841.

The act of 1867, § 19 (14 Stat. at L. 517, 525, c. 176, carried into

the Revised Statutes as § 5068), provided expressly for cases of

contingent debts and contingent liabilities contracted by the

bankrupt, and permitted applications to be made to the court to

have the present value of the debt or liability ascertained and

liquidated, which was to be done in such manner as the court
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should order; and the creditor was then to be allowed to prove

for the amount so ascertained.

§ 5 of the act of 1841 (5 Stat. at L. 440, c. 9) provides in terms

for the holders of uncertain or contingent demands coming in

and proving such debts under the act. But neither the act of

1841 nor that of 1867 would probably cover the case of such a

contract as the one under consideration.

Cases have been cited showing some contingent debts which

were held capable of being proved under the bankruptcy act of

1898, among which are Moch v. Market Street Nat. Bank, 47 C.

C. A. 49, 107 Fed. 897, Circuit Court Appeals, Third Circuit,

1901, and Cobb v. Overman, 54 L. R. A. 369, 48 C. C. A. 223, 109

Fed. 65. Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 1901. And

under former bankrupt acts, the cases of Fisher v. Tifft (1S78),

12 R. I. 56; Hey wood v. Shreve (1882), 44 N. J. L. 94, and

Shelton v. Pease (1847), 10 Mo. 473.

The contingency in the case of Moch v. Market Street Nat.

Bank, 47 C. C. A. 49, 107 Fed. 897, was that the bankrupt was

the indorser of commercial paper not due at the time of filing the

H. & A. Bankruptcy—28

as were not then payable and did not bear interest." ( 4)
''Founded upon an open account or upon a contract, express or
implied."
In § 63b, provision is made for unliquidated claims against
the bankrupt, which may be liquidated upon application to the
court in such manner as it shall direct, and may thereafter be
proved and allowed aga.inst his estate. This paragraph b, however, adds nothing to the class of debts which might be proved
under paragraph a of the same section. Its purpose is to permit
an unliquidated claim, coming within the provisions of § 63a, to
be liquidated as the court should direct.
We do not think that by the use of the language in § 63a it
was intended to permit proof of contingent debts or liabilities
or demands the valuation or estimation of which it was substantially impossible to prove.
.
The language of § 63a of the act of 1898 differs from that contained in the bankruptcy act of 1867, and also from that of 1841.
The act of 1867, § 19 (14 Stat. at L. 517, 525, c.176, carried into
the Revised Statutes as § 5068), provided expressly for cases of
contiugent debts and contingent liabilities contracted by the
bankrupt, and permitted applications to be made to the court to
have the present value of the debt or liability ascertained and
liquidated, which was to be done in such manner as the court
should order; and the creditor was then to be allowed to prove
for the amount so ascertained.
§ 5 of the act of 1841 (5 Stat. at L. 440, c. 9) provides in terms
for the holders of uncertain or contingent demands coming in
and proving such debts under the act. But neither the act of
1841 nor that of 1867 would probably cover the case of such a
contract as the one under consideration.
Cases have been cited showing some contingent debts which
were held capable of being proved under the bankruptcy act of
1898, among which are Moch v. Market Street Nat. Bank, 47 C.
C. A. 49, 107 Fed. 897, Circuit Court Appeals, Third Circuit,
1901, and Cobb v. Overman, 54 L. R. A. 369, 48 C. C. A. 223, 109
Fed. 65. Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 1901. And
under former bankrupt acts, the cases of Fisher v. Tifft (1S78),
12 R. I. 56; Heywood v. Shreve (1882), 44 N. J. L. 94, and
Shelton v. Pease (1847), 10 Mo. 473.
The contingency in the case of Moch v. Market Street Nat.
Bank, 47 C. C. A. 49, 107 Fed. 897, was that the bankrupt was
the indorser of commercial paper not due at the time of filing the
H.. A A. Bankruptcy-28
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petition, and it was held that under § 63a, subdivision 4, the

creditor might prove against the estate of the bankrupt after the

liability had become fixed.

In Cobb v. Overman, 54 L. R. A. 369, 48 C. C. A. 223, 109 Fed.

65, the bond of the bankrupt to secure payment to the obligee of

an annuity for life was held to be properly proved under § 63a.

clause 1.

These cases, it will be seen, do not come within the principle

of the case at bar. The other cases arising under the acts of 1867

and 1841 do not affect this case.

The Massachusetts court held the debt herein not provable,

upon the authority of Morgan v. Wordell, 178 Mass. 350, 55 L.

R. A. 33, 59 N. E. 1037, and Goding v. Roscenthal, 180 Mass.

43, 61 N. E. 222. Mr. Justice Barker, in delivering the opinion

of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the latter

case, said:

"But in Morgan v. Wordell, 178 Mass. 350, 55 L. R. A. 33, 59

N. E. 1037, this court assumed that such claims were not prov-

able under the act, and we follow that view in the present case."

We think the contract, so far as it related to the payment to

the wife during her life or widowhood, was not a contingent

liability provable under the act of 1898.
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The judgment is affirmed.18

In re ROTH & APPEL

181 Fed. 667,104 C. C. A. 649

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. August 2, 1910)

On August 14, 1907, Adolph Boskowitz, the appellant, entered

into an indenture of lease with the firm of Roth & Appel, the

present bankrupts, wherein he let to them certain premises in

the city of New York for the term of five years from February

1, 1908, at the annual rental of $3,000, payable quarterly in

advance. The lease contained the following provision:

petition, and it was held that under § 63a, subdivision 4, the
creditor might prove against the estate of the bankrupt after the
liability bad become fixed.
In Cobb v. Overman, 54 L. R. A. 369, 48 C. C. A. 223, 109 Fed.
65, the bond of the bankrupt to secure payment to the obligee of
an anuuity for life was held to be properly proved under § 63a.
claUBe 1.
These cases, it will be seen, do not come within the principle
of the case at bar. The other cases arising under the acts of 186i
and 1841 do not affect this case.
The ~Iassachusctta court held the debt herein not provable,
upon the authority of Morgan v. Wordell, 178 !.lass. 350, 55 L.
R. A. 33, 59 N. E. 1037, and Goding v. Roscenthal, 180 Mass.
43, 61 N. E. 222. .Mr. Justice Barker, in delivering the opinion
of the· Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the latter
case, said:
''But in Morgan v. Wordell, 178 M888. 350, 55 L. R. A. 33, 59
N. E. 1037, this court assumed that such claims were not proY·
able under the act, and we follow that view in the present case."
We think the contract, so far as it related to the payment t-0
the wife during her life or wifwhood, was not a contingent
liability provable under the act of 1898.

• • •

The judgment is affirmed.12

"In case the lessee is declared bankrupt, the lease shall ter-

minate and the lessor has a right to re-enter, in which case the

12—The part of the opinion in port of the children was not prov-

which the court concluded that the able, is omitted. See Wetmore v,

In re ROTH & APPEL

claim based upon the husband's Markoe, ante, p. 384.

contract to pay money for the sup-

181 Fed. 667, 104 C. C. A. 649
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

August 2, 1910)

On August 14, 1907, Adolph Boskowitz, the appellant, entered
into an indenture of lease with the firm of Roth & Appel, the
present bankrupts, wherein he let to them certain premises in
the r.ity of New York for the term of five yea.rs from February
1, 1908, at the annual rental of $3,000, payable quarterly in
advance. The lease contained the following provision:
''In case the lessee is declared bankrupt, the lease shall ter·
minate and the lessor has a right to re-enter, in which case the
12-The part of the opinion in
''hieh the court concluded that the
l'!:i.irn based upon the huslian<\'s
cuntract to pay money for the sup·

port of the children wu not prov·
able, is omitted. See Wetmore v.
.Ma.rkoe, ant~, p. 38'.
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leasee agrees, as a part consideration hereof, that it, and its legal

representatives, will pay to the lessor and his legal representa-

tives on the first day of each month, as upon rent days, the dif-

ference between the rents and sums reserved and agreed to be

paid by the lessee and those otherwise reserved or with due dili-

gence collectible, on account of rents of the demised premises for

the preceding month, up to the end of the term remaining at

the time of the entry. Such re-entry shall not prejudice the

right of the lessor to recover for rent accrued or due at the time

of such re-entry."

On January 20, 1908, a petition in involuntary bankruptcy

was filed against said Roth & Appel, and on May 27, 1908, they

were adjudicated bankrupts. On April 29, 1908, prior to the

adjudication, the appellant relet the premises for the remainder

of the term to another tenant, who entered into possession on

July 1, 1908. The rental under the new lease was at the rate

of $175 per month from July 1, 1908, to February 1, 1909, and

at the rate of $250 per month thereafter. On July 14, 1908, the

appellant filed his claim made up in substance of the following

items.

(1) Pull rent from February, 1908, to July, 1908 $1,250

(2) Difference between rent reserved and rent stipulated
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in new lease from July, 1908, to February, 1909... 525

$1,775

The trustee moved to expunge the claim upon the ground that

it was not provable in bankruptcy. The referee expunged from

the claim so much as embraced the difference in rents arising sub-

leasee agrees, as a part consideration hereof, that it, and its legal
representatives, will pay to the lessor and his legal representatives on the first day of each month, as upon rent days, the difference between the rents and sums reserved and agreed to be
paid by the lessee and those otherwise reserved or with due diligence collectible, on account of rents of the demised premises for
the preceding month, up to the end of the term remaining at
the time of the entry. Such re-entry shall not prejudice the
right of the lessor to recover for rent accrued or due at the time
of such re-entry.''
On January 20, 1908, a petition in involuntary bankruptcy
was filed against said Roth & Appel, and on ~lay 27, 1908, they
were adjudicated bankrupts. On April 29, 1908, prior to the
adjudication, the appellant relet the premises for the remainder
of the term to another tenant, who entered into po~ssion on
July 1, 1908. The rental under the new lease was at the rate
of $175 per month from July 1, 1908, to February 1, 1909, and
at the rate of $250 per month thereafter. On July 14, 1908, the
appellant filed his claim made up in substance of the following
itema.

sequent to the time of filing the claim, and allowed the balance.

The trustee and the appellant both filed petitions to review the

referee's order and the District Court expunged the entire claim.

The opinion of the district judge is printed in 174 Fed. 64.

Adolph Boskowitz appeals from the order expunging his claim.

(1) Full rent from February, 1908, to July, 1908 ......... $1,250

(2) Difference between rent reserved and rent stipulated
in new lease from July, 1908, to February, 1909. . .

525

NOYES, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

Rent is a sum stipulated to be paid for the use and enjoyment of

land. The occupation of the land is the consideration for the rent.

$1,775

If the right to occupy terminate, the obligation to pay ceases.

Consequently, a covenant to pay rent creates no debt until the

time stipulated for the payment arrives. The lessee may be

evicted by title paramount or by acts of the lessor. The destruc-

The trustee moved to expunge the claim upon the ground that
it was not provable in bankruptcy. The referee expunged from
the claim so much as embraced the difference in rents arising subsequent to the time of filing the claim, and allowed the balance.
The trustee and the appellant both filed petitions to review the
referee's order a.nd the District Court expunged the entire claim.
The opinion of the district judge is printed in 174 Fed. 64.
Adolph Boskowitz appeals from the order expunging his claim.
NOYES, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).
Rent is a sum stipulated to be paid for the use and enjoyment of
land. The occupation of the land is the consideration for the rent.
[f the right to occupy terminate, the obligation to pay ceases.
Consequently, a covenant to pay rent creates no debt until the
time stipulated for the payment arrives. The lessee may be
evicted by title paramount or by acts of the lessor. The destruc-
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tion or disrepair of the premises may, according to certain statu-

tory provisions, justify the lessee in abandoning them. The lessee

may quit the premises with the lessor's consent. The lessee may

assign his term with the approval of the lessor, so as to relieve

himself from further obligation upon the lease. In all these

cases the lessee is discharged from his covenant to pay rent. The

time for payment never arrives. The rent never becomes due.

It is not a case of debitum in prasenti solvendum in futuro.

On the contrary, the obligation upon the rent covenant is alto-

gether contingent. Watson v. Merrill, 136 Fed. 362, 69 C. C. A.

185, 69 L. R. A. 719. See, also, Coke on Littleton, 2926; Wood

v. Partridge, 11 Mass. 492; Bordman v. Osborn, 23 Pick. (Mass.)

299.

It follows from these principles that rent accruing after the

filing of a petition in bankruptcy against the lessee is not provable

against his bankrupt estate as "a fixed liability * * • abso-

lutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition," within the

meaning of § 63a (1) of the bankruptcy act of 1898. It is not

a fixed liability, but is contingent in its nature. It is not abso-

lutely owing at the time of the bankruptcy, but is a mere

possible future demand. Both its existence and amount are

contingent upon uncertain events. Watson v. Merrill, supra;
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Atkins v. Wilcox, 105 Fed. 595, 44 C. C. A. 626, 53 L. R. A.

118. Also In re Rubel (D. C.) 166 Fed. 131; In re Mahler (D.

C.) 105 Fed. 428; In re Hayes, etc., Co. (D. C.) 117 Fed. 879;

In re Arnstein (D. C.) 101 Fed. 706; In re Jefferson (D. C.)

93 Fed. 948; In re Inman & Co. (D. C.) 171 Fed. 185.

Even under the bankruptcy acts of 1841 (Act Aug. 19, 1841,

c. 9, 5 Stat. 440) and 1867 (Act March 2, 1867, c. 176, 14 Stat.

517), which, unlike the present act, expressly permitted the

proof of contingent demands, claims for unaccrued rent were not

provable. Ex parte Houghton, 1 Low. 554, Fed. Cas. No. 6,725,

In re May, 9 N. B. R. 419, Fed. Cas. No. 9,325, and Bailey v.

Loeb, 11 N. B. R. 271, Fed. Cas. No. 739, were cases under the

act of 1867. Bosler v. Kuhn, 8 Watts & S. (Pa.) 183, was under

the act of 1841.

The authorities are not entirely in accord upon the question

whether a lease, containing the usual provisions, is terminated

by bankruptcy. In some cases it has been held that bank-

ruptcy destroys the relation of landlord and tenant and prac-

tically annuls the lease. In re Jefferson, supra; In re Hayes, etc.,

Co., supra. See, also, Bray v. Cobb (D. C.) 100 Fed. 270, re-

tion or disrepair of the premises may, according to certain statutory provisions, justify the lessee in abandoning them. 1'he lessee
may quit the premise.a with the lessor's consent. The lessee may
aasign his term with the approval of the lessor, so as to relieve
himself from further obligation upon the lease. In all these
cases the lessee is discharged from his covenant to pay rent. The
time for payment never arrives. The rent never becomes due.
It is not a case of debit um in pr<Uenti soluendum in f ut11ro.
On the contrary, the obligation upon the rent covenant is altogether contingent. Watson v. Merrill, 136 Fed. 362, 69 C. C. A.
185, 69 L. R. A. 7·19. See, also, Coke on Littleton, 292b; Wood
v. Partridge, 11 M888. 492 ; Bord man v. Osborn, 23 Pick. ( l\Iass.)
299.
It follows from these principles that rent accruing after the
.filing of a petition in bankruptcy against the lessee is not provable
against his bankrupt estate as ''a fixed liability • • • abaolutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition," within the
meaning of § 63a ( 1) of the bankruptcy act of 1898. It is not
a fixed liability, but is contingent in its nature .. It is not absolutely owing at the time of the bankruptcy, but is a mere
possible future demand. Both its existence and amount are
contingent upon uncertain events. Watson v. Merrill, supra;
Atkins v. Wilcox, 105 Fed. 595, 44 C. C. A. 626, 53 L. R. A.
118. Also In re Rubel (D. C.) 166 Fed. 131; In re Mahler (D.
C.) 105 Fed. 428; In re Hayes, etc., Co. ( D. C.) 117 Fed. 879;
In re Arnstein (D. C.) 101 Fed. 706; In re Jefferson (D. C.)
93 14,ed. 948; In re Inman & Co. ( D. C.) 171 Fed. 185.
Even under the bankruptcy acts of 1841 (Act Aug. 19, 1841,
c. 9, 5 Stat. 440) and 1867 (Act March 2, 1867, c. 176, 14 Stat.
517), which, unlike the present act, expressly permitted the
proof of contingent demands, claims for unaccrued rent were not
provable. Ex parte Houghton, 1 Low. 554, Fed. Cas. No. 6,725,
In re May, 9 N. B. R. 419, Fed. Cas. No. 9,325, and Bailey v.
Loeb, 11 N. B. R. 271, Fed. Cas. No. 739, were cases under the
act of 1867. Bosler v. Kuhn, 8 Watts & S. (Pa.) 183, was under
the act of 1841.
The authorities are not entirely in accord upon the question
whether a lease, containing the usual provisions, is terminated
by bankruptcy. In some cases it has been held that bankruptcy destroys the relation of landlord and tenant and practically annuls the lease. In re Jefferson, supra; In re Hayes, etc.,
Co., supra. See, also, Bray v. Cobb (D. C.) 100 Fed. 270, re-
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versed in Cobb v. Overman, 109 Fed. 65, 48 C. C. A. 223, 54

L. B. A. 369. In other cases it is held that bankruptcy does

not sever such relation, that the tenant remains liable, and that

the obligation to pay rent is not discharged as to the future,

unless the trustee elect to retain the lease as an asset. Watson

v. Merrill, supra; In re Hinckel Brewing Co. (D. C.) 123 Fed.

942. See, also, In re Ells (D. C.) 98 Fed. 968.

In our opinion the latter view is the correct one. We think

the early law, as stated in Ex parte Houghton, supra, is the

law under the present bankruptcy statute, applicable in the case

of leases having the usual covenants and conditions. In that

case the court said:

"The earlier law of England, which we have adopted in

this country, was that the assignees of a bankrupt have a rea-

sonable time to elect whether they will assume a lease which

they find in his possession; and, if they do not take it, the bank-

rupt retains the term 6n precisely the same footing as before,

with the right to occupy, and the obligation to pay rent. If they

do take it, he is released, as in all other cases of valid assign-

ment, from all liability, excepting on his covenants; and from

these he is not discharged in any event."

This reasoning leads by another course to the same conclu-

sion already reached. If the lessee remain liable upon the lease
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after his bankruptcy in cases where it is not assumed by the

trustee, it necessarily follows that his estate is not liable thereon.

With a few exceptions, not applicable here, that which is not

dischargeable in bankruptcy is not provable in bankruptcy.

The claim in this case was regarded in the report of the

referee as a demand for installments of rent falling due accord-

ing to the terms of the lease subsequent to the time of filing the

petition in bankruptcy, and the question considered in such

report was whether demands of that character are provable in

bankruptcy. So the claim was assumed to be of that character

by the district judge, and was ordered expunged upon that

assumption. Regarding, then, the claim as one for unaccrued

rent, it is clear, upon the principles already examined, that

it was not provable against the bankrupt estate under the first

clause of § 63a of the bankruptcy act.

But, while there may be a question whether the demand as

covering the period prior to the re-entry by the lessor might not

be considered a claim for rent as such, it is clear that the demand

for the difference between the rent reserved and the rent stipu-

1

versed in Cobb v. Overman, 109 Fed. 65, 48 C. C. A. 223, 54
L. R. A. 369. In other cases it is held that bankruptcy does
not sever such relation, that the tenant remains liable, and that
the obligation to pay rent is not discharged as to the future,
unless the trustee elect to retain the lease as an asset. Watson
v. :Merrill, supra; In re Hinckel Brewing Co. ( D. C.) 123 Fed.
942. See, also, In re Ells (D. C.) 98 Fed. 968.
In our opinion the latter view is the correct one. We think
the early law, as stated in Ex parte Houghton, supra, is the
law under the present bankruptcy statute, applicable in the case
of leases having the usual covenants and conditions. In that
case the court said:
"The earlier law of England, which we have adopted in
this country, was that the assignees of a bankrupt have a reasonable time to elect whether they will assume a lease which
they find in his possession; and, if they do not take it, the bankrupt retains the term bn precisely the same footing as before,
with the right to occupy, and the obligation to pay rent. If they
do take it, he is released, as in all other cases of valid assignment, from all liability, excepting on his covenants; and from
these he is not discharged in any ev~nt. ''
This reasoning leads by another course to the same conclusion already reached. If the lessee remain liable upon the lease
after his bankruptcy in cases where it is not assumed by the
trustee, it necessarily follows that his estate is not liable thereon.
With a few exceptions, not applicable here, that which is not
dischargeable in bankruptcy is not provable in bankruptcy.
The claim in this case was regarded in the report of the
referee as a demand for installments of rent falling due according to the terms of the lease subsequent to the time of filing the
petition in bankruptcy, and the question conBidered in such
report was whether demands of that character are provable in
bai1kruptcy. So the claim was assumed to be of that character
by the district judge, and was ordered expunged upon that
assumption. Regarding, then, the claim as one for unaccrued
rent, it is clear, upon the principle.a already examined, that
it was not provable against the bankrupt estate under the first
clause of § 63a of the bankruptcy act.
But, while there may be a question whether the demand as
covering the period prior to the re-entry by the lessor might not
be considered a claim for rent as such, it is clear that the demand
for the difference between the rent reserved and the rent stipu-
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lated in the new lease is not such a demand, but is based upon

the indemnity provision in the lease shown in the foregoing

statement of facts.

The lease in the present case is not a lease containing the usual

covenants and conditions. It contains unusual provisions. As

we have seen, it expressly provides that in case the lessee is de-

clared bankrupt the lease shall terminate and the lessor shall

have the right to re-enter. Under such a lease as this the

trustee could not adopt the lease against the lessor's objection.

The lessor had the right to terminate it, and did terminate it, by

re-entry. And when he terminated it the obligation of the bank-

rupts as lessees terminated. The question in this case—at least

with respect to a large part of the claim—is not, in its essence,

whether rent to accrue in the future is provable against a bank-

rupt estate, but whether a claim founded upon .an agreement to

indemnify a landlord for loss of rents following bankruptcy is

provable.

Undoubtedly the parties to a lease may agree that bankruptcy

shall terminate it, and that, upon such termination, all future

installments of rent shall at once become due and payable. In

such a case, the installments may be regarded as consolidated

by the contract, or, perhaps, as falling due by way of penalty.

Not improbably claims based upon such leases are provable in
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bankruptcy. Thus in the case of In re Pittsburg Drug Co. (D.

C.) 164 Fed. 482, where a lease provided that, on default in the

payment of any rent, the rent for the entire term should at once

become due and payable, it was held that, on the bankruptcy of

the lessee while in default, the entire rent was "a fixed liability

absolutely owing," and provable against the bankrupt estate.

But the convenant of indemnity in the present lease was of a

very different nature. It called for the payment of no fixed and

certain sum. Its purpose was merely to guarantee against pos-

sible loss.

The inquiry, then, is as to the status of the lessor's demand

upon this indemnity covenant at the time when the petition in

bankruptcy was filed; for it is held that that is the time when

the provability of claims against the estate of a bankrupt is fixed.

Thus in the case of In re Pettingill (D. C.) 137 Fed. 145, it was

said:

"Under that act the provability of a claim depends upon its

status at the time the petition is filed. If, at that time, the

claim is provable, within the definition of § 63, it may be proved.

lated in the new lease is not such a demand, but is based upon
the indemnity provision in the lease shown in the foregoing
statement of facts.
The lease in the present case is not a lease containing the usual
covenants and conditions. It contains unusual provisions. As
we have seen, it expressly provides that in case the lessee is declared bankrupt the lease shall terminate and the lessor shall
have the right to re-enter. Under such a lease as this the
trustee could not adopt the lease against the lessor's objection.
The lessor had the right to terminate it, and did terminate it, by
re-entry. And when he terminated it the obligation of the bank.
rupts as lessees terminated. The question in this case-at least
with respect to a large part of the claim-is not, in its essence,
whether rent to accrue in the future is provable against a bankrupt est.ate, but whether a claim founded upon .an agreement to
indemnify a landlord for loss of rents following bankruptcy is
provable.
Undoubtedly the parties to a lease may agree that bankruptcy
shall terminate it, and that, upon such termination, all future
installments of rent shall at once become due and payable. In
such a case, the installments may be regarded as consolidated
by the contract, or, perhaps, as falling due by way of penalty.
Not improbably claims based upon such leases are provable in
bankruptcy. Thus in the case of In re Pittsburg Drug Co. (D.
C.) 164 Fed. 482, where a lease provided that, on default in the
payment of any rent, the rent for the entire term should at once
become due and payable, it was held that, on the bankruptcy of
the lessee while in default, the entire rent was "a fixed liability
absolutely owing,'' and provable against the bankrupt estate.
But the convenant of indemnity in the present lease was of a
very different nature. It called for the payment of no fixed and
certain sum. Its purpose was merely to guarantee against possible loss.
The inquiry, then, is as to the status of the lessor's demand
upon this indemnity covenant at the time when the petition in
bankruptcy was filed; for it is held that that is the time when
the provability of claims against the estate of a bankrupt is fixed.
Thus in the case of In re Pettingill (D. C.) 137 Fed. 145, it was
said :
"Under that act the provability of a claim depends upon its
status at the time the petition is filed. If, at that time, the
claim is provable, within the definition of § 63, it may be proved.
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If, at that time, it does not fall within that definition, but does

so at some later time, it cannot be proved."

See, also, Swarts v. Fourth National Bank, 117 Fed. 5, 54

C. C. A. 387; In re Bingham (D. C.) 94 Fed. 796; Watson v.

Merrill, supra; In re Adams (D. C.) 130 Fed. 381; In re Swift,

112 Fed. 320, 50 C. C. A. 264.

Now, when the petition was filed, the first step toward declar-

ing the lessee bankrupt was taken. It was not certain that bank-

ruptcy would follow; but, if it did follow, the lessor would have

the right to re-enter and terminate the lease. Notwithstanding

the provision that the lease should terminate in case the lessees

should be declared bankrupt, and the lessor should have the right

to re-enter, the lease was undoubtedly terminable by the re-entry,

and not by the bankruptcy. In re Ells (D. C.) 98 Fed. 967.

But the lessor was not obliged to re-enter, and whether he would

do so or not was manifestly dependent upon uncertainties. In-

deed, looking at the claim as it existed either at the time of the

petition or the adjudication, it was altogether contingent in its

nature:

(1) It was uncertain, as just pointed out, whether the lessor

would re-enter and terminate the lease.

(2) In case the lease was terminated, it was uncertain whether

there would be any loss in rents. If the rent received by the
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landlord from the new tenant equaled or exceeded that stipu-

lated in the lease, there would be no loss, and, consequently, no

foundation for any claim upon the indemnity covenant.

The case of In re Ells (D. C.) 98 Fed. 967, already referred

to, is in point. In that case the lease contained a provision that

the landlord might re-enter and resume possession if the bank-

rupt should be "declared bankrupt or insolvent according to

law," and the lessee covenanted that in case of such termination

of the lease he would '' indemnify the lessor against all loss of rent

or other payments which he may incur by reason of such termi-

nation during the remainder of the term," and the landlord re-

entered upon the bankruptcy of the tenant. It was held that

the claim of the landlord for the difference between the present

letting value of the premises and the rent reserved for the re-

mainder of the term could not be proved against the bankrupt

estate of the lessee. Judge Lowell said (p. 968):

'' The contract was one of indemnity for loss of rent and other

payments, and would be broken only after, and so far as, rent

had been lost and payments had been made. * * * At the

If, at that time, it does not fall within that definition, but does
so at some later time, it cannot be proved.''
See, also, Swarts v. fourth National Bank, 117 Fed. 5, 54
C. C. A. 387; In re Bingham (D. C.) 94 Fed. 796; Watson v.
l\lerrill, supra; In re Adams (D. C.) 130 Fed. 381; In re Swift,
112 Fed. 320, 50 C. C. A. 264.
Now, when the petition was filed, the first step toward declaring the lessee bankrupt was taken. It was not certain that bankruptcy would follow; but, if it did follow, the lessor would have
the right to re-enter and terminate the lease. Notwithstanding
the provision that the lease should terminate in case the lessees
should be declared bankrupt, and the lessor should have the right
to re-enter, the lease was undoubtedly terminable by the re-entry,
and not by the bankruptcy. In re Ells (D. C.) 98 Fed. 967.
But the lessor was not obliged to re-enter, and whether he would
do so or not was manifestly dependent upon uncertainties. Indeed, looking at the claim as it existed either at the time of the
petition or the adjudication, it was altogether contingent in its
nature:
(1) It was uncertain, as just pointed out, whether the lessor
would re-enter and terminate the lease.
(2) In case the lease was terminated, it was uncertain whether
there would be any loss in rents. If the rent received by the
landlord from the new tenant equaled or exceeded that stipulated in the lease, there would be no loss, and, consequently, no
foundation for any claim upon the indemnity covenant.
The case of In re Ells (D. C.) 98 Fed. 967, already referred
to, is in point. In that case the lease contained a provision that
the landlord might re-enter and resume possession if the bankrupt should be "declared bankrupt or insolvent according to
law," and the lessee covenanted that in case of such termination
of the lease he would ''indemnify the lessor against all loss of rent
or other payments which he may incur by reason of such termination during the remainder of the term,'' and the landlord reentered upon the bankruptcy of the tenant. It was held that
the claim of the landlord for the difference between the present
letting value of the premises and the rent reserved for the remainder of the term could not be proved against the bankrupt
estate of the lessee. Judge Lowell said (p. 968) :
''The contract was one of indemnity for loss of rent and other
payments, and would be broken only after, and so far as, rent
had been lost and payments had been made. • • • At the
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time of the adjudication the claim ib this case was contingent,

first, upon the determination of the lease by the lessor for breach

of the covenant; and, second, upon a subsequent loss of rent by

the lessor. If the lessor permitted the lease to continue, or if the

rent subsequently obtained by him equalled or exceeded that

provided in the lease, the claim would not arise. * * * The

provisions of the act of 1898 concerning the proof and allow-

ance of contingent claims differ materially from those contained

in the acts of 1841 and 1867. • • * Even under the broad

provisions of the act of 1867 above referred to, it was held

that a provision in a lease that the lessors might re-enter and

relet the premises at the risk of the lessees, who should remain

liable for the rent, and be credited with the sums actually re-

alized, did not give rise to a provable contingent claim. Ex parte

Lake, 2 Low. 544, Fed. Cas. No. 7,991. The provision above

quoted of the lease here in question, though not identical with

that in Ex parte Lake, yet resembles it so closely as to be essen-

tially similar. If the contingent claim arising in Ex parte Lake

could not be proved under the act of 1867, it is clear that the

contingent claim arising in this case cannot be proved under

the act of 1898."

See, also, In re Shaffer (D. C.) 124 Fed. 111.

For these reasons, we are satisfied that the claim in question
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as based upon the indemnity covenant is contingent, and not

provable against the bankrupt estate under the first clause of

§ 63a of the bankruptcy act

.

But this does not dispose of all of the appellant's conten-

tions. It is urged, in effect, that the claim, whether regarded

as a demand for rent or as based upon the indemnity provision,

is "a debt founded upon an express contract," and provable

under the fourth clause of § 63a, irrespective of the question

whether it is of such character as to be provable under the first

clause.

The principal cases cited in support of this contention are

In re Smith (D. C.) 146 Fed. 923, and Moch v. Market St. Nat.

Bank, 107 Fed. 897, 47 C. C. A. 49, which hold that the liability

of a bankrupt indorser of commercial paper, which does not

become absolute until after the filing of the petition, is a debt

founded upon contract within § 63a (4), and provable against

the bankrupt estate after it becomes fixed within the time allowed

for proving claims.

It is not necessary for the purposes of the present case that

time of the adjudication the claim in this case was contingent,
first, upon the determination of the lewie by the lessor for breach
of the covenant; and, second, upon a subsequent lo~ of rent by
the lessor. If the lessor permitted the lease to continue, or if the
rent subsequently obtained by him equalled or exceeded that
provided in the lease, the claim would not arise. • • • The
provisions of the act of 1898 concerning the proof and allowance of contingent claims differ materially from those contained
in the acts of 1841 and 1867. • • • Even under the broad
provisions of the act of 186i above referred to. it was held
that a provision in a lease that the lessors might re-enter and
relet the premises at the risk of the lessees, who should remain
liable for the rent, and be credited with the sums actually realiu'd, did not give rise to a provable contingent claim. Ex parte
Lake, 2 Low. 544, Fed. Cas. No. 7,991. The provision abo\•e
quoted of the lease here in question, though not identical with
that in Ex parte Lake, yet resembles it so closely as to be essentially similar. If the contingent claim arising in Ex parte Lake
could not be proved under the act of 1867, it is clear that the
contingent claim arising in this case cannot be proved under
the act of 1898.''
See, also, In re Shaffer (D. C.) 124 Fed. 111.
For these reasons, we are satisfied that the claim in question
as based upon the indemnity covenant is contingent, and not
provable against the bankrupt estate under the first clause of
§ 63a of the bankruptcy act.
But this does not dispose of all of the appellant's contentions. It is urged, in effect, that the claim, whether regarded
as a demand for rent or as based upon the indemnity provision,
is ''a debt founded upon an express contract,'' and provable
under the fourth clause of § 63a, irrespective of the question
whether it is of such character as to be provable under the first
clause.
The principal cases cited in support. of this contention are
In re Smith (D. C.) 146 Fed. 923, and Moch v. Market St. Nat.
Bank, 107 Fed. 897, 47 C. C. A. 49, which hold that the liability
of a bankrupt indorser of commercial paper, which does not
become absolute until after the filing of the petition, is a debt
founded upon contract within § 63a ( 4), and provable against
the bankrupt estate after it becomes fixed within the time allowed
for proving claims.
It is not necessary fQr the purposes of the present case that
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we should go so far as to dispute the conclusions reached in these

decisions. While a contract of indorsement is contingent, the

extent of the liability is at all times ascertainable, and it might

be that such a contract would be provable without it following

that an indemnity contract covering possible loss of rents—both

the existence and extent of the liability upon which are uncertain

and contingent—would be provable.

The present bankruptcy statute, unlike—as we have seen—

the acts of 1841 and 1867, does not provide for the proof of con-

tingent claims. Taking the fourth subdivision of § 63a as being

independent of the first subdivision, still there is nothing to indi-

cate that it was intended to embrace wholly contingent demands.

Indeed, it is only by reading § 636—which permits the liquida-

tion of unliquidated demands—in connection with said fourth

clause of 63a, that any ground is shown for contending that a

claim like the one in question can be proved. But this con-

struction expands the provisions of § 63a by those of 636, and

it is well settled that such a construction cannot be adopted.

§ 636 adds nothing to the class of debts provided under 63a. It

merely permits the liquidation of an unliquidated claim prov-

able under the latter provision. In Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S.

340, 23 Sup. Ct. 757, 47 L. ed. 1084, the Supreme Court of the
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United States said:

"§ 63a provides for debts which may be proved, which, among

others, are: (1) 'A fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment

or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the

filing of the petition against him, whether then payable or not,

with any interest thereon which would have been recoverable at

that date or with a rebate of interest on such as were not then

payable and did not bear interest;' (4) 'founded upon an open

account, or upon a contract express or implied.' In § 636 pro-

vision is made for unliquidated claims against the bankrupt,

which may be liquidated upon application to the court in such

manner as it shall direct, and may thereafter be proved and

allowed against his estate. This paragraph 'b,' however, adds

nothing to the class of debts which might be proved under

paragraph 'a' of the same section. Its purpose is to permit an

unliquidated claim, coming within the provisions of § 63a, to be

liquidated as the court should direct. We do not think that by

the use of the language in § 63a it was intended to permit proof

of contingent debts or liabilities or demands the valuation or

estimation of which it was substantially impossible to prove."

we should go so far as to dispute the conclusions reached in these
decisions. \Vhile a contra<'t of indorsement is contingent, the
extent of the liability is at all times ascertainable, and it might
he that such a contract would be provable without it following
that an indemnity contract covering possible loss of rents-both
the existence and extent of the liability upon which are uncertain
and contingent-would be provable.
The present bankruptcy statute, unlike-as we have seenthe acts of 1841 and 1867, does not provide for the proof of contingent elaims. Taking the fourth subdivision of § 63a as being
independent of the first subdivision, still there is nothing to indicate that it was intended to embrace wholly contingent demands.
Indeed, it is only by reading § 63b-which permits the liquidation of unliquidated demands-in connection with said fourth
clause of 63a, that any ground is shown for contending that a
cla.im like the one in question can be proved. But this construotion expands the provisions of § 63a by those of 63b, and
it is well settled that such a construction cannot be adopted.
§ 63b adds nothing to the class of debts provided under 63a. It
merely permits the liquidation of an unliquidated claim provable under the latter provision. In Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S.
340, 23 Sup. Ct. 757, 47 L. ed. 1084, the Supreme .Court of the
United States said:
'' § 63a provides for debts which may be proved, which, among
others, are: ( 1) 'A fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment
or an instrnment in writing, absolutely owing at the time of the
filing of the petition against him, whether then payable or not,
with any interest thereon which would have been recoverable at
that date or with a rebate of interest on such as were not then
payable and did not hear interest;' ( 4) ' founded upon an open
account, or upon a contract express or implied.' In § 63b provision is made for unliquidated claims against the bankrupt,
which may be liquidated upon application to the court in such
manner as it shall direct, and may thereafter he proved and
allowed agai1uit his estate. This paragraph 'b,' however, adds
nothing to the class of debts which might be proved under
paragraph 'a' of the same section. Its purpose is to permit an
unliquidated claim, coming within the provisions of § 63a, to be
liquidated as the court should direct. \Ve do not think that by
the use of the language in § 63a it was intended to permit proof
of C'ontingent debts or liabilities or demands the valuation or
t>stimntion of which it was substantially impossible to prove."
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In Dunbar v. Dunbar, supra, the case of Moch v. Market St.

Nat. Bank, supra, was distinguished.

But, while it is not necessary, in order to reach a decision in

this case, to determine whether 63a (4) is subject to the limita-

tion contained in 63a (1)—that debts to be provable must be

absolutely owing at the time of filing the petition—we think it

the better view that it is so limited. If it is not so limited, the

limitations in the first subdivision are practically of no effect.

All claims upon instruments in writing not provable under the

first clause, because not absolutely owing at the time of the

petition, might be proved as claims founded upon a "contract

express or implied" under the fourth clause, if no limitations

are attached to the latter. We cannot regard this interpreta-

tion as tenable. We think that the different clauses of 63a

should not be considered as independent, but should be read

together, and that the said limitation in the first clause should

be considered as repeated in the fourth clause. This interpre-

tation of the section is supported by authority. Thus In re

Swift, 112 Fed. 316, 50 C. C. A. 270, already referred to, the

Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit said:

"That part of the present bankruptcy act which describes

what debts may be proved does not repeat at all points the words
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'owing at the time of the filing of the petition,' but it is im-

possible to consider it other than as though it did thus repeat

them."

And In r^ Adams (D. C), 130 Fed. 381, the court said:

"But a creditor cannot prove for an indebtedness arising

between the filing of the involuntary petition and adjudication.

This appears from the analogy of § 63a (1), (2), (3), and (5),

as applied to the interpretation of clause (4). In clauses (1)

and (4), for example, the limit of time must be the same, inas-

much as clause (4) includes clause (1), and, if clause (4) were

less limited in point of time, the limit imposed upon clause (1)

would become nugatory."

For these reasons, we think that the claim of the appellant,

whether regarded as one for unaccrued rent or for indemnity

for loss of rent, was not provable against the bankrupt estate

under either § 63a (1) or 63a (4), and was properly expunged

by the District Court.

The order of the District Court is affirmed, with costs.18

13—See Colman Co. v. Withoft,

195 Fed. 250.

In Dunbar v. Dunbar, supra, the case of Moch v. Market St.
Nat. Bank, supra, was distinguished.
But, while it is not necessary, in order to reach a decision in
this case, to determine whether 63a ( 4) is subject to the limitation contained in 63a (1 )-that debts to be provable must be
absolutely owing at the time of filing the petition-we think it
the better view that it is so limited. If it is not so limited, the
limitations in the first subdivision are practically of no effect.
All claims upon instruments in writing not provable uuder the
first clause, because not absolutely owing at the time of the
petition, might be proved as claims founded upon a "contract
express or implied'' under the fourth clause, if no limitations
are attached to the latter. We cannot regard this interpretation as tenable. We think that the different clauses of 63a
should not be considered as independent, but should be read
together, and that the said limitation in the first clause should
he considered as repeated in the fourth clause. This interpretation of the section is supported by authority. Thus In re
Swift, 112 Fed. 316, 50 C. C. A. 270, already referred to, the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit said:
''That pnrt of the present bankruptcy act which describes
what debts may be proved does not repeat at all points the words
'owing at the time of the filing of the petition,' but it is impossible to consider it other than as though it did thus repeat
them.''
And In r~ Adams (D. C.), 130 Fed. 381, the court said:
''But a creditor cannot prove for an indebtedness arising
between the filing of the involuntary petition and adjudication.
This appears from the analogy of§ 63a (1), (2), (3), and (5),
as applied to the interpretation of clause ( 4). In clauses (1)
and ( 4), for example, the limit of time must be the same, inasmuch as clnuse (4) includes clause (1), and, if clause (4) were
less limited in point of time, the limit imposP<l upon clause ( 1)
would become nugatory."
For these reasons, we think that the claim of the appellant,
wlwther regarded as one for unaccrued rent or for indemnity
for loss of rent, was not provable against the bankrupt estate
under either § 63a ( 1) or 63a ( 4), and was properly expunged
hy the District Court.
The order of the District Court is affirmed, with costs.1 8
13-See Colman Co. v. Withoft,
195 Fed. 250.
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210 Fed. 425, 127 C. C. A. 157

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. January 6, 1914)

SHELBY, Circuit Judge. The petitioner had a mortgage on

BRITISH & AMERICAN MORTGAGE CO. v. STUART

the bankrupt's real estate, which contains the following stipu-

lations as to attorney's fees:

210 Fed. 425, 127 C. C. A. 157

"That the parties of the first part hereby agree to pay the

attorney's fees, and all other expenses which may be incurred

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

January 6, 1914)

by the said mortgagee, its successors or assigns, in the collection

of, or in attempting to collect the several sums, herein secured,

by a foreclosure of the mortgage, or otherwise, or for enforcing

or attempting to enforce any of the terms or provisions hereof,

with or without suit, for the payment of which this conveyance

is a lien, including solicitor's fees for a foreclosure by suit in

equity, and this mortgage shall stand as security for the same,

and it shall be no defense as to such solicitor's fees, or other

costs, fees, or expenses for a foreclosure in equity, that a fore-

closure might have been made under any power herein, the

course of procedure being optional with the holder, and it being

the purpose and intent hereof to secure such holder in the col-

lecting of principal and interest—hereby, secured—net of every-

thing."

The controversy here is as to a claim for attorney's fees based
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on the foregoing agreement.

After the adjudication in bankruptcy, George Stuart, the

trustee of the bankrupt, filed a petition in the District Court to

sell the land described in the mortgage, free of liens, and the

mortgagee, petitioner here, was made a party to the proceeding.

It filed an answer, and also filed proof of the mortgage debt and

proof of the attorney's fees for services rendered in and con-

nected with said proceedings "according to stipulations in the

mortgage;" but the services were all rendered after the filing

of the petition in bankruptcy. No question is made as to the

rendition of the services, nor of the fact that they were fairly

worth $250, the amount claimed. The referee allowed the mort-

gage debt as proved, but disallowed the claim for attorney's

fees, and the District Court confirmed the referee's order. The

petitioner seeks to revise and reverse the order disallowing the

attorney's fees.

For a clear understanding of the question to be considered

SHELBY, Circuit Judge. The petitioner had a mortgage on
the bankrupt's real estate, which contains the following stipulations as to attorney's fees:
''That the parties of the first part hereby agree to pay the
attorney's fees, and all other expenses which may be incurred
by the said mortgagee, it.'3 successors or 88Signs, in the collection
of, or in attempting to collect the several sums, herein secured,
by a foreclosure of the mortgage, or otherwise, or for enforcing
or attempting to enforce any of the terms or provisions hereof,
with or without suit, for the payment of which this conveyance
is a lien, including solicitor's fees for a foreclosure by suit in
equity, and this mortgage shall stand 88 security for the same,
and it shall be no defense as to such solicitor's fee!i, or other
costs, fees, or expenses for a foreclOE1ure in equity, that a foreclosure might have been made under any power herein, the
course of procedure being optional with the holder, and it being
the purpose and intent hereof to secure such holder in the collecting of principal and interest-hereby,secured-net of everything.,,
The controversy here is 88 to a claim for attorney's fees based
on the foregoing agreement.
After the adjudication in bankruptcy, George Stuart, the
trustee of the bankrupt, filed a petition in the District Court to
sell the land described in the mortgage, free of liens, and the
mortgagee, petitioner here, was made a party to the proceeding.
It filed an answer, and also filed proof of the mortgage debt and
proof of the attorney's fees for services rendered in and connected with said proceedings ''according to stipulations in the
mortgage;" but the services were all rendered after the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy. hlo question is made 88 to the
rendition of the services, nor of the fact that they were fairly
worth $250, the amount claimed. The referee allowed the mart·
gage debt as proved, but disallowed the claim for attorney's
fees, and the District Court confirmed the referee's order. The
petitioner seeks to revise and reverse the order disallowing the
attorney's fees.
For a clear understanding of the question to be considered
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later, it is first necessary to ascertain the effect and proper con-

struction of stipulations in notes and mortgages to pay attorney's

fees for their enforcement and collection. Such stipulations are

generally held to be valid, and they are sustained in Alabama,

where the mortgaged land is situated. Hunter & Faber v. Linn,

61 Ala. 492. The agreement here is for no fixed sum; but such

an agreement, if made for a definite sum, would not be conclusive

as to the amount on the parties. It could only be enforced for

such an amount as was reasonable. Unless the services, or some

of the services, covered by the stipulation, are performed, there

can be no collection or enforcement of such contract. It follows

that the obligation to reimburse the mortgagee or payee for costs

of enforcement or collection is contingent, creating no liability

unless the services provided for are performed or partly per-

formed. If the debt is paid promptly at maturity, no services

of an attorney being required or rendered, no attorney's fees

can be added to the amount of the note or mortgage. The cred-

itor would not be permitted to make a profit by collecting fees

he did not have to pay. Until the claim becomes due and the

services of the attorney are rendered, no debt exists, on account

of such stipulation, to be added to the amount of the note or

mortgage. Springstead et al. v. Crawfordsville State Bank, 34
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Sup. Ct. 195, 231 U. S. 541, 58 L. ed. — (decided December 22,

1913) ; Williams v. Flowers, 90 Ala. 136, 137, 7 South. 439, 24

Am. St. Rep. 772; McQabe v. Patton, 174 Fed. 217, 98 C. C. A.

225.

The stipulation which we have copied from the mortgage names

no sum which was to be paid as attorney's fees. It fixes no time

of payment. The payment is to be made for attorney's fees

"incurred by the said mortgagee * * * in the collection of,

or in attempting to collect, the several sums," etc. It is obvious

that it was not in the contemplation of the parties that an at-

torney would be employed to collect or attempt to collect the

mortgage debt before it was due. When the mortgage became

due, without the aid of attorneys and without expense, so far

as it appears, the debt was extended for four years—a period

not yet expired. So it cannot be that any debt on such account

was due and "absolutely owing" at the date of bankruptcy,

according to the terms of the contract.

The petition in bankruptcy was filed against Vandiver by his

creditors on September 19,1912, and he was adjudicated a bank-

rupt on October 10, 1912. Up to that time nothing had occurred

later, it is first necessary to ascertain the effect and proper construction of stipulations in not.es and mortgages to pay attorney's
fees for their enforcement and collection. Such stipulations are
generally held to be valid, and they are sustained in Alabama,
where the mortgaged land is situated. Munter & Faber v. Linn,
61 Ala. 492. The agreement here is for no fixed sum; but such
an agreement, if made for a definite sum, would not be conclusive
as to the amount on the parties. It could only be enforced f<irsuch an amount as was reasonable. Unless the services, or some
of the services, covered by the stipulation, are performed, there
can be no collection or enforcement of such contract. It follows
that the obligation to reimburse the mortgagee or payee for <'Ost.s
of enforcement or collection is contingent, creating no liability
unless the services provided for are performed or partly performed. If the debt is paid promptly at maturity, no services
of an attorney being required or rendered, no attorney's fees
can be added to the amount of the note or mortgage. The creditor would not be permitted to make a profit by collecting fees
he did not have to pay. Until the claim becomes due and the
services of the attorney are rendered, no debt exists, on account
of such stipulation, to be added to the amount of the note or
mortgage. Springstead et al. v. Crawfordsville State Bank, 34
Sup. Ct. 195, 231 U.S. 541, 58 L. ed. - (decided December 22,
1913) ; Williams v. Flowers, 90 Ala. 136, 137, 7 South. 439, 24
Am. St. Rep. 772; McC.abe v. Patton, 174 Fed. 217, 98 C. C. A.
225.
The stipulation which we have copied from the mortgage names
no sum which wH to be paid as attorney's fees. It fixes no time
of payment. The payment is to be made for attorney's fees
'' incuITed by the said mortgagee • • • in the collection of,
or in attempting to collect, the several sums,'' etc. It is obvious
that it was not in the contemplation of the parties that an attorney would be employed to collect or attempt to collect the
mortgage debt before it was due. When the mortgage became
due, without the aid of attorneys and without expense, so far
as it appears, the debt was extended for four years-a period
not yet expired. So it cannot be that any debt on such account
was due and "absolutely owing" at the date of bankruptcy,
according to the terms of the contract.
The petition in bankruptcy was filed against Vandiver by his
creditors on September 19, 1912, and he was adjudicated a bankrupt on October 10, 1912. Up to that time nothing had occurred
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which would authorize the addition of any sum to the amount

of the mortgage ou account of attorney's fees; the mortgagee

had not been required, nor had anything happened to authorize

him, to employ and compensate an attorney and add the fees to

the amount of the mortgage.

So we have the important if not the controlling facts shown

by the record that, at the date of the filing of the petition in

bankruptcy, no debt for attorney's fees existed; and, the mort-

gage not being due, the time had not arrived when such debt

could have been created.

The bankruptcy act designates the debts which may be proved

asrainst a bankrupt's estate. The claim presented here is one

"evidenced * * * by an instrument in writing," and, if

provable, it must be under § 63a, the relevant part of which is

as follows:

"Debts Which May Be Proved.—(a) Debts of the bankrupt

may be proved and allowed against his estate which are (1) a

fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in

writing, absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition

against him, whether then payable or not, with any interest

thereon which would have been recoverable at that date or with

a rebate of interest upon such as were not then payable and did
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not bear interest. * * *" Bankruptcy Act (Act July 1,

1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 562 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3447]) § 63a.

The limitation is to claims "absolutely owing at the time of

the filing of the petition against him." For accuracy and uni-

formity of administration, some time had to be fixed. The lan-

guage used excludes the idea that debts may be proved which

did not exist and which the bankrupt did not owe at the time

fixed—the date of the filing of the petition. Subdivision 5 of

the same section forbids the proving of interest which accrues

on judgments "after the filing of the petition." When a dis-

charge is granted, it only discharges provable debts, and "none

post-dating the petition in bankruptcy are affected by the dis-

charge." Collier on Bankruptcy (8th ed.) 312; §17, Bank-

ruptcy Act. The property owned by the bankrupt at the date

of bankruptcy vests in the trustee, but property acquired after

the adjudication does not pass to the trustee. § 70, Bankruptcy

Act; In re Parish (D. C), 122 Fed. 553. The date of the filing

of the petition is all-important in setting the time at which the

bankrupt's condition becomes fixed in relation to debts provable

against his estate. This is shown pointedly by a class of cases

which would authorize the addition of any sum to the amount
of the mortgage oo account of attorney's fees; the mortgag.·e
had not been required, nor had anything happened to authorize
Jijm, to employ and compensate an attorney and ad<l tlie fees to
tlw amount of the mortgage.
So we have the important if not the controlling facts shown
hy the · record that, at the date of the filing of the petition in
haukruptcy, no debt for attorney's fees existed; and, the mortgage not being due, the time had not arrived when such debt
('0Uld have been created.
The bankruptcy act designates the debts which may be proved
:uwinst a bankrupt's estate. The claim presented here is one
''evidenced • • • by an instrument in writing,'' and, if
provable, it must be under § 63a, the relevant part of which is
as follows:
"Debts Which May Be Proved.-(a) Debts of the bankrupt
may be proved and allowed against his estate which are (1) a
fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in
YiTiting, absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition
against him,' whether then payable or not, with any interest
thereon which would have been recoverable at that date or with
a rebate of interest upon such as were not then payable and did
not bear interest. • • •" Bankruptcy Act (Act July 1,
1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 562 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3447]) § 63a.
The limitation is to claims ''absolutely owing at the time of
the filing of the petition against him." For accuracy and uniformity of· administration, some time had to be fixed. The language used excludes the idea that debts may be proved which
did not exist and which the bankrupt did not owe at the time
fixed-the date of the filing of the petition. Subdivision 5 of
the same section forbids the proving of interest which accrues
on judgments "after the filing of the petition." When a discharge is granted, it only discharges provable debts, and ''none
post-dating the petition in bankruptcy are affected by the discharge." Collier on Bankruptcy (8th ed.) 312; §17, Bankruptcy Act. The property owned by the bankrupt at the date
of bankruptcy vests in the trustee, but property acquired aftn
the adjudication does not pass to the trusfee. § 70, Bankruptcy
Act: In re Parish (D. C.), 122 Fed. 553. The date of the filing
of the petition is all-important in setting the time at which the
bankrupt's condition becomes fixed in relation to debts provable
against his estate. This is shown pointedly by a class of cas~
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relating to court costs. Where part of such costs are incurred

before the filing of the petition and part afterwards, the part

incurred before the filing is provable against the estate and dis-

chargeable, and the part incurred afterwards is not provable or

dischargeable. 1 Remington on Bankruptcy, § 692.

In McCabe v. Patton, 174 Fed. 217, 98 C. C. A. 225, the ques-

tion was on the allowance of attorney's fee provided for in the

notes. The court held that, to be allowed, it must meet the re-

quirements of being "a fixed liability as evidenced by • * •

an instrument in writing absolutely owing at the time of the

filing of the petition against him." The claim was rejected for

want of proof of the rendition of collection services before the

date of bankruptcy. In re Gebhard (D. C), 140 Fed. 571, the

attorney's fee was rejected because no attorney was, in fact,

employed by the creditor "until after the bankruptcy." In re

Garlington (D. C), 115 Fed. 999, the attorney's fees were re-

jected because the note had not matured at the time of the bank-

ruptcy. And In re Keeton, Stell & Co. (D. C), 126 Fed. 426,

the note had become due, but had not been placed in the hands

of an attorney prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,

and the fees were disallowed. In re Jenkins (D. C), 192 Fed.

1000, a provision was placed in chattel mortgages for attorney's

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

fees, and the mortgages were placed in the hands of an attorney,

but no services were performed by him; and, subsequently, on

the bankruptcy of the mortgagor, his trustee sold the property,

and the question arose as to the proof of the attorney's fees as

a debt against the bankrupt's estate. The claim was disallowed.

See, also, In re Roche, 101 Fed. 956, 42 C. C. A. 115. The rule

that the fees, to be provable, must have accrued before the filing

of the petition, seems to be generally recognized. Collier on

Bankruptcy (8th ed.) 708; 1 Remington on Bankruptcy, §§ 670,

671; 1 Loveland on Bankruptcy, 619, § 300.

In Merchants' Bank v. Thomas, 121 Fed. 306, 57 C. C. A. 374,

decided by this court, and cited by the petitioner, in which

attorney's fees provided for by notes were allowed to be proved,

the notes had been placed in the hands of an attorney and he

had performed services before the bankruptcy. The case in

that regard was wholly unlike the instant case.

Although not due, the mortgage was a provable debt, with the

rebate of interest prescribed by § 63a.

But the petitioner was not obliged to prove his mortgage as a

debt against the bankrupt's estate. 1 Jones on Mortgages (6th

relating to court costs. \Vhere part of such costs are incurred
before the filing of the petition and part afterwards, the part
incurred before the filing is provable against the estate a11<l uischargeable, and the part incurred afterwards is not provable or
dischargeable. 1 Remington on Bankruptcy, § 692.
In McCabe v. Patton, 174 Fed. 217, 98 C. C. A. 225, the question was on the allowance of attorney's fee provided for iu the
notes. The court held that, to be allowed, it must meet the requirements of being ''a fixed liability as evidenced by • • •
an instrument in writing absolutely owing at the time of the
filing of the petition against him." The claim was rejected for
want of proof of the rendition of collection services before the
date of bankruptcy. In re Gebhard (D. C.), 140 Fed. 571, the
attorney's fee was rejected because no attorney was, in fact,
employed by the creditor "until after the bankruptcy." In re
Garlington ( D. C.), 115 Fed. 999, the attorney's fees were rejected because the note had not matured at the time of the bankruptcy. And In re Keeton, Stell & Co. (D. C.), 126 Fed. 426,
the note had become due, but had not been placed in the hands
of an attorney prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,
and the fees were disallowed. In re Jenkins (D. C.), 192 Fed.
1000, a provision was placed in chattel mortgages for attorney's
fees, and the mortgages were placed in the hands of an attorney,
but no services were performed by him; and, subsequently, on
the bankruptcy of the mortgagor, his trustee sold the property,
and the question arose as to the proof of the attorney's fees 88
. a debt against the bankrupt's estate. The claim was disallowed.
See, also, In re Roche, 101 Fed. 956, 42 C. C. A. 115. The rule
that the fees, to be provable, must have accrued before the filing
of the petition, seems to be generally recognized. Collier on
Bankruptcy (8th ed.) 708; 1 Remington on Bankruptcy, §§ 670,
671 ; 1 Loveland on Bankruptcy, 619, § 300.
In Merchants' Bank v. Thomas, 121 Fed. 306, 57 C. C. A. 374,
decided by this court, and cited by the petitioner, in which
attorney's fees provided for by notils were allowed to be proved,
the notes had been placed in the hands of an attorney and he
had performed services before th.e bankruptcy. The case in
that rpgard was wholly unlike the instant case.
Although not due, the mortgage was a provable debt, with the
rebate of interest prescribed by § 63a.
But the petitioner was not obliged to prove his mortgage as a
debt against the bankrupt's estate. 1 Jones on Mortgages (6th
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ed.) § 729. The discharge of the bankrupt would not have af-

fected his right to enforce his mortgage when it became due (In

re Blumberg [D. C] 94 Fed. 476; Bank of Commerce v. Elliott,

6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 409, 109 Wis. 648, 85 N. W. 417; Paxton v.

Scott, 10 Am. Bankr. Rep. 80, 66 Neb. 385, 92 N. W. 611; 2

Jones on Mortgages [6th -ed.] § 1236); and if, on its becoming

due, he was required to resort to suit, it may be that the amount

of his attorney's fees would be a proper claim to add to the

amount of the mortgage. But that is far from allowing the

mortgage debt to be proved, with abatement of interest, before

it is due, with the addition of attorney's fees which, under the

circumstances, could not have been within the contemplation of

the parties when the contract was made and which were not

absolutely owing at the date of bankruptcy.

In Riggin v. Magwire, 15 Wall. 549, 21 L. ed. 232, it was held

that, although the fifth section of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841

gave the right to prove "uncertain and contingent demands,"

so long as it remains wholly uncertain whether a contract or

engagement will ever give rise to an actual duty or liability and

there is no means of removing the uncertainty by calculation,

such contract or engagement is not provable under the act. The

same construction is placed on the present act. Dunbar v. Dun-

bar, 190 U. S. 340, 23 Sup. Ct. 757, 47 L. ed. 1084. So it seems
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clear that the agreement as to attorney's fees, on its face and

at the date of bankruptcy, was not provable as a claim against

the bankrupt estate.

After the date of the filing of the petition, the bankrupt can-

not add to the liabilities of his estate. He may create personal

liabilities which are not affected by the bankruptcy proceedings

and against which his discharge, when obtained, will not pro-

tect him. It may be conceded (but we do not so decide) that,

although the mortgage was not due, the proceedings to sell, free

of liens, in the District Court were equivalent to foreclosure, and

that the mortgagee, being called into the litigation, was neces-

sarily required to employ an attorney, and that such employ-

ment would be embraced within the clause of the mortgage re-

lating to attorney's fees, and all this would only show an in-

debtedness or liability accruing after the filing of the petition

in bankruptcy; and, whether considered as a secured or an un-

secured claim, it was one not provable nor dischargeable under

ed.) § 729.

The discharge of the bankrupt would not have affected his right to enforce his mortgage when it became due (In
re Blumberg [D. C.] 94 Fed. 476; Bank of Commerce v. Elliott,
6 Am. Bankr. Rep. 4-09, 109 Wis. 648, 85 N. W. 417; Paxton v.
Scott, 10 Am. Bankr. Rep. 80, 66 Neb. 385, 92 N. W. 611 ; 2
Jones on Mortgages [6th -ed.] § 1236); and if, on its becoming
due, he was required to resort to suit, it may be that the amount
of his attorney's fees would be a proper claim to add to the
amount of the mortgage. But that is far from allowing the
mortgage debt to be proved, with abatement of interest, before
it is due, with the addition of attorney's fees which, under the
circumstances, could not have been within the contemplation of
the parties when the contract was made and which were not
absolutely owing at the date of bankruptcy.
In Riggin v. Magwire, 15 Wall. 549, 21 L. ed. 232, it was held
that, although the fifth section of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841
gave th~ right to prove "uncertain and contingent demands,"
so long as it remains wholly uncertain whether a contract or
engagement will ever give rise to an actual duty or liability and
there is no means of removing the uncertainty by calculation,
such contract or engagement is not provable under the act. The
same construction is placed on the present act. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, 23 Sup. Ct. 757, 47 L. ed. 1084. So it seems
clear that the agreement as to attorney's fees, on its face and
at the date of bankruptcy, was not provable as a claim against
the bankrupt estate.
After the date of the filing of the petition, the bankrupt cannot add to the liabilities of his estate. He may create personal
liabilities which are not aft:ected by the bankruptcy proceedings
and against which his discharge, when obtained, will not protect him. It Jll8Y be conceded (but we do not so decide) that,
although the mortgage was not due, the proceedings to sell, free
of liens, in the District Court were equivalent to foreclosure, and
that the mortgagee, being called into the litigati<m, was necessari1y required to employ an attorney, and that such employment would be embraced within the clause of the mortgage relating to attorney's fees, and all this would only show an indebtedness or liability accruing after the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy; and, whether considered as a seeured or an unsecured claim, it was one not provable nor dischargeable under
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the provisions of the bankruptcy act. In re Burka (D. C), 104

Fed. 326.

The petition to revise is denied, and the decree is affirmed."

the provisions of the bank111ptcy act. In re Burka (D. C.), 10-t
Fed. 326.
The petition to revise is denied, and the decree is aftirmed. 1 i

In re NEFF

In re NEFF

157 Fed. 57, 84 C. C. A. 561

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. November 20, 1907)

LURTON, Circuit Judge. These three appeals have been

157 Fed. 57, 84 C. C. A. 561

heard together, as they involve the provability of a number of

claims against the bankrupt of like character. In tenor and

substance the contracts are alike. That presented by Emily M.

Nichols is an example and is as follows:

"$2,500.00 Bellaire, Ohio, Feb. 7, 1905.

"Two years after date, I, we, or either of us promise to pay

to the order of Miss Emily M. Nichols twenty-five hundred and

no 100 dollars at the office of the Avery-Caldwell Mfg. Co., upon

surrender of certificate No. 38 for 2,500 shares of preferred

stock of said company, value received interest 7 per cent per

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. November 20, 1907)
LURTON, Circuit Judge. These three appeals have been
heard together, 88 they involve the provability of a number of
claims against the bankrupt of like character. In tenor and
substance the contract.s are alike. That presented by Emily M.
Nichols is an example and is 88 follows:

annum.

"J. Brent Harding,

"Theodore Neff."

Some of these contracts related to the stock of a manufactur-

ing corporation, known as the Avery-Caldwell Company, and
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others to the stock of the Federal Casket Company. It was

agreed, as a fact, that the contract set out and others of like

character were made by the persons signing the same as pro-

moters, and to induce sales of the stock of the corporations

named, and that in consideration of this agreement the claim-

"$2,500.00
Bellaire, Ohio, Feb. 7, 1905.
"Two years after date, I, we, or either of us promise to pay
to the order of Miss Emily M. Nichols twenty-five hundred and
no 100 dollars at the office of the Avery-Caldwell Mfg. Co., upon
surrender of certificate No. 38 for 2,500 shlll"eS of preferred
stock of said company, value received interest 7 per cent per

annum.

ants became subscribers to the stock of said companies, paying

therefor the amount named in each contract, and received there-

for the shares of stock mentioned. It was also agreed that both

of these corporations were "insolvent" before the bankruptcy

of said Neff, and that this stock was of no value. The stock

certificates were filed as part of the proof in each ease and ten-

dered to the trustee. The contracts are plainly agreements to

purchase the shares of stock named at the time and price stated.

They rest upon a sufficient consideration, and are written agree-

14—See in re Pettingill, 137 Fed. In re Putnam, 193 Fed. 464; In re

143; Sayre v. Glenn, 87 Ala. 631; Ellis, 143 Fed. 103.

'' J. Brent Harding,
"Theodore Nef?."
Some of these contracts related to the stock of a manufacturing corporation, known as the Avery-Caldwell Company, and
others to the stock of the Federal Casket Company. It was
agreed, as a fact, that the contract set out and others of like
character were made by the persons signing the same 88 promoters, and to induce sales of the stock of the corporations
named, and that in consideration of this agreement the claimants became subscribers to the stock of said companies, paying
therefor the amount named in each contract, and received therefor the shares of stock mentioned. It was also agreed that both
of these corporations were "insolvent" before the bankruptcy
of said Neff, and that this stock was of no value. The stock
certificates were filed as part of the proof in each case and tendered to the trustee. The contract.s are plainly agreement.s to
purchase the shares of stock named at the time and price stated.
They rest upon a sufficient consideration, and are written agree14-See in re Pettingill, 137 Fed.
143; Sayre v. Glenn, 87 Ala. 631;

In re Putnam, 193 Fed. 464; In re
Ellis, l43 Fed. 103.
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ments to take and pay for the shares named and signed by the

parties to be charged and delivered to and accepted by the

promisees. There is, therefore, nothing in the objection as to

the contracts being invalid under the statute of frauds because

not signed by claimants also. Thayer v. Luce, 22 Ohio St. 62;

Himrod Furnace Co. v. Cleveland, 22 Ohio St. 451; Lee v.

Cherry, 85 Tenn. 707, 4 S. W. 835, 4 Am. St. Rep. 800; Brown's

Statute of Frauds, § 345c. The status of a claim must depend

upon its provability at the time the bankrupt petition was filed.

At that time it must come within the definition of § 63 of the

bankrupt act; it cannot be benefited by its status at a later date.

The defense is that these claims were not "fixed liabilities,"

"absolutely owing" at the time of the filing of the petition

against the bankrupt. This is based upon the fact that the lia-

bility of the bankrupt is made dependent upon the surrender

of the stock certificate at a date which had not then arrived,

and that it was optional with the promisees to surrender or

keep the stock until that time, and that the liability of the

promisor was undetermined and contingent until such surrender

at the time named.

That the promisor might refuse performance until the time

named is true. But if, before the time of performance, one
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absolutely repudiate liability and disavow unequivocally any

purpose to perform at any time, the other party may treat such

repudiation, at his election, as a breach of the agreement and

sue for his damages. This is the rule as settled in Hochster v.

De La Tour, 2 El. & Bl. 678, and approved by the Supreme

Court in Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 780, 44 L.

ed. 953, and by this court in Foss Brewing Co. v. Bullock, 16

U. S. App. 311, 59 Fed. 83, 8 C. C. A. 14, and Edward Hines

Lumber Co. v. Alley, 43 U. S. App. 169, 73 Fed. 603, 19 C. C.

A. 599; McBath v. Jones Cotton Co., 149 Fed. 383, 79 C. C. A.

203; Michigan Yacht Co. v. Busch, 143 Fed. 939, 75 C. C. A.

109. So, if one of the parties absolutely disables himself from

performing the contract by putting performance out of his

power, the other party may treat that as a repudiation and bring

his action to recover damages then or wait the time of perform-

ance at his election. This aspect of the question of an anticipa-

tory breach is well put by Fuller, chief justice, in Roehm v.

Horst, cited above, when he says:

"It is not disputed that if one party to a contract has de-
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ments to take and pay for the shares named and signed by the
parties to be charged and delivered to and ~cepted by the
promisees. There is, therefore, nothing in the objection as to
the contracts being invalid under the statute of frauds because
not signed by claimants also. Thayer v. Luee, 22 Ohio St. 62;
Himrod Furnace Co. v. Cleveland, 22 Ohio St. 451; Lee v.
Cherry, 85 Tenn. 707, 4 S. W. 835, 4 Am. St. Rep. 800; Brown's
Statute of Frauds, § 345c. The status of a claim must depend
upon its provability at the time the bankrupt petition was filed.
At that time it must come within the definition of § 63 of the
bankrupt act; it cannot be benefited by its status at a later date.
The defense is that these claims were not "fixed liabilities,"
"absolutely owing" at the time of the filing of the petition
against the bankrupt. This is based upon the fact that the liability of the bankrupt is made dependent upon the surrender
of the stock certificate at a date which had not then arrived,
and that it was optional with the promisees to surrender or
keep the stock until that time, and that the liability of the
promisor was undetermined and contingent until such surrender
at the time n~med.
That the promisor might refuse performance until the time
named is true. But if, before the time of performance, one
absolutely repudiate liability and disavow unequivocally any
purpose to perform at any time, the other party may treat such
repudiation, at his election, as a breach of the agreement and
sue for his damages. This is the rule as settled in Hochster v.
De La Tour, 2 El. & Bl. 678, and approved by the Supreme
Court in Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 780, 44 L.
ed. 953, and by this court in Foss Brewing Co. v. Bullock, 16
U. S. App. 311, 59 Fed. 83, 8 C. C. A. 14, and Edward Hines
Lumber Co. v. Alley, 43 U. S. App. 169, 73 Fed. 603, 19 C. C.
A. 599; McBath v. Jones Cotton Co., 149 Fed. 383, 79 C. C. A.
203; :Michigan Yal'ht Co. v. Busch, 143 Fed. 939, 75 C. C. A.
109. So, if one of the parties absolutely disables himself from
perfonning the contract by putting performance out of his
power, the other party may treat that as a repudiation and bring
his action to recover damages then or wait the time of performance at his election. This aspect of the question of an anticipatory breal'h is well put by Fuller, chief justice, in Roehm v.
Horst, cited above, when he says:
"It is not disputed that if one party to a contract has deu. & A. Bankr11ptc1-29

450

ADMINISTRATION

450

ADMINISTRATION

stroyed the subject-matter, or disabled himself so as to make

performance impossible, his conduct is equivalent to a breach

of the contract, although the time of performance has not ar-

rived; and also that if a contract provides for a series of acts,

and actual default is made in the performance of one of them,

accompanied by a refusal to perform the rest, the other party

need not perform, but may treat the refusal as a breach of the

entire contract, and recover accordingly."

In Lovell v. St. Louis Life Ins. Co., 11l U. S. 264, 274, 4 Sup.

Ct. 390, 395, 28 L. ed. 423, the company had failed and trans-

ferred its business to another company. The court held that

this authorized one insured to treat the contract as at an end

and to sue to recover back premiums paid although the time of

performance had not arrived. Mr. Justice Bradley, for the

court, said:

"Our third conclusion is that, as the old company totally

abandoned the performance of its contract with the complainant

by transferring all its assets and obligations to the new com-

pany, and as the contract is executory in nature, the complainant

had a right to consider it as terminated by the act of the com-

pany, and to demand what was justly due to him in that ex-

igency. Of this we think there can be no doubt. Where one
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party to an executory contract prevents the performance of it,

or puts it out of his own power to perform it, the other party may

regard it as terminated and demand whatever damage he has

sustained thereby. We had occasion to examine this subject in

the recent case of United States v. Behan, 110 U. S. 339, 4 Sup.

Ct. 81, 28 L. ed. 168, to which we refer."

See, also, Carr v. Hamilton, 129 U. S. 669, 9 Sup. Ct. 295, 32

L. ed. 669.

Bankruptcy is a complete disablement from performance and

the equivalent of an out and out repudiation, subject only to

the right of the trustee, at his election, to rehabilitate the con-

tract by performance. In the case styled In re Swift, 112 Fed.

315, 50 C. C A. 264, this consequence was considered by the

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in a very satisfactory

opinion by Putnam, C. J. There the obligation of a broker

to deliver certain shares of stock on demand was held to be

breached by bankruptcy, and that no prior demand was essen-

tial, a right of action accruing simultaneously with the bank-

rupt petition, which was the act of disablement to which the

stl'oyed the subject-matter, or disabled himself so as to make
performance impossible, his conduct is equivalent to a breach
of the contract, although the time of performance has not arrived; and also that if a contract provides for a series of acts,
and actual default is made in the performance of one of them,
accompanied by a refusal to perform the rest, the other party
need not perform, but may treat the refusal as a breach of the
eutire contract, and recover accordingly."
Iu Lovell v. St. Louis Life Ins. Co., 111 U. S. 264, 274, 4 Sup.
Ct. 390, 395, 28 L. ed. 423, the company had failed and transferred its business to another company. The court held that
this authorized one insured to treat the contract as at an end
and to sue to recover back premiums paid although the time of
performance had not arrived. Mr. Justice Bradley, for the
court, said :
"Our third conclusion is that, as the old company totally
abandoned the performanee of its contract with the complainant
by transferring all its assets and obligations to the new company, and as the contract is executory in nature, the complainant
had a right to consider it as terminated by the act of the company, and to demand what was justly due to him in that exigency. Of this we think there can be no doubt. Where one
party to an executory contract prevents the performance of it,
or puts it out of his own power to perform it, the other party may
regard it as terminated and demand whatever damage he has
sustained thereby. "\Ve had occasion to examine this subject in
the recent case of United States v. Behan, 110 U. S. 339, 4 Sup.
Ct. 81, 28 L. ed. 168, to which we refer."
See, also, Carr v. Hamilton, 129 U. S. 669, 9 Sup. Ct. 295, 32
L. ed. 669.
Bankruptcy is a complete disablement from performance and
the equivalent of an out and out repudiation, subject only to
the right of the trustee, at his election, to rehabilitate the contract by performance. In the case styled In re Swift, 112 Fed.
315, 50 C. C. A. 264, this consequence was considered by the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in a very satisfactory
opinion by Putnam, C. J. There the obligation of a broker
to deliver certain shares of stock on demand was held to be
breached by bankruptcy, and that no prior demand was essential, a right of action accruing simultaneously with the bankrupt petition, which was the act of disablement to which the
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adjudication related. In re Pettingill Co. (D. C), 137 Fed.

143,147, Judge Lowell, in a very able and discriminating opinion

in which the authorities are considered in the light of the re-

quirements for a provable debt under the present bankrupt law,

reached the conclusion that:

"If the bankrupt, at the time of bankruptcy, by disenabling

himself from performing the contract in question, and by re-

pudiating its obligation, could give the proving creditor the

right to maintain at once a suit in which damages could be

assessed at law or in equity, then the creditor can prove in

bankruptcy on the ground that bankruptcy is the equivalent of

disenablement and repudiation. For the assessment of damages

proceedings may be directed by the court under § 636, Act July

1, 1898, c. 541 (30 Stat. 562, U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3447)."

In that case it was held that a contract guaranteeing "the

redemption" of corporate shares, three years after date of issue,

was a provable claim, although the time for "redemption" had

not arrived at date\ of bankruptcy.

It is sufficient that a claim becomes provable as a consequence

of bankruptcy. The right to sue for and recover damages then

accrues. As Judge Lowell puts it In re Pettingill Co., cited

above:
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"In admission to proof, however, the claim need not arise

before bankruptcy, nor need the contract be broken theretofore.

It is sufficient for proof if the breach of contract and bankruptcy

are coincident."

The creditor by offering to file his claim manifests his elec-

tion to treat the contract as broken. This the court held he

might do. The decree in each case is affirmed.18

In re INMAN & CO.

171 Fed. 185

(District Court, N. D. Georgia. June 7, 1909)

NEWMAN, District Judge. • * •

It will be perceived from the foregoing that T. B. Ketterson

was in the employment of the bankrupt firm at the time the pro-

15—See Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. Fed. 308, commented upon in 27

N. Y. City By. Co., 198 Fed. 721, Harv. L. Rev. 469.

743; In re Scott Transfer Co., 216

adjudication related. In re Pettingill Co. ( D. C.), 137 Fed.
143, 147, Judge Lowell, in a very able and discriminating opinion
in which the authorities are considered in the light of the requirements for a provable debt Wlder the present bankrupt law,
reached the conclusion that:
"If the bankrupt, at the time of bankruptcy, by disenabling
himself from performing the contract in question, and by reput.liating iU:i obligation, could give the proving creditor the
right to maintain at once a suit in which damages could be
assessed at law or in equity, then the creditor can prove in
bankruptcy on the ground that bankruptcy is the equivalent of
disenablement and repudiation. For the assessment of damages
proceedings may be directed by the court under § 63b, Act July
1, 1898, c. 541 (30 Stat. 562, U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3447)."
In that case it was held that a contract guaranteeing "the
redemption'' of corporate shares, three years after date of issue,
was a provable claim, although the time for ''redemption'' had
not arrived at date\ of bankruptcy.
It is sufficient that a claim becomes provable as a consequence
of bankruptcy. The right to sue for and recover damages then
accrues. As Judge Lowell puts it In re Pettingill Co., cited
above:
•'In admission to proof, however, the claim need not arise
before bankruptcy, nor need the contract be broken theretofore.
It is sufficient for proof if the breach of contract and bankruptcy
are coincident.''
The creditor by offering to file his claim manifests his election to treat the contract as broken. This the court held he
might do. The decree in each case is affirmed. 1 5
In re INMAN & CO.
171 Fed. 185
(District Court, N. D. Georgia. June 7, 1909)
NEWMAN, District Judge. • • •
It will be perceived from the foregoing that T. B. Ketterson
was in the employment of the bankrupt firm at the time the pro15---See Pennsylvania Steel Co. v.
N. Y. City Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721,

743; In re Scott Transfer Co., 216

Fed. 308, commented upon in 27
Ha". L. Rev. 469.
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ceedings in bankruptcy were filed, and that the term for which

he was employed had not expired when the bankruptcy occurred.

He seeks to prove a claim for the unexpired portion of the time

of his employment. He was allowed without objection the

amount that was due him at the time the bankruptcy proceed-

ings were instituted, and, as it was less than three months, he

was allowed priority for the same.

The question presented is an interesting one, and is almost

without direct authority since the passage of the present bank-

ruptcy act. The right to prove, if it exists at all, is under para-

graph 4, § 63, of the bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541,

30 Stat. 563 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3447]). § 63 provides

that:

"Debts of the bankrupt may be proven and allowed against

his estate which are * • • (4th) founded upon an open ac-

count or upon a contract expressed or implied."

§ 636 provides that:

"Unliquidated claims against the bankrupt, may, pursuant to

application to the court, be liquidated in such manner as it shall

direct, and may thereafter be proved and allowed against his

estate.''

It is conceded that if a breach of contract had occurred prior
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to the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings, and the

claim for damages on account of the breach already existed,

that the amount of such damages might be liquidated in such

manlier as the court might direct; but the immediate question

is whether where there is a discontinuance of employment grow-

ing out of, and resulting from, the filing of a petition in bank-

ruptcy, and that only the right to damage exists and may be

proved and the amount of such damage ascertained. Stating

the inquiry somewhat differently, it is this: Whether, where

proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy are instituted, followed

by an adjudication, and the bankrupt is a party to a contract

of employment not terminated, this of itself is a breach of the

contract on the part of the bankrupt, or is the contract simply

terminated and annulled by operation of law without any de-

fault on the part of the bankrupt 1 The latter being true, there

is no cause of action arising as for a breach of contract.

•••

[After citing the corresponding section of the act of 1867,

and referring and quoting from the case of Dunbar v. Dunbar,

190 U. S. 340, supra, the court continued:]

ceedings in bankrnpt.cy were filed, and that the term for which
he was employed had not expired when the bankruptcy occurred.
He seeks to prove a claim for the unexpired portion of the time
of his employment. He was allowed without objection the
amount that was due him at the time the bankruptcy proceedings were instituted,. and, as it was less than three months, he
was allowed priority for the same.
The question presented is an interesting one, and is almost
without direct authority since the paSS&ge of the present bankruptcy act. The right to prove, if it exists at all, is under paragraph 4, § 63, of the bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541,
30 Stat. 563 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3447) ). § 63 provides
that:
''Debts of the bankrupt may be proven and allowed against
his estate which are • • • (4th) founded upon an open account or upon a contract expressed or implied.''
§ 63b provides that:
"Unliquidated claims against the bankrupt, may, pursuant to
application to the court, be liquidated in such manner as it shall
direct, and may thereafter be proved and allowed against his
estate."
'
It is conceded that if a breach of contract had occurred prior
to the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings, and the
cJaim for damages on account of the breach already existed,
that the amount of such damages might be liquidated in such
manner as the court might direct; but the immediate question
is whether where there is a discontinuance of employment growing out of, and resulting from, the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, and that only the right to damage exists and may be
proved and the amount of such damage ascertained. St.sting
the inquiry somewhat differently, it is this: Whether, where
proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy are instituted, followed
by an adjudication, and the bankrupt is a party to a contract
of employment not terminated, this of itself is a breach of the
contract on the part of the bankrupt, or is the contract simply
terminated and annulled by operation of law without any default on the part of the bankrupt T The latter being true, there
is no cause of action arising as for a breach of contract.

• • •

[After citing the corresponding section of the act of 1867,
and referring and quoting from the case of Dunbar v. Dunbar,
190 U. S. 340, supra, the court continued:]
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According to this, § 636 adds nothing to 63a as to the class

of debts which may be proven, and it was not intended by § 63a

to admit proofs of contingent debts or contingent liabilities.

'The liability here on the part of the employers was certainly

contingent. It was contingent upon the life, health, and ability

to render services on the part of the employe in the future, and

contingent also upon the life of the members of the firm of ln-

man & Co. The death of one member would have dissolved the

firm and necessitated the winding up of its affairs.

A number of decisions have been cited from other District

Courts and some from Circuit Courts of Appeals in other

circuits. The only one I have seen in the Circuit Courts of

Appeals for this circuit is Atkins v. Wilcox, 105 Fed. 595, 44

C. C. A. 626, 53 L. R. A. 118. This was an effort to prove a

claim for future rental and the judgment of the District Court

refusing to allow the claim was affirmed. This decision is in

line with the decisions on the subject of rent contracts, and

it is conceded by counsel for the claimants here that contracts

for future rent are not provable under the present bankruptcy

act. The latest decision I have seen on this question of the right

to recover rent not due is In re Rubel et al. (D. C.) 166 Fed.

131. The case was decided by Judge Quarles of the District

Court for the Eastern Division of Wisconsin. In that opinion
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it is said:

"The text-books and the authorities all seem to concur in the

proposition that rent upon such a lease which has not accrued

at the time of adjudication cannot be proven as a claim in

bankruptcy. Loveland on Bankruptcy (3d ed.) 265, 268; Col-

lier on Bankruptcy, 479; In re Jefferson (D. C.) 93 Fed. 948;

Bray v. Cobb (D. C.) 100 Fed. 270; Atkins v. Wilcox, 105 Fed.

595, 44 C. C. A. 626, 53 L. R. A. 118; In re Hays and Foster

(D. C.) 117 Fed. 879; Watson v. Merrill, 136 Fed. 359, 69 C. C.

A. 185, 69 L. R. A. 719. These authorities are not in accord as

to the method of reasoning by which the conclusion is reached.

Some of them hold that the adjudication destroys the relation

of landlord and tenant, and practically annuls the lease. Others

hold that the claim, not being provable in bankruptcy, is not

affected by the discharge; that the bankrupt remains bound by

his covenant; but that the trustee is not bound thereby. It is

conceded on all hands that the trustee has a reasonable time

after his appointment to determine whether he will adopt the

lease as an asset of the estate, and offer the same for sale, or

According to this, § 63b adds nothing to 63a as to the class
of debts which may be proven, and it was not intended by § 63a
to admit proofs of contingent debts or contingent liabiliti<.'s.
·.The liability here on the part of the employers was certainly
contingent. It was contingent upon the life, health, and ability
to render services on the part of the employe in the future, and
contingeut also upon the life of the members of the firm of Inman & Co. The death of one member would have dissolved the
firm and necessitated the winding up of its affairs.
A number of decisions have been cited from other District
Courts and some from Circuit Courts of Appeals in other
circuits. The only one I have seen in the Circuit Courts of
Appeals for this circuit is Atkins v. ·wilcox, 105 Fed. 595, 44
C. C. A. 626, 53 L. R. A. 118. This was an effort to prove a
claim for future rental and the judgment of the District Court
refusing to allow the claim was affirmed. This decision is in
line with the decisions on the subject of rent contracts, and
it is conceded by counsel for the claimants here that contracts
for future rent are not provable under the present bankruptcy
act. The latest decision I have seen on this question of the right
to recover rent not due is In re Rubel et al. (D. C.) 166 Fed.
131. The case was decided by Judge Quarles of the District
Court for the Eastern Division of Wisconsin. In that opinion
it is said:
''The teKt-books and the authorities all seem to concur in the
proposition that rent upon such a lease which has not accrued
at the time of adjudication cannot ·be proven as a claim in
bankruptcy. Loveland on Bankruptcy (3d ed.) 265, 268; Collier on Bankruptcy, 479; In re Jefferson (D. C.) 93 Fed. 948;
Bray v. Cobb (D. C.) 100 Fed. 270; Atkins v. Wilcox, 105 Fed.
595, 44 C. C. A. 626, 53 L. R. A. 118; In re Hays and Foster
(D. C.) 117 Fed. 879; Watson v. Merrill, 136 Fed. 359, 69 C. C.
A. 185, 69 L. R. A. 719. These authorities are not in accord as
to the method of reasoning by which the conclusion is reached.
Some of them hold that the adjudication destroys the relation
of landlord and tenant, and practically annuls the lease. Others
hold that the claim, not being provable in bankruptcy, is not
affected by the discharge; that the bankrupt remains bound by
his covenant; but that the trustee is not bound thereby. It is
conceded on all hands that the trustee has a reasonable time
:1 ftt>r his appointment to determine whether he will adopt the
lease as an asset of the estate, and offer the same for sale, or
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whether he will ignore it entirely. For practica' purposes it

makes no difference in the instant case which line of authority

is adopted, for either is fatal to a recovery of rent, as such, for

the unexpired term."

After some other discussion immaterial here the judge con-

cludes:

"It may be remarked in passing that, if application had been

made to liquidate the claim pursuant to § 636, the proceeding

would have been ineffective unless the claim were of such a na-

ture that, being liquidated, it might have been proven under

§ 63a. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, 350, 23 Sup. Ct . 757,

47 L. ed. 1084. We have seen that the unearned installment

of rent, although liquidated by a written lease, cannot be proven

under § 63a, so that the proceeding to liquidate would have been

unavailable in the instant case."

Counsel for the claimants here rely mainly upon the follow-

ing cases: In re Swift, 112 Fed. 315, 50 C. C. A. 264, In re

Stern, 116 Fed. 604, 54 C. C. A. 60, and In re Pettingill & Co.

(D. C.) 137 Fed. 143, and upon the cases therein cited, par-

ticular stress being laid upon the case cited by Judge Lowell,

Ex parte Pollard, Fed. Case No. 11,252 (2 Lowell, 411, and 17

N. B. H. 228). The second headnote in the latter case is to
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this effect:

"The filing of a petition in bankruptcy by a corporation ipso

facto dissolves the contract with an employe, and is tantamount

to a dissolution, and he may have his damages assessed and

prove his amount in a bankruptcy court."

It may be remarked that this decision, Ex parte Pollard, was

under the act of 1867, which, as has been stated, in reference to

the proof of claims of this character was entirely different from

the present act. None of the other cases relied upon were cases

of employer and employe. In re Pettingill & Co. (D. C.) 137

Fed. 143, Judge Lowell in the opinion says:

"It seems, therefore, that the test of provability under the

act of 1898 may be stated thus: If the bankrupt at the time of

bankruptcy by disenabling himself from performing the con-

tract in question, and by repudiating its obligation, could give

the proving creditor the right to maintain at once a suit in

which damages could be assessed at law or in equity, then the

creditor can prove in bankruptcy on the ground that bankruptcy

is equivalent of disenablement and repudiation. For the assess-

whether he will ignore it entirely. For practica.1 purposes it
makes no difference in the instant case which line of authority
is adopttd, for either is fatal to a recovery of rent, as such, for
the unexpired term.''
·
After some other discussion immaterial here the judge concludes:
''It may be remarked in passing that, if application had been
made to liquidate the claim pursuant to § 63b, the proceeding
would have been ineffective unless the claim were of such a nature that, being liquidated, it might have been proven under
~ 63a. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340, 350, 23 Sup. Ct. 757,
47 L. ed. 1084. \\"'e have seen that the unearned iu.stallment
of rent, although liquidated by a written lease, cannot be proven
under § 63a, so that the proceeding to liquidate would have been
u 11available in the instant case."
Counsel for the claimants here rely mainly upon the following cases: In re Swift, 112 Fed. 315, 50 C. C. A. 264, In re
Stern, 116 Fed. 604, 54 C. C. A. 60, and In re :Pettingill & Co.
(D. C.) 137 Fed. 143, and upon the cases therein cited, particulur stress being laid upon the case cited by Judge Lowell,
Ex parte Pollard, Fed. Case No. 11,252 (2 Lowell, 411, and 17
N. B. R. 228). The second headnote in the latter case is to
this effect:
''The filing of a petition in bankruptcy by a corporation ipso
facto dissolves the contract with an employe, and is tantamount
to a dissolution, and he may have his damages assessed and
prove his amount in a bankruptcy court.''
It may be remarked that this decision, Ex parte Pollard, was
uuder the act of 1867, which, as has been stated, in reference to
the proof of claims of this character was entirely different from
the present act. None of the other cases relied upon were cases
of employer and eruploye. In re Pettingill & Co. (D. C.) 137
Fed. 1-13, Judge Lowell in the opinion says:
''It seems, therefore, that the test of provability under the
act of 1898 may be stated thus: If the bankrupt at the time of
bankruptcy by disenabling himself from performing the contract in question, and by repudiating its obligation, could give
the proving creditor the right to maintain at once a suit in
which damages could be assessed at law or in equity, then the
creditor can prove in bankruptcy on the ground that bankruptcy
is equivalent of di.senablement and repudiation. For the assess-
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§ 636 (30 Stat. 562 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3447]).".

Counsel for the claimants here also consider In re Silverman

(D. C.) 101 Fed. 219, as favorable to them. In that case Silver-

man Bros, on the 9th day of January, 1899, made a deed of

trust of their stock of goods in favor of their creditors. One

Swift was named as trustee in the deed of trust, and took pos-

/ session of the stock of goods, and on the same day, January 9,

1899, discharged from the store the employes under Silverman

Bros., including one Rosenberg. On the 18th day of January

thereafter proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy were insti-

tuted against Silverman Bros., and Swift was appointed re-

ceiver. Rosenberg's claim was based upon the breach of his

contract of employment, and he claimed $1,200 for the re-

mainder of the contract year. In the opinion in this case Judge

Philips says:

"There can be no question but what if on the 9th day of

January, 1899, there was a breach of the contract between

Silverman Bros, and Rosenberg by his discharge from their

service, or by their voluntary act which rendered the perform-

ance of the contract on their part impossible, a cause of action

at once arose in favor of Rosenberg against Silverman Bros, for

damages; and it is equally clear that the subsequent adjudica-
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tion of bankruptcy in February, 1899, did not put an end to

the cause of action, as it was then an existing right, which the

mere adjudication in bankruptcy could not destroy. So the

real question in this case is not whether an adjudication in

bankruptcy against the employer would put an end to a con-

tract with an employe like the one in question, so that the dis-

charge of the employe would be under the operation of the

bankruptcy law, and not by reason of the voluntary act of the

employer, but it is whether or not the act of Silverman Bros, in

making the deed of trust and placing Swift in absolute charge

of the store and its business, whereby Rosenberg was displaced

as manager and employe, did not constitute a breach of the

contract, and create a subsisting cause of action, three weeks

before the adjudication in bankruptcy."

The court then holds that there was such a breach of con-

tract, and fixes the amount that Rosenberg would be entitled

to recover. I do not consider this case of In re Silverman au-

thority either way.

In the case of In re Imperial Brewing Company (D. C.) 143

ment of damages proceedings may be directed by the court under
§ 63b (30 Stat. 562 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3447]).' '.
Counsel for the claimants here also consider ln re Silverman
(D. C.) 101 Fed. 219, as favorable to them. In that case Siiverman Bros. on the 9th day of January, 1899, made a deed of
trust of their stock of goods in favor of their creditors. One
Swift was named as trustee in the deed of trust, and took possession of the stock of goods, and on the same day, Jan nary 9,
1899, discharged from the store the employes under Silverma:i
Bros., including one Rosenberg. On the 18th day of Januar.r
thereafter proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy were i1:.stituted against Silverman Bros., and Swift was appointed receiver. Rosenberg's claim was based upon the breach of his
contract of employment, and he claimed $1,200 for the remainder of the contract year. In the opinion in this case Judge
Philips says:
''There can be no question but what if on the 9th day of
January, 1899, there was a bre11ch of the contraCt between
Silverman Bros. and Rosenberg by his discharge ·from their
service, or by their voluntary act which rendered the performance of the contract on their part impossible, a cause of action
at once arose in favor of Rosenberg against Silverman Bros. for
damages; and it is equally clear that the subsequent adjudication of bankruptcy in February, 1899, did not put an end to
the cause of action, as it was then an existing right, which the
mere adjudication in bankruptcy could not destroy. So the
real question in this case is not whether an adjudication in
bankruptcy against the employer would put an end to a contract with an employe like the one in question, so that the discharge of the employe would be under the operation of the
bankruptcy law, and not by reason of the voluntary act of the
employer, but it is whether or not the act of Silverman Bros. in
making the deed of trust and placing Swift in absolute charge
of the store and its business, whereby Rosenberg was displaced
as manager and employe, did not constitute a breach of the
contract, and create a subsisting cause of action, three weeks
before the adjudication in bankruptcy.''
The court then holds that there was such a breach of contract, and fixes the amount that Rosenberg would be entitled
to recover. I do not consider this case of In re Silverman authority either way.
In the case of In re Imperial Brewing Company (D. C.) 143
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Fed. 579, decided by Judge Philips for the Western District of

Missouri, it is said:

"The question to be decided is: Did the adjudication in bank-

ruptcy against the Imperial Brewing Company in and of itself

constitute such a breach of the contract as to mature the whole

executory contract, entitling the claimant to prove up and have

allowed against the estate in bankruptcy the damages claimed?

While the statement of the petition is a little indefinite respect-

ing the proceedings leading to the adjudication, the court will

take cognizance of its own records, which show that it was an

involuntary proceeding in bankruptcy—necessarily so because

the corporation could not on its own voluntary petition be ad-

judged a bankrupt. While the petition herein states that the

Imperial Brewing Company was permanently disabled from

performing said contract and repudiated the same in all its

parts, and that it retired permanently from business and was

hopelessly insolvent, etc., these results are alleged to follow 'by

reason of said bankruptcy proceedings.' At the time of the

adjudication in bankruptcy, there was no debt owing by the

bankrupt to the claimant. There had been no delivery or tender

of delivery prior thereto, and none since. It may be conceded as

the law of this jurisdiction that where a party is bound from
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time to time, as expressed in the contract, to deliver articles to

be manufactured or products to be grown, each parcel as deliv-

ered to be paid for at a certain time and in a certain way, a

refusal by the vendee to be further bound by the terms of the

contract or to accept further deliveries constitutes a breach of

the contract as a whole, and gives the vendor a right of action

to recover the damages he may sustain by reason of such refusal.

In such case the positive refusal of the vendee to perform when

tender is made, or notice by him to the vendor before maturity

of the time for delivery that he will not carry out the contract,

will release the vendor from making any tender, and entitle

him to an action in advance of the fixed period for delivery on

his part to recover damages as for breach of the whole contract.

Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 780, 44 L. ed. 953. The

sole reliance of the claimant to bring it within this rule for such

breach is predicated on the adjudication in an involuntary pro-

ceeding in bankruptcy against the vendee. I am unable to con-

sent to the proposition that such an adjudication in bankruptcy,

ex vi termini, is in law tantamount to a refusal of the bankrupt

to perform, or that it thereby permanently disabled itself from

Fed. 579, decided by Judge Philips for the Western District of
Missouri, it is said:
''The question to be decided is: Did the adjudication in bankruptcy against the Imperial Brewing Company in and of itself
constitute such a breach of the contract as to mature the whole
executory contract, entitling the claimant to prove up and have
allowed against the estate in bankruptcy the damages claimed Y
'Vhile the statement of the petition is a little indefinite respecting the proceedings leading to the adjudication, the court will
take cognizance of its own records, which show that it was an
involuntary proceeding in bankruptcy~necessarily so because
the corporation could not on its own voluntary petition be adjudged a bankrupt. 'Vhile the petition herein states that the
Imperial Brewing Company was permanently disabled from
performing said contract and repudiated the same in all its
parts, and that it retired permanently from business and was
hopelessly insolvent, etc., these results are alleged to follow 'by
reason of said bankruptcy proceedings.' At the time of the
adjudication in bankruptcy, there was no debt owing by the
bankrupt to the claimant. There had been no delivery or tender
of delivery prior thereto, and none since. It may be conceded as
the law of this jurisdiction that where a party is bound from
time to time, as expressed in the contract, to deliver articles to
be manufactured or products to be grown, each parcel as delivered to be paid for at a certain time and in a certain way, a
refusal by the vendee to be further bound by the terms of the
contract or to accept further deliveries constitutes a breach of
the contract as a whole, and gives the vendor a right of action
to recover the damages he may sustain by reason of such refusal.
In such case the positive refusal of the vendee to perform when
tender is made, or notice by him to the vendor before maturity
of the time for delivery that he will not carry out the contract,
will release the vendor from making any tender, and entitle
him to an action in advance of the fixed period for delivery on
his part to recover damages ns for breach of the whole contract.
Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 780, 44 L. ed. 953. The
sole reliance of the claimant to bring it within this rule for such
breach is predicated on the adjudication in an involuntary proceeding in bankruptcy against the vendee. I am unable to conS<'nt to the proposition that such an adjudication in bankruptcy~
r.r t•i termini, is in law tantamount to a refusal of the bankrupt
to pPrform, or that it thereby permanently disabled itself from
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performance to bring the claim asserted by petitioner within

the operation of the rule laid down in Roehm v. Horst, supra."

The judge then cites and quotes from the opinion in Watson v.

Merrill, 136 Fed. 359, 69 C. C. A. 185, 69 L. R. A. 719, decided

by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and In

re Swift, supra, and says:

"In re Swift, 112 Fed. 315, 50 C. C. A. 264, a broker had

made a contract to deliver certain stock to a customer. It was

held that he made it impossible to fulfill his agreement to deliver

the stock by his adjudication in bankruptcy, for the reason that

it took the stock from him and vested it with all his property,

in his trustee. But that is clearly not this case.''

Judge Philips refers to In re Pettingill & Co., supra, in this

way:

"I may say that I can concur in the syllabus of that case

that, under the bankruptcy act, the provability of a claim de-

pends upon its status at the time of the filing of the petition

in bankruptcy. If not then a provable debt, as defined in the

act, it cannot be proved, although it may thereafter come within

such definition. * * * If, however, it was intended to hold

that as applied to an executory contract for the sale of annual

crops to be raised in successive years, where no breach had
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occurred at the time of an involuntary adjudication in bank-

ruptcy, the mere act of such declared statutory insolvency con-

stituted such a breach of the contract as to enable the vendor

to prove up against the estate the contingent damages, as, on a

repudiation of the contract by the vendee, I cannot consent

thereto. There was no renunciation by the vendee company of

the contract after the commencement of performance or renun-

ciation before the time for performance had arrived. Nor has

the vendee deliberately incapacitated itself or rendered per-

formance of the contract impossible within the rule laid down

in Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 18, 20 Sup. Ct. 787, 44 L. ed. 953.

As a discharge in bankruptcy under § 1, cl. 12, means no more

than 'the release of a bankrupt from all of his debts which

are provable in bankruptcy, except such as are excepted by

the act,' and the claim for damages for a possible future breach

of a contract is not a debt provable against the estate, in the

absence of any refusal on the part of the bankrupt to recog-

nize the contract, and he has not voluntarily or positively dis-

abled himself from performing it, where its performance does

not become obligatory until after the adjudication in bankruptcy,

performance to bring the claim asserted by petitioner within
the operation of the rule laid down iu Hoehm v. Horst, s1tpra."
The judge then cites and quotes from the opinion in W a tsou v .
.Merrill, 136 Fed. 359, 69 C. C. A. 185, 69 L. R. A. 719, decided
by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and In
re Swift, supra, and says:
"In re Swift, 112 Fed. 315, 50 C. C. A. 264, a broker had
made a contract to deliver certain stock to a customer. It was
held that he made it impossible to fulfill his agreement to deliver
the stock by his adjudication in bankruptcy, for the reason that
it took the stock from him and vested it with all his property,
in his trustee. But that is clearly not this case."
Judge Philips refers to In re Pettingill & Co., supra, in this
way:
''I may say that I can concur in the syllabus of that case
that, under the bankruptcy act, the provability of a claim depends upon its status at the time of the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy. If not then a provable debt, as defined in the
act, it cannot be proved, although it may thereafter come within
such definition. • • • If, however, it was intended to hold
that as applied to an executory contract for the sale of annual
crops to be raised in successive years, where no breach had
occurred at the time of an involuntary adjudication in bankruptcy, the mere act of such declared statutory insolvency constituted such a breach of the contract as to enable the vendor
to prove up against the estate the contingent damages, as, on a
repudiation of the contract by the vendee, I cannot coosent
thereto. There was no renunciation by the vendee company of
the contract after the commencement of performance or renunciation before the time for performance had arrived. Nor has
the vendee deliberately incapacitated itself or rendered performance of the contract impossible within the rule laid down
in Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 18, 20 Sup. Ct. 787, 44 L. ed. 953.
As a discharge in bankruptcy under § 1, cl. 12, means no more
than 'the release of a bankrupt from all of his debts which
are provable in bankruptcy, except such as are excepted by
the act,' and the claim for damages for a possible future breach
of a contract is not a debt provable against the estate, in the
absence of any refusal on the part of the bankrupt to recog·
nize the contract, and he has not voluntarily or positively disabled himself from performing it, where its performance does
not become obligatory until after the adjudication in bankruptcy,
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my conclusion is that the claim in question is not one provable

in bankruptcy. It is a noteworthy fact that, under the bank-

rupt acts of 1841 and 1867, the right was given to prove 'un-

certain and contingent demands' against the estate. This

provision was omitted from the present bankruptcy act of 1898.

In my judgment this omission is significant."

The important question in the instant case, and the one which

in my judgment is controlling, is discussed in the cases to whu-h

I shall now refer. The first of these is In re Jefferson (D. C.)

93 Fed. 948, decided by Judge Evans for the District of Ken-

tucky. The syllabus in that case is as follows:

"A lease for a term of years, reserving rent payable in

monthly installments, is terminated by the adjudication of the

lessee as a bankrupt during the term; and the landlord has no

provable claim against the tenant's estate in bankruptcy for

the rent which would have accrued under the lease after the

date of such adjudication." .

The reasoning of the court in the opinion to the effect that

proceedings in bankruptcy terminate the relation of landlord

and tenant applies, it seems to me, with equal force to the rela-

tion of employer and employee. The next case in order is that of

Bray v. Cobb (D. C.) 100 Fed. 270, decided by Judge Purnell

says:
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for the Eastern District of North Carolina. In the opinion he

"The relation of landlord and tenant is severed by operation

of the bankruptcy law."

The question was again presented before Judge Evans In re

Hays, Foster & Ward Company (D. C.) 117 Fed. 879, and the

opinion expressed In re Jefferson, supra, was reiterated. In

both cases the conclusion reached is based largely upon the de-

cisions in Bailey v. Loeb, 2 Fed. Cas. 376; In re Webb. 29 Fed.

Cas. 494; In re Breck, 4 Fed. Cas. 43. In Watson v. Merrill,

136\Fed. 359, 69 C. C. A. 185, 69 L. R. A. 719, decided in the

Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the opinion

being delivered by Circuit Judge Sanborn, the court differs

from the views expressed in the three cases just referred to,

although it reaches the same result; that is, that a claim for

damages for a breach of a contract in a lease to pay install-

ments of rent for the use of the premises at times subsequent

to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy is not provable under

the bankruptcy law of 1898. In the opinion it is said:

"An adjudication in bankruptcy does not dissolve or termi-

my conclusion is that the claim in question is not one provable
in bankruptcy. It is a noteworthy fact that, under the h:rnkrupt acts of 1841 and 1867, the right was given to prove 'trncertain and contingent demands' against the estate. Thi~
provision was omitted from the present bankruptcy act of 1898.
In my judgment this omission is significant."
The important question in the instant case, and the one ·,,·hieh
in my judgment is controlling, is discussed in the cas..'s to whil'h
I shall now refer. The first of these is In re Jefferson (D. C.)
93 Fed. 948, decided by Judge Evans for the District of Kentucky. The syllabus in that case is as follows:
''A lease for a term of years, reserving rent payable in
monthly installments, is terminated by the adjudication of the
lessee as a bankrupt during the term; and the landlord hHs no
provable claim against the tenant's estate in bankruptcy for
the rent which would have accrued under the lease after the
date of such adjudication."
The reasoning of the court in the opinion to the effect that
proceedings in bankruptcy terminate the relation of landlord
and tenant applies, it seems to me, with equal force to t~ relation of employer and employee. The next case in order is that of
Bray v. Cobb (D. C.) 100 Fed. 270, decided by Judge Purnell
for the Eastern District of North Carolina. In the opinion he
says:
''The relation of landlord and tenant is severed by operation
of the bankruptcy law.''
The question was again presented before Judge Evans In re
Hays, Foster & Ward Company (D. C.) 117 Fed. 879, and the
opinion expressed In re Jefferson, su.pra, was reiterated. In
both cases the conclusion reached is based largely upon the decisions in Bailey v. Loeb, 2 Fed. Cas. 376; In re Webb, 29 Fed.
Cas. 494; In re Breck, 4 Fed. Cas. 43. In Watson v. Merrill,
136'\Fed. 359, 69 C. C. A. 185, 69 L. R. A. 719, decided in the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the opinion
being delivered by Circuit Judge Sanborn, the court differs
from the views expressed in the three cases just referred to,
although it reaches the same result; that is, that a claim for
damages for a breach of a contract in a lease to pay installments of rent for the use of the premicJes at times subsequent
to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy is not provable under
the bankruptcy law of 1898. In the opinion it is said:
''An adjudication in bankruptcy does not dissolve or termi-
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nate the contractual relations of the bankrupt, notwithstanding

the decisions to the contrary In re Jefferson (D. C.) 93 Fed. 448;

Bray v. Cobb (D. C.) 100 Fed. 270; and Re Hays, Foster &

Ward Company (I}. C.) 117 Fed. 879. Its effect is to trans-

fer to the trustee all the property of the bankrupt except his

executory contracts, and to vest in the trustee the option to

assume or to renounce these. It is the assignment of the prop-

erty of the bankrupt to the trustee by operation of law. It

neither releases nor absolves the debtor from any of his contracts

or obligations, but, like any other assignment of property by

an obligor, leaves him bound by his agreements and subject

to the liabilities he has incurred. It is the discharge of the

bankrupt alone, not his adjudication, that releases him from

liability for provable debts in consideration of his surrender

of his property, and its distribution among the creditors who

hold them. Even the discharge fails to relieve him from claims

figainst him that are not provable in bankruptcy, and, since the

i"iling of the petition in bankruptcy may not be the basis of a

provable claim, his liability for them is neither released nor

affected by his adjudication in bankruptcy, or by his discharge

from his provable debts. One agrees to pay monthly rents for

the place of residence of his family or for his place of busi-
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ness, or to render personal services for monthly compensation

for a term of years, he agrees to purchase or to convey prop-

erty, and he then becomes insolvent and is adjudicated a bank-

rupt. His obligations and liabilities are neither terminated

nor released by the adjudication. He still remains legally bound

to pay the rents, to render the services, and to fulfill all his other

obligations, notwithstanding the fact that his insolvency may

render him unable immediately to do so. Nor are those who

contracted with him absolved from their obligations. If he or

his trustee pays the stipulated rents for his place of residence

or for his place of business, the lessors may not deny to the

payor the use of the premises according to the terms of the

lease. If he renders the personal services, he who contracted

to pay for them may not deny his liability to discharge this

obligation. His trustee does not become liable for his debts,

but he does acquire the right to accept and assume or to re-

nounce the executory agreements of the bankrupt as he may

deem most advantageous to the estate he is administering, and

the parties to those contracts which he assumes are still liable to

perform them. And so, throughout the entire field of con-

nate the contractual relations of the bankrupt, notwithstanding
the decisions to the contrary In re Jefferson ( D. C.) 93 Fed. 44~;
Bray v. Cobb (D. C.) 100 Fed. 270; and Re Hays, Foster &
Ward Company (Q_. C.) 117 Fed. 879. Its effect is to trans- .
fer to the trustee all the property of the bankn1pt except his
executory contracts, and to vest in the trustee the option to
assume or to renounce these. It is the a~gnment of the property of the bankrupt to the trustee by operation of law. It
neither releases nor absolves the debtor from any of his contracts
or obligations, but, like any other assignment of property by
an obligor, leaves him bound by his agreements and subject
to the liabilities he has incurred. It is the discharge of the
bankrupt alone, not his adjudication, that releases him from
liability for provable debts in consideration of his surrender
of his property, and its distribution among the creditors who
hold them. Even the discharge fails to relieve him from claims
ngeinst him that are not provable in bankruptcy, and, since the
[;Jing of the petition in bankruptcy may not be the basis of a
pr0vable claim, his liability for them is neither released nor
a fTected by his adjudication in bankruptcy, or by his discharge
from his provable debts. One agrees to pay monthly rents for
the place of residence of his family or for his place of business, or to render personal sen·ices for monthly compensation
for a term of years, he agrees to purchase or to convey property, and he then becomes insolvent and is adjudicated a bankrupt. His obligations and liabilities are neither terminated
nor released by the adjudication. He still remains legally bound
to pay the rents, to render the services, and to fulfill all his other
obligations, notwithstanding the fact that his insolvency may
render him unable immediatR.ly to do so. Nor are those who
contracted with him absolved from their obligations. If he or
his trustee pays the stipulated rents for his place of residence
or for his place of business, the lessors may not deny to the
payor the use of the premises according to the tnms of the
lease. If he renders the personal services, he who contracted
to pay for them may not deny his liability to discharge this
obligation. His trustee does not become liable for his debts,
but he does acquire the right to accept and assume or to renounce the executory agreements of the bankrupt as he may
deem most advantageous to the estate he is administering. and
the parties to those contracts which he assumes are still liable to
perform them. And so, throughout the entire field of con-
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tractual obligations, the adjudication in bankruptcy absolves

from no agreement, terminates no contract, and discharges no

liability. In re Curtis, 9 Am. Bankr. Rep. 286, 109 La. 171, 33

South. 125; In re Ells (D. C.) 98 Fed. 967, 968; Witthaus v.

Zimmerman, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 314, 315, 91 App. Div. 202,

86 N. Y. Supp. 315; White v. Griffing, 44 Conn. 437, 446, 447;

In re Pennewell, 119 Fed. 139, 55 C C. A. 571."

It will be seen from the foregoing that the conclusion reached

in this case of Watson v. Merrill was that claims for future rent,

and probably, from the language used in the opinion, for future

personal services, are not provable in bankruptcy, though the

reason given therefor is entirely different from that given in

the other cases. According to this last opinion contracts such

as those in question here will remain of force and unaffected by

the bankruptcy proceedings. Bailey v. Loeb, 2 Fed. Cas. 376,

was decided under the act of 1867 by Circuit Judge Wood, after-

wards a Justice of the Supreme Court. An extract from the

opinion in that case will show the view that Judge Wood enter-

tained of the matter, as follows:

"For instance, a business man has a manager or bookkeeper

hired by the year, at a salary payable quarterly. At the end of

two months he is adjudicated bankrupt. His manager or book-
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keeper may prove for a proportionate part of his salary up to

the time of the bankruptcy, but he cannot prove for any part

that may accrue and fall due after the bankruptcy. The clear

purpose of the bankruptcy act is to cut off all claims for rent

to accrue, or for services to be rendered, after the date of the

bankruptcy."

The fact that this decision by Judge Wood was under the

bankruptcy act of 1867 strengthens it as an authority, because

it is generally conceded that the bankruptcy act of 1867 was

more liberal as to the proof of claims for contingent liabilities

than is the present act. In Malcomson v. Wappoo Mills et al.

(C. C.) 88 Fed. 680, Judge Simonton held that:

"Damages are not recoverable against a corporation for its

failure to perform a contract for the sale and delivery of mer-

chandise, where performance was prevented solely by the action

of a court in appointing a receiver for the corporation, and en-

joining all others from interfering with its business or property.

In such cases the breach of contract is damnum absque injuria."

It seems clear to me that adjudication in bankruptcy ends

contracts for rent, and for personal services, and I agree with

tractual obligations, the adjudication in bankruptcy absolves
from no agreement, terminates no contract, and discharges no
liability. In re Curtis, 9 Am. Bankr. Rep. 286, 109 La. 171, 33
South. 125; In re Ells (D. C.) 98 Fed. 967, 968; Witthaus v.
Zimme:r:man, 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 314, 315, 91 App. Div. 202,
86 N. Y. Supp. 315; White v. Griffing, 44 Conn. 437, 446, 447;
In re Pennewell, 119 Fed. 139, 55 ·C. C. A. 571."
It will be seen from the foregoing that the conclusion reached
in this case of 'Vatson v. ·Merrill was that ~laims for future rent,
and probably, from the language used in the opinion, for future
personal services, are not provable in bankruptcy, though the
reason given therefor is entirely different from that given in
the other cases. According to this last opinion contracts such
as those in question here will remain of force and unaffected by
the bankruptcy proceedings. Bailey v. Loeb, 2 Fed. Cas. 376,
was decided under the act of 1867 by Circuit Judge Wood, afterwards a Justice of the Supreme Court. An extract from the
opinion in that case will show the view that Judge Wood entertained of the matter, as follows:
''For instance, a business man has a manager or bookkeeper
hired by the year, at a salary payable quarterly. At the end of
two months he is adjudicated bankrupt. His manager or bookkeeper may prove for a proportionate part of his salary up to
the time of the bankruptcy, but he cannot prove for any part
that may accrue and fall due after the bankruptcy. The clear
purpose of the bankruptcy act is to cut off all claims for rent
to accrue, or for services to be rendered, after the date of the
bankruptcy.''
The fact that this decision by Judge Wood was under the
bankruptcy act of 1867 strengthens it as an authority, because
it is generally oonceded that the bankruptcy act of 1867 was
more liberal as to the proof of claims for contingent liabilities
than is the present act. In Malcomson v. Wappoo Mills et al.
(C. C.) 88 Fed. 680, Judge Simonton held that:
''Damages are not recoverable against a corporation for its
failure to perform a contract for the sale and delivery of merchandise, where performance was prevented solely by the action
of a court in appointing a receiver for the corporation, and enjoining all others from interfering with its busine,ss or property.
In such cases the breach of contract is damnum absque injuria."
It seems clear to me that adjudication in bankruptcy ends
eontract.s for rent, and for personal services, and I agree with
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the views expressed in the opinions in In re Jefferson, supra,

Bray v. Cohb, supra, In re Hayes, Foster & Ward Company,

supra, and Malcomson v. Wappoo Mills et al., supra. The case

of James Dunlap Carpet Company (D. C.) 163 Fed. 541, is a

case favorable to the contention of the claimants here to the

extent of allowing proof of claim. The difficulty about the case

to my mind is that the learned judge based his decision on Moch

v. Market Street National Bank, 107 Fed. 897, 47 C. C. A. 49.

In the case of Moch v. National Bank the person seeking to

prove had indorsed for the bankrupt and the paper matured

after the bankruptcy proceedings were instituted. The indorser

paid the paper, and then proposed to prove it as a debt against

the bankrupt in the bankruptcy proceedings. I can see no similar-

ity at all between such a case and the case of an employe seek-

ing to prove for salary to be earned by services to be rendered

in the future. The indorsement in the Moch Case was a definite

and fixed liability which the indorser had undertaken for the

bankrupt, and it was in existence before the bankruptcy pro-

ceedings commenced. It matured, and the indorser was com-

pelled to pay the debt pending the bankruptcy proceedings. This

is entirely different from a contract to render personal services.

Such services depend upon the life, health, and ability other-
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wise of the employe to render the services, and also upon the

life, certainty, and perhaps other contingencies as to the em-

ployer. But it is a partnership in bankruptcy here, and what-

ever is true as to individual cases there would seem to be no

doubt, first, that a partnership is dissolved by the bankruptcy

proceedings (22 Am. & English Cyclopedia of Law [2d ed.]

202, and 30 Cyc. 654, and cases cited in both); and, second, if

the firm is dissolved by operation of law, then certainly the

contracts of that firm are ended.

In Griggs v. Swift, 82 Ga. 392, 9 S. E. 1062, 5 L. R. A. 405,

14 Am. St. Rep. 176, it is held in the opinion by Chief Justice

Bleckley:

"From the very nature of a contract for the rendering of

personal services to a partnership in its current business, where

nothing is expressed to the contrary, both parties should be re-

garded as having by implication intended a condition dependent

on the one hand upon the life of the employe, and, on the other,

upon the life of the partnership, provided the death in either

case was not voluntary."

the views expressed in the opinions in In re Jefferson, supra,
Bray v. Cobb, supra, In re Hayes, Foster & Ward Company,
supra, and Malcomson v. Wappoo Mills et al., supra. The case
of James Dunlap Carpet Company (D. C.) 163 Fed. 541, is a
case favorable to the contention of the claimants here to the
extent of allowing proof of claim. The difficulty about the case
to my mind is that the learned judge based his decision on Moch
v. l\Iarket Street National Bank, 107 Fed. 897, 47 C. C. A. 49.
In the case of Moch v. National Bank the person seeking to
•
prove had indorsed for the bankrupt and the paper matured
after the bankruptcy proceedings were instituted. The indorsl'r
paid the paper, and then proposed to prove it as a debt against
the bankrupt in the bankruptcy proceedings. I can see no similarity at all between such a case and the case of an employe seeking to prove for salary to be earned by services to be rendered
in the future. The indorsement in the Moch Case was a definite
and fixed liability which the indorser had undertaken for the
bankrupt, and it was in existence before the bankruptcy proceedings commenced. It matured, and the indorser was compelled to pay the debt pending the bankruptcy proceedings. This
is entirely different from a contract to render personal services.
Such servicl's depend upon the life, hl'alth, and ability otherwise of the employe to render the services, and also upon the
life, certainty, and perhaps other contingencies as to the employer. But it is a partnership in bankruptcy here, and whatever is true as to individual cases there would seem to be no
doubt, first, that a partnership is dissolved by the bankruptcy
proceedings (22 Am. & English Cyclopedia of Law [2d ed.]
202, and 30 Cyc. 654, and cases cited in both) ; and, second, if
the firm is dissolved by operation of law, then certainly the
contracts of that firm are ended.
In Griggs v. Swift, 82 Ga. 392, 9 S. E. 1062, 5 L. R. A. 405,
14 Am. St. Rep. 176, it is held in the opinion by Chief Justice
Bleckley:
"From the very nature of a contract for the ren<lering of
personal services to a partnership in its current business, where
nothing is expressed to the contrary, both parties should be regarded as having by implication intended a condition dependent
on the one hand upon the life of the employe, and, on the other,
upon the life of the partnership, provided the death in either
case was not voluntary."
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Wood on Master and Servant, § 163, is then quoted with ap-

proval to the following effect:

"'Where a servant is employed by a firm, a dissolution of

the firm dissolves the contract, so that a servant is absolved

therefrom; but, if the dissolution results from the act of the

parties, they are liable to the servant for his loss therefrom, but,

if the dissolution results from the death of a member of the

firm, the dissolution resulting by operation of law, and not from

the act of the parties, no action for damages will lie. • • •

So, if a firm consists of two or more persons, and one or more

of them dies, but the firm is not thereby dissolved, the contract

still subsists, because one or more of his partners is still in the

firm, and this is so even though other persons are taken into

the firm. The test is whether the firm is dissolved. So long as

it exists, the contract is in force, but, when it is dissolved, the

contract is dissolved with it, and the question as to whether dam-

ages can be recovered therefor will depend upon the question

whether the dissolution resulted from the act of God, the opera-

tion of law, or the act of the parties.'"

None of the cases cited from the United States Courts seem

to bear directly upon the question immediately involved here—

that is, of the right of an employe to prove for future services—
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except, perhaps, the case of James Dunlap Carpet Company,

supra, and with the utmost respect for the learned judge decid-

ing the case I am, for the reason stated above, unable to agree

with his conclusion. I have, perhaps, cited authorities at un-

necessary length, but the question is an interesting one, and is

presented in its present shape for the first time in this district.

I do not believe that it was the intention and purpose of the

bankruptcy act that contracts extending into the future for

rent and personal services should be left hanging over the

bankrupt to embarrass and harass him after his discharge in

bankruptcy. It is said that if this is not true, and he is relieved

of such liability by the bankruptcy act, it follows that claims

for such rent and personal service should be admitted to proof

in the bankruptcy proceedings. I do not think this follows at

all. The adjudication in bankruptcy ends all such contracts.

Of course, proof may be allowed for any amount due prior to

the institution of the proceedings in bankruptcy. It is provided

by the bankruptcy act that for most personal services the em-

ploye would have priority for any amount due him for as much

as three months preceding the bankruptcy proceedings. This

Wood on Master and Servant, § 163, is then quoted with approval to the following effect:
" 'Where a servant is employed by a firm, a dissolution of
the firm dissolves the contract, so that a servant is absolved
therefrom; but, if the dissolution results from the act of the
parties, they are liable to the servant for his loss therefrom, but,
if the dissolution results from the death of a member of the
firm, the dissolution resulting by operation of law, and not from
the act of the parties, no action for damages will lie. • • •
So, if a firm consists of two or more persons, and one or more
of them dies, but the firm is not thereby dissolved, the contract
still subsists, because one or more of his partners is still in the
firm, and this is so even though other persons are taken into
the firm. The test is whether the firm is dissolved. So long as
it exists. the contract is in force, but, when it is dissolved, the
contract is dissolved with it, and the question as to whether damages can be recovered therefor will depend upon the question
whether the dissolution resulted from the act of God, the operation of law, or the act of the parties.' "
None of the cases cited from the United States Courts seem
to bear directly upon the question immediately involved here-that is, of the right of an employe to prove for future services-except, perhaps, the case of James Dunlap Carpet Company,
supra, and with the utmost respect for the learned judge deciding the case I am, for the reason stated above, unable to agree
with his conclusion. I have, perhaps, cited authorities at unnecessary length, but the question is an interesting one, and is
presented in its present shape for the first time in this district.
I do not believe that it was the intention and purpose of the
bankruptcy act that contracts extending into the future for
rent and personal services should be left hanging over the
bankrupt to embarrass and harass him after his discharge in
bankruptcy. It is said that if this is not true, and he is relieved
of sueh liability by the bankruptcy act, it follows that claims
for such rent and personal service should be admitted to proof
in the bankruptcy proceedings. I do not think this follows at
all. The adjudication in bankruptcy ends all such contracts.
Of course, proof may he allowed for auy amount due prior· to
the institution of the proceedings in bankruptcy. It is provided
hy the bankruptcy act that for most personal services the employe would have priority for any amount due him for as much
as three mouths preceding the bankruptcy proceedings. This
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fact of priority of payment for three months extending to so

large a class of employes is another reason why I believe it was *

the intention, in passing this act, that such contracts should

terminate with the adjudication in bankruptcy. All this is cer-

tainly true as. to a partnership. The adjudication dissolves it

by operation of law, and that dissolution ends all its liabilities

except such aa are expressed in the act.

My conclusion is that the referee in bankruptcy correctly de-

cided that this claim should not be admitted to proof.18

D. Secured Claims

SEXTON v. DREYFUS et al.

219 U. S. 339, 55 L. ed. 244, 31 Sup. Ct. 256

fact of priority of payment for three months extending to so
large a class of employes is another reason why I believe it was
the intention, in passing this act, that such contracts should
terminate with the adjudication in bankruptcy. All this is certainly true as. to a partnership. The adjudication dissolves it
by operation of law, and that dissolution ends all its liabilities
except such as are expressed in the act.
My conclusion is that the referee in bankruptcy correctly decided that this claim should not be admitted to proof. 1•

(United States Supreme Court, January 23, 1911)

Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court:

In both of these cases, secured creditors, selling their se-

D.

SECURED CLAlllS

curity some time after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,

and finding the proceeds not enough to pay the whole amount

SEXTON v. DREYFUS et al.

of their claims, were allowed by the referee to apply the pro-

ceeds first to interest accrued since the filing of the petition,

219 U.S. 339, 55 L. ed. 244, 31 Sup. Ct. 256

then to principal, and to prove for the balance. The referee

certified the question whether the creditors had a right to the

interest. The district judge answered the question in the affirm-
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ative, giving the matter a very thorough and persuasive dis-

cussion, and declining to follow the English rule. Re Kessler,

171 Fed. 751. On appeal, his decision was affirmed by a ma-

jority of the Circuit Court of Appeals. 180 Fed. 979.

The argument certainly is strong. A secured creditor could

apply his security to interest first when the parties were solv-

ent (Story v. Livingston, 13 Pet. 359, 371, 10 L. ed. 200, 206),

and liens are not affected by the statute. § 67d [30 Stat. at L.

564, c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3449]. The law is not

intended to take away any part of the security that a creditor

may have, as it would seem at first sight to do if the course

adopted below were not followed. Some further countenance to

that course is thought to be found in § 57h, which provides that

16—See In re James Dunlap Car-

pet Co., 163 Fed. 541; In re D.

Levy & Sons Co., 208 Fed. 479.

(United States Supreme Court, January 23, 1911)
Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court:
In both of these cases, secured creditors, selling their security some time after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,
and finding the proceeds not enough to pay the whole amount
of their claims, were allowed by the referee to apply the proceeds first to interest accrued since the filing of the petition,
then to principal, and to prove for the balance. The referee
certified the question whether the creditors had a right to the
interest. The district judge answered the question in the affirmative, giving the matter a very thorough and persuasive discussion, and declining to follow the English rule. Re Kessler,
171 Fed. 751. On appeal, his decision was affirmed by a majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals. 180 Fed. 979.
The argument certainly is strong. A secured creditor could
apply his security to interest first when the parties were solvent (Story v. Livingston, 13 Pet. 359, 371, 10 L. ed. 200, 206),
and liens are not affected by the statute. § 67d [30 Stat. at L.
564, c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3449]. The law is nC>t
intended to take away any part of the security that a creditor
msy have, aa it would seem at first sight to do if the course
adopted below were not followed. Some further countenance to
that course is thought to be found in § 57k, which provides that
16-See In re James Dunlap Car·
pet Co., 163 Fed. 541; In re D.
Levy & Sona Co., 208 Fed. 479.
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the value of securities shall be determined by converting them

into money "according to the terms of the agreement," for it

is urged that, by construction, the right to apply them to in-

terest is as much part of the agreement as if it had been written

in. Nevertheless, it seems to us that, on the whole, the considera-

tions on the other side are stronger and must prevail.

"For more than a century and a half the theory of the English

bankrupt system has been that everything stops at a certain

date. Interest was not computed beyond the date of the com-

mission. Ex parte Bennet, 2 Atk. 527. This rule was applied

to mortgages as well as to unsecured debts (Ex parte Wardell,

1787; Ex parte Hercy, 1792, 1 Cooke, Bankrupt Laws, 4th ed.

181 [1st ed. Appx.]); and notwithstanding occasional doubts,

it has been so applied with the prevailing assent of the English

judges ever since (Ex parte Badger, 4 Ves. Jr. 165; Ex parte

Ramsbottom, 2 Mont. & A. 79; Ex parte Penfold, 4 De G. & S.

282; Ex parte Lubbock, 9 Jur. N. S. 854; Re Savin, L. R. 7 Ch.

760, 764; Ex parte Bath, L. R. 22 Ch. Div. 450, 454; Quarter-

maine's Case [1892] 1 Ch. 639; Re Bonacino, 1 Manson, 59).

As appears from Cooke, supra, the rule was laid down not be-

cause of the words of the statute, but as a fundamental principle.

We take our bankruptcy system from England, and we naturally
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assume that the fundamental principles upon which it was ad-

ministered were adopted by us when we copied the system,

somewhat as the established construction of a law goes with the

words where they are copied by another state. No one doubts

that interest on unsecured debts stops. See § 63 (1). Shawnee

County v. Hurley, 94 C. C. A. 362, 169 Fed. 92, 94.

The rule is not unreasonable when closely considered. It

simply fixes the moment when the affairs of the bankrupt are

supposed to be wound up. If, as in a well-known illustration

of Chief Justice Shaw's (Parks v. Boston, 15 Pick. 198, 208),

the whole matter could be settled in a day by a pie-powder court,

the secured creditor would be called upon to sell or have his

security valued on the spot, would receive a dividend upon that

footing, would suffer no injustice, and could not complain. If,

under § 57 of the present act, the value of the security should

be determined by agreement or arbitration, the time for fixing

it naturally would be the date of the petition. At that moment

the creditors acquire a right in rem against the assets. Chem-

ical Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 28 L. R. A. 231, 8 C. C. A. 155, 16

U. S. App. 465, 59 Fed. 372, 378, 379; Merrill v. National

the value of securities shall be determined by converting them
into money "according to the terms of the agreement," for it
is urged that, by construction, the right to apply them to intt•rcst is as much part of the agreement as if it had been written
in. Nevertheless, it seems to us that, on the whole, the considerations on the other side are stronger and must prevail.
· J<"'or more than a century and a half the theory of the English
bankrupt system has been that everything stops at a certain
date. Interest was not computed beyond the date of the commission. Ex parte Bennet, 2 Atk. 527. This rule was applied
to mortgages as well as to unsecured debts (Ex parte Wardell,
1787; Ex parte Hercy, 1792, 1 Cooke, Bankrupt Laws, 4th ed.
181 [1st ed. Appx.]) ; and notwithstanding occasional doubts,
it has been so applied with the prevailing assent of the English
judges ever since (Ex parte Badger, 4 Ves. Jr. 165; Ex part.e
Ramsbottom, 2 Mont. & A. 79; Ex parte Penfold, 4 De G. & S.
282; Ex parte Lubbock, 9 Jur. N. S. 854; Re Savin, L. R. 7 Ch.
760, 764; Ex parte Bath, L. R. 22 Ch. Div. 450, 454; Quartermaine 's Case [ 1892] 1 Ch. 639; Re Bonacino, 1 Manson, 59).
As appears from Cooke, supra, the rule was laid down not because of the words of the statute, but as a fundamental principle.
\Ye take our bankruptcy system from England, and we naturally
assume that the fundamental principles upon which it was administered were adopted by us when we copied the system,
somewhat as the established construction of a law goes with the
words where they are copied by another state. No one doubts
that interest on unsecured debts stops. See § 63 ( 1). Shawnee
County v. Hurley, 94 C. C. A. 362, 169 Fed. 92, 94.
The rule is not unreasonable when closely considered. It
simply fixes the moment when the affairs of the bankrupt are
impposed to be wound up. If, as in a well-known illustration
of Chief Justice Shaw's (Parks v. Boston, 15 Pick. 198, 208),
the whole matter could be settled in a day by a pie-powder court,
the secured creditor would be called upon to sell or have his
security valued on the spot, would receive a dividend upon that
footing, would suffer no injustice, and could not complain. If,
under § 57 of the present act, the value of the security should
be determined by agreement or arbitration, the time for fixing
it naturally would be the date of the petition. At that moment
the creditors acquire a right in rem against the assets. Chemical Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 28 L. R. A. 231, 8 C. C. A. 155, 16
U. S. App. 465, 59 Fed. 372, 378, 379; Merrill v. National
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Bank, 173 U. S. 131, 140, 43 L. ed. 640, 643, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep.

360. When there is delay in selling because of the hope of get-

ting a higher price, it is more for the advantage of the secured

creditor than of any one else, as he takes the whole advance,

and the others only benefit by a percentage, which does not

seem a good reason for allowing him to prove for interest by

indirection. Whenever the creditor proves, his security may

be cut short. That is the necessarily possible result of bank-

ruptcy. The rule under discussion fixes the moment in all cases

at the date [on] which the petition is filed; but beyond the fact

of being compelled to realize his security and look for a new in-

vestment, there is no other invasion of the secured creditor's

contract rights, and that invasion is the same in kind what-

ever moment may be fixed.

It is suggested that the right of a creditor having security

for two claims, one provable and the other unprovable, to mar-

shal his security against the unprovable claim (see Hiscock v.

Varick Bank, 206 U. S. 28, 37, 51 L. ed. 945, 951, 27 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 681), is inconsistent with the rule applied in this case. But

that right is not affected by fixing a time for winding up, and

the bankruptcy law does not touch securities otherwise than in

this unavoidable particular. The provision in § 57ft for con-
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verting securities into money according to the terms of the

agreement has no appreciable bearing on the question. Apart

from indicating, in accordance with § 67d, that liens are not to

be affected, it would seem rather to be intended to secure the

right of the trustees and general creditors in cases where the

security may be worth more than the debt. The view that we

adopt is well presented in the late Judge Lowell's work on Bank-

ruptcy, § 419; seems to have been entertained in Coder v. Arts,

15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 372, 82 C. C. A. 91, 152 Fed. 943, 950

(affirmed without touching this point, 213 U. S. 223, 53 L. ed.

772, 29 Sup. Ct . Rep. 436, 16 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1008), and is

somewhat sustained by analogy in the case of insolvent banks

Merrill v. National Bank, supra; White v. Knox, 111 U. S. 784,

787, 28 L. ed. 603, 604, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 686).

Interest and dividends accrued upon some of the securities

after the date of the petition. The English cases allow these

to. be applied to the after-accruing interest upon the debt. Ex

parte Ramsbottom; Ex parte Penfold; and Quartcrmaine's

Case,—supra. There is no more reason for allowing the bank-

rupt estate to profit by the delay beyond the day of settlement

H. & A. Bankruptcy—30

Bank, 173 U. S. 131, H·O, 43 L. e<l. 640, 643, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep.
360. 'Vhen there is delay in selling because of the hope of getting a higher price, it is more for the advantage of the secured
creditor than of any one else, as he takes the whole advance,
and the others only benefit by a percentage, which does not
seem a good reason for allowing him to prove for interest by
indirection. Whenever the creditor proves, his security may
be cut short. That is the necessarily possible result of bankruptcy. The rule under discussion fixes the moment in all cases
at the date [on] which the petition is filed; but beyond the fact
of being compelled to realize his security and look for a new investment, there is no other invasion of the secured creditor's
contract rights, and that invasion is the same in kind whatewr moment may be fixed.
It is suggested that the right of a creditor having security
for two claims, one provable and the other unprovable, to marshal his security against the unprovable claim (see Hiscock v.
Varick Bank, 206 U. S. 28, 37, 51 L. ed. 945, 951, 27 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 681), is inconsistent with the rule applied in this case. But
that right is not affected by fixing a time for winding up, and
the bankruptcy law does not touch securities otherwise than in
this unavoidable particular. The provision in § 57k for converting securities into money according to the terms of the
agreement has no appreciable bearing on the question. Apart
from indicating, in accordance with § 61d, that liens are not to
be affected, it would seem rather to be intended to secure the
right of the trustees and general creditors in cases where the
security may be worth more than the debt. The view that we
adopt is well presented in the late Judge Lowell's work on Bankruptcy, § 419; seems to have been entertained in Coder v. Arts,
15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 372, 82 C. C. A. 91, 152 Fed. 943, 950
(affirmed without touching this point, 213 U. S. 223, 53 L. ed.
772, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436, 16 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1008), and is
s:lmewhat sustained by analogy in the case of insolvent banks
' :\[errill v. National Bank, supra; White v. Knox, 111 U. S. 784,
7Si, 28 L. ed. 603, 604, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 686).
Interest and dividends accrued upon some of the S'!l'Urities
sifter the date of the petition. The English cast•s allow th1'se
to be applied to the after-accruing interest upon the debt. Ex
parte Ramsbottom; Ex parte Penfold; and Quartcrmaiue 's
Case,-supra. There is no more reason for allowing the bankrupt estate to profit by the delay beyond the day of settlement
H. 6 A. B&nkruptc:r-80
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than there is for letting the creditors do so. Therefore to apply

these subsequent dividends, etc., to subsequent interest, seems

just.

Decrees reversed.

than there is for letting the creditors do so. Therefore to &ppl.y
these subsequent dividends, etc., to subsequent int.erest, aeema
just.
l)ecrees reversed.

E. Claims Having Priority

In re ROUSE, HAZARD & CO.

91 Fed. 96, 33 C. C. A. 356

E. Cw.ius HAVJNO

PB101UTY

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. January 3, 1899)

JENKINS, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

In re ROUSE, HAZARD & CO.

* * * It appears that on the 1st day of November, 1898,

an involuntary petition was filed in the court below against

91 Fed. 96, 33 C. C. A. 356

Rouse, Hazard & Co., a corporation existing under the laws of

the state of Illinois, and that on the 11th day of November,

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. January 3, 1899)

1898, that corporation was adjudicated a bankrupt; that on the

5th day of November, 1898, a petition was filed in the court

below by a large number of workmen, laborers, and servants

of Rouse, Hazard & Co., asking for the payment of their labor

claims accruing to them prior to the filing of the petition, and

that such claims be awarded priority in payment out of the

bankrupt's estate. Rouse, Hazard & Co., on the 31st day of

August, 1898, suspended business, its property on that date

being seized by the sheriff of Peoria county, Ill., under execu-
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tions issued upon judgments rendered against the corporation

in the courts of the state of Illinois, and such property remained

in the possession of the sheriff until it was sold by him, and the

proceeds, under order of the bankrupt court, turned over to

the temporary receiver appointed under the bankruptcy pro-

ceedings. The labor claims in question accrued within three

months prior to August 31, 1898, the date upon which the cor-

poration bankrupt suspended business by reason of the levy of

the executions, none of the services for which payment was sought

being rendered after that date. Specific objections were filed by

certain general creditors to the allowance of priority of pay-

ment of these claims, and upon the hearing in the bankruptcy

court it was ordered that the claims for wages as shown by the

receiver's report be approved as preferred claims, not exceeding

by any one claimant the sum of $300, and that such claims

should be paid out of the bankrupt's estate in preference and

priority to the general creditors. It is this direction for the pay-

JENKINS, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.
• • • It appears that on the 1st day of November, 1898,
an involuntary petition was filed in the court below against
Rouse, Hazard & Co., a corporation existing under the laws of
the state of Illinois, and that on the 11th day of November,
1898, that corporation was adjudicated a bankrupt; that on the
5th day of November, 1898, a petition was filed in the court
below by a large number of workmen, laborers, and servants
of Rouse, Hazard & Co., asking for the payment of their labor
cJaims accruing to them prior to the filing of the petition, and
that such claims be awarded priority in payment out of the
bankrupt's estate. Rouse, Hazard & Co., on the 31st day of
August, 1898, suspended business, its property on that date
being seized by the sheriff of Peoria county, Ill., under executions issued upon judgm<'nts rendered against the corporation
in the courts of the state of Illinois, and such property remained
in the possession of the sheriff until it was sold by him, and the
proceeds, under order of the bankrupt court, turned over to
the temporary receiver appointed under the bankruptcy proceedings. The labor claims in question accrued within three
months prior to August 31, 1898, the date upon which the corporation bankrupt suspended business by reason of the levy of
the executions, none of the services for which payment was sought
being rendered after that date. Specific objections were filed by
certain general creditors to the allowance of priority of payment of these claims, and upon the hearing in the bankruptcy
court it was ordered that the claims for wages as shown by the
receiver's report be approved as preferred claims, not excooding
by any one claimant the sum of $300, and that such claims
should be paid out of the bankrupt's estate in preference and
priority to the general creditors. It is this direction for the pay-
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ment of labor claims in priority to the general creditors that is

asked to be reviewed here as a question of law.

The bankrupt law (c. 7, § 646) provides that:

'' The debts to have priority, except as herein provided, and to

be paid in full out of the bankrupt's estate, and the order of pay-

ment shall be * • * (4) wages due to workmen, clerks or

servants which have been earned within three months before the

date of the commencement of proceedings, not to exceed $300 to

each claimant. (5) Debts owing to any person, who by the laws

of the states, or of the United States, is entitled to priority.''

The laws of the state of Illinois with respect to voluntary

assignments provides (Rev. St. Ill. 1898, p. 172, c. 10, § 6):

"That all claims for the wages of any laborer or servant, which

have been earned within the term of three months next preceding

the making of such assignment, and which have been filed within

said term of three months after such assignment, and to which no

exception has been made, or to which exception has been made

and the same having been adjudicated and settled by the court,

shall, after the payment of the costs, commissions and expenses

of assignment, be preferred, and first paid to the exclusion of all

other demands and claims.''

By c. 38a, p. 629, Rev. St. Ill. 1898, it is provided:

"That hereafter, when the business of any person, corporation,
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company or firm shall be suspended by the action of creditors, or

be put into the hands of a receiver or trustee, then in all such

cases the debts owing to laborers and servants which have accrued

by reason of their labor or employment, shall be considered and

treated as preferred claims, and such laborers or employes shall

be preferred creditors, and shall be first paid in full, and if there

shall not be sufficient to pay them in full the same shall be paid

from the proceeds of the sale of the property seized.''

• •••••«••

Coming, then, to the merits, it may be remarked by way of

preface that the several provisions of the law of the state of Illi-

nois with respect to the priority of payment to be allowed labor

claims are not altogether consistent. In the case of voluntary as-

signments, the claim of the laborer which is preferred must have

accrued within three months next preceding the making of the

assignment. In the case of a suspension of business by action of

creditors there is neither limit as to time nor as to amount. The

reason of the distinction is not easy to understand. It is also to

be observed that the Bankrupt Court whose order is here under

ment of labor claims in priority to the general creditors that is
asked to be reviewed here as a question of law.
The bankrupt law (c. 7, § 64b) provides that:
"The debts to have priority, except as herein provided, and to
be paid in full out of the bankrupt's estate, and the order of payment shall be • • • ( 4) wages due to workmen, clerks or
servants which have been earned within three months before the
date of the commencement of proceedings, not to exceed $300 to
each claimant. (5) Debts owing to any person, who by the laws
of the st.ates, or of the United States, is entitled to priority.''
The laws of the state of Illinois with respect to voluntary
assignments provides (Rev. St. Ill. 1898, p. 172, c. 10, § 6):
"That all claims for the wages of any laborer or servant, which
have been earned within the term of three months next preceding
the making of such assignment, and which have been filed within
said term of three months after such assignment, and to which no
exception has been made, or to which exception has been made
and the same having been adjudicated and settled by the court,
shall, after the payment of the costs, commissions and expenses
of assignment, be preferred, and first paid to the exclusion Qf all
other demands and claims. ''
By c. 38a, p. 629, Rev. St. Ill. 1898, it is provided:
''That hereafter, when the business of any person, corporation,
company or firm shall be suspended by the action of creditors, or
be put into the hands of a receiver or trustee, then in all such
cases the debts owing to laborers and servants which have accrued
by reason of their labor or employment, shall be considered and
treated as preferred claims, and such laborers or employes shall
be preferred creditors, and shall be first paid in full, and if there
shall not be sufficient to pay them in full the same shall be paid
from the proceeds of the sale of the property seized.''

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Coming, then, to the merits, it may be remarke<l by way of
preface that the several provisions of the law of the state of Illinois with respect to the priorit~,. of payment to be allowed labor
claims are not altogether consistent. In the case of voluntary assignments, the claim of the la borer which is preferred must have
accrued within three months next preceding the making of the
assignment. In the case of a suspension of business by action of
creditors there is neither limit as to time nor as to amount. The
reason of the distinct.ion is not easy to understand. It is also to
be observed that the Bankrupt Court whose order is here under
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review proceeded upon the theory that § 646, cl. 4, applied as to

the amount, but did not apply as to time. Singularly enough,

priority of payment of claims was allowed upon the theory that

the provision of § 646, cl . 5, governed, and that, notwithstanding

the previous provision, wherever the laws of a state granted

priority with respect to payment of labor claims, those laws must

be recognized and followed. Yet here the Bankrupt Court has

allowed priority with respect to these claims without regard to

limitation of time, but has imposed the limitation of the bankrupt

act with respect to amount when the law of the state under which

priority was allowed contains no such limitation.

The question here is one of construction of the bankrupt law

of the United States, and is this: whether the congress, having

spoken by a particular provision (§ 646, cl. 4) with respect to the

priority to be allowed labor claimants, and having subsequently

in the same act (§ 646, cl. 5) spoken generally with respect to

the recognition of the priorities allowed by the laws of the state

or the United States, the latter general provision overrides or en- .

larges the prior special provision. The bankrupt act, by its

terms, went into full force and effect upon its passage, July 1,

1898, and * • * was operative from the date of its passage,

and was effective from that date to supersede the insolvency laws
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of the several states. Manufacturing Co. v. Hamilton (Mass.) 51

N. E. 529; Blake v. Francis-Valentine Co., 89 Fed. 691; In re

Bruss-Ritter Co. (E. D. Wis.) 90 Fed. 651. • • • What was

the real intention of the congress as expressed in clauses 4 and 5

of § 646? In the first clause congress addresses itself to the sub-

ject of labor claims, and particularly provides that all wages that

have been earned within three months before the date of the com-

mencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, not to exceed $300 to

each claimant, shall be awarded priority of payment. It recog-

nized, it must be assumed, the various provisions of law in the

several states with respect to this subject. It found them not to

be in harmony, and in some states—as, notably, Illinois—the laws

upon that subject not to be consistent with each other. It found

limitation as to time different in the different states. It found

that in some of the states priority of payment was unlimited as

to amount, and in some limited to so small a sum as $50. With

this divergence within its knowledge, the congress spoke to the

subject specially and particularly, and limited the amount to

$300, and, as to time, to wages earned within three months before

the commencement of proceedings. Can, then, the general pro-

review proceeded upon the theory that § 64b, cl. 4, applied as to
the amount, but did not apply as to time. ·Singularly enough,
priority of payment of claims was allowed upon the theory that
the provision of § 64b, cl. 5, governed, and that, notwitl1standing
the previous provision, wherever the laws of a state granted
priority with respect to payment of labor claims, those laws must
be recognized and followed. Yet here the Bankmpt Court has
allowed priority with respect to these claims without regard to
limitation of time, but has imposed the limitation of the bankrupt
act with respect. to amount when the law of the state under which
priority was allowed contains no such limitation.
The question here is· one of construction of the bankrupt Jaw
of the United States, and is this: whether the congress, having
spoken hy a particular provision ( § 64b, cl. 4) with respect to the
priority to be allowed labor claimants, and having subsequently
in the same act ( § 64b, cl. 5) spoken generally with respect to
the recognition of the priorities allowed by the laws of the state
or the United States, the latter general provision overrides or en- .
larges the prior special provision. The bankrupt act, by its
terms, went into full force and effect upon its passage, July 1,
1898, and • • • was operative from the date of its passage,
and was effective from that date to supersede the insolvency laws
of the several states. Manufacturing Co. v. Hamilton (Mass.) 51
N. E. 529; Blake v. E"'rancis-Valentine Co., 89 Fed. 691; In re
Bruss-Ritter Co. (E. D. Wis.) 90 Fed. 651. • • • What was
the real intention of the congress as expressed in clauses 4 and 5
of § 64b T In the first clause congress addresses itself to the subject of labor claims, and particularly provides that all wages t}1at
have been earned within three months before the date of the co\n.
mencement of proceedings in bankmptcy, not to exceed $300 to
each claimant, shall be awarded priority of payment. It recog.
nizcd, it must be assumed, the various provisions of law in the
several ste.tes with respect to this subject. It found them not to
be in harmony, and in some stateS:-as, notably, lllinois--the laws
upon that subject not to be consistent with each other. It found
limitation as to time different in the different states. It found
that in some of the states priority of payment was unlimited as
to amount, and in some limited to so small a sum as $50. With
this divergence within its knowledge, the congress spoke to the
subject specially and particularly, and limited the amount to
$300, and, as to time, to wages earned within three months before
the commencement of proceedings. Can, then, the general pro-
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vision of the law following immediately thereafter, allowing pri-

ority of payment for all debts owing to any person who, by the

laws of the states or the United States, is entitled to priority, be

held to enlarge the prior provision so that the statute should

be read that, in any event, the laborer should be entitled to pri-

ority of payment in respect of wages earned within three months

prior to proceedings, and in amount not exceeding $300, and

that wherever the laws of the state of the residence of the bank-

rupt grant the laborer priority of payment without limit as to

time or amount, or impose a limit in excess of that imposed by

the bankrupt act, he shall be entitled to a further priority in pay-

ment according to the law of the particular state? We think not.

It is not to be supposed:—unless the language of the act clearly

so speaks—that the congress intended that in the administration

of the act there should be a marked contrariety in the priority

of payment of labor claims dependent upon locality. It is an

elementary principle of construction that where there are in one

act or in several acts contemporaneously passed specific provisions

relating to a particular subject, they will govern in respect to

that subject as against general provisions contained in the same

act. See Suth. St. Const. § 158. Thus, in State v. Inhabitants of

Trenton, 38 N. J. Law, 67, it is said: "When the intention of
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the lawgiver, which is to be sought after in the interpretation of

a statute, is specifically declared in a prior section as to a par-

ticular matter, it must prevail over a subsequent clause in gen-

eral terms, which might, by construction, conflict with it. The

legislature must be presumed to have intended what it expressly

stated, rather than that which might be inferred from the use

of general terms." • * *

Our conclusion is that congress having spoken specifically to

the subject of priority of payment of labor claims, what it has

said upon that subject expresses the particular intent of the law-

making power, and that provision is not to be tolled or enlarged

by any general prior or subsequent provision in that act. That

which is given in particular is not affected by general words. So

that the statute providing for the priority of payment of debts

referred to in clause 5 must be construed to mean other debts

and different debts than those specified in clause 4. We are not

unmindful of the particular hardship which our conclusion, it

-is said, will work out here. It arises from the fact that under

the law proceedings in bankruptcy, except by voluntary act of

the bankrupt, could not be commenced in time to fully protect

vision of the law following immediately thereafter, allowing priority of payment for all debts owing to any person who, by the
laws of the states or the United States, is entitled to priority, be
held to enlarge the prior provision so that the statute should
be read that, in any event, the laborer should be entitled to priority of payment in respect of wages earned within three months
prior to proceedings, and in amount not exceeding $300, and
that wherever the laws of the state of the residence of the bankrupt grant the laborer priority of payment without limit as to
time or amount, or impose a limit in excess of that imposed by
the bankrupt act, he shall be entitled to a further priority in payment according to the law of the particular state T 'Ve think uot.
It is not to be supposed,..-unless the language of the act clenrly
so speaks--that the congress intended that in the administration
of the act there should be a marked contrariety in the priority
of payment of labor claims dependent upon locality. It is an
elementary principle of construction that where there are in one
act or in several acts contemporaneously passed specific provisions
relating to a particular subject, they will govern in respect to
that subject as against general provisions contained in the same
act. See Suth. St. Const. § 158. Thus, in State v. Inhabitants of
Trenton, 38 N. J. Law, 67, it is said: "\Vhen the intention of
the lawgiver, which is to be sought after in the interpretation of
a statute, is specifically declared in a prior section as to a particular matter, it must prevail over a subsequent clause in general terms, which might, by construction, conflict with it. The
legislature must be presumed to have intended what it expressly·
stated, rather than that which might be inferred from the use
of general terms.'' • • •
Our conclusion is that congress having spoken specifically to
the subject of priority of payment of labor claims, what it has
said upon that subject expresses the parti<'ular intent of the lawmaking power, and that provision is not to be tolled or enlarged
by any general prior or subsequent provision in that act. That
which is given in particular is not nffected by general words. So
that the statute providing for the priority of payment of debts
referred to in clause 5 must he construed to mean other debts
and different debts than those specified in clause 4. We are not
unmindful of the particular hardship which our conclusion, it
·is said, will work out here. It arises from the fact that under
the law proceedings in bankruptcy, except by voluntary act of
the bankrupt, could not be commenced in time to fully protect
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these labor claimants. We regret that this is so. It is a mis-

fortune arising from the provisions of the act, but to remedy

this particular wrong we cannot override a recognized canon

of construction of statute law.

The prayer of this petition must be allowed, and the order

of the District Court, * • • so far as it allows priority of

payment to labor claims which accrued prior to the 1st day of

August, 1898, must be set aside, and held for naught. • • •

SHROPSHIRE, WOODLIFF & CO. v. BUSH et al.

204 U. S. 186, 51 L. ed. 436, 27 Sup. Ct. 178

these labor claimants. We regret that this is so. It is a misfortune arising from the provisions of the act, but to remedy
this pall'ticular wrong we cannot override a recognized canon
of construction of statute law.
The prayer of this petition must be allowed, and the order
of the District Court, • • • so far as it allows priority of
payment to labor claims which accrued prior to the 1st day of
August, 1898, must be set aside, and held for naught. • • •

(United States Supreme Court. January 7, 1907)

Mr. Justice MOODY delivered the opinion of the court:

The appellees are trustees of the bankrupt estate of the

Southern Car & Foundry Company. The appellants, before the

SHROPSHIRE, WOODLIFF & CO. v. BUSH et al.

commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, acquired by

purchase and assignment a large number of claims for wages

204 U. S. 186, 51 L. ed. 436, 27 Sup. Ct. 178

of workmen and servants, none exceeding $300 in amount, and

all earned within three months before the date of the commence-

(United States Supreme Court. January 7, 1907)

ment of the proceedings in bankruptcy. The District Court

for the eastern district of Tennessee rendered a judgment dis-

allowing priority to these claims, because, when filed, they

were not "due to workmen, clerks, or servants."
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On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the sixth circuit

that court duly certified here for instructions the following ques-

tion:

"Is an assignee of a claim for wages earned within three

months before the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy

against the bankrupt debtor entitled to priority of payment, un-

der § 64 (4) of the bankrupt act, when the assignment occurred

prior to the commencement of such bankruptcy proceedings?"

The question certified has never been passed upon by any

Circuit Court of Appeals, and in the District Courts the decisions

upon it are conflicting. Re Westlund, 99 Fed. 399; Re St. Louis

Ice Mfg. & Storage Co., 147 Fed. 752; Re North Carolina Car Co.

[semble], 127 Fed. 178, where the right of the assignee to pri-

ority was denied; Re Brown, 4 Ben. 142, Fed. Cas. No. 1,97 J

[act of 1867, 14 Stat. at L. 517, c. 176]; He Harmons. 128 Fed.

170, where, on facts slightly but not essentially different, the

right of the assignee to priority was affirmed.

Mr. Justice MOODY delivered the opinion of the oourt:
The appellees are trustees of the bankrupt estate of the
Southern Car & Foundry Company. The appellants, before the
commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, acquired by
purchase and assignment a large number of elaims for wages
of workmen and servants, none exceeding $300 in amount, and
all earned within three months before the date of the commencement of the proceedings in bankrupfoy. The District Court
for the eastern district of Tennessee rendered a judgment disallowing priority to these claims, because, when filed, they
were not ''due to workmen, clerks, or servants.''
On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the sixth circuit
-that court duly certified here for instructions the following ques.
tion:
''Is an assignee of a claim for wages earned within three
months before the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy
against the bankrupt debtor entitled to priority of payment, under § 64 ( 4) of the bankrupt act, when the assignment <><:curred
prior to the commencement of such bankruptcy proceedings T''
The question certified has never been passed upon by any
Circuit Court of Appeals, and in the District Courts the decisions
upon it are conflicting. Re Westlund, 99 Fed. 399; Re St. Louis
Ice Mfg. & Storage Co., 147 Fed. 752; Re North Carolina Car Co.
[semble], 127 Fed. 178, where the right of the assignee to priority was denied: Re Brown, 4 Ben. 142, Fed. Ca.s. No. 1 ,97~
[act of 1867, 14 Stat. at L. 517, c. 176); Re Harmons. 128 Fed.
170, where, on facts slightly but not essentially different, the
right of the assignee to priority was affirmed.
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The bankruptcy law (act July 1, 1898, 30 Stat. at L. pp. 544, .

563, c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3447), in §1, defines

"debt" as including "any debt, demand, or claim, provable in

bankruptcy." § 64, under which priority is claimed in this case,

is, in the parts material to the determination of the question, as

follows:

"§ 64. Debts which have priority.— * • • b. The debts

to have priority, except as herein provided, and to be paid in

full, out of bankrupt estates and the order of payment, shall be

• • • (4) wages due to workmen, clerks, or servants

which have been earned within three months before the date of

the commencement of proceedings, not to exceed three hundred

dollars to each claimant; * • *"

The precise inquiry is whether the right of prior payment thus

conferred is attached to the person or to the claim of the wage-

earner; if to the person, it is available only to him; if to the

claim, it passes with the transfer to the assignee. In support of

the proposition that the right is personal to the wage-earner, and

enforceable only by him, it is argued that it is not wages earned

within the prescribed time which are given priority, but wages

"due to workmen, clerks, or servants;" that when the claim is

assigned to another it is no longer '' due to workmen, clerks, or
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servants,'' but to the assignee; and therefore, when presented by

him, lacks one of the characteristics which the law makes essen-

tial to priority. In this argument it is assumed that the wages

must be "due" to the earner at the time of the presentment of

the claim for proof, or, at least, at the time of the commencement

of the proceedings in bankruptcy. Without that assumption the

argument fails to support the conclusion. But the statute lends

no countenance to this assumption. It nowhere expressly or by

fair implication says that the wages must be due to the earner

at the time of the presentment of the claim, or of the beginning

of the proceedings, and we find no warrant for supplying such

a restriction. Regarding, then, the plain words of the statute,

and no more, they seem to be merely descriptive of the nature

of the debt to which priority is given. When one has incurred

a debt for wages due to workmen, clerks, or servants, that debt,

within the limits of time and amount prescribed by the act, is

entitled to priority of payment. The priority is attached to the

debt, and not to the person of the creditor; to the claim, and not

to the claimant. The act does not enumerate classes of creditors

and confer upon them the privilege of priority in payment, but,

The bankruptcy law (act July 1, 1898, 30 Stat. at L. pp. 544, ·
563, c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3447), in § 1, defines
''debt'' as including ''any debt, demand, or claim, provable in
bankruptcy." § 64, under which priority is claimed in this case,
is, in the parts material to the determination of the question, as
follows:
"§ 64. Debts which have priority.- • • • b. The debts
to have priority, except as herein provided, and to be paid in
full, out of bankrupt estates and the order of payment, shall be
• • • ( 4) wages due to workmen, clerks, or servants
which have been earned within three months before the date of
the commencement of proceedings, not to exceed three hundred
dollars to each claim.ant; • • • ''
The precise inquiry is whether the right of prior payment thus
conferred is attached to the person or to the claim of the wageearner; if to the person, it is available only to him; if to the
claim, it passes with the transfer to the assignee. In support of
the proposition that the right is personal to the wage-earner, and
enforceable only by him, it is argued that it is not wages earned
within the prescribed time which are given priority, but wages
''due to workmen, clerks, or servants;'' that when the claim is
assigned to another it is no longer ''due to workmen, clerks, or
servants," but to the assignee; and therefore, when presented by
him, lacks one of the characteristics which the law makes essential to priority. In this argument it is assumed that the wages
must be "due'' to the earner at the time of the presentment of
the claim for proof, or, at least, at the time of the commencement
of the proceedings in bankruptcy. 'Vithout that assumption the
argument fails to support the conclusion. But the statute lends
no countenance to this assumption. It nowhere expressly or by
fair implication says that the wages must be due to the earner
at the time of the presentment of the claim, or of the beginning
of the proceedings, and we find no warrant for supplying such
a restrietion. Regarding, then, the plain words of the statute,
and no more, they seem to be merely descriptive of the nature
of the deht to which priority is given. When one has incurred
a d1 ,bt for wages due to workmen, clerks, or servants, that debt,
within the limits of time and amount prescribed by the act, is
entitled to priority of payment. The priority is attache.d to the
debt, and not to the person of the creditor; to the claim, and not
to the claimant. The act does not enumerate classes of creditors
and confer upon them the privilege of priority in payment, but,

I

472

ADMI.N ISTRA'l'lUN

472 ADMINISTRATION

on the other hand, enumerates classes of debts as "the debts to

have priority."

In this case the Southern Car & Foundry Company had in-

curred certain debts for wages due to workmen, clerks, or

servants, which were earned within three months before the

date of the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy. These

debts were exactly within the description of those to which the

bankruptcy act gives priority of payment, and they did not cease

to be within that description by their assignment to another.

The character of the debts was fixed when they were incurred,

and could not be changed by an assignment. They were pre-

cisely of one of the classes of debts which the statute says are

"debts to have priority."

The question certified is answered in the affirmative, and it

is so ordered.

In re McDAVID LUMBER CO.

190 Fed. 97

(District Court, N. D. Florida. September 25, 1911)

SHEPPARD, District Judge. This cause comes here for

consideration on petition of Wm. F. Lee for review of the ruling

on the other hand, enumerates classes of debts as ''the de lits to
have priority.''
In this case the Southern Car & Foundry Compa11y had incurred certain debts for wages due to workmen, clerks, or
servants, which were earned within three months before the
date -Of the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy. These
debts were exactly within the description of those to which the
bankruptcy act gives priority of payment, and they did not cease
to be within that description by their assignment to another.
The character of the debts was fixed when they were incurred,
and could not be changed by an assignment. They were precisely of one of the classes of debts which the statute says are
"debts to have priority."
1'he question certified is answered in the affirmative, and it
is so ordered.

of C. L. Shine, Esq., referee in bankruptcy, and involves the

question of priority of liens attaching to the lumber and other

products of a sawmill plant in due course of administration in
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a court of bankruptcy.

In re McDA VID LUMBER CO.

The McDavid Lumber Company, bankrupt, was lately engaged

in manufacturing lumber and operated a large plant when pro-

190 Fed. 97

ceedings in bankruptcy were begun. The company was adju-

dicated a bankrupt in June, 1910. Wm. F. Lee was employed

(District Court, N. D. Florida. September 25, 1911)

as bookkeeper for the company, and by his petition before the

referee sought to declare his lien on the stock of lumber and

fixtures of the company for wages due him for the month of

April and a part of May, 1910, at the rate of $115 per month.

It is disclosed by the petition that the stock of lumber, the greater

portion of which was produced during Lee's employment, com-

prised the principal assets of the company. Three months prior

to Lee's employment, to wit, on January 10, 1910, the McDavid

Lumber Company executed a chattel mortgage, based upon the

present consideration of $1, to the Hayward Export Company,

embracing all the lumber and timber of whatsoever kind which

SHEPPARD, District Judge. This cause comes here for
consideration on petition of Wm. F. Lee for review of the ruling
of C. L. Shine, Esq., referee in bankruptcy, and involves the
question of priority of liens attaching to the lumber and other
products of a sawmill plant in due course of administration in
a court of bankruptcy.
The McDavid Lumber Company, bankrupt, was lately engaged
in manufacturing lumber and operated a large plant when proceedings in bankruptcy were begun. The company was adjudicated a bankrupt in June, 1910. Wm. ~· Lee was employed
as bookkeeper for the company, and by his petition before the
referee sought to declare his lien on the stock of lumber and
fixtures of the company for wages due him for the month of
April and a part of May, 1910, at the rate of $115 per month.
It is disclosed by the petition that the stock of lumber, the greater
portion of which was produced during Lee's employment, com- .
prised the principal assets of the company. Three mouths prior
to Lee's employment, to wit, on January 10, 1910, the l\icpavid
Lumber Company executed a chattel mortgage, based upon the
present consideration of $1, to the Hayward Export Company,
embracing all the lumber and timber of whatsoever kind which
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should be manufactured at the mill of said company from the

1st of January, 1910, to the 1st of January, 1911; this mortgage

provided that the export company should advance 80 per cent.

of the value of the output of the mill each month, and further

stipulated that the export company should be the selling agent

of the lumber company for all its product, excepting interior

stock. The advances to the extent of 80 per cent. were secured

by a mortgage based upon the whole output, and included all

the lumber and timber stored upon the yards of the company

during the existence of the mortgage.

The further point is made by Lee's petition that the mort-

gage of the export company was not recorded until the 15th of

April, 1910, 15 days after Lee's employment by the McDavid

Lumber Company; but actual notice of its existence is nowhere

negatived by the petition, although, as will later appear, notice

of the mortgage is not material in view of the determination of

the question certified to this court. Lee by his petition seeks

to have his claim for wages declared a preference over the

mortgage of the export company on the proceeds of the product

embraced in the mortgage, and that the export company which

has disposed of the lumber be required to pay his claim for

wages.
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The Hayward Export Company interposed a demurrer to

Lee's petition, the first ground of which is only necessary to be

considered at this time, viz.:

"(1) The allegations of the petition show that the rights of

the Hayward Export Company under its mortgage and contract

of sale are superior to the rights of petitioner in the proceeds

of the lumber."

The referee upon the hearing before him sustained the de-

murrer, and it is this order which is certified here on petition

of Lee for review.

The contest seems to have waged so far over the priority of

the respective liens of contestants, the mortgage of the export

company, and the statutory lien of the laborer as created by

§ 2198, Gen. St. Florida 1906, which provides:

"That liens prior in dignity to all others accruing thereafter

sluill exist in favor of bookkeepers, clerks, etc., upon the stock

and fixtures and other property of merchants and corpora-

tions."

Whether the statutory lien in favor of Lee should be declared

superior to the mortgage of the Hayward Export Company,

should be manufactured at the mill of said company from the
1st of Ja11uary, 1910, to the 1st of January, 1911; this mortgage
provided that the export company should advance 80 pt•r cent.
of the value of the output of the mill each month, and furtlwr
stipulated that the export company should be the sl'lling agent
of the lumber company for all its product, excepting interior
stock. The advances to the extent of 80 per cent. were securt>d
by a mortgage based upon the whole output, and indu<led n11
the lumber and timber stored upon the yards of the company
during the existence of the mortgage.
The further point is made by Lee's petition that the mortgage of the export company was not recorded until the 15th of
April, 1910, 15 days after Lee's employment by the McDavid
Lumber Company; but actual notice of its existence is nowhere
negatived by the petition, although, as will later appear, notice
of the mortgage is not material in view of the determination of
the question certified to this court. Lee by his petition seeks
to have his claim for wages declared a preference over the
mortgage of the export company on the proceeds of the product
embraced in the mortgage, and that the export company which
has disposed of the lumber be required to pay his claim for
•
wages.
The Hayward Export Company interposed a demurrer to
Lee's petition, the first ground of which is only necessary to he
considered at this time, viz.:
"(1) The allegations of the petition show that the rights of
the Hayward Export Company under its mortgage and contract
of sale are superior to the rights of petitioner in the proceeds
of the lumber."
The referee upon the hearing before him sustained the dern urrer, and it is this order which is certified here on petition
of Lee for review.
The contest seems to have waged so far over the priority of
the respective liens of contestants, the mortgage of the export
company, and the statutory lien of the laborer as created b~·
§ 2198, Gen. St. Florida 1906, which provides:
'' 1'hat liens prior in dignity to all others accruing thereafter
shall exist in favor of bookkeepers, elerks, etc., upon the sto(_'k
und fixtures and other property of merchants and corpora-

tions.''
Whether the statutory lien in favor of Lee should be declared
!.uperior to the mortgage of the Hayward Export Company,
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which antedated the performance of any labor by Lee, was the

question before the referee, and was decided by him in favor of

the mortgage lien. If the question were to be settled by state

statute and without reference to the order of distribution of the

estates of bankrupts provided by the federal bankruptcy act,

the referee may have decided rightly. It will be conceded that

the bankrupt act (§ 67d) recognizes liens generally in the prior-'

ity precisely as the state law fixes them, when the bankruptcy

act is silent, or where by its terms priority is left for state regu-

lation. When, however, the lien of the laborer for hi| wages

earned within three months of his employer's bankruptcy is

given preference in the distribution of the assets of the estate,

it is immaterial whether under the state law his claim is or is

not superior to the mortgage lien. It was earnestly insisted at

the argument that the bankruptcy act (§ 64b) does no more

than provide for the order of distribution of the assets after

satisfaction has been made of valid liens recognized by § 67d.

When Congress, however, provides the order of payment and

gives preference to a certain class of claims, such as taxes, cost

of administration, and wages in limited amounts for a definite

time, such legislation can have no other effect in reality than to

create a lien in favor of the claims thus preferred. Undoubt-

edly it was intended by Congress that when property of em-
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ployers should be placed in bankruptcy and beyond the reach

of those who had aided in its creation, to charge and impress

such property to the limited extent noted with a preference by

law second only to taxes and cost of administration. Those

entering into contracts with employers of labor for manufac-

tured product must contemplate the relation of the labor to the

finished product and should be held to know that, in case bank-

ruptcy overtakes the enterprise, the assets resulting from the

administration of such trust shall be distributed in the course

provided.

Nor does the adoption of this principle destroy the probity of

contracts or work greater hardship to secured creditors than

would fall unhappily to the lot of that creditor class who live

from hand to mouth, if a different construction were adopted.

The priority of laborers' claims when they are based upon pro-

ductive or operating expense of a quasi public corporation is a

salutary doctrine long established in this country predicated

upon the theory of public interest and of public benefit as well

as pecuniary advantage to the security holders; the operating

\\·hich antedated the performance of any labor by Lee, was the
question before the referee, and was decided by him in favor of
the mortgage lien. If the question were to be settled by state
statute and without reference to the order of distribution of the
estates of bankrupts provided by the federal bankruptcy act,
the referee may have decided rightly. It will be conceded that
the bankrupt act ( § 67d) recognizes liens generally in the prior- '
ity precisely as the state law fixes them, when the bankruptcy
act is silent, or where by its terms priority is left for state regulation. When, however, the lien of the laborer for hi' wages
earned within three months of his employer's bankruptcy is
given preference in the distribution of the assets of the estate,
it is ·immaterial whether under the state law his claim is or is
not superior to the mortgage lien. It was earnestly insisted at
the> argument that the bankruptcy act ( § 64b) does no more
than provide for the order of distribution of the assets aft('r
satisfaction has been made of valid liens recognized by § 67d.
When Congress, however, provides the order of payment ai;d
gives preference to a certain class of claims, such as taxes, cost
of administration, and wages in limited amounts for a definite
time, such legislation can have no other effect in reality than to
create a lien in favor of the claims thus preferred. Undoubtedly it was intended by Congress that when property of employers should be placed in bankruptcy and beyond the reach
of those who had aided in its creation, to charge and impress
such property to the limited extent noted with a preference by
law second only to truces and cost of administration. Those
entering into contracts with employers of labor for manufactured product must contemplate the relation of the labor to the
finished product and should be held to know that, in case bankruptcy overtakes the enterprise, the assets resulting from the
administration of such trust shall be distributed in the course
provided.
Nor does the adoption of this principle destroy the probity of
contraets or work greater hardship to secured creditors than
would fall unhappily to the lot of that creditor class who live
from hand to mouth, if a different construction were adopted.
Th~ priority of laborers' claims when they are based upon productive or operating expense of a quasi public corporation is a
salutary doctrine long established in this country predicated
upon the theory of public interest and of public benefit as well
as pecuniary advantage to the security holders; the operating
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expenses of such corporations are recognized by the courts as a

first lien on the property of such corporations. Buroham v.

Brown, 111 U. S. 776, 4 Sup. Ct. 675, 28 L. ed. 596; Southern

R. Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 176 U. S. 257, 20 Sup. Ct. 347, 44

L. ed. 458.

What substantial reason would justify any distinction in the

protection the law secures to the flagman of the railroad train

whose wages are preferred over the interest of the bondholder,

and the laborer in the sawmill whose handiwork is a constructive

force in the product of the plant, which not only pays the inter-

est on the mortgage, but returns the investment?"

That sound legal philosophy established by numerous and

powerful decisions of the Supreme Court recognizing the prior-

ity of labor engaged in the service of quasi public corporations

because of the public convenience and necessity of continued

operation, fortunately, is being gradually and wisely extended

to the legal preservation of the rights of the laborer whose toil

produces the output which pays the interest and enhances the

value of the mortgage security. L'Hote v. Boyett, 85 Miss. 636,

38 South. 1; Dickinson v. Saunders, 129 Fed. 20, 63 C. C. A.

666.

It was well said by the Court of Appeals of the First Circuit,
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in Dickinson v. Saunders, supra, discussing the effect of the fed-

eral bankruptcy act regulating priority:

"Turning, therefore, either to the local statute, or to what

for the federal courts is the higher authority, the bankrupt act,

the priority in favor of creditors of the class of interveners in

this case is declared as a rule of administration, not only for

quasi public corporations, but for all corporations, and in the

federal statute for corporations and individuals.''

It was further observed by the learned court in this instruct-

ive case that the statute of Massachusetts could not control ad-

ministration in bankruptcy in the federal court.

When the order of distribution of a bankrupt estate has been

expressly laid down by Congress that order should be observed

by the federal court in administration in bankruptcy. As said

by Collier in his admirable work on Bankruptcy ([7th ed.]

742):

"The bankrupt act not only controls the state law in case of

absolute conflict, but by its express legislation on these priorities

excludes the state law altogether."

And again, as said by Judge Lowell, when both a state statute

expenses of such corporations are re<;ognized by the c·ourts as a
first lien on the property of such corporatious. Bur11ham v.
Brown, 111 U. S. 776, 4 Sup. Ct. 675, 28 L. ed. 596; Southern
R. Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 176 U. S. 257, 20 Sup. Ct. 347, 44
L. ed. 458.
What substantial reason would justify any distinction in the
protection the law secures to the flagman of the railroad train
whose wages are preferred over the interest of the houdholder,
and the laborer in the sawmill whose handiwork is a constructive
force in the product of the plant, which not only pays the interest on the mortgage, but returns the investment TThat sound legal philosophy established by nwnerous and
powerful decisions of the Supreme Court recognizing the priority of labor engaged in the service of quasi public corporations
because of the public convenience and necessity of continued
operation, fortunately, is being gradually and wisely extended
to the legal preservation of the rights of the laborer \vhose toil
produces the output which pays the interest and enhances the
value of the mortgage security. L 'Hote v. Boyett, 85 l\Iiss. 636,
38 South. 1; Dickinson v. Saunders, 129 Fed. 20, 63 C. C. A.
666.
It was well said by the Court of Appeals of the First Circuit,
in Dickinson v. Saunders, supra, discussing the effect of the federal bankruptcy act regulating priority :
''Turning, therefore, either to the local statute, or to what
for the federal courts is the higher authority, the bankrupt act,
the priority in favor of creditors of the class of interveners in
this case is declared as a rule of administration, not only for
quasi public corporations, but for all corporations, and in the
federal statute for corporations and individuals.''
It was further observed by the learned court in this instruct;..
ive case that the statute of Massachusetts could not control administration in bankruptcy in the federal court.
When the order of distribution of a bankrupt estate has been
expressly laid down by Congress that order should be observed
hy the federal court in administration in bankruptcy. As said
by Collier in his admirable work on Bankruptcy ((7th ed.]
742):
''The bankrupt act not only controls the state law in case of
absolute conflict, but by its express legislation on these priorities
excludes the state law altogether.''
And again, as said by Judge Lowell, when both a state statute
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and the bankrupt act gives priority to the same class of debts,

the bankrupt act supersedes the state law. Dickinson v. Lewis,

129 Fed. 20, 63 C. C. A. 666; In re Lewis (D. C.) 99 Fed. 935:

In re Erie Lbr. Co. (D. C.) 150 Fed. 823; In re Tebo (D. C.)

101 Fed. 420.

It is clear that the trust fund arising from the administration

is distinctly charged by the act in favor of wages to the extent

provided by § 64b, and, if it cannot be said to constitute tech-

nically a lien, its effect is tantamount to any claim or privilege

created by state statute. It will not be denied that, where liens

have attached before bankruptcy administration and are not dis-

solved by the act, they will be respected as criteria in the order

for distribution of the estate, except preferred claims under the

bankruptcy act which unquestionably supersedes the state law.

In re Laird, 109 Fed. 557, 48 C. C. A. 538. It should be the

policy of the law and the primary duty of society to protect the

wages of the laborer in every contingency. Congress has indi-

cated its purpose, and courts should declare the law.17

SECTION III

THE TRUSTEE

A. Appointment

In re EAGLES

99 Fed. 695
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(District Court, E. D. North Carolina. February 16, 1900)

PURNELL, District Judge. The referee certifies for review

the following record:

and the bankrupt act gives priority to the same class of debts,
the bankrupt act supersedes the state law. Dickinson v. Lewis,
129 Fed. 20, 63 C. C. A. 666; In re Lewis (D. C.) 99 F(•d. 93;;:
In re Erie Lbr. Co. ( D. C.) 150 Fed. 823; In re Tebo ( D. C.)
101 Fed. 420.
It is clear that the trust fund arising from the n<lministration
is distinctly charged by the act in favor of wages to the extent
provided by § 64b, and, if it cannot be said to constitute technically a lien, its effect is tantamount to any claim or privilt>ge
created by state statute. It will not be denied that, where liens
have attached before bankruptcy administration and are not dissolved by the act, they will be respected as criteria in the order
for distribution of the estat~, except preferred claims under the
bankruptcy act which unquestionably supersedes the state law.
In re Laird, 109 Fed. 557, 48 C. C. A. 538. It should be the
policy of the law and the primary duty of society to protect the
wages of the laborer in every contingency. Congress bas indicated its purpose, and courts should declare the law. 17

"I, C. C. Fagan, one of the referees in bankruptcy of said

court, do hereby certify that the first meeting of the creditors

herein was held in Tarboro, N. C, on February 12, 1900, at

SECTION III

which claims were proven, and the election of a trustee entered

upon; that nine (9) creditors, whose proven claims amounted

THE TRUSTEE

to two thousand and eighty-four and 97/ioo dollars, voted for

Stamps Howard, Esq., as trustee, and twenty-six (26) creditors,

A. ' APPOINTMENT

whose proven claims amounted to two thousand and eight hun-

dred and twenty-five and 5%oo dollars, voted for Henry Gillaim,

In re EAGLES

17—See the discussion of the sub-

ject in 78 Cent. L. Jour. 313.

99 Fed. 695
(District Court, E. D. North Carolina. February 16, 1900)
PURNELL, District Judge. The referee certifies for review
the following record :
''I, C. C. Fagan, one of the referees in bankruptcy of said
court, do hereby certify that the first meeting of the cn>ditors
herein was held in Tarboro, N. C., on February 12, 1900, at
which claims were proven, and the election of a trustee entered
upon; that nine (9) creditors, whose proven claims amounted
to two thousand and eighty-four and ir~foo dollars, voted for
Stamps Howard, Esq., as trustee, and twenty-six (26) creditors,
whose provl'n claims amounted to two thousand and eight hundred and twenty-five and 6 o/i 00 dollars, voted for Henry Gillaim,
17-See the discussion of the aub·
ject in 78 Cent. L. Jour. 313.
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and the bankrupt act gives priority to the same class of debts,

the bankrupt act supersedes the state law. Dickinson v. Lewis,

129 Fed. 20, 63 C. C. A. 666; In re Lewis (D. C.) 99 Fed. 935:

In re Erie Lbr. Co. (D. C.) 150 Fed. 823; In re Tebo (D. C.)

101 Fed. 420.

It is clear that the trust fund arising from the administration

is distinctly charged by the act in favor of wages to the extent

provided by § 64b, and, if it cannot be said to constitute tech-

nically a lien, its effect is tantamount to any claim or privilege

created by state statute. It will not be denied that, where liens

have attached before bankruptcy administration and are not dis-

solved by the act, they will be respected as criteria in the order

for distribution of the estate, except preferred claims under the

bankruptcy act which unquestionably supersedes the state law.

In re Laird, 109 Fed. 557, 48 C. C. A. 538. It should be the

policy of the law and the primary duty of society to protect the

wages of the laborer in every contingency. Congress has indi-

cated its purpose, and courts should declare the law.17

SECTION III
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(District Court, E. D. North Carolina. February 16, 1900)

PURNELL, District Judge. The referee certifies for review

the following record:

and the bankrupt act gives priority to the same class of debts,
the bankrupt act supersedes the state law. Dickinson v. Lewis,
129 Fed. 20, 63 C. C. A. 666; In re Lewis (D. C.) 99 F(•d. 93;;:
In re Erie Lbr. Co. ( D. C.) 150 Fed. 823; In re Tebo ( D. C.)
101 Fed. 420.
It is clear that the trust fund arising from the n<lministration
is distinctly charged by the act in favor of wages to the extent
provided by § 64b, and, if it cannot be said to constitute technically a lien, its effect is tantamount to any claim or privilt>ge
created by state statute. It will not be denied that, where liens
have attached before bankruptcy administration and are not dissolved by the act, they will be respected as criteria in the order
for distribution of the estat~, except preferred claims under the
bankruptcy act which unquestionably supersedes the state law.
In re Laird, 109 Fed. 557, 48 C. C. A. 538. It should be the
policy of the law and the primary duty of society to protect the
wages of the laborer in every contingency. Congress bas indicated its purpose, and courts should declare the law. 17

"I, C. C. Fagan, one of the referees in bankruptcy of said

court, do hereby certify that the first meeting of the creditors

herein was held in Tarboro, N. C, on February 12, 1900, at

SECTION III

which claims were proven, and the election of a trustee entered

upon; that nine (9) creditors, whose proven claims amounted

THE TRUSTEE

to two thousand and eighty-four and 97/ioo dollars, voted for

Stamps Howard, Esq., as trustee, and twenty-six (26) creditors,

A. ' APPOINTMENT

whose proven claims amounted to two thousand and eight hun-

dred and twenty-five and 5%oo dollars, voted for Henry Gillaim,

In re EAGLES

17—See the discussion of the sub-

ject in 78 Cent. L. Jour. 313.

99 Fed. 695
(District Court, E. D. North Carolina. February 16, 1900)
PURNELL, District Judge. The referee certifies for review
the following record :
''I, C. C. Fagan, one of the referees in bankruptcy of said
court, do hereby certify that the first meeting of the cn>ditors
herein was held in Tarboro, N. C., on February 12, 1900, at
which claims were proven, and the election of a trustee entered
upon; that nine (9) creditors, whose proven claims amounted
to two thousand and eighty-four and ir~foo dollars, voted for
Stamps Howard, Esq., as trustee, and twenty-six (26) creditors,
whose provl'n claims amounted to two thousand and eight hundred and twenty-five and 6 o/i 00 dollars, voted for Henry Gillaim,
17-See the discussion of the aub·
ject in 78 Cent. L. Jour. 313.
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Esq., as trustee; that questions arose as to the right of Howard

& Co. ami George Howard to vote, in the selection of the trustee,

$712 due the former, and $1,000 due the hitter, both of which

claims are reported and proven as secured by the assignment of

collaterals of bankrupts, fully set forth in schedule; that ques-

tion also arose as to who was entitled to vote a certain indebt-

edness duly proven by B. F. Eagles, and due him by Eagles and

Crisp, bankrupts, for $2,886.36, and which is hypothecated with

George Howard as collateral security for the sum of one thou-

sand dollars, the amount due and secured to George Howard as

above. Howard & Co. and George Howard claimed the right to

vote their debts of $712 and $1,000 in the election of a trustee,

and offered to vote the same for Stamps Howard, Esq. The

referee was of opinion that the said creditors, being secured by

collaterals, were not entitled to participate in the selection of a

trustee, unless they first surrendered their securities. George

Howard claimed the right to vote the debt of $2,886.36 due to

and proven by B. F. Eagles, and deposited with him as collateral

security for $1,000 due by bankrupts as aforesaid, and offered

to vote the said indebtedness for Stamps Howard as trustee. B.

F. Eagles, to whom the debt is due, claims the right to vote said

indebtedness, and offers to vote the same for Henry Gillaim, as

trustee. The referee was of opinion that B. F. Eagles was en-
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titled to vote said indebtedness in the selection of a trustee, and

the same was voted for Henry Gillaim. The referee declared

Henry Gillaim duly elected trustee, and fixed his bond at the

sum of $2,500. Attorneys for the said Howard & Co. and George

Howard object to the above rulings and decision of the referee,

and ask that the same be certified to the judge of the district

court for review."

It would not be inappropriate for referees to follow the fa-

miliar practice of "explaining the object of the meeting" to

creditors and attorneys not familiar with the practice in the

courts of bankruptcy. Many questions similar to those presented

may thus be solved, thus saving time, frequently so essential in

a proper adjustment of estates. The meeting is for business, and

must be held in strict accordance with the notice, at the time and

place specified, not at some other time, sooner or later, or an-

other place, though near by. Adjournments may be had if the

business requires it, but all adjournments are the same meeting,

in contemplation of law. If no creditor appears, the meeting is

as effectual as if they were present or represented. The court,

Esq., as trustee; that questions arose as to the right of Howard
& C~. and George Howard to vote, in the selection of tlw truste1•,
$712 due the former, and $1,000 due the latter, both of which
claims are reported and proven as secured by the assignment of ·
collaterals of baukrupts, fully set forth in schedule; that CJ.Uestion also arose as to who was entitled to vote a certain indebtedness duly proven by 13. F. Eagles, and due him by Eagles and
Crisp, bankrupts, for $2,886.36, and which is hypothecated with
George Howard as collateral security for the sum of oue thousand dollars, the amount due and secured to George Howard as
above. Howard & Co. and George Howard claimed the right to
vote their debts of $712 and $1,000 in the election of a trustee,
and offered to vote the same for Stamps Howard, Esq. The
referee was of opinion that the said creditors, being secured by
collaterals, were not entitled to participate in the selection of a
trustee, unless they first surrendered their securities. George
Howard claimed the right to vote the debt of $2,886.36 due to
and proven by B. F. Eagles, and deposited with him as collateral
security for $1,000 due by bankrupts as aforesaid, and offered
to vote the said indebtedness for Stamps Howard as trustee. B.
F. Eagles, to whom the debt is due, claims the right to vote said
indebtedness, and offers to vote the same for Henry Gillaim, as
trustee. The referee was of opinion that B. F. Eagles was entitled to vote said indebtedness in the selection of a trustee, and
the same was voted for Henry Gillaim. The referee declared
Henry Gillaim duly elected trustee, and fixed his bond at the
sum of $2,500. Attorneys for the said Howard & Co. and George
Howard object to the above rulings and decision of the referee,
and ask that the same be certified to the judge of the district
court for review. ''
It wou1d not be inappropriate for referees to follow the familiar practice of "explaining the object of the meeting" to
creditors and attorneys not familiar with the practice in the
courts of bankruptcy. Many questions similar to those presented
may thus be solved, thus saving time, frequently so essential in
a proper adjustment of estates. The meeting is for business, and
must be held in strict accordance with the notice, at the time aud
place specified, not at some other time, sooner or later, or another place, though near by. Adjournments may be had if the
business requires it, but all adjournments are the same meeting,
in contemplation of law. If no creditor appears, the meeting is
as effectual as. if they were present or represented. The court,
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judge, or referee is not authorized or required to wait for or

"count a quorum." If, in such case, the schedules disclose no

assets, the court may order that no trustee be appointed. Rule

15.

The referee should be punctually present at the time and place

specified in the notice. He or the judge presides, and his duties

are judicial. He does not otherwise participate. The bankrupt

is required and should be actually present at the first meeting.

It is a creditors' meeting, and they (the referee and bankrupt)

are there to assist the creditors,—the first as an oflBcer of the

law, and the other to aid him in so doing. Thus aided, the ref-

eree should, in most cases, be able to pass upon all claims which

have been or may be presented at the meeting. Bankr. Act,

§ 55c. Having thus passed upon the claims presented, a cred-

itor to participate in and vote at such meeting must own an un-

secured claim, provable in bankruptcy, and must not only have

proved such claim, but had it allowed. Id. §§ 56a, 56b; In re

Hill, Fed. Cas. No. 6,481; In re Altenheim, Id. 268. Secured

creditors cannot vote at such meetings, unless their claims exceed

the amount of the security held by them, and then only for such

excess as shall be allowed by the court. Bankr. Act, § 56b. An

attorney, agent, or proxy can represent and vote for such cred-
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itors, but, before being permitted to do so, should be required to

produce and file written authority from the creditor, which

should be filed by the referee as a part of his record. In re

Sugeuheimer (D. C.) 91 Fed. 744. Creditors holding claims"

which are secured or have priority are not, in respect to such

claims, entitled to vote. To do so, such security or priority

must be surrendered. In re Saunders, Fed. Cas. No. 12,371;

Bankr. Act, § 57g; In re Conhaim (D. C.) 97 Fed. 924. Thia

provision illustrates the homely maxim, of Heywood, hoary with

the age of over four centuries, that one cannot eat his cake and

have his cake too. The creditor must decide. He can make a

surrender, thus becoming an unsecured creditor, and participate

with other creditors in the management of the estate, or he can

stand on his security or priority. He cannot do both. He can-

not run with the hare and hold with the hounds, as boys who

run rabbits would express it, quoting a sixteenth century au-

thority.

Assisted as indicated by the schedules, the bankrupt, and

others interested, creditors present, it would seem the court could

pass on all or most of the claims without difficulty or delay. If

judge, or referee is not authorized or required to wait for or
''count a quorum.'' If, in such case, the schedules disclose no
assets, the court may order that no trustee be appointed. Rule
15.
The referee should be punctually present at the time and place
specified in the notice. He or the judge presides, and his duties
are judicial. He does not otherwise participate. The bankrupt
is required and should be actually present at the first meeting.
It is a creditors' meeting, and they (the referee and bankrupt)
are there to assist the creditors,-the first as an officer of the
law, and the other to aid him in so doing. Thus aided, the referee should, in most cases, be able to pass upon all claims which
have been or may be presented at the meeting. Bankr. Act,
§ 55c. Having thus passed upon the. claims presented, a creditor to participate in and vote at such meeting must own an un- \
secured claim, provable in bankruptcy, and must not only have
proved such claim, but bad it allowed. Id. §§ 56a, 56b; In re
Hill, Fed. Cas. No. 6,481; In re Altenheim, Id. 268. Secured
creditors cannot vote at such meetings, unless their claims exceed \
the amount of the security held by them, and then only for such
excess as shall be allowed by the court. Bankr. Act, § 56b. An
atton1ey, a.gent, or proxy can represent and vote for such creditors, but, before being permitted to do so, should be required to
produce and file written authority from the creditor, which I
should be filed by the referee as a part of his record. In re~
Sugenbeimer (D. C.) 91 Fed. 744. Creditors holding claims·
which are secured or have priority are not, in respect to such (
claims, entitled to vote. To do so, such security or priority
must be surrendered. In re Saunders, Fed. Cas. No. 12,371 ;
Bankr. Act, § 57g; In re Conhaim (D. C.) 97 Fed. 924. This
provision illustrates the homely maxim, of Heywood, hoary with
the age of over four centuries, that one cannot eat his cake and
have his cake too. The creditor must decide. He can make a
surrender, thus becomjng an unsecured creditor, and participate 1
with other creditors in the management of the estate, or he can
stand on his security or priority. He cannot do both. He cannot run with the hare and hold with the hounds, as boys who
nm rabbits would express it, quoting a sixteenth century authority.
Assisted as indicated by the schedules, the bankrupt, and
others interested, creditors present, it would seem the court could
pass on all or most of the claims without difficulty or delay. If
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a particular claim is objected to, the question should be heard as

soon as feasible, and, if the court (judge or referee) is not satis-

fied with the weight of evidence, the hearing may be postponed,

and heard at some subsequent time. The act of 1867 provided

expressly for such postponement, and the act of 1898 does not

prohibit, but, by lodging a large discretion in the court, war-

rants and contemplates it. On a decision, the allowance or rejec-

tion of a claim of $500 or over, both may be reviewed by the

court of appeals. Bankr. Act, § 25, subd. 3. The effect of allow-

ing or postponing the hearing on a particular claim affects only

the creditor's right to vote at the first meeting of creditors. If

made to appear the result would be changed by such vote or

votes, the judge or referee may set aside the result, and order a

new vote to be taken. When it appears the right to vote would

not affect the business of the estate, the proceedings would not

be disturbed to allow a creditor to exercise the right to vote

when it would be barren of results. A creditor who has received

a preference must surrender such preference before he can par-

ticipate in a meeting of creditors. By the adjudication, the

estate of the bankrupt is in the custody of the court. If the

preference is by the assignment of securities, the creditor can-

not realize on such securities, or release the debtor of the bank-

rupt, except through the bankrupt court. See In re Cobb (D.
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C.) 96 Fed. 821, and authorities cited. Such creditor should

prove and file his claim, and his preference, if valid, will be

protected by the court, but he cannot participate in meetings as

an unsecured creditor. In a proceeding like the one at bar, the

creditors of the partnership elect the trustee, but an individual

creditor of one of the partners cannot vote for a trustee of the

partnership. Bankr. Act, § 5b.

Applying the foregoing principles, which are thus fully dis-

cussed for the benefit of referees, to the case at bar, the rulings

of the referee are affirmed. The claim of-$712 due Howard &

Co., and that of $1,000 due George Howard, "reported and

proven as secured by the assignment of collaterals of bankrupt,

fully set forth in schedule," are not such claims as would entitle

the creditor holding such claim to participate in the first meet-

ing of creditors or vote for a trustee.

The question propounded, but not presented in such a way as

to be properly passed upon, as to who is entitled to vote the

claim of B. F. Eagles, due him by Eagles and Crisp, bankrupts,

for $2,886.36, may be settled by an answer to the question, was

a particular claim is objected to, the question should be heard as
soon as feasible, and, if the court (judge or referee) is not satisfied with the weight of evidence, the hearing may be postponed,
and heard at some subsequent time. The act of 1867 provided
expressly for such postponement, and the act of 1898 docs not
prohibit, but, by lodging a large discretion in the court, warrants and contemplates it. On a decision, the allowance or rejec- ')
tion of a claim of $500 or over, both may be reviewed by the
court of appeals. Bankr. Act, § 25, subd. 3. The effect of allowing or postponing the hearing on a particular claim affects only J
the creditor's right to vote at the first meeting of creditors. If
made to appear the result would be changed by such vote or
votes, the judge or referee may set aside the result, and order a
new vote to be taken. When it appears the right to vote would
not affect the business of the estate, the proceedings would not
be disturbed to allow a creditor to exercise the right to vote
when it would be barren of results. A creditor who has received
a preference must surrender such prefeNnce before he can participate in a meeting of creditors. By the adjudication, the
estate of the bankrupt is in the custody of the court. If the
preference is by the assignment of securities, the creditor cannot realize on such securities, or release the debtor of the bankrupt, except through the bankrupt court. See In re Cobb (D.
C.) 96 Fed. 821, and authorities cited. Such creditor should
prove and file his claim, and his preference, if valid, will be
protected by the court, but he cannot participate in meetings as
an unsecured creditor. In a proceeding like the one at bar, the \
creditors of the partnership elect the trustee, but an individual
creditor of one of the partners cannot vote for a trustee of the
partnership. Bankr. Act, § 5b.
Applying the foregoing principles, which are thus fully discussed for the benefit of referees, to the case at bar, the rulings
of the referee are affirmed. The claim of· $712 due Howard &
Co., and that of $1,000 due George Howard, ''reported and
proven as secured by the assignment of collaterals of bankrupt,
fully set forth in schedule,'' are not such claims as would entitle
the creditor holdiug such claim to participate in the first meeting of creditors or vote for a trustee.
The question propounded, but not presented in such a way as
to he properly passed upon, as to who is entitled to vote the
daim of B. F. Eagles, due him by Eagles and Crisp, bankrupts,
for $2,886.36, may be settled by an answer to the question, was
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such claim allowed? If not, no one can vote it. B. F. Eagles

was a member of the bankrupt firm, and schedules his individual

property. § 5g of the bankrupt act provides:

"The court may permit the proof of the claim of the partner-

ship estate against the individual estates, and vice versa, and

may marshal the assets of the partnership estate and individual

estates so as to prevent preferences and secure the equitable dis-

tribution of the property of the several estates."

The schedules disclose the fact that the $1,000 debt due George

Howard by B. F. Eagles, partner, is secured by the hypotheca-

tion of a note of A. H. Crisp (not of the bankrupt firm), which

note is secured by real-estate mortgage and other collaterals.

Other questions as to this claim may arise hereafter, which are

not now presented for review, as contemplated by the bankrupt

act, and even the question of who is entitled to prove and vote

the claim is not so presented. Howard cannot prove or vote the

claim, for he does not own it. It is only assigned as collateral

security. If, when reduced to money, the proceeds are in ex-

cess of his claim, which he cannot vote, the excess would, in a

marshaling of assets, go to the estate, and, if not sufficient to

satisfy his claim, then he would be entitled to prove, as an unse-

cured creditor, any excess. How this may be cannot now be
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determined. B. F. Eagles cannot prove the claim, because he does

not own it. Aliunde the bankrupt proceedings, he would own

an equitable interest, but has assigned the legal title to the

claim. Nor does the report of the referee and the schedules

correspond in some essential particulars as to this claim. Only

the right to prove and vote the claim, which is not property

presented, is now considered, and the many questions which may

arise are not intended to be passed upon. It will be in apt time

to adjudicate such questions should they arise in the course of

the administration of the estates of the firm and the partners.

It is impossible to say from the report which claims are in-

cluded in the vote for trustee. If the claims not entitled to vote

were included in the vote for Mr. Gillaim or Mr. Howard, they

must be eliminated, and the one who thus has a majority in num-

ber and amount of the claims proved and allowed will be de-

clared trustee. Such trustee will at once file the bond fixed by

the creditors, and proceed with the administration of the estate

according to the statute.

such claim allowed T If not, no one can vot~ it. B. F. Eagles
was a member of the bankrupt firm, and schedules his individual
property. § 5g of the bankrupt act provides:
''The court may permit the proof of the claim of the partnership estate against the individual estates, and vice versa, and
may marshal the assets of the partnership estate and individual
estates so as to prevent preferences and secure the equitable distribution of the property of the several estates.''
The schedules disclose the fact that the $1,000 debt due George
Howard by B. F. Eagles, partner, is secured by the hypotbecation of a note of A. H. Crisp (not of the bankrupt firm), which
note is secured by real-estate mortgage and other collaterals.
Other questions as to this claim may arise hereafter, which are
not now presented for review, as contemplated by the bankrupt
act, and even the question of who is entitled to prove and vote
the claim is not so presented. Howard cannot prove or vote the
claim, for he does not own it. It is only assigned as collateral
security. If, when reduced to money, the proceeds are in excess of his claim, which he cannot vote, the excess would, in a
marshaling of assets, go to the estate, and, if not sufficient to
satisfy his claim, then he would be entitled to prove, as an unsecured creditor, any excess. How this may be cannot now be
determined. B. F. Eagles cannot prove the claim, because he does
not own it. Aliunde the bankrupt proceedings, he would own
an equitable interest, but has assigned the legal title to the
claim. Nor does the report of the referee and the schedules
correspond in some essential particulars as to this claim. Only
the right to prove and vote the claim, which is not properly
presented, is now considered, and the many questions which may
arise are not intended to be passed upon. It will be in apt time
to adjudicate such questions should they arise in the course of
the administration of the estates of the firm and the partners.
It is impossible to say from the report which claims are included in the vote for trustee. If the claims not entitled to vote
were included in the vote for Mr. Oillaim or Mr. Howard, they
must be eliminated, and the one who thus has a majority in number and amount of the claims proved and allowed will be declared trustee. Such trustee will at once file the bond fixed by
the creditors, and proceed with the administration of the estate
according to the statute.
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164 Fed. 275

(District Court, N. D. New York. October 5, 1908)

RAY, District Judge. The petition in bankruptcy was filed in

In re SYRACUSE PAPER & PULP CO.

this case June 17, 1908, not August 17, 1908, as stated in the

164 Fed. 275

petition of review. On the same day, on all the papers and a full

hearing and examination of Geo. W. Driscoll as to his connection

with and relations to the alleged bankrupt, this court appointed

(District Court, N. D. New York. October 5, 1908)

Frank P. Hakes, of Cortland, N. Y., a person selected by the

court because of his known integrity, long business experience,

education, and good judgment, and entire disassociation with

said alleged bankrupt and its officers, and said Driscoll, receivers

of the estate of said paper and pulp company. I then was and

still am of the opinion that some one fully acquainted with the

operations and business of the company should be associated in

the administration and winding up of its affairs. Soon there-

after, and early in July, an order was made for the examination

of the officers of the alleged bankrupt and a full and complete

inspection of its books and papers, to commence, as my recollec-

tion serves, July 20, 1908. This order was made on application

of Mr. Stoltz, who represented certain creditors, including those,

or some of those, who now object. This was done to enable a

full discovery, so far as practicable, in advance of the election of
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a trustee. This afforded every opportunity to ascertain the real

creditors of the bankrupt, etc. All the claims voted on and ques-

tioned here were included in the schedules and appeared on the

books of the company. If there was valid objection to these

claims in question here, or any one of them, it would have been

easy to prepare in advance, or on the day of the first meeting

of creditors, properly verified objections to the claims, which

could have been filed on that day.

The first meeting of creditors was duly called and held on the

5th and 6th days of August, 1908. At that meeting there was

a lively contest over the appointment of trustees. Three tickets

were in the field. One ticket was for the appointment of three

trustees, and the others for the appointment of one trustee. The

minutes of the meeting show that some informal proofs were

rejected; but no question is raised as to the propriety and legal-

ity of such action. One hundred and sixty-six votes were cast

for each ticket, and Frank P. Hakes of Cortland, Frank M. Bos-

H. & A. Bankruptcy—31

RAY, District Judge. The petition in bankruptcy was filed in
this case June 17, 1908, not August 17, 1908, as stated in the
petition of review. On the same day, on all the papers and a full
hearing and examination of Geo. W. Driscoll as to his conner.tio!l
with and relations to the alleged bankrupt, this court appointed
Frank P. Hakes, of Cortland, N. Y., a person selected by the
court because of his known integrity, long business experienc~,
education, and good judgment, and entire disassociation with
said alleged bankrupt and its officers, and said Driscoll, receivers
of the estate of said pa.per and pulp company. I then was and
still am of the opinion that some one fully acquainted with the
op~rations and business of the company should be associated in
the adminisuation and winding up of its affairs. Soon thereafter, and early in July, an order was made for the examination
of the officers of the alleged bankrupt and a full and complete
inspection of its books and papers, to commence, as my recollection serves, July 20, 1908. This order was made on application
of Mr. Stoltz, who represented certain creditors, including those,
or some of those, who now object. This was done to enable a
full discovery, so far as practicable, in advance of the election of
a trustee. This afforded every opportunity to Mcertain the real
~reclitors of the bankrupt, etc. All the claims voted on and questioned here were included in the schedules and appeared on the
books of the cornpe.ny. If there was valid objection to these
claims in question here, or any one of them, it would have been
easy to prepare in advance, or on the day of the first meeting
of creditors, properly verified objections to the claims, which
could have been filed on that day.
The first meeting of creditors was duly called and held on the
5th and 6th days of August, 1908. At that meeting there was
a lively contest over the appointment of trustees. Three tickets
were in the field. One tfoket was for the appointment of three
trustees, and the others for the appointment of one trustee. The
minutes of the meeting show that some informal proofs were
rejected ; but no question is raised as to the propriety and legality of such action. One hundred and sixty-six votes were cast
for each ticket, and Frank P. Hakes of Cortland, Frank M. BosH. • A. Bankruptcy-81
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worth, of Watertown, and George W. Driscoll, of Syracuse, on

one ticket, received 85 votes each, representing $215,380.04 of the

proved and allowed claims; William A. McKenzie, Jr., on another

ticket, received 6 votes, representing $12,806.08; and Geo. D.

Chapman, on another ticket, received 75 votes, representing $112,-

173.52 of such claims. It is seen that Hakes, Bosworth, and Dris-

coll had a clear majority of 4 over all and a plurality of 10 over

Chapman. The intelligence and general character and ability

of Mr. Driscoll cannot be questioned. Hakes and Bosworth are

pre-eminently fit for the place; Bosworth being skilled in the

business he is to care for and settle, and Hakes having proved

his ability and integrity while acting as receiver. From the fact

that Heath and Stoltz represented creditors, or were able to

control the votes of creditors, to the number of 75, it is evident

they had been working up the election of Chapman. Mr. Heath,

or Mr. Stoltz, or both, orally objected to the following claims:

Hannawa Falls Water Power Co., $7,299, on the ground it was

a claim against other companies, or one of two other compa-

nies. Commercial National Bank, $6,802.37, on ground it had,

with knowledge of insolvency, received a preferential payment

within four months. National Bank of Auburn, $25,159.69, on

same grounds. Salt Springs National Bank, $7,563.69, on same
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ground. Salt Springs National Bank, $9,139.50, same ground.

Jefferson County National Bank, $15,523, same ground. Utica

Trust & Deposit Company, $3,976.19, same ground. State Bank

of Syracuse, $77,181.15, same ground. Skaneateles Railway Com-

pany, $1,920, on ground services were rendered to Rose & Moses

Pulp & Paper Company. Rose & Moses Paper & Pulp Companj-,

$36,536.02, on ground it is not a provable claim, and bankrupt

not indebted to it in any sum whatever. Pottsdam Paper Mills,

$3,941.46; George W. Phelps, $1,792.25; George W. Phelps,

$575.75; G. Wittner, $8,100.97; Battle Island Paper Company,

$12,585.99; John C. Lutz, $2,840—and also numerous small

claims, on the general ground, in nearly every case, that it was

not a provable claim, and that alleged bankrupt was not in-

debted to the claimant in any sum. and frequently was added

the objection that a preference had been paid and received with

knowledge of insolvency. These general oral objections, not

reduced to writing, or signed by any one, or verified, were made

to substantially every claim voted in favor of Hakes, Bosworth,

and Driscoll.

The objections having been made and overruled, no offer hav-

·worth, of Watertown, and George W. Driscoll, of Syracwie, on
one ticket, received 85 votes each, representing $215,380.04 of the
proved and allowed claims; William A. McKenzie, Jr., on another
ticket; recei~ed 6 votes, representing $12,806.08; and Geo. D.
Chapman, on another ticket, received 75 votes, representing $112,173.52 of such claims. It is seen that Hakes, Bosworth, and Driscoll had a clear majority of 4 over all and a plurality of 10 over
Chapman. The intelligence and general character and ability
of. Mr. Driscoll cannot be questioned. Hakes and Bosworth are
pre-eminently fit for the place ; Bosworth being skilled in the
business he is to care for and settle, and Hakes having proved
his ability and integrity while acting as receiver. From the fact
that Heath and Stoltz represented creditors, or were able to
control the votes of creditors, to the number of 75, it is evident
they had been working up the election of Chapman. Mr. Heath,
or Mr. Stoltz, or both, orally objected to the following claims:
Hannawa Falls Water Power Co., $7,299, on the ground it was
a claim against other companies, or one of two other companies. Commercial National Bank, $6,802.37, on ground it had,
with knowledge of insolvency, received a preferential payment
within four months. National Bank of Auburn, $25,159.69, on
same grounds. Salt Springs National Bank, $7,563.69, on same
ground. Salt Springs National Bank, $9,139.50, fB,.me ground.
Jefferson County National Bank, $15,523, same ground. Utica
Trust & Deposit Company, $3,976.19, same ground. State Bank
of Syracuse, $77,181.15, same ground. Skaneateles Railway Company, $1,920, on ground services were rendered to Rose & l\loses
Pulp & Paper Company. Rose & Moses Paper & Pulp Company,
$36,536.02, on ground it is not a provable cl.aim, and bankrupt
not indebted to it in any sum whatever. Pottsdam Paper Mills,
$3,941.46; George W. Phelps, $1,792.25; George W. Phelps,
$575.75; G. Wittner, $8,100.97; Battle Island Paper Company,
$12,585.99; John C. Lutz, $2,840-and also numerous small
claims, on the general ground, in nearly every case, that it was
not a provable claim, and that alleged bankrupt was not indebted to the claimant in any sum, and frequently was added
the objection that a preference had been paid and received with
knowledge of insolvency. These general oral objections, not
reduced to writing, or signed by any one, or verified, were made
to substantially every claim voted in favor of Hakes, Bosworth,
nnd Driscoll.
The objections having been made and overntled, no offer hav-
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ing been made to substantiate tbe objections by proof, and noth-

ing appearing tending to impeach the validity of the claims, the

referee announced that the election of a trustee was in order.

Mr. Heath then objected to the election of a trustee on the ground

that he had a right to have the claims to which he had objected,

and where his objections were overruled, heard upon the evi-

dence, and requested an adjournment for that purpose. This

was an objection to proceeding to the election of a trustee with-

out an adjournment. No evidence was offered to sustain the

objections, and there was no claim made that evidence, if any,

to sustain the objections was not then at hand. The referee ruled

that to try out the objections would take more time than was

at his disposal, and overruled the objection. This was equivalent

to denying an adjournment for the purpose of trying the various

and numerous objections on the merits. It was evident to the

referee, and is evident to the court, that to have taken time to

try out the question of the validity of these objections would have

required weeks of time. The objections were not verified or re-

duced to writing. Evidently they were made at random and for

purposes of delay. It was essential to the due administration of

the estate that it proceed with reasonable diligence. The oppor-

tunity given for the examination of the officers and books of

the company had developed nothing, so far as appears, against
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these claims. If so, that record could have been produced as a

basis or ground for the objections. The claims, so far as al-

lowed and voted upon, were regular upon their face and appar-

ently valid. The claims stood proved, and were entitled to

allowance, unless met and overthrown by proof. Whitney v.

Dresser, 200 U. S. 532, 26 Sup. Ct. 316, 50 L. ed. 584, and cases

there cited.

But the allowance of a claim is not final; for if, at a later

time, it is desired to open it and try out its validity, it can be

done. And it is the duty of the referee and judge to afford such

a rehearing on a prima facie case. True, the trustee or trustees

represent the creditors, and this reopening of a claim is done

by the trustees; but if a creditor, one or more, makes a prima

facie case, and asks the trustee to take measures for the opening

of a claim, and he refuses, an appeal to the referee or court would

effect the desired result, and perhaps result in the removal of the

trustee. The referee, in the absence of verified objections, and in

the absence of any offer of evidence to sustain the oral objec-

tions made, overruled the objections in most instances and pro-

ing been made to substantiate the objcctio11s by proof, and uothing appearing tending to impeach the validity of the claims, the
referee announced that the election of a trustee was in oruer.
Mr. Heath then objected to the election of a trustee on the ground
that he had a right to have the claims to which he had objected,
and where his objections were overruled, heard upon the evidence, and requested an adjournment for that purpose. This
was an objection to proceeding to the election of a trustee without an adjournment. No evidence was offered to sustain the
objections, and there was no claim made that evidence, if any,
to sustain the objections was not then at hand. The referee ruled
that to try out the objections would take more time than was
at his disposal, and overruled the objection. This was equivalent
to denying an adjournment for the purpose of trying the various
and numerous objections on the merits. It was evident to the
referee, and is evident to the court, that to have taken time to
try out the question of the validity of these objections would have
required weeks of time. The objections were not verified or reduced to writing. Evidently they were made at random and for
purposes of delay. It was essential to the due administration of
the estate that it proceed with reasonable diligence. The opportunity given for the examination of the officers and books of
the company had developed uothing, so far as appears, against
these claims. If so, that record could have been produced as a
basis or ground for the objections. The claims, so far as allowed and voted upon, were regular upon their face and apparently valid. The claims stood proved, and w'e re entitled to
allowance, unless met and overthrown by proof. Whitney v.
Dresser, 200 U. S. 532, 26 Sup. Ct. 316, 50 L. ed. 584, and cases
there cited.
But the allowance of a claim is not final ; for if, at a later
time, it is desired to open it and try out its validity, it can be
done. And it is the duty of the referee and judge to afford such
a rehearing on a prima fa.cie case. True, the trustee or trustees
represent the creditors, and this reopening of a claim is done
by the trustees; but if a creditor, one or more, makes a prima
f acie case, anu asks the trustee to take measures for the opening
of a claim, and he refuses, an appeal to the referee or court would
effect the desired result, and perhaps result in the removal of the
trustee. The referee, in the absence of verified objections, and in
the absence of any offer of evidence to sustain the oral objections made, overruled the objections in most instances and pro-
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ceeded to obey the statute, which is imperative that the trustee

shall be elected or appointed by the creditors at their first meet-

ing. Bankr. Act, July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 44, 30 Stat. 557 (U. S.

Comp. St. 1901, p. 3438):

'' The creditors of a bankrupt shall, at their first meeting after

the adjudication • • • appoint one trustee or three trustees

of such estate. If the creditors do not appoint a trustee or

trustees as herein provided, the court shall do so.''

I do not doubt that it is competent for the [referee] to adjourn

this first meeting of creditors for a reasonable time, and from

time to time when necessary, and in a proper case it is his duty

so to do. But when it is apparent, as it was here, that certain

attorneys in their own interest take it upon themselves to orally

object to all, or substantially all, claims presented which may be

voted against their nominee for trustee, and fail to file written

and verified objections, or to offer then and there some evidence

tending to support those made, and it is apparent that to try

out the validity of such unsupported oral objections would un-

duly postpone the election of a trustee or trustees, it is the duty

of the referee to obey the spirit and letter of the law and pro-

ceed with the election of a trustee. Any other course in such a

case should not be tolerated. It is quite true that the creditors
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are to elect the trustee; but it is also true that at the first meet-

ing they are to perform this duty, and that they should come

prepared to act with reasonable expedition, and that these matters

should not be dragged along on mere oral objections to verified

claims apparently valid, and which are conceded by the bankrupt

to be valid. And verified claims, presumptively valid, and which

are entitled to probative force, which in effect prove themselves,

should not be held up or denied allowance or participation in

the election of trustees on mere oral objections in any case, un-

less some written evidence is placed before the court tending to

impeach their validity, or some oral evidence is offered at the

time having that tendency, or it is made to appear that such

evidence exists, but cannot be then obtained and presented.

As the vote for trustee was being taken, objections were made

to a vote being allowed on certain claims. The most of these

objections, if not all, were clearly frivolous. A vote on the claim

of Mr. Latterner was objected to on the ground that the claim-

ant was an employe of the bankrupt company, and therefore not

a proper person to vote for the election of a trustee. No such dis-

ability is imposed by the bankruptcy act or by common sense. It

ceeded to obey the statute, which is imperative that the trustee
shall be elected or appointed by the creditors at their first meeting. Bankr. Act, July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 44, 30 Stat. 557 (U. S.
Comp. St. 1901, p. 3438) :
''The creditors of a bankrupt shall, at their first meeting after
the adjudication • • • appoint one trustee or three trustees
of such estate. If the creditors do not appoint a trustee or
trustees as herein provided, the court shall do so.''
I do not doubt that it is competent for the [referee] to adjourn
this first meeting of creditors for a reasonable time, and from
time to time when necessary, and in a proper case it is his duty
so to do. But when it is apparent, as it was here, that certain
attorueys in their own interest take it upon themselves to orally
object to all, or substantially all, claims presented which may be
voted against their nominee for trustee, and fail to file written
and verified objections, or to offer then and there some evidence
tending to support those made, and it is apparent that to try
out the validity of such unsupported oral objections would unduly postpone the election of a trustee or trustees, jt is the duty
of the referee to obey the spirit and letter of the law and proceed with the election of a trustee. Any other course in such a
case should not be tolerated. It is quite true that the creditors
are to elect the trustee; but it is also true that at the first meeting they are to perform this duty, and that they should come
prepared to act with reasonable expedition, and that these matters
should not be dragged along on mere oral objections to verified
l'laims apparently valid, and which are conceded by the bankrupt
to bL• valid. And verified claims, presumptively valid, and which
are entitled to probative force, which in effect prove themselves,
should not be held up or denied allowance or participation in
the election of trustees on mere oral objections in any case, unless some written evidence is placed before the court tending to
impeach their validity, or some oral evidence is offered at the
time having that tenden<'y, or it is made to appear that such
evidence exists, but cannot be then obtained and presented.
As the vote for trustee was being taken, objections were made
to a vote being allowed on certain claims. The most of these
objections, if not all, were clearly frivolous. A vote on the claim
of Mr. Latterner was objected to on the ground that the claimant was an employe of the bankrupt company, and therefore not
a proper person to vote for the election of a trustee. No such disability is imposed by the bankruptcy. act or by common sense. It
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might be that two-thirds of the creditors of the bankrupt com-

pany were employes of the concern. Are they to be debarred

from voting on the suspicion that they may have a friendly

feeling for the company which has given them employment? A

vote on the claims of John C. Lutz was objected to on the ground

that he was a stockholder in the corporation, and not a proper

person to unite in the selection of a trustee. A vote on the

claims of G. Wittner were objected to on the same ground, with

the addition that he was also a director. The law imposes no

such disability on the creditor of such a corporation who hap-

pens to be a stockholder or director therein, and there is no

valid reason why he should be debarred from voting for trustee.

* * * Cases may arise where the directors of a bankrupt corpo-

ration, also creditors thereof, may seek to control the election of

the trustee in the interest of the bankrupt itself, and in opposition

to the interests of the general creditors. In such a case I do

not doubt that the referee or judge has the power to set aside

sueh an election, if made; but it would be on other grounds than

that the directors were not entitled to vote for the appointment

of the trustee. In this case there was no combination of di-

rectors; no attempt to elect trustees in the interest of the bank-

rupt corporation. As stated, two of those elected and confirmed

by the referee are men of the highest probity and business abil-
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ity, and entirely disinterested; and the inclusion of Driscoll,

familiar with all the books and affairs of the company, was wise

and proper. Should he attempt to hide or cover the transac-

tions, or balk proper legal proceedings, it would be ground of

removal, and the referee should not hesitate to report the facts,

and this court would speedily remove him.

It was suggested on the argument that there is a possibility

that it will become the duty of the trustees to bring action

against some or all the directors, including Driscoll, and that he,

as trustee, cannot sue himself as director, or as an individual.

There will be ample opportunity to cross that bridge when

reached, if it ever is; but I am of opinion that a trustee as such

may be party complainant or plaintiff as such, and also defendant

as an individual. In this ease Hakes and Bosworth may prose-

cute all necessary actions, making Driscoll as director or person-

ally, or even as trustee, a party defendant, stating the necessity

for sueh action. 1 Foster's Fed. Pr. p. 148, §42; Harding v.

Handy, 11 Wheat. 103, 6 L. ed. 429; Wisner v. Barnett, 4 Wash.

might be that two-thirds of the creditors of the bankrupt compauy were employes of the concern. Are they to be debarred
from voting on the suspicion that they may have a friendly
feding for the company which has given them employment f A
vote on the claims of John C. Lutz was objected to on the ground
that he was a stock.holder in the corporation, and not a proper
person to unite in the selection of a trustee. A vote on the
claims of G. Wittner were objected to on the same ground, with
the addition that he was also a director. The law imposes no
such disability on the creditor of such a corporation who happeus to be a stockholder or director therein, and there is no
valid reason why he should be debarred from voting for trustee.
• • • Cases may arise where the directors of a bankrupt corporation, also creditors thereof, may seek to control the election of
the trustee in the interest of the bankrupt itself, and in opposition
to the i11tcrests of the general creditors. In such a case I do
not doubt that the referee or judge has the power to set aside
such an election, if made; but it would be on other grounds than
that the directors were not entitled to vote for the appointment
of the trustee. In this case there was no combination of directors; no attempt to elect trustees in the interest of the bankrupt corporation. As stated, two of those elected and confirmed
by the referee are men of the highest probity and business ability, aud entirely disinterested; and the inclusion of Driscoll,
familiar with all the books and affairs of the company, was wise
and proper. Should he attempt to hide or cover the transactions, or balk proper legal proceedings, it would be ground of
removal, and the referee should not hesitate to report the facts,
and this court would speedily remove him.
It was suggested on the argument that there is a possibility
that it will become the duty of the trustees to bring action
against some or all the directors, including Driscoll, and that he,
as trustee, cannot sue himself as director, or as an individual.
There will be ample opportunity to cross that bridge when
rPached, if it ever is; but I am of opinion that a trustee as such
may be party complainant or plaintiff as such, and also defendant
ns 3D individual. In this case Hakes and Bosworth may prosecute all necessary actions, making Driscoll as director or personally, or even as trustee, a party defend.ant, stating the nec~ty
for such action. 1 Foster's Fed. Pr. p. 148, § 42; Hardiug v.
Handy, 11Wheat.103, 6 L. ed. 429; Wisner v. Barnett, 4 Wash.
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C. C. 631, 642, Fed. Cas. No. 17,914; Barry v. Missouri, etc.

(C. C.) 27 Fed. 1, per Wallace, J.

The creditors and all of them are at liberty to examine the

directors, including Driscoll, and if it shall develop that he is an

improper person to act as trustee, or that his presence as such,

interferes with the due and proper administration of the estate,

he can be removed. No self-respecting court would hesitate a

moment to take such action. There was a clear majority in

number and amount voting for Hakes, Bosworth, and Driscoll.

I have examined all the cases cited, and find nothing that would

require, or even justify, the setting aside of their appointment.

•••

The order of the referee, affirming the action of the creditors,

is therefore approved and affirmed.

B. Property Acquired

1. AS OP WHAT TIME

JOHNSON v. COLLIER

222 U. S. 538, 56 L. ed. 306, 32 Sup. Ct. 104

(United States Supreme Court. January 9, 1912)

C. C. 631, 642, Fed. Cas. No. 17,914; Barry v. Missouri, etc.
(C. C.) 27 Fed. 1, per Wallace, J.
The creditors and all of them are at liberty to examine the
directors, including Driscoll, and if it shall develop that he is an
improper person to act as trustee, or that his presence as such
interferes with the due a.nd proper administration of the estate,
he can be removed. No self-respecting court would hesitate a
moment to take such action. There was a clear majority in
uumber and amount voting for Hakes, Bosworth, and Driscoll.
I. have examined all the cases cited, and find nothing that would
require, or even justify, the setting aside of their appointment.

• • •

The order of the referee, affirming the action of the crediton,
is therefore approved and affirmed.

M. B. Johnson, as executor, recovered judgment against B. T.

Collier, in the city court of Gadsden, Alabama. Execution

thereon was levied July 20, 1906, on certain personal property.

B.

PROPERTY ACQUIRED
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Under a provision of the Alabama statute, Collier immediately

filed with the sheriff a claim of exemption. On the same day he

1.

AS OF WHAT TIKE

filed, in the proper District Court of the United States, a volun-

tary petition in bankruptcy, including this property in his

JOHNSON v. COLLIER

schedule of assets. Notwithstanding the claim of exemption,

the sheriff sold the property at public outcry on July 30, 1906.

222 U. S. 538, 56 L. ed. 306, 32 Sup. Ct. 104

Thereafter, on a date not shown by the record, Collier was

adjudicated a bankrupt. On August 8, 1906, before a trustee

was elected, he brought suit against both Johnson and the sheriff

for damages, on the theory that the sale of the property after

the filing of the claim of exemption made them trespassers ab

initio. The defendants filed a plea, in which they set up the

pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings, and alleged that Col-

lier had no title to the cause of action, which was in gremio legis

until the election of the trustee, and for that reason he could

not maintain a suit for damages occasioned by the unlawful sale

(United States Supreme Court. January 9, 1912)
l\L B. Johnson, as executor, recovered judgment against B. T.
Collier, in the city court of Gadsden, Alabama. Execution
thereon was levied July 20, 1906, on certain personal property.
Under a provision of the Alabama statute, Collier immediately
filed with the sheriff a claim of exemption. On the same day he
filed, in the proper District Court of the United States, a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, including this property in his
schedule of assets. Notwithstanding the claim of exemption,
the sheriff sold the property at public outcry on July 30, 1906.
Thereafter, on a date not shown by the record, Collier was
adjudicated a bankrupt. On August 8, 1906, before a trustee
was elected, he brought suit against both Johnson a.nd the sheri1f
for damages, on the theory that the sale of the property after
the filing of the claim of exemption made them trespassers ab
initio. The defendants filed a plea, in which they set up the
pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings, and alleged that Collier had no title to the cause of action, which was in gremio legis
until the election of the trustee, and for that reason he could
not maintain a suit for damages occasioned by the unlawful sale
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of property included in the schedule of assets. A demurrer to

this plea was sustained. The jury found a verdict in favor of

Collier, which the trial court refused to set aside. This ruling

was affirmed, and the case is here on writ of error from that

judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama.

Mr. Justice LAMAR, after making the foregoing statement,

of property included in the schedule of assets. A demurrer to
this plea was sustained. The jury found a verdict in favor of
Collier, which the trial court refused to set .aside. This ruling
was affirmed, and the case is here on writ of error from that
judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama.

delivered the opinion of the court:

The trustee, with the approval of the court, may prosecute

any suit commenced by the bankrupt prior to the adjudication.

(§llc.) But the statute is otherwise silent as to the right of

the bankrupt himself to begin a suit in the time which intervenes

between the filing of the petition and the election of the trustee.

There is a conflict in the conclusions reached in the few cases

dealing with this question. Rand v. Sage, 94 Minn. 344, 102

N. W. 864; Rand v. Iowa C. R. Co., 186 N. Y. 58, 116 Am. St.

Rep. 530, 78 N. E. 574, 9 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 542; Gordon v.

Mechanics' & T. Ins. Co., 120 La. 444, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 827,

124 Am. St. Rep. 434, 45 So. 384, 14 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 886.

While for many purposes the filing of the petition operates in

the nature of an attachment upon choses in action and other

property of the bankrupt, yet his title is not thereby divested.

He is still the owner, though holding in trust until the appoint-
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ment and qualification of the trustee, who thereupon becomes

"vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt" as

of the date of adjudication. (§70.)

Until such election the bankrupt has title,—defeasible, but

sufficient to authorize the institution and maintenance of a suit

on any cause of action otherwise possessed by him. It is to the

interest of all concerned that this should be so. There must

always some time elapse between the filing of the petition and

the meeting of the creditors. During that period it may fre-

quently be important that action should be commenced, attach-

ments aud garnishments issued, and proceedings taken to recover

what would be lost if it were necessary to wait until the trustee

was elected. The institution of such suit will result in no harm

to the estate. For if the trustee prefers to begin a new action

in the same or another court, in his own name, the one previously

brought can be abated. If, however, he is of opinion that it

would be to the benefit of the creditors, he may intervene in the

suit commenced by the bankrupt, and avail himself of rights

Mr. Justice LAMAR, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The trustee, with the approval 'of the court, may prosecu~e
any suit commenced by the bankrupt prior to the adjudication.
( § l1c.) But the statute is otherwise silent as to the right of
the bankrupt himself to begin a suit in the time which intervenes
between the filing of the petition and the election of the trustee.
There is a conflict in the conclusions reached in the few cases
dealing with this question. Rand v. Sage, 94 Minn. 344, 102
N. W. 864; Rand v. Iowa C. R. Co., 186 N. Y. 58, 116 Am. St.
Rep. 530, 78 N. E. 574, 9 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 542; Gordon v.
Mechanics' & T. Ins. Co., 120 L.a. 444, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 827,
124 Am. St. Rep. 434, 45 So. 384, 14 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 886.
While for many purposes the filing of the petition operates in
the nature of an attachment upon choses in action and other
property of the bankrupt, yet his title is not thereby divested.
He is still the owner, though holding in trust until the appointment and qualification of the trustee, who thereupon becomes
"vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt" as
of the date of adjudication. (§ 70.)
Until such election the bankrupt has title,-defeasible, but
sufficient to authorize the institution and maintenance of a suit
on any cause of action otherwise possessed by him. It is to the
interest of all concerned that this should be so. There must
always some time elapse between the filing of the petition and
the meeting of the creditors. During that period it may frequently he important that action should be commenced, attachments and garnishments issued, and proceedings taken to recover
what would be lost if it were necessary to wait until the trustee
was elected. The institution of such snit will result in no harm
to the estate. For if the trustee prefers to begin a new action
in the same or another court, in his own name, the one previously
brought can be abated. If, however, he is of opinion that it
would be to the benefit of the creditors, he may intervene in the
suit commenced by the bankrupt, and avail himself of rights
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and priorities thereby acquired. Thatcher v. Rockwell, 105 U. S

469, 26 L. ed. 950.

If, because of the disproportionate expense, or uncertainty a>

to the result, the trustee neither sues nor intervenes, there is

no reason why the bankrupt himself should not continue the

litigation. He has an interest in making the dividend for cred

itors as large as possible, and in some states the more direct

interest of creating a fund which may be set apart to him as an

exemption. If the trustee will not sue and the bankrupt cannot

sue, it might 'result in the bankrupt's debtor being discharged

of an actual liability. The statute indicates no such purpose,

and if money or property is finally recovered, it will be for the

benefit of the estate. Nor is there any merit in the suggestion

that this might involve a liability to pay both the bankrupt and

the trustee. The defendant in any such suit can, by order of

the bankrupt court, be amply protected against any danger of

being made to pay twice. Rand v. Iowa C. R. Co., 186 N. Y. 58,

116 Am. St. Rep. 530, 78 N. E. 574, 9 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 542;

Southern Exp. Co. v. Connor, 49 Ga. 415.

There was no error in holding that the bankrupt had title to

the cause of action and could institute and maintain suit

thereon.
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Affirmed.1

STATE BANK OF CHICAGO v. COX

143 Fed. 91, 74 C. C. A. 285

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. January 2, 1906)

This is a suit in assumpsit, by the trustee in bankruptcy, to

recover assets of the bankrupt which were appropriated by State

1—"The complainant'8 counsel

agrees that from the time of the

adjudication until the appointment

l

and priorities thereby acquired. Thakher v. Rockwell, 105 lJ. 8
4£9, 26 L. ed. 950.
If, because of the disproportionate expense, or uncertainty a::to the result, the trustee neither sues nor intervenes, there is
no reason why the bankrupt himself should not continue the
litigation. He has an interest in making the dividend for cred·
itors as large as possible, and in some states the more direct
interest of creating a fund which may be set apart to him as au
exemption. If the trustee will not sue and the bankrupt cannot
sue, it might 'result in the bankrupt's debtor being discharged
of an actual liability. The statute indicates no such purpose,
and if money or property is finally recovered, it will be for the
benefit of the estate. Nor is there any merit in the suggestion
that this might involve a liability to pay both the bankrupt and
the trustee. The defendant in any such 81lit can, by order of
the bankrupt court, be amply protected against any danger of
being made to pay twice. Rand v. Iowa C. R. Co., 186 N. Y. 58,
116 Am. St. Rep. 530, 78 N. E. 574, 9 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 542;
Southern Exp. Co. v. Connor, 49 Ga. 415.
There was no error in holding that the bankrupt had title to
the cause of action and could institute and maintain suit
thereon.
Affirmed. 1

of a trustee the bankrupt is civilly

dead, and that nothing that takes

place in the meantime can deprive

STATE BANK OF CHICAGO v. COX

the trustee of his right to elect

whether to accept any asset of the

143 Fed. 91, 74 C. C. A. 285

bankrupt or not. If that doctrine

were true, the court would have no

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. January 2, 1906)

l o»er to authorize any action what-

ever in respect to the assets of the

estate until the trustee was ap-

pointed. It could not order a sale;

This is a suit in assumpsit, b:v the trustee in bankruptcy, to
recover assets of the bankrupt which were appropriated by State

it could not permit a delivery of

property admitted not to belong to

the bankrupt; it could not permit

a busines-s to be carried on; the

adjudication would strike tho estate

with a complete paralysis until nec-

essary weeks or the usual months

had passed before the appointment

of a trustee. There is nothing in

the Bankruptcy Act which author-

1-'' The complainant's rounsel
agrees that from the time of the
adjudication until the appointment
of a trustee the bankrupt is civilly
dead, and that nothing that takes
plnr.e in the meantime can deprive
the trustee of his right to elect
whether to acrept any asset of the
bankrupt or not. If that doctrine
were trne, the court would have no
I O\\l'f to authorize any action what·
e\·er in respect to the aseets of the

estate until the trustee wa~ appointed. It ro11ld not order a sale;
it l'ould not permit a delin•ry of
property admitted not to belong to
the uankr11pt j it could not permit
a bueine~s to he l'&rrit'd on; the
ndjudil'ation would strike the eetate
with a complete paralysis until neceB11&ry weeks or the ui<ual months
had passed before the appointment
of a trustee. There is nothing in
the Bankrupt.cy Act whieh author·
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Bank of Chicago, plaintiff in error, through attachment and

garnishee process, pending the proceedings in bankruptcy; and

the writ of error is from the judgment, upon verdict, for $2,-

692.36 against the bank. The bankruptcy proceedings were in

the District Court of the United States for the Western District

of New York, against Muskoka Lumber Company, a New York

corporation, upon petition for involuntary bankruptcy filed

August 20, 1901; and adjudication as a bankrupt was entered

May 1, 1902! On August 21, 1901, the plaintiff in error com-

menced attachment proceedings against the bankrupt, in the

Circuit Court of Cook county, Ill., under which property of the

bankrupt was seized and certain of its creditors were served

with garnishee process. The John S. Owen Lumber Company

followed with another attachment, through the same attorneys,

returnable at the same term, and thus became a prorating attach-

ment creditor under the Illinois statute. § 37, c. 11, 1 Starr &

C. Ann. St. 1896 (2d ed.). Through the attachment on the part

of the plaintiff in error the sheriff collected $286.13 and the

garnishees paid $2,014.52. Of this aggregate it appears that

the share actually received was $1,902.78; the remainder being

costs and pro rata share of the other attaching creditor. The

trustee in bankruptcy brought the present action, against the
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plaintiff in error alone, May 11, 1903, no claim having been filed

or appearance entered on its part in the bankruptcy proceed-

ings, and various questions of pleading were raised, which in-

volve no substantial controversy not otherwise presented for

review, aside from jurisdictional features which are referred

to in the opinion. Upon issues joined, with the substantial

facts undisputed, the case was tried and resulted in a verdict,

directed by the court, against the plaintiff in error for the entire

amount so realized and interest, without deduction for the share

of the prorating attachment.

SEAMAN, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts and dispos-

ing of matter of jurisdiction of the court below). • * *

The questions arise for review therefore: (1) Whether the

trustee in bankruptcy establishes a right of recovery; and, if

so (2) whether the true measure of damages was awarded. As

izes such a conclusion.'' Plant v. Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman

Gorham Mfg. Co., 174 Fed. 852, 858. Lumber Co., 222 U. 8. 300.

See In re Pease, 4 Am. B. B. 578;

Bank of Chicago, plaintiff in error, through attachme11t am]
garnishee process, pending the proceedings in bankruptcy; nwl
the writ of error is from the judgment, upon verdict, for $2,692.36 against the bank. The bankruptcy proceedings were in
the District Court of the United States for the Western District
of New York, against l\luskoka Lumber Company, a New York
corporation, upon petition for involuntary bankruptcy filed
August 20, WOI; and adjudication as a bankrupt was entered
May 1, 1902: On August 21, 1901, the plaintiff in error commenced attachment proceedings against the bankrupt, in the
Circuit Court of Cook county, Ill., uuder which property of the
bankrupt was seized and certain of its ·creditors were served
with garnishee process. The John S. Owen Lumber Company
followed with another attachment, through the same attorneys,
returnable at the same term, and thus became a prorating attachment creditor under the Illinois statute. § 37, c. 11, 1 Starr &.
C. Ann. St. 1896 (2d ed.). Through the attachment on the part
of the plaintiff in error the sheriff collected $286.13 and the
garnishees paid $2,014.52. Of this aggregate it appears that
the share actually received was $1,902.78; the remainder being
costs and pro rata share of the other attaching creditor. The
trustee in bankruptcy brought the present action, against the
plaintiff in error alone, l\Iay 11, 1903, no claim having been filed
or appearan<:e entered on its part in the bankruptcy proceedings, and various questions of pleading were raised, whieh involve no substantial controversy not otherwise presented for
review, aside from jurisdictional features which are referred
to in the opinion. Upon issues joined, with the substantial
facts undisputed, the case was tried and resulted in a verdict,
directed by the court, against the plaintiff in error for the entire
amount so realized and interest, without deduction for the share
of the prorating attachment.
SEAMAN, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts and disposing of matter of jurisdiction of the court below). • • •
The questions arise for review therefore: ( 1) Whether the
trustee in bankruptcy establishes a right of recovery; and, if
so (2) whether the true measure of damages was awarded. As
ize11 such a conclusion.'' Plant v.
Gorham Mfg. Co., li4 Fed. 852, 858.
See In re Pease, 4 Am. B. B. 578;

Acme Harveeter Co. v. Beekman
Lumber Co., 222 U. B. 300.
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the material facts are undisputed, the inquiry is within narrow

compass, if not otherwise free from difficulty.

the material facts are undisputed, the inquiry is within narrow
eolllpass. if not otherwise free from difficulty.

1. Upon the first question the contentions are twofold: (1)

That under the present bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c.

541, § 70, 30 Stat. 565 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3451]), the

trustee is vested with title to the property of the bankrupt, "as

of the date he was adjudged a bankrupt," so that he ca:inot re-

cover for property theretofore attached and sold; and (2) that

in any view, if such attaching creditor obtained no greater per-

centage than other creditors of like class, the proceeds were not

recoverable as a preference. The attachment processes under

consideration were instituted in Illinois on the day following

the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings in New York,

but both attachment and appropriation of the proceeds were

prior to the adjudication of bankruptcy, and the first-men-

tioned proposition is thus fairly involved.

The general purposes and scope of bankruptcy enactments, to

take and administer all of the assets of the bankrupt for pro rata

distribution to the unsecured creditors, is well recognized. In

conformity with this view the provisions of the present act, alike

with those of the former acts, are uniform—from § 1, cl. 10 (30

Stat. 544— [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418]), to and including
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§ 70, cl. 5, in fixing the date when the petition was filed as the

time bankruptcy jurisdiction is established over the property

then possessed by the bankrupt, as the date from which the

sequestration of property becomes operative and with reference

to which the validity or invalidity of the various transactions

affecting the estate must be ascertained. As well remarked by

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the Supreme Court, in

Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1, 14, 22 Sup. Ct. 269, 46 L. ed. 405:

"It is as true of the present law as it was of that of 1867 that

the filing of the petition is a caveat to all the world, and in

effect an attachment and injunction (Bank v. Sherman, 101 U.

S. 403, 25 L. ed. 866), and on adjudication title to the bank-

rupt's property became vested in the trustee (§§70, 21e, 30

Stat. 565, 52 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 3451, 3430]), with

actual or constructive possession, and placed in the custody of

the bankruptcy court."

In this court the view is clearly expressed in the opinion by

Judge Jenkins, In re Rodgers, 60 C. C. A. 567, 578, 125 Fed.

169:

"The filing of the petition, followed by seizure and by ad-

1. Upon the first question the contentions are twofold: (I)
That under the present bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898. c.
541, § 70, 30 Stat. 565 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3451]), the
trustee is vested with title to the property of the bankrupt, '•as
of the date he was adjudged a bankrupt,'' so that he eanno( recover for property theretofore attached and sold; and (2) that
in any view, if such attaching creditor obtained no greater percentage than other creditors of like class, the prO<'eeds were not
recoverable as a preference. The attachment processes uudt>r
consideration were instituted in Illinois on the day following
the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings in New York,
but both attachment and appropriation of the proceeds were
prior
the adjudication of be.nkruptcy, and the first-mentioned proposition is thus fairly involved.
The general purposes and scope of bankruptcy enactments, to
take and administer all of the assets of the bankrupt for pro rata
distribution to the unsecured creditors, is well recognized. In
conformity with this view the provisions of the present act, alike
with those of the former acts, are uniform-from § 1, cl. 10 ( 30
Stat. 544-[U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418]), to and including
§ 70, cl. 5, in fixing the date when the petition was filed as the
time bankruptcy jurisdiction is established over the property
then possessed by the bankrupt, as the date from which the
sequestration of property becomes operative and with reference
to which the validity or invalidity of the various transactions
affecting the estate must be ascertained. As well remarked by
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the Supreme Court, in
Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. 1, 14, 22 Sup. Ct. 269~ 46 L. ed. 405:
"It is as true of the present law as it was of that of 1867 that
the filing of the petition is a C'a.Veat to all the world, and in
effect an attachment and injunction (Bank v. Sherman, 101 U.
S. 403, 25 L. ed. 866), and on adjudication title to the bankrupt's property became vested in the trustee ( §§ 70, 21e, 30
Stat. 565, 52 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 3451, 3430] ) , with
actual or constructive possession, and placed in the custody of
the bankruptcy court.''
In this court the view is clearly expressed in the opinion by
Judge Jenkins, In re Rodgers, 60 C. C. A. 567, 578, 125 Fed_
169:
''The filing of the petition, followed by seizure and by ad-

fo
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judication in bankruptcy, is a seizure of the property by the

law for the benefit of creditors, and an appropriation of it to

the payment of the debts of the bankrupt. It is a seizure of

the property by legal process, equal in rank to and of the same

force and effect as by execution or attachment."

In other words, it is the established doctrine that bankruptcy

proceedings are in rem, and when commenced all of the property

then held by the bankrupt or for his use (aside from exemp-

tions) is subjected to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court,

and that, when bankruptcy is adjudicated, the sequestration

reaches all such property at least, and becomes operative from

the institution of proceedings, as "a caveat to all the world,"

preventing interference by attachments or other means in dero-

gation of the interests of the estate. In re Pekin Plow Co., 50

C. C. A. 257, 259, 112 Fed. 308; Chesapeake Shoe Co. v. Seldner,

58 C. C. A. 261, 264, 122 Fed. 593; Loveland's Bankruptcy (2d

ed.) 366; Collier on Bankruptcy (5th ed.) 553. While title

rests in the bankrupt up to adjudication, and in form until a

trustee qualifies, it is subject to the pending sequestration, and

no rights can be acquired thereunder which are not equally

amenable. The formal title of the bankrupt to the estate passes

to the trustee (§ 70a) '' by operation of law" as of the date of

adjudication, but the trustee is vested as well under subdivisions
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(4) and (5) with property transferred in fraud of creditors,

and "property which prior to the filing of the petition" the

bankrupt "could by any means have transferred" or which

might have been levied upon and sold. Thus the narrow con-

struction of the first-mentioned provision, which is sought for

escape from liability for the plain violation of the act through

the seizure in question, not only ignores these succeeding and

comprehensive clauses, but it would nullify the terms and entire

policy of the act for the protection of creditors against spolia-

tion of estates subject to bankruptcy proceedings.

We are clearly of opinion that such rights of action, arising

out of transactions prohibited by the act, vest in and are en-

forceable by the trustee, unaffected by the date when the legal

title passes from the bankrupt to the trustee. In re Pekin Plow

To.. 50 C. C A. 257, .259, 112 Fed. 308; In re Gareewich, 53

C. C. A. 510, 513, 115 Fed. 87; In re Breslauer (B.C.), 121 Fed.

!)10; 914: Chesapeake Shoe Co. v. Seldner, 58 C. C. A. 261, 265,

i22 Fed. 593. The question is not raised in Clarke v. Larre-

judication in ba11kruptcy, is a seizure of the property by the
law for the b('nefit of creditors, and an appropriation of it to
the payment of the debts of the bankrupt. It is a seizure of
the property by legal process, equal in rank to and of the same
force and effect as by execution or attachment.''
In other words, it is the established doctrine that bankruptcy
proceedings are in rem, and when commenced all of the property
then held by the bankrupt or for his use (aside from exemptions) is suhjected to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court,
and that, when bankruptcy is adjudicated, the sequestration
reaches all such property at least, and becomes operative from
the institution of proceedings, as ''a caveat to all the world,''
preventing interference by attachments or other means in derogation of the interests of the estate. In re Pekin Plow Co., 50
C. C. A. 257, 259, 112 Fed. 308; Chesapeake Shoe Co. v. Seidner,
58 C. C. A. 261, 264, 122 Fed. 593; Loveland's Bankruptcy (2d
ed.) 366; Collier on Bankruptcy (5th ed.) 553. While title
rests i11 the bankrupt up to adjudication, and in form until a
trustee qualifies, it is subject to the pending sequestration, and
no rights can be acquired thereunder which are not equally
amenable. The formal title of the bankn1pt to the estate passes
to the trustee ( § 70a) "by operation of law" as of the da tc of
adjudication, but the trustee is vested as well under subdivisions
(4) and (5) with property transferred iu fraud of creditors,
and "property which prior to the filing of the petition" the
bankrupt "could by any means have transferred" or which
might have been levied upon and sold. Thus the narrow construction of the first-mentioned provision, which is sought for
£>S('ape from liability for the plain violation of the act through
the seizure in question, not only ignores these succeeding and
comprehensive clauses, but it would nullify the terms and entire
policy of the act for the protection of creditors against spoliation of estates subject to bankruptcy proceedings.
We are clearly of opinion that such rights of action, arising
out of transactions prohibited by the act, vest in and are enfnreeahle hy the trustee, unaffected by the date when the legal
tit le passes from the bankrupt to the trustee. In re Pekin Plow
ro .. 50 C. C. A. 257, ·"259, 112 Fed. 308; In re Gareewich, 53
\. \.A. 510, rl13, 115 Fed. 87; In re Breslauer (D. C.) , 121 Fed.
'll 11: !114: Chesapeake Shoe Co. v. Seldner, 58 C. C. A. 261, 265,
1:2:! F ed. 593. The question is not raised in Clarke v. Larre-
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more, 188 U. S. 486, 23 Sup. Ct. 363, 47 L. ed. 555, bat the

recovery affirmed in that case could rest on no other view.

In reference to the further contention that the proceeds of

the attachment and sale gave the plaintiff in error no per-

centage upon the indebtedness to it beyond that received br-

other creditors, and thus no preference in fact, it is sufficient

to remark that the alleged cause of action does not rest upon

the provision relating to preferences, but upon the prohibited

seizure and appropriation of property of the estate vested in

the court of bankruptcy for administration. Whether the

amount realized was more or less than the percentage which

might otherwise have been awarded the creditor cannot enter

into consideration.2

2. KINDS OP PROPERTY

In re COFFIN

152 Fed. 381, 81 C. C. A. 507

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. February, 26, 1907)

v

more, 188 U. S. 486, 23 Sup. Ct. 363, 47 L. ed. 555, but the
recovery affirmed in that case could rest on no other view.
In reference to the further contention that the proceeds of
the attachment and sale gave the plaintiff in error no percentage upon the indebtedness to it beyond that received by
other creditors, and thus no preference in fact, it is sufficient
to remark that the alleged cause of action does not rest upon
the provision relating to preferences, but upon the prohibited
seizure and appropriation of property of the estate vested in
the court of bankruptcy for administration. · Whether the
amount realized was more or le.ss than the percentage which
· might otherwise have been awarded the creditor cannot enter
into consideratioo.2

This cause comes here upon petition to review an order of

the District Court, District of Connecticut, enjoining the bank-

2.

rupt from making any conveyances of certain real estate in
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western states, standing in his name, and directing him to turn
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over certain drafts and cash to the trustee in bankruptcy.

LACOMBE, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts). In 1890 a

152 Fed. 381, 81 C. C. A. 507

Nebraska corporation, the Real Estate & Live Stock Association,

of which the bankrupt and his wife were stockholders, being fi-

nancially embarrassed, sought a loan from its stockholders. The

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. February, 26, 1907)

stockholders advanced $50,000 ($18.75 per share of their re-

spective holdings), and took as security a mortgage upon nu-

merous parcels of real estate in Nebraska and Wyoming. The

mortgagee named in the instrument was one Alonzo Clark as

trustee. The money not being paid, Clark brought suit in fore-

closure, and under proper decree the real estate in Nebraska

was sold and bought in by him and conveyance thereof made to

2—That part of the opinion deal- the judgment was reversed and new

\

This cause comes here upon petition to review an order of
the District Court, District of Connecticut, enjoining the bankrupt from making any conveyances of certain real estate in
western states, standing in his name, and directing him to turn
over certain drafts and cash to the trustee in bankruptcy.

ing with the second question is trial directed.

omitted. Because of the damages See Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206

having been measured improperly U. S. 28, 51 L. ed. 945.

LACOMBE, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts). In 1890 a
Nebraska corporation, the Real Estate & Live Stock Association,
of which the bankrupt and his wife were stockholders, being financially embarrassed, sought a loan from its stockholders. Tbe
stockholders advanced $50,000 ($18.75 per share of their respective holdings), and took as security a mortgage upon numerous parcels of real estate in Nebraska and Wyoming. The
mortgagee named in the instrument was one Alonzo Clark as
trustee. The money not being paid, Clark brought suit in foreclosure, and under proper decree the real estate in Nebraska
was sold and bought in by him and conveyance thereof made to
2-That part of the opinion dealing with the second question is
omitted. Because of the damages
having been measured improperly

the judgment was reversed and new
trial directed.
See Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206
U. S. 281 51 L. ed. lMD.
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him by the "master commissioner under foreclosure proceed-

ings." The real estate in Wyoming was bought in by Coffin. In

November, 1900, Clark conveyed all the real estate to Coffin,

who thereupon undertook to sell and dispose of the same and

to distribute the proceeds ratably to the beneficiaries, for whom

he was acting as trustee. Upon the sale of one parcel in Ne-

braska, the prospective purchasers questioned Coffin's title to

the lands. Thereupon each of the parties interested and the

association executed quitclaim deeds to Coffin of their respective

interests in all said lands both in Nebraska and Wyoming.

Moreover, a friendly suit was brought in Nebraska by Coffin

against the association and all the other parties in interest to

quiet the title, and decree was entered therein June 2, 1902,

declaring that the title of Coffin in and to said lands was abso-

lute as against any of the parties defendant. On or prior to

that date the quitclaim deeds were all filed.

Subsequent to June 2, 1902, Coffin sold and conveyed from

time to time portions of said real estate in both states, and re-

ceived in payment therefor certain amounts of cash, which were

deposited with his personal account in a bank in Middletown,

and certain notes and mortgages which were taken in his in-

dividual name for part payment of such sales. From the
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amounts so received he paid between July 30 and October 30,

1902, to the parties who had advanced the funds to the associa-

tion 30 per cent of the amount so loaned or advanced by them,

together with 8 per cent interest thereon. Part of these pay-

ments were made in cash and part by the transfer to them of

notes secured by mortgages received -in part payment for the

lands so sold. Subsequently to these payments there had accu-

mulated a large sum over and above disbursements from sales

of tne land in question, which had been deposited in his bank

account. On November 14, 1903, he drew his entire deposit

($4,800) from the bank, took $1,000 in cash which he kept in a

drawer at his office, and added to it a draft of $1,915.86 which

he had received from his agent in the West as proceeds of the

sale of part of said lands, and bought a draft on New York to

the order of himself as trustee of $7,715.86. This draft and

some others sent from the West by said agent have come into

the possession of the trustee in bankruptcy. On December 2,

1903, Coffin was adjudicated a bankrupt on his own petition.

Various technical matters have been eliminated during the

him by the ''master commissioner under foreclosure proceedings." The real estate in Wyoming was bought in by Coffin. In
November, 1900, Clark conveyed all the real estate to Coffin,
who thereupon undertook to sell and dispose of the same and
to distribute the proceeds ratably to the beneficiaries, for whom
he was acting as trustee. Upon the sale of one parcel in Nebraska, the prospective purchasers questioned Coffin's title to
the lands. Thereupon each of the parties interested and the
association executed quitclaim deeds to Coffin of their respective
interests in all said lands both in Nebraska and Wyoming
Moreover, a friendly suit was brought iu Nebraska by Coffin
against the association and all the other parties in interest to
quiet the title, and decree was entered therein June 2, 1902,
declaring that the title of Coffin in and to said lands was abso1ute as against any of the parties defendant. On or prior to
that date the quitclaim deeds were all filed.
Subsequent to June 2, 1902, Coffin sold and conveyed from
time to time portions of said real estate in both states, and received in payment therefor certain amounts of cash, which were
deposited with his personal account in a bank in Middletown,
and certain notes and mortgages which were taken in his individual name for part payment of such sales. From the
amounts so received he paid between July 30 and October 30,
1902, to the parties who had advanced the funds to the association 30 per cent of the amount so loaned or advanced by them,
together with 8 per cent interest thereon. Part of these payments were made in cash and part by the transfer to them of
notes secured by mortgages received ·in part payment for the
lands so sold. Subsequently to these payments there had accumulated a large sum over and above disbursements from sales
of the land in question, which had been deposited in his bank
account. On November 14, 1903, he drew his entire deposit
($4,800) from the bank, took $1,000 in cash which he kept in a
drawer at his office, and added to it a draft of $1,915.86 which
he had received from his agent in the West as proceeds of the
sale of part of said lauds, and bought a draft on New York to
the order of himself as trustee of $7,715.86. This draft and
~ome others sent from the West by said agent hav" rome into
the possession of the trustee in bankruptcy. On December 2,
1903, Coffin was adjudicated a bankrupt on his own petition.
Various technical matters have been eliminated during the
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argument, and the single question is presented whether the sev-

eral parcels of real estate yet unsold prior to December 2, 1903,

were held by Coffin in trust for the beneficiaries, and therefore

did not pass to his trustee in bankruptcy, or whether they were

a part of his individual estate to be disposed of by the trustee

for the benefit of his creditors. That question may appropriately

be answered by this court. The bankrupt and the trustee (rep-

resenting all the creditors) duly appeared. The record would

seem to indicate that there was no appearance for the so-called

"beneficiaries," who claim interest in the western lands, but it

was asserted upon the argument that the record is defective in

that respect, and, with the consent and concurrence of all parties,

the beneficiaries formally entered their appearance in this court.

It appears from the referee's findings of fact that credit was

not given or extended by any creditors upon the strength of

Coffin being the owner of the lands and property in question.

This simplifies the situation, because under such circumstances

the trustee in bankruptcy stands in no better position than that

in which the bankrupt stood on the day the petition was filed,

and it will be necessary only to determine whether, if there had

been no bankruptcy, the beneficiaries could in a court of equity

have established their right to have him dispose of these lands

them.
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for their benefit and distribute the proceeds ratably among

The express trust created by the deeds to Clark as trustee and

from Clark to Coffin, and resultant upon the furnishing of the

money by the beneficiaries, was terminated by the delivery of

the quitclaim deeds and by the entry of the decree of the Ne-

braska court on June 2, 1902. Coffin already held the legal

title, and each quitclaim deed conveyed to him every right, title,

and interest, legal and equitable, which the beneficiary execut-

ing it had to convey. At the close of this transaction Coffin was

the absolute owner with no outstanding interest in and no re-

sultant trust to any one. But, since the property was his abso-

lutely, he was entirely free to do what he pleased with it. He

could convey it to one, or more, or all of his fellow stockholders,

or to a stranger. He could convey it to any one he chose in

trust to make any disposition of it he might prescribe so long as

such trust did not violate the law or the statutes of the state.

He could make a declaration of trust which would constitute

argument, and the single question is presented whether the several parcels of real estate yet unsold prior to December 2, 1903.
were held by Coffin in trust for the beneficiaries, and therefore
did not pass to his trustee in bankruptcy, or whether they were
a part of his individual estate to be disposed of by the trustee
for the benefit of his creditors. That question may appropriately
be answered by this court. The bankrupt and the trustee (representing all the creditors) duly appeared. The record would
seem to indicate that there was no appearance for the so-called
"beneficiaries," who claim interest in the western lands, but it
was asserted upon the argument that the record is defective in
that respect, and, with the consent and concurrence of all parties,
the beneficiaries formally entered their appearance in this court.
It appears from the referee's findings of fact that credit was
not given or extended by any creditors upon the strength of
Coffin being the owner of the lands and property in question.
This simplifies the situation, because under such circumstances
the trustee in bankruptcy stands in no better position than that
in which the bankrupt stood on the day the petition was filed,
and it will be necessary only to determine whether, if there had
been no bankruptcy, the beneficiaries could in a court of equity
have established their right to have him dispose of these lands
for their benefit and distribute the proceeds ratauly among
t.hem.
The express trust created by the deeds to Clark as trustee and
from Clark to Coffin, and resultant upon the furnishing of the
money by the beneficiaries, was terminated by the delivery of
the quitclaim deeds and by the entry of the decree of the Nebraska court on June 2, 1902. Coffin already held the legal
title, and each quitclaim deed conveyed to him every right, title,
and interest, legal and equitable, which the beneficiary executing it had to convey. At the close of this transaction Coffin was
the absolute owner with no outstandinll: interest in and no resultant trust to any one. But, since the property was his absolutely, he was entirely free to do what he pleased with it. He
could convey it to 011e, or more, or all of his fellow stockholders,
or to a stranger. He could convey it to any one he chose in
trust to make any disposition of it he might prescribe so long as
such trust did not violate the law or the statutes of the state.
He could make a declaration of trust which would constitute
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himself the trustee for any such purpose. What did he do after

he became the absolute owner on June 2, 1902? Were his acts

such that as between himself and the other stockholders—to

whom undoubtedly he owed a moral obligation to distribute a

proportionate part of the proceeds—a court of equity would

hold that he had created a new trust in their favor? It seems

to us that, upon this record, such question must be auswered in

the affirmative.

In the first place we have the sworn statement of Coffin him-

self made June 15, 1904, that although he held the apparent

legal title to the several parcels of land, the same was really in

trust for the benefit of the several individuals whom he enumer-

ated and called beneficiaries. This statement was made after

bankruptcy, and no act of his at that time, no position which

he might take, could alter the status established by the bank-

ruptcy. But it is not as an act of the bankrupt that this state-

ment of June 15, 1904, is important. It is an historical narra-

tive of a transaction long prior to the bankruptcy, and, with such

a sworn "declaration against interest" in the case, it is difficult

to see how a court of equity could refuse such relief as would

give the applicants the benefit of the trust which he thus de-

clared he had created. Nor is this declaration a mere after-
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thought. Coffin's whole course of conduct shows that he con-

sidered himself a trustee for his fellow stockholders. The referee

has found that between July 30 and October 30, 1902, he col-

lected from the sale of these lands and distributed to them 30

per cent of the amounts originally advanced by them. Nor were

his declarations merely oral. The referee finds that:

"In and about October, 1903, he wrote to some and made

statements to others of the parties named in the petition, and

therein called beneficiaries, that he soon hoped and intended to

pay another dividend of from 30 to 40 per cent to claimants

who had advanced funds to the Nebraska Real Estate & Live

Stock Association, part of which was to be paid in cash and

part with notes secured by mortgages on the land in question.

See Exhibits 73 to 131."

Examination of the exhibits referred to shows that the dec-

larations of Coffin as to the equities of the beneficiaries were

much more explicit than the above quotation would indicate.

Thus on August 2, 1902, he writes to one of the beneficiaries to

himself the trustee for any such purpose. What did he do after
he became the absolute owner on Jnne 2, 19021 Were his acts
such that as between himself and the other stockholders-to
whom undoubtedly he owed a moral obligation to distribute a
proportionate part of the p:roceeds-a court of equity would
hold that he had created a new trust in their favorY It seems
to us that, upon this record, such question must be answered in
the affirmative.
In the first place we have the sworn statement of Coffin himself made June 15, 1904, that although he held the apparent
legal title to the several parcels of land, the same was really in
trust for the benefit of the several individuals whom he enumerated and called beneficiaries. This statement was made after
bankruptcy, and no act of his at that time, no position which
he might take, could alter the status established by the bankruptcy. But it is not as an act of the bankrupt that this statement of June 15, 1904, is important. It is an historical narrative of a transaction long prior to the bankruptcy, and, with such
a sworn "declaration against interest" in the case, it is difficult
to see how a court of equity could refuse such relief as would
give the applicants the benefit of the trust which he thus declared he had created. Nor is this declaration a mere afterthought. Coffin's whole course of conduct shows that he considered himself a trustee for his fellow stockholders. The referee
has found that between July 30 and October 30, 1902, he collected from the sale of these lands and distributed to them 30
per cent of the amounts originally advanced by them. Nor were
his declarations merely oral. The referee finds that:
"In and about October, 1903, he wrote to some and made
statements to others of the parties named in the petition, and
therein called beneficiaries, that he soon hoped and intended to
pay another dividend of from 30 to 40 per cent to claimantl:1
who had advanced funds to the Nebraska Real Estate & Live
Stock Association, part of which was to be paid in cash and
part with notes secured by mortgages on the land in question.
See Exhibits 73 to 131."
Examination of the exhibits referred to shows that the declarations of Coffin as to the equities of the beneficiaries were
much more explicit than the above quotation would indicate.
Thus on August 2, 1902, he writes to one of the beneficiaries to
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whom he had sent three notes received as part payment for a

parcel of land just sold:

"A party in Nebraska has made me an offer of $950 for each

$1,000 note, but I have replied that the notes are not mine. If

you should wish to accept the offer, please so advise when re-

turning the receipt."

No one can peruse these exhibits without being convinced that

subsequent to June 2, 1902, Coffin undertook to manage these

lands, to sell them, and to distribute the proceeds in the interest

of all who had originally invested in the enterprise. No doubt

the fact that there was such a trust was kept secret, so that no

other prospective purchaser might question the title to any

property he sold, but it was communicated to the others over

Coffin's signature repeatedly, and, since the rights of no one

else had supervened during this period of secrecy, a court of

chancery would have enforced their equities had application

been made to do so just before the petition in bankruptcy was

filed. As the district judge expresses it, '' the acts of Mr. Coffin

after the decree [of June, 1902] undoubtedly put the stock-

holders in a position where they could, if there had been time,

have established such a relation;" i. e., a trust relationship.

That being so, the trustee in bankruptcy, who is not the grantee
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of the bankrupt for a valuable consideration, but a transferee

by act of the law, who takes his property subject to all existing

equities, cannot successfully dispute their right to establish such

relationship in an appropriate tribunal. And, since all parties

are here, this court may properly dispose of the controversy.

As to the various drafts referred to supra, the evidence is

not sufficiently clear to enable us to determine how much of

them represents proceeds of sales of land and how much repre-

sents general funds of the bankrupt. Upon remand of the cause

the District Court will be able to determine those questions.

The order is reversed, and cause remanded, with instructions

to the District Court to vacate the injunction which now pre:

vents Coffin as trustee for the "beneficiaries" from continuing

to sell this western land and to distribute the proceeds between

them. As to the drafts and cash, disposition can be made of

them in conformity with the views expressed in this opinion.3

3—See Carpenter v. Marnell, 3 129. Cf. In re Packing Co., 138 Fed.

B. & P. 40; In re Davie, 112 Fed. 625.

whom he had sent three notes received as part payment for a
parcel of land just sold:
''A party in Nebraska has made me an offer of $950 for t•a1·h
$1,000 note, but I have replied that the notes are not mine. If
you should wish to accept the offer, please so advise when returning the receipt."
~o one can peruse these exhibits without being convinced that
~uhsequent to June 2, 1902, Coffin undertook to manage these
lands, to sell them, and to distribute the proceeds in the interest
of all who had originally invested in the enterprise. No doubt
the fact that there was such a trust was kept secret, so that no
other prospective purchaser might question the title to any
property he sold, but it was communicated to the others over
Coffin's signature repeatedly, and, since the rights of no one
else had supervened during this period of secrecy, a court of
chancery would have enforced their equities bad application
been made to do so just before the petition in bankruptcy was
filed. AB the district judge expresses it, ''the acts of Mr. Coffin
after the decree [of June, 1902] undoubtedly put the stockholders in a position where they could, if there had been time,
have established such a relation;" i. e., a trust relationship.
That being so, the trustee in bankruptcy, who is not the grantee
of the bankrupt for a valuable consideration, but a transferee
by act of the law, who takes his property subject to all existing
equities, cannot successfully dispute their right to establish such
relationship in an appropriate ·tribunal. And, since all parties
are here, this court may properly dispose of the controversy.
As to the various drafts referred to supra, the evidence is
not sufficiently clear to enable us to determine how much of
them represents proceeds of sales of land and how much represents general funds of the bankrupt. Upon remand of the cause
the District Court will be able to determine those questions.
The order is reversed, and cause remanded, with instructions
to the District Court to vacate the injunction which now pre:
vents Coffin as trustee for the ''beneficiaries'' from continuing
to sell this western land and to distribute the proceeds between
them. AB to the drafts and cash, disposition can be made of
them in conformity with the views expressed in this opinion.s
3-See Carpenter v. Marnell, 3
B. & P. 40; In re Davia, 112 Fed.

129. Cf. In re Packing Co., 138 Fed.
625.
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PANY v. HALL

229 U. S. 511, 57 L. ed. 1306, 33 Sup. Ct. 885

(United States Supreme Court. June 9, 1913)

Hall, a resident of Douglas county, Nebraska, was employed

CHICAGO, BURLINGTON, & QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY v. HALL

by the railroad as switchman in its yards in Omaha. His wages

were exempt from garnishment by the laws of Nebraska. In

229 U. S. 511, 57 L. ed. 1306, 33 Sup. Ct. 885

July, 1907, he was insolvent, and in that month, while tem-

porarily in the state of Iowa, two proceedings were instituted

(United States Supreme Court. June 9, 1913)

against him, in which he was personally served, and the rail-

road, which owed him $122 as wages, was garnisheed. In one

of these cases Rawles sued on an open account for $54.20, the

railroad being required to answer on August 10th. In the other,

Torrey, holding a judgment for $22.40, rendered in 1894, served

a summons of garnishment on the railroad, requiring it to an-

swer on August 27, 1907.

While these proceedings were pending in the Iowa courts,

Hall returned to Nebraska, and, on August 7, 1907, he was, on

his own application, adjudged a bankrupt, his wages being

claimed as exempt, and the two Iowa plaintiffs included in his

list of creditors. Notice of the bankruptcy proceeding was given

to them and to the railroad.

Thereafter, on August 10th, the railroad answered in the
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Rawles suit, admitting that it owed Hall $122, and a judgment

was accordingly entered against the railroad as garnishee for

$61.60. On August 27, it answered in the Torrey suit, and the

court entered judgment against it as garnishee for $56.91. Hall,

in the bankruptcy proceedings, had asked that, as allowed by

the laws of Nebraska, his wages be set apart as exempt, and filed

a petition praying that the railroad should be summarily ordered

to pay him the amount due for work done in June and July,

1907. The application was resisted by the railroad and was

denied by the court, which held, on the authority of Ingram v.

Wilson, 60 C. C. A. 618, 125 Fed. 913, that the bankruptcy court

could determine that the property was exempt, but had no juris-

diction to compel ita payment.

In view of that ruling, Hall made a further application to

have the $122 set off to him as exempt. An order to that effect

was passed by the referee. Hall was discharged as a bankrupt

in April, 1908, and then sued the railroad and recovered a judg-

H. A A. Bankruptcy—82

Hall, a resident of Douglas county, Nebraska, was employed
by the railroad as switchman in its yards in Omaha. His wages
were exempt from garnishment by the laws of Nebraska. In
July, 1907, he was insolvent, and in that month, while temporarily in the. state of Iowa, two proceedings were iustit ute<l
against him, in which he was personally served, and the railroad, which owed him $122 as wages, was garnisheed. In one
of these cases Rawles sued on an open accow1t for $54.20, the
railroad being required to answer on August 10th. In the other,
Torrey, holding a judgment for $22.40, rendered in 1894, served
a summons of garnishment on the railroad, requiring it to answer on August 27, 1907.
While these proceedings were pending in the Iowa courts,
Hall returned to Nebraska, and, on August 7, 1907, he was, on
his own application, adjudged a bankr\lpt, his wages being
claimed as exempt, and the two Iowa plaintiffs included in his
list of creditors. Notice of the bankruptcy proceeding was given
to them and to the railroad.
Thereafter, on August 10th, the railroad answered in the
Rawles suit, admitting that it owed Hall $122, and a judgment
was accordingly entered against the railroad as garnishee for
$61.60. On August 27, it answered in the Torrey suit, and the
court entered judgment against it as garnishee for $56.91. Hall,
in the bankruptcy proceedings, had asked that, as allowed by
the laws of Nebraska, his wages be set apart as exempt, and filed
a petition praying that the railroad should be summarily ordered
to pay him the amount due for work done in June and July,
1907. The application was resisted by the railroad and was
denied by the court, which held, on the authority of Ingram v.
Wilson, 60 C. C. A. 618, 125 Fed. 913, that the bankruptcy court
could determine that the property was exempt, but had no jurisdiction to compel its payment.
In view of that ruling, Hall made a further application to
have the $122 set off to him as exempt. An order to that effect
was passed by the referee. Hall was discharged as a bankrupt
in April, 1908, and then sued the railroe.d and recovered a judgH. le A. Bankruptc)'-82

498

498

ADMINISTRATION

ADMINISTRATION

ment, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court (88 Neb. 20,

128 N. W. 645), and the case was brought here.

Mr. Justice LAMAR, after making the foregoing statement

ment, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court (88 Neb. 20.
128 N. W. 645), and the case was brought here.

of facts, delivered the opinion of the court:

Hall, a married man, head of a family, and insolvent, worked

as a switchman for the railroad company in Nebraska, his wages

being exempt from garnishment by the laws of that state. While

temporarily absent in Iowa, two suits were there brought against

him, summons of garnishment being served upon the railroad's

agent in Iowa, where it had been held that the Nebraska exemp-

tion statute had no extra-territorial effect.

While these two suits were pending in Iowa, Hall returned to

Nebraska, was adjudged a bankrupt, and claimed his wages as

exempt. No defense was made to the Iowa suits, and in both

eases judgment was entered against the railroad as garnishee.

For this reason it refused to pay Hall when he demanded the

money, which had been set apart to him as exempt by the referee.

He then sued the company and recovered a judgment, which

was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Nebraska. The railroad

. sued out a writ of error to test its liability in this class of cases,

which it insists are constantly arising, because of the employ-

ment of many persons on its lines, extending into different states,
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with varying garnishment laws. It contends that the laws of

Iowa do not recognize the Nebraska exemption of wages from

garnishment; that Hall was personally served in the Iowa suits,

and that the judgments therein entered against the railroad as

garnishee are unreversed and binding; that to compel it to pay

Hall and these Iowa plaintiffs also is to impose upon it a double

liability, and to deny to the judgments of the Iowa courts the

full faith and credit to which they are entitled under the Fed-

eral Constitution.

But if they were nullified by § 67/ of the bankruptcy act, they

are entitled to no faith and no credit. That they were so nulli-

fied is Hall's contention; for he insists that if there was a lien

against his wages, it was obtained by garnishment served within

four months of his bankruptcy, and discharged by virtue of the

provisions of § 67/, which declares that "all • • * liens ob-

tained through legal proceedings against a person who is in-

solvent, at any time within four months prior to the filing of a

petition in bankruptcy against him, shall be deemed null and

void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the property af-

Mr. Justice LAMAR, after making the foregoing statement
of facts, delivered the opinion of the court:
Hall, a married man, head of a family, and insolvent, worked
as a switchman for the railroad company in Nebraska, his wages
being exempt from garnishment by the laws of that state. While
temporarily absent in Iowa, two suits were there brought against
him, summons of garnishment being served upon the railroad's
agent in Iowa, where it had been held that the Nebraska exemp- _
tion statute had no extra..territorial effect.
While these two suits were pending in Iowa, Hall returned to
Nebraska, was adjudged a bankrupt, and claimed his wages as
exempt. No defense was made to the Iowa suits, and in both
cases judgment was entered against the railroad as garnishee.
For this reason it refused to pay Hall when he demanded the
money, which had been set apart to him as exempt by the referee.
He then sued the company and recovered a judgment, which
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Nebraska. The railroad
. sued out a writ of error to test its liability in this class of cases,
which it insists are constantly arising, because of the employment of many persons on its lines, extending into different states,
with varying garnishment laws. It contends that the laws of
Iowa do not recognize the Nebraska exemption of wages from
garnishment; that Hall was personally served in the Iowa suits,
and that the judgments therein entered against the railroad as
garnishee are unreversed and binding; that to compel it to pay
Hall and these Iowa plaintiffs also is to impose upon it a double
liability, and to deny to the judgments of the Iowa courts the
full faith and credit to which they are entitled under the Federal Constitution.
But if they were nullified by § 67f of the bankruptcy act, they
are entitled to no faith and no credit. That they were so nullified is Hall's contention; for he insists that if there was a lien
against bis wages, it was obtain,ed by garnishment served within
four mouths of his bankruptcy, and discharged by virtue of the
provisions of § 67f, which declares that ''all • • • liens obtained through legal proceedings against a person who is insolvent, at any time within four months prior to the .filing of a
prtition in bankruptcy against him, shall .be deemed null and
void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the property af-
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fected by the levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien shall

be deemed wholly discharged and released from the same, and

fected by the levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien shall

shall pass tc the trustee as a part of the estate of the bankrupt."

The railroad, on the other hand, contends that under § 70 the

trustee acquires no title "to property which is exempt," and

that liens thereon are not discharged by § 6T/, since that section

has reference only to liens on property which can "pass to the

trustee as a part of the estate of the bankrupt."

On this question there is a difference of opinion, some state

and Federal courts holding that the bankruptcy act was intended

to protect the creditor's trust fund, and not the bankrupt's own

property, and that therefore liens against the exempt property

were not annulled even though obtained by legal proceedings

within four months of filing the petition. Re Driggs, 171 Fed.

897; Re Durham, 104 Fed. 231. On the other hand, Re Tune,

115 Fed. 906; Re Forbes, 108 C. C. A. 191, 186 Fed. 79, hold

that § €7/ annuls all such liens, both as against the property

which the trustee takes and that which may be set aside to the

bankrupt as exempt.

This view, we think, is supported both by the language of the

section and the general policy of the act, which was intended

not only to secure equality among creditors, but for the benefit

of the debtor in discharging him from his liabilities and en-
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abling him to start afresh with the property set apart to him

as exempt. Both of these objects would be defeated if judg-

ments like the present were not annulled, for otherwise the

two Iowa plaintiffs would not only obtain a preference over

other creditors, but would take property which it was the pur-

pose of the bankruptcy act to secure to the debtor.

Barring exceptional cases, which are specially provided for,

the policy of the act is to fix a four months' period in which a

creditor cannot obtain an advantage over other creditors nor a

lien against the debtor's property. "All liens obtained by legal

proceedings" within that period are declared to be null and

void. That universal language is not restricted by the later

provision that "the property affected by the • • * lien

shall be released from the same, and pass to the trustee as a part

of the estate of the bankrupt." It is true that title to exempt

property does not vest in the trustee, and cannot be adminis-

tered by him for the benefit of the creditors. But it can '' pass

to the trustee as a part of the estate of the bankrupt," for the

purposes named elsewhere in the statute, included in which is

be deemed wholly discharged and released from the same, and

shall p888 tc the trustee as a part of the estate of the bankrupt.''
The railroad, on the other hand, contends that under·§ 70 the
trustee acquires no title ''to property which is exempt,'' and
that liens thereon are not discharged by § 61{, since that section
has reference only to liens on property which can ''pass to the
trustee as a part of the estate of the bankrupt.''
On this question there is ·a difference of opinion, some state
and Federal courts holding that the bankruptcy act was intended
to protect the creditor's trust fund, and not the bankrupt's own
property, and that therefore liens against the exempt property
were not annulled even though obtained by legal proceedings
";thin four months of filing the petition. Re Driggs, 171 Fed.
897; Re Durham, 104 Fed. 231. On the other hand, Re Tune,
115 Fed. 906; Re Forbes, 108 C. C. A. 191, 186 Fed. 79, hold
that § f,7/ annuls a.II such liens, both as against the property
which the trustee takes and that which may be set aside to the
bankrupt as ex.empt.
This view, we think, is supported both by the language of the
section and the general policy of the act, which was intended
not only to secure equality among creditors, but for the benefit
of the debtor in discharging him from his liabilities and enabling him to start afresh with the property set apart to him
88 exempt. Both of these objects would be defeated if judgments like the present were uot annulled, for otherwise the
two Iowa plaintiffs would not only obtain a preference over
other creditors, but would take property which it was the purpose of the bankruptcy act to secure to the .debtor.
Barring exceptional cases, which are specially provided for,
the policy of the act is to fix a four months' period in which a
creditor cannot obtain an advantage over other creditors nor a
lien against the debtor's property. "All liens obtained by legal
proceedings" within that period are declared to be null and
void. That universal language is not restricted by the later
provision that ''the property affected by the • • • lien
shall be released from the same, and pass to the trustee as a part
of the estate of the bankrupt.'' It is true that title to exempt
property does not vest in the trustee, and cannot be administered by him for· the benefit of the creditors. But it can ''pass
to the trustee as a part of the estate of the bankrupt,'' for the
purposes named elsewhere in the statute, included in which is
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the duty to segregate, identify, and appraise what is claimed

to be exempt. He must make a report "of the articles set off

to the bankrupt, with the estimated value of each article," and

creditors have twenty days in which to except to the trustee"s

report. §47 (11) and general orders in bankruptcy 17. In

other words, the property is not automatically exempted, but

must "pass to the trustee as a part of the estate,"—not to be

administered for the benefit of creditors, but to enable him to

perform the duties incident to setting apart to the bankrupt

what, after a hearing, may be found to be exempt. Custody and

possession may be necessary to carry out these duties, and all

levies, seizures, and liens obtained by legal proceedings within

the four months, that may or do interfere with that possession,

are annulled, not only for the purpose of preventing the prop-

erty passing to the trustee as a part of the estate, but for all

purposes, including that of preventing their subsequent use

against property that may ultimately be set aside to the bank-

rupt. This property is withdrawn from the possession of the

trustee, not for the purpose of being subjected to such liens,

hut on the supposition that it needed no protection, inasmuch

as they had been nullified.

The liens rendered void by § 67/ are those obtained by legal
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proceedings within four months. The section does not, however,

defeat rights in the exempt property acquired by contract or by

waiver of the exemption. These may be enforced or foreclosed

by judgments obtained even after the petition in bankruptcy was

filed, under the principle declared in Lockwood v. Exchange

Bank, 190 U. S. 294, 47 L. ed. 1061, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 751. But

Hall did not waive his exemption in favor of the Iowa plaintiffs,

and they had no right against his wages except that which was

obtained by a legal proceeding within four months of the bank-

ruptcy. Those liens, having been annulled by § 67/ of the bank-

ruptcy act, furnished no defense to the railroad when sued by

Hall for his wages, earned in Nebraska, exempt by the laws of

that state, and duly set apart to him by the referee in bank-

ruptcy. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Nebraska is

affirmed.4

4—Southern Pac. Co. v. I. X. L.

Furniture, etc., House (Utah, 1914),

MO Pac. 665, acc.

the duty to segregate, identify, and appraise what is claimed
to be exempt. He must make a report '•of the articles set off
to the bankrupt, with the estimated value of each article,'' and
creditors have twenty days in which. to except to the trustee ·s
report. § 47 (11) and general orders in bankruptcy 17. Jn
other words, the property is not automatically exempted, but
must "pass to the trustee as a part of the estate, "-not to be
ad.ministered for the benefit of creditors, but to enable him to
perform the duties incident to setting apart to the bankrupt
what, after a hearing, may be found to be exempt. Custody and
possession may be necessary to carry out these duties, and all
levies, seizures, and liens obtained by legal proceedings within
the four months, that may or do interfere with that possession,
are annulled, not only for the purpose of preventing the property passing to the trustee as a part of the estate, but for all
purposes, including that ·of preventing their subsequent use
agaiwrt property that may ultimately be set aside to the bankrupt. This property is withdrawn from the possession of the
trustee, not for the purpose of being subjected to such liens,
hut on the supposition that it needed no protection, inasmuch
as they had been nullified.
The liens rendered void by § 67/ are those obtained by 'legal
proceedings within four months. The section does not, however,
defeat rights in the exempt property acquired by contract or by
waiver of the exemption. These may be enforced or foreclosed
hy judgments obtained even after the petition in bankruptcy was
filed, under the principle declared in Lockwood v. Exchange
Bank, 190 U. S. 294, 47 L. ed. 1061, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 751. But·
Hall did not waive his exemption in favor of the Iowa plaintiffs,
and they hacl no right against his wages except that which was
obtained by a legal proceeding within four months of the bankruptcy. Those liens, having been annulled by § 67/ of the bankruptcy act, furnished no defense to the railroad when sued by
Hall for his wages, earned in Nebraska, exempt_by the laws of
that state, and duly set apart to him by the referee in bankruptcy. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Nebraska lS
affirmed.4
4-Soutbern Pac. Co. v. I. X. L.
Furniture, etc., House (Utah, 1914),
H 0 Pac. 665, acc.
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LOCKWOOD v. EXCHANGE BANK

190 U. S. 294, 47 L. ed. 1061, 23 Sup. Ct. 751

LOCKWOOD v. EXCHANGE BANK

(United States Supreme Court. June 1, 1903)

In this proceeding, upon certain questions being certified by

190 U. S. 294, 47 L. ed. 1061, 23 Sup. Ct. 751

the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the fifth circuit

for decision by this court, a writ of certiorari was allowed, and

(United States Supreme Court. June 1, 1903)

the entire record has been brought up for consideration.

The controversy is fully set forth in the following "state-

ment of case," embodied in the certificate of the Circuit Court

of Appeals:

"On the 23d day of November, 1900, said Joel W. Lockwood

was, on his application, duly adjudged a bankrupt by the District

Court of the United States for the southern district of Georgia.

On December 6, 1900, F. T. Rape was duly appointed trustee for

said bankrupt; on the 16th day of December, 1900, the said F. T.

Rape, trustee, set aside and designated as an exemption all of

the property returned by the said bankrupt in his schedule of

assets. On the 1st day of January, 1901, the Exchange Bank of

Fort Valley, a creditor who had duly proven its debt as an unse-

cured claim, filed exceptions to the trustee's assignment of home-

stead and exemption, upon the following grounds:

"' (a) That said creditor held a contract against the bankrupt
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in which said bankrupt specially waived and renounced all right

to the homestead exemption allowed by the laws of Georgia or the

United States. Said waiver is contained in a note constituting

contract of indebtedness, and was made in accordance with the

provisions of the Constitution and laws of said state, authorizing

and empowering the debtor to waive and renounce in writing his

right to the benefit of the exemption provided for by the Con-

stitution and laws of said state.

"'(6) That creditor's debt was unsecured, save and except

so far as a waiver of homestead and exemption may be construed

as a security.

"' (c) That the trustee has set apart all the property of said

bankrupt returned by him in bankruptcy.

"'(d) Under the laws of Georgia, the debtor's exemption can-

not be subjected to the payment of a debt containing a waiver

of homestead except by putting said debt in judgment, and after-

wards causing execution to issue thereon to be levied on the

In this proceeding, upon certain questions being certified by
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the fifth circuit
for decision by this court, a writ of certiorari was allowed, and
the entire record has been brought up for consideration.
The controversy is fully set forth in the following "statt!ment of case,'' embodied in the certificate of the Circuit Court
of Appeals:
"On the 23d day of November, 1900, said J()('l \V. Lockwood
was, on his application, duly adjudged a bankrupt by the Distriet
Court of the United States for the southern district of Georgia.
On December 6, 1900, F. T. Rape was duly appointed trustee for
said bankrupt; on the 16th day of December, 1900, the said I•'. T.
Rape, trustee, set aside and designated as an exemption all of
the property retumed by the said bankrupt in his schedule of
assets. On the 1st day of January, 1901, the Exchange Bank of
Fort Valley, a creditor who had duly proven its debt as an u11sccured claim, filed exceptions to the trustee's assignment of homestead and exemption, upon the following grounds:
" '(a) That said creditor held a contract against the bankrupt
in which said bankrupt specially waived and renounced all right
to the homestead exemption allowed by the laws of Georgia or the
United States. Said waiver is contained in a note constituting
contract of indebtedness, and was made in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution and laws of said state, authorizing
and empowering the debtor to \vaive and renounce in writing his
right to the benefit of the exemption provided for by the Constitution and laws of said state.
" ' (b) That creditor's debt was unsecured, save and except
so far as a waiver of homestead a11d exemption may be construed
as a security.
" '(c) That the trustee has set apart all the property of said
bankrupt returned by him in bankruptcy.
" '(d) Under the laws of Georgia, the debtor's exemption cannot be subjected to the payment of a debt containing a waiver
of homestead except by putting said debt in judgment, and afterwards causing execution to issue thereon to be levied on the
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exempt property, in accordance with the provisions of §§ 2850

et seq. of the Code of Georgia. If bankrupt court should ap-

prove trustee's assignment izi this case, without reserving to peti-

tioner the right to sue his claim and put same in judgment, and

without itself giving judgment for said debt, creditor would be

left without means of enforcing his rights created and arising

out of the aforesaid waiver, and would be without remedy.

"'(e) Creditor therefore prays equitable relief and such de-

cree as will protect his rights; that the homestead be set aside

and trustee be required to take charge of and administer the

property of said bankrupt so set apart, except so much as cannot

be waived, for the benefit of creditors holding waiver contracts.'

'' To these exceptions of the creditor the bankrupt duly filed a

demurrer on the following grounds:

"' (o) That said exceptions are wholly insufficient in law to

defeat the report of the trustee.

"'(b) That the exceptions made are not such as, under the

laws of Georgia, will defeat the setting apart of the exemption,

and furnish no reason why the trustee should not assign the

exemption.

"' (c) That the bankrupt court has no jurisdiction over ex-

empted property, and no authority to administer the same.
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".'(d) That there is no authority of law for the exceptions

made, nor for the relief sought.'

"The referee, Honorable Shelby Myrick, overruled the afore-

said demurrer, and directed the trustee to carve out of the said

exemption of property a portion of the same, amounting to

$300.00, which was to be free from the claims of all creditors.

The residue of the exempted property was to be sold, and the

proceeds held by the trustee for the benefit of creditors holding

waiver notes. The bankrupt was ordered to yield possession to

the trustee for the purpose of carrying out this order. The ref-

eree, at the request of bankrupt, certified the record in said case,

together with his decision thereon, to the Honorable Emory

Speer, judge of the District Court of said district, for final

determination. On the 30th March, 1901, said case came on regu-

larly to be tried before said district judge, and, after hearing

argument of counsel, his honor Judge Emory Speer held and

decided and adjudged the aforesaid exceptions to the determina-

tions and report of the trustee be sustained, and that the exemp-

tions set apart by the trustee in his said report be denied and

refused to the said bankrupt, save and except the item of house-

exempt property, ·in accordance with the provisiona of §§ 2850
et seq. of the Code of Georgia. If bankrupt court should approve trustee's assignment in this case, without reserving to petitioner the right to sue his claim and put same in judgment, and
without itself giving judgmel1t for said debt, creditor would be
left without means of enforcing his rights created and arising
out of the aforesaid waiver, and would be without remedy.
" '(e) Creditor therefore prays equitable relief and such decree 88 will protect his rights; that the homestead be set aside
· and trustee be required to take charge of and administer the
property of said bankrupt so set apart, except so much 88 cannot
be waived, for the benefit of credit~ holding waiver contracts.'
"To these exceptions of the creditor the bankrupt duly filed a
demurrer on the following grounds:
" '(a) That said exceptions are wholly insufficient in law to
defeat the report of the trustee.
'' ' ( b) That the exceptions made are not such as, under the
laws of Georgia, will defe.at the setting apart of the exemption.
and furnish no reason why the trustee should not assign the
exemption.
'' ' ( c) That the bankrupt court has no jurisdiction over exempted property, and no authority to administer the same.
" -' (d) That there is no authority of law for the exceptions
made, nor for the relief sought.'
''The referee, Honorable Shelby Myrick, overruled the aforesaid demurrer, and directed the trustee to carve out of the said
exemption of property a portion of the same, amounting to
$300.00, which was to be free from the claims of all creditors.
The residue of the exempted property was to be sold, and the
proceeds held by the trustee for the benefit of creditors holding
waiver notes. The bankrupt was ordered to yield possession to
the trustee for the purpose of carrying out this order. The referee, at the request of bankrupt, certified the record in said case,
together with his decision thereon, to the Honorable Emory
Speer, judge of the District Court of said district, for final
determination. On the 30th l\Iarch, 1901, said case came on regularly to be tried before said district judge, and, after hearing
argument of counsel, his honor Judge Emory Speer held and
decided and adjudged the aforesaid exceptions to the determinations and report of the trustee be sustained, and that the exemptions set apart by the trustee in bis said report be denied and
refused to the said bankrupt, save and except the item of house-

KINDS OP PROPERTY

503

KINDS OF PROPERTY

503

hold furniture and wearing apparel, and that the said bankrupt

was not entitled to an exemption as claimed by him, by reason of

having waived and renounced in writing his rights thereto, in

accordance with the Constitution and laws of the state of

Georgia."

This judgment of the District Court is the one complained of,

and which was sought to be revised in the Circuit Court of

Appeals.

Mr. Justice WHITE, after making the foregoing statement,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The general exemption of property from levy or sale, author-

ized by article 9, § 1, fl 1, of the present Constitution of the state

bold furniture and wearing apparel, and that the said bankrupt
was not entitled to an exemption as claimed by him, hy reason of
having waived and renounced in writing his rights thereto, in
accordance with the Constitution and laws of the state of
Georgi.a. ''
This judgment of the District Court is the one complained of,
and which was sought to be revised in the Circuit Court of
Appeals.

of Georgia (that of 1877), is "realty or personalty, or both, to

the value in the aggregate of $1,600." By article 9, § 3, If 1, of

the same Constitution, a debtor is vested with power to waive or

renounce in writing this right of exemption, '' except as to wear-

ing apparel, and not exceeding $300 worth of household and

kitchen furniture and provisions.'' The mode of enforcement of

a waiver of exemption is provided for in § 2850 of the Code of

1895, reading as follows:

"In all cases when any defendant in execution has applied

for and had set apart a homestead of realty and personalty, or
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either, or where the same has been applied for and set apart out

of his property, as provided for by the Constitution and laws of

this state, and the plaintiff in execution is seeking to proceed

with the same, and there is no property except the homestead on

which to levy upon the ground that his debt falls within some one

of the classes for which the homestead is bound under the Con-

stitution, it shall and may be lawful for such plaintiff, his agent,

or attorney, to make affidavit before any officer authorized to

administer oaths that, to the best of his knowledge and belief,

the debt uppn which such execution is founded is one from which

the homestead is not exempt, and it shall be the duty of the officer

in whose hands the execution and affidavit are placed to proceed

at once to levy and sell, as though the property had never been

set apart. The defendant in such execution may, if he desires to

do so, deny the truth of the plaintiff's affidavit by filing with

the levying officer.a counter affidavit."

The question presented on the record before us may be stated

in similar language to that which was used by the district judge

—the correctness of whose decision in the case at bar is now for

Mr. Justice WHITE, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The general exemption of property from levy or sale, authorized by article 9, § 1, if 1, of the present Constitution of the state
of Georgia (that of 1877), is "realty or personalty, or both, to
the value in the aggregate of $1,600. " By article 9, § 3, if 1, of
the same Constitution, a debtor is vested with power to waive or
renounce in writing this right of exemption, "except as to wearing apparel, and not exceeding $:300 worth of household and
kitchen furniture and provisions.'' The mode of enforcement of
a. waiver of exemption is provided for in § 2850 of the Code of
1895, reading as follows:
''In a.II cases . when any defendant in execution has applied
for and had set apart a homestead of realty and personalty, or
either, or where the same has been applied for and set apart out
of his propert.tr, as provided for by the Constitution and laws of
this state, and the plaintiff in execution is seeking to proceed
with the same, and there is no property except the homestead on
which to levy upon the ground that his debt falls within some one
of the classes for which the homestead is bound under the Constitution, it shall and may be lawful for such plaintiff, .his agent,
or attorney, to make affidavit before any officer authorized to
administer oaths that, to the best of his knowledge and belief,
the debt u~n which such execution is founded is one from which
the homestead is not exempt, and it shall be the duty of the officer
in whose hands the execution and affidavit are placed to proceed
at once to levy and sell, as though the property had never been
set apart. The defendant in such execution may, if he desires to
do so, deny the truth of the plaintiff's affidavit by filing with
the levying officer. a counter affidavit.''
The question presented on the record before us may be stated
in similar language to that which was used by the district judge
-the correctness of whose decision in the case at bar is now for
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review—in the course of his opinion In re Woodruff, 96 Fed. 317,

as follows (p. 318):

"Has the bankruptcy court jurisdiction to protect or enforce

against the bankrupt's exemption the rights of creditors not hav-

ing a judgment or other lien, whose promissory notes or other

like obligations to pay contain a written waiver of the homestead

and exemption authorized and prescribed by the Constitution of

the state, or are such creditors to be remitted to the state courts

for such relief as may be there obtained I''

The provisions of the bankruptcy act of 1898 [30 Stat. at L.

544, c. 541 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3418),] which control the

consideration of the question just propounded are as follows:

By clause 11 of § 2 courts of bankruptcy are vested with juris-

diction to "determine all claims of bankrupts to their exemp-

tions." § 6 provides as follows:

"§ 6. This act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of

the exemptions which are prescribed by the state laws in force

at the time of the filing of the petition in the state wherein they

have had their domicil for the six months or the greater portion

thereof immediately preceding the filing of the petition."

By clause 8 of § 7 the bankrupt is required to schedule all his

property, and to make "a claim for such exemptions as he may
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be entitled to." By clause 11 of § 47 it is made the duty of the

trustees to "set apart the bankrupt's exemptions and report

the items and estimated value thereof to the court as soon as

practicable after their appointment." By § 67 it is provided,

among other things, that the property of the debtor fraudulently

conveyed, etc., "shall, if he be adjudged a bankrupt, and the

same is not exempt from execution and liability for debts by the

law of his domicil, be and remain a part of the assets and estate

of the bankrupt," etc. In § 70 is enumerated the property of

the bankrupt which is to vest in the trustee as of the date of

the adjudication in bankruptcy, "except in so far as it is to

property which is exempt."

Under the bankruptcy act of 1867 [14 Stat . at L. 522, c. 176]

it was held that property generally exempted by the state law

from the claims of creditors was not part of the assets of the

bankrupt, and did not pass to the assignee, but that such prop-

erty must be pursued by those having special claims against it,

in the proper state tribunals. Thus, speaking of the act of 1867,

Mr. Justice Bradley (Re Bass, 3 Woods, 382, 384, Fed. Cas.

No. 1,091) said:

review-in the course of his opinion In re Woodruff, 96 Fed. 317,
as follows (p. 318):
''Has the bankruptcy court jurisdiction to protect or enforce
against the bankrupt's exemption the rights of creditors not having a judgment or other lien, whose promiasory notes or other
like obligations to pay contain a written waiver of the homestead
and exemption authorized and prescribed by the Constitution of
the state, or are such creditors to be remitted to the state courts
for such relief as may be there obtained T''
The provisions of the bankruptcy act of 1898 [30 Stat. at L.
544, c. 541 (U.S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3418),] which control the
consideration of the question just propounded are as follows:
By clause 11 of § 2 courts of bankruptcy are vested with jurisdiction to ''determine all claims of bankrupts to their exemptions.'' § 6 provides as follows:
'' § 6. This act shall not affect the· allowance to bankrupts of
the exemptions which are prescribed by the state laws in force
at the time of the filing of the petition in the state wherein they
have had their domicil for the six months or the greater portion
thereof immediately preceding the filing of the petition."
By clause 8 of § 7 the bankrupt is required to schedule all his
property, and to make "a claim for such exemptions as be may
be entitled to.'' By clause 11 of § 47 it is made the duty of the
trustees to ''set apart the bankrupt's exemptions and report
the items and estimated value thereof to the court as soon as
practicable after their appointment.'' By § 67 it is provided,
among other things, that the property of the debtor fraudulently
conveyed, etc., ''shall, if he be adjudged a bankrupt, and the
same is not exempt from execution and liability for debts by the
law of his domicil, be and remain a part of the assets and estate
of the bankrnpt," etc. In § 70 is enumerated the property of
the bankrupt which is to vest in the trustee as of the date of
the adjudication in bankruptcy, "except in so far as it is to
property which is exempt."
Under the bankruptcy act of 1867 [14 Stat. at L. 522, c. 176]
it was held that property generally exempted by the state law
from the claims of creditors was not part of the assets of the
bankrupt, and did not pass to the assignee, but that such property must be pursued by those having special claims against it,
in the proper state tribunals. Thus, speaking of the act of 1867,
Mr. Justice Bradley (Re Bass, 3 Woods, 382, 384, Fed. Cas.
No. 1,091) said:
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'' Not only is all property exempted by state laws, as those laws

stood in 1871, expressly excepted from the operation of the con-

veyance to the assignee, but it is added in the section referred to,

as if ex industria, that 'these exceptions shall operate as a limi-

tation upon the conveyance of the property of the bankrupt to

his assignee, and in no case shall the property hereby excepted

pass to the assignee, or the title of the bankrupt thereto be im-

paired or affected by any of the provisions of this title.'

"In other words, it is made as clear as anything can be that

such exempted property constitutes no part of the assets in

bankruptcy. The agreement of the bankrupt in any particular

case to waive the right to the exemption makes no difference. He

may owe other debts in regard to which no such agreement has

been made. But whether so or not, it is not for the bankrupt

court to inquire. The exemption is created by the state law, and

the assignee acquires no title to the exempt property. If the

creditor has a claim against it, he must prosecute that claim in

a court which has jurisdiction over the property, which the bank-

rupt court has not.''

We think that the terms of the bankruptcy act of 1898, above

set out, as clearly evidence the intention of Congress that the

title to the property of a bankrupt, generally exempted by state

laws, should remain in the bankrupt, and not pass to his repre-
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sentative in bankruptcy, as did the provisions of the act of 1867,

considered In re Bass. The fact that the act c-f 1898 confers

upon the court of bankruptcy authority to control exempt prop-

erty in order to set it aside, and thus exclude it from the assets

of the bankrupt estate to be administered, affords no just ground

for holding that the court of bankruptcy must administer and

distribute, as included in the assets of the estate, the very prop-

erty which the act, in unambiguous language, declares shall not

pass from the bankrupt, or become part of the bankruptcy assets.

The two provisions of the statute must be construed together,

and both be given effect. Moreover, the want of power in the

court of bankruptcy to administer exempt property is, besides,

shown by the context of the act; since, throughout its text, ex-

empt property is contrasted with property not exempt, the lat-

ter alone constituting assets of the bankrupt estate subject to

administration. The act of 1898, instead of manifesting the pur-

pose of Congress to adopt a different rule from that which was

applied, as we have seen, with reference to the act of 1867, on

the contrary, exhibits the intention to perpetuate the rule, since

"Not only is all property exempted by state laws, as those laws
stood in 1871, expressly excepted from the operation of the conveyance to the assignee, but it is added in the section reforred to,
as if ex indu-stria, that 'these exceptions shall operate as a limitation upon the conveyance of the property of the bankrupt to
his assignee, and in no case shall the property hereby excepted
pass to the assignee, or the title of the bankrupt thereto be impaired or affected by any of the provisions of this title.'
''In other words, it is made as clear as anything can be that
such exempted property constitutes no part of the assets in
ba11kruptey. The agreement of the bankrupt in any particular
case to waive the right to the exemption makes no difference. He
may owe other debts in regard to which no such agreement has
been made. But whether so or not, it is not for the bankrupt
court to inquire. The exemption is created by the state law, and
the assignee acquires no title to the exempt property. If the
creditor has a claim against it, he must prosecute that claim in
a court which has jurisdiction over the property, which the bankrupt court has not.''
We think that the terms of the bankruptcy act of 1898, above
set out, as clearly evidence the intention of Congress that the
title to the property of a bankrupt, generally exempted by state
laws, should remain in the bankrupt, and not pass to his representative in bankruptcy, as did the provisions of the act of 1867,
considered In re Baas. The fact that the act o-f 1898 confers
upon the court of bankruptcy authority to control exempt property in order to set it aside, and thus exclude it from the assets
of the bankrupt estate to be administered, affords no jUBt ground
for holding that the court of bankruptcy must administer and
distribute, as included in the assets of the estate, the very property which the act, in unambiguous language, declares shall not
pass from the bankrupt, or become part of the bankruptcy assets.
The two provisions of the statute must be construed together,
and both be given effect. Moreover, the want of power in the
eourt of bankruptcy to administer exempt property is, besides,
shown by the context of the act; since, throughout its text, exempt property is contrasted with property not exempt, the latter alone constituting assets of the bankrupt estate subject to
administration. The act of 1898, instead of manifestiug the purpose of Congress to adopt a different rule from that which was
applied, as we have seen, with reference to the act of 1867, on
tlie contrary, exhibits the intention to perpetuate the rule, since
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the provision of the statute to which we have referred in reason

is consonant only with that hypothesis.

Though it be conceded that some inconvenience may arise from

the construction which the text of the statute requires, the fact

of such inconvenience would not justify us in disregarding both

its letter and spirit. Besides, if mere arguments of incon-

venience were to have weight, the fact cannot be overlooked that

the contrary construction would produce a greater inconvenience.

The difference, however, between the two is this: That in the

latter case—that is, causing the exempt property to form a part

of the bankruptcy assets—the inconvenience would be irremedi-

able, since it would compel the administration of the exempt

property as part of the estate in bankruptcy; whilst in the other,

the rights of creditors having no lien, as in the case at bar, but

having a remedy under the state law against the exempt prop-

erty, may be protected by the court of bankruptcy, since, cer-

tainly, there would exist in favor of a creditor holding a waiver

. note, like that possessed by the petitioning creditor in the case at

bar, an equity entitling him to a reasonable postponement of

the discharge of the bankrupt, in order to allow the institution

in the State Court of such proceedings as might be necessary

to make effective the rights possessed by the creditor.
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As, in the case at bar, the entire property which the bank-

rupt owned is within the exemption of the state law, it becomes

unnecessary to consider what, if any, remedy might be available

in the court of bankruptcy for the benefit of general creditors,

in order to prevent the creditor holding the waiver as to exempt

property from taking a dividend on his whole claim from the

general assets, and thereafter availing himself of the right result-

ing from the waiver to proceed against exempt property.

The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the pro-

ceeding is remanded to that court with directions to overrule

the exceptions to the trustee's assignment of homestead and

exemption, and to withhold the discharge of the bankrupt, if

he be otherwise entitled thereto, until a reasonable time has

elapsed for the excepting creditor to assert, in a state tribunal,

his alleged right to subject the exempt property to the satis-

faction of his claim. And it is so ordered.

the provision of the statute to' which we have referred in reason
is consonant only with that hypothesis.
Though it be conceded that some inconvenience may &rise from
the construction which the text of the statute requires, the fact
of such inconvenience would not justify us in disregarding both
its letter and spirit. Besides, if mere arguments of inconvenience were to have weight, the fact cannot be overlooked that
the contrary construction would produce a greater inconvenience.
The difference, however, between the two is this: That in the
latter case-that is, causing the exempt property to form a part
of the bankruptcy assets-the inconvenience would be irremediable, since it would compel the administration of the exempt
property as part of the estate in bankruptcy; whilst in the other~
the rights of creditors having no lien, as in the case at bar, but
having a remedy under the state law against the exempt property, may be protected by the court of bankruptcy, since, certainly, there would exist in favor of a creditor holding a waiver
. note, like that possessed by the petitioning creditor in the case at
har, an equity entitling him to a reasooable postponement of
the discharge of the bankrupt, in order to allow the institution
in the State Court of such proceedings as might be neeesaary
to muke dfective the rights possessed by the creditor.
As, in the case at bar, the entire property which the bankrupt owned is within the exemption of the state law, it becomes
unnecessary to consider what, if any, remedy might be available
in the court of bankruptcy for the benefit of general creditora,
in order to prevent the creditor holding the waiver as to exempt
property from taking a dividend on his whole claim from the
general assets, and thereafter availing himself of the right resulting from the waiver to proceed against exempt property.
The judgment of the District Ct>Url is reversed, and the proceeding is remanded to that court with directions to overrule
the exceptions to the trustee's assignment of homestead and
exemption, and to withhold the disch~rge of the bankrupt, if
be be otherwise entitled thereto, until a reasonable time has
elapsed for the excepting creditor to assert, in a state tribunal,
bis alleged right to subject the exempt property to the satisfaction of his claim. And it is so ordered.
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In re GHAZAL

174 Fed. 809, 98 C. C. A. 517

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. December 7, 1909)

In re GHAZAL

LACOMBE, Circuit Judge. The sum in question was awarded

to Ohazal by the Treasury Department on May 6, 1908, as a

174 Fed. 809, 98 C. C. A. 517

reward for information given by him against smugglers, which

information resulted in the discovery and confiscation by the

United States government of certain smuggled property. The

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. December 7, 1909)

award was made under authority of Act June 22, 1874, c. 391,

§ 4, 18 Stat. 186 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2019), which provides:

"That whenever any officer of the customs or other person

shall detect and seize goods, wares, or merchandise, in the act

of being smuggled, or which have been smuggled, he shall be

entitled to such compensation therefor as the Secretary of the

Treasury shall award not exceeding in amount one-half of the

net proceeds, if any, resulting from such seizure, after deduct-

ing all duties, costs, and charges connected therewith: provided,

that for the purpose of this act smuggling shall be construed to

mean the act, with intent to defraud, of bringing into the United

States, or with like intent, attempting to bring into the United

States, dutiable articles without passing the same, or the pack-

age containing the same, through the custom house, or submitting
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them to the officers of the revenue for examination. And when-

ever any person not an officer of the United States shall furnish

to a district attorney, or to any chief, officer of the customs,

original information concerning any fraud upon the customs-

revenue, perpetuated or contemplated, which shall lead to the

recovery of any duties withheld, or of any fine, penalty, or for-

feiture incurred, whether by importers or their agents, or by

any officer or person employed in the customs service, such com-

pensation may, on such recovery, be paid to such person so fur-

nishing information as shall be just and reasonable, not exceeding

in any case the sum of five thousand dollars; which compensa-

tion shall be paid, under the direction of the Secretary of the

Treasury out of any money appropriated for that purpose.''

It is clear that the statute makes the Secretary of the Treasury

the sole judge as to whether there is an informer who is entitled

to a share under this section. Until he acts the informer has

merely an expectation of reward. Ramsey v. U. S., 14 Ct. CI.

-

LACO)IBE, Circuit Judge. The sum in question was awarded
to Ghazal by the Treasury Department on May 6, 1908, as a
reward for information given by him against smugglers, which
information resulted in the discovery and confiscation by the
United States government of certain smuggled property. The
award was made under authority of Act June 22, 1874, c. 391,
§ 4, 18 Stat. 186 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2019), which provides:
''That whenever any officer of the customs or other person
shall detect and seize goods, wares, or merchandise, in the act
of being smuggled, or which have been smuggled, he shall be
entitled to such compensation therefor as the Secretary of the
Treasury shall award not exceeding in amount one-half of the
net proceeds, if any, resulting from such seizure, after deducting all duties, costs, and charges connected therewith: provided,
that for the purpose of this act smuggling shall be construed to
mean the act, with intent to defraud, of bringing into the United
States, or with like intent, attempting to bring into the United
States, dutiable articles without passing the same, or the package containing the same, through the custom house, or submitting
them to the officers of the revenue for examination. And whenever any person not an officer of the United States shall furnish
to a district attorney, or to any chief, officer of the customs,
original information concerning any fraud upon the customsrevenue, perpetuated or contemplated, which shall lead to the
recovery of any duties withheld, or of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture incurred, whether by importers or their agents, or by
any officer or person employed in the customs service, such compensation may, on such recovery, be paid to such person so furnishing information as shall be just and reasonable, not exceeding
in any case the sum of five thousand dollars; which compensation shall be paid, under the direction of the Secretary of the
Treasury out of any money appropriated for that purpose.''
It is clear that the statute makes the Secretary of the Treasury
the sole judge as to whether there is an informer who is entitled
to a share under this section. Until he acts the informer has
merely an expectation of reward. Ramsey v. U. S., 14 Ct. Cl.

508

508

ADMINISTRATION

ADMINISTRATION

367. The trustee does not question the accuracy of this proposi-

tion.

§ 3477, Eev. St. U. S. (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2320),

provides:

"All transfers and assignments made of any claim upon the

United States or any part or share thereof, or interest theiein,

whether absolute or conditional, and whatever may be the con-

sideration therefor, and all powers of attorney, orders, or other

authorities for receiving payment of any such claim, or any part

or share thereof, shall be absolutely null and void, unless they

are freely made and executed in the presence of at least two

attesting witnesses, after the allowance of such a claim, the ascer-

tainment of the amount due, and the issuing of a warrant for the

payment thereof, such transfers, assignment, and powers of at-

torney, must recite the warrant for payment, and must be

acknowledged by the person making them, before an officer hav-

ing authority to take acknowledgments of deeds, and shall be

certified by the officer; and it must appear by the certificate that

the officer at the time of the acknowledgment, read and fully

explained the transfer, assignment or warrant of attorney to the

person acknowledging the same."

It is therefore apparent that, before the allowance to him of
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the $428.93, Ghazal could not have transferred the same, be-

cause any such attempted transfer would be null and void, and

certainly a hoped-for award, not yet made, could not have been

levied upon and sold in judicial process against him.

The relevant provision of the bankrupt act (Act July 1, 1898,

c. 541, 30 Stat. 565 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3451]) is:

"§70. That the trustee • • • shall * • • be vested

by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date

he was adjudged a bankrupt * * * to all • * • prop-

erty which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any

means have transferred or which might have been levied upon

and sold under judicial process against him."

The petition in bankruptcy was filed on April 29, 1908, but

the award was not made by the Secretary of the Treasury until

May 6, 1909. Under the provisions of statute above cited, there-

fore the trustee did not take title to this sum of $428.93.

It is contended, and the District Judge reached the/Conclusion,

that the bankrupt was estopped from insisting that title to this

sum never passed to the trustee. Before petition was filed Ghazal

had made assignments to some of his creditors of certain sums,

367. The trustee does not question the accuracy of this proposition.
§ 3477, Rev. St. U. S. (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2320),
provides:
"All transfers and assignments made of any claim upon the
United States or any part or share thereof, or interest the: ein,
whether absolute or conditional, and whatever may be the consideration therefor, and all powers of attorney, orders, or other
authorities for receiving payment of any such claim, or any part
or share thereof, shall be absolutely null and void, unless they
are freely made and executed in the presence of at least two
attesting witnesses, after the allowance of such a claim, the ascertainment of the amount due, and the issuing of a warrant for the
payment thereof, such transfers, BBSignment, and powers of attorney, must recite the warrant for payment, and mUBt be
acknowledged by the person making them, before an officer having authority to take acknowledgments of deeds, and shall be
certified by the officer; and it must appear by the certificate that
the officer at the time of the acknowledgment, read and fully
explained the transfer, assignment or warrant of attorney to the
person acknowledging the same.''
It is therefore apparent that, before the allowance to him of
the $428.93, Ghazal could not have transferred the same, because any such attempted transfer would be null and void, and
certainly a hoped-for award, 11ot yet made, could not have been
levied upon and sold in judicial process against him.
The relevant provision of the bankrupt act (Act July 1, 1898,
c. 541, 30 Stat. 565 [U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3451]) is:
'' § 70. That the trustee • • • shall • • • be vested
by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date
he was adjudged a bankrupt • • • to all • • • property which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any
means have transferred or which might have been levied upon
and sold under judicial process against him.''
The petition in bankruptcy was filed on April 29, 1908, but
the award was not made by the Secretary of the Treasury until
May 6, 1909. Under the provisions of statute above cited, therefore the trustee did not take title to this sum of $428.93.
It is conten<led, and the District Judge reached the ,eonclusion,
that the bankrupt was estopped from insisting that title to this
sum never passed to the trustee. Before petition was filed Ghazal
ha.d made assignments to some of his creditors of certain sums,

KINDS OF PROPERTY

509

KINDS OF PROPERTY

509

out of moneys to be paid him by the government, all of which

assignments were of course "null and void." It was on the

theory that these were preferential that proceedings in involun-

tary bankruptcy were instituted. Ghazal at first disputed the

allegation of the petition, but subsequently withdrew his answer

and consented to an adjudication. The proposition contended

for is that:

"When the bankrupt voluntarily receded from his position

and endeavored to accept what now appears to be the benefits of

the bankruptcy statute in this case, in the way of applying for

a discharge from his debts, and at the same time to keep out of

the estate in bankruptcy the only property about which the cred-

itors could have attempted to maintain their position • • •

the bankrupt is estopped from insisting that upon the 29th of

April he could not have transferred his claim against the United

States."

We do not find, in the circumstance that he has not chosen to

oppose adjudication, sufficient ground for holding him to be

estopped from insisting that after-acquired property shall not

go to the trustee. No injury has resulted therefrom, and no

one has been misled thereby. Nor can we see that the circum-

stance that he had no property at the time of adjudication is
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any reason why he should be required to give up after-acquired

property, which the bankrupt act did not transfer to his trustee.

The order is reversed.8

PAGE v. EDMUNDS

187 U. S. 596, 47 L. ed. 318, 23 Sup. Ct. 200

(United States Supreme Court. January 5, 1903)

The appellant is a resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and

has been a member of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange in good

standing since the year 1880. On the 16th of November, 1899,

he was adjudged a voluntary bankrupt in the District Court for

the eastern district of Pennsylvania, and the cause was referred

to Alfred Driver, Esq., referee in bankruptcy. In the schedules

out of moneys to be paid him by the government, all of whid1
assignments were of course "null and void." lt was 011 the
theory that these were preferential that proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy were instituted. Ghazal at first disputed the
allegation of the petition, but subsequently withdrew his answer
and consented to an adjudication. The proposition contended
for is that:
''When the bankrupt voluntarily receded from his position
and en<leavore<l to accept what now appears to be the benefits of
the bankruptcy statute in this case, in the way of applying for
a discharge from his debts, and at the same time to keep out of
the estate in bankruptcy the only property about which the creditors could have attempted to maintain their position • • •
the bankrupt is estopped from insisting that upon the 29th of
April he could not have transferred his claim against the United
Stat.es."
We do not find, in the circumstance that he has not chosen to
oppose adjudication, sufficient ground for holding him to be
estopped from insisting that after-acquired property shall not
go to the trustee. No injury has resulted therefrom, and no
one has been misled thereby. Nor can we see that the circumstance that he had no property a.t the time of adjudication is
any reason why he should be required to give up after-acquired
property, which the bankrupt act did not transfer to his trustee.
The order is reversed. 3

attached to his petition the appellant did not include as an asset

of his estate his membership in the stock exchange. His trustee

in bankruptcy caused the membership to be appraised, and peti-

PAGE v. EDMUNDS

6—Cf. Tart v. Maiiely, 120 N. Y. Williams v. Heard, 140 U. S. 529

474; Brooks v. Ahrens, 68 Md. 212; (reversing Heard v. Sturgis, 146

187 U. S. 596, 47 L. ed. 318, 23 Sup. Ct. 200

Kingsbury v. Mattocks, 81 Me. 310; Mass. 545).

(United States Supreme Court. January 5, 1903)
The appellant is a resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and
has been a member of the Philadelphia StOC'k Exchange in good
standing since the year 1880. On the 16th of November, 1899,
he was adjudged a voluntary bankrupt in the District Court for
the eastern district of Pennsylvania, and the cause was referred
to Alfred Driver, Esq., referee in bankruptcy. In the schedules
attached to his petition the appellant did not include as an asset
of his estate his membership in the stock exchange. His trustee
in bankruptcy caused the membership to be appraised, and peti&-Cf. Taft v. Maisely, 120 N. Y.
4 i4; Brooks l". Ahrens, 68 Md. 212;
Kingsbury v. Mattocks, 81 Me. 310;

William11 v. Heard, 140 U. S. 529

(re,·ersing Heard v. Sturgis, 146
Mau. 545).
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tioued the referee for an order to sell the same. The petition

was heard before the referee, who, after hearing, filed his report

containing a summary as follows:

"The said Page was adjudicated a bankrupt upon his own

petition on November 16, 1899. Upon his examination he stated

that he is a member of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange; that

he bought his seat in 1880, paying for it at that time about

$5,500; that when a member wishes to dispose of his seat he

hunts up somebody who wants to buy and sells it to him; that

seats are always salable; that the last price paid of which he

heard was $8,500; that he could sell his seat at any time to any-

one who wanted to buy it; that the buyer takes it with the under-

standing that he will be elected a member; otherwise it is no

sale; that he could sell his seat without the approval and con-

currence of the other members; that he did not include the seat

as an asset in his schedules because from his understanding of

the matter he did not consider it an asset; that in the event of

his death there would be paid to his wife $5,000 out of the

gratuity fund, and that she would get said sum and the seat; that

if he should sell the seat the gratuity or insurance would go with

the seat.

"The trustee upon this evidence of the bankrupt caused the
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seat in the stock exchange to be appraised, and the appraisers

have reported its value to be $8,000.

"The secretary of the stock exchange testified that the bank-

rupt had no unsettled contracts with or claims against him by

any member of the exchange. The Philadelphia Stock Exchange

is an unincorporated association. The constitution and by-laws

were offered in evidence.

•••

"The by-laws contain no provision relating to membership or

transfer of membership."

As a conclusion from these facts and from the bankrupt law,

the referee on March 7, 1900, "ordered that the trustee sell at

public auction the seat or membership of Edward D. Page, the

bankrupt, and all his right and interest therein, subject to the

constitution and by-laws of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange

regulating membership therein."

The appellant petitioned for a review of the referee"s order by

the District Court, averring error in the order in that the peti-

tioner was advised and believed that his membership in the Phila-

delphia Stock Exchange was not property within the meaning

tioned the referee for an order to sell the same. The petition
was heard before the referee, who, after bearing, filed bis report
containing a summary as follows:
''The said Page was adjudicated a bankrupt upon his own
petition on November 16, 1899. Upon his examination he stated
that he is a member of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange; that
he bought his seat in 1880, paying for it at that time about
$5,500; that when a member wishes to dispose of his seat he
hunts up somebody who want.s to buy and sells it to him; that
scats are always salable; that the last price paid of whieh he
heard was $8,500 ; that he could sell his seat at any time to anyone who wanted to· buy it; that the buyer takes it with the understanding that he will be elected a member; otherwise it is no
sale; that he could sell his seat without the approval and concurrence of the other members; that he did not include the seat
as an asset in his schedules because from bis understanding of
the matter he did not consider it an asset; that in the event of
his death there would be paid to his wife $5,000 out of the
gratuity fund, and that she would get said sum and the seat; that
if he should sell the seat the gratuity or insurance would go with
the seat.
''The trustee upon this evidence of the bankrupt caused the
seat in the stock exchange to be appraised, and the appraisers
have reported its value to be $8,000. ·
''The secretary of the stock exchange testified that the bankrupt had no unsettled contracts with or claims against him by
any member of the exchange. The Philadelphia Stock Exchange
is an unincorporated association. The constitution and by-laws
were offered in evidence.

• • •

''The by-laws contain no provision relating to membership or
transfer of membership.''
As a conclusion from these facts and from the bankrupt law,
the referee on March 7, 1900, ''ordered that the trustee sell at
public auction the seat or membership of Edward D. Page, the
bankrupt, and all his right and interest therein, subject to the
constitution and by-laws of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange
regulating membership therein.''
The ap~llant petitioned for a. review of the referee ·s order by
the District Court, averring error in the order in that the petitioner was advised and believed that his membership in the Philadelphia Stock Exchange was not property within the meaning
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of the bankrupt act of July 1, 1898 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p.

3418), nor was it an asset of his estate which could be sold by his

trustee in bankruptcy.

On June 19, 1900, the District Court approved the order of

sale made by the referee, and directed it to be executed. The

matter was then taken for review to the Circuit Court of Appeals,

which court confirmed the order of the District Court. This

appeal was thereupon taken.

Mr. Justice McKJENNA delivered the opinion of the court:

The case presented by the record is a simple one, and does not

of the bankrupt act of July 1, 1898 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p.
3418), nor was it an asset of his estate which could be sold by his
trustee in bankruptcy.
On June 19, 1900, the District Court approved the order of
sale made by the referee, and directed it to be executed. The
matter was then taken for review to the Circuit Court of Appeals,
which court confirmed the order of the District Court. This
appeal was thereupon taken.

call for elaborate discussion. Indeed, it has been virtually ruled

by this court. Hyde v. Woods, 94 U. S. 525, 24 L. ed. 265; Spar-

hawk v. Yerkes, 142 U. S. 1, 35 L. ed. 915, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 104.

§ 70 of the bankrupt act of 1898 provides that the trustee shall

be vested with:

"The title of the bankrupt as of the date he was adjudged a

bankrupt, except in so far as it is property which is exempt, to

all • • •

"(3) Powers which he might have exercised for his own

benefit. • • *

"(5) Property which prior to the filing of the petition he could

by any means have transferred, or which might have been levied
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upon and sold under judicial process.''

•••

1. Was the seat in the stock exchange property which could

have been by any means transferred, or which might have been

levied upon and sold under judicial process? If the seat was

subject to either manner of disposition, it passed to the trustee

of the appellant's estate.

We think it could have been transferred within the meaning

of the statute. The appellant could have sold his membership,

the purchaser taking it subject to election by the exchange, and

some other conditions. It had decided value. The appellant paid

for it in 1880, $5,500, and he testified that the last price he had

heard paid for a seat was $8,500. One or the other of these sums,

or at any rate, some sum, was the value of the seat. It was prop-

erty and substantial property to the extent of some amount, not-

withstanding the contingencies to which it was subject. In other

words, the buyer took the risk of the contingencies. And they

seem to be capable of estimation. The appellant once estimated

them and paid $5,500 for the seat in controversy; another buyer

Mr. Justice McKlENNA delivered the opinion of the court:
The case presented by the record is a simple one, and does not
call for elaborate discussion. Indeed, it has been virtually ruled
by this court. Hyde v. Woods, 94 U.S. 525, 24 L. ed. 265; Sparhawk v. Yerkes, 142 U. S. 1, 35 L. ed. 915, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 104.
§ 70 of the bankrupt act of 1898 provides that the trustee shall
be vested with :
"The title of the bankrupt as of the date he was adjudged a
bankrupt, except in so far as it is property which is exempt, to
all • • •
"(3) Powers which he might have exercised for his own
benefit. • • •
'' ( 5) Property which prior to the filing of the petition he could
by any means have transferred, or which might have been levied
upon and sold under judicial process.''

• • •

1. Was the seat in the stock exchange property which could
have been by any means tran.<;ferred, or which might have been
levied upon and sold wider judicial process? If the seat was
subject to either manner of disposition, it passed to the trustee
of the appellant's estate.
We think it could have been transferred within the meaning
of the statute. The appellant could have sold his membership,
the purchaser taking it subject to election by the exchange, and
some other conditions. It had decided value. The appellant paid
for it in 1880, $5,500, and he testified that the last price he had
heard paid for a seat was $8,500. One or the other of these sums,
or at any rate, some sum, was the value of the seat. It was property and substantial property to the extent of some amount, notwithstanding the contingencies to which it was subject. In other
words, the buyer took the risk of the contingencies. And they
seem to be capable of estimation. The appellant once estimated
them and paid $5,500 for the seat in controversy; another buyer
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estimated them and paid $8,500 for a seat. A thing having such

vendible value mnst be regarded as property, and as it could have

been transferred by some means by appellant (one of the condi-

tions expressed in § 70) it passed to and vested in his trustee.

Whether it was subject to levy and sale by judicial process we

need not consider except incidentally in discussing the next

contention.

•••

Judgment affirmed.9

EARLE v. MAXWELL

86 S. C 1, 67 S. E. 962

(Supreme Court of South Carolina. April 29, 1910)

estimated them and paid $8,500 for a seat. A thing having such
vendible value must be regal'de<l as property, and as it could have
been transferred by some means by appellant (one of the conditions expressed in § 70) it passed to and vested in his trustee.
Whether it was subject to levy and sale by judicial process we
need not consider except incidentally in discussing the next
contention.

• • •

Judgment affirmed.&

WOODS, J. This appeal is from a decree overruling a de-

murrer to a complaint, the material allegations of which may

thus be stated: On the 24th of February, 1908, the defendant

EARLE v. MAXWELL

F. B. Maxwell made an assignment of all his property for the

benefit of his creditors to J. M. Paget. Thereafter, on the 18th

86 S. C. 1, 67 S. E. 962

day of March, 1908, Maxwell was adjudged a bankrupt by the

District Court of the United States, and Martin & Earle, a part-

(Supreme Court of South Carolina. April 29, 1910)

nership composed by B. F. Martin and C. B. Earle, became

trustee for the bankrupt estate. This action was originally

brought in the name of the partnership as trustee, but afterwards

the referee in bankruptcy, with the consent of a majority of the
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creditors in numbers and amount, substituted C. B. Earle as

trustee, and the complaint was amended to conform to the change.

F. B. Maxwell, the bankrupt, is the grandson of F. C. Borstell

and the son of Mrs. Alice Maxwell. By his will, Borstell made

the following devise: "I will and bequeath to my daughter,

Alice Maxwell, my lot on Brick Range with the storeroom, offices

and all buildings connected therewith, and in view of the mis-

fortunes of life which are incident to all persons however prudent

and cautious they may be, and not from any distrust of my said

daughter or her husband, I have concluded to make this a trust

property, and therefore vest the fee simple of said lot and build-

6—See In re Becker, 98 Fed. 407; of Commerce); In re Spitzel & Co.,

In re Comer & Co., 171 Fed. 261; 168 Fed. 156 (license to sell pat-

Tn re Miller, 171 Fed. 263; In re ented article). But see In re Dans,

Weisel, 173 Fed. 718 (all cases of 129 Fed. 495 (inventor's rights be-

liquor licenses); In re Niemann, 124 fore patent issued).

Fed. 738 (Membership in Chamber

WOODS, J . This appeal is from a decree overruling a demurrer to a complaint, the material allegations of which may
thus be stated: On the 24th of February, 1908, the defendant
F. B. Maxwell made an assignment of all bis property for the
benefit of his creditors to J. M. Paget. Thereafter, on the 18th
day of March, 1908, Maxwell was adjudged a bankrupt by the
District Court of the United States, and Martin & Earle, a partnership composed by B. F . M.artin and C. B. Earle, became
trustee for the bankrupt estate. This action was originally
brought in the Dllme of the partnership as trustee, but afterwards
the referee in bankruptcy, with the consent of a majority of the
creditors in nwnbers and amount, substituted C. B. Earle as
trustee, and the complaint was amended to conform to the change.
F. B. Maxwell, the bankrupt, is the grandson of F. C. Borstell
and the son of Mrs. Alice Maxwell. By bis will, Borstell made
the following devise: ''I will and bequeath to my daughter,
Alice Maxwell, my lot on Brick Range with the storeroom, offices
and all buildings connected therewith, and in view of the misfortunes of life which are incident to all persons however prudent
and cautious they may be, and not from any distrust of my said
daughter or her husband, I have concluded to make this a trust
property, and therefore vest the fee simple of said lot and build6-See In re Becker, 98 Fed. 40i;
In re Comer & Co., 1i l Fed. 261 ;
In re Mil1er, 171 Fed. 263; In re
Weisel, 173 Fed. 718 (all cases of
liquor licenses); In re Niemann, 124
· Fed. 738 (Membenhip in Chamber

of Commerce); In re Spitzel & Co.,
168 Fed. 156 (license to eell patented artiele) . But see In re Dann,
129 Fed. 495 (inventor 'a rights b~
fore patent issued).
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ings in D. S. Maxwell, as trustee for her, to have and to hold all

and singular the said premises to him and his heirs and assigns.

In trust nevertheless for the following uses and purposes: That

my said daughter shall have the right to use, occupy and possess

the said property, to receive the issues, rents and profits of the

same, for and during the term of her natural life, and at her

death, the same to be sold and the proceeds to be divided among

her children, share and share alike, the share of any deceased

child, or remote descendant to take the share to which the

parent would be entitled if living as under the statute of dis-

tributions. And should the said trustee die or by any means a

change should be necessary, my said daughter shall have the right

to appoint a new trustee in writing without application to any

court, who shall have all the rights conferred on the said D. S.

Maxwell, and so continue to appoint new trustees as often as a

contingency may arise." Mrs. Maxwell, the life beneficiary of

the trust, is still living, and it is therefore uncertain whether

at her death the bankrupt will take, or his children, or their chil-

dren or descendants. Some years before Maxwell was adjudged

a bankrupt, he undertook to assign his interest under the will to

his aunt, Miss Von Borstell, now Mrs. Coleman; but this assign-

ment is alleged to be invalid for lack of record or other notice to
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subsequent creditors. The trustee, believing Maxwell's interest

in the trust estate to be salable, advertised it for sale, and there-

upon received notice from the bankrupt that his contingent in-

terest was not the subject of sale, and that "said sale would be

contested.'' The allegation is made: '' That by reason of such

notification and claim on the part of F. B. Maxwell and on

the part of others on his behalf, a cloud has been and is now

being cast upon the title of the interest of the plaintiff as trustee,

and that on account of the resultant probability of the bidding

for the said interest being chilled by virtue of such claim and

cloud upon the title as aforesaid, the plaintiff withdrew said in-

terest from sale and now desires the question of title and sala-

bility of the said interest to be determined and declared by the

court, and the cloud from said title removed." The relief asked

is that the cloud on the title be removed, that the court deter-

mine and declare the salability of the interest of the bankrupt,

and order the plaintiff as trustee to sell and convey it.

In the decree of the Circuit Court this statement appears:

"By consent of counsel, the demurrer to the original complaint

is to be considered as made to the amended complaint." The

H. ft A. Bankruptcy—SS

ings in D. S. Maxwell, as trustee for her, to have and to hold all
and singular the said premises to him and his heirs and aasigns.
In trust nevertheless for the following uses and purposes: That
my said daughter shall have the right to use, occupy and p08Se88
the said property, to receive the issues, rents and profits of the
same, for and during the term of her natural life, and at her
death, the same to be sold and the proceeds to be divided among
her children, share and .share alike, the share of any deceased
child, or remote descendant to take the share to which the
parent would be entitled if living as under the statute of distributions. And should the said trustee die or by any means a
change should be necessary, my said daughter shall have the right
to appoint a new trustee in writing without application to any
court, who shall have all the rights cooferred on the said D. S.
Maxwell, and so continue to appoint new trustees as often as a
contingency may arise.'' l\Irs. Maxwell, the life beneficiary of
the trust, is still living, and it is therefore uncertain whether
at her death the bankrupt will take, or his children, or their children or descendants. Some years before Maxwell was adjudged
a bankrupt, he undertook to assign his interest under the will to
his aunt, Miss Von Borstell, now Mrs. Coleman; but this assignment is alleged to be invalid for lack of record or other notice to
subsequent creditors. The trustee, believing Maxwell's interest
in the trust estate to be salable, advertised it for sale, and thereupon received notice from the bankrupt that his contingent interest was not the subject of sale, and that "said sale would be
contested.'' The allegation is made: 1 ' That by reason of such
notification and claim on the part of F. B. Maxwell and on
the pert of others on his behalf, a cloud has been and is now
heing cast upon the title of the interest of the plaintiff as trustee,
and that on account of the resultant probability of the bidding
for the said interest being chilled by virtue of such claim and
cloud upon the title as aforesaid, the plaintiff withdrew said interest from sale nnd now desires the question of title and salability of the said interest to be determined and declared by the
court, and the cloud from said title removed.'' The relief asked
is that the cloud on the title be removed, that the court determine anrl declare the salability of tli_e interest of the bankrupt,
and order the plaintiff as trustee to sell and convey it.
In the decree of the Circuit Court this statement appears:
·'By co1;sent of counsel, the demurrer to the original complaint
is to be considered as made to the amended complaint." The
l:t. &t A. Bankruptcy-BB
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first ground of demurrer to the original complaint was: "Be-

cause ft appears from the face of the complaint that the plain-

tiffs have not legal capacity to sue for the following reason,

to wit: § § 44 and 45 of the act of Congress entitled 'An act to

establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United

States' provide that the creditors of a bankrupt estate shall

appoint one or three trustees of the estate, who shall be indi-

viduals or corporations; whereas, it appears from the complaint

that Martin & Earle, a partnership composed of B. F. Martin

and C. B. Earle, and engaged in the practice of law, was ap-

pointed trustee of said estate by the creditors of the bankrupt

estate." Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 557 (U. S. Comp. St.

1901, p. 3438). This was the only objection made to the capacity

of the plaintiff to sue, and it was removed by the amendment

alleging C. B. Earle to be the sole trustee and substituting his

name as plaintiff for the firm name of Martin & Earle. Therefore

the point made in argument that C. B. Earle was not properly

appointed trustee of the bankrupt estate was not before the Cir-

cuit Court and cannot be considered by this court.

By the demurrer the bankrupt. Maxwell, submits that the com-

plaint does not state a cause of action: First, because his interest

under the will is contingent. and is therefore not the subject of
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sale; and, second, because the will provides that the land shall be

sold on the death of his mother and the proceeds divided, and

therefore his interest is personalty, with respect to which an

action to remove a cloud on title cannot be maintained. § 70a

of the bankruptcy statute provides that the trustee of the estate

of the bankrupt shall be vested by operation of law with the title

of the bankrupt as of the date he was adjudged a bankrupt,

except in so far as it is to property which is exempt, to "all

property which prior to the filing of the petition he could by

any means have transferred or which might have been levied

upon and sold by judicial process against him." The bankruptcy

statute further provides for the sale of the property of the bank-

rupt subject to the approval of the bankrupt court.

Since under the will the trustee therein named was to sell the

land and divide the proceeds of the sale after the death of the

life beneficiary, the interest of F. B. Maxwell and the other chil-

dren of Mrs. Maxwell is a contingent interest, not in the land,

but in the proceeds of the land, which is personalty. Wood v.

Reeves, 23 S. C. 382; Walker v. Killian, 62 S. C. 482, 40 S. E.

887. The court held, in Pickens v. Pickens, 13 Rich. Eq. Ill,

first ground of demurrer to the original complaint was: ''Because ft appears from the face of the complaint that the plaintiffs have not legal capacity to sue for the following reason,
to wit: §§ 44 B:Ild 45 of the act of Congress entitled 'An act to
establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United
States' provide that the creditors of a bankrupt estate shall
appoint one or three trustees of the estate, who shall be individuals or corporations; whereas, it appears from the complaint
that Martin & Earle, a partnership composed of B. F. Martin
and C. B. Earle, and engaged in the practice of law, was appointed trustee of said estate by the creditors of the bankrupt
estate." Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 557 (U.S. Comp. St.
1901, p. 3438). This was the only objection made to the capacity
of the plaintiff to sue, and it was removed by the amendment
alleging C. B. Earle to be the sole trustee and substituting his
uame as plaintiff for the firm name of Martin & Earle. Therefore
the point made in argument that C. B. Earle was not properly
appointed trustee of the bankrupt estate was not before the Circuit Court and cannot be considered by this court.
By the demurrer the bankrupt, Maxwell, submits that the com!Maint does not state a cause of action : First, because his interest
under the will is contingent, and is therefore not the subject of
sale; and, second, because the will provides that the land shall be
sold on the death of his mother and the proeeeds divided, and
therefore his interest is personalty, with respect to which an
action to remove a cloud on title cannot be maintained. § 704
of the bankruptcy statute provides that the trustee of the estate
of the bankrupt shall be vested by operation of law with the title
of the bankrupt as of the date he was adjudged a bankrupt,
except in so far as it is to pt'operly which is exempt, to ''all
property whieh prior to the filing of the petition he could by
any means have transferred or which might have been levied
upon and sold by judicial process against him.'' The bankruptcy
statute further provides for the sale of the property of the bankrupt subject to the approval of the bankrupt court.
Since under the will the trustee therein named was to sell the
land and divide the proceeds of the sale after the death of the
life beneficiary, the interest of F . B. Maxwell and the other children of Mrs. Maxwell is a contingent · interest, not in the land,
but in the proceeds of the land, which is personalty. Wood v.
Reeves, 23 S. C. 382; Walkn v. Killian, 62 S. C. 482, 40 S. E.
887. The court held, in Pickens v. Pickens, 13 Rich. Eq. 111,

KINDS OF PROPERTY

515

KINDS OP PROPERTY 515

that, while a contingent interest in land passes to the assignee

of an insolvent, the sale must be postponed until the contingent

interest should become vested. It has been often decided in this

state that an assignment or mortgage of a contingent remainder

in land is good, at least in equity. Allston v. Bank of the State,

2 Hill, Eq. 235; Rountree v. Rountree, 26 S. C. 450, 2 S. E. 474;

Bank v. Garlington, 54 S. C. 413, 32 S. E. 513. Under the

bankrupt statute, providing that all property which the bank-

rupt could by any means have transferred passes to the assignee,

there can be no doubt that a contingent remainder in land would

pass and would be subject to sale by the trustee.

The interest of the bankrupt in this case not being an interest

in the laud, but in personal property—the money to be realized

from the sale of the land—it might have been doubtful, under

the authority of Wood v. Reeves, supra, whether it could be

assigned or mortgaged; for in that case the view is indicated

that such possible future interest in personal property could

not be mortgaged. But in the later case of Walker v. Eillian,

supra, it is expressly held that, while a paper in the form of a

mortgage of such a possible future interest in personal prop-

erty cannot operate as a mortgage, it is good in equity as an

assignment.

In three cases in the District Court of the United States and
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in one case in the Circuit Court of Appeals, it has been held

that such a contingent interest in either real or personal prop-

erty as is here involved does not pass to the trustee in bank-

ruptcy, because it is not property which could have been trans-

ferred by the bankrupt. In re Hoadley (D. C.) 101 Fed. 233;

In re Gardner (D. C.) 106 Fed. 670; In re Twaddell (D. C.)

110 Fed. 145; In re Wetmore, 108 Fed. 520, 47 C. C. A. 477.T

But these cases arose under the laws of New York and Penn-

sylvania. Under our law there can be no doubt that a bankrupt

could transfer such an interest before his bankruptcy; and,

that being so, the conclusion is inevitable that it passes to the

trustee under a bankrupt act which provides that all "prop-

erty" shall pass which the bankrupt "could by any means have

transferred." It is true, as has been often said, that a con-

tingent remainder is not technically an estate, but a mere pos-

sibility of an estate in the future; but that is very far from

7—See In re McCrea, 161 Fed.

246; Clowe v. Seavey, 208 N. Y.

496, 47 L. B. A. (N. 8.) 284.

that, while a contingent iuterest in land passes to the assignee
of an insolvent, the sale must be postponed until the contingent
interest should become vested. It has been often decided in this
state that an assignment or mortgage of a contingent remainder
in land is good, at least in equity. Allston v. Bank of the State,
2 Hill, Eq. 235; Rountree v. Rountree, 26 S. C. 450, 2 S. E. 474;
Bank v. Garlington, 54 S. C. 413, 32 S. E. 513. Under the
baukrupt Rtatute, providing that all property which the bankrupt could by any means have transferred passes to the assignee,
there can be no doubt that a contingent remainder in land would
pass and would be subject to sale by the trustee.
The interest of the bankrupt in this case not being an interest
in the land, but in personal property-the money to be realized
from the sale of the land-it might have been doubtful, under
the authority of Wood v. Reeves, supra, whether it could be
assigned or mortgaged; for in that case the view is indicated
that such possible future interest in personal property could
not be mortgaged. But in the later case of Walker v. Killian,
supra, it is expressly held that, while a paper in the form of a
mortgage of such a possible future interest iu personal property cannot operate as a mortgage, it is good in equity as an
assignment.
In three cases in the District Court of the United States and
in one case in the Circuit Court of Appeals, it has been held
that such a contingent interest in either real or personal property as is here involved does not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy, because it is not property which could have been transferred by the bankrupt. In re Hoadley (D. C.) 101 Fed. 233;
In re Gardner (D. C.) 106 Fed. 670; In re Twaddell (D. C.)
110 Fed. 145; In re 'Vetmore, 108 Fed. 520, 47 C. C. A. 477. 7
But these cases arose uuder the laws of New York and Pennsylvania. Under our law there can be no doubt that a bankrupt
could transfer such an interest before his bankruptcy; and,
that being so, the conclusion is inevitable that it passes to the
trustee under a bankrupt act which provides that all ''prop.
erty'' shall pass which the bankrupt ''could by any m~ans have
transferred." It is true, as has been often said, that a contingent remainder is not technically an estate, but a mere possibility of an estate in the future; but that is very far from
7-8ee In re McCrea., 161 Fed.
246; Clowe v. Sea"ey, 208 N. Y.
496, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 284.
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saying that it is not property. The term "property," used in

the bankruptcy act, is of the broadest possible signification,

embracing everything that has exchangeable value, or goes to

make up a man's wealth—every interest or estate which the law

regards of sufficient value for judicial recognition. Chas. & W.

C. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 69 S. C. 481, 48 S. E. 476; South Bound

Ry. Co. v. Burton, 67 S. C. 515, 46 S. E. 340; Delassus v.

United States, 34 U. S. 117, 9 L. ed. 71"; Knight v. United Laud

Association, 142 U. S. 161, 12 Sup. Ct. 258, 35 L. ed. 974. It

follows that under our decisions the interest of the bankrupt

under the will was "property" which he could have transferred,

and that, therefore, it passed to his trustee in bankruptcy to be

sold by him.

•••

It might have been more appropriate to have the right de-

termined by application to the Federal Court having control of

the bankrupt proceedings; but that point was not made by the

demurrer, and is not before us.

The judgment of this court is that the judgment of the Cir-

cuit Court be affirmed.

In re MEYER'S ESTATE

Appeal of WEISS
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232 Pa. St. 89, 81 Atl. 145

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. May 23, 1911)

From the record it appeared that testator died December 19,

1902, leaving a will by which he gave his residuary estate to

his daughter, Clara L. Beihl, and her husband. Ernest H.

saying that it is not- property. The term "property," used iii
the bankruptcy act, is of the broadest possible signilicatio11,
embracing everything that has exchangeable value, or goes to
make up a man's wealth-€'very interest or estate which the law
regards of sufficient value for judicial recognition. Chas. & W.
C. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 69 S. C. 481, 48 S. E. 476; South Bound
Ry. Co. v. Burton, 67 S. C. 515, 46 S. E. 340; DelaBSus v.
United States, 34 U. S. 117, 9 L. ed. 7f; Knight v. United Land
Association, 142 U. S. 161, 12 Sup. Ct. 258, 35 L. ed. 974. It
follows that under our decisions the interest of the bankrupt
under the will was "property" whirh he rould have transferred,
and that, therefore, it p888ed to his trustee in bankruptcy to be
sold by him.

• • •
It might have been more appropriate to have the right determined by application to the Federal Court having control of
the bankrupt proceedings; but that point was not made by the
demurrer, and is not before us.
The judgment of this court is that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.

Beihl, "absolutely and forever, as tenants by entireties." On

July 2, 1909, Ernest H. Beihl was adjudicated a bankrupt by

the United States District Court. and Charles J. Weiss was ap-

In re MEYER'S ESTATE

pointed his trustee in bankruptcy. The trustee in bankruptcy

claimed that one-half of the fund before the court should be

Appeal of WEISS

awarded to him as the property of the bankrupt. The auditing

judge disallowed the claim.

232 Pa. St. 89, 81 Atl. 145

STEWART, J. The appeal is by the trustee in bankruptcy

of the estate of Ernest H. Beihl from a decree of the Orphans'

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. May 23, 1911)

Court in the adjudication of the account of the trustees under

the last will of C. A. Adolph Meyer, deceased, awarding the

From the record it appeared that testator died December 19,
HJ02, leaving a will by which he gave his residuary estate to
his daughter, Clara J.J. Beihl, and her husband, Ernrst H.
Beihl, "absolutely and forever, as tenants hy entireties." On
July 2, 1909, Ernest H. Bcihl was adjudicated a bankrupt by
the United States District Court. and Charles J. Weiss was appointed his trustee in bankruptcy. The trustee iu bankruptcy
claimed that one-half of the fund before the court should be
awarcll•d to him as the property of the bankrupt. The auditing
juugc disallowed the claim.
STEW ART, J. The appeal is by the trustee in bankruptcy
of the E>State of Ernest IT. Beihl from a decree of the Orphans'
Court in the adjudication of the account of the trustees under
th1~ last will of C. A. Adolph Meyer, deceased, awarding the
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fund before the court to Ernest H. Beihl and Clara, his wife.

The appellant claims the fund in virtue of his office in bank-

ruptcy, the appellees on the ground that the estate vested in

them as husband and wife. It is not questioned that under the

will through which this estate was derived husband and wife

took by entireties, if indeed such estate may still be created.

The contention of appellant is that this venerable and unique

common-law estate has been abolished in Pennsylvania by the

act of June 8, 1893 (P. L. 344), not in express terms, but by

unavoidable implication. [After concluding that the estate by

the entirety may still be created in Pennsylvania, the court con-

tinues:]

It is further complained of as error that the court refused to

order proper security to be given for the payment to the trustee

of one-half the income arising during the life of the wife from

the fund for distribution. Whatever the rights of the trustee

may be with respect to the fund in the event of the husband

surviving his wife, it is too plain for discussion that, except as

estates by entirety no longer exist, he can have no present right

of enjoyment. We have just held that they do still exist. In

estates of this kind husband and wife are not joint tenants or

tenants in common, but both are seised of the entirety, per tout

et non per my. As a consequence neither can dispose of any
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part without the consent of the other, but the whole must remain

to the other. It follows that the interest of the appellant in

the fund in dispute, under all our authorities defining this kind

of estate, and its characteristics, is at most a contingent one.

He is not presently substituted for the husband, and cannot be.

His right to the use and enjoyment of any part of the fund must

await the happening of the contingency of the husband surviv-

ing the wife. Until that happens, the wife's right to the enjoy-

ment of the whole may not be disputed by any one claiming

under the husband. The very enlightening discussion of the

subject in the able opinion of Judge Thayer, approved and

adopted by this court in McCurdy v. Canning, 64 Pa. 39, and

which has consistently been followed, makes further citation

of authority for the views here expressed unnecessary.

This assignment of error is likewise overruled, and the appeal

is dismissed.8

8—See Ann. Cm. 1912 C, 1242,

where the case is annotated.

fund before the court to Ernest H. Beihl and Clara, his wife.
The appellant claims the fund in virtue of his office in bankruptcy, the appellees on the ground that the estate vested in
them as husband and wife. It is not questioned that under the
will through which this estate was derived husband and wire
took by entireties, if indeed such estate may still be created.
The contention of appellant is that this venerable and uni11ue
common-law estate has been abolished in Pennsylvania by the
act of June 8, 1893 (P. L. 344), not in express terms, but by
unavoidable implication. [After concluding that the estate by
the entirety may still be created in Pennsylvania, the court continues:]
It is further complained of as error that the court refused to
order proper security to be given for the payment to the trustee
of one-half the income arising during the life of the wife from
the fund for distribution. Whatever the rights of the trustee
may be with respect to the fund in the event of the husband
surviving his wife, it is too plain for discussion that, except as
estates by entirety no longer exist, he can have no present right
of enjoyment. We have just held that they do still exist. In
estates of this kind husband and wife are not joint tenants or
tenants in common, but both are seised of the entirety, per tout
et non per my. As a consequence neither can dispose of any
part without the consent of the other, but the whole must remain
to the other. It follows that the interest of the appellant in
the fund in dispute, under all our authorities defining this kind
of estate, and its characteristics, is at most a contingent one.
He is not presently substituted for the husband, and cannot be.
His right to the use and enjoyment of any part of the fund must
await the happening of the contingency of the husband surviving the wife. Until that happens, the wife's right to the enjoyment of the whole may not be disputed by any one claiming
under the husband. The very enlightening discussion of the
subject in the able opinion of Judge Thayer, approved and
adopted by this court in McCurdy v. Canning, 64 Pa. 39, and
which has consistently been followed, makes further citation
of authority for the views here expressed unnecessary.
This assignment of error is likewise overruled, and the appeal
is dismissed. s
8-See Ann. Caa. 1912 C, 1242,
where the ease is annotated.
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GAZLAY v. WILLIAMS

210 U. S. 41, 52 L. ed. 950, 28 Sup. Ct. 687

GAZLAY v. WILLIAMS

(United States Supreme Court. May 18, 1908)

June 16, 1902, W. A Gazlay, Hanna F. Gazlay, Hulda G.

210 U. S. 41, 52 L. ed. 950, 28 Sup. Ct. 687

Miller, Emma G. Donaldson, Julia G. Stewart, and Clara G.

Kuhn entered into a written agreement as lessors with one J. D.

(United States Supreme Court. May 18, 1908)

Kueny, whereby, in consideration of the rents to be paid and

the covenants to be performed by said lessee, his heirs and

assigns, they leased to said Kueny certain premises situated on

the east side of Vine street, south of Sixth street, Cincinnati,

Ohio, for a period of ten years, with the privilege of ten years

additional.

The lease contained the following condition:

"'Provided, however, that if said lessee shall assign this lease

or underlet said premises, or any part thereof, or if said lessee's

interest therein shall be sold under execution or other legal

process, without the written consent of said lessors, their heirs

or assigns, is first had, or if said lessee or assigns shall fail to

keep any of the other covenants of this lease by said lessee to be

kept, it shall be lawful for said lessors, their heirs or assigns,

into said premises to re-enter and the same to have again, re-

possess, and enjoy as in their first and former estate, and there-
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upon this lease and everything therein contained on the said

lessors' behalf to be done and performed shall cease, determine,

and be utterly void."

On the 9th of April the lessors filed a petition in the Superior

Court of Cincinnati, Ohio, against J. D. Kueny for the recovery

of rent due under the lease. In their petition the lessors asked

that a receiver be appointed to take charge of all the property

of said J. D. Kueny, including said leasehold estate, and that

said leasehold premises and the unexpired term be sold, "sub-

ject, however, to all the terms, covenants, and conditions con-

tained in the lease from said plaintiffs to said J. D. Kueny."

The court thereupon appointed receivers to take charge of and

manage said property, and later made an order directing said

receivers to sell all of the personal property of said J. D. Kueny,

including the leasehold estate, and under said order all of said

property, including said leasehold estate, was sold to H. D.

Brown, who took possession of the same, made extensive im-

provements thereon, and paid to the lessors the rent reserved

June 16, 1902, W. A. Gazlay, Hanna F. Gazlay, Hulda G.
Miller, Emma G. Donaldson, Julia G. Stewart, and Clara G.
Kuhn entered into a written agreement as lessors with one J. D.
Kueny, whereby, in consideration of the rent.a to be paid and
the covenant.a to be performed by said lessee, his heirs and
assigns, they leased to said Kueny certain premises situated on
the east side of Vine street, south of Sixth street, Cincinnati,
Ohio, for a period of ten years, with the privilege of ten yean
additional.
The lease contained the following conditioa:
·'Provided, however, that if said lessee shall 888ign th.is lease
or underlet said premises, or any part thereof, or if said lessee's
interest therein shall be sold under execution or other legal
process, without the written consent of said lessors, their heirs
or assigns, is first had, or if said lessee or assigns ahall fail to
keep any of the other covenants of this lease by said lessee to be
kept, it shall be lawful for said lessors, their heirs or assigns,
into said premises to re-enter and the same to have again, repossess, and enjoy as in· their first and former estate, and thereupon this lease and everything therein contained on the said
lessors' behalf to be done and performed shall cease, determine,
and be utterly void."
On the 9th of April the lessors filed a petition in the Superior
Court of Cincinnati, Ohio, against J. D. Kueny for the recovery
of rent due under the lease. In their petition the lessors asked
that a receiver be appointed to take charge of all the property
of said J. D. Kueny, including said leasehold estate, and that
said leasehold premises and the unexpired term be sold, "subject, however, to all the terms, covenant.a, and conditions contained in the lease from said plaintiffs to said J. D. Kneny."
The court thereupon appointed receivers to take charge of and
manage said property, and later made an order directing said
receivers to sell all of the personal property of said J. D. Kueny,
including the leasehold estate, and under said order all of said
property, including said leasehold estate, was sold to H. D.
Brown, who took possession of the same, made extensive improvements thereon, and paid to the lessors the rent reserved
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under said lease, from the time he took possession, July, 1005,

to January, 1906, when proceedings were begun against him in

the District Court of the United States for the Southern District

of Ohio, western division, to have him adjudged a bankrupt.

Pending the adjudication, a receiver was appointed, who took

charge of all of Brown's property, including said leasehold

estate, and who, as such receiver, paid to said lessors the rent

reserved in said lease for the month of January, 1906.

In February, 1906, the appellee herein, Fletcher R. Williams,

was elected as trustee in bankruptcy of the estate and effects of

said Brown, and on March 1, 1906, he filed in the bankruptcy

proceeding an application for the sale of said leasehold estate,

making the lessors parties thereto, and asking that they be re-

quired to set up any claim they might have upon the same.

Process was issued and served upon all but one of the lessors on

March 5, 1906, and on that one on March 9, 1906.

On March 6, 1906, said trustee paid to W. A. Gazlay rent for

the month of February, 1906, the amount paid being the monthly

sum named in the said lease. Thereupon said lessors, coming in

for the purposes of the motion only, filed a motion to be dis-

missed from the proceedings on the ground that the court had

no jurisdiction over their persons, which motion was overruled
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by the referee in bankruptcy. Thereupon the lessors filed an

answer, "and, without intending to enter their appearance

herein, but acting under protest and the direction of the court,''

alleged that the lease contained the condition, among others,

"that if said lessee should assign the lease or underlet said

leased premises or any other part thereof, or if said lessee's

interest therein should be sold under execution or other legal

process without the written consent of said lessors, their heirs

or assigns first had; or if said lessee or assign should fail to

keep any of the other covenants of the lease by lessee to be kept,

it should be lawful for said lessors, their assigns or heirs, into

said premises to re-enter and the same to have again, repossess,

and enjoy, as in the first and former estate; and thereupon this

lease and everything therein contained on said lessor's behalf

to be done and performed, should cease, determine, and be

utterly void. They further say that said lease and the premises

thereby leased passed into the possession of Harry D. Brown,

the bankrupt herein, without the written consent of said lessors,

but with their acquiescence only, and that said condition in said

lease is still in full force and effect as against said Harry D.

under said lease, from the time he took pussession, July, l!J03,
to January, 1906, when proceedings were begun against lum in
the District Court of the United States for the Southem District
of Ohio, western division, to have him adjudged a bankrupt.
Pending the adjudication, a receiver was appoiuted, who took
charge of all of Brown's property, including said leasehold
estate, and who, as such receiver, paid to said lessors the rent
reserved in said lease for the month of January, 1906.
In February, 1906, the appellee herein, Fletcher R. Wiliiarns.
was elected as trustee in bankruptcy of the estate and effects uf
said Brown, and on March 1, 1906, he filed in the bankruptcy
proceeding an application for the sale of said leasehold estate,
making the lessors parties thereto, and asking that they be required to set up any claim they might have upon the same.
Process was issued and served upon all but one of the lessors on
March 5, 1906, and on that one on March 9, 1906.
On March 6, 1906, said trustee paid to W. A. Gazlay rent for
the month of February, 1906, the amount paid being the monthly
sum named in the said lease. Thereupon said lessors, coming in
for the purposes of the motion only, filed a motion to be dismissed from the proceedings on the ground that the court bad
no jurisdiction over their persons, which motion was overruled
by the referee in bankruptcy. Thereupon the lessors filed an
answer, "and, without intending to enter their appearance
herein, but acting under pr<>U>st and the direction of the court,''
alleged that the lease contained the condition, among others,
''that if said lessee should 88Sign the lease or underlet said
leased premises or any other part thereof, or if said lessee's
interest therein should be sold under execution or other legal
process without the written consent of said lessors, their heirs
or assigns first had ; or if said lessee or assign should fail to
keep any of the other covenants of the lease by lessee to be kept,
it should be lawful for said lessors, their assigns or heirs, into
said premises to re-enter and the same to have again, repossess,
and enjoy, as in the first and former estate; and thereupon this
lease and everything therein contained on said lessor's behalf
to be done and performed, should cease, determine, and be
utterly void. They further say that said lease and the premises
thereby leased pBBSed into the possession of Harry D. Brown,
the bankrupt herein, without the written consent of said lessors,
but with their acquiescence only, and that said condition in said
lease is still in full force and effect a.s against said Harry D.
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Brown and his trustee in bankruptcy herein. That at the time

of filing of the application herein, so far as they know or are

informed, the said lessors had no claim in said leasehold premises

adverse to said trustee in bankruptcy."

The case was submitted to the referee upon these pleadings,

an agreed statement of facts, and the arguments and briefs of

counsel.

The referee found that the trustee being in lawful possession

of said leasehold estate, the court had jurisdiction of the persons

and subject-matter of the suit; that the claim of the lessors,

assuming that they had one and that it would be enforceable

only after a sale, nevertheless was in the nature of a cloud upon

the title of the trustee to said leasehold estate, and, as such,

could be determined in this proceeding in advance of its happen-

ing; and he thereupon held that the lessors had no right, as

against the trustee in bankruptcy herein, to forfeit the lease in

the event of a sale by him under the court's order, and ordered

the trustee to sell the same free from any claim or right on the

part of the lessors to forfeit the same. To these findings and

this judgment of the referee the lessors took exception and filed

a petition for a review of the same in the District Court in bank-

ruptcy. The referee certified his proceedings to the District
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Court, where, upon a hearing on the pleadings and facts, the

findings and judgment of the referee were affirmed and the

petition dismissed.

From this judgment the lessors took an appeal to the United

States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. There

the cause was again submitted upon the same pleadings and

facts as in the District Court, and that court affirmed the judg-

ment of the District Court, and held that the clause in said lease

providing for its forfeiture in case of a sale of the same under

execution or other legal process, without the lessors' written

consent thereto, had no application to a sale by the trustee in

bankruptcy, and that therefore the lessors could not forfeit the

lease in case the trustees herein should sell the same. 77 C. C.

A. 662, 147 Fed. 678.

From this judgment the present appeal was taken.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER delivered the opinion of the court:

The passage of the lessee's estate from Brown, the bankrupt,

to Williams, the trustee, as of the date of the adjudication, was

by operation of law, and not by the act of the bankrupt, nor

Brown and his trustee in bankruptcy herein. That at the time
of filing of the application herein, so far as they know or ar~
informed, the said lessors had no claim in said leasehold premises
adverse to said trustee in bankruptcy.''
The ca.se was submitted to the referee upon these pleadings,
an agreed statement of facts, and the arguments and briefs of
counsel.
The referee found that the trustee being in lawful p068e.S8ion
of said leasehold estate, the court had jurisdiction of the persons
and subject-matter of the suit; that the claim of the lessors,
assuming that they had one and that it would be enforceable
only after a sale, nevertheless was in the nature of a cloud upon
the title of the trustee to said leasehold estate, and, as such,
could be determined in this proceeding in advance of its happening; and he thereupon held that the lessors had no right, as
against the trustee in bankruptcy herein, to forfeit the lease in
the event of a sale by him under the court's order, and ordered
the trustee to sell the same free from any claim or right on the
part of the lessors to forfeit the same. To these findings and
this judgment of the referee the le.asors took exception and filed
a petition for a review of the same in the Di.strict Court in bankruptcy. The referee certified his proceedings to the District
Court, where, upon a hearing on the pleadings and facts, the
findings and judgment of the referee were affirmed and the
petition dismissed.
From this judgment the lessors took an appeal to the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. There
the cause was again submitted upon the same pleadings and
facts as in t;he District Court, and that court affirmed the judgment of the District Court, and held that the clause in said lease
providing for its forfeiture in case of a sale of the same under
execution or other legal process, ";thout the lessors' written
consent thereto, had no application to a sale by the trustee in
bankruptcy, and that therefore the lessors could not forfeit the
lease in case the trustees herein should sell the same. 77 C. C.
A. 662, 147 Fed. 678.
From this judgment the present appeal was taken .
.Mr. Chief Justice FULLER delivered the opinion of the court :
The passage of the lessee's estate from Brown, the bankrupt,
to Williams, the trustee, as of the date of the adjudication, was
by operation of law, and not by the act of the bankrupt, nor
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was it by sale. The condition imposed forfeiture if the lessee

assigned the lease or the lessee's interest should be sold ui;der

execution or other legal process without lessors' written consent.

A sale by the trustee for the benelit of Brown's creditors was

not forbidden by the condition and would not be in breach

thereof. It would not be a voluntary assignment by the lessee,

nor a sale of the lessee's interest, but of the trustee's interest,

held under the bankruptcy proceedings, for the benefit of cred-

itors. Jones, in his work on Landlord and Tenant, lays it down

(§466) that "an ordinary covenant against subletting and as-

signment is not broken by a transfer of the leased premises by

operation of law, but the covenant may be so drawn as to ex-

pressly prohibit such a transfer, and in that case the lease would

be forfeited by an assignment by operation of law.'' The cove-

nant here is not of that character.

The doctrine of Dumpor's Case, 4 Coke, 119, 1 Smith, Lead.

Cas. *85, is that a condition not to alien without license is de-

termined by the first license granted; and District Judge Thomp-

son expressed the opinion that it was applicable here, and that

the sale to Brown, under the order of the Superior Court of

Cincinnati, entered on the petition of these lessors for the

recovery of rent, set the leasehold free from the forfeiture
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clauses, especially as that court did not direct that the sale be

subject to the terms, covenants, and conditions of the lease, as

prayed for in the petition. Moreover, the lessors, in their an-

swer in these proceedings, stated that "said lease and the

premises thereby leased passed into the possession of Harry D.

Brown, the bankrupt herein, without the written consent of said

lessors, but with their acquiescence only; and that the said con-

dition in said lease is still in full force and effect as against said

Harry D. Brown and his trustee in bankruptcy herein."

In respect of the lessors, Brown may be treated, then, as if

he were the original lessee; and the sale by his assignee in bank-

ruptcy, under order of the bankruptcy court, was not a breach

of the condition in question. The language of Bayley, J., in

Doe ex dem. Goodbehere v. Bevan, 3 Maule & S. 353, cited by

the Court of Appeals, is applicable.

The premises in question in this case, being a public house,

were demised by Goodbehere to one Shaw for a term of years,

and Shaw covenanted that he, his executors, etc., should not nor

would, during the term, assign the indenture, or his or their

interest therein, or assign, set, or underlet the messuage and

was it by sale. The condition imposed f orfciture if the lessee
assigned the lease or the lessee's interest should be sold u1:der
execution or other legal process without lessors' written consent.
A sale by the trustee for the benetit of Brown's creditors was
not forbidden by the condition aud would not be in breach
thereof. It would not be a voluntary assignment by the lessee,
nor a sale of the lessee's interest, but of the trustee's interest,
' held under the bankruptcy proceedings, for the benefit of creditors. Jones, in his work on Landlord and Tenant, lays it down
( § 466) that "an ordinary covenant against subletting and assignment is not broken by a transfer of the leased premises by
operation of law, but the covenant may be so drawn as to expressly prohibit such a transfer, and in that case the lease would
be forfeited by an assignment by operation of law." The covenant here is not of that character.
The doctrine of Dumpor 's Case, 4 Coke, 119, 1 Smith, Lead.
Cas. •s5, is that a condition not to alien without license is determined by the first license granted; and District Judge Thompson expressed the opinion that it was applicable here, and that
the sale to Brown, under the order of the Superior Court of
Cincinnati, entered on the petition of these lessors for the
recovery of rent, set the leasehold free from the forfeiture
clauses, especially as that court did not direct that the sale be
subject to the terms, covenants, and conditions of the lease, as
prayed for in the petition. Moreover, the lessors, in their answer in these proceedings, stated that ''said lease and the
premises thereby leased passed into the possession of Harry D.
Brown, the bankrupt herein, without the written consent of said
lessors, but with their acquiescence only; and that the said condition in said lease is still in full force and effect as against said
Harry D. Brown and his trustee in bankruptcy herein.''
In respect of the lessors, Brown may be treated, then, as if
he were the original lessee; and the sale by his assignee in bankruptcy, under order of the bankruptcy court, was not a breach
of the condition in question. The language of Bayley, J., in
Doe ex dem. Goodbehere v. Bevan, 3 Maule & S. 353, cited by
the Court of Appeals, is applicable.
The premises in question in this case, being a public house,
were demised by Goodbehere to one Shaw for a term of years,
and Shaw covenanted that he, his executors, etc., should not nor
would, during the term, assign the indenture, or his or their
interest therein, or assign, set, or underlet the messuage and
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premises, or any part thereof, to any person or persons whatso-

ever, without the consent in writing of the lessor, his executors,

etc. Proviso, that in case Shaw, his executors, etc., should part

with his or their interest in the premises, or any part thereof,

contrary to his covenant, that the lessor might re-enter. After-

wards Shaw deposited this lease with Whitbread & Company

as a security for the repayment of money borrowed of them;

and, becoming bankrupt, and his estate and effects being as-

signed by the commissioners to his assignees, the lease was, upon

the petition of Whitbread & Company, directed by the Lord

Chancellor to be sold in discharge of their debt, and was, accord-

ingly, sold to the defendant, and, without the consent of Good-

behere, assigned to the defendant by the assignees, and he en-

tered, etc. The trial judge ruled that this was not a breach of

the proviso not to assign without consent, etc., inasmuch as the

covenant did not extend to Shaw's assignees, they being as-

signees in law; wherefore he directed a nonsuit. The rule to

set aside the nonsuit was discharged on argument before Lord

Ellenborough, Ch. J.; LeBlanc, J.; Bayley, J., and Dampier, J.

(delivering concurring opinions); and Bayley, J., said:

"It has never been considered that the lessee's becoming bank-

rupt was an avoiding of the lease within this proviso; and if it
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be not, what act has the lessee done to avoid it? All that has

followed upon his bankruptcy is not by his act, but by the

operation of law, transferring his property to his assignees.

Then shall the assignees have capacity to take it. and yet not to

dispose of it? Shall they take it only for their own benefit, or

be obliged to retain it in their hands, to the prejudice of the

creditors, for whose benefit the law originally cast it upon them T

Undoubtedly that can never be."

Decree affirmed.9

BURLINGHAM v. CROUSB

228 U. S. 459, 57 L. ed. 920, 33 Sup. Ct. 564

(United States Supreme Court. April 28, 1913)

Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the court:

The action was brought in the United States District Court for

the Southern District of New York by the trustees of the firm

9—See In re Montello Brick Frazin, 183 Fed. 28; Wilson v. WaJ-

Works, 163 Fed. 624; Plaut v. Gor- lani, 5 Ex. Div. 155 (reviewing the

ham Mfg. Co., 174 Fed. 872; In re English statutes).

premises, or any part thereof, to a.ny person or persons whatsoever, witltout the consent in writing of the lessor, his executors,
etc. Proviso, that in case Shaw, his executors, etc., should part
with his or their interest in the premises, or any part thereof,
coatrary to bis c6venant, that the lessor might re-enter. Afterwards Shaw deposited this lease w~th Whitbread & Company
as a security for the repayment of money borrowed of them ;
and, becoming bankrupt, and his estate and effects being assigned by the commissioners to his assignees, the lease wa.s, upon
the petition of Whitbread & Company, directed by the Lord
Chancellor to be sold in discharge of their debt, and was, accordingly, sold to the defendant, and, without the consent of Ooodbehere, assigned to the defendant by the assignees, and he entered, etc. The trial judge ruled that this was not a breach of
the proviso not to assign without consent, etc., inasmuch as the
covenant did not extend to Shaw's assignees, they being assignees in law; wherefore he directed a nonsuit. The rule to
set aside the nonsuit was discharged on argument before Lord
Ellenborough, Ch. J.; LeBlanc, J.; Bayley, J., and Dampier, J.
(delivering concurring opinions) ; and Bayley, J., said:
''It has never been considered that the le.ssee 's becoming bankrupt was an avoiding of the lease within this proviso; and if it
be ·not, what act has the lessee done to avoid it T All that has
followed upon his bankruptcy is not by his act, hut by the
operation of law, transferring his property to his assignees.
Then shall the assignees have capacity to take it. and yet not to
dispose of it T Shall they take it only for their own benefit, or
be obliged to retain it in their hands, to the prejudice of the
creditors, for whose benefit the law originally cast it upon them T
Undoubtedly that can never be."
·
9
Decree affirmed.
BURLINGHAM v. CR.OUSE
228 U. S. 459, 57 L. ed. 920, 33 Sup. Ct. 564
(United States Supreme Court.

April 28, 1913)

Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the court:
'l'he action was brought in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York by the trustees of the firm
9-See

In

re

Montello

Briek

Works, 163 Fed. 624; Plaut v. Gorham Mfg. Co., 174 Fed. 8i2; In re

Fruin, 183 Fed. 28; Wil11on v. Walla.ni, 5 Ex. Div. 155 (reviewing the
Eugli~h

statutes).
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of that firm, bankrupts, against Charles M. Crouse and the

Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, to re-

cover the sum of $90,698.32, the net proceeds of certain policies

of insurance issued by the Equitable Life Assurance Society

upon the life of Thomas A. Mclntyre, one of the bankrupts, de-

ceased. The proceeds of the policies were paid into court by

the society. The judgment of the District Court in favor of

Crouse was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (104 C. C.

A. 227, 181 Fed. 479), and the case has been appealed to this

court. .

It appears that on the 10th of April, 1902, Thomas A. Mc-

lntyre obtained two policies of life insurance in the Equitable

Society. They were known as "guaranteed cash-value, limited

payment, life policies," each providing that upon the death of

the insured the company would pay to his executors, adminis-

trators, or assigns the sum of $100,000 in fifty annual instal-

ments, or the sum of $53,000 in cash, a total of $106,000 for the

two policies. On April 14, 1906, the policies were assigned abso-

lutely to the firm of T. A. Mclntyre & Company, and on April

24, 1907, they were by that firm assigned to the Equitable

Society as collateral security for a loan of $15,370. On Febru-

ary 25, 1908, two months prior to the filing of the petition in

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

bankruptcy, the policies were assigned by Mclntyre & Company

to the defendant, Charles M. Crouse, subject, however, to the

prior assignment to the Equitable Society. A petition in in-

voluntary bankruptcy was filed against Mclntyre & Company

and its individual members on April 25, 1908, and on May 9,

1908, the defendant Crouse paid the premiums on the policies,

in the sum of $6,078.38. Mclntyre & Company and the in-

dividual members thereof were adjudged involuntary bankrupts

on May 21, 1908, and the trustees were elected on the 24th of

July, 1908. On the 29th of July, 1908, Thomas A. Mclntyre

died, and the policies became payable.

It appears that the policies had a cash surrender value, which,

at the time when the trustees qualified, was $15,370, or the

amount of the loan of the Equitable Society upon the policies.

It is therefore apparent that on the day when the petition was

filed, as well as the day of the adjudication in bankruptcy, the

cash surrender value would not have exceeded the loan and lien

of the society upon the policies. The Circuit Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit held that, under the circumstances, the

of T. A. Mcintyre & Company, and of the individual members
of that firm, bankrupts, against Charles M. Crouse aud the
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, to recover the sum of $90,698.32, the net proceeds of certain policies
of insurance issued by the Equitable Life Assurance Society
upon the life of Thomas A. l\Iclntyre, one of the bankrupts, deceased. The proceeds of the policies were paid into court by
the society. The judgment of the District Court in favor of
Crouse was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals ( 104 C. C.
A. 227, 181 Fed. 479), and the case has been appealed to this
court.
1
It appears that on the 10th of April, 1902, Thomas A. McIntyre obtained two policies of life insurance in the Equitable
Society. They were known as ''guaranteed cash-value, limited
payment, life policies,'' each providing that upon the death of
the insured the company would pay to his executors, administrators, or assigns the sum of $100,000 in fifty annual instalments~ or the sum of $53,000 in cash, a total of $106,000 for the
two policies. On April 14, 1906, the policies were assigned absolutely to the firm of T. A. Mcintyre & Company, and on April
24, 1907, they were by that firm assigned to the Equitable
Society as collateral security for a loan of $15,370. On February 25, 1908, two months prior to the filiug of the petition in
bankruptcy, the policies were assigned by l\Iclntyre & Company
to the defendant, Charles. M. Crouse, subject, however, to the
prior assignment to the Equitable Society. A petition in involuntary bankr\).ptcy was filed again~t 1\Iclntyre & Company
and its individual members on April 25, 1908. and on May 9,
1908, the defendant Crouse paid the premiums on the policies,
in the sum of $6,078.38. Mcintyre & Company and the individual members thereof were adjudged _involuntary bankrupts
on May 21, 1908, and the trustees were elected on the 24th of
July, 1908. On the 29th of July, 1908, Thomas A. Mcintyre
died, and the policies became payable.
It appears that the policies had a cash surrender value, which,
at the time when the trustees qualified, was $15,370, or the
amount of the loan of the Equitable Society upon the policies.
It is therefore apparent that on the day when the petition was
filed, as well as the day of the adjudication in bankruptcy, the
cash surrender value would not have exceeded the loan and lien
of the society upon the policies. The Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that, under the circumstances, the
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policies did not pass to the trustees as assets, and therefore the

action which had been begun to set aside the transfer to Crouse,

as a preference within the bankruptcy act, could not be

maintained.

The correctness of this decision depends primarily upon the

construction of § 70a of the bankruptcy act, which reads:

"The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt, upon his appoint-

ment and qualification, and his successor or successors if he

shall have one or more, upon his or their appointment and

qualification, shall in turn be vested by operation of law with

the title of the bankrupt, as of the date he was adjudged a

bankrupt, except in so far as it is to property which is exempt,

to all (1) documents relating to his property; (2) interests in

patents, patent rights, copyrights, and trademarks; (3) powers

which he might have exercised for his own benefit, but not those

which he might have exercised for some other person; (4) prop-

erty transferred by him in fraud of his creditors; (5) property

which, prior to the filing of the petition, he could by any means

have transferred, or which might have been levied upon and

sold under judicial process against him: Provided, that when

any bankrupt shall have any insurance policy, which has a cash

surrender value payable to himself, his estate, or personal repre-
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sentatives, he may, within thirty days after the cash surrender

value has been ascertained and stated to the trustee by the com-

pany issuing the same, pay or secure to the trustee the sum so

ascertained and stated, and continue to hold, own, and carry

such policy free from the claims of the creditors participating

in the distribution of his estate under the bankruptcy proceed-

ings; otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as assets; and

(6) rights of action arising upon contracts or from the unlawful

taking or detention of, or injury to, his property."

The part of the section particularly to be considered is subdiv.

5 and its proviso. Subdivision 5 undertakes to vest in the trustee

property which, prior to the filing of the petition, the bankrupt

could by any means have transferred, or which might have been

levied upon or sold under judicial process against him. Then

follows the proviso with reference to insurance policies which

have a cash surrender value, permitting a bankrupt, when the

cash surrender value has been ascertained and stated, to pay or

secure such sum to the trustee, and to continue to hold, own, and

carry the policies free from the claims of creditors; otherwise

the policies to pass to the trustee as assets.

policies did not pass to the trustees as assets, and therefore the
action which had been begun to set aside the transfer to Crouse,
as a preference within the bankruptcy act, could not be
maintained.
The correctness of this decision depends primarily upon the
construction of § 10a of the bankruptcy act, which reads:
''The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt, upon his appointment and qualification, and his successor or successors if he
shall have one or more, upon his or their appointment and
qualification, shall in tum be vested by operation of law with
the title of the bankrupt, as of the date he was adjudged a
bankrupt, except in so fa.r as it is to property which is exempt,
to all (1) documents relating to his property; (2) interests in
patents, patent rights, copyrights, and trademarks; ( 3) powers
which he might have exercised for bis own benefit, but not those
which he might have exercised for some other person; ( 4) property transferred by him in fraud of his creditors; (5) property
which, prior to the filing of the petition, he could by any means
have transferred, or which might have been levied upon and
sold under judicial process against him : Provided, that when
any bankrupt shall have any insurance policy, which has a cash
surrender value payable to himself, his estate, or persona.I representatives, he may, within thirty days after the cash surrender
value has been ascertained and stated to the trustee by the company issuing the same, pay or secure to the trustee the sum so
ascertained and stated, and continue to hold, own, and carry
such policy free from the claims of the creditors participating
in the distribution of his estate under the bankruptcy proceedings ; otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as assets ; and
(6) rights of action arising upon contracts or from the unlawful
taking or detention of, or injury to, his property."
The part of the section particularly to be considered is subdiv.
5 and its proviso. Subdivision 5 undertakes to vest in the trustee
property which, prior to the filing of the petition, thQ bankrupt
could by any means have transferred, or which might have been
levied upon or sold under judicial process against him. Then
follows the proviso with reference to insurance policies which
have a cash surrender value, permitting a bankrupt, when the
cash surrender value has been ascertained and stated, to pay or
secure such sum to the trust~e, and to continue to hold, own, and
carry the policies free from the claims of creditors; otherwise
the policies to pass to the trustee as asseta.
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Two constructions have been given this section, and the ques-

tion, as presented in this case, has not been the subject of direct

determination in this court. The one favors the view that only

policies having a cash surrender value are intended to pass to

the trustee for the benefit of creditors.10 The other, conceding

that the proviso deals with this class of policies, maintains that

policies of life insurance which have no surrender value pass to

the trustee under the language of § 70a immediately preceding

the proviso, which reads: "Property which, prior to the filing

of the petition, he could by any means have transferred, or which

might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process

against him." 11

To determine the congressional intent in this respect requires

a brief consideration of the nature of the rights dealt with.

Life insurance may be given in a contract providing simply for

payment of premiums on a calculated basis which accumulates

no surplus for the holder. Such insurance has no surrender

value. Policies, whether payable at the end of a term of years

or at death, may be issued upon a basis of calculation which

accumulates a net reserve in favor of the policy holder, and

which forms a consequent basis for the surrender of the policy

by the insured, with advantage to the company upon the pay-
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ment of a part of this accumulated reserve. This feature of

surrender value was discussed by Judge Brown of the Southern

District of New York, In re McKinney, 15 Fed. 535, 537:

'' The first of these elements, the surrender value of the policy,

arises from the fact that the fixed annual premium is much in

excess of the annual risk during the earlier years of the policy,—

an excess made necessary in order to balance the deficiency of

the same premium to meet the annual risk during the latter

years of the policy. This excess in the premium paid over the

annual cost of insurance, with accumulations of interest, con-

stitutes the surrender value. Though this excess of premiums

paid is legally the sole property of the company, still in practi-

cal effect, though not in law, it is moneys of the assured, de-

posited with the company in advance, to make up the deficiency

10— In re Buelow, 98 Fed. 86;

In re Josephson, 121 Fed. 142;

Gould v. New York L. Ins. Co., 132

Fed. 927; Morris v. Dodd. 110 Ga.

606, 50 L,. B. A. 33, 78 Am. St. Bep.

129, 36 S. E. 83.

11— In re Becker, 106 Fed. 54;

In re Slingluff, 106 Fed. 154; In re

Welling, 51 C. C. A. 151, 113 Fed.

189; In re Coleman, 69 C. C. A. 496,

136 Fed. 818; In re Hettling, 99 C.

C. A. 87, 175 Fed. 65; In re Orear,

30 L. B. A. (N. S.) 990, 102 C. C,

A. 78, 178 Fed. 632.

Two constructions have been given this section, and the question, as presented in this case, has not been the subject of direct
determination in this court. The one favors the view that only
policies having a cash surrender value are intended to pas& to
the trustee for the benefit of creditol'S- 10 The other, conceding
that the proviso deals with this class of policies, maintains that
policies of life insurance which have no surrender value pass to
the trustee under the language of § 70a immediately preceding
the proviso, which reads: ''Property which, prior to the filing
of the petition, he could by any means have transferred, or which
might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process
·
against him." 11
To determine the congressional intent in this resp~ct requires
a brief consideration of the nature of the rights dealt with.
Life insurance may be given in a contract providing simply for
payment of premiums on a calculated basis which accumulates
no surplus for the holder. Such insurance has no surrender
value. Policies, whether payable at the end of a term of years
or at death, may he issued upon a basis of calculation which
accumulates a net reserve in favor of the policy holder, and
which forms a consequent basis for the surrender of the policy
by the insured, with advantage to the company upon the payment of a part of this accumulated reserve. This feature of
surrender value was discussed by Judge Brown of the Southern
District of New York, In re McKinney, 15 Fed. 535, 537:
"The first of these elements, the surrender value of the policy,
arises from the fact that the fixed annual premium is much in
excess of the annual risk during the earlier years of the policy,an excess made necessary in or<ler to balance the deficiency of
the same premium to meet the annual risk during the latter
years of the policy. This excess in the premium paid over the
annual cost of insurance, with accumulations of interest, constitutes the surrender value. Though this excess of premiums
paid is legally the sole property of the company, still in practical effect, though not in law, it is moneys of the assured, deposited with the company in advance, to make up the deficiency
IO-In re Buelow, 98 FP11. ~fl;
In re Josephson, 121 Fed. 142;
Gould ,., New York L. Ins. Co., 132
Fe<l. 927; 1\Jorris v. Dorlcl. 110 Ga.
606, 50 J,. R. A. 33, 78 Am. St. Rep.
129, 36 S. E. 83.
11- In re Becker, 106 Fed. 54;

In re Slingluff, 106 Fed. 154; In re
Welling, 51 C. C. A. 151 , 113 Fed.
189; In re Coleman, 69 C. C. A. 496,
136 Fed. 818; Jn re Hettling, 99 C.
C. A. 87, 1 i5 Fed. 65: In re Orear,
30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 990, 102 C. C,
A. 78, 178 Fed. 632.
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in later premiums to cover the annual cost of insurance, instead

of being retained by the assured, and paid by him to the com-

pany in the shape of greatly-increased premiums, when the risk

is greatest. It is the 'net reserve' required by law to be kept

by the company for the benefit of the assured, and to be main-

tained to the credit of the policy. So long as the policy remains

in force, the company has not practically any beneficial interest

in it, except as its custodian, with the obligation to maintain it

unimpaired and suitably invested for the benefit of the insured.

This is the practical, though not the legal, relation of the com-

pany to this fund.

"Upon the surrender of the policy before the death of the

assured, the company, to be relieved from all responsibility for

the increased risk, which is represented by this accumulating

reserve, could well afford to surrender a considerable part of it

to the assured, or his representative. A return of a part in

some form or other is now usually made. • • •"

This case has been cited with approval in this court. Holden

v. Stratton, 198 U. S. 202, 49 L. ed. 1018, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 656;

Hiscock v. Mertens, 205 U. S. 202, 51 L. ed. 771, 27 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 488.

Under the bankruptcy act of 1867 [14 Stat. at L. 522, c. 176,
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§ 14] no special provision was made for insurance policies. The

section providing for the passing of the assets of the bankrupt

to the trustee contained the broad language of "all the estate,

real and personal." Under this statute it was held In re

McKinney, supra, that the insurance upon the life of the bank-

rupt vested in the bankrupt estate only to the extent of its cash

surrender value at the time of the filing of the petition.

In Holden v. Stratton, supra, this court held that the law of

the state of Washington, exempting the proceeds of life insur-

ance policies, was applicable, and under the bankruptcy act of

1898, § 6, the bankrupt might retain such policies. The Circuit

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, from which Holden v.

Stratton came by certiorari to this court, had held that § 70a

was not controlled by the exemptions provided in § 6 of the

bankruptcy act, and had adhered to its former decision In re

Scheld, 52 L. R. A. 188, 44 C. C. A. 233, 104 Fed. 870, in which

§ 70a had been construed to pass insurance policies having a

cash surrender value to the trustee, unless the bankrupt paid

or secured the surrender value, as pointed out in the section

While this court held that the exemption under the state law

in later premiums to cover the annual cost of insurance, instead
of being retained by the 888ured, and paid by him to the company in the shape of greatly-increased premiums, when the risk
is greatest. It is the 'net reserve' required by law to be kept
by the company for the benefit of the assured, and to be maintained to the credit of the policy. So long as the policy remains
in force, the company has not practically any beneficial interest
in it, except as its custodian, with the obligation to 1maintain it
UJtimpaired and suitably invested for the benefit of the insured.
This is the practical, though not the legal, relation of the company to this fund.
~'Upon the surrender of the policy before the death of the
aamred, the company, to be relieved from all responsibility for
the increased risk, which is represented by this accumulating
reserve, could well afford to surrender a considerable part of it
to the a.ssured, or his representative. A return of a part in
some form or other is now usually made. • • • ''
This case has been cited with approvat in this court. Holden
v. Stratton, 198 U. S. 202, 49 L. ed. 1018, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 656;
Hiscock v. Mertens, 205 U. S. 202, 51 L. ed. 771, 27 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 488.
Under the bankruptcy act of 1867 [14 Stat. at L. 522, c. 176,
§ 14] no special provision was made for insurance policies. The
section providing for the passing of the assets of the bankrupt
to the trustee contained the broe.d language of ''all the estate,
real and personal." Under this statute it was held In re
McKinney, supra, that the insurance upon the life of the bankrupt vested in the bankrupt estate only to the extent of its cash
surrender value at the time of the filing of the petition.
In Holden v. Stratton, supra, this court held that the law of
the state of Washington, exempting the proceeds of life insurance policies, was applicable, and under the bankruptcy act of
1898, ~ 6, the bankrupt might retain such policies. The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, from which Holden v.
Stratton came by certiorari to this court, had held that § 70a
was not controlled by the exemptions provided in § 6 of the
bankruptcy act, and had adhered to its former decision In re
Seheld, 52 L. R. A. 188, 44 C. C. A. 233, 104 Fed. 870, in which
§ 70a had been construed to pass insurance policies having a
cash surrender value to the trustee, unless the bankrupt paid
or secured the surrender value, as pointed out in the section.
While this court held that the exemption under the state law
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applied under the bankruptcy act to the policy in question,

coming to deal with the construction of § 70a, this court said

(198 U. S., p. 213):

"As § 70a deals only with property which, not being exempt,

passes to the trustee, the mission of the proviso was, in the in-

terest of the perpetuation of policies of life insurance, to pro-

vide a rule by which, where such policies passed to the trustee

because they were not exempt, if they had a surrender value

their future operation could be preserved by vesting the bank-

rupt with the privilege of paying such surrender value, whereby

the policy would be withdrawn out of the category of an asset

of the estate. That is to say, the purpose of the proviso was to

confer a benefit upon the insured bankrupt by limiting the char-

acter of the interest in a nonexempt life insurance policy which

should pass to the trustee, and not to cause such a policy when

exempt to become an asset of the estate. "When the purpose of

the proviso is thus ascertained it becomes apparent that to main-

tain the construction which the argument seeks to affix to the

proviso would cause it to produce a result diametrically opposed

to its spirit and to the purpose it was intended to subserve."

The section came again before this court in Hiscock v. Mer-

tens, supra, and it was held that the insured was entitled to
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retain the policies upon the payment to the trustee of a sum

equivalent to the amount the company was willing to pay accord-

ing to its custom, although there was no stipulation in the poli-

cies as to a cash surrender value, and upon this subject the court

said (p. 212):

"What possible difference could it make whether the surren-

der value was stipulated in a policy or universally recognized

by the companies? In either case the purpose of the statute

would be subserved, which was to secure to the trustee the sum

of such value and to enable the bankrupt to 'continue to hold,

own, and carry such policy free from the claims of the creditors

participating in the distribution of the estate under the bank-

ruptcy proceedings.' "12

And in that case it appeared that this sum was less than

$0,000, whereas in a short time, some six months later, the ma-

turity of one of the policies would give it a value of over $11,000.

But this court held that this circumstance made no difference

12—See In re Coleman, 136 Fed.

818, where the policy had a loan

value only.

applied under the bankruptcy act to the policy in question,
coming to deal with the construction of § 10a, this court said
(198 u. s., p. 213):
''As § 10a deals only with property which, not being exempt,
passes to the trustee, the missiou of the proviso was, in the interest of the perpetuation of policies of life insurance, to provide a rule by which, where such policies passed to the trustee
because they were not exempt, if they had a surrender value
their future operation could be preserved by vesting the bankrupt with the privilege of paying such surrender value, whereby
the policy would be withdrawn out of the category of an asset
of the estate. That is to say, the purpose of the proviso was to
eonfer a benefit upon the in~mred bankrupt by limiting the character of the interest in a nonexempt life insurance policy which
should pass to the trustee, and not to cause such a policy when
exempt to become an asset of the estate. When the purpose of
the proviso is thus ascertained it becomes apparent that to maintain the construction which the argument seeks to affix to the
proviso would cause it to produce a result diametrically opposed
to its spirit and to the purpose it was intended to subserve.''
The section came again before this court in Hisc0<~k v. Mertens, supra, and it was held that the insured was entitled to
retllin the policies upon the payment to the trustee of a sum
equivalent to the amount the company was willing to pay according to its custom, although there was no stipulation in the policies as to a cash surrender value, and upon this subject the court
said (p. 212) :
''What possible difference could it make whether the surrendt'r value was stipulated in a policy or universally recognized
by the companies T In either case the purpose of the statute
would be imbserved, which was to secure to the trustee the sum
of surh value and to enable the bankrupt to 'continue to hold,
own, and carry such policy free from the claims of the creditors
participating in the distribution of the estate under the bankruptcy proceedings.' "12
And in that case it appeared that this sum was less than
:f;G.000, whereas in a short time, some six months later, the maturity of one of the policies would give it a value of over $11,000.
But this court held that this circumstance made no difference
12-See In re Coleman, 136 Fed.
818, where the policy had a loan
\'aluc only.
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in the right of the insured to pay the surrender value and hold

the policy.

True it is that life insurance policies are a species of property

and might be held to pass under the general terms of subdiv. 5,

§ 70a, but a proviso dealing with a class of this property was

inserted and must be given its due weight in construing the

statute. It is also true that a proviso may sometimes mean

simply additional legislation, and not be intended to have the

usual and primary office of a proviso, which is to limit general-

ities and exclude from the scope of the statute that which would

otherwise be within its terms.

This proviso deals with explicitness with the subject of life

insurance held by the bankrupt which has a surrender value.

Originally life insurance policies were contracts in considera-

tion of annual sums paid as premiums for the payment of a fixed

sum on the death of the insured. It is true that such contracts

have been much varied in form since, and policies payable in a

period of years, so as to become investments and means of money

saving, are in common use. But most of these policies will be

found to have either a stipulated surrender value or an estab-

lished value, the amount of which the companies are willing to

pay, and which brings the policy within the terms of the proviso
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(Hiscock v. Martens, supra), and makes its present value avail-

able to the bankrupt estate. While life insurance is property,

it is peculiar property. Legislatures of some of the states have

provided that policies of insurance shall be exempt from lia-

bility for debt, and in many states provision is made for the

protection from such liability of policies in favor of those de-

pendent upon the insured. See Holden v. Stratton, supra.

Congress undoubtedly had the nature of insurance contracts

in mind in passing § 70a with its proviso. Ordinarily the keep-

ing up of insurance of either class would require the payment

of premiums perhaps for a number of years. For this purpose

the estate might or might not have funds, or the payments might

be so deferred as to unduly embarrass the settlement of the

estate. Congress recognized also that many policies at the time

of bankruptcy might have a very considerable present value

which a bankrupt could realize by sun'endering his policy to

the company. We think it was this latter sum that the act

intended to secure to creditors by requiring its payment to the

trustee as a condition of keeping the policy alive. In passing

this statute Congress intended, while exacting this much, that

in the right of the insured to pay the surrender value and bold
the policy.
True it is that life insurance policies are a species of property
arnl might be held to paas under the general terms of subdiv. 5,
~ 70a, but a proviso dealing with a class of this property was
i11s,~rted and must be given its due weight in construing the
statute. It is also true that a proviso may sometimes mean
simply additional legislation, and not be intended to have the
usual and primary office of a proviso, which is to limit generalities and exclude from the scope of the statute that which would
otherwise be within its terms.
This proviso deals with explicitness with the subject of life
insurance held by the bankrupt which has a surrender value.
Originally life insurance policies were contracts in consideration of annual sums paid as premiums for the payment of a fixed
sum on the death of the insured. It is true that such contracts
have been much varied in form since, and policies payable in a
period of years, so as to become investments and means of money
saving, are in common use. But most of these policies will be
found to have either a stipulated surrender value or an established value, the amount of which the companies are willing to
pay, and which brings the policy within the terms of the proviso
(Hiscock v. Martens, supra), and makes its present value available to the bankrupt estate. While life insurance is property,
it is peculiar property. Legislatures of some of the states have
provided that policies of insurance shall be exempt from liability for debt, and in many states provision is made for the
protection from such liability of policies in favor of those dependent upon the insured. See Holden v. Stratton, supra.
Congress undoubtedly had the nature of insurance contracts
in mind in passing § 70a with its proviso. Ordinarily the keeping up of insurance of either class would require the payment
of premiums perhaps for a number of years. For this purpose
the estate might or might not have funds, or the payments might
be so deferred as to unduly embarrass the settlement of the
estate. Congress recognized also that many policies at the time
of bankruptcy might have a very considerable present value
which a bankrupt could realize by surrendering his policy to
the company. We think it was this latter sum that the act
intended to secure to creditors by requiring its payment to the
trustee as a condition of keeping the policy alive. In passing
this statute Congress intended, while exacting this much, that
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when that sum was realized to the estate, the bankrupt should

be permitted to retain the insurance which, because of advanc-

ing years or declining health, it might be impossible for him to

replace. It is the twofold purpose of the bankruptcy act to

convert the estate of the bankrupt into cash and distribute it

among creditors, and then to give the bankrupt a fresh start

with such exemptions and rights as the statute left untouched.

In the light of this policy the act must be construed. We think

it was the purpose of Congress to pass to the trustee that sum

which was available to the bankrupt at the time of bankruptcy

as a cash asset; otherwise to leave to the insured the benefit of

his life insurance.

It should be observed, in this connection, that in the present

case the company had advanced upon the policies their full sur-

render value, as stipulated in the policies, and that the only

interest that could have passed to the trustees would have been

the speculative right to the net proceeds of the policies, con-

tingent upon the death of the bankrupt, and possibly dependent

upon the payment of large annual premiums for thirteen years.

It is urged, however, that under § 70a, the cash surrender

value was to be paid by the bankrupt when ascertained, and the

policies kept alive for his benefit; and as these policies had been

assigned by the beneficiary to Mclntyre & Company, not as
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collateral, but absolutely, they would not come within the terms

of the proviso, and therefore the proceeds of the policies vested

in the bankrupt estate; but we find nothing in the act by which

the right of the assignee of a policy to the benefits which would

have accrued to the bankrupt is limited. As we have construed

the statute, its purpose was to vest the surrender value in the

trustee for the benefit of the creditors, and not otherwise to

limit the bankrupt in dealing with his policy.

•••

It results that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals

must be affirmed.13

13—See Foxhever v. Order of Red Hettling, 175 Fed. 65; In re Orear,

Cross, 2 O. C. C. (N. S.) 394; In 178 Fed. 632. See also Hewlett v.

re Pfaffinger, 161 Fed. 526; In re Home for Incurables, 74 Md. 350.

Whelpley, 169 Fed. 1019; In re

H. A A. Bankruptcy—84

_,

when that sum was realized to the estate, the bankrupt should
be permitted to retain the insurance which, because of advancing years or declining health, it might be impossible for him to
repface. It is the twofold purpose of the bankruptcy act to
convert the estate of the bankrupt into cash and distribute it
among creditors, and then to give the bankrupt a fresh start
with such exemptions and rights as the statute left untouched.
In the light of this policy the act must be construed. We think
it was the purpose of Congress to pass to the trustee that sum
which was available to the bankrupt at the time of bankruptcy
as a cash asset; otherwise to leave to the insured the benefit of
his life insurance.
It should be observed, in this connection, that in the present
case the company had advanced upon the policies their full surrender value, as stipulated in the policies, and that the only
interest that could have passed to the trustees would have been
the speculative right to the net proceeds of the policies, contingent upon the death of the bankrupt, and possibly dependent
upon the payment of large annual premiums for thirteen years.
It is urged, however, that under § 70a, the cash surrender
value was to be paid by the bankrupt when ascertained, and the
policies kept alive for his benefit; and as these policies had been
as&igned by the beneficiary to Mcintyre & Company, not as
collateral, but absolutely, they would not come within the terms
of the proviso, and therefore the proceeds of the policies vested
in the bankrupt estate; but we find nothing in the act by which
the right of the assignee of a policy to the benefits which would
have accrued to the bankrupt is limited. As we have construed
the statute, its purpose was to vest the surrender value in the
trustee for the benefit of the creditors, and not otherwise to
limit the bankrupt in dealing with his policy.

• • •

It results that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals
must be affirmed.13
13-See Foxhever v. Order of Red
Cross, 2 0. C. C. (N. S.) 394; Io
re Pfaffinger, 161 Fed. 526; In re
Whelpley, 169 Fed. 1019; In re
H . & A. Bankruptcy-Bf

Hettling, 175 Fed. 65; In re Orear,
178 Fed. 632. See also Hewlett v.
Home for Incurables, 74 Md. 350.
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EVERETT v. JUDSON

EVERETT v. JUDSON

228 U. S. 474, 57 L. ed. 927, 33 Sup. Ct . 568

(United States Supreme Court. April 28, 1913)

228 U. S. 474, 57 L. ed. 927, 33 Sup. Ct. 568

Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the court:

This case involves the title to the proceeds of certain insurance

(United States Supreme Court.

April 28, 1913)

policies upon the life of Alfred M. Judson, bankrupt, deceased,

collected by the trustee in bankruptcy. The executor of Jud-

son's estate brought suit against the trustee in the United States

District Court for the Southern District of New York, assert-

ing title to such funds. The District Court ordered that the

proceeds of the policies, less their cash surrender value, be paid

to the executor (188 Fed. 702); the Circuit Court of Appeals

for the second circuit, upon petition to revise, affirmed that

order (113 C. C. A. 158, 192 Fed. 834), and the case comes here

on certiorari.

A "petition in involuntary bankruptcy was filed against the

firm of Judson & Judson and its members, Alfred M. Judson

being one, on December 17, 1910, and on December 23, 1910,

Judson entered a notice of his appearance in the proceedings.

On January 9, 1911, the firm and its members were adjudged

bankrupts, and on February 9, 1911, Everett qualified as trus-

tee, Judson owned certain life insurance policies at the time
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of the institution of the bankrupt proceedings, and thereafter

and until his death, payable to his executors, administrators, or

assigns. So far as this case is concerned, at the time of the filing

of the petition in bankruptcy, these policies, with cash surrender

values and subject to loans, were as follows: One policy for

$5,000, having a cash surrender value of $2,291.49, and subject

to a loan of $2,238; another for $1,000, having a cash surrender

value of $3132.31, and subject to a loan of $322; and another for

$10,000, having a cash surrender value of $5,030, and subject

to a loan of $5,240. It therefore appears that the cash surrender

value of the policies on December 17, 1910, was $63.80.

On January 4, 1911, Judson committed suicide. Notice was

served on the trustee that the executor claimed the right, under

§ 70or of the bankruptcy act, to pay to the trustee the cash sur-

render value of the policies when ascertained, but the trustee

denied such right and also the right of the executor to the bal-

ance of the proceeds of the policies. Under agreement, the

insurance companies paid to the trustee $8,675.14 upon the

Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the court:
This case involves the title to the proceeds of certain insurance
policies upon the life of Alfred M. Judson, bankrupt, deceased,
collected by the trustee in bankruptcy. The executor of Judson's estate brought suit against the trustee in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, aaaertiug title to such funds. The District Court ordered that the
proceeds of the policies, less their cash surrender value, be paid
to the executor ( 188 Fed. 702) ; the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the second circuit, upon petition to revise, affirmed that
order (113 C. C. A. 158, 192 Fed. 834), and the case comes here
on certiorari.
A 'petition in involuntary bankruptcy was filed against the
firm of Judson & Judson and its members, Alfred :M. Judson
liei11g one, on December 17, 1910, and on December 23, 1910,
J u<lson entered a notice of his appearance in the proceedings.
On January 9, 1911, the firm and its members were adjudged
ballkrupts, and on February 9, 1911, Everett qualified as trustre. Judson owned certain life insurance policies at the time
of the institution of the bankrupt proceedings,. and thereafter
and uutil his death, payable to his executors, administrators, or
assigns. So far as this case is concerned, at the time of the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy, these policies, with cash surrender
values and subject to loans, were as follows: One policy for
$5,000, having a cash surrender value of $2,291.49, and subject
to a loan of $2,238; another for $1,000, having a cash surrender
rnlne of $332.31, and subject to a loan of $322; and another for
$10.000, hnving a cash surrender value of $5,030, and subject
to a loan of $5,240. It therefore appears that thP cash surrender
value of the policies on December 17, 1910, was $63.80.
On .January 4, 1911, Judson committed suicide. Notice was
serYed on the trustee that the executor claimed the right, under
§ 70a of the bankruptcy act, to pay to the trustee the cash surrender value of the policies when ascertained, but the trustee
denied such right and also the right of the executor to the balance of the proceeds of the policies. Under agreement, the
insurance compani€s paid to the trustee $8,675.14 upon the
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policies. The executor asserted title to the difference between

the sum realized on the policies and the cash surrender value;

namely, $8,611.34. The District Court, upon the authority of

Burlingham v. Crouse, 104 C. C. A. 227, 181 Fed. 479, held that

the proceeds of the policies, over and above the cash surrender

value as of the date of the filing of the petition, passed to the

executor. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the order of

the District Court, holding that the time when the interest of

the bankrupt estate in the policies passed to the trustee was the

date of the filing of the petition, and further, also upon the

authority of Burlingham v. Crouse, supra, that the interest of

the trustee in the policies extended only to their cash surrender

value.

The present case was argued at the same time as the case of

Burlingham v. Crouse [228 U. S. 459, 57 L. ed. —, 33 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 564], and in so far as it is like that case the principles

therein laid down are controlling. The present case has, how-

ever, a feature not directly involved in the case of Burlingham

v. Crouse, because Judson, the insured, committed suicide before

the adjudication in bankruptcy, although after the filing of the

petition, and it is the contention of the petitioner that the bank-

ruptcy act vested the title to the property in the trustee as of
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the time of the adjudication, and that the death of the bankrupt

between the filing of the petition and the date of the adjudica-

tion made the proceeds of the policies assets in the hands of

the trustee.

While it is true that § 70a provides that the trustee, upon his

appointment and qualification, becomes vested by operation of

law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date he was adjudged

a bankrupt, there are other provisions of the statute which, we

think, evidence the intention to vest in the trustee the title to

such property as it was at the time of the filing of the petition.

This subject was considered in Acme Harvester Co. v. Beck man

Lumber Co., 222 U. S. 300, 56 L. ed. 208, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 96,

wherein it was held that, pending the bankrupt proceedings, and

after the filing of the petition, no creditor could obtain by at-

tachment a lien upon the property which would defeat the gen-

eral purpose of the law to dedicate the property to all creditors

alike. § 70a vests all the property in the trustee, which, prior to

the filing of the petition, the bankrupt could by any means have

transferred, or which might have been levied upon and sold un-

der judicial process against him. The bankrupt's discharge is

policies. The executor asserted title to the difference between
the sum realized on the policies and the cash surrender value;
namely, $8,611.34. The District Court, upon the authority of
Burlingham v. Crouse, 104 C. C. A. 227, 181 F'ed. 47~, held that
the proceeds of the policies, over and above the cash surrender
value as of the date of the filing of the petition, passed to tbe
executor. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirm~d the order of
the District Court, holding that the time when the interest of
the bankrupt estate in the policies passed to the trustee was the
date of the filing of the petition, and further, also upon the
authority of Burlingham v. Crouse, supra, that the interest of
the trustee in the policies extended only to their cash surrender
value.
The present case was argued at the same time as the case of
Burlingham v. Crouse [228 U. S. 459, 57 L. ed. -, 33 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 564], and in so far as it .is like that case the princi pies
therein laid down are controlling. The present case has, however, a feature not directly involved in the case of Burlingham
v. Crouse, because Judson, the insured, committed suicide before
the adjudication in bankruptcy, although after the filing of the
petition, and it is the contention of the petitioner that the bankruptcy act vested the title to the property in the trustee as of
the time of the adjudication, and that the death of the bankrupt
between the filing of the petition and the date of the adjudication ·made the proceeds of the policies assets in the hands of
the trustee.
While it is true that § 10a provides that the trustee, upou his
appointment and qualification, becomes vested by operation of
law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date he was adjml~t'd
a bankrupt, there are other provisions of the statute which, Wt~
think, evidence the intention to vest in the trustee the title to
such property as it was at the time of the filing of the petition.
This subject was considered in Acme Harvester Co. v. Bccknrnn
Lumber Co., 222 U. S. 300, 56 L. ed. 208, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. %,
wherein it was held that, pending the bankrupt proceedings, a11d
after the filing of the petition, no creditor could obtain by attachment a lien upon the property which would defeat the gt•neral purpose of the law to dedicate the property to all creditors
alike. § 10a vests all the property in the trustee, which, prior to
the filing of the petition, the bankrupt could by any means have
transferred, or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him. The bankrupt's discharge is
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from all provable debts and claims which existed on the day on

which the petition for adjudication was tiled. Zavelo v. Reeves,

227 U. S. 625, 630, 631, 57 L. ed. 676, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365. The.

schedule that the bankrupt is required to file, showing the loca-

tion and value of his property, must be filed with his petition.

We think that the purpose of the law was to fix the line of

cleavage with reference to the condition of the bankrupt estate

as of the time at which the petition was filed, and that the prop-

erty which vests in the trustee at the time of adjudication is

that which the bankrupt owned at the time of the filing of the

petition. And it is as of that date that the surrender value of

the insurance policies mentioned in § 70a should be ascertained.

The subsequent suicide of the bankrupt before the adjudication

was an unlooked-for circumstance which does not change the

result in the light of the construction which we give the statute.

It follows that the judgment should be affirmed.

GIBSON et al. v. CARRUTHERS

8 Meeson & Welsby, 321

(Court of Exchequer. May 3, 1841)

ROLFE, B. The plaintiffs in this cause are the assignees of

Thomas Harris, a bankrupt.

The declaration states, that Harris, before his bankruptcy,

from all provable debts and claims which existed on the d1tv on
which the petition for adjudication was filed. Zavelo v. Reeves,
227 U. S. 625, 630, 631, 57 L. ed. 676, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365. Tb~
schedule that the bankrupt is required to file, showiug the location and value of his property, must be filed with his petition.
We think that the purpose of the law was to fix the line of
cleavage with reference to the condition of the bankrupt estate
as of the time at which the petition was filed, and that the property which vests in the trustee at the time of adjudication is
that which the bankrupt owned at the time of the filing of the
petition. And it is as of that date that the surrender value of
the insurance policies mentioned in § 70a should be ascertained.
The subsequent suicide of the bankrupt before the adjudication
was an unlooked-for circumstance which does not change the
result in the light of the construction which we give the statute.
It follows that the judgment should be affirmed.
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agreed to buy from the defendant about 2,000 quarters of lin-

seed, free on board at Odessa, at 30s. lOd. per quarter, the ship-

ment to be made on board the buyer's vessel on arrival at Odessa,

GIBSON et al. v. CARRUTHERS

which vessel was to be forthwith chartered for thence, and the

amount of the invoice was to be paid on handing over the same

8 Meeson & W elsby, 321

and the bills of lading to the buyers in London.

The declaration then states mutual promises by Harris and

(Court of Exchequer. May 3, 1841)

the defendant, according to the terms of that agreement, and

goes on to aver that Harris, in part performance, &c, dispatched

a vessel to Odessa, which arrived there in a reasonable time, and

was ready to receive the linseed on board; that before its arrival

Harris had become bankrupt; but the master of the ship was

ready and offered to receive the linseed on board, and to give

bills of lading pursuant to the agreement; that the defendant

refused to deliver the linseed on board, or any part thereof, by

reason whereof the plaintiffs, as assignees of Harris, have suf-

fered damage, etc. The declaration then goes on to state that

ROLFE, B. The plaintiffs in this cause are the assignees of
Thomas Harris, a bankrupt.
The declaration states, that Harris, before his bankruptcy,
agreed to buy from the defendant about 2,000 quarters of linseed, free on board at Odessa, at 30s. lOd. per quarter, the shipment to be made on board the buyer's vessel on arrival at Odessa,
which vessel was to be forthwith chartered for thence, and the
amount of the invoice was to be paid on handing over the same
and the bills of lading to the buyers in London.
The declaration then states mutual promises by Harris and
the defendant, according to the terms of that agreement, and
goes on to aver that Harris, in part performance, &c., <lispatched
a vessel to Odessa, which arrived there in a reasonable time, and
was ready to receive the linseed on board; that before its arrival
Harris had become bankrupt; but the master of the ship was
ready and offered to receive the linseed on board, and to give
bills of lading pursuant to the agreement; that the defendant
refused to deliver the linseed on board, or any part thereof, by
reason whereof the plaintiffs, as assignees of Harris, have suffered damage, etc. The declaration then goes on to state that
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the plaintiffs afterwards, within a reasonable time after the

arrival of the vessel at Odessa, gave notice to the defendant of

their being ready and willing to pay for the linseed on delivery

in London according to the agreement; yet the defendant re-

fused to deliver, etc.

To this declaration the defendant has pleaded, that the plain-

tiffs did not, within a reasonable time after the arrival of the

vessel at Odessa, give notice to the defendant of their intention

to adopt the contract.

The plaintiffs have demurred to this plea, and have assigned

several causes of demurrer, all founded on the principle that the

plea attempts to raise an immaterial issue.

On the argument of this case in last Michaelmas Term it was

contended on the part of the defendant, first, that the declara-

tion does not state a case which gives a right of action to the

assignees; and secondly, that if it does, then the plea discloses

a good defense.

I am of opinion that neither of these propositions can be

supported.

As to the first point, the validity of the declaration: it is

clear that assignees of a bankrupt are entitled to the benefit of

all contracts entered into by the bankrupt, and which are in

fieri at the time of the bankruptcy. They may elect to adopt or
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reject such contracts, according as they are likely to be bene-

ficial or onerous to the estate. In no case can the party who

contracted with the bankrupt set up the bankruptcy against the

assignees, as a reason for not doing what he has agreed to do.

Where, indeed, the payment of money or performance of any

other duty by the bankrupt forms a condition precedent to the

doing of the act which the contracting party has agreed to do,

there, unless the money is paid or duty performed, either by

the bankrupt or his assignees, it is plain, on principles alto-

gether independent of any questions arising from bankruptcy

or insolvency, that no obligation exists on the other party to

perform his part of the engagement. But no objection of this

sort can be set up, except in the case of a mere contract for the

sale and delivery of goods, until the time has arrived when the

party seeking the benefit of the contract fails to do something

which according to its provisions he ought to do. Until default,

no such objection arises, even where the whole matter rests iu

fieri; but much less can such a course be pursued where, as in

the present case, the declaration shows that a part, and probably
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the plaintiffs afterwards, within a reasonable time a t:ter the
arrival of the vessel at Odessa, gave notice to the defend.ant of
their being ready and willing to pay for the linseed on delivery
in London according to the agreement; yet the defcndau t refused to deliver, etc.
To this declaration the defendant has pleaded, that the plaiutiffs did not, within a reasonable time after the arrival of the
vessel at Odessa, give notice to the defendant of their intention
to adopt the contract.
The plaintiffs have demurred to this plea, and have nssig11ed
several causes of demurrer, all founded on the principle that the
plea attempts to raise an immaterial issue.
On the argument of this case in last Michaelmas Term it was
contended on the part of the defendant, first, that the declaration does not state a case which gives a right of action to the
assignees; and secondly, that if it does, then the plea discloses
a good defense.
I am of opinion that neither of these propositions can be
supported.
As to the first point, the validity of the declaration: it is
clear that assignees of a bankrupt are entitled to the benefit of
all contracts entered into by the bankrupt, and which are in
fieri at the time of the bankruptcy. They may elect to adopt or
reject such coutracts, according as they are likely to be beneficial or onerous to the estate. In no case can the pm·fy who
contracted with the bankrupt set up the bankruptcy against the
assignees, as a reason for not doing what he has agreed to do.
Where, indeed, the payment of money or performance of nny
other duty by the bankrupt forms a condition precedent to the
doing of the act which the contracting party has agreed to do,
there, unless the money is paid or duty performed, either hy
the bankrupt or his assignees, it is plain, on principles altogether independent of any questions arising from bankruptcy
or insolvency, that no obligation exists on the other party to
perform his part of the engagement. But no objection of this
sort can be set up, except in the case of a mere contract for the
sale and delivery of goods, uutil the time has arrived when the
party seeking the benefit of the contract fails to do somethi116
which according to its provisions he ought to do. Until default,
no surh objection arises, even where the whole matter rests iu
fieri; but much less can such a course be pursued where, as in
the present case, the declaration shows that a part, and probably
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no inconsiderable part, of the contract has actually been already

performed by the plaintiffs, or rather by the bankrupt whom

the plaintiffs represent. For it will be observed, that in this

case the first act to be performed under the contract was the

sending of a ship to Odessa. This was actually done at the cost

and risk of the bankrupt. If the argument of the defendant be

well founded, the bankrupt or his estate must sustain the loss

occasioned by his having thus far fulfilled his part of the contract.

It was endeavored to liken this to a case of stoppage in

transitu, to which it was supposed to bear a strong analog}-.

But it does not appear to me that any such analogy exists.

Where a vendor of goods has put them into the hands of a

carrier, in order to their being by him forwarded and delivered

to the vendee, then, if the vendee before actual delivery to him

becomes insolvent, the vendor has a right to resume the pos-

session with which he had previously parted. It may be con-

ceded, that the same circumstances which would justify a seller

in stopping the goods in transitu, will also warrant his retaining

them before the transitus has commenced, where nothing remains

to be done but to deliver the goods to the purchaser. But here

the proposed transit of the linseed from Odessa to London was

not, as it seems to me, a transitus within the meaning of the
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doctrine relative to stoppage in transitu. I consider it to be

of the very essence of that doctrine, that during the transitu*

the goods should be in the custody of some third person, inter-

mediate between the seller who has parted with, and the buyer

who has not yet acquired, actual possession. In this case the

linseed was to be brought to London, not in the ordinary course

of delivery by a seller to a buyer, but under the terms of a

special contract, which reserved to the defendant, the seller, the

exclusive control over it by means of the bills of lading. It was

one of the terms of the contract, that the defendant should in a

certain stipulated mode cause the linseed to be transported to

London, in order that it might there be by him delivered at a

price agreed upon to the bankrupt. This the defendant was

bound to do, in the same way as if he had agreed to do any other

act; as for instance, to build a ship, to manufacture goods, or

the like; and he had no right to anticipate that when he had

performed his part .of the contract, the bankrupt, with whom he

had contracted, would not by himself or his assignees perform

what he had agreed to do. If the contract was beneficial to the

bankrupt, the assignees would of course adopt it; if it was

no inconsiderable part, of the contract bas actiJally been already
performed by the plaintiffs, or rather by the bankrupt whom
the plaintiffs represent. For it will be observed, that in this
case the first act to be performed under the contract was the
sending of a ship to Odessa. This was actually done at the cost
and risk of the bankrupt. If the argument of the defendant be
well founded, the bankrupt or his estate must sustain the loss
occasioned by his having thus far fulfilled his part of the contract.
It was endeavored to liken this to a case of stoppage tn
transitu, to which it was supposed to bear a strong analogy.
But it does not appear to me that any such analogy exists.
Where a vendor of goods has put them into the bands of a
carrier, in order to their being by him forwarded and delivered
to the vendee, then, if the vendee before actual delivt:ry to him
becomes insolvent, the vendor bas a right to resu!lle the possession with which he had previously parted. It may be conceded, that the same circumstances which would justify a seller
in stopping- the goods i11 tra nsitu, will also warrant his retaining
them before the transitus has commenced, where nothing remains
to be done but to deliver the goods to the purchaser. But here
the proposed transit of the linseed from Odessa to London was
not, as it seems to me, a transit11s within the meaning of the
doctrine relative to stoppage in transitu. I consider it to be
of the very essence of that doctrine, that during the transitu.-t
the goods should be in the custody of some third person, intermediate between the seller who has parted with, and the buyer
who has not yet acquired, actual possession. In this case the
linseed was to be brought to London, not in the ordinary course
of delivery by a seller to a buyer, but under the terms of a
special contract, which reserved to the defendant, the seller, the
exclusive control over it by means of the bills of lading. It was
one of the terms of the contract, that the defendant should in li
certain stipulated mode cause the linseed to be transported to
London, in order that it might there be by him delivered at a
price agreed upon to the bankrupt. This the defendant was
bound to do, in the same way as if he had agreed to do any other
act; as for instance, to builJ a ship, to manufacture goods, or
the like; and he had no right to anticipate that when he had
performed his part.of the contract, the hankrupt, with whom he
had contracted, would not by himself or his assignees perform
what he had agreed to do. If the contract was beneficial to the
bankrupt, the assignees would of eoul'Se adopt it; if it was
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onerous, then the defendant would have to look to the bankrupt

himself, the sole party with whom he contracted, and whose

liability would continue notwithstanding the bankruptcy, as

was established by the case of Boorman v. Nash, 9 B. & C. 145.

On these grounds I think the declaration discloses a state of

facts which gives the plaintiffs a right of action.

Supposing this to be so, then the only other question i3,

whether the plea states matter which destroys the right of

action appearing on the declaration: I think it does not. All

beneficial interests in the bankrupt are by operation of law

transferred to the assignees, including such a right of action as

exists in the present case. The assignees have the right of adopt-

ing or repudiating the contracts of the bankrupt, according as

they may think them likely to prove beneficial or the contrary.

The proposition implied and asserted by this plea is, that the

assignees are not entitled to the benefit of the bankrupt's con-

tracts, unless, within a reasonable time, they give notice of their

intention to adopt them. But for this proposition I find no

warrant either in the statutes or the decided cases. All that

the assignees are bound to do, is, to fulfill the bankrupt's part

of the engagement when the proper time arrives. If they ex-

pressly waive the contract, or without any express waiver, if
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at the proper time they omit to do what, by the terms of the

contract, they are bound to do, in the first case they certainly

will, and in the second they probably may, absolve the other

party from all obligation towards the assignees. But in such a

case the proper course for the defendants would be to plead,

not that the assignees had not given notice of adopting the con-

tract, but that they had repudiated it, of which the express

waiver certainly would, and the implied waiver, by omitting to

do what they ought to do, might, under the circumstances, afford

sufficient evidence. In this case it is not alleged by the plea that

there was any express waiver, or any implied waiver, by omit-

ting to perform any part of the contract, which, as representing

the bankrupt, they were bound to perform; and on the contrary,

it is clear, from the pleadings, that they were always ready to

do all which the bankrupt would have been bound to do; and I

therefore think that nothing is stated in the plea defeating the

plaintiffs' right of action as disclosed in the declaration, and

consequently that judgment ought to be for the plaintiffs.14

14—The opinions of Gurney, B., But see In re Chalmers, L. B. 8

Pabke, B., and Lord Abinoer, C. B., Ch. App. .289. See also In re Glicfc,

are omitted. 104 Fed. 967; In re Stern, 116 Fed.

onerous, then the defendant would have to look to the bankrupt
himself, the ~ole party with whom he contracted, and whose
liability would continue notwithstanding the bankruptcy, as
was established by the case of Boorman v. Nash, 9 B. & C. 145.
On these grounds I think the declaration discloses a state of
facts which gives the plaintiffs a right of action.
Supposing this to be so, then the only other question i.3,
whether the plea states matter which destroys the right of
action appearing on the declaration: I think it does not. All
beneficial interests in the bankrupt are by operation of law
transferred to the assignees, including such a right of action as
exists in the present case. The as&gnees have the right of adopting or repudiating the contracts of the bankrupt, according as
they may think them likely to prove beneficial or the contrary.
The proposition implied and asserted by this plea is, that the
assignees are not entitled to the benefit of the bankrupt's contracts, unless, within a reasouable time, they give notice of their
intention to adopt them. But for this proposition I find no
warrant either in the statutes or the <lecided cases. All th.at
the assignees are bound to do, is, to fultill the bankrupt's part
of the engagement when the proper time arrives. If they expressly waive the contract, or without any express waiver, if
at the proper time they omit to do what, by the terms of the
contract, they are bound to do, in the first case they certainly
will, and in the second they probably may, absolve the other
party from all obligation towards the assignees. But in such a
case the proper course for the defendants would he to plead,
not that the assignees had not given notice of adopting the contract, but that they had repudiated it, of which the express
waiver certainly would, and the implied waiver, by omitting to
do what they ought to do, might, µnder the circumstances, afford
sufficient evidence. In this case it is not alleged by the plea that
there was any express waiver, or any implied waiver, by omitting to perform any part of the contract, which, as representing
the bankrupt, they were bound to perform; and on the contrary,
it is clear, from the pleadings, that they were always ready to
do all which the bankru.pt would have been bound to do; and I
tberrfore think that nothing is stated in the plea defeating the
plaintiffs' right of action as disclosed in the declaration, and
consequently that judgment ought to be for the plaintiifs. 14
14--The opinions of GURNEY, B.,
B., and Lord ABINOD, c. B.,
are omitted.
PARKE,

But see In re Chalmers, L. R. 8
Cb. App. .289. See also In re Gliclr,
lo.t Fed. 967°; In re Stern, 116 Fed.
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BECKHAM v. DRAKE

BECKHAM v. DRAKE

2 II. L. Cas. 579

(House of Lords. 1847, 1849)

2 H. L. Cas. 579

This was a writ of error upon a judgment of the Court of

Exchequer Chamber reversing a judgment of the Court of

(HoUBe of Lords.

18·17, 184!1)

Exchequer of Pleas, in an action on promises. Beckham had

entered the employment of the defendants under a contract for

seven years' service at a stated compensation. It was agreed

that in case either of the parties should not well and truly ob-

serve, etc., the covenants, etc., the party in default should pay

to the other five hundred pounds as "specific damages." After

being dismissed Beckham was declared bankrupt. Later he

brought this action. The defendants pleaded, first, "non-

assumpsit;" and secondly, that Beckham became bankrupt after

the accruing of the cause of action and before the commence-

ment of the suit. Beckham joined issue upon the plea of "non-

assumpsit," and demurred to the plea of bankruptcy. The

issue in fact was tried and a verdict given for the plaintiff,

damages £500 (9 M. & W. 79).

The demurrer was argued before the judges of the Court of

Exchequer, who gave judgment for the plaintiff upon the de-

murrer (8 M. & W. 846). The defendants brought a writ of
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error in the Exchequer Chamber, and, after argument. the judg-

ment of the Court of Exchequer was reversed (11 M. & W.

315).15

BARON PARKE. The question proposed by your Lordships

is, whether the plaintiff or the defendant in error is entitled to

judgment.

It was my duty to deliver the judgment of the Court of

Exchequer, consisting of my brothers Alderson, Rolfe, my late

brother Gurney, and myself, when this case was decided by that

court (8 M. & W. 846), and to assign the reasons which induced

me to form the opinion then expressed. The discussion of the

case on the writ of error at your Lordships' Bar, and the sub-

sequent consideration of it, and of the judgment of the Ex-

chequer Chamber, have induced me to think that the reasons so

This was a writ of error upon a judgment of the Court of
Exchequer Chamber reversing a judgment of the Court of
Exchel1uer of Pleas, in an action on promises. Beckham had
entered the employment of the defendants under a contract for
seven years' service at a stated compensation. It was agreed
that in case either of the parties should not well and truly observe, etc., the covenauts, etc., the party in default should pay
to the other five hundred pounds as "specific damages." After
being dismissed Beckham was declared bankrupt. Later he
hruught this action. The defendants pleaded, first, ''nonassumpsit;" and secondly, that Beckham became bankrupt after
the accruing of the cause of action and before the commence111t•11 t of the suit. Beckham joined issue upon the plea of "nonnssumpsit,'' and demurred to the plea of bankruptcy. The
issue in fact was tried and a verdict given for the plaintiff,
damages £500 (9 M. & 'V. 79).
The demurrer was argued before the judges of the Court of
Exchequer, who gave judgment for the plaintiff upon the demurrer (8 l\L & W. 846). The defendants brought a writ of
error in the Exchequer Chamber, and, after argument, the judgment of the Court of Exchequer was reversed (11 ~L & 'V.
315). 15

assigned by me are insufficient.

604; In re Nat. Wire Corp., 166 Fed. 15—Thie statement of facts is

631.

BARON PARKE. The question proposed by your Lordships
is, whether the plaintiff or the defendant in error is entitled to
judgment.
It was my duty to deliver the judgment of the Court of
Exchequer, consisting of my brothers Alderson, Rolfe, my late
brother Gurney, and myself, when this case was decided by that
court (8 M. & W. 846), and to assign the reasons which induced
me to form the opinion then expressed. The discussion of the
case on the writ of error at your Lordships' Bar, and the subsequent consideration of it, and of the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber, have induced me to think that the reasons so
assigned by me are insufficient.
604; In re Nat. Wire Corp., 166 Fed.
631.

15-Thi• statement of facts ia
substituted for that in the rel>ort.
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One of the causes that has led me to doubt the propriety of

that decision is, that a penalty is given for the non-performance

of this agreement: for it is clear, that, according to the cases of

Kemble v. Farren (31 R. R. 366 [6 Bing. 141]) and others,

though the sum of £500 is said to be for "specific damages," it

is to be construed as a penalty; and whether that penalty would

vest in the assignees under the circumstances of this case, is a

question which I propose afterwards to consider. But I assume

for the present, that the case is in the same position as if there

was no penalty; on which footing it has been argued at your

Lordships' Bar and in the court below. I would premise that

it is not necessary to say anything upon a question discussed in

the court below, whether all the defendants are liable upon a

contract, though in writing, made by one in reality on his own

behalf, and as agent for the others. There is now no doubt upon

this point; both the courts below concur in this respect; nor

was it disputed in the argument here. The principal question in

the case on the above mentioned assumption is, whether the right

of action for a breach before bankruptcy of such a contract as

this, for the personal services of the bankrupt, passes to the

assignees.

The general question turns on the 6 Geo. IV, c. 16, § 63,
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which must be construed with the aid of the twelfth sectioh,

and with that of former decisions upon the repealed statutes

relative to bankrupts. By that section, "all the present and

future personal estate of the bankrupt, wheresoever found or

known, and all property which he may purchase, or which may

revert, descend, be devised or bequeathed to, or come to him

before he shall have obtained his certificate, and all debts due

or to be due to him, wheresoever the same shall be found or

known, are assigned, and such assignment is to vest the property,

right, and interest in such debts, as fully as if the assurance

whereby they are secured had been made to the assignees, and

they have the same remedy to recover as the bankrupt would

have had."

A former section (12) enabled the Lord Chancellor to ap-

point commissioners, with full power and authority to make

such order and direction as to the lands, moneys, fees, offices,

annuities, goods, chattels, wares, merchandises and debts, where-

soever they may be found or known. The two sections are to

be read together.

It is not disputed that the rights of the assignee under the

One of the causes that has led me to doubt the propriety of
that decision is, that a penalty is given for the non-performance
of this agreement: for it is clear, that, according to the cases of
Kemble v. Farren ( 31 R. R. 366 [6 Bing. 141]) and others,
though the sum of £500 is said to be for ''specific damages,'' it
is to be coustrued as a penalty; and whether that penalty would
vest in the assignees under the circumstances of this case, is a
question which I propose afterwards to consider. But I assume
for the present, that the case is in the same position as if there
was no penalty; on which footing it has been argued at your
Lordships' Bar and in the court below. I would premise that
it is not necessary to say anything upon a question discussed in
the court below, whether all the defendants are liable upon a
contract, though in writing, made by one in reality on his own
behalf, and as agent for the others. There is now no doubt upon
this point; both the courts below concur in this respect; nor
was it disputed in the argument here. The principal question in
the case on the above mentioned assumption is, whether the right
of action for a breach before bankruptcy of such a contract as
this, for the personal services of the bankrupt, passes to the
888lgnees.
The general question turns on the 6 Geo. IV, c. 16, § 63,
which must be construed with the aid of the twelfth section,
and with that of former decisions upon the repealed statutes
relative to bankrupts. By that section, "all the present and
future personal estate of the bankrupt, wheresoever found or
known, and all property which he may purchase, or which may
revert, descend, be devised or bequeathed to, or come to him
before he shall have obtained his certificate, and all debts due
or to be due to him, wheresoever the same shall be found or
known, are assigned, and such ~ignment is to vest the property,
right, and interest in such <lebts, as fully as if the assurance
whereby they are secured had been made to the assignees, and
they have the same remedy to recover as the baukrupt would
have had.''
A former section (12) enabled the Lord Chancellor to appoint commissioners, with full power and authority to make
such order and direction as to the lands, moneys, fees, offices,
annuities, goods, chattels, wares, merchandises and debts, wheresoever they may be fol1Ild or known. The two sections are to
he rra<l together.
It is oot disputed that the rights of the assignee under the
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statute law are not identical with, nor are they so extensive as

those of an executor, who stands in the place of his testator,

and represents him as to all his personal contracts, and is by

law his assignee (Wentw. Off. Exor. 100), and therefore may

maintain any action in his right which he himself might. (Bac.

Abr. Exors. N.) That must be understood to mean any action

on a contract, for an executor never could sue for wrongs to

his testator; "actio personalis moritur cum persona." And

with respect to contracts, some exceptions have been introduced

by modern decisions: Chamberlain v. Williamson (15 R. R.

295 [2 M. & S. 408]), Kingdon v. Nottle (14 R. R. 462 [1 M. &

S. 355]) and 16 R. R. 379 [4 M. & S. 53]), as explained by

Lord Abinger in the case of Raymond v. Fitch (41 R. R. 797

[2 Cr. M. & R. 588, 599]), and the executor cannot sue upon

contracts the breach of which is a mere personal wrong. The

executor takes all the other personal rights of a testator, as a

consequence of his representative character, whether they are

available for the payment of debts or not, for his liability to

pay debts is the consequence, not the object, of the appoint-

ment. The assignee is created by statute, for the purpose of

recovering and receiving the estate, and paying the debts of the

bankrupt, and takes only what the statute gives for that pur-
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pose. What then does it givet It clearly gives in the section

above mentioned, not merely all personal chattels, securities for

money, and debts properly so called, but all unexecuted con-

tracts which the assignee could perform, the performance of

which would be beneficial to the bankrupt's estate. These are

"personal estate." The assignee takes, in the language of Lord

Tenterden in Wright v. Fairfield (2 B. & Ad. 727), all "the

beneficial matters" belonging to the bankrupt; or, as Mr. Jus-

tice Buller said, "anything belonging to the bankrupt that can

be turned to profit;" Smith v. Coffin (3 R. R. 435 [2 H. Bl.

444]).

This contract, if unexecuted, would clearly not have passed

to the assignees. But the question is, not whether the contract,

but whether the right of action for the breach of it before the

bankruptcy, passed. The words "personal estate" clearly com-

prise all chattels, chattel interests, and all the subjects men-

tioned in the twelfth section; and they also comprise some rights

of action which are not properly debts, and would not pass

under the word "debts," but do pass under the description of

"personal estate."

statute law are not identical with, nor are they so extensive as
those of an executor, who stands in the place of his testator,
and represents him as to all his personal contracts, and is by
law his assignee (Wentw. Off. Exor. 100), and therefore may
maintain any action in his right which he himself might. (Bae.
Abr. Exors. N.) That must be understood to mean any action
on a contract, for an executor never could sue for wrongs to
his testator; "actio personalis nwritur cum persc>na." And
with respect to contracts, S<>me exceptions have been introduced
by modern decisions: Chamberlain v. Williamson ( 15 R. R.
295 [2 M. & S. 408] ), Kingdon v. Nottle (14 R. R. 462 [1 M. &
S. 355] ) and 16 R. R. 379 [ 4 M. & S. 53] ) , as explained by
Lord Abinger in the case of Raymond v. Fitch ( 41 R. R. 797
[2 Cr. l\L & R. 588, 599] ) , and the executor cannot sue upon
contracts the breach of which is a mere personal wrong. The
executor takes all the other personal rights of a testator, as a
consequence of his representative character, whether they are
available for the payment of debts or not, for his liability to
pay debts is the consequence, not the object, of the appointment. The assignee is created by statute, for the purpose of
recoveriug and receiving the estate, and paying the debts of the
bankrupt, and takes only what the statute gives for that purpose. What then does it give T It clearly gives in the section
above mentioned, not merely all personal chattels, securities for
money, a11d debts properly so called, but all unexecuted contracts which the assignee could perform, the performance of
which would be beneficial to the bankrupt's estate. These are
''personal estate.'' The assignee takes, in the language of Lord
Tenterden in Wright. v. Fairfield (2 B. & Ad. 727), all "the
beneficial matters" belonging to the bankrupt; or, as Mr. J ustice Buller said, ''anything belonging to the ·bankrupt that can
be turned to profit;" Smith v. Coffin (3 R. R. 435 [2 H. Bl.
444]).
This contract, if unexccuted, would clearly not have passed
to the assignees. But the question is, not whether the contract,
hut whether the right of action for the breach of it before the
bankruptcy, passed. The words "personal estate" clearly comprise nll ehattels, chattel interests, and all the subjects mentioned in the twelfth section; and they also comprise some rights
of action which are not properly debts, and would not pass
under the word ''debts,'' but do pass under the description of
''personal estate.''
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For instance, some actions for torts do pass. Actions for

injuries to personal chattels, whereby they are directly affected,

and are prevented from coming to the hands of the assignee, or

come diminished in value, undoubtedly pass. The action of

trover for a conversion before the bankruptcy is a familiar

instance of this.

On the other hand, rights of action for injuries to the person,

or reputation, or the possession of real estate, do not pass.

Actions of assault, for example, and for defamation, actions on

the case for misfeasance, doing damage to the person, for tres-

pass quare clausum fregit (Rogers v. Spence, 67 R. R. 736 [13

M. & W. 571] ; affirmed in this house, 69 R. R. 169 [12 CI. &

Fin. 700]), actions for criminal conversation with the wife, for

seduction of the servant or daughter of the bankrupt, are not

transferred to the assignee, even though some of these causes

of action may be followed by a consequential diminution of the

personal estate, as where by reason of a personal injury a man

lias been put to expense, or has been prevented from earning

wages or subsistence; or where by the seduction the plaintiff has

been put to expense: Howard v. Crowther (58 R. R. 823 [8 M.

& W. 601 ]). But with respect to contracts; rights of action

for the breach of such as directly affect the personal estate,
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whereby the assignee is prevented from receiving part of it, or

its value is diminished, are certainly transferred; as for ex-

ample, rights of action on a beneficial contract, whereby one

engaged to sell and deliver goods to the bankrupt, and which, if

performed, would have put him in the possession of the goods,

or a contract with another to carry or take care of the goods

of the bankrupt which are lost, or injured, and thereby dimin-

ished in value.

On the other hand, actions for the breach of contracts per-

sonal to the bankrupt, unaccompanied by an injury to the per-

sonal estate, as a contract to carry him in safety, to cure his

person of a wound or disease, or a contract with a person, who

subsequently becomes bankrupt, to marry, are certainly not

assigned. This is conceded; but it is questioned on the part of

the defendant in error, I think without sufficient ground,

whether the assignee would not be entitled to sue in any of

these cases, if the personal estate was consequently damaged,

as where the bankrupt was put to expense by the breach of

contract, or lost the power of earning money.

What then is the proper construction of this section of the

For instance, some actions for torts do pass. Actions for
injuries to personal chattels, whereby they are directly uli:'ceted,
and are prevented from coming to the hands of the assignee, or
come diminished in value, undoubtedly pass. The action of
trover for a conversion before the bankruptr-y is a familiar
instance of this.
On the other hand, rights of action for injuries to the person,
or reputation, or the possession of real estate, do not pass.
Actions of assault, for example, and for defamation, actions on
the case for misfeasance, doing damage to the person, for trespass qu<U"e clausum fregit (Rogers v. Spence, 67 R. R. 736 [13
M. & \V. 571] ; affirmed in this house, 69 R. R. 169 [ 12 Cl. &
Fin. 700]), actions for criminal conversation with the wife, for
seduction of the servant or daughter of the bankrupt, are not
transferred to the assignee, even though some of these causes
of action may be followed by a consequential diminution of the
personal estate, as where by reason of a personal injury a man
has been put to expense, or has been prevented from earning
wages or subsistence; or where by the seduction the plaintiff has
been put to expense: Howard v. Crowther (58 R. R. 823 [8 i\l.
& \V. 601]). But with respect to contracts; rights of action
for the breach of such as directly affect the personal estate,
whereby the assignee is prevented from receiving part of it, or
its value is diminished, are certainly transferred; as for example, rights of action on a beneficial contract, whereby one
engaged to sell and deliver goods to the bankrupt, and which, if
performed, would have put him in the possession of the goods,
or a contract with another to carry or take care of th'e goods
of the bankrupt which are lost, or injured, and thereby diminished in value.
On the other hand, actions for the breach of contracts personal to the bankrupt, unaccompanied by an. injury to the personal estate, as a contract to carry him in safety, to cure his
person of a wound or disease, or a contract with a person, who
subsequently becomes bankrupt, to marry, are certainly not
assigned. This is conceded; but it is questioned on the part of
the defendant in error, I think without sufficient ground,
whether the assignee would not be entitled to sue in any of
these cases, if the personal estate was consequently damaged,
as where the bankrupt was put to expense by the breach of
contract, or lost the power of earning money.
What then is the proper construction of this section of the
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act, according to its words and the several eases decided upon

it ¥ The proper and reasonable construction appears to me to

be,' that the statute transfers not all rights of action which wouM

pass to executors (for rights incapable of being converted into

money, such as the next presentation to a void benefice, pass to

them), but all such as would be assets in their hands for the

payment of debts, and no others—all which conld be turned to

profit, for such rights of action are personal estate. Of such 1 h«-

executor is assignee in law; and the nature of the office and duty

of a bankrupt's assignee requires that he should have thein

also. But rights of action for torts which would die with the

testator, according to the rule, "actio personalis moritur cum

persona," and all actions of contract affecting the person only,

would not pass. Of such the executor is not assignee in law;

and whatever may be the reason of the law which prohibits him

from being so, seems equally to apply to a bankrupt's assignee.

According to this rule, the description of contracts upon which

the right of action is transferred, would include, but would not

be restricted to, such as directly affect some chattel or subject

of property which would pass to the assignees, or to such as

would, if they had been performed, have produced such prop-

erty, which alone, it was argued at your Lordships' Bar, would
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be transferred by the statute; and this was in accordance with

the view I took in the court below. I think, upon subsequent

reflection, that this is too narrow a construction of the statute,

and that it applies to all contracts for the breach of which an

executor could sue, which could be turned to profit for the

payment of creditors. And if this be the true construction of

the statute, if all the damages for this breach of contract could

have been recovered by an executor, the assignee could recover

them, and the plea would be a good plea in bar.

But if part was recoverable for the personal inconvenience

of the bankrupt, a different question presents itself. I think

this contract cannot be said not to relate in any part to the

person of the bankrupt. but that his personal inconvenience and

trouble in looking out for a new employment would be part of

the damages recovered. If so, that part could not be transferred

to the assignees, and ought not to be lost: the right to those

damages, which would be lost in the case of a testator's death

altogether, continues in the bankrupt. It is upon this point that

the case appears to me to turn. Who then are to sue for the

breach of contract where part belongs to the assignee, part to

act, according to its words and the several cases decided upon
i~ Y The proper and reaaonable construction appears to me to
be,' that the statute transfers not all rights of action which woul· I
pass to executprs (for rights incapable of being couvel'ted into
money, such as the next presentation to a void benefice, p:iss to
them), but all such as would be assets in their hands for the
payment of debts; and no others-all which could be turnt>ll to
profit, for such rights of action are J<ersoual estate. Of such th"
executor is assignee in law; and the nature of t.he office and dnt.r
of a bankrupt's assignee requires that he should haw th1~u1
also. But rights of action for torts which would di~ with the
testator, according to the rule, "actio per1onalis moritur cum
persona," and all actions of contract affecting the person only,
would not pass. Of such the executor is not assignee in law;
and whatever may be the reason of the law which prohibits him
from being so, seems equally to apply to a bankn1pt 's assignee.
According to this rule, the description of contract.s upon which
the right of action is transferred, would include, but would not
be restricted to, such as directly affect some chattel or subject
of property which would pass to the assignees, or to such as
would, if they had been performed, have produced such property, which alone, it was argued at your Lordships' Bar, would
be transferred by the statute ; and this was in accordance with
th~ view I took in the court below. I think, -upon subsequent
reflection, that this is too narrow a construction of the statute,
and that it applies to all contracts for the breach of which an
executor could sue, which could be turned to profit for the
payment of creditors. And if this be the true const.ruction of
the statute, if all the damages for this breach of contract could
have been recovered by an executor, the assignee could recover
them, and the plea would be a good plea in bar.
But if part was recoverable for the personal inconvenience
of the ba•krupt, a different question presents itaelf. I think
this contract cannot be said not to relate in any part to the
person of the bankrupt, but that his personal inconvenience and
trouble in looking out for a new employment would be part of
the damages recovered. If so, that part could not be transferred
to the assignees, and ought not to be lost; the rigltt to those
damages, which would be lost in the case of a testator's death
altogether, continues in the bankrupt. It is upon this point that
the case appears to me to turn. Who then are to sue for the
breach of contract where part belongs to the assignee, part to
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the bankrupt? Who would have to sue if the contract was to

cure the bankrupt of a disease, and give him a sum of money,

and there had been a breach of both parts, which appears to me

to be a similar question? It is extremely difficult to say in whom

the right of action would be.

Either the right of action on the contract must be divided,

and each sue, or the right of action altogether must remain in

the bankrupt, or altogether be transferred to the assignees, or

both must join, the contract being entire, to sue for the damages.

In the first two cases the plea would be good, in the last two

bad; for in the first it would be no answer to the entire cause of

action; in the second, it would be no answer to any part. I

should feel considerable difficulty in deciding the question, but

this case does not depend upon it, for I have now to consider

what the effect of the penalty is.

This subject was not discussed at your Lordships' Bar, and

was little adverted to in the court below.

At common law the penalty would have been forfeited, and,

being a sum certain, would have passed to the assignees; for, at

the time of the bankruptcy it would have been uncertain

whether the defendant would ever have filed a bill for relief,

supposing he could have done so; and a sum certain, defeasible
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on an uncertain event, would have been, until defeated, personal

estate, and would certainly vest in the assignees. But the ques-

tion is, whether the statute 8 & 9 Will. Ill, c. 11, has not made

an alteration. That statute in effect makes the bond a security

only for the damages really sustained. If all the damages

would be recoverable by the assignees, the penalty would pass;

if none, the penalty could not be levied, and therefore could not

be available for the payment of creditors, and probably would

not pass to the assignees. If part of the damages could be re-

covered by the assignees, and part not, the question is different.

The penalty would then be a security for damages partly be-

longing to the assignees, partly to the bankrupt. It would be

like the case of a bond to the bankrupt conditioned not to assault

him, and to pay him a sum of money, forfeited in both respects

before the bankruptcy; and I have had some difficulty in sayinij

whether the right of action on such a bond would or would not

pass to the assignees.

But it seems to me to be clear that the penalty, which is an

entire thing, could not be divided, so that each could sue for a

part; and it could not be predicated what part would pass to

the bankrupt? Who would have to sue if the contract was to
cure the bankrupt of a disease, and give him a sum of money,
a11d there had been a breach of both parts, which appears to me
to be a similar question 1 It is extremely difficult to say in whom
the right of action would be.
Either the right of action on the contract must be divided,
and each sue, or the right of action altogether must remain in
the bankrupt, or altogether be transferred to the assignees, or
both must join, the contract being entire, to sue for the damages.
In the first two cases the plea would be good, in the last two
bad ; for in the first it would be no answer to the entire cause of
action ; in the second, it would be no answer to any part. I
should feel considerable difficulty in deciding the question, but
this case does not depend upon it, for I have now to consider
what the effect of the penalty is.
This subject was not discussed at your Lordships' Bar, and
was little adverted to in the court below.
At common law the penalty would have been forfeited, and,
being a sum certain, would have passed to the assignees; for, at
the time of the bankruptcy it would have been uncertain
whether the defendant would ever have filed a bill for relief,
supposing he could have done so; and a sum certain, defeasible
on an uncertain event, would have been, until defeated, personal
estate, and would certainly vest in the assignees. But the question is, whether the statute 8 & 9 Will. III, c. 11, has not made
an alteration. That statute in effect makes the bond a security
only for the damages really sustained. If all the damages
would be recoverable by the assignees, the penalty would pas.~;
if none, the penalty could not be levied, and therefore could not
be available for the payment of creditors, and probably would
not pass to the assignees. If part of the damages could be recovered by the assignees, and part not, the question is different.
The penalty would then be a security for damages partly belonging to the assignees, partly to the bankrupt. It would be
like the case of a bond to the bankrupt conditioned not to assault
him, and to pay him a sum of money, forfeited in both respects
bel'ore the bankruptcy; and I have had some difficulty in sayin~r
whether the right of action on such a bond would or would not
pass to the assignees.
But it seems to me to be clear that the penalty, which is an
entire thing, could not be divided, so that each could sue for a
part; and it could not be predicated what part would pass to
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each. It follows, therefore, that either the right to the entire

penalty must remain in the bankrupt, or that either both the

bankrupt and the assignee must join, as being both interested,

or that the right to sue goes to the assignees, in order to secure

such part of the damages as is the personal estate of the bank-

rupt vested in them. I cannot help thinking that both ought to

sue, as they would do if the bankrupt before his bankruptcy had

assigned a part of an entire debt as a security to a creditor, and

consequently was a trustee for him for that part. But, at all

events, I do not think the right to the penalty would remain in

the bankrupt; and therefore the plea is a good plea, as it

shows that the bankrupt could not sue alone.

Therefore, in either view of the case, I now think the judg-

ment of the Court of Exchequer should be reversed, and the

judgment of the Exchequer Chamber affirmed. If the whole of

the damages are part of the personal estate which passed to the

assignees, the plaintiff was barred; if some were, and some were

not, still for the reasons before-mentioned the plea appears to

me to be good, and my opinion which I expressed in the court

below was wrong.

My opinion now, therefore, is, that the plea of the plaintiff's

bankruptcy is a good bar, and that the judgment of the Ex-
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chequer Chamber ought to be affirmed.18

SIBLEY v. NASON et al.

196 Mass. 125, 81 N. E. 887

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. June 20, 1907)

On July 12, 1902, plaintiff was [injured through the alleged

negligence of defendant. It] appeared that plaintiff was ad-

judged a bankrupt in March, 1904, after having brought suit for

his injuries on August 9. 1902, whereupon defendant requested

the court to rule, inter alia, (4) that plaintiff, having been ad-

judged a bankrupt subsequent to the commencement of the ac-

each. It follows, therefore, that either the right to the entire
penalty must remain in the bankrupt, or that either both the
bankrupt and the assignee must join, as being both interested.
or that the right to sue goes to the assignees, in order to seeure
such part of the damages as is the personal estate of the bankrupt vested in them. I cannot help thinking that both ought to
sue, as they would do if the bankrupt before his bankruptcy had
assigned a part of an entire debt as a security to a creditor, and
consequently was a trustee for him for that part. But, at all
events, I do not think the right to the penalty would remain in
the bankrupt; and therefore the plea is a good plea, as it
shows that the bankrupt could not sue alone.
Therefore, in either view of the case, I now think the judgment of the Court of Exchequer should be reversed, and the
judgment of the Exchequer Chamber affirmed. If the whole of
the damages are part of the personal estate which passed to the
assignees, the plaintiff was barred; if some were, and some were
not, still for the reasons before-mentioned the plea appears to
me to be good, and my opinion which I expressed in the court
below was wrong.
My opinion now, therefore, is, that the plea of the plaintiff's
bankruptcy is a good bar, and that the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber ought to be affirmed.HJ

tion, could not prosecute the same, and was therefore not entitled

to recover; (7) that, if plaintiff was entitled to recover, he could

not recover for debts incurred for physicians' services, which had

SIBLEY v. NASON et al.

never been paid, but had been proved against his estate in bank-

ruptcy or included in his bankruptcy schedules; (8) that, if

196 Mass. 125, 81 N. E. 887

16—See Streeter v. Sumner, 31 N.

H. 542.

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. June 20, 1907)
On July 12, 1902, plaintiff was [injured through the alleged
negligence of defendant. It] appeared that plaintiff wu adjudged a bankrupt in March, 1904, after having brought suit for
his injuries on August 9, 1902, whereupon defendant requested
the court to rule, inter alia, ( 4) that plaintiff, having been adjudged a bankrupt subsequent to the commencement of the action, could not proseeute the same, and was therefore not entitled
to recover; ( 7) that, if plaintiff was entitled to recover, be could
not recover for debts incurred for physicians' services, which bad
never been paid, but had been proved against his estate in bankruptcy or included in his bankruptcy ~hedules; (8) that, if
16-See Streeter v. Sumner, 31 N.
H. 542.

KINDS OF PROPERTY

KINDS OF PROPERTY

543

543

plaintiff was entitled to recover, the market value in the kind of

business in which he was engaged, if any, of his services from the

time of the accident to the time of his adjudication in bankruptcy,

could not be taken into consideration in determining the amount

of damages, if any; and (9) that, if plaintiff was entitled to re-

cover, the fair value of the time lost as a result of the injury

from the date thereof to the day of the adjudication of bank-

ruptcy could not be considered as an element of damage—which

requests the court refused to charge.

RUGG, J. Four contentions have been argued in behalf of the

defendant. His other exceptions are treated as waived.

•••

plaintiff was entitled to recover, the market value in the kind of
business in which he was engaged, if any, of his services from the
time of the accident to the time of his adjudication in bankruptcy,
could not be taken into consideration in determining the amount
of damages, if any; and (9) that, if plaintiff was entitled to recover, the fair value of the time lost as a result of the injury
from the date thereof to the day of the adjudication of bankruptcy could not be considered as an element of damage-which
requests the court refused to charge.

4. Several questions are raised respecting the effect upon the

plaintiff's right to maintain his action and the damages he may

recover, growing out of the fact that in March, 1904, he was duly

adjudged a bankrupt and the ordinary proceedings were had;

the accident having occurred on the 11th day of July, 1902, and

this action having been begun on the 9th of August, 1902. It is

lirst urged that the plaintiff is debarred from the right to main-

tain his action by reason of the bankruptcy. The bankruptcy

act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 565, 566 [U. S. Comp.

St. 1901, p. 3451]) provides in § 70a that "the trustee • • •
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shall * • * be vested by operation of law with the title of

the bankrupt as of the date he was adjudged bankrupt, * • •

to all (5) property which prior to the filing of the petition he

could by any means have transferred, or which might have been

levied upon and sold under judicial process against him; • * •

(6) rights of action arising upon contracts or from the unlawful

taking or detention of, or injury to his property." This action,

having been brought for damages to the person of the plaintiff,

could not by any means have been transferred by him. Rice v.

Stone, 1 Allen, 566; Robinson v. Wiley, 188 Mass. 533, 74 N. E.

923; Flynn v. Butler, 189 Mass. 377-389, 75 N. E. 730. It was

not property nor a right of property until it was reduced to a

judgment. Stone v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 7 Gray, 539. It

could not be reached by trustee process. Thayer v. Southwick,

8 Gray, 229; Wilde v. Mahaney, 183 Mass. 455, 67 N. E. 337,

62 L. R. A. 813. Nor could it be reached in equity by a cred-

itors' bill. Bennett v. Sweet, 171 Mass. 600, 51 N. E. 183; Bill-

ings v. Marsh, 153 Mass. 311, 26 N. E. 1000, 10 L. R. A. 764, 25

Am. St. Rep. 635. The liability being disputed, the claim was not

RUGG, J. Four contentious have been argued in behalf of the
defendant. His other exceptions are trented as waived.

• • •

4. Several questions are raised respecting the effect upon the
plaintiff's right to maintain his action and the damages he may
recover, growing out of the fact that in ~larch, 1904, he was duly
adjudged a bankrupt and the ordinary proeeedings were had ;
the accident having occuITed on the 11th day of July, 1902, and
this action having been begun on the 9th of Angust, 1902. It i~
first urged that the plaintiff is debarred from the right to maintain his action by reason of the bankruptcy. The bankruptcy
act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 565, 566 [U. S. Comp.
St. 1901, p. 3451] ) provides in § 10a that "the trustee • • •
shall • • • be vested by operatio11 of law with the title of
the bankrupt as of the date he was adjudged bankrupt, • • •
to all ( 5) property which prior to the filing of the petition he
could by any means have tra11sferred, or which might have been
levied upou and sold under judicial process against him; • • •
(6) rights of action arising upon contracts or from the unlawful
taking or detention of, or injury to his property." This action,
having been brought for damages to the person of the plaintiff,
could not by any means have been transferred by him. Rice v.
Stone, 1 Allen, 566; Robinson v. Wiley, 188 Mass. 533, 74 N. E .
923; Flynn v. Butler, 189 Mass. 377-389, 75 N. E. 730. It was
not property nor a right of property until it was reduced to a
judgment. Stone v. Boston & l\laine Railroad, 7 Gray, 539. It
could not be reached by trustee process. Thayer v. Southwick,
8 Gray, 229; Wilde v. Mahaney, 183 Mass. 455, 67 N. E. 337,
62 L. R. A. 813. Nor could it be reached in equity by a creditors' bill. Bennett v. Sweet, 171 Mass. 600, 51 N. E. 183; Billings v. Marsh, 153 Mass. 311, 26 N. E. 1000, 10 L. R. A. 764, 25
Am. St. Rep. 635. The liabiHty being disputed, the claim was not

544

544

ADMINISTRATION

ADMINISTRATION

subject to taxation and therefore could not be levied upon or

i reached by the assessor or tax collector. Deane v. Hathaway, 136

Mass. 129. Thus it appears that the claim which the plaintiff was

prosecuting against the defendant is not properly described by

any of the phraseology in subsection 5. Subsection 6 is limited

to rights of action arising upon contract or respecting property

and does not include an action of tort for personal injuries. It

is not, and never has been, the policy of the law to coin into

money for the profit of his creditors the bodily pain, mental

anguish or outraged feelings of a bankrupt. None of the federal

or English bankruptcy acts, nor our own insolvency statutes, have

gone to that length. It has been held that the following actions

do not pass to the trustee or assignee: Malicious prosecution (In

re Haensell [D. C] 91 Fed. 357; Noonan v. Orton, 34 Wis. 259,

17 Am. Rep. 441; Francis v. Burnett, 84 Ky. 223); slander (Dil-

lard v. Collins, 25 Grat. [Va.] 343); seduction of servant (How-

ard v. Crowther, 8 M & W. 601); malicious attachment (Brewer

v. Dew, 11 M. & W. 625); deceit (In re Crocket, Fed. Cas. No.

3.402) ; malicious trespass (Rogers v. Spence, 12 CI. & Fin. 700);

trespass to ship (Bird v. Hempsted, 3 Day [Conn.] 272, 3 Am.

Dec. 269); trespass accompanied by personal annoyance (Rose

v. Buckett [1901] 2 K. B. 449; negligence of an attorney (Weth-

473.
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erell v. Julius, 10 C. B. 267). See Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S.

It is also urged that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, as

an element of damage, for the wages which he would have earned

between the date of his accident and his adjudication in bank-

ruptcy. If the defendant's requests for instructions be construed

narrowly, they were properly refused, for the reason that under

the bankruptcy act property acquired between the date of the

filing of the petition and the date of the adjudication in bank-

ruptcy does not pass. But, looking at the question broadly, the

contention cannot be sustained. The cause of action for which

the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages on account of the

pain and suffering which he had endured and was likely to

endure, as well as his loss of time, was indivisible. Doran v.

Cohen, 147 Mass. 342, 17 N. E. 647. Moreover, the wages which

the plaintiff might have earned, if not injured, are not strictly

recoverable. The value of his time, while prevented from work-

ing by reason of the negligence of the defendant, is a proper

element to be considered in fixing the damages. Braithwaite v.

Hall, 168 Mass. 38, 46 N. E. 398; Whipple v. Rich, 180 Mass.

suhject to taxation and therefore could not be levied upon or
reached by the assessor or tax collector. Deane v. Hathaway, 136
Mass. 129. Thus it appears that the claim which the plaintiff was
prosecuting against the defendant is not properly described by
any of the phraseology in subsection 5. Subsection 6 is limited
to rights of action arising upon contract or respecting property
and does not include an action of tort for personal injuries. It
is not, and never has been, the policy of the law to coin into
money for the profit of his creditors the bodily pain, mental
anguish or outraged feelings of a bankrupt. None of the federal
or English bankruptcy acts, nor our own insolvency statutes, have
gone to that length. It has been held that the following actions
do not pass to the trustee or assignee: :Malicious prosecution (In
re Haell8ell [D. C.] 91 Fed. 357; Noonan v. Orton, 34 Wis. 259,
17 Am. Rep. 441; Francis v. Burnett, 84 Ky. 223) ; slander (Dillard v. Collins, 25 Grat. [Va.] 343); seduction of servant (Howard v. Crowther, 8 M. & W. 601); malicious attachment (Brewer
v. Dew, 11 M. & W. 625); deceit (In re Crocket, Fed. Cas. No.
3.402) ; malicious trespass (Rogers v. Spence, 12 Cl. & Fin. 700) ;
trespass to ship (Bird v. Hempsted, 3 Day [Conn.] 272, 3 Am.
Dec. 269); trespass accompanied by personal annoyance (Rose
v. Buckett [ 1901] 2 K. B. 449; negligence of an attorney (Wetherell v. Julius, 10 C. B. 267). See Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S.
473.
It is also urged that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, as
an element of damage, for the wages which he would have earned
between the date of his accident and his adjudication in bank·
ruptcy. If the defendant's requests for instructions be construed
narrowly, they were properly refused, for the reason that under
the bankruptcy act property acquired between the date of the
filing of the petition and the date of the adjudication in bankruptcy does not pass. But, looking at the question broadly, the
contention cannot be sustained. The cause of action for which
the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages on account of the
pain and suffering which he had endured and was likely to
endure, as well as his loss of time, was indivisible. Doran v.
Cohen, 147 Mass. 342, 17 N. E. 647. Moreover, the wages whfoh
the plaintiff might have earned, if not injured, are not strictly
recoverable. The value of his time, while prevented from working by reason of the negligence of the defendant, is a proper
Plement to be considered in fixing the damages. Braithwaite v.
Hall, 168 Mass. 38, 46 N. E. 398; Whipple v. Rich, 180 Mass.
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477, 63 N. E. 5. The personal injury is the gist of the action.

The other elements of damage are incidents only of this main

cause of action. Prayers 8 and 9 were therefore properly refused.

The final question argued was that the plaintiff was not entitled

to recover for debts incurred for physicians' services, never paid

by the plaintiff, but proved against his estate in bankruptcy or

included in his schedules. A plaintiff in an action for personal

injury is entitled to recover for reasonable expenditures for

nursing and physicians' care rendered necessary by the wrong-

ful act of the defendant. Turner v. B. & M. R. R., 158 Mass.

261, 33 N. E. 520; McGarrahan v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 171

Mass. 211, 50 N. E. 610; Atwood v. Boston Forwarding & Trans-

fer Co., 185 Mass. 557, 71 N. E. 72; Scullane v. Kellogg, 169

Mass. 544, 48 N. E. 622. It may be assumed that the bills in-

curred by the present plaintiff for physicians' services would

be barred by his discharge in bankruptcy. This fact, however,

does not prevent the plaintiff from treating such obligations as

debts of honor. It is through no virtue of the defendant that

the plaintiff will be enabled to interpose any defense to the pay-

ment of a reasonable charge for these services for the ameliora-

tion of his suffering, but rather the clemency of the law to his

financial distress. Under these circumstances, the law ought not
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to prevent or discourage the exercise of a debtor's conscience

respecting his past indebtedness. See Klein v. Thompson, 19

Ohio St. 569; Denver, etc., Co. v. Lorentzen, 79 Fed. 291, 24 C.

C. A. 592.

Exceptions overruled.

In re GAY et al.

182 Fed. 260

(District Court, D. Massachusetts. July 16, 1910)

DODGE, District Judge. At the time of the bankruptcy an

action of tort was pending in the Massachusetts Superior Court,

which the bankrupts had brought against the firm of Tucker,

Anthony & Co. The declaration alleged that the bankrupts, who

were dealers in stocks and bonds, had been induced to buy cer-

tain bonds from the defendants, who were in the same business,

at prices greater than their value, by false and fraudulent rep-

resentations made by the defendants regarding facts materially

477, 63 N. E. 5. The personal injury is the gist of the action.
The other elements of damage are incidents only of this main
cause of action. Prayers 8 and 9 were therefore properly refused.
The final question argued was that the plaintiff was not entitled
to recover for debts incurred for physicians' services, never paid
by the plaintiff, but proved against his est.ate in bankruptcy or
included in his schedules. A plaintiff in an action for personal
injury is entitled to recover for reasonable expenditures for
nursing and physicians' care rendered necessary by the wrongful act of the defendant. Turner v. B. & M. R. R., 158 Mass.
261, 33 N. E. 520; McGarrahan v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 171
.i\Iass. 211, 50 N. E. 610; Atwood v. Boston .i..,orwarding & Transfer Co., 185 Mass. 557, 71 N. E. 72; Scullane v. Kellogg, 169
Mass. 544, 48 N. E. 622. It may be assumed that the bills incurred by the present plaintiff for physicians' services would
be barred by his discharge in bankruptcy. This fact, however,
does not prevent the plamtiff from treating such obligations as
debts of honor. It is through no virtue of the defendant that
the plaintiff will be enabled to interpose any defense to the payment of a reasonable charge for these services for the ameliora.
tion of his suffering, but rather the clemency of the law to his
financial distress. Under these circumst.ances, the law ought not
to prevent or discourage the exercise of a debtor's conscience
respecting his past indebtedneBS. See Klein v. Thompson, 19
Ohio St. 569; Denver, etc., Co. v. Lorentzen, 79 Fed. 291, 24 C.
C. A. 592.
Exceptions overruled.

affecting the value of the bonds. Damages were claimed for al-
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In re GAY et al.

182 Fed. 260
(District Court, D. Massachusetts. July 16, 1910)
DODGE, District Judge. At the time of the bankruptcy an
action of tort was pending in the Massachusetts Superior Court,
which the bankrupts had brought against the firm of Tuck~r,
Anthony & Co. The declaration alleged that the bankrupts, who
were dealers in stocks and bonds, had been induced to buy cert.a.in bonds from the defendants, who were in the same business,
at prices greater than their value, by false and fraudulent representations made by the defendants regarding facts materially
affecting the value of the bonds. Damages were claimed for ala.

6 A.

Bankruptc7-8~

546

546

ADMINISTRATION

ADMINISTRATION

leged losses to the plaintiff resulting from the purchase. The

question to be decided is: Were the bankrupts' rights of action

asserted in this suit "rights of action arising • • • from

* • * injury to [the bankrupts'] property," so as to pass to

the trustee under § 70a (6) of the bankruptcy act (Act July 1,

1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 565 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3451]).

Assuming that the bankrupts were in fact induced, as their

declaration alleged, to pay $239,594.44 for bonds having no such

real value, by means of false and fraudulent representations such

as the declaration set forth, I think it may be said, as a matter

of fair and reasonable construction, that their right of action

arose from injury to their property. If those were the facts,

they lost by the deceit practiced upon them money then belong-

ing to them which might otherwise have been available to meet

their obligations. This construction of clause 6 has the support

of a recent decision by the District Court for the Northern Dis-

trict of New York. In re Harper, 175 Fed. 412. A trustee in

bankruptcy was there allowed to set off against a claim for

goods sold and delivered a counterclaim for damages to the

bankrupt, caused by the creditor's deceit in connection with the

sale. The bankrupt 's claim for damages by the deceit was held

to have passed to the trustee, because, if deceived as the bank-
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rupt alleged, his money had thereby been lost and his estate

diminished. It was held (p. 421) that the trustee might there-

fore establish the claim for damages as a counterclaim before

the referee, unless some other mode of establishing and liquidat-

ing it should be directed.

It is urged on the bankrupt's behalf that the court does not ap-

pear iu Re Harper to have held the right of action for the deceit

a right which may be properly described as a right arising from

injury to the bankrupt's property, but to have held only that it

passed to the trustee because made assignable by the New York

Code. Such a right of action, it is said, is not assignable under

the law of Massachusetts, and the decision is, therefore, of no

authority here. But if the right of action dealt with in Re

Harper belonged to the trustee only because assignable in New

York, and not because a right arising from injury to the bank-

rupt's property, it belonged to him, not by virtue of subdivision

6 of § 70a but by virtue of subdivision 5, or, in other words, be-

cause it was property transferable by the bankrupt, or which

might have been sold under judicial process against him. See

leged 1088e8 to the plaintiff resulting from the purchase. The
question to be decided is: Were the bankrupts' rights of action
asserted in this suit ' 'rights of action arising • • • from
.. • • injury to [the bankrupts'] property," so as to p888 to
the trustee under § 70a ( 6) of the bankruptcy act (Act July 1,
1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 565 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3451] ).
Assuming that the bankrupts were in fa.ct induced, as their
declaration alleged, to pay $239,594.44 for bonds having no such
real value, by means of false and fraudulent representations such
as the declaration set forth, I think it may be 1aid, as a matter
of fair and reasonable constructiou, that their right of action
arose from injury to their property. If those were the facts,
they lost by the deceit practiced upon them money then belonging to them which might otherwise have been available to meet
their obligations. This construction of clause 6 has the support
of a recent decision by the District Court for the Northern Dist2·ict of Ne~ York. In re Harper, 175 Fed. 412. A trustee in
bankruptcy was there allowed to set off against a claim for
goods sold and delivered a counterclaim for damages to the
bankrupt, caused by the creditor's deceit in connection with the
sale. The bankrupt's claim for damages by the deceit was held
to have passed to the trustee, because, if deceived as the bankrul't alleged, his money had thereby been lost and his estate
diminished. It was held (p. 421) that the trustee might therefore establish the claim for damages as a counterclaim before
the referee, unless some other mode of establishing and liquidating it should be directed.
It is urged on the bankrupt's behalf that the court does not appear iu Re Harper to have held the right of action for the deceit
a right which may be properly described as a right arising from
injury to the bankrupt's property, but to have held only that it
passed to the trustee because made assignable by the New York
Code. Such a right of action, it is said, is not assignable under
the law of Massachusetts, and the decision is, therefore, of no
authority here. But if the right of action dealt with in Re
Harper belonged to the trustee only because assignable in New
York, and not because a right arising from injury to the bankrupt 's property. it belonged to him, not by virtue of subdivision
6 of ~ 70a but by virtue of subdivision 5, or, in other words, because it was property transferable by the bankrupt, or which
might have been sold under judicial process against him. See
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Remington, Bankruptcy, § 1019, p. 569. And the court expressly

says in Re Harper, at p. 418 of 175 Fed.:

"It is self-evident, I think, that rights of action for unliqui-

dated damages for false and fraudulent representations, * • •

whether assignable or not, are not regarded aa property under

subdivision 5."

The decision, as I understand it, holds the trustee entitled to

the right of action only because subdivision 6 gives it to him.

The definition of '' injury to property'' in the New York Code is

discussed, because a definition of words used in subdivision 6,

and the New York decisions bearing upon the Code definition

are quoted only as interpreting and illustrating that definition.

The Code can hardly have been supposed capable of making '' in-

jury to property" in subdivision 6 mean something in New York

which it does not mean elsewhere. I am unable to see in this

contention any reason for declining to follow In re Harper.

No other decision has been found which deals with this ques-

tion as presented under the present bankruptcy act. Under the

bankruptcy act of 1867 the rights of action belonging to a bank-

rupt which were to pass to his assignee were those '' arising from

an unlawful taking or detention or injury to his property."

Rev. St. § 5046. The language used may be regarded as substan-

tially identical, for the purposes of the question under consid-
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eration, with that of clause 6. Two decisions under that act are

relied on by the bankrupts. They are In re Crockett, 2 Ben.

514, Fed. Cas. No. 3,402, and In re Brick, 4 Fed. 804. In the

first of these cases the question was whether there were any

assets in existence belonging to a partnership which had been

dissolved. A suit which the partnership had brought to recover

damages for fraudulently and deceitfully recommending a per-

son, to whom it had sold goods, as worthy of trust and confidence,

was held to be not within the description of the assets which

pass to the assignee in bankruptcy. The court said:

"It is not a debt, or a security for a debt, or a right in equity,

or a chose in action, or a right of action for property. Nor is

it a right of action or a cause of action arising from contract. It

is an action of tort for the fraud and deceit, and not an action

on a contract."

. The question was not further discussed. In the second case

it was held, largely on the authority of the first, that a pending

suit by the bankrupt for false and fraudulent representations

as to its solvency, made by an officer of a company to which a

Remington, Bankruptcy, § 1019, p. 569. And the court expreBSly
says in Re Harper, at p. 418 of 175 Fed. :
''It is self-evident, I think, that right.a of action for unliquidated damages for false and fraudulent representations, • • •
whether assignable or not, are not regarded as property under
subdivision 5."
The decision, as I understand it, holds the trustee entitled to
the right of action only because subdivision 6 gives it to him.
The definition of ''injury to property'' in the New York Code is
discussed, because a definition of words used in .subdivision 6,
and the New York decisions bearing upon the Code definition
are quoted only as interpretiug and illustrating that definition.
The Code can hardly have been supposed capable of making ''injury to property" in subdivision 6 mean something in New York
which it does not mean elsewhere. I am unable to see in this
contention any reason for declining to follow In re Harper.
No other decision has been found which deals with this question as presented under the present bankruptcy act. Under the
bankruptcy act of 1867 the rights of action belonging to a bankrupt which were to pass to bis assignee were those ''arising from
an unlawful taking or detention or injury to his property.''
Rev. St. § 5046. The language used may be regarded as substantially identical, for the purposes of the question under consideration, with that of clause 6. Two decisions under that act are
relied on by the bankrupts. They are In re Crockett, 2 Ben.
514, Fed. Cas. No. 3,402, and In re Brick, 4 Fed. 804. In the
first of these cases the question was whether there were any
assets in existence belonging to a partnership which had been
dissolved. A suit which the partnership had brought to recover
damages for fraudulently and deceitfully recommending a person, to whom it had sold goods, as worthy of trust and confidence,
was held to be not within the description of the asset.a which
pass to the assignee in bankruptcy. The court said:
"It is not a debt, or a security for a debt, or a right in equity,
or a chose in action, or a right of action for property. Nor is
it a right of action or a cause of action arising from contract. It
is an action of tort for the fraud and deceit, and not an action
on a contract."
. The question was not further discussed. In the second case
it was held, largely on the authority of the first, that a pending
suit by the bankr}lpt for false and fraudulent representations
as to its solvency, made by an officer of a company to which a
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firm, whereof the bankrupt was a member, had sold iron, taking a

promissory note of the company in payment, was not a partner-

ship asset, so that failure to include it in his schedules would va-

cate his discharge. The court said that the language of § 5046

did not include causes of action arising ex delicto, a statement

which, as will appear, I must regard as too broad.

Another decision under the act of 1867 (Act March 2, 1867,

c. 176, 14 Stat. 517), also relied on by the bankrupts, is Tufts v.

Matthews, 10 Fed. 609, decided by the Circuit Court in this dis-

trict. In that case the purchaser of a right of action originally

belonging to a bankrupt, from his assignee, sold it to another who

brought suit in his own name. The right of action was for de-

ceit, and the deceit consisted in false representations inducing

the surrender of certain bonds, deposited as security for the

defendant's notes. The defendant's demurrer was sustained,

partly on the ground that the plaintiff could not sue in his own

name, and partly because of the doubt whether the claim was

transferable by the assignee in bankruptcy, or by the purchaser

from him, even if it ever passed to the assignee under the stat-

ute. But the court also undoubtedly held that an action for per-

sonal tort, "such as a fraudulent and deceitful recommendation

of a person as worthy of credit whereby goods were obtained,"
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was not a right of action which passed to the assignee under the

statute. 10 Fed. 611. /

The case last referred to did not, as has been stated, turn

wholly upon the question whether or not the bankrupt's right of

action passed to his assignee, nor do I think that I am required

by what was said or decided in either case to hold that this right

of action did not pass. That such a right was not assignable at

common law does not seem to me to settle the question. In some

states such rights of action have been made assignable by statute

(as in the case of New York, above referred to); in other states,

not. But the bankruptcy act, in providing among the rights of

action for torts which shall and which shall not pass to the

trustee, has adopted its own line of division, and this does not

necessarily follow any of the distinctions observed elsewhere or

for other purposes. It is recognized as a general principle in

bankruptcy that the right of redress for wrongs to the bank-

rupt's person, feelings, or reputation does not helong to his cred-

itors. A reason given is that the discretion as to whether such

redress should be sought ought not to be intrusted to any one but

the very person who has received the injury (Lowell, Bank-

firm, whereof the bankrupt was a member, had sold iron, taking a
promissory note of the company in payment, was not a partuership asset, so that failure to include it in his schedules would vacate his discharge. The court said that the language of § 5046
did uot include causes of action arising ex delicto, a statement
which, as will appear, I must regard as too broad.
Another decision under the act of 1867 (Act March 2, 1867,
c. 176, 14 Stat. 517), also relied on by the bankrupts, is Tufts v.
~llitthcws, 10 Fed. 609, decided by the Circuit Court in this district. In that case the purchaser of a right of action originally
belouging to a bankrupt, from his assignee, sold it to another who
brought suit in his own name. The right of action was for deceit, and the deceit consisted in false representations inducing
the surrender of certain bonds, deposited as security for the
defendant's notes. The defendant's demurrer was sustained,
partly on the ground that the plaintiff could not sue in his own
name, and partly because of the doubt whether the cl&im was
transferable by the assignee in bankruptcy, or by the purchaser
from him, even if it ever passed to the assignee under the statute. But the court also undoubtedly held that an action for per.
sonal tort, ''such as a fraudulent and deceitful recommendation
of a person as worthy of credit whereby goods were obtained,''
was not a right of action which p'889ed to the assignee under the
statute. 10 Fed. 611.
The case last referred to did not, as has been stated, turn
wholly upon the question whether or not the bankrupt's right of
action passed to his assignee, nor do I think that I am required
by what was said or decided in either case to hold that this right
of action did not pass. That such a right was not assignable at
common law does not seem to me to settle the question. In some
states such rights of action have been made assignable by statute
(as in the case of New York, above referred to) ; in other states,
not. But the bankruptcy act, in providing among tht> rights of
action for torts which shall and which shall not pass to the
trustee, has adopted its own line of division, and this does not
necessarily fallow any of the distinctions observed elsewhere or
for other purposes. It is recognized as a general principle in
bankruptcy that the right of redress for wrongs to the bank·
rupt 's person, feelings, or reputation does not belong to his creditors. A reason given is that the discretion as to whether such
redress should be sought ought not to be intru~ted to any one but
the very person who bas received the injury (Lowell, Bank-
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ruptcy, § 325); a reason which has no application where the re-

dress sought is the recovery of money out of which the bankrupt

has been cheated in a transaction entered into in the ordinary

course of his business. In such a case his money loss is properly

described as resulting directly from the deceit, instead of being

a result merely incidental, remote, or indirect. The damage is to

\>e classed with damage to property, rather than with damage to

the feelings or person, and the right to recover it, therefore, on

broad grounds, with actions which pass to the assignee, rather

than with those which do not pass. Lowell, Bankruptcy, § 305.

Iu England an action for false representations "qr other deceit

sounding in damages" passes to the assignee, like actions for

damage to property, real or personal. Lowell, Bankruptcy, § 307.

And see, also, more recent statements of the English law in

Robson, Bankruptcy (7th ed.) 423, and Williams, Bankruptcy

(8th ed.) 211, 212.

As among actious of tort there are some which pass to the as-

signee in bankruptcy and some which do not, it would seem to

be entirely possible that among actions for deceit there may be

some which will pass and others which will not. As in Cutter

v. Hamlen, 147 Mass. 471,18 N. E. 397, 1 L. R. A. 429, an action

for deceit against a lessor for false representations, inducing the
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plaintiff to hire from him an infected house whereby the plaintiff

was made sick, the action was said to be "not for the deceit alone,

the naked injuria, but for the damage caused by the deceit," and

to be properly classed as an action for '' damage to the person''

within the meaning of Pub. St. Mass. 1882, c. 165, § 1, because

'' the nature of the damage sued for, not the nature of its cause,

determines whether an action survives," so in this case, if the

nature of the damage sued for be considered, rather than the

mere deceit which was its cause, it may properly be described as

arising from injury to property within the meaning of clause 6.

The bankrupts contend that an action cannot properly be so

described unless it claims damage to some specific property, real

or personal. This is based on the Massachusetts decisions con-

struing the state statutes regulating the survival of actions. In

those cases the question was whether the action could be called

an action for "damage done to real or personal estate"—words

which may well require a narrower construction than the lan-

guage of clause 6. And, of course, the test here is not whether

the action is one which survives under the Massachusetts law.

Lastly, it is urged on the bankrupts' behalf that they have

ruptC'y, § 325) ; a reason which has no application where the redress sought is the recovery of money out of which the bankrupt
has been cheated in a transaction entered into in the ordinary
course of his business. In such a case his money loss is properly
described as resulting directly from the deceit, instead of being
a result merely incidental, remote, or indirect. The damage is to
he classed with damage to property, rather than with damage to
the feelings or person, and the right to recover it, therefore, on
broad grounds, with actions which pass to the assignee, rather
than with th<>se which do not pass. Lowell, Bankruptcy, § 305.
lu England an action for false representations ' ' Ql' other deceit
sounding in dama~s'' passes to the assignee, like actions for
dama.gc to property, real or personal. Lowell, Bankruptcy, § 307.
And see, also, more recent statements of the English law in
Robson, Bankruptcy (7th ed.) 423, and Williams, Bankruptcy
(8th ed.) 211, 212.
As among actions of tort there are some which pass to the assignee in bankruptcy and some which do not, it would seem te>
be entirely possible that among actions for deceit there may be
some which will pass and others which will not. As in Cutter
v. Hamlen, 147 Mass. 471, 18 N. E. 397, 1 L. R. A. 429, an action
for deceit against a lessor for false representations, inducing the
plaintiff to hire from h~m an infected house whereby the plaintiff ·
was made sick, the action was said to be "not for the·deceit alone,
the naked injuria, but for the damage caused by the deceit,'' and
to be properly classed as an action for ''damage to the person''
within the meaning of Pub. St. Mass. 1882, c. 165, § 1, because
"the nature of the dam.age sued for, not the nature of its cause,
determines whether an action survives,'' so in this case, if the
nature of the damage sued for be considered, rather than the
mere deceit which was its cause, it may properly be described as
arising from injury to property within the meaning of clause 6.
The bankrupts contend that an action cannot properly be so
described unless it claims damage to some specific property, real
or personal. This is based on the Massachusetts decisions construing the state statutes regulating the survival of actions. In
those case.s the question was whether the action could be called
an action for "damage done to real or personal estate "-words
which may well require a narrower construction than the language of clause 6. And, of course, the test here is not whether
the action is one which survives under the Massachusetts law.
Lastly, it is ur~d on the bankrupts' behalf that they have
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resold the bonds, or some of them, to customers of their own,

under representations made by them, on their own account, to

the same effect as the representations of which they complain in

the suit referred to, and that any recovery in that suit ought in

justice to belong to them, rather than to the trustee, because they

are not discharged in bankruptcy from such claims as the pur-

chasers of the bonds from them assert against them. If all this

is properly before the court, it is, of course, a sufficient answer

that no such claims can be maintained against them, save for

their own independent deceit or negligence in repeating the rep-

resentations of which they complain.

The order of the referee is approved and affirmed.17

In re COLUMBUS BUGGY CO.

143 Fed. 859, 74 C. C. A. 611

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. March 2, 1906)

SANBORN, Circuit Judge. By a statute of Oklahoma Terri-

resold the bonds, or some of them, to customers of their own,
under representations made by them, on their own account, to
the same effect as the representations of which they complain in
the. suit referred to, and that any recovery in that suit ought in
justice to belong to them, rather than to the trustee, because they
. are not discharged in bankruptcy from such claims as the purchasers of the bonds from them assert against them. If all this
is properly before the court, it is, of course, a sufficient answ~r
that no such claims can be maintained against them, save for
their own independent deceit or negligence in repeating the representations of which they complain.
The order of the referee is approved and aftirmed.11

tory an instrument in writing which evidences the conditional

sale of personal property and the retention of title in the vendor

until the purchase price is paid is rendered voidable at the in-

In re COLlThIBUS BUGGY CO.

• stance of innocent purchasers or creditors of the vendee unless it

is deposited in the office of the proper register. 2 Wilson's Rev.

& Ann. St. Okl. 1903, p. 966, § 162. On August 4, 1903, the
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Washburn-Lytle Implement Company was adjudged a bankrupt

upon an involuntary petition by the District Court of the United

States for the Third District of Oklahoma Territory. The trustee

in bankruptcy took from the possession of the bankrupt goods of

the value of about $5,400, which were situated in Oklahoma and

were held by the Washburn company under a contract with the

Columbus Buggy Company, which had not been deposited with

the proper register of deeds. The material terms of this contract

were that the goods should be selected from those of the Colum-

bus company by the Washburn company and should be shipped

and billed to it as agent by the Columbus company at the latter's

wholesale prices, that the Washburn company might sell the

goods at such prices as it saw fit and that it would pay to the

17—See Kose v. Buckett [1901], Fed. 828; Fellebrown v. Haywood,

2 K. B. 449; Cleland v. Anderson, 190 Mass. 472; Epstein v. Handrer-

75 Neb. 273; Hansen v. Wyman, ker, 29 Okla. 337; First Nat'l Bank

105 Minn. 491; In re Burnstine, 131 v. Lasater, 196 U. 8. 115.

143 Fed. 859, 74 C. C. A. 611
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. March 2, 1906)
SANBORN, Circuit Judge. By a statute of Oklahoma Territory an instrument in writing which evidences the conditional
sale of personal property and the retention of title in the vendor
until the purchase price is paid is rendered voidable at the in. stance of innocent purch&sers or creditors of the vendee unless it
is deposited in the office of the proper register. 2 Wilson's Rev.
& Ann. St. Oki. 1903, p. 966, § 162. On August 4, 1903, the
'Yashhurn-Lytle Implement Company was adjudged a bankrupt
upon an involuntary petition by the District Court of the United
States for the Third District of Oklahoma Territory. The trustee
in bankruptcy took from the possession of the bankrupt goods of
the value of about $5,400, which were situat;ed in Oklahoma and
were held by the Washburn company under a contract with the
Colu.mhus Buggy Company, which bad not been deposited with
the proper register of deeds. The material terms of this contract
were that the goods should be selected from those of the Columbus company by the Washburn company and should be shipped
and billed to it as agent by the Columbus company at the latter's
wholesale prices, that the Washburn company might sell the
goods at such prices as it saw fit and that it would pay to the
17-8ee Rose v. Buekett [1901],
2 K. B. 449; Cleland v. Anderson,
7fi Neb. 273; Hansen v. Wyman,
105 Minn. 491;. In re Burnatine, 131

Fed. 828; Fellebrown v. Haywood,
190 Mua. 472; Epstein v. Handver·
ker, 29 Okla. 337; First Nat'l Bank
v. Lasater, 196 U. 8. 115.
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Columbus company the wholesale prices less 5 per cent. discount

for the goods if sold in each month by the tenth day of the suc-

ceeding month, that it would keep the property insured for the

benefit of the Columbus company and would bear all expenses of

freight, storage and hauling, that the contract should continue in

force one year and that, unless it was renewed, the Washburn

company would at its expiration return that portion of the mer-

chandise unsold and the Columbus company would repay the

freight which had been paid upon this portion and that all the

goods should be on consignment and the title should remain in

the Columbus company and subject to its order until they were

sold and paid for in cash. The Columbus company properly pre-

sented to the District Court its claim for that part of the mer-

chandise which the Washburn Company held unsold under this

contract and which the trustee had taken at the time of the ad-

judication, and that court denied its petition upon the ground

that the contract evidenced a conditional sale and was therefore

voidable under the statute of Oklahoma. The case is presented

to this court by a petition to revise this ruling.

A conditional sale is one in which the vesting of the title in

the purchaser is subject to a condition precedent, or in which its

revesting in the seller is subject to a failure of the buyer to com-
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ply with a condition subsequent.

An agreed price, a vendor, a vendee, an agreement of the

former to sell for the agreed price and an agreement of the lat-

ter to buy for and to pay the agreed price are essential elements

of a contract of sale. The contract involved in this case has none

of these characteristics. The power to require the restoration of

the subject of the agreement is an indelible incident of a contract

of bailment. South Australian Ins. Co. v. Randell, L. R. 3 P. C.

101, 108; 2 Kent's Com. *589; Powder Co. v. Burkhardt, 97

U. S. 116, 24 L. ed. 973; Sturm v. Boker, 150 U. S. 312, 14 Sup.

Ct. 99, 37 L. ed. 1093. This contract contains a plain stipulation

that the goods are at all times subject to the order of the Colum-

bus company until they are sold and that at the expiration of the

term of the contract the Washburn company will return the goods

which remain unsold. It was therefore a contract of bailment for

sale and it was not subject to the statute of Oklahoma regarding

conditional sales. One of the most striking and familiar illus-

trations of its character is given by Chief Justice Gibson in

McCnllough v. Porter, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 177, 39 Am. Dec. 68,

where he says:

Columbus company the wholesale prices less 5 per cent. discount
for the goods if sold in each month by the tenth day of the succeeding month, that it would keep the property insured for the
benefit of the Columbus. company and would bear all expenses of
freight, storage and hauling, that the contract should continue in
force one year and that, unless it was renewed, the Wash burn
company would at its expiration return that portion of the merchandise unsold and the Columbus company would repay the
freight which had been paid upon this portion and that all the
goods should be on consignment and the title should remain in
the Columbus co~pany and subject to its order until they were
sold and paid for in cash. The Columbus company properly presented to the District Court its claim for that part of the merchandise which the Washburn Company held uusold under this
contract and which the trustee had taken at the time of the adjudication, and that court denied its petition upon the ground
that the contract evidenced a conditional sale and was therefore
voidable under the statute of Oklahoma. The case is presented
to this court by a petition to revise this ruling.
A conditional sale is one in which the vesting of the title in
the purchaser is subject to a condition precedent, or in which its
revesting in the seller is subject to a failure of the buyer to comply with a condition subsequent.
An agreed price, a vendor, a vendee, an agreement of the
former to sell for the agreed price and an agreement of the latter to buy for and to pay the agreed price are essential elements
of a contract of sale. The contract involved in this ease has none
of these characteristics. The power to require the restoration of
the subject of the agreement is an indelible incident of a contract
of bailment. South Australian Ins. Co. v. Randell, L. R. 3 P. C.
101, 108; 2 Kent's Com. • 589; Powder Co. v. Burkhardt, 97
U. S. 116, 24 L. ed. 973; Sturm v. Boker, 150 U. S. 312, 14 Sup.
Ct. 99, 37 L. ed. 1093. This contraet contains a plain stipulation
that the goods are at all times subjcet to the order of the Columbus company until they are sold and that at the expiration of the
term of the contract the Washburn company will 1,,turn the goods
which remain unsold. It was therefore a contract of bailment for
sale and it was not subject to the statute of Oklahoma regarding
conditiDnal sales. One of the most striking and familiar illustrations of its character is given by Chief .Justice Gibson in
)foCullough v. Porter, 4 'Vatts & S. (Pa.) 177, 39 Am. Dec. 68,
where he says:
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"Were I to put my horse in the custody of a friend, to be sold

for a designated sum, with permission to retain whatever could

be got beyond it, it would not be suspected that I had ceased to

own him in the meantime, or that my friend would not be bound

to return him, even without a stipulation, should he have failed

to obtain the prescribed price."

A contract between a furnisher of goods and the receiver that

the latter may sell them at such prices as he chooses, that he will

account and pay for the goods sold at agreed prices, that he will

bear the expense of insurance, freight, storage and handling and

that he will hold the unsold merchandise subject to the order of

the furnisher discloses a bailment for sale and does not evidence

a conditional sale. It contains no agreement of the receiver to

pay any agreed price for the goods. It is not, therefore, affected

by a statute which renders unrecorded contracts for conditional

sales voidable by creditors and purchasers. The fact that such

a contract provides that the receiver of the goods may fix the

selling prices and may retain the difference between the agreed

prices of the accounting and the selling prices to recompense

him for insurance, storage, commission and expenses does not

constitute the contract an agreement of sale. It still lacks the

obligation of the receiver to pay a purchase price for the goods
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and the obligation of the furnisher to transfer the title to him

for that price. Sturm v. Boker, 150 U. S. 312, 14 Sup. Ct. 99, 37

L. ed. 1093; John Deere Plow Co. v. McDavid (C. C. A.) 137

Fed. 802; Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Benedict Co., 20 C. C. A.

377, 380, 74 Fed. 182, 185; In re Gait, 56 C. C. A. 470, 473, 120

Fed. 64, 67; Union Stock-Yards, etc., Co. v. Western Land, etc.,

Co., 7 C. C. A. 660, 664, 59 Fed. 49, 53; Keystone Watch-Case Co.

v. Fourth National Bank, 194 Pa. 535, 45 Atl. 328; In re

Flanders, 67 C. C. A. 484, 134 Fed. 560; Martin v. Stratton-

White Co., 1 Ind. T. 394, 37 S. W. 833; National Bank v. Good-

year, 90 Ga. 711, 726, 16 S. E. 962; Barnes Safe & Lock Co. v.

Bloch Bros. Tobacco Co., 38 W. Va. 158, 164, 18 S. E. 482, 22

L. R. A. 850, 45 Am. St. Rep. 846; National Cordage Co. v. Sims,

44 Neb. 148, 153, 62 N. W. 514; Rosencranz & Weber Co. v.

Hanchett, 30 Ill. App. 283, 286; Harris v. Coe, 71 Conn. 157, 41

Atl. 552, 554; W. O. Dean Co. v. Lombard, 61 Ill. App. 94, 97;

Norton & Co. v. Melick, 97 Iowa, 564, 566, 66 N. W. 780; Lenz v.

Harrison, 148 Ill. 598, 36 N. E. 567, 569.

The order of the referee which denied the application of the

Columbus Buggy Company and the order of the District Court

"Were I to put my horse in the custody of a friend, to be sold
for a designated sum, with permission to retain whatever could
be got beyond it, it would not be suspected that I had ceased to
own him in the meantime, or that my friend would not be bound
to return him, even without a stipulation, should he have failed
to obtain the prescribed price.''
A contract between a furnisher of goods and the receiver that
the latter may sell them at such prices as he chooees, that he will
account and pay for the goods sold at agreed prices, that he will
bear the expense of insurance, freight, storage and handling and
that he will hold the unsold merchandise aubject to the order of
the furnisher discloses a bailment for sale and does not evidence
a conditional sale. It contains no agreement of the receiver to
pay any agreed price for the goods. It is not, therefore, affected
by a statute which renders unrecorded contracts for conditional
sales voidable
by creditors and purchasers. 'fhe fact that such
I
a l!ontract provides that the receiver of the goods may fix the
selling prices and may retain the difference between the agreed
prices of the accounting and the selling prices to recompense
him for insurance, storage, commission and expenses does not
constitute the contract an agreement of sale. It still lacks the
obligation of the receiver to pay a purchase price for the goods
and the obligation of the furnisher to transfer the title to him
for that price. Sturm v. Boker, 150 U. S. 312, 14 Sup. Ct. 99, 37
L. ed. 1093; John Deere Plow Co. v. McD.avid ( C. C. A.) 137
Fed. 802; Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Benedict Co., 20 C. C. A.
377, 380, 74 Fed. 182, 185; In re Galt, 56 C. C. A. 470, 473, 120
Fed. 64, 67; Union Stock-Yards, etc., Co. v. Western Land, etc.,
Co., 7 C. C. A. 660, 664, 59 Fed. 49, 53; Keystone Watch-Case Co.
v. Fourth National Bank, 194 Pa. 535, 45 Atl. 328; In re
Flanders, 67 C. C. A. 484, 134 ~'ed. 560; Martin v. StrattonWhite Co., 1 Ind. T. 394, 37 S. W. 833; National Rank v. Goodyear, 90 Ga. 711, 726, 16 S. E. 962; Barnes Safe & Lock Co. v.
Bloch Bros. Tobacco Co., 38 W. Va. 158, 164, 18 S. E. 482, 22
L. R. A. 850, 45 Am. St. Rep. 846; National Cordage Co. v. Sims,
44 Neb. 148, 153, 62 N. W. 514; Rosencranz & Weber Co. v.
Hanchett, 30 Ill. App. 283, 286; Harris v. Coe, 71 Conn. 157, 41
Atl. 552, 554; W. 0. Dean Co. v. Lombard, 61 Ill. App. 94, 97;
Norton & Co. v. Melick, 97 Iowa, 564, 566, 66 .N. \V. 780; Lenz v.
Harrison, 148 Ill. 598, 36 N. E. 567, 569.
The order of the referee which denied the application of the
Columbus Buggy Company and the order of the District Court
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which confirmed that order must be vacated, and the case must

be remanded to the court below with directions to grant the peti-

tion of the Columbus Buggy Company for the delivery to it of

all the goods remaining in the hands of the trustee which were

received by him from the bankrupt, and which had been obtained

by the latter from the Columbus company under the contract

between them, and that the trustee also pay over to the Colum-

bus company the proceeds of all goods of this character which

he received from the bankrupt and has since sold, and it is so

ordered.18

In re ALLEN

183 Fed. 172

(District Court, E. D. Arkansas, W. D. November 23, 1910)

The Heim Brewery Company filed its intervention for a num-

which confirmed that order must be vacated, and the case must
be remanded to the court below with directions to grant the petition of the Columbus Buggy Company for the delivery to it of
all the goods remaining in the hands of the trustee which were
received by him from the bankrupt, and which had been obtained
by the latter from tbe Columbus company under the contract
between them, and that the trustee also pay over to the Columbus company the proceeds of all goods of this character which
he received from the bankrupt and has since sold, and it is so
ordered.18
'

ber of casks and cases containing empty beer bottles in the pos-

session of the trustee of the estate of the bankrupt, claiming to

be the owner thereof and entitled to the immediate possession.

In re ALLEN

The claim is based upon the following contract:

'' Contract.

183 Fed. 172

"Little Rock, Ark., April 22, 1910.

"This contract is entered into on this date between the Heim

(District Court, E. D. Arkansas, W. D. November 23, 1910)

Brewery of Kansas City, Mo., and Allen & Kirkland, liquor

dealers, Little Rock, Ark. Allen & Kirkland agree to purchase
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bottled beer in carload lots, f. o. b. Kansas City, Mo., at the

following prices: Kyffhauser beer, 4 doz. small bottles in cases,

$3.10. Kyffhauser beer, 2 doz. large bottles in cases, $3.10.

Heim Brewery agrees to allow a rebate of $1.50 for each case

of empty- bottles returned to the Heim Brewery, containing

either 4 dozen small, or 2 dozen large bottles, and pay return

The Heim Brewery Company filed its intervention for a number of casks and cases containing empty beer bottles in the possession of the trustee of the estate of the bankrupt, claiming to
be the owner thereof and entitled to the immediate possession.
The claim is based upon the following contract:

freight charges on all empty bottles to the Brewery in carload

lots. It is mutually agreed that Allen & Kirkland are to pay

the net price only on the bottled beer, but it is distinctly under-

stood and agreed to by Allen & Kirkland that they pay cash

for all cases or bottles not returned to the Heim Brewery, at

the rate of $1.50 per case for either large or small bottles. It

is further agreed that the dating on the first car of beer shipped

18—See Ludvigh v. Am. Woolen

Co., 231 U. 8. 522; Thomas v. Field-

Brundage Co., 215 Fed. 891.

''Contract.
"Little Rock, Ark., April 22, 1910.
''This contract is entered into on this date between the Heim
Brewery of Karuias City, Mo., and Allen & Kirkland, liquor
dealers, Little Rock, Ark. Allen & Kirkland agree to purchase
bottled beer in carload lots, f. o. b. Kansas City, Mo., at the
following prices: Kyffhauser beer, 4 doz. small bottles in cases,
$3.10. Kyffhauser beer, 2 doz. large bottles in cases, $3.10.
Heim Brewery agrees to allow a rebate of $1.50 for each case
of empty, bottles returned to the Heim Brewery, containinf?
either 4 dozen small, or 2 dozen large bottles, and pay return
freight charges on all empty bottles to the Brewery in carload
lots. It is mutually agreed that Allen & Kirkland are to pay
the net price only on the bottled beer, but it is distinctly understood and agreed to by Allen & Kirkland that they pay cash
for all cases or hottles not returned to the Heim Brewery, at
the rate of $1.50 per case for either large or small bottles. _It
is further agreed that the dating on the first car of beer shipped
18-See Ludrigh v. Am. Woolen
Co., 231 U. S. 522; Thomas v. Field·
Brundage Co., 215 Fed. 891.
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to Allen & Kirkland is for sixty (60) days' credit, and even-

car thereafter is to be paid for in thirty days from date of the

arrival of the beer in Little Rock. Heim Brewery agrees to

give Allen & Kirkland five cases of pints free in each car to

aid in drayage and advertising same, and also a two per cent,

discount on all cars of beer they pay for in thirty days from

the arrival of said beer in Little Rock, which includes the first

car shipped.

"[Signed] John Q. Allen.

"D. 0. Kirkland."

The trustee denied that under the contract the intervener was

the owner of the property, but insists that the property claimed

belongs to the bankrupt's estate.

to Allen & Kirkland is for sixty (60) days' ('redit, and <·very
car thel"('aftcr is to be paid for in thirty days from date of th··
arrival of the beer in Little Rock. Heim Brewery agrees to
give Allen & Kirkland five cases of pints free iu each ear to
aid in drayage and advertising same, and also a two per cent.
discount on all cars of beer they pay for in thirty days from
the arrival of said beer in Little Rock, which includes the first
car shipped.
''[Signed]
John Q. Allen.
"D. 0. Kirkland.''

Tbe cause was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts,

which shows that under that contract the bankrupt bought

large quantities of beer from the intervener; that the beer was

delivered in cases containing bottles and in casks containing

bottles bearing the individual brand and registered copyright

of the intervener; that a part of said casks, cases, and bottles

have been returned; but that the trustee is now in possession of

a number claimed by the intervener. Upon a hearing before

the referee, he found in favor of the intervener. The cause now
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comes before the court on petition for review by the trustee.

TRIEBER, D. J. (after stating the facts as above). On

behalf of the intervener, it is claimed that, until the articles

claimed are paid for by the vendee, it is merely a bailment, and

he is entitled to a return of them, or, at most, that it was an

option to purchase. On the other hand, it is claimed on the

part of the trustee that it was a contract of "sale and return."

A "bailment" is properly defined as being a delivery of

goods in trust upon a contract, express or implied, that the

trust shall be duly executed and the goods restored by the bailee

The trustee denied that under the contract the intervener was
the owner of the property, but insists that the property claimed
he longs to the bankrupt's estate.
The cause was submitted upon an agreed statement of faets,
which shows that under that contract the bankrupt bought
large quantities of beer from the intervener; that the beer was
delivered in cases containing bottles and in casks containing
bottle& bearing the individual brand and registered copyright
of the intervener; that a part of said casks, cases, and bottles
have been returned; but that the trustee is now in poss~ion of
a number claimed by the intervener. Upon a hearing before
the referee, he found in favor of the intervener. The cause now
comes before the court on petition for review by the trustee.

as soon as the purpose of the bailment shall be served. 2 Kent,

Com. 558.

On the other hand, a "contract of sale" is when there is an

agreed price, a vendor, a vendee, an agreement of the former

to sell for the agreed price, and an agreement of the latter to

buy and pay the agreed price. An "option to purchase" is

merely an agreement whereby the vendee may, upon compliance

with certain terms and conditions, become the owner of the

property; the vendor giving him that option.

TRIEBER, D. J. (after stating the facts as above). On
behalf of the intervener, it is claimed that, until the articles
claimed are paid for by the vendee, it is merely a bailment, and
he is entitled to a return of them, or, at most, that it was an
option to purchase. On the other band, it is claimed on the
part of the trustee that it was .a contract of ''sale and return.''
A "bailment" is properly defined as being a delivery of
goods in trust upon a contract, express or implied, that the
trust shall be duly executed and the goods restored by the bailee
as soon as the purpose of the bailment shall be served. 2 Kent,
Com. 558.

On the other hand, a ''contract of sale'' is when there is an
ngreed price, a vendor, a vendee, an agreement of the former
to sell for the agreed price, and an agreement of the latter t.o
buy and pay the agreed price. An ''option to purchase'' is
merely an agreement whereby the vendee may, upon compliance
with certain terms and conditions, become the owner of the
property; the vendor giving him that option.
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The leading case upon which the intervener relies is Westcott

v. Thompson, 18 N. Y. 363. In that case the contract was for

the sale of beer and provided for the sale of the beer to the

vendee at a certain price. The beer was to be shipped in barrels

and the barrels to be returned to the plaintiff when emptied of

the beer, and if not returned the vendee was to pay for every

barrel not returned the sum of $2, and thereupon become the

owner thereof. On the other hand, in the case at bar, the con-

tract provides that the vendee is to be charged and pay for the

cases and bottles, but in case he wishes to return any of the cases

and empty bottles he is to be allowed a rebate on his bill of $1.50

for each case of empty bottles returned to the intervener.

Is this an option to purchase or a contract of sale and return f

The distinction between these two forms of agreement has been

aptly pointed out in Hunt v. "Wyman, 100 Mass. 198, as follows:

"An option to purchase if he liked is essentially different

from an option to return a purchase if he should not like. In

one case the title would not pass until the option is determined;

on the other hand, the property passes at once, subject to the

right to rescind and return."

See, also, Guss v. Nelson, 200 U. S. 298, 26 Sup. Ct. 260, 50

L. ed. 489; In re Schindler (D. C), 158 Fed. 458; Hotchkiss
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v. Higgins, 52 Conn. 205, 52 Am. Rep. 582; Martin v. Adams,

104 Mass. 262.

Applying this rule to the contract between the intervener and

the bankrupt, it clearly appears that it was not an option to

purchase, but a contract of sale and return, while, on the other

hand, the contract in Westcott v. Thompson was merely an

option to purchase. In the latter case it was optionary with the

vendee to keep the empty barrels and pay the sum of $2 for

each barrel kept by him or to return them. In the case at bar

the bankrupt was charged and promised to pay for the cases

and bottles unless he desired to return the same, and if he did

he was to be paid or given credit on his account therefor the

sum of $1.50 for each case and bottles therein.

Great stress is laid upon the fact that under the contract the

bankrupt was to pay the net price only on the bottled beer, still

the charge was made against him, and until he returned them he

wns liable to the intervener who had a cause of action against

him. In Herryford v. Davis, 102 U. S. 235, 26 L. ed. 160, the

contract between the parties spoke of the cars sold as being

leased until paid for, but notes were executed by the vendee for

The leading case upon which the intervener relies is Westcott
v. Thompson, 18 N. Y. 363. In that case the contract was for
the sale of beer and provided for the sale of the beer to the
vendee at a certain price. The beer was to be shipped in barrels
and the barrels to be returned to the plaiutiff when emptied of
the beer, and if not returned the vendee was to pay for every
barrel not returned the sum of $2, and thereupon become the
owner thereof. On the other hand, in the case at bar, the contract provides that the vendee is to be charged and pay for the
cases and bottles, but in case he wishes to return any of the cases
aud empty bottles he is to be allowed a rebate on his bill of $1.50
for each case of empty bottles returned to the intervener.
Is this an option to purchase or a contract of sale and return T
The distinction between these two f<?rmS of agreement has been
aptly pointed out in Hunt v. Wyman, 100 Mass. 198, as follows:
''An option to purchase if he liked is essentially different
from an option to return a purchase if he should not like. In
oue case the title would not pass until the option is determined;
on the other hand, the property passes at once, subject to the
right to rescind and return.''
See, also, Guss v. Nelson, 200 U. S. 298, 26 Sup. Ct. 260, 50
L. ed. 489; In re Schindler (D. C.), 158 Fed. 458; Hotchkiss
v. Higgins, 52 Conn. 205, 52 Am. Rep. 582; Martin v. Adams,
104 ~lass. 262.
Applying this rule to the contract between the intervener and
the bankrupt, it clearly appears that it was not an option to
purchase, but a contract of sale and return, while, on the other
hand, the contract in "Westcott v. Thompson was merely an
q>tiou to purchase. In the latter case it was optionary with the
\C'tHll'e to keep the empty barrels and pay the sum of $2 for
t>:teh barrel kept by him or to return them. In the case at bar
1 he bankrupt was charged and promised to pay for the cases
awl bottles unless he desired to return the same, and if he did
he was to be paid or given credit on his account therefor the
su 111 of $1.50 for each case and bottles therein.
Great stress is laid upon the fact that under the contract the
bankrupt was to pay the uet price only on the bottled beer. still
the charge was made against him, and until he returned them he
,'vns liable to the intervener who had a cause of action a~ainst
him. In IIcrryford v. Davis, 102 U. S. 235, 26 L. ed. 160, the
contract between the parties spoke of the cars sold as being
leased until paid for, but notes were executed by the vcndee for
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the full purchase money. The cars, before they were paid for,

having been seized under execution, the vendor claimed them

as his property, but the court held that calling it a lease did

not make it so, nor was it a conditional sale, but merely an

attempt to retain a lien for the purchase money, and, the same

not having been recorded as required by the laws of the state

of Missouri, it was void as against creditors.

In re Rahilly v. Wilson, 3 Dill. 420, Fed. Cas. No. 11,532,

grain was stored in a warehouse with the understanding that it

should be sold by the warehouseman, and when the depositor

would surrender the receipt therefor the warehouseman had the

right to return an equal amount of grain of equal quality or

pay the then market price of the grain. Upon these facts it

was held by Judge Dillon that it was a sale and not a bailment.

The distinction between bailments and sales is clearly shown

by the opinion of that eminent jurist, who carefully reviews

the authorities on that subject.

In Sturm v. Boker, 150 U. S. 312, 14 Sup. Ct. 99, 37 L. ed.

1093, the court held that "a transaction is a 'sale,' as distin-

guished from a 'bailment,' when there is no obligation to return

the specified article." In this case there was no obligation on

the part of the bankrupt to return the property claimed by the
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intervener; but, if he saw proper, he had the right to do so and

receive a credit for the amount specified in the agreement. If

the property had been destroyed by fire or by any other cause,

even if without any fault or negligence on the part of the bank-

rupt, the loss or destruction would still have fallen on him.

This is the rule applicable to contracts of sale and return.

Moss v. Sweet, 16 Q. B. 493; Martineau v. Kitching, L. R. 7 Q.

B. 436; Schlesinger v. Stratton, 9 R. I. 578.

As this was a contract of sale and return and not a mere

option to purchase, nor a bailment in any sense, the title passed

to the bankrupt, and the trustee is entitled to the possession of

the property.

The finding of the referee will be set aside, and judgment

entered dismissing the intervention, with costs.

the full purchase money. The cars, before they were paid for,
having been seized under execution, the vendor claimed them
as his property, but the court held that calling it a lease did
not make it so, nor was it a conditional sale, but merely an
attempt to retain a lien for the purchase money, and, the same
not having been recorded as required by the laws of the state
of ~lissouri, it was void as against creditors.
In re Rahilly v. Wilson, 3 Dill. 420, Fed. Cas. No. 11,532,
grain was stored in a warehouse with the understanding that it
should be sold by the warehouseman, and when the depositor
would surrender the receipt therefor the warehouseman had the
right to return an equal amount of grain of equal quality or
pay the then market price of the grain. Upon these facts it
was held by Judge Dillon that it was a sale and not a bailmeot.
The distinction between bailments and sales is clearly shown
by the opinion of that eminent jurist, who carefully reviews
I he authorities on that subject.
Iu Sturm v. Boker, 150 U. S. 312, 14 Sup. Ct. 99, 37 L. ed.
1093, the court held that "a transaction is a 'sale,' as distinguished from a 'hailmrnt,' when there is no obligation to return
the specified article." In this case there was no obligation on
the part of the bankrupt to r~turn the property claimed by the
intervener; but, if he saw proper, he had the right to do so and
receive a credit for the amount specified in the agreement. If
the property had been destroyed by fire or by any other cause.
even if without any fault or negligence on the part of the bank·
rupt, the loss or destruction would still have fallen on him.
This is the rule applicable to contracts of sale and return.
Moss v. Sweet, 16 Q. B. 493; Martineau v. Kitching, L. R. 7 Q.
B. 436; Schlesinger v. Stratton, 9 R. I. 578.
As this was a contract of sale and return and not a mere
option to purchase, nor a bailment in any sense, the title passed
to the bankrupt, and the trustee is entitled to the posse!tiion of
the property.
·
The finding of the referee will be set aside, and judgment
entered dismissing the intervention, with cost.a.
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In re GOLD

210 Fed. 410, 127 C. C. A. 142

In re GOLD

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. October 7, 1913)

The bankrupt, who was a furrier doing a retail business, in

the city of Chicago, on or about August 10, 1910, approached

appellants, who were wholesale furriers in the city of New York,

with a view to securing a line of credit in the purchase of furs.

210 Fed. 410, 127 C. C. A. 142
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

October 7, 1913}

She represented that she was worth between $5,000 and $6,000

above all her debts, which, she stated to appellants, did not

exceed $1,000. Relying upon her representations, appellants

sold and delivered to her at two different dates furs amounting

in value to the sum of $926.25. After receiving said furs, she

proceeded to conceal the same and, with intent to defraud ap-

pellants, shipped a large part of the same out of Chicago.

Within two months thereafter she was adjudged an involuntary

bankrupt. Then, for the first time, appellants learned of the

fraud through which she had obtained the goods. In the mean-

time, the trustee took steps to recover the furs so concealed and

shipped out of the city, and did recover a portion of appellants'

said furs, of the value of $425. On learning of said fraudulent

conduct and said bankruptcy proceedings, appellants rescinded

said sales and at once petitioned the court for the return of said

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

recovered furs or the proceeds thereof to them, the same having

been sold by the trustee pending such proceedings, all of which

steps they took after the furs had come into the possession of

the trustee. The matter was heard before the referee, who

found that the trustee's title to said goods, under § 47a (2) of

the bankruptcy act as amended June 25, 1910, was superior to

that of appellants', and dismissed appellants' petition for want

of equity. Thereupon the referee filed with the District Court

a certificate for review, wherein he stated that under the undis-

puted evidence adduced on the hearing of appellants' petition,

"said petitioners [the appellants] were entitled to reclaim said

goods and were entitled to the proceeds of the sale thereof, if,

under the bankruptcy law as amended by the act of June 25,

1910, a vendor of goods who has been induced to sell such goods

by false and fraudulent representations, can, under any circum-

stances- appearing in evidence, reclaim such goods from the

trustee in bankruptcy of the vendee." Upon the hearing upon

said petition for review and the said referee's certificate, the

The bankrupt, who was a furrier doing a retail business in
the city of Chicago, on or about August 10, 1910, approached
appellants, who were wholesale furriers in the city of New York,
with a view to securing a line of credit in the purchase of furs.
She represented that she was worth betweeu $5,000 aud $6,000
above all her debts, which, she stated to appella.uts, did not
exceed $1,000. Relying upon her representations, appellants
sold and delivered to her at two different dates furs amounting
in value to the sum of $926.25. After receiving said furs, she
proceeded to conceal the same and, with intent to defraud appellants, shipped a large part of the same out of Chicago.
Within two months thereafter she was adjudged an involuntary
bankrupt. Then, for the first time, appellants learned of the
fraud through which she had obtained the goods. In the meantime, the trustee took steps to recover the furs so concealed and
shipped out of the city, and did recover a portion of appellants'
said furs, of the value <>f $425. On learning of said fraudulent
conduct and said bankruptcy proceedings, appellants rescinded
said sales and at once petitioned the court for the return of said
recovered furs or the proceeds thereof to them, the same having
been sold by the trustee pending such proceedings, all of which
steps they took after the furs had come into the possession of
the trustee. The matter was heard before the referee, who
found that the trustee's title to said goods, under § 47a (2) of
the bankruptcy act as amended June 25, 1910, was superior to
that of appellants', and dismissed appeJlants' petition for want
of equity. Thereupon the referee filed with the District Court
a certificate for review, wherein he stated that under the undisputed evidence adduced on the hearing of appellants' petition,
"said petitioners [the appellants] were entitled to reclaim said
goods and were entitled to the proceeds of the sale thereof, if,
under the bankruptcy law as amended by the act of June 25,
1910, a ven<lor of goods who has been induced to sell such goods
by false and fraudulent representations, can, under any circumstances· appearing in evidence, reclaim such goods from the
trustee in bankruptcy of the vendee." Upon the hearing upon
so id petition for review and the said referee 's certificate, the
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District Court affirmed the action of the referee in dismissing

said petition. The cause is before us on appeal from that order.

The errors assigned, in substance, resolve themselves into the

one proposition, viz., the court erred in holding that the rights

of the appellants were inferior, under the facts of the case, to

those of the trustee.

KOHLS A AT, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

§ 47a (2) of the Bankruptcy Act as the same was amended by

the act of June 25, 1910, reads as follows, viz.:

District Court affirmed the action of the referee in dismissing
said petition. The cause is before us on appeal from that order.
The errors assigned, in substance, resolve themselves into the
one proposition, viz., the court erred in holding that the rights
of the appellants were inferior, under the facts of the case, to
those of the trustee.

"And such trustee, as to all property in the custody or com-

ing into the custody of the Bankruptcy Court, shall be deemed

KOHLSAAT, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as abcve).

vested with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor

holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings thereon; and

also, as to all property not in the custody of the bankruptcy

court, shall be deemed vested with all the rights, remedies, and

powers of a judgment creditor holding an execution duly re-

turned unsatisfied."

By the order of the court affirming the referee's action upon

the petition for review, the court in effect held that under the

statute as amended, and under the laws of Illinois as construed

by the courts of that state, the rights of a defrauded vendor

were inferior to those of "a creditor holding a lien by legal or
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equitable proceedings," and that the latter has the rights of

a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the fraud.

The question is one of Illinois law. In support of this proposi-

tion, the trustee cites a number of cases from Illinois, the doc-

trine of which is fully summed up in Van Duzor v. Allen, 90

Ill. 499. In that case it appears that one Gaston bought of Van

Duzor a threshing machine. Van Duzor claimed that Gaston

was to have given his notes with sureties. Gaston insisted his

notes were to be secured by chattel mortgage on the thresher.

Gaston was given possession without the delivery of security,

and proceeded to thresh for those desiring his services, for more

than two months, said question of the nature of the security to

be given still remaining unsettled, when judgments against him

were obtained in favor of persons who had rendered services to

him in threshing, upon which judgment executions were sworn

out and placed in the hands of a constable, who levied upon the

thresher. Van Duzor replevied the latter. On the trial of the

replevin suit, Van Duzor was defeated. On appeal the Supreme

Court affirmed the judgment. In its opinion the court said:

§ 47a (2) of the Bankruptcy Act as the same was amended by

the act of June 25, 1910, reads as follows, viz. :
''And such trustee, as to all property in the custody or coming into the custody of the Bankruptcy Court, shall be deemed
vested with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor
holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings thereon; and
also, as to all property not in the custody of the bankruptcy
court, shall be deemed vested with all the rights, remedies, and
powers of a judgment creditor holding an execution duly returned unsatisfied.''
By the order of the court affirming the re.feree 's action upon
the petition for review, the court in effect beld that under the
statute as amended, and under the laws of Illinois as construed
by the courts of that state, the rights of a defrauded vendor
were inferior to those of ''a creditor holding a lien hy legal or
equitable proceedings," and that the latter has the rights of
a bcma fide purchaser for value without notice of the fraud.
The question is one of Illinois law. In support of this proposition, the trustee cites a number of cases from Illinois, the doctrine of which is fully summed up in Van Duzor v. Allen, 90
Ill. 499. In that case it appears that one Gaston bought of Van
Duzor a threshing machine. Van Duzor claimed that Gaston
was to have given his notes with sureties. Gaston insisted his
notes were to be secured by chattel mortgage on the thresher.
Gaston was given possession without the delivery of security.
and proceeded to thresh for those desiring his services, for more
than two months, said question of the nature of the security to
be givt>n still remaining unsettled, wbeu judgments against him
were olitaincd in favor of persons who had rendered services to
him in threshing, upon which judgment executions were sworn
out and placed in the hands of a constable, who levied upon the
thresher. Van Duzor replevied the latter. On the trial of the
replcvin suit, Van Duzor was defeated. On appeal the Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment. In its-opinion the court said:
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"A bona fide creditor, who, under a judgment and execution,

acquires a lien on property thus situated, occupies the same posi-

tion in all respects as does a bona fide purchaser. Where the

apparent owner of property thus acquired has the indicia of

ownership and may sell and pass a good title to a purchaser,

without notice, a bona fide creditor may seize the property on

execution and sell it thereunder and pass the title, not only

against the apparent, but also the real owner."

This decision must be construed with reference to the facts of

the case. The question of the rights of a defrauded vendor were

not under consideration. Whatever lien, if any, Van Duzor

possessed as against Allen, was a secret lien and was not made

a condition of the passing of the title. Allen actually had title.

This case states the law of Illinois as it stands today. Further

cases cited by the trustee in support of this doctrine are Union

Stockyards & Transit Co. et al. v. Mallory, 157 Ill. 565-566, 41

N. B. 888, 48 Am. St. Rep. 341; Brundage v. Camp, 21 Ill. 330;

Fawcett v. Osborn, 32 Ill. 411, 83 Am. Dec. 278; Chicago Dock

Co. v. Foster, 48 Ill. 507; Doane v. Lockwood, 115 Ill. 490, 4

N. E. 500; Butters v. Haughwout, 42 Ill. 18, 89 Am. Dec. 401;

Farwell v. Hanchett, 120 Ill. 577, 11 N. E. 875.

None of these, however, apply to the facts of the case at bar.
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This clearly appears from the decisions of the Illinois courts.

The leading case is that of Schweizer v. Tracy, 76 Ill. 345, the

facts of which are very similar to those of the case at bar. There

the purchaser had obtained the goods through fraudulent repre-

sentations as to his financial circumstances. After possession

taken, the goods were levied upon under a writ of attachment

issued against the fraudulent vendee. The defrauded vendors

instituted a suit in replevin in which they were defeated and

the return of the property to the sheriff awarded. Having

failed to return the goods, suit was instituted upon the replevin

bond, in which suit Schweizer was impleaded with the defrauded

vendors. In the lower court judgment went for the plaintiff in

that suit. On appeal the judgment was reversed. In the course

of its opinion the court said:

'' Coming, then, to the conclusion which we do, that had Mack,

Stadler & Co. discovered the fraud practiced upon them whilst

the goods remained in the hands of the fraudulent vendee, and

replevied them, they could have successfully maintained their

action, the question is presented, whether the attaching cred-

itors here, or the sheriff, by virtue of his writ of attachment,

''A bona fide creditor, who, under a judgment and execution,
acquires a lien on property thus situated, occupies the same position in all respects as does a bona fide purchaser. Where the
apparent owner of property thus acquired has the indicia of
ownership and may sell and pass a good title to a purchaser,
without notice, a bona fide creditor may seize the property on
execution and sell it thereunder and pass the title, not only
against the apparent, but also the real owner.''
This decision must be construed with reference to the facts of
the case. The question of the rights of a defrauded vendor were
not under consideration. Whatever lien, if any, Van Duzor
possessed as against Allen, was a secret lien and was not made
a condition of the passing of the title. Allen actually had title.
This case states the law of Illinois as it stands today. Further
cases cited by the trustee in support of this doctrine are Union
Stockyards & Transit Co. et al. v. Mallory, 157 Ill. 565-566, 41
N. E. 888, 48 Am. St. Rep. 341; Brundage v. Camp, 21 Ill. 330;
Fawcett v. Osborn, 32 ill. 411, 83 Am. Dec. 278; Chicago Dock
Co. v. Foster, 48 Ill. 507; Doane v. Lockwood, 115 Ill. 490, 4
N. E. 500; Butters v. Haughwout, 42 Ill. 18, 89 Am. Dec. 401;
Farwell v. Hanchett, 120 Ill. 577, 11 N. E. 875.
None of these, however, apply to the facts of the case at bar.
This clearly appears from the decisions of the Illinois courts.
The leading case is that of Schweizer v. Tracy, 76 Ill. 345, the
facts of which are very similar to those of the case at bar. There
the purchaser had obtained the goods through fraudulent representations as to his financial circumstances. After possession
taken, the goods were levied upon under a writ of attachment
issued against the fraudulent vendee. The defrauded vendors
instituted a suit in replevin in which they were defeated and
the return of the property to the sheriff awarded. Having
failed to return the goods, suit was instituted upon the replevin
bond, in which suit Schweizer W88 impleaded with the defrauded
vendors. In the lower court judgment went for the plaintiff in
that suit. On appeal the judgment was reversed. In the course
of its opinion the court said :
''Coming, then, to the conclusion which we do, that had Mack,
Stadler & Co. discovered the fraud practiced upon them whilst
the goods remained in the hands of the fraudulent vendee, and
replevied them, they could have successfully maintained their
action, the question is presented, whether the attaching creditors here, or the sheriff, by virtue of his writ of attachment,
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acquired any other or greater title than the fraudulent vendee

possessed. Had the vendee, before the reclaiming of the goods

by Mack, Stadler & Co., sold them to an innocent purchaser for

value, no doubt, under the decisions of this court, the purchaser

would have acquired a valid title to the goods"—citing Jennings

v. Gage et al., 13 HL 610, 56 Am. Dec. 476; M. C. R. R. Co. v.

Phillips et al., 60 IU. 190; Young et al. v. Bradley et al., 68

Il1. 553.

The court thereupon proceeded to explain the language in

Burnell v. Robertson, 5 Gilman (Ill.) 282, and said:

"That case was a case where a debtor had title to the prop-

erty, and the controversy was between a prior purchaser from

the debtor, who had not obtained possession of the property,

and a subsequent attaching creditor; and in reference to such

a state of facts, the court says: 'In case of two sales of per-

sonal property, both equally valid, his is the better right who

first gets possession of the property, and the attaching creditor

stands in the light of a purchaser and is to be protected as such.'

That is, the attaching creditor stands in the light of a purchaser,

not necessarily as against the world, but as against another pur-

chaser, the creditor having, by virtue of his attachment, first

obtained possession of the property; thus acknowledging the
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common doctrine respecting the sale of personal property, that

a sale without the delivery of possession, is void as against sub-

sequent purchasers and creditors. This is the full import of

that decision. But in the case at bar, the only title of the debtor

is one acquired by fraud and false representations, and voidable

at the option of his vendors. The general expression used in

the case cited is to be understood with reference to the facts of

that case, and is not authority in support of the view, that an

attaching creditor, under the circumstances of such a case as

the present, as against the vendor, stands in the same position as

an innocent purchaser for value."

The court further in said opinion said there was no difference

as to priority of lien between an attachment lienor and an exe-

cution lien, citing Tousley v. Tousley, 5 Ohio St. 78; that the

attachment creditor took no better title than the fraudulent

vendee possessed, and proceeded to hold that the right of pos-

session was in the defrauded vendor and that there was no

liability upon the replevin bond. This case was decided prior

to Van Duzor v. Allen, supra, but has been approved in a num-

ber of subsequent cases. In Walsh v. First National Bank, 228

acquired any other or greater title than the fraudulent vendee
possessed. Had the vendee, before the reclaiming of the goods
by Mack, Stadler & Co., sold them to an innoeent purchaser for
value, no doubt, under the decisions of this court, the purchaser
would have acquired a valid title to the goods"-eiting Jennings
v. Gage et al., 13 ill. 610, 56 Am. Dec. 476; ll. C. R. R. Co. v.
Phillips et al., 60 Ill. 190; Young et al. v. Bradley et al., 68
Ill. 553.
The court thereupon proceeded to explain the language in
Burnell v. Robertson, 5 Gilman (Ill.) 282, and said :
''That case was a case ·where a debtor had title to the property, and the controversy was between a prior purchaser from
the debtor, who had not obtained possession of the property,
and a subsequent attaching credioor; and in reference to BUch
a state of fact.s, the court says: 'In case of two sales of personal property, both equally valid, his is the better right who
first get.s possession of the property, and the attaching creditor
stands in the light of a purchaser and is to be protected as such.'
That is, the attaching creditor stands in the light of a purchaser,
not necessarily as against the world, but as against another purchaser, the creditor having, by virtue of his attachment, first
obtained possession of the propert)·; thus acknowledging the
common doctrine respecting the sale of personal property, that
a sale without the delivery of possession, is void as against subsequent purchasers and creditors. This is the full import of
that decision. But in the case at bar, the only title of the debtor
is one acquired by fraud and false representations, and voidable
at the option of his vendors. The general expression used in
the case cited is to be understood with reference to the fact.s of
that case, and is not authority in support of the view, that an
attaching. creditor, under the circumstances of such a case as
the present, as against the vendor, stands in the same position as
an innocent purchaser fOI' value.''
The court further in said opinion said there was no difference
ns to priority of lien between an attachment lienor and an execution lien, citing Tousley v. Tousley, 5 Ohio St. 78; that the
attachment creditor took no better title than the fraudulent
vendee possessed, and proceeded to hold that the right of possession was in the defrauded vendor and that there was no
liability upon the replevin bond. This case was decided prior
to Van Duzor v. Allen, supra, but has been approved in a number of subsequent cases. In Walsh v. First National Bank, 228
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Ill. 446, 81 N. E. 1067, the court held that the transferee of a

bill of lading prevailed over an attaching creditor, and says:

"In such a case an attachment creditor only obtains the rights

which the debtor has in the property at the time of the levy of

the writ. One claiming to be a creditor of another and levying

a writ of attachment is not a bona fide purchaser for a valuable

consideration"—citing, among other authorities, Schweizer v.

Tracy, supra.

The latter case is cited approvingly in Hacker v. Munroe &

Son, 176 Ill. 394, 52 N. E. 12; King & Co. v. Brown, 24 Ill.

App. 579-582; Gould v. Howell, 32 Ill. App. 349-350; O'Neil v.

Patterson & Co., 52 Ill. App. 27-33; Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Levy,

75 Ill. App. 55-58; La Salle Pressed Brick Co. v. Coe, 65 IlI.

App. 619-622; Link v. Gibson, 93 Ill. App. 433-435; Magerstadt

v. Schaefer, 110 Ill. App. 171, and other cases. The same rule

of law is laid down in Doane v. Lock wood, supra; Staver &

Abbott Mfg. Co. v. Coe, 49 Ill. App. 426-431.

From the foregoing it appears that the rule laid down in

Schweizer v. Tracy, supra, is here controlling. The vendors

having at the earliest opportunity rescinded the sale, the title to

the furs in question never passed to the bankrupt, by reason of

her fraudulent representations to the vendors, therefore the
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trustee took no title thereto inasmuch as, under the laws of

Illinois, as construed by the courts of the state, the rights of

the defrauded vendor prevailed over the claims "of a creditor

holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings thereon."

•••

The judgment of the District Court is reversed, with direction

to vacate its decree herein and grant the prayer of the petition

to the amount of $425.

SHERMAN v. LUCKHARDT

67 Kans. 682, 74 Pac. 277

(Supreme Court of Kansas. Nov. 7, 1903)

POLLOCK, J. This case is before us upon rehearing. It

has been fully rebriefed and reargued. The facts will be found

stated in the former opinion of this court. 65 Kan. 610, 70 Pac.

702. The law there decLared reads: "A preferential payment

by a debtor to one of his creditors within four months prior to

the former's bankruptcy is not void under clause 'b,' § 60, and

H. & A. Bankruptcy—36

Ill. 446, 81 N. E. 1067, the court held that the transferee of a
bill of lading prevailed over an attaching creditor, and says:
"In such a case an attachment creditor only obtains the rights
which the debtor has in the property at the time of the levy of
the writ. One claiming to be a creditor of another and levying
a writ of attachment is not a bona fide purchaser for a valuable
col.18ideration "--citing, among other authorities, Schweizer v.
Tracy, supra.
The latter case is cited approvingly in Hacker v. :Munroe &
Son, 176 Ill. 394, 52 N. E. 12; King & Co. v. Brown, 24 Ill.
App. 579-582; Gould v. Howell, 32 Ill. App. 349-350; 0 'Neil v.
Patterson & Co., 52 Ill. App. 27-33; Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Levy,
75 Ill. App. 55-58 ; La Salle Pressed Brick Co. v. Coe, 65 Ill.
App. 619-622; Link v. Gibson, 93 Ill. App. 433-435; ~lagerstadt
v. Schaefer, 110 Ill. App. 171, and other cases. The same rule
of law is laid down in Doane v. Lockwood, supra; Staver &
Abbott Mfg. Co. v. Coe, 49 Ill. App. 426-431.
From the foregoing it appears that the rule laid down in
Schweizer v. Tracy, supra, is here controlling. The vendors
having at the earliest opportunity rescinded the sale, the title to
the furs in question never passed to the bankrupt, by reason of
her fraudulent representations to the vendors, therefore the
trustee took no title thereto inasmuch as, under the laws of
Illinois, as construed by the courts of the state, the rights of
the defrauded vendor prevailed over the claims ''of a creditor
holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings thereon."

• • •

The judgment of the District Court is reversed, with direction
to vacate its decree herein and grant the prayer of the petition
to the amount of $425.
SHERMANv.LUCKHARDT
67 Kans. 682, 74 Pac. 277
(Supreme Court of Kansas.

Nov. 7, 1903)

POLLOCK, J. This case is before us upon rehearing. It
has been fully rebriefed and reargued. The facts will be found
stated in the former opinion of this court. 65 Kan. 610, 70 Pac.
702. The law there declared reads: ''A preferential payment
by a debtor to one of his creditors within four months prior to
the former's bankruptcy is not void under clause 'b,' § 60, and
H. 6 A.. Bankruptcy-86
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clause V §67, Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 562,

564 [U. S."Comp. St. 1901, pp. 3445, 3449], though made with

a fraudulent intent on the debtor's part, if it be accepted by the

creditor without knowledge of such intent, and without knowl-

edge that a preference was intended." The question is, shall

that decision now be upheld or overruled t Prior to the pas-

sage of the national bankrupt act of July 1, 1898 (c. 541, 30

Stat. 544 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418]), in this and other

jurisdictions the estate of an insolvent debtor was often swept

away in an unequal division among his creditors, leaving un-

satisfied demands to harass and annoy the debtor. The intent

of the lawmaking power in the passage of this act was twofold:

First, the protection and discharge from liability of the bank-

rupt; second, the equal distribution of his nonexempt property

among his creditors in proportion to their provable demands.

Swarts v. Fourth National Bank, 117 Fed. 3, 54 C. C. A. 387;

In re Gutwillig, 92 Fed. 337, 34 C. C. A. 379. One of the

methods employed by the insolvent debtor to effect an unequal

distribution of his estate among his creditors before the passage

of this act was, without any fraudulent intent on his part, to

prefer one or more of his creditors over others. Another method

was to transfer a portion or all of his property to one or more
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of his creditors to the exclusion of all others, with the intent on

his part to hinder, delay, and defraud his other creditors. In

the case first mentioned the transfer was without fraud, and

therefore valid. In the second case, the transfer having been

made without any guilty knowledge on the part of, or participa-

tion in the fraudulent act of the debtor by, the creditor, the

transfer was upheld as valid. To remedy this, among other ex-

isting evils, the act was passed.

In the case at bar it is found by the court, from the evidence,

as follows: " (8) That the said William Luckhardt, in causing the

above-described real estate to be conveyed to this defendant, in-

tended thereby to prefer this defendant over his other creditors.

(9) That the said William Luckhardt, in causing the above-de-

scribed real estate to be deeded to this defendant, intended thereby

to hinder, delay, and defraud his other creditors. (10) That the

said defendant was not a purchaser of said real estate in good

faith and for a present fair consideration." "(12) That upon

the trial of this action the counsel for plaintiff admitted that

the said William Luckhardt, at the time he caused to be con-

veyed to the defendant the real estate hereinabove described,

clause 'e,' § 67, Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 562,
564 [U. S."Comp. St. 1901, pp. 3445, 3449], though made with
a fraudulent intent on the debtor's part, if it be accepted by the
creditor without knowledge of such intent, and without knowledge that a preference was intended.'' The question is, shall
that decision now be upheld or overruled! Prior to the passage of the national bankrupt act of July 1, 1898 ( c. 541, 30
Stat. 544 [ U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418] ) , in this and other
jurisdictions the estate of an insolvent debtor was often swept
away in an unequal division among his creditors, leaving unsatisfied demands to harass and annoy the debtor. The intent
of the lawmaking power in the passage of this act was twofold :
First, the protection and discharge from liability of the bankrupt; second, the equal distribution of his nonexempt property
among his creditors in proportion to their provable dem&nds.
Swarts v. Fourth National Bank, 117 Fed. 3, 54 C. C. A. 387;
In re Gutwillig, 92 Fed. 337, 34 C. C. A. 379. One of the
methods employed by the insolvent debtor to effect an unequal
distribution of bis estate among his creditors before the passage
of this act was, without any fraudulent intent on his part, to
prefer one or more of his creditors over others. Another method
was to transfer a portion or all of his property to one or more
of his creditors to the exclusion of all others, with the intent on
his part to hinder, delay, and defraud his other creditors. In
the case first mentioned the transfer was without fraud, and
therefore valid. Jn the second case, the transfer having been
made without any guilty knowledge on the part of, or participation in the fraudulent act of the debtor by, the creditor, the
transfer was upheld as valid. To remedy this, among other existing evils, the act was passed.
Ju the case at bar it is found by the court, from the evidence,
as follows: '' ( 8) That the said William Luckhardt, in causing the
above-described real estate to be conveyed to this defendant, intended thereby to prefer this defendant over his other creditors.
(9) 'l'hat the said William Luckhardt, in causing the above-described real estate to be deeded to this defendant, intended thereby
to hinder, delay, and defraud his other creditors. (10) That the
said defendant was not a purchaser of said real estate in good
faith and for a present fair consideration." "(12) That upon
thP trial of this action the counsel for plaintiff admitted that
the said William Luckhardt, at the time he caused to be conVl'yed to the defendant the real estate hereinabove described,
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was indebted to the said defendant in the sum of $1,500, aud

that it was further admitted that the said defendant, M. M.

Luckhardt, at the time she received and accepted the convey-

ance of said premises to herself, had no knowledge of the in-

solvency of her husband, William Luckhardt, nor of his inten-

tion or purpose to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors in the

collection of their debts by means of said conveyance to her of

said real estate; that the defendant had no knowledge of the

plaintiff's intention to make her a preferred creditor; and that

the reasonable value of the real estate conveyed to her was

$1,500."

The contention of the parties to this controversy is this: On

the one hand, the trustee claims the conveyance, under finding

10 of the court, is condemned by, and may be avoided under

the provisions of, clause "e" of § 67 of the act, which provides

"that all conveyances, transfers, assignments or encumbrances

of his property, or any part thereof, made or given by a person

adjudged a bankrupt under the provisions of this act, subse-

quent to the passage of this act and within four months prior to

the filing of this petition, with the intent and purpose on his

part to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors, or any of them,

shall be null and void as against the creditors of such debtor,
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except as to purchasers in good faith and for a present fair

consideration; and all property of the debtor conveyed, trans-

ferred, assigned or encumbered as aforesaid shall, if he be

adjudged a bankrupt, and the same is not exempt from execu-

tion and liability for debts by the law of his domicile, be and

remain a part of the assets and estate of the bankrupt and shall

pass to his said trustee, whose duty it shall be to recover and

reclaim the same by legal proceedings or otherwise for the bene-

fit of the creditors."

The defendant contends, under findings 9 and 12, above

quoted, the conveyance was a preference, and having been re-

ceived by the creditor without knowledge on her part of the

insolvency of the debtor, or his intent to hinder, delay, and de-

fraud his other creditors, or to prefer her over other creditors,

it must be upheld. Clause "b" of § 60 of the act reads: "If

a bankrupt shall have given a preference within four months

before the filing of a petition, or after the filing of the petition

and before the adjudication, and the person receiving it, or to

be benefited thereby, or his agent acting therein, shall have had

reasonable cause to believe that it was intended thereby to give

was indebted to the said defendant in the sum of $1,500, and
that it was further admitted that the said defendant, M. l\L
J-'uckhardt, at the time she received and accepted the conveyance of said premises to herself, had no knowledge of the iusolvency of her husband, William Luckhardt, 11or of his intention or purpose to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditorR i 11 the
collection of their debts by means of said conveyance to her of
said real estate; that the defendant had no knowledge of the
plaintiff's intention to make her a preferred creditor; and that
the reasonable value of the real estate conveyed to her was
$1,500."
The contention of the parties to this controversy is this: On
the one hand, the trustee cl.aims the conveyance, under finding
10 of the court, is condemned by, and may be avoided under
the provisions of, clause "e" of § 67 of the act, which provides
"tha.t all conveyances, transfers, assignments or encumbrances
of his property, or any part thereof, made or given by a persou
adjudged a bankrupt under the provisions of this act, subsequent to the passage of this act and within four months prior to
the filing of this petition, with the intent and purpose on his
part to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors, or any of them,
shall be null and void as against the creditors of such debtor,
except as to purchasers in good faith and for a present fair
consideration ; and all property of the debtor conveyed, transferred, assigned or encumbered as aforesaid shall, if he be
adjudged a bankrupt, and the same is not exempt from execution and liability for debts by the law of his domicile, be and
remain a part of the assets and estate of the bankrupt and shall
pass to his said trustee, whose duty it shall he to recover and
reclaim the same by legal proceedings or otherwise for the benefit of the creditors. ''
The defendant contends, under findings 9 and 12, above
quoted, the conveyance was a preference, and having been received by the creditor without knowledge on her part of the
insolvency of the debtor, or his intent to hinder, delay, and defraud his other creditors, or to prefer her over other creditors,
it must be upheld. Clause "b" of § 60 of the act reads: "If
a bankrupt shall have given a preference within four months
before the filing of a petition, or after the filing of the petition
and before the adjudication, and the person receiving it, or to
be benefited thereby, or his agent acting therein, shall have had
reasonable cause to believe that it was intended thereby to give
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a preference, it shall be voidable by the trustee, and he may

recover the property or its value from such person." Clause

"g" of § 57 reads: "The claims of creditors who have received

preferences shall not be allowed unless such creditors shall sur-

render their preferences." 30 Stat. 560 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901,

p. 3443]. Under these provisions of the act, upon the findings

made by the court, and viewed alone in the light of a preference

only, we are of the opinion the contention of defendant would

prevail, but the condemnation of the act does not end here. The

clauses quoted from § 57 and § 60 treat only the subject of

preferences. No mention is there made of fraud. The law-

making power dealt with the subject of fraud in clause "e"

of § 67 of the act, and, in language so plain, concise, exact, and

unequivocal as to leave no room for • doubt or construction,

there inhibited all transfers of the property of an insolvent

debtor made within four months prior to the institution of

bankruptcy proceedings under the act wherein the debtor, with

the intent on his part of hindering, delaying, or defrauding his

creditors, parted with his property regardless of the knowledge

of or participation in such fraud by the creditor. This is a

case of first instance in this state in construing the above pro-

visions of the act. In other jurisdictions a like view of the act
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has been reached. Friedman v. Verchofsky, 105 Ill. App. 414;

Unmack v. Douglass (75 Conn. 633), 55 Atl. 12. There are cases

holding a contrary view. Congleton v. Schreihofer et al. (N. J.

Ch.) 54 Atl. 144; Gamble v. Elkin et al. (205 Pa. St. 226), 54 Atl.

782. However, the reasoning employed in these cases, contrary to

the view expressed in this opinion, does not commend itself to our

judgment or meet our approval. Such a construction of the act

would nullify one of its most important and beneficial pro-

visions, and, in so far as the act deals with fraudulent trans-

fers of the property of an insolvent debtor, the law would remain

the same as before the passage of the act; and this notwithstand-

ing the act prohibits all conveyances, transfers, assignments, or

incumbrances of the property of the insolvent debtor within

four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy

with the intent and purpose on his part to hinder, delay, or

defraud his creditors, or any of them, '"except as to purchasers

in good faith and for a present fair consideration," in which

case the estate of the bankrupt to be distributed is not dimin-

ished, and also notwithstanding the fact that the act itself avoids

all transfers which might be avoided under existing state laws.

a preference, it shall be voidable by the trustee, and he may
recover the property or its value from such person.'' Clause
"g" of § 57 reads: "The claims of creditors who have received
preferences shall not be allowed unless such creditors shall surrender their preferences." 30 Stat. 560 [ U. S. Comp. St. 1901,
p. 3443]. Under these provisions of the act, upon the iindings
made by the court, and viewed alone in the light of a preference
only, we are of the opinion the contention of defendant would
prevail, but the condemnation of the act does not end here. The
clauses quoted from § 57 and § 60 treat only the subject of
preferences. No mention is there made of fraud. The lawmaking power dealt with the subject of fraud in clause "e"
of § 67 of the act, and, in language 80 plain, concise, exact, and
une4uivocal as to leave no r0001 for. doubt or construction,
there inhibited all transfers of the property of an insolvent
debtor made within four months prior to the institution of
bankruptcy proceedings under the act wherein the debtor, with
the intent on his part of hindering, delaying, or defrauding his
creditors, parted with his property regardless of the knowledge
of or participation in such fraud by the creditor. This is a
case of first instance in this state in construing the above provisions of the act. In other jurisdictions a like view of the act
has been reached. Friedman v. Vercbofsky, 105 Ill. App. 414;
Unmack v. Douglass (75 Conn. 633), 55 Atl. 12. There are cases
holding a contrary view. Congleton v. Scbreihofer et al. (N. J.
Ch.) 54 Atl. 144; Gamble v. Elkin et al. (205 Pa. St. 226), 54 Atl.
782. Ilowev('r, the reasoning employed in these cases, contrary to
the view expressed in this opinion, does not commend itself to our
judgment or meet our approval. Such a construction of the act
would nullify one of its most important and beneficial provisions, and, in 80 far as the act deals with fraudulent transfers of the property of an insolvent debtor, the law would remain
the same as before the passage of the act; and this notwithstanding the act prohibit.a all conveyances, transfers, assignments, or
incumbrances of the property of the insolvent dehtor within
four months prior to the filing of the petition in hankruptcy
with the intent and purpose on his part to hinder, delay, or
defraud his ereditors, or any of them, '·except as to purchRfit>rs
in good faith and for a present fair consideration," in which
case tlie estate of the hankrupt to be distributed is not diminished, and also notwithstanding the fact that tht> act itself avoid~
all transfns which might be avoided under existing state laws.
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It follows, upon the findings made by the trial court, the

trustee is entitled to judgment in his favor setting aside the

conveyance made. Therefore the former opinion of this court

(65 Kan. 610, 70 Pac. 702) must be overruled, the judgment

below reversed, and cause remanded, with direction to enter

judgment in favor of the trustee.

CUNNINGHAM, BURCH, and MASON, J J., concur.19

JOHNSTON, C. J., and SMITH and GREENE, JJ., dissent

from the reasoning and conclusions of this opinion for the rea-

It follows, upon the findings made by the trial court, the
trustee is entitled to judgment in his favor setting aside the
conveyance made. Therefore the former opinion of this court
(65 Kan. 610, 70 Pac. 702) must be overruled, the judgment
below reversed, and cause remanded, with dircctiou to enter
judgment in favor of the trustee.

sons stated in the majority opinion on the original hearing.

BEASLEY v. COGGINS et ux.

48 Fla. 215, 37 So. 213

CUNNINGHAM, BURCH, and l\IASON, JJ., concur. 19

(Supreme Court of Florida, Division A. July 13, 1904)

The appellant, D. P. Beasley, filed his bill in the Circuit Court

of Madison county as trustee in bankruptcy of P. S. Coggins,

alleging that the said Coggins was adjudged a bankrupt by the

United States District Court on July 8, 1902; that he (Beasley)

was duly selected and appointed as trustee in bankruptcy of

JOHNSTON, C. J., and Sl\IITH and GREENE, JJ., di~ent
from the reasoning and conclusions of this opinion for the reasons stated in the majority opinion on the original hearing.

and for all the estate of said Coggins, and was then such trus-

tee, as shown by exhibits attached.

BEASLEY v. COGGINS et ux.

The bill alleges substantially that P. S. Coggins, prior to being

adjudged a bankrupt, was engaged in the mercantile business

48 Fla. 215, 37 So. 213

at the city of Madison, in Madison county, and had been so
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engaged for several years prior thereto, and had then contracted

(Supreme Court of Florida, Division A. July 13, 1904)

a large amount of indebtedness with various creditors, of about

$12,000.

The bill sets forth an indebtedness to several persons, includ-

ing the Bank of Madison, on several notes, all due on March 8,

1901, and other debts contracted subsequent to March 8, 1901,

and all unpaid and due when the bill was filed; that Coggins,

being so indebted on March 8, 1901, in a large sum of money,

intended a continuance for an indefinite period of his said mer-

cantile business, contemplated the creation of further indebted-

19—See Jacobs v. Van Sickle, 127 App. 320; Schilling v. Curran, 30

Fed. 62; Wright v. Sampter, 152 Mont. 370; Lehrenkrauss v. Bonnell,

Fed. 196; Underleak v. Scott, 117 122 N. Y. Supp. 866; Clowe v. Sea-

Minn. 136; Coder v. Arts, 213 U. S. vey, 208 N. Y. 496.

223; Sherman v. Luckhardt, 96 Mo.

The appellant, D. P. Beasley, filed his bill in the Circuit Court
of Madison county as trustee in bankruptcy of P. S. Coggins,
alleging that the said Coggins was adjudged a bankrupt by the
United States District Court on July 8, 1902; that he (Beasley)
was duly selected and .appointed as trustee in bankruptcy of
and for all the estate of said Coggins, and was then such trustee, as shown by exhibits attached.
'
The bill alleges substantially that P. S. Coggins, prior to being
adjudged a bankrupt, was engaged in the mercantile business
at the city of Madison, in Madison county, and had been so
engaged for several years prior thereto, and had then contracted
a large amount of indebtedness with various creditors, of about
$12,000.
The bill sets forth an indebtedness to several persons, including the Bank of Madison, on several notes, all due on .March 8,
1901, and other debts contracted suhsequent to March 8, 1901,
and all unpaid and due when the bill was filed; that Coggins,
~eing so indebted on March 8, 1901, in a large sum of money,
inknd<'d a continuance for an indefinite period of his said merC"antile business, contemplated the creation of further indebted19-See Jacobs v. Van Sickle, 127
Fed. €'.!; Wright v. Sampter, 15'.!
Fed. 196; Underleak v. Scott, 117
Minn. 136; Coder v. Arts, 213 U. S.
223; Sherman v. Luckhardt, 96 Mo.

A pp. 320; Schilling v. Curran, 30

'.\font. 370; Lehrenkrauss v. Bonnell,
1:22 ?\. Y. Supp. 866; Clowe v. Sea·

vey, 208 N. Y. 496.
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ness, and was then, on said March 8, 1901, insolvent; that on said

March 8, 1901, said Coggins and his wife, Lilla F., executed a

deed of certain landed property to W, F. Parramore upon an

alleged and fictitious consideration of $50, and that Parramore

on the same day conveyed said property to Lilla F. Coggins

for an alleged and fictitious consideration of $50; that said deeds

were properly recorded on March 9, 1901; that the lots so con-

veyed, upon information and belief, are worth $3,500; that said

lots of land were on March 8, 1901, the property of P. S. Cog-

gins; that it was the purpose of Coggins, by the recited deeds,

to make a gift of said lots of land to his wife, Lilla F. Coggins,

without any valuable consideration; that said deeds were made,

contrived, and executed of covin and collusion by the parties, to

the end, purpose, and intent that the creditors of Coggins, both

prior and subsequent, should be delayed, defrauded, and defeated

in the collection of their lawful and just debts and demands

against Coggins; and that said deeds are fraudulent and utterly

void, as against the claims and demands of the creditors of

Coggins.

The bill, among other things, prays a decree declaring said

deeds to be fraudulent and void against the claims and demands

of creditors; that the real estate thereby attempted to be con-

veyed be sold, and the proceeds paid to the trustee in bank-
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ruptcy, to be disposed of in the regular administration of the

estate of the bankrupt. Copies of the deeds are made exhibits

to the bill, and also a copy of the order appointing the com-

plainant as trustee in bankruptcy.

The defendants demurred to this bill on the following grounds,

in substance, viz.: (1) That the bill does not make out a case

entitling complainant to discovery or relief.

(2) That it does not show any judgment or lien upon the

property.

(3 and 4) That it does not show that complainant has ex-

hausted his legal remedies, and that he has a full and adequate

remedy at law.

(5) That the clauses alleging the several deeds were made

to hinder and delay creditors, etc., are demurred to because:

First. The same are impertinent.

Second. That all persons who became creditors after March

8, 1901, had notice of them, and that the trustee cannot claim

said deeds void as to such creditors.

ness, and was then, on said )larch 8, 1901, insolvent; that on said
March 8, 1901, said Coggins and his wife, Lilla 14..., executed a
deed of certain landed property to
F. Parramore upon an
alleged and fictitious consideration of $50, and that Parramore
on the same day conveyed said property to Lilla F. Coggins
for au alleged and fictitious consideration of $50; that said deeds
were properly recorded on l\larch 9, 1901; that the lots so conveyed, upon information and beli<'f, are worth $3,500; that said
lots of land were on l\larch 8, 1901, the property of P. S. Coggins; that it was the purpose of Coggins, by the recited deeds,
to make a gift of said lots of land to his wife, Lilla F. Coggins,
without any valuable consideration; that said deeds were made,
contrived, and executed of covin and collusion by the parties, to
the end, purpose, and intent that the creditors of Coggins, both
prior and subsequent, should be delayed, defrauded, and defeated
in the collection of their lawful and just debts and demands
against Coggins; and that said deeds are fraudulent and utterly
void, as against the claims and demands of the creditors of
Coggins.
The bill, among other things, prays a decree declaring said
deeds to be fraudulent a.ml void against the claims and demands
of creditors; that the real estate thereby attempted to be conveyed be sold, and the proceeds paid to the trustee in bankruptcy, to be disposed of in the regular admiuii;tration of the
estate of the bankrupt. Copies of the deeds are made exhibits
to the bill, and also a copy of the order appointing the complainant as trustee in bankruptcy.
The defendants demurred to this bill on the following grounds,
in substance, viz.: ( 1) That the bill does not make out a case
entitling complainant to discovery or relief.
(2) That it does not show any judgment or lien upon the
property.
(3 and 4) That it does not show that complainant has exhausted his legal remedies1 and that he has a full and adequate
remedy at law.
( 5) That the clauses alleging the several deeds were made
to hinder and delay creditors, etc., are demurred to because :
First. The same are impertinent.
Second. That all persons who became creditors after l\larch
8, 1901, had notice of them, and that the trustee cannot claim
said deeds void as to such creditors.
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Third. That said deeds can only be avoided, if at all, by
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creditors whose claims existed at the date of said conveyances.

Upon a hearing this demurrer was sustained, and from this

order an appeal was taken.

The assignments of error are, first, that the court erred in

making the order sustaining the demurrer to the bill; and, sec-

ond, that the court erred in holding that complainant must allege

and prove a judgment at law before the bill of complaint could

be maintained.

HOCKER, J. (after stating the facts). It does not appear

upon what ground the court below sustained the demurrer to

the bill, but presumably all the grounds were sustained.

The general rule is that, before a creditor can maintain a bill

in equity to set aside a conveyance by his debtor of his real

Third. That said deeds can only be avoided, if at all, by
creditors whose claims existed at the date of said conveyances.
Upon a hearing this demurrer was sustained, and from this
order an appeal was taken.
The assignments of error are, first, that the court erred in
making the order sustaining the demurrer to the bill ; and, second, that the court erred in holding that complainant must allege
and prove a judgment at law before the bill of complaint could
be maintained.

estate on the ground of fraud, the creditor must reduce his claim

to judgment, or its equivalent, a decree for a balance remaining

after a foreclosure sale of mortgaged property, creating a lien

on such real estate; and, when personal property or equitable

assets are pursued, he must have an execution issued and re-

turned nulla bona. Robinson v. Springfield Company, 21 Fla.

203. But does this rule apply to such a suit by a trustee in bank-

ruptcy?

§ 70 of the act of Congress to establish a uniform system of
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bankruptcy, passed July 1, 1898 (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30

Stat. 565 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3451]), provides: "The

trustee of the estate of a bankrupt, upon his appointment and

qualification, and his successors, if he shall have one or more,

upon his or their appointment and qualification, shall in turn be

vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, as of

the date he was adjudged a bankrupt, except in so far as it is

to property which is exempt, to all * • • (4) property

transferred by him in fraud of his creditors." In addition to the

foregoing, paragraph "e." § 70 (30 Stat. 566 [U. S. Comp. St.

1901, p. 3452J), provides: "The trustee may avoid any transfer

by the bankrupt of his property which any creditor of such bank-

rupt might have avoided, and may recover the property so trans-

ferred or its value from the person to whom it was transferred,

unless he was a bona fide holder for value prior to the date of the

adjudication," etc. § 67e (30 Stat. 564 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901,

p^ 3449]) treats of conveyances, transfers, etc., made by a bank-

HOCKER, J. (after stating the facts). It does not appear
upon what ground the court below sustained the demurrer to
the bill, but presumably all the grounds were sustained.
The general rule is that, before a creditor can 'maintain a bill
in equity to set aside a conveyance by his debtor of his real
estate on the ground of fraud, the creditor must reduce his claim
to judgment, or its equivalent, a decree for a balance remaining
after a foreclosure sale of mortgaged property, creating a lien
on such real estate; and, when personal property or equitable
assets are pursued, he must have an execution issued and returned nulla bona. Robinson v. Springfield Company, 21 Fla.
203. But does this rule apply to such a suit by a trustee in bankruptcy T
§ 70 of the act of Congress to establish a uniform system of
bankruptcy, passed July 1, 1898 (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30
Stat. 565 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3451]), provides: "The
trustee of the estate of a bankrupt, upon his appointment and
qualification, and his successors, if he shall have one or more,
upon his or their appointment and qualification, shall in turn be
vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, as of
the date he was adjudged a bankrupt, except in so far as it is
to property which is exempt, to all • • • ( 4) property
transferred by him in fraud of his creditors." In addition to the
foregoing, paragraph "e," ~ 70 (30 Stat. 566 [U. S. Comp. St.
1901, p. 3452 J ) , provides: "The trustee may avoid any traOBfer
by the bankrupt of his property which any creditor of such bankrupt might have avoided, and may recover the property so transferred or its value from the person to whom it was transferred,
unless he was a bona ft.de holder for value prior to the date of the
adjudication," etc. § 61e (30 Stat. 564 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901,
p ... 3449] ) treats of conveyances, transfers, etc., made by a bank-
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rupt within four mouths prior to tiling the petition, with iniei.t

to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.

Some of the Federal Courts have found difficulty in reeonciliri x

these sections of the bankrupt act, but it seems to us that the

views expressed in In re Mullen (D. C.) 101 Fed. 413, text, 416.

are substantially correct. It is there said that § 70c, 30 Stat. 5(5G

[U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3452], was intended to provide simply

that the trustee in bankruptcy should have the same right to

avoid conveyances as was possessed by creditors, or any of them,

and this with especial reference to the statute of 13 Elizabeth.

Under the bankruptcy act, when one is thereunder adjudged a

bankrupt, creditors are not permitted to attack fraudulent con-

veyances of their debtor, made more than four months of the ad-

judication of bankruptcy; and, if the trustee could not do so,

then the act would constitute "a device to permit fraudulent

conveyances to take effect with impunity in case they are success-

fully concealed for the specified four months." Lewis v. Bishop.

47 App. Div. 554, text, 558, 62 N. Y. Supp. 618. It is only by

holding that the trustee is subrogated to the rights of creditors

against a fraudulent conveyance that full effect and operation

can be given to the statute of 13 Elizabeth against fraudulent

conveyances, from which our statute (§ 1991, Rev. St. 1892) is
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substantially taken. In Wall v. Cox, 101 Fed. 403, 41 C. C. A.

408, the second headnote is as follows: "A trustee in bankruptcy

seeking to set aside and annul a bill of sale and transfer of prop-

erty previously made by the bankrupt, and alleged to have been

fraudulent under, the bankruptcy law, and as against creditors,

may appropriately proceed by bill in equity, and will not be

required to seek his remedy at law." It is true that the trans-

fer there sought to be set aside was made three days before the

petition of involuntary bankruptcy was filed, and involved a

transfer rendered void, if made to hinder and delay creditors un-

der § 67e of the bankruptcy act. 30 Stat. 564 [U. S. Comp. St.

1901, p. 3449]. But no reason is apparent why the same rule

should not apply to fraudulent transfers covered by the cited

provisions of § 70, 30 Stat. 566 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3452].

The case of Piatt, Assignee, v. Matthews (D. C.) 10 Fed. 280,

arose under the bankrupt law previous to that of 1898. A bill

was filed by the assignee to reach property alleged to have been

fraudulently transferred by the bankrupt. It was contended on

demurrer that, as no creditor had a judgment and execution

against the bankrupt, such a bill would not lie. The court held

rupt withiu four mouths prior to tiling the petition, with iu;.-,,t
to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.
Some of the Federal Courts have found difficulty in rel'oneili!!:
these sections of the bankrupt act, but it seems to us that 11:.views expressed in In re Mullen (D. C.) 101 Fed 413, text, 4iU,
are substantially correct. It is there said that § 70e, 30 Stat. 5li~
[U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3452], was intended to provide simply
that the trustee in bankruptcy should have the same right to
avoid conveyances as was possessed by creditors, or any of them,
and this with especial reference to the statute of 13 Eli1.aheth.
Under the bankruptcy act, when one is thereunder adjudged a
bankrupt, creditors are not permitted to attack fraudulent conveyances of their debtor, made more than four months of the adjudication of bankruptcy; and, if the trustee could not do so,
then the act would constitute ''a device to permit fraudulent
conveyances to take effect with impunity in case they are successfully concealed for the specified four months." Lewis v. Bishop,
47 App. Div. 554, text, 558, 62 N. Y. Supp. 618. It is only by
holding that the trustee is subrogated to the rights of crt•ditors
against a fraudulent conveyance that full effect and operation
can be given to the statute of 13 Elizabeth against fraudulent
conveyances, from which our statute (§ 1991, Rev. St. 18~l2) is
substantially taken. In Wall v. Cox, 101 Fed. 403, 41 C. C. A.
408, the second headnote is as follows: ''A trustee in bankruptcy
seeking to set aside and annul a bill of sale and transfer of property previously made by the bankrupt, and alleged to have been
fraudulent under the bankruptcy law, and as against creditors,
may appropriately proceed by bill in equity, and will not be
required to seek his remedy at law." It is true that the transfer there sought to be set aside was made three days before the
petition of involuntary bankruptcy was filed, and involved a
transfer rendered void, if made to hinder and delay creditors under § 61e of the bankruptcy act. 30 Stat. 564 [U. S. Comp. St.
1901, p. 3449]. But no reason is apparent why the same rule
should not apply to fraudulent transfers covered by the cited
provisions of § 70, 30 Stat. 566 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3452].
The case of Platt, Assignee, v. Matthews (D. C.) 10 Fed. 280,
arose under the bankrupt law previous to that of 1898. A bill
was filed by the assignee to reach property alleged to have been
fraudulently transferred by the bankrupt. It was contended on
demurrer that, as no creditor had a judgment and execution
against the bankrupt, such a bill would not lie. The court held
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that, inasmuch as the bankruptcy act vested the assignee with the

title of all property conveyed by the bankrupt in fraud of cred-

itors, the assignee acquired his rights through the act, and not

through what had been done by the creditors. The court over-

ruled the demurrer.

In Bump on Fraudulent Conveyances, § 553, it is stated that,

in order for an assignee in bankruptcy to maintain a bill to set

aside a fraudulent conveyance, it is not necessary that he shall

have a lien on the property, and obtain a return of nulla bona.

In Cady v. Whaling, 7 Biss. 430, Fed. Cas. No. 2,285, an assignee

in bankruptcy filed a bill to set aside a fraudulent conveyance

made before the bankrupt act was passed. It was contended that

such a bill could not be maintained on behalf of general creditors

who had no specific lien. The contention was overruled. The

question is very thoroughly discussed in Mueller, Trustee, v.

Brass, 112 Wis. 406, 88 N. W. 229, where it is held that the bill

might be maintained, though no judgment at law had been recov-

ered. The deeds sought to be set aside in the case at bar were

made about 14 months before P. S. Coggins was adjudged a bank-

rupt. At the time they were made he is alleged to have been

insolvent, and the bill shows that some of the debts he owed

at the time of the deed were unpaid and owing when he was
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adjudicated a bankrupt. The bill further alleges that the deeds

of March 8, 1901, from P. S. Coggins to Parramore, and from

Parramore to Mrs. Coggins, were made without valuable consid-

eration and were voluntary.

In the case of McKeown v. Allen, 37 Fla. 490, 20 South. 556,

this court held that "a voluntary conveyance by one who is

indebted is presumptively fraudulent, when attacked by a judg-

ment creditor upon a debt existing at the time of its execution."

As, in our opinion, a trustee in bankruptcy occupies a relation

similar to that of a judgment creditor, we think that the first

four grounds of the demurrer should have been overruled.

The remaining grounds of the demurrer are directed to the

allegations upon which is founded the prayer of the bill requir-

ing the defendants to answer whether P. S. Coggins on the 8th

day of March, 1901, contemplated the creation of other and fur-

ther indebtedness during the conduct of his mercantile business,

and whether the conveyances from Coggins to Parramore, and

from Parramore to Lilla F. Coggins, were executed and contrived

by the defendants and Parramore of covin and collusion, to the

end, purpose, and intent that such persons as should afterwards

that, inasmuch as the bankruptcy act vested the assignee with the
title of all property conveyed by the bankrupt iu fraud of creditors, the assignee acquired his rights through the act, and not
through what had been done by the creditors. The court overruled the demurrer.
In Bump on Fraudulent Conveyances, § 553, it is stated that,
in order for an assignee in bankruptcy to maintain a bill to set
aside a fraudulent conveyance, it is not necessary that he shall
have a lien on the property, and obtain a return of nulla bona.
In Cady v. ·whaling, 7 Biss. 430, Fed. Cas. No. 2,285, an assignee
in bankruptcy filed a bill to set aside a fraudulent conveyance
made before the bankrupt act was passed. It was contended that
such a bill could not be maintained on behalf of general creditors
who had no specific lien. The contention was overruled. The
question is very thoroughly discussed in Mueller, 'frustee, v.
Bruss, 112 'Vis. 496, 88 N. W. 229, where it is held that the bill
might be maintained, though no judgment at law had been recovered. The deeds sought to be set aside in the case at bar were
made about 14 months before P. S. Coggins was adjudged a bankrupt. At the time they were made he is alleged to have been
insolvent, and the bill shows that some of the debts he owed
at the time of the deed were unpaid and owing when he was
adjudicated a bankrupt. The bill further alleges that the deeds
of March 8, 1901, from P. S. Coggins to Parramore, and from
Parramore to .Mrs. Coggins, were made without valuable consideration and were voluntary.
In the case of McKeown v. Allen, 37 Fla. 490, 20 South. 556,
this court held that "a voluntary conveyance by one who is
indebted is presumptively fraudulent, when attacked by a judgment creditor upon a debt existing at the time of its execution.''
As, in our opinion, a trustee in bankruptcy occupies a relation
similar to that of a judgment creditor, we think that the first
four grounds of the demurrer should have been overruled.
The remaining grounds of the demurrer are directed to the
allegations upon which is founded the prayer of the bill requiring the defendants to answer whether P. S. Coggins on the 8th
day of March, 1901, contemplated the creation of other and further indebtedness during the conduct of his mercantile business,
and whether the conveyances from Coggins to Parramore, and
from Parramore to Lilla F. Coggins, were executed and contrived
by the defendants and Parramore of covin and collusion, to the
end, purpose, and intent that such persons as should afterwards
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become the creditors of P. S. Coggins, in pursuance of his said

intentions to create further indebtedness, should be delayed, hin-

dered, and defrauded of their just and lawful debts and demands.

It is contended, first, that these allegations are impertinent. We

are not aware of any recognized practice in equity authorizing

a defendant to raise the question of impertinence in a bill by

demurrer. The recognized practice, as we understand it, is to

bring the matter of impertinence to the notice of the court by

motion for a reference or by exceptions. 19 Ency. PI. & Pr. 200,

207, 208, 214; Story's Eq. PI. (10th ed.) § 266 et seq.; Eastham

v. Liddell, 12 Vesey, Jr., 201. But assuming the court might, on

its own motion, refer a bill for impertinence, if the matter was

called to its attention, we, in view of our conclusions, do not

regard these allegations of the bill, or the prayer of the bill in

relation thereto, as impertinent.

Under the two last grounds of demurrer it is contended that

creditors who became such after the deeds from P. S. Coggins

to Parramore, and from Parramore to Lilla F. Coggins, the wife

of P. S. Coggins, were recorded, to wit, after the 9th day of

March, 1901, had constructive notice of said deeds, and therefore

such creditors could not attack said deeds as being voluntary,

and that the trustee in bankruptcy occupies no more advan-

tageous ground than such subsequent creditors.
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In the case of Alston v. Bowles, 13 Fla. 118, the rights and

status of subsequent creditors were referred to on p. 136. Justice

Westcott there says: '' The doctrine of the Supreme Court of the

United States, as announced in the leading case of Sexton v.

Wheaton, 8 Wheat. 229, 5 L. ed. 603, and as understood by Judge

Story, is that a voluntary conveyance made by a person not in-

debted at the time, in favor of his wife, cannot be impeached by

subsequent creditors upon the mere ground of its being volun-

tary. It must be shown to be fraudulent in fact, or to be made

with a view to future debts." The opinion in this case (Sexton

v. Wheaton) was written by Chief Justice Marshall, and

learnedly discusses the proper construction and effect to be given

the statute of 13 Eliz., dealing with fraudulent conveyances as

regards creditors, and the statute of 27 Eliz., dealing with fraud-

ulent conveyances as regards purchasers. These two statutes are

substantially embraced in §§ 1991, 1992, Bev. St. 1892. This case

and the kindred one of Salmon v. Bennett, 1 Conn. 525, 7 Am.

Dec. 237, are selected in 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 17, as the basis for very

elaborate discussion and annotation. On p. * 40 it is said:

become the creditors of P. S. Coggins, in pursuance of his said
intentions to create further indebtedness, should be delayed, hindered, and defrauded of their just and lawful debts and demands.
It is contended, first, that these allegations are impertinent. We
are not aware of any recognized practice in equity authorizing
a defendant to raise the question of impertinence in a bill by
demurrer. The recognized practice, as we understand it, is to
bring th~ matter of impertinence to the notice of the court by
motion for a reference or by exceptions. 19 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 200,
207, 208, 214; Story's Eq. Pl. (10th ed.) § 266 et seq.; Eastham
v. Liddell, 12 Vesey, Jr., 201. But assuming the court might, on
its own motion, refer a bill for impertinence, if the matter was
called to its attention, we, in view of our conclusions, do not
regard these allegations of the bill, or the prayer of the bill in
relation thereto, as impertinent.
Under the two last grounds of demurrer it is contended that
creditors who became such after the deeds from P. S. Coggins
to Parramore, and from Parramore to Lilla F. Coggins, the wife
of P. S. Coggins, were recorded, to wit, after the 9th day of
March, 1901, had constructive notice of said deeds, and therefore
such creditors could not attack said deeds as being voluntary,
and that the trustee in bankruptcy occupies no more advantageous ground than such subsequent creditors.
In the ease of Alston v. Rowles, 13 Fla. 118, the rights and
status of subsequent creditors were referred to on p. 136. Justice
'Vestcott there says: ''The doctrine of the Supreme Court of the
United States, as announced in the leading case of Sexton v.
Wheaton, 8 'Vheat. 229, 5 L. ed. 603, and as understood by Judge
Story, is that a voluntary conveyance made by a person not indebted at the time, in favor of his wife, cannot be impeached by
subsequent creditors upon the mere ground of its being voluntary. It must be shown to be fraudulent in fact, or to be made
with a view to future debts." The opinion in this case (Sexton
v. Wheaton) was written by Chief Justice Marshall, and
learnedly uiscusses the proper construction and effect to be given
the statute of 13 Eliz., dealing with fraudulent conveyances as
regards creditors, and the statute of 27 Eliz., dealing with fraudulent conveyances as regards purchasers. These two statutes are
substantially embraced in §§ 1991, 1992, Rev. St. 1892. This e&se
and the kindred one of Salmon v. Bennett, 1 Conn. 525, 7 Am.
Dec. 237, are selected in 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 17, as the basis for very
elaborate discussion and annotation. On p. • 40 it is said:
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"Against subsequent creditors, as is decided in Sexton v.

Wheaton, a conveyance is not void unless actually fraudulent.

But there is a little obscurity as to what are the frauds of which

they might take advantage. If the fraud be directed specifically

against subsequent creditors—that is, if a Voluntary settlement

be made with a view to becoming subsequently indebted, which

may be inferred from the fact of debts being contracted immedi-

ately after—there is no doubt that the settlement may be avoided

- by subsequent creditors. But that is not the only sort of fraud

that may be taken advantage of by subsequent creditors, for it is

clear that if a conveyance be made colorably, with actual intent

to defraud any existing creditor or creditors, it may be avoided

by subsequent creditors; in other words, that evidence of collu-

sion against existing creditors is sufficient evidence of fraud

against subsequent creditors. Otherwise it would be easy to

evade the statute. The party might pay off those to whom he

is indebted at the time he is making the settlement, by borrow-

ing of others, and then say to these last, 'I did not make the

settlement to defraud you, but to defraud the other persons who

were my creditors.'" It is stated that the foregoing doctrine is

probably limited to voluntary conveyances which are accompa-

nied, in law, by the presumption of a secret trust for the grantor.
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It is further said on p. *41: "An intent actually to defraud

creditors is to be legally inferred from the grantor's being in-

solvent at the time, or greatly embarrassed, or so largely indebted

that his conveyance necessarily has the effect to hinder and de-

fraud creditors, * • • and a voluntary conveyance made

under such circumstances may be set aside by a subsequent cred-

itor." In some of the cases referred to in note 1, p. 41, we find

that the registration laws have been regarded as settling the law

to the extent that a subsequent creditor cannot complain of a

voluntary deed of which he has constructive notice, except on

the ground of actual fraud. Cooke's Lessee v. Kell, 13 Md. 469;

Kane v. Roberts, 40 Md. 590. In the last case the headnote states

the law as follows: "A deed fraudulent and void as against the

grantor's antecedent creditors is valid, if recorded, as against

subsequent creditors, when there is nothing in the deed itself,

and no evidence, to show any intent or design to defraud such

creditors." In the case of Walker, Evans and Cogswell v. Boll-

mann, 22 S. C. 512, the court held that a subsequent creditor

could not attack a prior voluntary deed, of which he had notice,

on the ground that it was voluntary, but that he could do so on

"Against subsequent creditors, as is decided in Sexton v.
Wheaton, a conveyance is not void unless adually fraudulent.
But there is a little obscurity as to what are the frauds of which
they might take advantage. If the fraud be direeted specifically
against subsequent creditors-that is, if a voluntary settlement
be made with a view to becoming subse<1uently indebted, which
may be inferred from the fact of debts being contracted immediately after-there is no doubt that the settlement may be avoided
by subsequent creditors. But that is not the only sort of fraud
that may be taken advantage of by subsequent creditors, for it is
clear that if a conveyance be made colorably, with actual intent
to defraud any existing creditor or creditors, it may be avoided
by subsequent creditors; in other words, that evidence of collusion against existing creditors is sufficient evidence of fraud
against subsequent creditors. Otherwise it would be easy to
evade the statute. The party might pay off those to whom he
is indebted at the time he is making the settlement, by borrowing of others, and then say to these last, 'I did not make the
settlement to defraud you, but to defraud the other persons who
were my creditors.' " It is stated that the foregoing doctrine is
probably limited to voluntary conveyances which are accompanied, in law, by the presumption of a secret trust for the grantor.
It is further said on p. • 41: "An intent actually to defraud
creditors is to be legally inferred from the grantor's being insolvent at the time, or greatly embarrassed, or so largely indebted
that his conveyance necessarily has the effect to hinder. and defraud creditors, • • • and a voluntary conveyance made
under such circumstances may be set aside by a subsequent creditor." In some of the cases referred to in note 1, p. 41, we find
that the registration laws have been regarded as settling the law
to the extent that a subsequent creditor cannot complain of a
voluntary deed of which he has constructive notice, except on
the ground of actual fraud. Cooke's Lessee v. Kell, 13 M:d. 469;
Kane v. Roberts, 40 Md. 590. In the last case the headnote states
the law as follows: "A deed fraudulent and void as against the
grantor's antecedent creditors is valid, if recorded, as against
subsequent creditors, when there is nothing in the deed itself,
and no evidence, to show any intent or design to defraud such
creditors." In the case of \Valker, Evans and Cogswell v. Boll, mann, 22 S. C. 512, the court held that a subsequent creditor
could not attack a prior voluntary deed, of which he had notice,
on the ground that it was voluntary, but that he could do so 011
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the ground that it was made with reference to future indebted-

ness, or other circumstances of fraud other than its being vol-

untary. Also, see Moore v. Blonheim, 19 Md. 172; Brundage v.

Cheneworth, 101 Iowa, 256, 70 N. W. 211, 63 Am. St. Rep. 3S2;

Jackson v. Plyler, 38 S. C. 496, 17 S. E. 255, 37 Am. St. Rep. 782.

See, also, the following annotated cases: Jenkins v. Clement, 14

Am. Dec. 706; Hagermann v. Buchanan, 14 Am. St. Rep. 751,

752 et seq.; Rudy v. Austin, 35 Am. St. Rep. 85 et seq. On

p. 752, 14 Am. St. Rep., supra, the annotator, discussing the

effect of a conveyance as against subsequent creditors, says:

"We apprehend that no general rule can be formulated equally

applicable to all cases, and that such judicial declarations as

have been made upon the subject must be interpreted with ref-

erence to the particular facts of the case in which they were

made. If the subsequent debts were contracted long after the

voluntary transfer was made, the presumption that it might

have been made with a view of contracting them and of defraud-

ing the subsequent creditors certainly becomes exceedingly weak,

and may reasonably be treated as entirely destroyed, unless

other circumstances appear to give it renewed vitality. The evi-

dence may, on the other hand, disclose that the subsequent debts

have merely taken the place of prior ones, or that the debtor has
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continued or embarked in a business in which bis becoming in-

debted was inevitable, or there may be other circumstances of

the like persuasive character, creating or strengthening the pre-

sumption that. as the transfer was in fraud of prior, it was also

in fraud of subsequent, creditors." Bump on Fraudulent Con-

veyances (4th ed.) §§ 293-296. After a careful examination of

many cases, this doctrine seems reasonable. We are unable to

discover how constructive or even actual notice of the execution

of a voluntary deed by a debtor could of itself inform a subse-

quent creditor of the secret purposes of the debtor in making the

deed, of his insolvency, of his intention to contract large debts,

or of his intention to engage in a hazardous enterprise, the risks

of which be was seeking to avoid, or of other fraudulent and

covinous purposes he might entertain, so as to shut off the subse-

quent creditor from attacking the voluntary deed for such or

other sufficient causes. See Digrgs v. McCullough, 69 Md. 592, 16

Atl. 453; Scott v. Keane, 87 Md. 709, 40 Atl. 1070, 42 L. R. A.

359; Baltimore High Grade Brick Co. v. Amos, 95 Md. 571, 52

Atl. 582, 53 Atl. 148. Our opinion is that, in so far as the instant

case is concerned, where the bill is filed by a trustee in bank-

the ground that it was made with reference to future indebtedness. or other circumstances of fraud other than its being voluntary. Also, see Moore v. Blonheim, 19 Md. 172; Brundage v.
Cheneworth, 101 Iowa, 256, 70 N. W. 211, 63 Am. St. Rep. 3S2;
Jackson v. Plyier, 38 S. C. 496, 17 S. E. 255, 37 Am. St. Rep. 782.
See, also, the following annotated cases: Jenkins v. Clement, 14
Am. Dec. 706; Hagermann v. Buchanan, 14 Am. St. Rep. 751,
752 et seq.; Rudy v. Austin, 35 Am. St. Rep. 85 el sl!q. On
p. 752, 14 Am. St. Rep., supra, the annotator, discussing the
effect of a conveyance as against subsequent creditors, says :
''We apprehend that no general rule can be formulated equally
applicable to all cases, and that such judicial declarations as
have been made upon the subject must be interpreted with reference to the particular facts of the case in which they were
made. If .the subsequent debts
. were contracted long after the
voluntary transfer was made, the presumption that it might
have been made with a view of contracting them and of defrauding the subsequent creditors certainly becomes exceedingly weak,
and may reasonably be treated as entirely destro~·ed, unlPss
other circumstances appear to give it renewed vitality. The evidence may, on the other hand, disclose that the subsequent debts
have merely taken the place of prior ones, or that the debtor has
continued or embarked in a business in which his becoming indebted was inevitable, or there may be other circumstances of
the like persuasive character, creating or strengthening the presumption that, as the transfer was in fraud of prior, it was also
in fraud of subsequent, creditors.'' Bump on Fraudulent Conveyances (4th ed.) §§ 293-296. After a careful examination of
many cases, this doctrine seems reasonable. We are unable to
discover how constructive or even actual notice of the execution
of a voluntary deed by a debtor could of itself inform a subsequent creditor of the secret purposes of the debtor in making the
deed, of "his insolvency, of his intention to contract large debts,
or of his intention to engage in a hazardous enterprise, the risks
of which he was seeking to avoid, or of other fraudulent and
covinous purposes he might entertain, so as to shut oft the subsequent creditor from attacking the voluntary deed for such or
other sufficient causes. See Diggs v. McCullough, 69 Md. 592, 16
Atl. 453; Scott v. Keane, 87 l\ld. 709, 40 Atl. 1070, 42 L. R. A.
359; Baltimore High Grade Brick Co. v. Amos, 95 l\ld. 571, 52
Atl. 582, 53 Atl. 148. Our opinion is that, in so far as the instant
case is concerned, where the bill is filed by a trustee in bank-
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ruptey representing all classes of creditors, and where the facts

are such as are here alleged, the bill is not obnoxious to the

demurrer which was interposed.

It is therefore adjudged, ordered, and decreed that the order

sustaining the demurrer be, and the same is hereby, reversed, and

the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with

law.

TAYLOR, C. J., and COCKRELL, J., concur.

CARTER, SHACKLEFORD, and WHITFIELD, JJ., concur

in the opinion.20

ruptcy representing all classes of creditors, and where the facts
are such as are here alleged, the bill is not obnoxious to the
di>murrC'r which was interposed.
It is therefore aJjudged, ordered, and decreed that the order
sustaining the dt~murrer be, and the same is hereby, reversed, and
the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with
law.

KNAPP v. MILWAUKEE TRUST COMPANY

TAYLOR, C. J., and COCKRELL, J., concur.

216 U. S. 545, 54 L. ed. 610, 30 Sup. Ct. 412

(United States Supreme Court. March 7, 1910)

Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the court:

The Standard Telephone & Electric Company, a Wisconsin

corporation, was adjudicated a bankrupt in the District Court

CARTER, SHACKLEFORD, and WHITFIELD, JJ., concur
in the opinion.20

of the United States for the eastern district of Wisconsin. Un-

der its articles of association it was authorized to carry on the

business of selling appliances for telephone purposes and operat-

KNAPP v. MILWAUKEE TRUST COMPANY

ing telephone exchanges. It had established and was operating

a telephone exchange at the village of Sheridan, Wisconsin, and

216 U. S. 545, 54 L. ed. 610, 30 Sup. Ct. 412

was carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling tele-
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phone apparatus in the city of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where it

(United States Supreme Court. March 7, 1910)

had a stock in trade and trade fixtures. The trustee in bank-

ruptcy filed a petition to sell all the property of the bankrupt.

Appellant Knapp, as trustee of certain mortgages given by the

telephone company, intervened, and asked to have the lien of

the mortgage established as the first lien on the property and

satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale. The property was sold,

and the question is as to the lien of these mortgages upon the

fund.

The trustee in bankruptcy answered the petition of Knapp,

trustee under the mortgage, averring that it was a chattel mort-

gage, and fraudulent and void as to creditors, because of certain

agreements contained therein, because it was on after-acquired

20—See Warren v. Moody, 122 U.

S. 132.

Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the court:
The Standard Telephone & Electric Company, a Wisconsin
corporation, was adjudicated a bankrupt in the District Court
of the United States for the eastern district of Wisconsin. Under its articles of 8$0Ciation it was authorized to carry on the
business of selling appliances for telephone purposes and operating telephone exchanges. It had established and was operating
a telephone exchange at the village of Sheridan, Wisconsin, and
wa.CJ carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling telephone apparatus in the city of l\filwaukee, Wisconsin, where it
had a stock in trade and trade fixtures. The trustee in bankruptcy filed a petition to sell all the property of the bankrupt.
Appellant Knapp, as trustee of certain mortgages given by the
telephone company, intervened, and asked to have the lien of
the mortgage established as the first lien on the property and
satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale. The property was sold,
and the question is as to the lien of these mortgages upon the
fund.
The trustee in bankruptcy answered the petition of Knapp,
trustee under the mortgage, averring that it was a chattel mortgage, and fraudulent and void as to creditors, because of certain
agreements contained therein, because it was oo after-acquired

s.

20-See Warren v. Moody, 122 U.
132.
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property, and because of the failure to file an affidavit of renewal,

as required by the Wisconsin statutes. The referee in bank-

ruptcy found the facts, and held the mortgage void. Upon hear-

ing, the district judge reached a like conclusion. 157 Fed. 106.

The Circuit Court of Appeals of the seventh circuit, upon

appeal, affirmed the decree of the District Court, holding the

mortgage void for the reasons set forth at large in the opinion

of the district judge. 89 C. C A. 467, 162 Fed. 675. • • •

The mortgages in question, which were upon all the property

and estate of the mortgagor, acquired or to be acquired, in con-

nection with or in relation to the business of the mortgagor, con-

tain, among others, the following provisions:

"Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent said

first party from carrying on, in the due and regular course, its

said business, and collecting the indebtedness and moneys due

or to become due therein, and applying the same to its own use,

except as hereinafter provided."

The mortgage makes provision for a sinking fund of $2,000

annually, $500 quarterly, out of the proceeds of the business, or,

if necessary, from the general resources; and the mortgage con-

tains this further provision:

"Said first party further agrees that no dividend shall be de-
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clared or paid on its capital stock at any time when any portion

of said sinking fund or the interest on said bonds shall not have

been duly provided for, according to the terms of this indenture.

"Provided, however, That said trustee be and he is hereby

empowered and authorized in his discretion, and in case he does

not procure for the sinking fund any of said bonds at par and

accrued interest, upon application in writing by said first party

to waive the making by said party of full or any payment into

or provision for said sinking fund for any quarter year, and in

the event of said trustee electing not to require said first party

to make such payment into or provision for such sinking fund,

the moneys which would otherwise have been placed therein for

the purchase of said bonds as aforesaid shall remain at the dis-

position of said first party, to be divided as dividends, or to en-

large, extend, improve, repair, renew, or rehabilitate its said

described business and property."

It will be seen that under these provisions the mortgagor is

allowed to remain in possession of the property, applying the

proceeds thereof to his own use, except that no dividends shall

be declared or paid without first making provision for the sink-

property, and because of the failure to file an affidavit of renewal,
as required by the Wisconsin statutes. The referee in bankruptcy found the facts, and held the mortgage void. Upon hearing, the district judge reached a like conclusion. 157 Fed. 106.
The Circuit Court of Appeals of the seventh circuit, upon
appeal, affirmed the decree of the District Court, holding the
mortgage void for the: reasons set forth at large in the opinion
of the district judge. 89 C. C. A. 467, 162 Fed. 675. • ' •
The mortgages in question, which were upon all the property
and estate of the mortgagor, acquired or to be acquired, in connection with or in relation to the business of the mortgagor, contain, among others, the following provisions:
"Nothing heNin contained shall be construed to prevent said
first party from carrying on, in the due and regular course, its
said business, and collecting the indebtedness and moneys due
or to become due therein, and applying the same to its own USt',
except as hereinafter providerl. ''
The mortgage makes provisiOJ?. for a sinking fund of $2,000
annually, $500 quarterly, out of the proceeds of the business, or,
if necessary, from the general resources; and the mortgage contains this I urther provision :
''Said first party further agrees that no dividend shall be declared or paid on its capital stock at any time when any portion
of _said sinking fund or the interest on said bonds shall not have
been duly provided for, according to the terms of this indenture.
''Provided, however, That said trustee be and he is hereby
empowered and authorized in his discretion, and in case be does
not procure for the sinking fund any of said bonds at par and
accrued interest, upon application in writing by said first party
to waive the making by said party of full or any payment into
or provision for said sinking fund for any quarter year, and in
the event of said trustee electing not to require said first party
to make such payment into or provision for such sinking fund,
the moneys which would otherwise have been placed therein for
the purchase of said bonds as aforesaid shall remain at the disposition of said fir~t party, to be divided as dividends, or to enlarge, extend, improve, repair, renew, or rehabilitate its said
described business and property."
It will be seen that under these provisions the mortgagor is
allowed to remain in possession of the property, applying the
proceeds thereof to his own use, except that no dividends shall
be declared or paid without first making provision for the sink-
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ing fund and the interest on the bonds, and with this important

proviso,—that the trustee under the mortgage may, in his dis-

cretion, in ease he does not procure for the sinking fund bonds

at par and accrued interest, upon the application of the mort-

gagor, waive the payment into or provision for the sinking fund

for any quarter year, and, in such case, the moneys which would

otherwise go into the sinking fund for the purchase of bonds

shall remain at the disposition of the mortgagor, to be distributed

as dividends, or to be used for the benefit of the business and

property in the manner described. • f *

While there was a finding that no intentional bad faith was

shown, still we agree with the Court of Appeals and the district

judge that, under the law of Wisconsin, as construed by her high-

est court, such conditions as were contained in these mortgages

rendered them fraudulent in law and void as to creditors. Mer-

chants' & M. Sav. Bank v. Lovejoy, 84 Wis. 601. 55 N. W. 108;

Bank of Kaukauna v. Joannes, 98 Wis. 321, 73 N. W. 997;

Charles Baumbach Co. v. Hobkirk, 104 Wis. 488, 80 N. W. 740;

Franzke v. Hitchon, 105 Wis. 11, 80 N. W. 931; Durr v. Wildish,

108 Wis. 401, 84 N. W. 437.

In this case the stipulations of the mortgages practically per-

mitted the mortgagor to dispose of the property for his own bene-
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fit, except that it must make certain provisions for a sinking

fund and interest on the bonds; and, with the consent of the

trustee, no provision need be made for the sinking fund or inter-

est, and the moneys which otherwise would have been placed

therein for the purchase of bonds might be applied for the bene-

fit of the mortgagor, whether as dividends or for the benefit of

its business and property. Such provisions are clearly within

the Wisconsin decisions, for they permit the mortgagor to have

the benefit of the property, to keep it in his possession, and to

appropriate the proceeds to his own use. The Wisconsin deci-

sions render such mortgages invalid as to creditors, because the

effect of such provisions is to give the beneficial use of the mort-

gaged property to the mortgagor in possession, and to make pos-

sible the use of the mortgage as a protection against creditors

of the mortgagor when they shall undertake to assert their

rights.

But it is said the trustee in bankruptcy may not defend against

these mortgages. It is contended that they are good as between

the parties, and that, as to them, the trustee in bankruptcy occu-

pies no better position than the bankrupt. This question was

ing fund and the interest on the bonds, and with tl)is important
proviso,-that the trustee under the mortgage may, in his discretion, in case he does not procure for the sinking fund bonds
at par and accrued interest, upon the application of the mortgagor, waive the payment into or provision for the sinking fund
for any quarter year, and, in such case, the moneys which would
otherwise go into the sinking fund for the purchase of bonds
shall remain at the disposition of the mortgagor, to be distributed
as dividends, or to be used for the benefit of the business and
property in the manner described. • • •
While there was a finding that no intentional bad .faith was
shown, still we agree with the Court of Appeals and the district
judge that, under the law of 'Visconsin, as construed by her highest court, such conditions as were contained in these mortgages
rendered them fraudulent in law and void as to creditors. Merchants' & M. Sav. Bank v. Lovejoy, 84 Wis. 601. 55 N. W. 108;
Bank of Kaukauna v. Joannes, 98 Wis. 321, 73 N. W. 997;
Charles Baumbach Co. v. Hobkirk, 104 Wis. 488, 80 N. W. 740;
Franzke v. Hitchon, 105 Wis. 11, 80 N. W. 931; Durr v. Wildish,
108 Wis. 401, 84 N. W. 437.
In this case the stipulations of the mortgages practically permitted the mortgagor to dispose of the property for his own benefit, except that it must make certain provisions for a sinking
fund and interest on the bonds; and, with the consent of the
trustee, no provision need be made for the sinking fund or interest, and the moneys which otherwise would have been placed
therein for the purchase o'f bonds might be applied for the benefit of the mortgagor, whether as dividends or for the benefit of
its business and property. Such provisions are clearly within
the 'Visconsin decisions, for they permit the mortgagor to have
the benefit of the property, to keep it in his possession, and to
appropriate the proceeds to his own use. The Wisconsin decisions render such mortgages invalid as to creditors, because the
effect of such provisions is to give the beneficial use of the mortgaged prop~rty to the mortgagor in possession, and to make possible the use of the mortgage as a protection against creditors
of the mortgagor when they shall undertake to assert their
rights.
But it is said the trustee in bankruptcy may not defend against
these mortgages. It is contended that they are good as between
the parties, and that, as to them, the trustee in bankruptcy occupies no better position than the bankrupt. This question was
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raised and decided in Security Warehousing Co. v. Hand, 206

U. S. 415, 51 L. ed. 1117, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 720, 11 A. & E. Ann.

Cas. 789. That case arose in Wisconsin, and it was therein held

that, under the Wisconsin law, an attempted pledge of property,

without change of possession, was void under the laws of that

state. In that case, as in this one, the question was raised as to

whether the trustee in bankruptcy could question the transaction,

and it was contended that, being valid as between the parties, the

trustee took only the right and title of the bankrupt. The ques-

tion was fully considered therein, and the previous cases in this

court were reviewed. The principle was recognized that the trus-

tee in bankruptcy stands in the shoes of the bankrupt, and that

the property in his hands is subject to the equities impressed

upon it while in the hands of the bankrupt.

But it was held that the attempt to create a lien upon the prop-

erty of the bankrupt was void as to general creditors under the

laws of Wisconsin. Applying § 70a of the bankruptcy act, it was

held that the trustee in bankruptcy was vested by operation of

the bankrupt law with the title of the property transferred by

the bankrupt in fraud of creditors, and also that the trustee took

the property which, prior to the filing of the petition, might have

been levied upon and sold by judicial process against the bank-
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rupt. It was therefore held that, as there had been no valid

pledge of the property, for want of change of possession, it could

have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against

the bankrupt at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy, and

passed to the trustee in bankruptcy.

The principles announced in Security Warehousing Co. v.

Hand, sitpra, when applied to the present case, are decisive of

the question here presented. Under the Wisconsin statutes and

decisions of the highest court of that state the conditions con-

tained upon the face of this mortgage were such as to render it

fraudulent in law and void as to creditors, and prior to the filing

of the petition in bankruptcy the property might have been

levied upon and sold by judicial process against the bankrupt.

It is true that in Security Warehousing Co. v. Hand the court

said that the attempted pledge was a '' mere pretense, a sham;''

but the courts of Wisconsin have held that such provisions as

are in these mortgages, giving the bankrupt the right to dispose

of the mortgaged property for its own benefit, rendered the con-

veyance fraudulent in law, and therefore void as to creditors.

This brings the conveyance within the terms of the bankrupt act,

raised and decided in Security \Varebousing Co. " · Hand, 206
U.S. 415, 51 L. ed. 1117, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 720, 11 A. & E. Ann .
Cas. 789. That case arose in Wisconsin. and it was therein held
that, under the Wisconsin law, an attempted pledge of property.
without change of possession, was void under the laws of that
state. In that case, 88 in this one, the question was raised as to
whether the trustee in bankruptcy could question the transactiou.
and it was contended that, being valid as between the parties, the
trustee took onl~· the right and title of the bankrupt. The question was fully considered therein, and the previous cases in this
court were reviewed. The principle was recognized that the trus,, tee in bankruptcy stands in the shoes of the bankrupt, and that
:· the property in his hands is subject to the equities impreSBed
upon it while in the hands of the bankrupt.
But it was held that the attempt to create a lien upon the property of the bankrupt was void as to general creditors under the
laws of Wisconsin. Applying § 70a of the bankruptcy act, it was
held that the trustee in bankruptcy was vested by operation of
the bankrupt law with the title of the property transferred by
the bankrupt in fraud of creditors, and also that the trustee took
the property which, prior to the filing of the petition, might have
been levied upon and sold by judicial process against the bankrupt. It was therefore held that, 88 there had been no valid
pledge of the property, for want of change of possess.ion, it could
have been levied upon and sold under judicial proce.ss against
the bankrupt at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy, and
passed to the tn1stee in bankruptcy.
The principles announced in Security Warehousing Co. v.
Hand, supra, when applied to the present case, are decisive of
the question here presented. Under the Wisconsin statutea and
decisions of the highest court of that state the conditions cont.ained upon the face of this mortgage were such as to render it
fraudulent in law and void as to creditors, and prior to the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy the property might have been
levied upon and sold by judicial process against the bankrupt.
It is true that in Security Warehou$4ing Co. v. Hand the court
said that the attempted pledge was a ''mere pretense, a sham ; ''
but the courts of Wisconsin have held that such provisions as
are in these mortgages, giving the bankrupt the right to dispose
of the mortgaged property for its own benefit, rendered the conveyance fraudulent in law, and therefore void as to creditors.
This brings the conveyance within the terms of the bankrupt act,
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as one which the trustee may attack, as conclusively as it would

if fraudulent intent in fact were shown to exist.

In Mueller v. Bruss, 112 Wis. 406, 88 N. W. 229, it was held

that a trustee in bankruptcy could maintain an action to set

aside a fraudulent conveyance, but that the complaint must aver

and the trustee must show that the estate had not sufficient assets

in the trustee's hands to satisfy the claims filed against the

debtor. And it is insisted that a showing of this character is

lacking in the present case. Without deciding that under the

bankruptcy act the answer of the trustee in bankruptcy was

required to make this averment, accompanied by proof, if neces-

sary, it is sufficient upon this point to say that the intervening

petition of the trustee of the mortgage sought to assert a lien

upon all the property of the bankrupt in the trustee's hands.

The suggestion in appellant's brief, that the trustee in bank-

ruptcy may possibly recover against directors and officers of the

corporation for dereliction of duty, and against stockholders for

unpaid subscriptions and additional liability on their part, pre-

sents no reason why he may not resist an attempt to take all the

available property in his hands to apply on a mortgage void

as to creditors at the time of the adjudication.

We are of opinion, for the reasons stated, that the mortgages

in question are void, and that, under the bankruptcy law, the
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trustee can assert their invalidity.

Judgment affirmed.

THOMPSON v. FAIRBANKS

196 U. S. 516, 49 L. ed. 577, 25 Sup. Ct. 306

[See this case given on page 282, ante] 21

21—"The question is simply

whether the York Mfg. Co. has a

right under its conditional sale of

the machinery to the bankrupt cor-

poration to take the machinery out

of the premises where it was placed

as against all except judgment, or

as one which the trustee may attack, as conclusively as it would
if fraudulent intent in fact w~re shown to exist.
In Mueller v. Bruss, 112 \Vis. 406, 88 N. W. 229, it was held
that a trustee in bankruptcy could maintain an action to set
aside a fraudulent conveyance, but that the complaint must aver
and the trustee must show that the estate had not sufficient assets
in the trustee's hands to satisfy the claiIDB filed against the
debtor. And it is insisted that a showing of this character is
lacking in the present case. Without deciding that under the
bankruptcy act the answer of the trustee in bankruptcy was
required to make this averment, accompanied by proof, if necessary, it is sufficient upon this point to say that the intervening
petition of the trustee of the mortgage sought to assert a lien
upon all the property of the bankrupt in the trustee's hands.
The suggestion in appellant's brief, that the trustee in b&nkruptcy may possibly recover against directors and officers of the
corporation for dereliction of duty, and against stockholders for
unpaid subscriptions and additional liability on their pa.rt, presents no reason why he may not resist an attempt to take all the
available property in his hands to apply on a mortgage void
as to creditors at the time of the adjudication.
We are of opinion, for the reasons stated, that the mortgages
in question are void, and that, under the bankruptcy law, the
trustee can assert their invalidity.
Judgment affirmed.

other creditors, by some specific lien.

There are no judgment creditors in

the case, and no attachment has been

levied, and the question is simply

whether the adjudication in bank-

THOMPSON v. FAIRBANKS
196 U.S. 516, 49 L. ed. 577, 25 Sup. Ct. 306

ruptcy is equivalent to a judgment

to prevent the York Mfg.

[See this case given on page 282, ante]

21

Co. from asserting its right to re-

move the machinery by virtue of

reservation of the title contained in

its contract * • *

"We come, then, to the question

whether an adjudication in bank-

ruptcy was equivalent to a judg-

ment, attachment, or other specific

lien upon the machinery. * • •

We are of opinion that it did not

operate as a lien upon the machinery,

as against the York Mfg. Co., the

or an attachment on the property,^ vendor thereof. Under the provl

H. * A. Bankruptcy—IT

21-'' The question is simply such. as to prevent the York Mfg.
whether the York Mfg. Co. has a
Co. from 8.88erting its right to re·
right under its conditional sale of move the machillery by virtue of
the machinery to the bankrupt cor·
ret1ervation of the title contained in
poration to take the machinery out itll contract. • • •
of the premises where it was placed
''We come, then, to the question
as against all except judgment, or
whether an adjudication in bank·
other credito111, by some specific lien.
mptcy wu equivalent to a judg·
There are no judgment creditol'll in
ment, attachment, or other specific
the case, and no attachment has been lien upon the machillery. * * *
levied, and the question is simply · We are of opinion that it did not
whether the adjudication in bank·
operate u a lien upon the machinery,
ruptcy is equivalent to a judgment
as against the York Mfg. Co., the
or an attachment on the praperty,_2 _vendor thereof. Under the pron·
H. A A. Bankruptc)"-87
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DISSOLUTION OF LIENS

HENDERSON v. MAYER

225 U. S. 631, 56 L. eA 1233, 32 Sup. Ct. 699

(United States Supreme Court, June 7, 1912)

HENDERSONv.MAYER

Samuel Mayer owned a plantation in Dooley county, Georgia,

which he rented to Joseph Burns for one year. The rent not

225 U.S. 631, 56 L. ed. 1233, 32 Sup. Ct. 699

having been paid at maturity, Mayer, on November 13, 1908,

made an affidavit in conformity with the statute, and a justice

of the peace thereupon issued a distress warrant, which, on the

same day, was levied upon the cotton, corn, and other products

of the place. The crops found on the premises being, appar-

ently, insufficient to pay what was due, the sheriff, at the same

time, levied upon other property by virtue of § 2795 of the Code

of Georgia, which declares that "landlords shall have a special

lien for rent on crops made on land rented from them, superior

to all other liens except liens for taxes, • • • and shall also

have a general lien on the property of the debtor liable to levy

and sale, and such general lien shall date from the time of

the levy of a distress warrant to enforce the same.''

Three days after the levy a petition in bankruptcy was filed

against Burns, the tenant, who was subsequently adjudged a

bankrupt. The trustee, when elected, obtained possession of all
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the property seized by the sheriff, and subsequently sold it in

the due administration of the estate. The proceeds of the cotton

and corn were paid over to Mayer, it being conceded that the

sions of. the bankrupt act, the trus-

tee in bankruptcy is vested with no

better right or title to the bank-

rupt's property than belongs to the

bankrupt at the time when the trus-

tee 's title accrued.'' York Manu-

facturing Co. v. Cassel, 201 U. 8.

344, 350. See 7 Mich. L. Hev. 474,

where it is suggested that the mat-

ter considered in the case quoted

above should be considered by Con-

gress.

In 1910, §47a (2) of the bank-

(United States Supreme Court, June 7, 1912)
Samuel Mayer owned a plantation in Dooley county, Georgia,
which he rented to Joseph Burns for one year. The rent not
having been paid at maturity, Mayer, on November 13, 1908,
made an affidavit in conformity with the statute, and a justice
of the peace thereupon issued a distress warrant, which, on the
same day, was levied upon the cotton, corn, and other products
of the place. The crops found on the premises being, apparently, insufficient to pay what was due, the sheriff, at the same
time, levied upon other property by virtue of § 2795 of the Code
of Georgia., which declares that ''landlords shall have a special
lien for rent on crops made· on land rented from them, superior
to all other liens except liens for taxes, • • • and shall also
have a general lien on the property of the debtor liable to levy
and sale, and sueh general lien shall date from the time of
the levy of a distress wMrant to enforce the same.''
Three days after the levy a petition in bankruptcy was filed
against Burns, the tenant, who was subsequently adjudged a
bankrupt. The trustee, when elected, obtained possession of all
the property seized by the sheriff, and su~quently sold it in
the due administration of the estate. The proceeds of the cotton
and corn were paid over to Mayer, it being conceded that the

ruptcy act was amended by adding

I he following: "and such trustees,

as to all property in the custody or

coming into the custody of the bank-

ruptcy court, shall be deemed vested

with all the rights, remedies, and

powers of a creditor holding a lien

by legal or equitable proceedings

thereon; and also, as to all prop-

erty not in the custody of the bank-

ruptcy court, shall be deemed vostcd

with all the rights, remedies, and

powers of a judgment creditor hold-

ing an execution duly returned un-

satisfied." See 24 Harv. L. Rev.

620; In re White's Express Co., 215

Fed. 894; Holt v. Henley, 232 U. &

637.

sions of . the bankrupt act, the tl'UB·
tRe in bankrnI?tcY is vested with no
better right or title to the bank·
rupt 'a property than belongs to the
bankrupt at the time when the trustee's title accrued.'' York Manufacturing Co. v. CB.88el, 201 U. B.
344, 350. See 7 Mich. L. Rev. 474,
where it is suggested that the mat·
ter considered in the case quoted
above should be considered by Con·
gress.
In 1910, § 47a (2) of the bankr11ptcy act was amended by adding
1he following: "and such trustees,
a!I to all property in the custody or

coming into the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be deemed vested
with all the right.I, remedies, and
powel'8 of a creditor ho1ding a lien
by legal or equitable proceedings
thereon; and also, as to all property not in the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be deemed rnstrd
with all the righta, remedies, and
powers of a judgment creditor hold·
ing an execution duly returned unsatisfied.'' See 24 Harv. L. Rev.
620; In re White's Exprem Co., lU5
Fed. 894; Holt v. Henley, 232 U. S.
637.
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landlord's special lien on the crops had not been affected by the

bankruptcy proceedings.

Mayer also claimed that, by virtue of his general lien, he was

entitled to have the balance of the rent paid out of the proceeds

arising from the sale of the other property levied on, and filed

his intervention to secure such an order. The trustee's objection

was sustained by the referee on the ground that the landlord's

general lien was discharged because it had been "obtained by

legal proceedings" or levy made three days before the filing of

the petition in bankruptcy. His ruling was reversed by the Dis-

trict Court (175 Fed. 633). That judgment was affirmed by the

Circuit Court of Appeals without opinion. The case was then

brought here by writ of certiorari, granted at the instance of the

trustee, who claims that under the Georgia Code the landlord had

no lien on the property prior to the levy of the distress war-

rant, and that whatever right had been acquired by that seizure

was discharged by § 67/, which declares that "all levies, judg-

ments, attachments, or other liens obtained through legal pro-

ceedings against a person who is insolvent at any time within

four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against

him shall be null and void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt."

Mr. Justice LAMAR, after making the foregoing statement,
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delivered the opinion of the court:

The provisions of the bankruptcy act, preventing an insolvent

from giving or the creditor from securing preferences for pre-

existing debts, apply not only to mortgages and transfers volun-

tarily made by the debtor, but also to those preferences which are

obtained through legal proceedings, whether the lien dates from

the entry of the judgment, from the attachment before judg-

landlord's special lien on the crops had not been affected by the
bankruptcy proceedings.
Mayer also claimed that, by virtue of his general lien, he was
entitled to have the balance of the rent paid out of the proceeds
arising from the sale of the other property levied on, and filed
his intervention to secure such an order. The trustee's objection
was sustained by the referee on the ground that the landlord's
general lien was discharged because it had been ''obtained by
legal proceedings'' or levy made three days before the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy. His ruling was reversed by the District Court (175 Fed. 633). That judgment was affirmed by the
Circuit Court of Appeals without opinion. The case was then
brought here by writ of certiorari, granted at the instance of the
trustee, who claims that under the Georgia Code the landlord had
no lien on the property prior to the levy of the distress warrant, and that whatever right had been acquired by that seizure
was discharged by § B1f, which decla,res that "all levies, judgments, attachments, or other liens obtained through legal proceedings against a person who is insolvent at any time within
four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against
him shall be null and void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt.''

ment, or, as in some states, from the levy of execution after

judgment. But the statute was not intended to lessen rights

which already existed, nor to defeat those inchoate liens given

by statute, of which all creditors were bound to take notice, and

subject to which they are presumed to have contracted when they

dealt with the insolvent.

Liens in favor of laborers, mechanics, and contractors are of

this character; and although they may be perfected by record or

foreclosure within four months of the bankruptcy, they are not

created by judgments, nor are they treated as having been "ob-

tained through legal proceedings," even when it is necessary to

enforce then by some form of legal proceeding. The statutes of

Mr. Justice LAMAR, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the court :
The provisions of the bankruptcy act, preventing an insolvent
from giving or the creditor from securing preferences for preexisting debts, apply not only to mortgages and transfers voluntarily made by the debtor, but also to those preference.a which are
obtained through legal proceedings, whether the lien dates from
the entry of the judgment, from the attachment before judgment, or, as in some states, from the levy of execution after
judgment. But the statute was not intended to lessen rights
which already existed, nor to defeat those inchoate liens given
by statute, of which all creditors were bound to take notice, and
subject to which they are presumed to have contracted when they
dealt with the insolvent.
Liens in favor of laborers, mechanics, and contractors are of
this character; and although they may be perfected by record or
foreclosure within four months of the bankruptcy, they are not
created by judgments, nor are they treated as having been ''obtained through legal proceedings,'' even when it is necessary to
enforce then by some form of legal proceeding. The statutes of
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the various states differ as to the time when such liens attach,

and also as to the property they cover. They may bind only

what the plaintiff has improved or constructed; or they may

extend to all the chattels of the debtor, or "all the property in-

volved in the business." Re Bennett, 82 C. C. A. 531, 153 Fed.

673.

In some cases the lien dates from commencement of the work,

or from the completion of the contract. In others, prior to levy

they are referred to as being dormant or inchoate liens, or as "a

right to a lien." Re Bennett, 82 C. C. A. 531, 153 Fed. 677;

Re Laird, 48 C. C. A. 538, 109 Fed. 554." But the courts, deal-

ing specially with bankruptcy matters, have almost uniformly

held that these statutory preferences are not obtained through

legal proceedings, and therefore are not defeated by § 67/, even

where the registration, foreclosure, or levy necessary to their com-

pletion or enforcement was within four months of the filing of

the petition in bankruptcy.

Similar rulings have been made where the landlord has only

a common-law right of distress. Re West Side Paper Co., 89 C.

C. A. 110,162 Fed. 110,15 Ann. Cas. 384. This is often referred

to as a lien, but it is "only in the nature of security." 3 Bl. Com.

18. The pledge, or quasi pledge, which the landlord is said to
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have, is, at most, only a power to seize chattels found on the

rented premises. These he could take into possession and hold

until the rent was paid. Doe ex dem. Qladney v. Deavors, 11 Ga.

84. But before the distraint the landlord at common law has

"no lien on any particular portion of the goods, and is only an

ordinary creditor, except that he has the right of distress by rea-

son of which he may place himself in a better position.'' Sutton

v. Rees, 9 Jur. N. S. 456, 1 New Reports, 464, 8 L. T. N. S. 343,

11 Week. Rep. 413. A right fully as great is created by the

Georgia statute here in question. For while giving the owners

of agricultural lands a special lien on the crops, there was no

intention to deprive the proprietor of urban and other real estate

of the lien for rent which there, as in other states, is treated as

an incident growing out of the relation of landlord and tenant.

The Code (§ 2787) expressly "establishes liens in favor of

landlords." It (§ 3124) gives them "power to distrain for rent

22—For example see In re Boeber, liens for material and labor under

121 Fed. 449; Kane Co. v. Kinney, New York law. Cf. Ryeraon &

174 N. Y. 69; In re Griasler, 136 Son v. Smith, 152 EL 641.

Fed. 754, all with reference to

the various states differ as to the time when such liens attach,
and also as to the property they cover. They may bind only
what the plaintiff has improved or constructed; or they IDJlY
extend to all the chattels of the debtor, or ''all the property involved in the business.'' Re Bennett, 82 C. C. A. 531, 153 Fed.

673.
In some cases the lien dates from commencement of the work,
or from the completion of the contract. In others, prior to levy
they are referred to as being dormant or inchoate liens, or as ''a
right to a lien." Re Bennett, 82 C. C. A. 531, 153 Fed. 677;
Re Laird, 48 C. C. A. 538, 109 Fed. 554.22 But the courts, dealing specially with bankruptcy matters, have almost uniformly
held that these statutory preferences are not obtained through
legal proceedings, and therefore are not defeated by § 67/, even
where the registration, foreclosure, or levy necessary to their completion or enforcement was within four months of the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy.
Similar rulings have been made where the landlord has only
a common-law right of distress. Re West Side Paper Co., 89 C.
C. A. 110, 162 Fed. 110, 15 Ann. Cas. 384. This is often referred
to as a lien, but it is" only in the nature of security." 3 Bl. Com.
18. The pledge, or quasi pledge, which the landlord is said to
have, is, at most, only a power to seize chattels found on the
rented premises. These he could take into possession and hold
until the rent was paid. Doe ex dem. Gladney v. Deavors, 11 Ga.
84. But before the distraint the landlord at common law has
' ' no lien on any particular portion of the goods, and is ouly an
ordinary creditor, except that he has the right of distress by reason of which he may place himself in a better position.'' Sutton
v. Recs, 9 Jur. N. S. 456, 1 New Reports, 464, 8 L. T. N. S. 343,
11 Week. Rep. 413. A right fully as great is c!'eated by the
G(·orgia statute here in question. For while giving the owners
of agricultural lands a special lien on the crops, there was no
intention to deprive the proprietor of urban and other real estate
of the lien for rent which there, as in other states, is treated as
an incident growing out of the relation of landlord antl tenant.
The Code ( § 2787) expressly "establishes liens in favor of
landlords." It ( § 3124) gives them "power to distraio for rent
22-For example IK'e In re Roeber,
121 Fed. 449; Kane Co. v. Kinney,
174 N. Y. 69; In re Griasler, 136
Fed. 754, all with reference to

liens for material and labor under
New York law. Cf. Ryerson &
Son v. Smith, 152 ID. 641.
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as soon as the same is due." It declares (§ 2795) that landlords

"'shall have a general lien on the property of the tenant, liable

to levy and sale * * * which dates from the levy of the

distress warrant to enforce the same." It is true that prior to

levy it covers no specific property, and attaches only to what is

seized under the distress warrant issued to enforce the lien given

by statute. But in this respect it is the full equivalent of a com-

mon-law distress—the lien of which is held not to be discharged

by § 67/. Re West Side Paper Co., supra; Austin v. O'Reilly,

2 Woods, 670, Fed. Cas. No. 665.

The fact that the warrant could be levied upon property which

had never been on the rented premises does not change the

nature of the landlord's right, though it may increase the extent

of his security. The statutory restrictions as to date, rank, and

priority may be important in a controversy with other lienhold-

ers, but was wholly immaterial in this contest between the land-

lord and trustee, where the latter was only representing general

creditors. As against them the landlord had, from the beginning

of the tenancy, the right to a statutory lien, which had com-

pletely ripened and attached before the filing of the petition in

bankruptcy. The priority arising from the levy of the distress

warrant was not secured because Mayer had been first in a race
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of diligence, but was given by law because of the nature of the

claim and the relation between himself as landlord and Burns

as tenant. In issuing the distress warrant the justice acted min-

isterially. Savage v. Oliver, 110 Ga. 638, 36 S. E. 54. The sheriff

was not required to return it to any court, and no judicial hear-

ing or action was necessary to authorize him to sell for the pur-

pose of realizing funds with which to pay the rent. Such a lien

was not created by a judgment nor "obtained through legal

proceedings.''

Decisions to the same effect were made under the bankruptcy

act of 1867 (14 Stat. at L. 522, § 14, c. 176), which dissolved

attachments or mesne process within four months prior to the

filing of the petition. In Austin v. O'Reilly, supra, decided in

1875, it appeared that in Mississippi the landlord had no lien,

but, as in Georgia, was authorized to seize (but by attachment)

the tenant's goods wherever found. Justice Bradley, presiding

at circuit, said that the landlord's right to a distress at common

law was not a strict lien, but'' being commonly called a lien, and

being a peculiar right in the nature of a lien, • * • the Su-

preme Court of the United States, and most of the District and

as soon as the same is due." It declares ( § 2i95) that landlords
·'shall have a general lien on the property of the tenaut, liable
to levy and sale • • • which dates from the levy of the
distress warrant to enforce the same." It is true that prior to
levy it covers uo specific property, and attaches only to what is
seized under the distress warrant issued to en/orcc the lien given
by statute. But in this respect it is the full e11uivale11t of a l'Olllmon-law distres.5-the lien of which is held not to be disclrnrged
by § G7/. Re \Vest Side Paper Co., supra; Austin v. 0 'Rf'illy,
~ Woods, 670, F'ed. Cas. No. 665.
The fact that the warrant could be levied upon property which
had never been on the rented premises does not change the
11ature of the landlord's right, though it may increase the extent
of his security. The statutory restrictions as to date, rank, and
priority may be important in a controversy with other lienholders, but was wholly immaterial in this contest between the landlord and trustee, where the latter was only representing general
creditors. As against them the landlord had, from the begiuning
of the tE:nancy, the right to a statutory lien, which had com- j
pletely ripened and attached before the filing of the petition in
baukruptcy. The priority arising from the levy of the distress
warrant was not secured because Mayer had been first in a race
of diligence, but was given by law because of the uature of the (
claim and the relation between himself as landlord and Burns
as tenant. In issuing the distress warrant the justice acted ministerially. Savage v. Oliver, 110 Ga. 638, 36 S. E. 54. The sheriff
was not required to return it to any court, and no judicial hearing or action was necessary to authorize him to sell for the purpose of realizing funds with which to pay the rent. Such a lien \
was not created by a judgment nor ''obtained through legal
prQceedings. ''
Decisions to the same effect were made under the bankruptcy
act of 1867 (14 Stat. at L. 522, §14, c. 176), which dissolved
attachments or mesne process within four months prior to the
filing of the petition. In Austin v. 0 'Reilly., supra, decided in
1875, it appeared that in :Mississippi the la.ndlord had no lien,
but, as in Georgia, was authorized to seize (but by attachment)
the tenant's goods wherever found. Justice Bradley, presiding
at circuit, said that the landlord's right to a distress at common
law was not a strict lien, but "being commonly called a lien, and
being a peculiar right in the nature of a lien, • • • the Supreme Court of the United States, and most of the District and
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Circuit Courts, have regarded it as fairly to be classed as a lien,

within the true intent and meaning of the bankrupt act," and

that the statutory attachment being in the nature of a common-

law distress was not nullified or discharged by the bankruptcy

proceedings.

There is nothing in the act of 1898 opposed to this conclu-

sion. On the contrary, its general provisions indicate a purpose

to continue the same policy, and an intent, as against general

creditors, to preserve rights like those given by the Georgia stat-

ute to landlords, even though the lien was enforced and attached

by levy of a distress warrant within four months of the filing of

the petition in bankruptcy.23

Affirmed.

POPE v. TITLE GUARANTY & SURETY CO.

152 Wis. 611, 140 N. W. 348

(Supreme Court of Wisconsin. March 19, 1913)

BARNES, J. On July 8, 1911, the plaintiff commenced an

action against the National Boat & Engine Company and attached

Circuit Courts, have regarded it as fairly to be classed as a lien,
within the true intent and meaning of the bankrupt act," and
that the statutory attachment being in the nature of a commonlaw ilistress was not nullified or discharged by the bankruptcy
proceedings.
·
There is nothing in the act of 1898 opposed to this conclusion. On the contrary, its general provisions indicate a purpose
to continue the same policy, and an intent, as against general
cre<litors, to preserve rights like those given by the Georgia statute to landlords, even though the lien was enforced and attached
by levy of a distress warrant within four months of the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy.23
Affirmed.

its property. On July 14th the attachment was released on a

bond conditioned to pay on demand the amount of any judg-

ment which the plaintiff might recover. This bond was signed

as surety by the Title Guaranty & Surety Company, the defend-

POPE v. TITLE GUARANTY & SURETY CO.
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ant in the present action. Judgment by default was taken in the

original action on August 3, 1911. On September 5, 1911, the

152 Wis. 611, 140 N. W. 348

defendant therein was adjudged a bankrupt. This action is

brought against the surety to recover the amount of the judg-

ment secured by plaintiff against the bankrupt.

(Supreme Court of Wisconsin. March 19, 1913)

The substantial question in the case is whether the adjudica-

tion in bankruptcy destroyed the judgment and released the

surety from liability. The answer to this question depends upon

the construction that should be placed on § 67, subd. "f," of the

bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 564, 565 [U. S.

Comp. St. 1901, p. 3449]; 1 Fed. Stat. Ann. 693). This section

reads as follows: "That all levies, judgments, attachments, or

other liens, obtained through legal proceedings against a person

who is insolvent, at any time within four months prior to the

23—See Hulbutt v. Brown, 72 N. 642; Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U. 8.

H. 235; Doe v. Childress, 21 Wait 165.

BARNES, J. On July 8, 1911, the plaintiff commenced an
action against the National Boat & Engine Company and attached
its property. On July 14th the attachment was released on a
bond conilitioned to pay on demand the amount of any judgment which the plaintiff might recover. This bond was signed
as surety by the 'fitle Guaranty & Surety Company, the defendant in the present action. Judgment by default was taken in the
original action on August 3, 1911. On September 5, 1911, the
defendant therein was adjudged a bankrupt. This action is
brought against the surety to recover the amount of the judgment secured by plaintiff against the bankrupt.
The substantial question in the case is whether the adjudication in haukruptcy destroyed the judgment and released the
surety from liability. The answer to this question depends upon
the construction that should be placed on § 67, subd. "f," of the
bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 564, 565 [U.S.
Comp. St. 1901, p. 3449]; 1 Fed. Stat. Ann. 693). This section
reads as follows: ''That all levies, judgments, attachments, or
other lieus, obtained through legal proceedings against a person
who is insolvent, at any time within four months prior to the
23-8ee Hulbutt v. Brown, 72 N.
H. 235; Doe v. Childresa, 21 Wall

642; Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U. 8.
165.
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filing of a petition in bankruptcy against him,24 shall be deemed

null and void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the prop-

erty affected by the levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien

shall be deemed wholly discharged and released from the same,

and shall pass to the trustee as a part of the estate of the bank-

rupt, unless the court shall, on due notice, order that the right

under such levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien shall be

preserved for the benefit of the estate; and thereupon the same

may pass to and shall be preserved by the trustee for the benefit

of the estate as aforesaid.''

If this statute is to be read literally, and it is held that the

judgment has been wiped out of existence by the proceedings in

bankruptcy, then we think it would have to be conceded that the

bondsman is absolved from liability. Its undertaking is to pay

a valid judgment, not one that is void and does not in fact exist.

If the statute only destroys any lien created by the judgment, and

simply aims to prevent the judgment creditor from obtaining any

preference or advantage over the general creditors of the bank-

rupt by virtue of his judgment, then the adjudication in bank-

ruptcy did not discharge the surety.

There are a number of decisions wherein the courts, follow-

ing the language of the statute, have said that the effect of an
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adjudication in bankruptcy, within four months after the re-

covery of a judgment against the bankrupt, is to render the

judgment void. In re Richards (D. C.) 95 Fed. 258, and In re

Beals (D. C.) 116 Fed. 530, are typical of the class of cases re-

ferred to. In nearly all of them the same result would have been

reached had the courts held that it was the liens created by the

judgments that had been destroyed, and not the judgments them-

selves. The point presently under discussion was neither in-

volved nor considered in the great majority of these cases, which

are relied upon by the appellant, and therefore they cannot be

accorded any great weight in deciding the question before us.

Congress gets its power to legislate on the subject of bank-

ruptcy from § 8 of article 1 of the Constitution, which empowers

it to pass "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies through-

cut the United States." It has been held, correctly, we think,

that the "subject of bankruptcies includes the distribution of

the property of the fraudulent or insolvent debtor among his

24—This language doea not apply

to involuntary bankruptcy alone. In

re Blair, 108 Fed. 529, where In re

De Lue, 91 Fed. 510, to the contrary,

is declared to be erroneous.

filing of a petition in bankruptcy against bim, 24 shall be deemed
null and void in case be is adjudged a bankrupt, and the property affected by the levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien
shall be deemed wholly discharged and releRsed from the same,
and shall pass to the trustee as a part of the estate of the bankrupt, unless the court shall, on due notice, order ~hat the right
under such levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien shall be
preserved for the benefit of the estate; and thereupon the same
may pass to and shall be preserved by the trustee for the benefit
of the estate as aforesaid.''
If this statute is to be read literally, and it is held that the
judgment has been wiped out of existence by the proceedings in
bankruptcy, then we think it would have to be conceded that the
bondsman is absolved from liability. I ts undertaking is to pay
a valid judgment, not one that is void and does not in fact exist.
If the statute only destroys any lien created by the judgment, and
simply aims to prevent the judgment creditor from obtaining any
preference or advantage over the general creditors of the bankrupt by virtue of his judgment, then the adjudication in bankruptcy did not discharge the surety.
There are a number of decisions wherein the courts, following the language of the st.atute, have said that the effect of an
adjudication in bankruptcy, within four months after the recovery of a judgment against the bankrupt, is to render the
judgment void. In re Richards (D. C.) 95 Fed. 258, and In re
Beals (D. C.) 116 Fed. 530, are typical of the class of cases referred to. In nearly all of them the same result would have been
reached had the courts held that it was the liens created by the
judgments that had been destroyed, and not the judgments themselves. The point presently under discussion was neither involved nor considered in the great majority of these cases, which
are relied upon by the appellant, and therefore they cannot be
Recorded any great weight in deciding the question before us.
Congress gets its power to legislate 011 the subject of bankruptcy from § 8 of article 1 of the Constitution, which empowers
it to pass "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughC1Ut the United States.'' It has been held, correctly, we think,
that the "subject of bankruptcies includes the distribution of
the property of the fraudulent or insolvent debtor among his
24--Tbis language does not apply
to involuntary bankruptcy alone. In
re Blair, 108 Fed. 529, where In re

De Lue, 91 Fed. 510, to the contrary,
is declared to be erroneous.
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creditors, and the discharge of the debtor from his contracts and

legal liabilities, as well as all the intermediate and incidental

matters tending to the accomplishment or promotion of these two

principal ends." Silverman's Case, 2 Abb. U. S. 243, 245, Fed.

Cas. No. 12,855.

The present bankruptcy act aims to secure an equal and equi-

table distribution of the debtor's property among his creditors,

and to promote that end has in effect provided that no preference

or advantage may be obtained by one creditor over another by

virtue of any attachment, garnishment, or levy made within four

months of the adjudication in bankruptcy. This is as far as it

was necessary for Congress to go to attain the ends aimed at.

It may well be doubted whether Congress could go to the extent

claimed. A creditor has a right to sue his debtor. State Courts

have jurisdiction of the persons of the parties, if they live therein,

and of the subject-matter of an action on contract brought to

collect a debt. A judgment in such an action is valid when

rendered. Congress can say to the creditor, "You may not ob-

tain any special advantage by virtue of the judgment over other

creditors in the distribution of the bankrupt's estate," and fur-

ther that the creditor may be discharged from his debts, and

that the judgment cannot be enforced against him. But can it
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say, for instance, that the judgment is not evidence of the

amount of the indebtedness due from the bankrupt to the judg-

ment creditor? Or that the judgment is unenforceable if the

bankrupt is not entitled to a discharge under the law? Or that

the judgment creditor may not proceed against a surety whose

liability depends on the validity of the judgment, where such

action in no way affects the other creditors of the bankrupt?

Whatever may be the correct answers to these questions, they

pointedly suggest the improbability of congressional intent to

legislate to the extent claimed, and to the extent to which a lit-

eral reading of the statute would lead. It was wholly unneces-

sary to do so. The judgment of the Wisconsin court was valid

when it was rendered, and the liability of the surety became

fixed at such time. If the creditor had any real estate to which

the lien of the judgment attached, such lien was destroyed by the

adjudication in bankruptcy, because such destruction was neces-

sary to preserve the property for all of the creditors. The same

would be true of the attachment lien if that had continued. If

the bankrupt was discharged, the judgment could not be enforced

against him, because Congress had the right to absolve the bank-

creditors, and the discharge of the debtor from his contracts and
legal liabilities, as well as all the intermediate and incidental
matters tending to the accomplishment or promotion of these two
principal ends.'' Silverman's Case, 2 Abb. U. S. 243, 245, Fed.
Cas. No. 12,855.
The present bankruptcy act aims to secure an equal and equitable distribution of the debtor's property among his creditors,
and to promote that end has in effect provided that no preference
or advantage may be obtained by one creditor over another by
virtue of any attachment, garnishment, or levy made within four
months of the adjudication in bankruptcy. This is as far as it
was necessary for Congress to go to attain the ends aimed at.
It may well be doubted whether Congress could go to the extent
claimed. A creditor has a right t-0 sue his debtor. State Courts
have jurisdiction of the persons of the parties, if they live therein,
and of the subject-matter of an action on contract brought to
collect a debt. A judgment in such an action is valid when
rendered. Congress can say to the creditor, ''You may not obtain any special advantage by virtue of the judgment over other
creditors in the distribution of the bankrupt's estate," and further that the creditor may be discharged from his debts, and
that the judgment cannot be enforced against him. But can it
say, for instance, that the judgment is not evidence of the
a.mount of the indebtedness due from the bankrupt to the judgment credit-Orf Or that the judgment is unenforceable if the
bankrupt is not entitled to a discharge under the law T Or that
the judgment creditor may not proceed against a surety whose
liability depends on the validity of the judgment, where such
action in no way affects the otht>r credit-Ors of the bankrupt T
Whatever may be the correct answers to these questions, they
pointedly suggest the improbability of congressional intent to
legislate t-0 the extent claimed, and to the extent to which a literal reading of the statute would lead. It was wholly unnecessary to do so. The judgment of the Wisconsin court was valid
when it was rendered, and the liability of the surety became
fixed at such time. If the creditor had any real estate to which
the lien of the judgment attached, such lien was destroyed by the
adjudication in bankruptcy, because such destruction was necessury to preserve the property for all of the creditors. The same
would be true of the attachment lien if that had continued. If
the bankrupt was discharged, the judgment could not be enforced
11gainst him, because Congress had the right to absolve the bank-
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rupt from his debts after his property or the proceeds of it were

distributed among the creditors. It was wholly unnecessary to

discharge the surety from the payment of its obligation in order

to protect either the debtor or the creditors.

Aside from what has been said, there are a number of consid-

erations which warrant the conclusion that the statute aimed at

the lien created by a judgment rather than the judgment itself.

The words "all judgments," found in § 67/ heretofore quoted,

are found in the act under the subtitle "liens," and are found

in connection with the words "levies, attachments, and other

liens," indicating that it was the lien, rather than the judgment

itself, that Congress intended to reach.

§ 63a of the bankruptcy act provides that judgments are prov-

able as claims against the estate of the bankrupt, without regard

to the time of their rendition. Congress certainly did not intend

that a void judgment could be proved as a claim in the bank-

ruptcy proceeding.

Subsection 5 of § 63a provides that judgments rendered after

the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, and before the consid-

eration of the application for the discharge, may be proved

against the estate of the bankrupt, less costs incurred and inter-

est accrued after the time of filing the petition.
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Under § 17, judgments in actions for frauds or obtaining

property under false pretenses or for willful and malicious in-

jury to the person or property of another are not affected at

all by a discharge in bankruptcy. Such a judgment is perfectly

valid if entered the day before filing the petition in bankruptcy.

If § 67 is to receive a literal construction, it is obviously incon-

sistent with § 17, because the words "all judgments" would in-

clude one rendered in any of the classes of cases provided for

in said § 17.

§ 905, Rev. St. (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 677), provides that

the records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any state

or territory, when duly authenticated as therein specified, shall

have such faith and credit given them in every court in the

United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the

state from which they are taken. This statute, in substantially

its present form, was enacted in 1790; and it is hardly suppos-

able that Congress intended to amend or partially repeal it by

§ 67/ of the bankruptcy act.

Again, if the words "all judgments" are to be literally con-

strued, they must be held to include judgments rendered in

rupt from his debts after his property or the proceeds of it were
distributed among the creditors. It wfls wholly unnecessary to
discharge the surety from the payment of its obligation in order
to protect either the debtor or the creditors.
Aside from what has been said, there are a number of consid·
erations which warrant the conclusion that the statute aimed at
the lien created by a judgment rather than the judgment itself.
The words "all judgments," found in § 67/ heretofore quoted,
are found in the act under the subtitle "liens," and are found
in connection with the words ''levies, attachments, and other
liens," indicating that it was the lien, rather than the judgment
itself, that Congress intended to reach.
§ 63a of the bankruptcy act provides that judgments are provable as claims against the estate of the bankrupt, without regard
to the time of their rendition. Congress certainly did not intend
that a. void judgment could be proved as a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding.
Subsection 5 of § 63a provides that judgments rendered after
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, and before the con.sideration <>f the application for the discharge, may be proved
against the estate of the bankrupt, less costs incurred and interest accrued after the time of filing the petition.
Under § 17, judgments in actions for frauds or obtaining
property under false pretenses or for willful and malicious injury to the person or property of another are not affected at
all by a discharge in bankmptcy. Such a judgment is perfectly
valid if entered the day before filing the petition in bankruptcy.
If § 67 is to receive a literal construction, it is obviously inconsistent with § 17, because the words "all judgments" would include one rendered in any of the classes of cases provided for
in said § 17.
§ 905, Rev. St. (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 677), provides that
the records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any state
or territory, when duly authenticated as therein specified, shall
have such faith and credit given them in every court in the
United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the
state from which they are taken. This statute, in substantially
its present form, was enacted in 1790 ; and it is hardly supposable that Congress intended to amend or partially repeal it by
§ 67/ of the bankruptcy act.
Again, if the words ''all judgments'' are to be literally construed, they must be held to include judgments rendered in
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courts of foreign countries, regardless of treaty stipulations, and

perhaps even judgments in the court in which the bankruptcy

proceedings are being carried on. We hold that the words "all

judgments" are qualified and denned by their context, and that

it is the lien or preference created by the judgment that is void.

This conclusion is not without support in the authorities. Doyle

v. Heath, 22 R. I. 213, 47 Atl. 213, is a well-considered case

directly in point. The case of In re Richards, heretofore cited,

was appealed, and the Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming the

judgment, was careful to say that it was the lien of the judg-

ment that § 67/ declared to be void. 96 Fed. 935, 37 C. C. A.

684. In re Pease, 4 Am. Baukr. Rep. 547, is likewise in point.

In this case it is said that § 67/ was incorporated in the bank-

ruptcy act by the conference committee; and the following quo-

tation is made from the report of the House conferees as found

in the Congressional Record, Second Session, Thirty-fifth Con-

gress, p. 7205: "By an addition to § 67, which relates to liens,

the bill has been materially strengthened. • * • In effect.

liens of any description obtained upon the property of a bank-

rupt within four months of the adjudication are made null and

void, except where given for a new and fair consideration to a

person who has no notice of the insolvency or reasonable cause
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for inquiry." This quotation would indicate that the authors

of the section had in mind the matter of declaring liens void,

rather than judgments. Other cases holding that judgments

recovered within four months of the adjudication in bankruptcy

are not void are In re Kavanaugh (D. C), 99 Fed. 928; In re

Beaver Coal Co. (D. C), 110 Fed. 630; In re Blair (D. C), 108

Fed. 529. Moreover, the federal Supreme Court has held that

§ 67/ should not receive a literal construction, and in substance

and effect has said that it is the lien of the judgment, and not

the judgment itself, that is destroyed. Metcalf v. Barker, 187

U. S. 165, 174, 23 Sup. Ct. 67, 47 L. ed. 122. Our own court

held in Bank of Commerce v. Elliott, 109 Wis. 648, 85 N. W.

417, that filing a petition in bankruptcy does not prevent a party

from maintaining and prosecuting an action against the bank-

rupt in the state courts, and that the creditor can only defeat

such an action if meritorious by pleading, his discharge in the

bankruptcy proceedings.

Holding, as we do, that the judgment was not void, we see no

good reason why the surety should escape liability. The contin-

gency has arisen under which it agreed to respond in damages.

courts of foreign countries, regardless of treaty stipulations, and
perhaps even judgments in the court in which the bankruptcy
proceedings are being carried on. We hold that the words •'all
judgments'' are qualified and defined by their context, and that
it is the lien or preference created by the judgment that is void.
This conclusion is not without support in the authorities. Doyle
v. Heath, 22 R. I. 21il, 47 Atl. 213, is a well-considered case
directly in point. The case of In re Richards, heretofore cited,
was appealed, and the Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming the
judgment, was careful to say that it was the lien of the judgment th.at § 67/ declared to be void. 96 Fed. 935, 37 C. C. A.
634. In re Pease, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 547, is like\\ise in point.
In this case it is said that § 67f was incorporated in the bankruptcy act by the conference committee; and the following quotation is made from the report of the House conferees as found
in the Congre,ssional Record, Second Session, Thirty-fifth Con.
gress, p. 7205: ''By an addition to § 67, which relates to liens,
the bill has been materially strengthened. • • • In effect.
liens of any description obtained upon the property of a bankrupt within four months of the adjudication are made null and
void, except where given for a new and fair consideration to a
person who has no notice of the insolvency or reasonable c&US{'
for inquiry." This quotation would indicate that the authors
of the section had in mind the matter of declaring liens void,
rather than judgments. Other cases holding that judgments
recovered within four months of the adjudication in bankruptcy
are not void are In re Kavanaugh ( D. C.) , 99 Fed. 928 ; Iu re
Beaver Coal Co. (D. C.), 110 Fed. 630; In re Blair (D. C.), 108
Fed. 529. Moreover, the federal Supreme Court has held that
§ 67/ should not receive a literal construction, and in substance
and effect has said that it is the lien of the Judgment, and not
the judgment itself, that is destroyed. :Metcalf v. Barker, 187
U. S. 165, 174, 23 Sup. Ct. 67, 47 L. ed. 122. Our own court
held in Bank of Commerce v. Elliott, 109 'Vis. 648, 85 N. \V.
417, that filing a petition in bankruptcy does not prevent a party
from maintaining and prosecuting an action against the bankrupt in the state courts, and that the creditor ean only defeat
such an action if meritorious by pleading, his discharge in the
bankruptcy proceedings.
Holding, as we do, that the judgment was not void, we see no
good reason why the surety should escape liability. The contingency has arisen under which it agreed to respond in damages.
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The mere fact that plaintiff, by reason of the bankruptcy pro-

ceedings, cannot enforce his judgment against the bankrupt does

not extend immunity to the surety. It agreed to pay when

judgment was rendered against its principal. That event having

taken place, the surety should respond. Wolf v. Stix, 99 U. S.

1, 8, 25 L. ed. 309. Indeed, many of the eases recognize the

right of the creditor to take a judgment, coupled with a per-

petual stay of execution, in order that the event may take place

on which the liability of the surety is made to depend; and this

court recognized the existence and the propriety of such a rule

in Whereatt v. Ellis, 103 Wis. 352, 79 N. W. 416, 74 Am. St.

Rep. 865. The decision in that case is conclusive as to the lia-

bility of the surety here. There is no difference in principle

between the two cases.

Some cases are cited which deal with the effect of a discharge

in the bankruptcy proceedings. No such question is in the ease.

No discharge was either pleaded or proved; and we infer from

the record that the bankruptcy proceedings had not been wound

up when this case was tried.

Judgment affirmed.

CLARKE v. LARREMORE

188 U. S. 486, 47 L. ed. 555, 23 Sup. Ct. 363
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(United States Supreme Court. February 23, 1903)

On January 23, 1899, the petitioner, the owner of certain notes

of Raymond W. Kenney, commenced an action thereon in the

Supreme Court of the state of New York. On March 6, 1899, he

recovered judgment for the sum of $20,906.66. An execution,

issued thereon, was by the sheriff of the county of New York

The mere fad that plaintiff, by reason of the bankruptcy proceedings, cannot enforce his judgment ~gainst the bankrupt does
not extend immunity to the surety. It agreed to pay when
judgment was rendered against its principal. That event having
taken place, the surety .should respond. 'Volf v. Stix, 99 U. S.
1, 8, 25 L. ed. 309. Indeed, many of the eases recognize the
right of the creditor to take a judgment, coupled with a perpetual stay of execution, in order that the event may take place
on which the liability of the surety is made to depend; and this
court recognized the existence and the propriety of imch a rule
in Whereatt v. Ellis, 103 Wis. 352, 79 N. W. 416, 74 Am. St.
Rep. 865. The decision in that case is conclusive as to the liability of the surety here. There is no difference in principle
between the two caseB.
Some cases are cited which deal with the effect of a discharge
in the bankruptcy proceedings. No such question is in the case.
No discharge WM either pleaded or proved; and we infer from
the record that the bankruptcy proceedings had not been wound
up when this case was tried.
Judgment affirmed.

levied upon a stock of goods and fixtures belonging to Kenney.

A sheriff's sale thereof, had on March 15, 1899, realized $12,-

451.09. Shortly after the levy of the execution Leon Abbett

sued out in the same court a writ of attachment against the

CLARKE v. LARREMORE

property of Kenney, and caused it to be levied upon the same

stock and fixtures. Immediately thereafter, claiming that the

188 U. S. 486, 47 L. ed. 555, 23 Sup. Ct. 363

debt in judgment was a fraudulent one, he commenced in aid of

his attachment an injunction suit to prevent the further en-

(United States Supreme Court. February 23, 1903)

forcement of the judgment, and obtained a temporary order

restraining: the sheriff from paying petitioner the money received

upon the execution sale. Upon a hearing the Supreme Court

On January 23, 1899, the petitioner, the owner of certain notes
of Reymond W. Kenney, commenced an action thereon in the
Supreme Court of the state of New York. On March 6, 1899, he
recovered judgment for the sum of $20,906.66. An execution,
issued thereon, was by the sheriff of the county of New York
levied upon a stock of goods and fixtures belonging to Kenney.
A sheriff's sale thereof, had on March 15, 1899, realized $12,451.09. Shortly after the levy of the execution Leon Abbett
sued out in the same court a writ of attachment against the
property of Kenney, and caused it to be levied upon the same
stock and fixtures. Immediately thereafter, claiming that the
debt in judgment was a fraudulent one, he commenced in aid of
his attachment an injunction suit to prevent the further enforcement of the judgment, and obtained a temporary order
restraining the sheriff from paying petitioner the money received
upon the execution sale. Upon a hearing the Supreme Court
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decided that the debt was just and honest, and on April 13,1899,

set aside the restraining order. On the same day, and before

the sheriff had returned the execution or paid the money col-

lected on it, a petition in involuntary bankruptcy against Ken-

ney was filed in the United States District Court for the southern

district of New York, and an order made by the district judge

restraining the sheriff from paying the money to Clarke, the

execution creditor. 95 Fed. 427. Kenney was thereafter ad-

judged a bankrupt, and on November 25, 1899, the plaintiff

having been appointed trustee in bankruptcy, the district judge

entered a further order directing the sheriff to pay the money

to the trustee. 97 Fed. 555. On review, the United States Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals for the second circuit affirmed these orders

of the district judge (45 C. C. A. 113, 105 Fed. 897), and there-

upon a certiorari was granted by this court. 180 U. S. 640, 45

L. ed. 711, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 927.

•••

Mr. Justice BREWER delivered the opinion of the court:

The contention of the petitioner is that—

"The sheriff having sold the goods levied on before the filing

of the petition in bankruptcy, the proceeds of the sale were the

property of the plaintiff in execution, and not of the bankrupt,
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at the time of the adjudication, and the trustee, therefore, has

no title to the same."

decided that the debt was just and honest, and on April 13, 1899,
set aside the restraining order. On the same day, and before
the sheriff had returned the execution or paid the money collected on it, a petition in involuntary bankruptcy against Kenney wa.s filed in the United States District Court for the southern
district of New York, and an order made by the district judge
restraining the sheriff from paying the money to Clarke, the
execution creditor. 95 Fed. 427. Kenney was thereafter adjudged a bankrupt, and on November 25, 1899, the plaintift
having been appointed trustee in bankruptcy, the district judge
entered a further order directing the sheriff to pay the money
to the trustee. 97 Fed. 555. On review, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the second circuit affirmed these orders
of the district judge (45 C. C. A. 113, 105 Fed. 897), and there·
upon a certwrari was granted by this court. 180 U. S. 640, 45
L. ed. 711, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 927.

• • •

This contention cannot be sustained. The judgment in favor

of petitioner against Kenney was not like that in Metcalf

Bros. v. Barker, 187 U. S. 165, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 67, one

giving effect to a lien theretofore existing, but one which, with

the levy of an execution issued thereon, created the lieu; and as

judgment, execution, and levy were all within four months prior

to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the lien created

thereby became null and void on the adjudication of bankruptcy.

This nullity and invalidity relate back to the time of the entry

of the judgment, and affect that and all subsequent proceedings.

The language of the statute [67/] is not "when" but "in case he

is adjudged a bankrupt," and the lien obtained through these

legal proceedings was by the adjudication rendered null and

void from its inception. Further, the statute provides that

"the property affected by"—not the property subject to—the

lien is wholly discharged and released therefrom. It is true

that the stock and fixtures, the property originally belonging to

Mr. Justice BREWER delivered the opinion of the court:
The conteution of the petitioner is that''The sheriff having sold the goods levied on before the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy, the proceeds of the sale were the
property of the plaintiff in execution, and not of the bankrupt,
at the time of the adjudication, and the trustee, therefore, bas
no title to the same."
This contention cannot be sustained. The judgment in favor
of petitioner against Kenney was not like that in Metcalf
Bros. v. Barker, 187 U. S. 165, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 67, one
giving effect to a lien theretofore existing, but one which, with
the levy of an execution issued thereon, created the lien; and as
judgment, execution, and levy were all within four months prior
to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the lien created
thereby became null and void on the adjudication of bankruptcy.
This nullity and invalidity relate back to the time of the entry
of the judgment, and affect that and all subsequent proeeedings.
The language of the statute [ 67fl is not ''when'' but ''in case he
is adjudged a bankrupt,'' and the lien obtained through these
legal proceedings w:as by the adjudica.tion rendered null and
void from its inception. Further, the statute provides that
"the property affected by "-not the propei1;y subject to--the
lien is wholly discharged and released therefrom. It is true
that the stock and fixtures, the property originally belonging to
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the bankrupt, had been sold, but having, so far as the record

shows, passed to a "bona fide purchaser for value," it remained

by virtue of the last clause of the section the property of the

purchaser, unaffected by the bankruptcy proceedings. But the

money received by the sheriff took the place of that property.

It is said that that money was not the property of the bank-

rupt, but of the creditor in the execution. Doubtless as between

the judgment creditor and debtor, and while the execution re-

mained in force, the money could not be considered the property

of the debtor, and could not be appropriated to the payment of

his debts as against the rights of the judgment creditor, but it

had not become the property absolutely of the creditor. The

writ of execution had not been fully executed. Its command to

the sheriff was to seize the property of the judgment debtor,

sell it, and pay the proceeds over to the creditor. The time

within which that was to be done had not elapsed, and the execu-

tion was still in his hands, not fully executed. The rights of

the creditor were still subject to interception. Suppose, for in-

stance, there being no bankruptcy proceedings, the judgment

had been reversed by an appellate court and the mandate of

reversal filed in the trial court; could it for a moment be

claimed that, notwithstanding the reversal of the judgment, the
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money in the hands of the sheriff belonged to the judgment

creditor, and could be recovered by him, or that it was the duty

of the sheriff to pay it to him? The purchaser at the sheriff's

sale might keep possession of the property which he had pur-

chased, but the money received as the proceeds of such sale would

undoubtedly belong and be paid over to the judgment debtor.

The bankruptcy proceedings operated in the same way. They

took away the foundation upon which the rights of the creditor,

obtained by judgment, execution, levy, and sale, rested. The

duty of the sheriff to pay the money over to the judgment cred-

itor was gone and that money became the property of the bank-

rupt, and was subject to the control of his representative in

bankruptcy.

It was held in Turner v. Fendall, 1 Cranch, 116, 2 L. ed. 53,

that money collected by a sheriff on an execution could not be

levied upon under execution placed in his hands against the

judgment creditor, and that the latter could maintain an action

against the sheriff for a failure to pay the money thus collected.

A similar ruling was made in New York (Baker v. Kenworthy,

41 N. Y. 215), in which it appeared that a sheriff had collected

the bankrupt, had been sold, but having, so far as the record
shows, passed to a "bona fick purchaser for value,'' it remained
by virtue of the last clause of the section the property of the
purchaser, unaffected by the bankruptcy proceedings. But the
money received by the sheriff took the place of that property.
It is said that that money was not the property of the bankrupt, but of the creditor in the execution. Doubtless as between
the judgment creditor and debtor, and while the execution remained in force, the money could not be considered the property
of the debtor, and could not be appropriated to the payment of
his debts as against the rights of the judgment creditor, but it
had not become the property absolutely of the creditor. The
writ of execution had not been fully executed. Its command to
the sheriff was to seize the property of the · judgment debtor,
sell it, and pay the proceeds over to the creditor. The time
within which th.at was to be done had not elapsed, and the execution was still in his hands, not fully executed. The rights of
the creditor were still subject to interception. Suppose, for instance, there being no bankruptcy proceedings, the judgment
had been reversed by an 8ppellate court and the mandate of
reversal filed in the trial court; could it for l!- moment be
claimed that, notwithstanding the reversal of the judgment, the
money in the hands of the sheriff belonged to the judgment
creditor, and could be recovered by him, or that it was the duty
of the sheriff to pay it to him 1 The purchaser at the sheriff's
sale might keep possession of the property which he had purcha~d, but the money received as the proceeds of such sale would
undoubtedly belong and be paid over to the judgment debtor.
The bankruptcy proceedings operated in the same way. They
took away the foundation upon which the rights of the creditor,
obtained by judgment, execution, levy, and sale, rested. The
duty of the sheriff to pay the money over to the judgment creditor was gone and that money became the property of the bankrupt, and was subject to the control of his representative in
bankruptcy.
It was held in Turner v. Fendall, 1 Cranch, 116, 2 L. ed. 53,
that money collected by a sheriff on an execution could not be
levied upon under execution placed in his hands against the
judgment creditor, and that the latter could maintain an action
against the sheriff for a failure to pay the money thus collected.
A similar ruling was made in New York (Baker v. Kenworthy,
41 N. Y. 215), in which it appeared that a sheriff had collected
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money on an execution in favor of one Brooks; that he returned

the execution without paying the money to Brooks, but, on the

contrary, levied upon it under an execution against Brooks,

and it was held that such levy did not release him from liability

to Brooks. It was said in the opinion (p. 216):

"The money paid into the hands of the sheriff on the execu-

tion in favor of Brooks did not become the property of Brooks

until it had been paid over to him. Until that was done, the

sheriff could not levy upon it by virtue of the execution against

Brooks then in his hands.''

The rule in that state in respect to a levy upon money in the

hands of a sheriff may have been changed,—at least, so far as

an attachment is concerned. See Wehle v. Conner, 83 N. Y. 231.

In Nelson v. Kerr, 59 N. Y. 224, it is said: '' The money col-

lected by the sheriff belongs to the plaintiff.'' But in that case

the execution had been returned, and yet the officer had not paid

the money to the execution creditor. See also Kingston Bank v.

Eltinge, 40 N. Y. 391, 100 Am. Dec. 516.

In none of those cases had anything been done to affect the

validity or force of the writ of execution. Whatever was done

was done under a writ whose validity and potency were un-

challenged and undisturbed; while here, before the writ of exe-
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cution had been fully executed, its power was taken away. Its

command had ceased to be obligatory upon the sheriff, and the

execution creditor had no right to insist that the sheriff should

further execute its commands.

A different question might have arisen if the writ had been

fully executed by payment to the execution creditor. Whether

the bankruptcy proceedings would then so far affect the judg-

ment and execution, and that which was done under them, as to

justify a recovery by the trustee in bankruptcy from the execu-

tion creditor, is a question not before us, and may depend on

many other considerations. It is enough now to hold that the

bankruptcy proceedings seized upon the writ of execution while

it was still unexecuted and released the property which was

held under it from the claim of the execution creditor.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Mr. Justice WHITE and Mr. Justice PECKHAM dissented.

money on an execution in favor of one Brooks; that he returned
the execution without paying the money to Brooks, but, on the
contrary, levied upon it under an execution against Brooks,
and it was held that such levy did not release him from liability
to Brooks. It was said in the opinion ( p. 216) :
''The money paid into the hands of the sheriff on the execution in favor of Brooks did not become the property of Brooks
until it had been paid over to him. Until that was done, the
sheri1f could not levy upon it by virtue of the execution against
Brooks then in his hands.''
The rule in that state in respect to a levy upon money in the
hands of a sheriff may have been changed,-at least, so far as
an attachment is concerned. See Wehle v. Conner, 83 N. Y. 231.
In Nelson v. Kerr, 59 N. Y. 224, it is said: ''The money col.
lected by the sheriff belongs to the plaintiff.'' But in that case
the execution had been returned, and yet the officer had not paid
the money to the execution creditor. See also Kingston Bank v.
Eltinge, 40 N. Y. 391, 100 Am. Dec. 516.
In none of those cCLSes had anything been done to affect the
validity or force of the writ of execution. Whatever was done
was done under a writ whose validity and potency were unchallenged and undisturbed; while here, before the writ of execution had been fully executed, its power was taken away. It.s
command had ceased to be obligatory upon the sheriff, and the
execution creditor had no right to insist that the sheriff should
further execute its commands.
A different question might have arisen if the writ had been
fully executed by payment to the execution creditor. Whether
the bankruptcy proceedings would then so far affect the judgment and execution, and that which was done under them, as to
justify a recovery by the trustee in bankruptcy from the execution creditor, is a question not before us, and may depend on
many other considerations. It is enough now to hold that the
bankruptcy proceedings seized upon the writ of execution while
it was still unexecuted and released the property which was
held under it from the claim of the execution creditor.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Mr. Justice WHITE and Mr. Justice PECKHAM dissented.
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In re RESNEK

167 Fed. 574

(District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania. February 9, 1909)

In re RESNEK

HOLLAND, District Judge. In this case the judgment had

been entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton

167 Fed. 574

county, the levy and sale made, and the money paid over to

Albert H. Resnek on the 9th day of December, 1907, within

(District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

February 9, 1909)

four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy against

the alleged bankrupts, which took place on the 16th day of

March, 1908, and the adjudication was entered April 16, 1908.

Upon the presentation of a petition, the referee summarily di-

rected Albert H. Resnek to pay over to the trustee in bank-

ruptcy the net proceeds received from the sheriff on the execu-

tion, to which order Resnek excepted, and the question is certi-

fied to this court for determination as to whether the referee,

under the circumstances, had jurisdiction to make this summary

order.

Where, within four months before the filing of a petition in

bankruptcy against an insolvent debtor, an execution has been

issued and levy and sale made and the proceeds paid over to the

judgment creditor before the filing of the petition, the case does

not fall within the provisions of § 67/ of the bankrupt act (Act
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July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 565 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p.

3450]), and the lien created by the judgment and levy is not

rendered void by the adjudication. The remedy, if any, the

trustee has against the creditor, is under the provisions of

§§ 60a and 60b of the bankrupt act in a plenary action, where

it will be necessary to allege and show that the creditor had

reasonable cause to believe that the bankrupt, by suffering judg-

ment to be taken against him, intended to give a preference.

In re Blair (D. C), 102 Fed. 987; In re Bailey (D. C), 144

Fed. 214. And this is true, even though the proceeds of the

execution are insufficient to satisfy the claim of the judgment

creditor. In re Knickerbocker (D. C), 121 Fed. 1004.

It follows, therefore, that the order of the referee must be

reversed. It is so ordered.

HOLLAND, District Judge. In this case the judgment had
been entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton
county, the levy and SBle made, and the money paid over to
Albert H. Resnek on the 9th day of December, 1907, within
four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy against
the alleged bankrupts, which took place on the 16th day of
March, 1908, and the adjudication was entered April 16, 1908.
Upon the presentation of a petition, the referee summarily directed Albert H. Resnek to pay over to the trustee in bankruptcy the net proceeds received from the sheriff on the execution, to which order Resnek excepted, and the question is certified to this court for determination as to whether the referee,
under the circumstances, had jurisdiction to make this summary
order.
Where, within four months before the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy against an insolvent debtor, an execution has been
issued and levy and sale made and the proceeds paid over to the
judgment creditor before the filing of the petition, the case does
not fall within the provisions of § 67/ of the bankrupt act (Act
July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 565 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p.
3450]), and th·e lien created by the judgment and levy is not
rendered void by the adjudication. The remedy, if any, the
trustee has against the creditor, is under the provisions of
s§ 60a and 60b of the bankrupt act in a plenary action, where
it will be necessary to allege and show that the creditor had
reasonable cause to believe that the bankrupt, by suffering judgment to be taken against him, intended to give a preference.
In re Blair (D. C.), 102 Fed. 987; In re Bailey (D. C.), 144
Fed. 214. And this is true, even though the proceeds of the
execution are insufficient to satisfy the claim of the judgment
creditor. In re Knickerbocker (D. C.), 121 Fed. 1004.
It follows, therefore, that the order of the referee must be
reversed. It is so ordered.
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FIRST NAT. BANK v. STAAKE

202 U. S. 141, 50 L. ed. 967, 26 Sup. Ct. 580

(United States Supreme Court. April 30, 1906)

FIRST NAT. BANK v. STAAKE

This writ of certiorari was allowed to review an order of the

Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming a decree of the District

202 U. S. 141, 50 L. ed. 967, 26 Sup. Ct. 580

Court in favor of Staakej as trustee-in bankruptcy of. the estate

of Chester R. Baird, bankrupt. ^h^g»t\njrJiinT__tn t>1p rig^t* jf

(United States Supreme Court. April 30, 1906)

certain creditors, and authorizing him to enforce their attaeh-

menTlnTnsTvith Uke~torceIand^^ as the attaching creditor^—

one of which was the First National Bank_"f ^fll^t^or"—might

have done had not the bankruptcy proceedings intervened.

The facts of the case are substantially as follows: Chester R.

Baird, doing business under the name of C. R. Baird & Com-

pany, and owning certain real estate in Virginia known as the

West End Furnace Company, sold the same, December 7, 1899,

to the Roanoke Furnace Company, subject to certain encum-

brances, executed a contract in writing, and received from the

furnace company the entire consideration, namely, $500,000, in

the capital stock of the furnace company. Under this contract

of sale the furnace company took immediate possession, but no

deed to the company was made until November 5, 1900, when a

deed was executed and recorded.
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Meantime, however, and on October 26, 1900, nine different

attachments, among them one by the petitioning bank, were sued

out of the hustings court for the city of Roanoke, amounting to

over $40,000, against Baird as a nonresident, and were levied

upon the furnace property. Under the provisions of the law of

Virginia the attachments, having been levied before the deed of

the furnace property had been executed and recorded, the at-

taching creditors acquired, as against Baird and the furnace

company, a lien on the properties attached.

Within four months after the levy of the attachments, namely,

December 24, 1900, Baird was adjudicated a bankrupt in the

District Court for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, and on

January 2, 1901, the District Court for the western district of

Virginia assumed ancillary jurisdiction of such property as

was located in Virginia. On December 29, 1900, the Roanoke

Furnace Company was also adjudicated a bankrupt. On March

26, 1901, Staake was appointed trustee of Baird's estate, and

This writ of certiorari was allowed to review an order of the
Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming a decree of the District
Court in favor of S~kt as. trnoo in bankrupt<:z o_t the .f.State
of Qhe_st er R._Baird, ba.nk_ru12t, su
a · hi to th ·
of
certain~redit;;;, and a;thoriziug him to enforce their attachrq_~iif ~~ct as the attf£hing credito;=one of which was the ~atiqpal Byik of Baltimor&-might
have done had not the bankruptcy proceediugs intervened.
The facts of the case are substantially as follows: Chester R.
Baird, doing business under the name of C. R. Baird & Company, and owning certain real estate in Virginia known as the
West End Furnace Company, sold the same, December 7, 1899,
to the Roanoke Furnace Company, subject to certain encumbrances, executed a contract in writing, and received from the
furn\ace company the entire consider~tion, namely, $500,000, in
the capital stock of the furnace company. Under this contract
of sale the furnace company took immediate possession, but no
deed to the company was made until November 5, 1900, when a
deed was executed and recorded.
Meantime, however, and on October 26, 1900, nine different
attachments, among them one by the petitioning bank, were sued
out of the hustings court for the city of Roanoke, amounting to
over $40,000, against Baird as a nonresident, and were levied
upon the furnace property. Under the provisions of the law o!
Virginia the attachments, having been levied before the deed of
the furnace property had been executed and recorded, the attaching creditors acquired, as against Baird and the furnace
company, a lien on the properties attached.
Within four months after the levy of the attachments, namely,
December 24, 1900, Baird was adjudicated a bankrupt in the
District Court for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, and on
January 2, 1901, the District Court for the western district of
Virginia assumed ancillary jurisdiction of such property as
was located in Virginia. On December 29, 1900, the Roanoke
Furnace Company was also adjudicated a bankrupt. On March
26, 1901, Staake was appointed trustee of Baird's estate, and
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on June 29, 1901, John M. N. Shinier was appointed trustee of

the Roanoke Furnace Company.

It was further agreed that the deed of November 5,1900, from

Baird to the Roanoke Furnace Company, was a valid convey-

ance to a purchaser in good faith for a then fair consideration,

and was not affected by the bankruptcy proceedings.

The proceedings in question here were instituted by a peti-

tion filed by Staake, entitled both in the cases of Chester R.

Baird and the Roanoke Furnace Company, averring that under

the laws of Virginia the rights of the attaching creditors were

superior to those of the furnace company, and that as to them

the property attached was the property of Baird; but that, by

reason of his insolvency and of the fact that these attachments

had been levied within four months preceding the filing of the

petition in bankruptcy, such attachments were null and void,

unless the court should order them preserved for the benefit of

the estate. He therefore prayed that they be decreed null and

void as regards plaintiffs, but that they be preserved for the

benefit of petitioner.

The bank demurred to this petition, and also answered, deny-

ing that its attachment was null and void, and also denying the

right of the court to enter an order preserving the attachment
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for the benefit of the petitioner; and alleging that respondent

is entitled to the benefit of the attachment, said property when

sold by an interlocutory order having realized enough to pay

said attachment, as well as all prior liens.

Shimer, trustee for the Roanoke Furnace Company, also an-

swered, praying that, if the attachment be continued for the

trustee of Baird, the petitioner should be required to abate a

large claim which he filed against the estate of the Roanoke

company, by the amount of said attachments.

Upon a hearing before the District Court, that court overruled

the demurrer to Staake's petition, and authorized him to enforce

the attachment liens for the benefit of the estate. 126 Fed. 845.

The Court of Appeals affirmed this action (66 C. C. A. 547, 133

Fed. 717), and the bank petitioned this court for a writ of

certiorari, which was granted.

Mr. Justice BROWN, after making the foregoing statement,

delivered the opinion of the court:

At the time these attachments were levied, the title to the

property in question stood in the name of Baird, and the attach-
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on June 29, 1901, Johu ~I. N. Shimer was appointed trustee of
the Roanoke Furnace Company.
It was further agreed that the deed of November 5, 1900, from
Baird to the Roanoke Furnace Company, was a valid conveyance to a purchaser in good faith for a then fair consideration,
and was not affected by the bankruptcy proceedings.
The proceedings in question here were instituted by a petition filed by Staake, entitled both in the cases of Chester R.
Baird and the Roanoke Furnace Company, averring that under
the laws of Virginia the rights of the attaching creditors were
superior to those of the furnace company, and that as to them
the property attached was the property o{ Baird; but that, by
reason of his insolvency and .of the fact that these attachments
had been levied within four months preceding the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy, such attachments were null and void,
unless the court should order them preserved for the benefit of
the estate. He therefore prayed that they be deereed null and
void as regards plaintiffs, but that they be preserved for the
benefit of petitioner.
The bank demurred to this petition, and also answered, denying that its attachment was null and void, and also denying the
right of the court to enter an order preserving the attachment
for the benefit of the petitioner; and alleging that respondent
is entitled to the benefit of the attachment, said property when
sold by an interlocutory order having realized enough to pay
said attachment, as well as all prior liens.
Shimer, trustee for the Roonoke Furnace Company, also answered, praying that, if the attachment be continued for the
trustee of Baird, the petitioner should be required to abate a
large claim which he filed against the estate of the Roanoke
·company, by the amount of said attachments.
Upon a bearing before the District Court, that court overruled
the demurrer to Staake's petition, and authorized him to enforce
the attachment liens for the benefit of the estate. 126 Fed. 845.
The Court of Appeals affirmed this action (66 C. C. A. 547, 133
Fed. 717), and the bank petitioned this court for a writ of
certiorari, which was granted.
Mr. Justice BROWN, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the court:
At the time these attachments were levied, the title to the
property in question stood in the name of Baird, and the attachH.

a:

A. Bankruptc:r-88

594

ADMINISTRATION

594

ADMINISTRATION

"ing creditors, by their levies, secured a preferential lien upon

the property, not only as against Baird, but also as against the

furnace company, which received a deed to the property Novem-

ber 5, 1900, after the attachments had been levied. These at-

tachments, however, were annulled by the filing of a petition in

bankruptcy against Baird within four months after the attach-

ments were levied, and if the case stood upon this fact alone

there could be no doubt that the property would pass to the

trustee of the furnace company, discharged of the lien of the

attachments. We are not concerned here with any conflicting

rights of the two trustees, Staake and Shimer, since they were

both appointed receivers of the Roanoke Furnace Company, and

the only claim made by Shimer now is that, if the attachments

be continued, the petitioner Staake be required to abate his

claim against the estate of the furnace company by the amount

of these attachments. It is therefore unnecessary to consider

whether, if the attachments were annulled, the property would

pass unencumbered to the trustee of the furnace company, since,

as stated by the district judge, the demurrer to the petition is

intended merely to raise the question whether the trustee of

Baird's estate or the attaching creditors shall have the benefit

of the attachments.
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This depends upon the peculiar terms of § 67 of the bankrupt

act, which provides as follows:

"§ 67/. That all levies, judgments, attachments, or other liens

obtained through legal proceedings against a person who is

insolvent, at any time within four months prior to the filing of

a petition iu bankruptcy against him, shall be deemed null and

void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the property affected

by the levy, judgment. attachment, or other lien shall be deemed

wholly discharged and released from the same, and shall pass

to the trustee as a part of the estate of the bankrupt, unless the

court shall, on due notice, order that the right under such levy,

judgment, attachment, or other lien shall be preserved for the

benefit of the estate; and thereupon the same may pass to and

shall be preserved by the trustee for the benefit of the estate as

aforesaid. And the court may order such conveyance as shall

be necessary to carry the purposes of this section into effect:

Provided, That nothing herein contained shall have the effect

to destroy or impair the title obtained by such levy, judgment,

attachment, or other lien, of a bona fide purchaser for value

, ing creditors, by their levies, secured a preferential lien upon
the property, not only as against Baird, but also BB against the
furnace company, which received a deed to the property November 5, 1900, after the attachments had been levied. Theae a~
tachments, however, were annulled by the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy against Baird within four months after the attachments were levied, and if the case stood upon this fact alone
there could be no doubt that the property would p&111 to the
trustee of the furnace company, discharged of the lien of the
attachments. 'Ve are not concerned here with any eonfticting
rights of the two trustees, Staake and Shimer, since they were
both appointed receivers of the Roanoke Furnace Company, and
the only claim made by Shimer now is that, if the attachment.a
be continued, the petitioner Staake be required to abate his
claim against the estate of the furnace company by the amount
of these attachments. It is therefore unnecessary to consider
whether, if the attachments were annulled, the property would
pass unencumbered to the trustee of the furnace company, since,
as stated by the district judge, the demurrer to the petition is
intended merely to raise the question whether the trustee of
Baird's estate or the attaching creditors shall have the benefit
of the attachments.
This depends upon the peculiar terms of § 67 of the bankrupt
act, which provides as follows:
"§ 67/. That all levies, judgments, attachments, or other liens
obtained through legal proceedings against a person who ia
insolvent, at any time within four mouths prior to the filing of
a petition in bankruptcy against him, shall be deemed null and
void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the property affected
by the levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien shall be deemed
wholly discharged and released from the same, and shall pa88
to the trustee as a part of the estate of the bankrupt, unlua 11&e
court shall, on due notice, order that tke right under sue/I. letJ11,
judgment, attachment, or other lien shall be preserved for Ille
benefit of the estate; and thereupon the same may p&111 to and
shall be preserved by the trustee for the benefit of the estate as
aforesaid. Aud the court may order such conveyance as shall
be necessary to carry the purposes of this section into effect:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall have the effect
to destroy or impair the title obtained by such levy, judgment,
attachment, or other lien, of a bona fi<k purchaser for value
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who shall have acquired the same without notice or reasonable

cause for inquiry."

§ 67c, which also treats of liens created by attachments on

mesne process, and provides for their dissolution, in the last

clause declares that—"if the dissolution of such lieu would

militate against the best interests of the estate of such person,

the same shall not be dissolved, but the trustee of the estate of

such person, for the benefit of the estate, shall be subrogated to

the rights of the holder of such lien, and empowered to perfect

and enforce the same in his name as trustee, with like force and

effect as such holder might have done had not bankruptcy pro-

ceedings intervened"

This section (67/) makes two distinct provisions for the dis-

position of the property of an insolvent attached within four

months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against

him. First, such attachments shall be declared null and void,

and the property affected shall be deemed released, and shall

pass to the trustee of the estate of the bankrupt; or second, the

court may order that the right acquired by the attachment shall

be preserved for the benefit of the estate. In the first case the

whole property passes free from the attachment. In the second,

so much of the value of the property attached as is represented
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by the attachments passes to the trustee for the benefit of the

entire body of creditors; that is, "for the benefit of the estate,"

—in other words, the statute recognizes the lien of the attach-

ment, but distributes the lien among the whole body of creditors.

The first provision contemplates the attachment of property

to which the bankrupt has the complete, legal, and equitable

title, which, as soon as the attachment is dissolved, passes at

once to the bankrupt's trustee as part of his estate. The second

provision evidently does not apply to this, as there is no object

in preserving the lien of the attachment for the benefit of the

estate, since, under the first clause, the entire value of the prop-

erty attached passes to the trustee, free from the attachment.

The second clause contemplates property in which the bankrupt

has an interest which has been secured to attaching creditors

by the levy of the writ, but which might have passed to another

person, as, for instance, a purchaser under an unrecorded deed,

but for the fact that the attaching creditors had acquired a prior

lien thereon. In such case the statute recognizes the validity

of the lien, but preserves it for the benefit of the entire body of

creditors, by reason of the fact that the attachment was dis-

who shall have acquired the same without notice or reasonable
cause for inquiry."
§ 67c, which also treats of liens created by attachments on
me.me process, and provides for their di~olution, in the last
clause declares that-'' if the dissolution of such lien would
militate against the best interests of the estate of such person,
the same shall not be dissolved, but the trustee of the estate of
such person, for the benefit of the estate, shall be subrogated to
the rights of the holder of such lien, and empowered to perfect
and enforce the same in his name as trustee, with like force and
effect as such holder might have done had not bankruptcy proceedings intervened.''
This section (67f) makes two distinct provisions for the disposition of the property of an insolvent attached within four
months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against
him. First, such attachments shall be declared null and void,
and the property affected shall be deemed released, and shall
pass to the trustee of the estate of the bankrupt; or second, the
court may order that the right acquired by the attachment shaU
be preserved for the benefit of the estate. In the first case the
whole property passes free from the attachment. In the second,
so much of the value of the property attached as is represented
by the attachments passes to the trustee for the benefit of the
entire body of creditors; that is, ''for the benefit of the estate,''
-in other words, the statute recognizes the lien of the attachment, but distributes the lien among the whole body of creditors.
The first provision conter;nplates the attachment of property
to which the bankrupt has the complete, legal, and equitable
title, which, as soon as the attachment is dissolved, passes at
once to the bankrupt's trustee as part of his estate. ThP, second
provision evidently. does not apply to this, as there is no object
in preserving the lien of the attachment for the benefit of the
estate, since, under the first clause, the entire value of the property attached passes to the trustee, free from the attachment.
The second clause contemplates property in which the bankrupt
has an interest which has been secured to attaching creditors
by the levy of the writ, but which might have passed to another
person, as, for instance, a purchaser under an unrecorded deed,
but for the fact that the attaching creditors had acquired a prior
lien thereon. In such case the statute recognizes the validity
of the lien, but preserves it for the benefit of the entire body of
creditors, by reason of the fact that the attachment was dis·
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solved as a preferential lien in favor of the attaching creditors,

by the institution of proceedings in bankruptcy.

In the present case Baird had contracted to convey the prop-

erty to the Roanoke Furnace Company, possession had been

taken, and the consideration paid, but the deed was not actually

executed and recorded until after the attachment had been

levied. Hence, under the Virginia statute, the validity of which

is not questioned, the lien of the attachment took precedence of

the deed, and would have remained a prior lien, had it not been

for the institution of the bankruptcy proceedings within four

months. This dissolved the attachment, and, had the case rested

here, the property would have apparently passed to the furnace

company, or to its trustee in bankruptcy, Shimer; but at this

point the court, under the second proviso of § 67/, interposed

and recognized the lien of the attachment; not, however solely

for the benefit of the attaching creditors, but for the benefit of

Baird's estate. Shimer made no objection, and the court de-

clined to express an opinion as to his rights.

This is one of the very contingencies provided for by the sec-

ond clause of the section, which apparently vests in the court

a certain discretion with regard to the preservation of the right

acquired under the attachment or other lien. In this case the
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court recognized the validity of the lien, the trustee of the fur-

nace company making no objection to this; but the attaching

creditors insist that, as the lien was acquired for their own

benefit, they should not be required to share with the general

creditors of Baird's estate.

Their argument is based upon the theory that the second clause

was not intended to apply to liens acquired upon the estate of

third parties, but to property which would have passed to

Baird's trustee had the attachment not been levied. In other

words, that the bankruptcy court has nothing to do with the

property, since it really did not belong to the bankrupt, and

would have passed to his vendee if the attachments had not been

levied upon it. Indeed, the opinion especially finds that "had

valid attachments not been levied, the property would have

passed to the trustee of the Roanoke Furnace Company."

To what extent liens obtained by prior judicial proceedings

shall be recognized is a matter wholly within the discretion of

Congress. It might have validated all such liens, even though

obtained the day before proceedings were instituted. It might

probably have invalidated all such liens whenever obtained. It

solved as a preferential lien in favor of the attaching creditors,
by the institution of proceedings in bankruptcy.
In the present case Baird bad contracted to convey the property to the R-0anoke Furnace Company, possession had been
taken, and the consideration paid, but the deed was not actually
executed and recorded until after the attachment had been
levied. Hence, under the Virginia statute, the validity of which
is not questioned, the lien of the attachment took precedence of
the deed, and would have remained a prior lien, had it uot been
for the institution of the bankruptcy proceedings within four
months. This dissolved the attachment, and, had the ease rested
here, the property would have apparently passed to the furnace
company, or to its trustee in bankruptcy, Shimer; but at this
point the court, under the second proviso of § 67f, interposed
and recognized the lien of the attachment; not, however solely
for the benefit of the attaching creditors, but for the benefit of
Baird's estate. Shimer made no objection, and the court declined to express an opinion as to his rights.
This is one of the very contingencies provided for by the second clause of the section, which apparently vests in the court
a certain discretion with regard to the preservation of the right
acquired under the attachment or other lien. In this case the
court recognized the validity of the lien, the trustee of the furnace company making no objection to this; but the attaching
creditors insist that, as the lien was acquired for their own
benefit, they should not be required to share with the general
creditors of Baird's estate.
Their argument is based upon the theory that the second clause
was not intended to apply to liens acquired upon the estate of
third parties, but to property which would have passed to
Baird's trustee had the attachment not been levied. In other
words, that the bankruptcy court has nothing to do with the
property, since it really did not belong to the bankrupt, and
would have passed to his vendee if the attachments had not been
levied upon it. Indeed, the opinion especially finds that ''had
valid attachments not been levied, the property would have
passed to the trustee of the Roanoke Furnace Company.''
To what extent liens obtained by prior judicial proceedings
shall be recognized is a matter wholly within the discretion of
Congress. It might have validated all such liens, even though
obtained the day before proceedings were instituted. It n1ig~t
probably have invalidated all such liens whenever . obtained.
lt
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took a middle course, and invalidated all liens obtained through

legal proceedings within four months prior to the filing of the

petition, but at the same time preserved to the general body of

creditors, as against third parties (such as purchasers under an

unrecorded deed), such liens as attaching creditors had secured

upon property which would have passed to the subsequent pur-

chaser in case the attachment had not been levied. It is true

that the attaching creditors are thereby deprived of the fruits

of their diligence, but the same thing would have happened had

the attachment been levied upon property to which the bankrupt

had the whole and undisputed title, or of which he had made a

fraudulent conveyance. As remarked by the district judge,

"In cases where the bankrupt makes a valid conveyance, or

where his fraudulent vendee makes a valid conveyance, the pur-

pose of the law is worked out by preserving and enforcing the

liens of the attaching creditors for the pro rata benefit of all

the creditors." [126 Fed. 847.]

§ 67/ is merely carrying out the general purposes of the act,

of securing to the creditors the entire property of the bankrupt,

reckoning as part of such property liens obtained by attaching

creditors against real estate which had been transferred to an-

other, though no deed had been actually executed and recorded.
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The argument that § 67/ in question here refers only to liens

upon property which, if such liens were annulled, would pass

to the trustee of the bankrupt, we think is unsound, since that

contingency is amply provided for by the prior clause of the

section annuling all such liens and providing that property af-

fected thereby shall pass to the trustee as a part of the estate.

Under the argument of the attaching creditors in this case, the

subsequent clause would be entirely unnecessary. This clause

evidently contemplates that attaching creditors may acquire

liens upon property which would not pass to the bankrupt if

the liens were absolutely annulled, and therefore recognizes

such liens, but extends their operation to the general creditors.

Had no proceedings in bankruptcy been taken, doubtless this

property would have been sold for the benefit of the attaching

creditors.

The general rule relied upon by the bank in this ease, that

the words '' prj|Q£rfy_l>£-Ll1 p htfkmpt" mean^pn^y the property

tojivMch^the jjjinkji^js j^eficially^ enljtled^ad-4p not include.

property to whicJi he haajjnlya barelegaljjtle^^s perhaps justi-

fied^byour, decision, in Hewit^Jfoi-li" Mnah Works, 194 U. S.

took a middle course, and invalidated all liens obtained through
legal proceedings within four months prior to the filing of the
petition, but at the same time preserved to the general body of
creditors, as against third parties (such as purchasers under an
unrecorded deed), such liens as attaching creditors had secured
upon property which would have passed to the subsequent purchaser in case the attachment had not been levied. It is true
that the attaching creditors are thereby deprived of the fruits
of their diligence, but the same thing would have happene<l had
the attachment been levied upon property to which the bankrupt
had the whole and undisputed title, or of which he had made a
fraudulent conveyance. As remarked by the district judge,
'' In cases where the bankrupt makes a valid conveyance, or
where his fraudulent vendee makes a valid conveyance, the purpose of the law is worked out by preserving and enforcing the
liens of the attaching creditors for the pro rata benefit of all
the creditors." [126 Fed. 847.]
§ 61{ is merely carrying out the general purposes of the act,
of securing to the creditors the entire property of the bankrupt,
reckoning as part of such property liens obtained by attaching
creditors against real estate which had been transferred to another, though no deed had been actually executed and recorded.
The argument that § 61{ in question here refers only to liens
upon property which, if sueh liens were annulled, would pass
to the trustee of the bankrupt, we think is unsound, since that
contingency is amply provided for by the prior clause of the
section annuling all such liens and providing that property affected thereby shall pass to the trustee as a part of the estate.
Under the ar.gument of the attaching creditors in this case, the
subsequent clause would be entirely unnecessary. This clause
evidently contemplates that attaching creditors may acquire
liens upon property which would not pass to the bankrupt if
the liens were absolutely annulled, and therefore recognizes
such liens, but extends their operation to the general creditors.
Had no proceedings in bankruptcy been taken~ doubtless this
property would have been sold for the benefit of the attaching
creditors.
'
The general rule relied upon by the bank in this oase, that
the words "iu:~ of-t.he.,..ba.Wa:Jlpt" m~ty
t w · c the
eficiall en ·tied
o not include
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296, 48 L. ed. 986, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690. But the extent to

which the bankruptcy court shall recognize the rights obtained

by creditors upon property attached as the property of the

bankrupt, though in fact such property had been conveyed by

an unrecorded contract, is a matter solely within the discretion

of Congress. Thja^liens^cquirejj i_u_tliis case were liens upon

property which, as to attaching creditors, was the property of

theba^ruDt. and Congress may lawfully insist that it. shall hp

reckoned as a part of his estate, and pass to the trustee. As

remarked^ by the Court of Appeals: -TTherule that the trustee

takes the estate of the bankrupt in the same plight as the bank-

rupt held it is not applicable to liens which, although valid as

to the bankrupt, are invalid as to creditors." [66 C. C. A. 550,

133 Fed. 720.]

If the interest of Baird in this property were sold solely for

the benefit of the attaching creditors, it would obviously result

in a preference to those creditors over the general creditors of

his estate, and in fraud of the bankruptcy act, which is designed

to secure equality among all creditors.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.25

25—Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Jus-

tice White, and Mr. Justice Peck-
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ham dissented.

—Construction of 67c and 67f.

—'' i 67c declares that all liens

obtained by suit in law or in

equity, including an attachment upon

296, 48 L. ed. 986, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690. But the extent to
which the bankruptcy court shall recognize the rights obtained
by creditors upon property attached as the property of the
bankrupt, though in fact such property had been conveyed by
an unrecorded contract, is a matter solely within the discretion
of Congress. The li':!!l acg__ui!:,S!d in t~ case were liens uggn
property which 'as to attaching creclitor , was the pro ertv of
t~ruot. and Co~ess may law
y mist that it shaJJ he
reckoned as a art of is
ate, and
tr te
As
remark
y the Court of Appeals: "The rule that the trustee
takes the estate of the bankrupt in the same plight as the bankrupt held it is not applicable to liens which, although valid as
to the bankrupt, are invalid as to creditors.'' [ 66 C. C. A. 550,
133 Fed. 720.]
If the interest of Baird in this property were sold solely for
the benefit of the attaching creditors, it would obviously result
in a preference to those creditors over the general creditors of
his estate, and in fraud of the bankruptcy act, which is designed
to secure equality among all creclitors.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.2 5 -

mesne process or a judgment by con-

fession begun within four months be

fore the filing of the petition in

bankruptcy, shall be dissolved by

the adjudication if it appear that

said lien was obtained or permitted

while the debtor was insolvent, and

that its existence and enforcement

will work a preference. This clause,

it would seem, recognizes a prefer-

ence obtainable through an attach-

ment, acquired upon mesne process

pursuant to a suit or proceeding at

law or in equity, the condition being

that the attachment shall have been

made while the debtor was insolvent,

and its existence and enforcement

will so operate; that is, as a prefer-

ence.

'' § 67f provides that all levies,

judgments, attachments, or other

liens obtained through legal proceed-

ings against a person who is insol-

vent at any time within four months

prior to the filing of the petition in

bankruptcy, shall be null and void

in case he is adjudged a bankrupt,

and that the property affected there-

by shall be wholly discharged and

released from the same. It has been

held and determined that subdivi-

sion 'c' is repugnant to the provi-

sions of subdivision 'f,' on the same

subject, and that the latter provi-

sions are controlling. In re Richards,

96 Fed. 933, 935, 37 C. C. A. 634;

Bear v. Chase, 99 Fed. 920, 40 C. C.

A. 182. We quote from the opinion

in the former case:

"'These two subdivisions, "c" and

"f," in our judgment, are plainly

25-Mr. Justice HARLAN, Mr. Justice WRITE, and Mr. Justice PECKHAM diMeD.ted,
-Con.atruction of 670 and 67{.
- ' ' § 67c declares that all lien•
obtained by suit in law or in
equity, including an attachment upon
mesne proceea or a judgment by con·
fes11ion begun withln four months be·
fore the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy, shall be di1111olve<l by
the adjudication if it appear that
so.id lien was obtained or permitted
while the debtor was insolvent, and
that its emtence and enforcement
will work a preference. This clause,
it would seem, recognizes a prefer·
ence obtainable through an attachment, acquired upon mesne process
pursuant to a suit or proceeding at
law or in equity, the condition being
that the attachment shall have been
made while the debtor was insolvent,
and its existence and enforcement
will so operate; that ill, as a prefer·
ence.

'' § 67f providee that all levies,
judgment., attachments, or other
liens obtained through legal proceed·
ings against a person who ia insolvent at any time within four months
prior to the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy, shall be null and void
in case he is adjudged a bankropt,
and that the property a1feet.ed thereby shall be wholly discharged and
released from the same. It baa been
held and determined that subdivision 'c' is repugnant to th~ provi·
sions of subdivision 1 f,' on the same
subject, and that the latter provisions are controlling. In re Richa.rdl1
96 Fed. 933, 935, 37 C. C. A. 634;
Bear v. Chase, 99 Fed. 920, 40 C. C.
A. 182. We quote from the opinion
in the former case:
" 'These two subdivisions, "<!!' and
"f," in our judgment, are plainly
antagonistic and irreconcilable. The
former saves a lien obtained through
legal proceedings ~ within four
months unless it was obtained and
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(United States Supreme Court. October term, 1881)

Error to the Supreme Court of the state of Ohio.

The suit was brought in the Superior Court of Cincinnati, by

LIBBY v. HOPKINS

A. T. Stewart & Co., of which firm the plaintift*s in error are

the survivors, against Lewis C. Hopkins and wife, and Isaac

104 U. S. 303, 26 L. ed. 769

M. Jordan, trustee in bankruptcy of Hopkins.

'

It appears from the record that A._ T,_ Stewjgt *fc Co., mer-

(United States Supreme Court. October term, 1881)

chants, of the city of New York, loaned. June 6, 1866, Hopkins,

a merchant of Cincinnati, Ohio, $100.000. and took his promis-

sory note of that date therefor, payable on demand with interest

from date, to_^ecurft tjjfi p^ym^pi nf which he executed and

deIiveredjQjh^m_sj^eraj_jnortgages on real_estatejn Cincinnati

and its vicinity. Both before and after that date he bought of

permitted while the debtor was in- al. 194 Fed. 785, 114 C. C. A.—, No.

solvent, or the creditor had reason-

able cause to believe such insolvency,

or the lien was sought and permitted

in fraud of the provisions of the act.

The question of the pecuniary condi-

tion of the debtor and knowledge
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upon the part of the creditor are in-

fluential in determining the validity

of the lien so obtained. But sub-

division "t" is broader in its scope,

and avoids all liens obtained through

legal proceedings within the time

stated against a person who is in-

solvent, within the meaning of the

subdivision, irrespective of knowl-

edge on the part of the creditor of

the fact of insolvency, and irrespect-

ive of the question whether the ob-

taining of the lien was in any way

suffered and permitted by the deb-

tor. It avoids all liens obtained

through legal proceedings against a

person who is insolvent within four

months before the filing of the peti-

tion.'

'' See, also, Cook v. Robinson et

2,013, just decided.

"Notwithstanding the repugnancy

of subdivision 'c' to subdivision 'f,'

and that the provisions of the latter

are controlling, those of the former

still remain for the purpose of in-

terpretation, as the intendment of

the act must be gathered from a

reading of all its provisions as

enacted in pari materia. So read-

ing the provisions as they relate to

a preference, we find that a prefer-

ence may not only consist in the

bankrupt's procuring or suffering a

judgment to be entered against him

or making a transfer of his prop-

erty within four months of the filing

of the petition in bankruptcy, but

also in the creation of a lien by way

of attachment, or the confession of

a judgment within four months of

the filing of the petition, the exist-

ence and enforcement of which will

work a preference." Folger v.

Putnam, 194 Fed. 793.

Error to the Supreme Court of the state of Ohio.
The suit was brought in the Superior Court of Cincinnati, by
A. T. Stewart & Co., of which firm the plaintiffs in error are
the survivors, against Lewis C. Hopkins and wife, and Isaac
M. Jordan, trustee in bankruptcy of Hopkins.
It appears from the record that A. Th Stewart.. j Co., merchants, of the city of New York, l~d, June 6, 1866, l!2Pkin..!,,
a merchant of Cincinnati, Ohio, $100.000. and took his promissory note of that date therefor, payable on demand with interest
from date, ~.secun: ~ .payment-of which he executed and
delivere_Q to the~rtgages on real estat1L,in Cincinnati
an.d itsVIcinity. Both before and after that date he bought of
permitted while the debtor was ineolvent, or the creditor had reasonable cauae to believe such insolvency,
or the lien was sought and ~rmitted
in fraud of the provisions of the act.
The question of the pecuniary condition of the debtor and knowledge
upon the part of the creditor are in·
tluential in determining the validity
of the lien so obtained. But subdivision '' f'' is broader in its eeope,
and avoids all liens obtained through
legal proeeedings within the time
stated against a person who is in·
solvent, within the meaning of the
1mbdivision, irrespecth·e of knowledge on the pa.rt of the creditor of
the fact of insolvency, and irrespective of the question whether the ob·
taining of the lien was in any way
suffered and permitted by the debtor. It avoids all liens obtained
through legal proceedings agaim1t a
person who is in8olvent within four
months before the filing of the petition.'
' ' See, also, Cook v. Robinson ~t

al., 194 Fed. 785, 114 C. C. A.-, No.
9.,013, just decided.

''Notwithstanding the repugnancy
of subdivision 'c' to subdivi11ion 'f,'
and that the pro\""isions of the latter
are controlling, those of the former
still remain for the purpose of in·
terpretation, as the intendment of
the act must be gathered from a
reading of all its provisions as
enacted in pan materia. So reading the provi11ions as they relate to
a preference, we find that a preference may not only consist in the
bankrupt's procuring or suffering a
judgment to be entered against him
or making a transfer of his prop·
erty within four months of the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy, but
also in the creation of a lien by way
of attachment, or the confession of
a judgment within four months of
the filing of the petition, the existence and enforcement of which will
work a preference. '' Folger v.
Putnam, 194 Fed. 793.
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them large quantities of goods, and as a matter of convenience

kept with them two accounts,—one a cash and the other a

merchandise account. They were his hankers. All his remit-

tances were sent to them and credited to him in the cash account.

By drafts thereon he paid his debts for merchandise to them

and other New York merchants, and in order to replenish it he

borrowed the $100,000 above mentioned, and it was carried to

his credit in that account. On May 4, 1867, he paid on his note

$25,000. On Nov. 12, 1867, he remitted to Stewart & Co.,

$10,000, on Dec. 27, 1867, $17,000, on the 28th of the same

month, $10,000, and on the 30th, $48,025. He directed these

remittances to be applied to the payment of his note and to be

credited thereon. It is now no longer disputed that the first

three of these remittances were so applied. The last two, with

the interest thereon, constitute the sum now in controversy.

On Jan. 1, 1868, Hopkins suspended business, insolvent. At

that time he owed A. T. Stewart & Co., $231,515 on account,

and unsecured. His liabilities to others amounted to more than

$500,000. A petition in bankruptcy was filed against him Feb-

ruary 29. He was adjudicated a bankrupt March 30. On Apri1

30 Jordan was appointed trustee.

As to the foregoing facts there is no dispute.
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In August, 1868, on what day the record does not show,

Stewart & Co. commenced this suit for the foreclosure of the

mortgages, claiming as due the full amount of the note, less the

payment of $25,000.

The answer, besides other defenses not pertinent to any con-

tention now raised, averred that Hopkins had paid on the note,

not only the said sum of $25,000, but also the remittances above

mentioned, making the total amount paid thereon $110,025;

and, after alleging that said payments were made in fraud of

the bankrupt act, demanded, by way of counterclaim, a judg-

ment against Stewart & Co. therefor.

The reply admitted that Hopkins requested Stewart & Co. to

credit the remittances on his mortgage debt, and averred that

they were held subject to his order, and continued to be so held,

up to the time when the rights of Jordan, trustee, attached,

subject to such law of set-off as is provided in the bankrupt act.

It nowhere appeared in the pleadings that Hopkins was in-

debted to the plaintiffs on any unsecured claim, or in any other

way, except upon the note for $100,000. No unsecured debt of

Hopkins was pleaded as a set-off or otherwise.

them large quantities of goods, and as a matter of convenit>nee
kept with them two account&,-one a cash and the othn a
merchandise account. They were his bankers. All his remittances were sent to them and credited to him in the cash account.
By drafts thereon he paid his debts for merchandise to them
and other New York merchants, and in order to replenish it be
borrowed the $100,000 above mentioned, and it was carried U>
his credit in that account. On May 4, 1867, he paid on his note
$25,000. On Nov. 12, 1867, he remitted to Stewart & Co.,
$10,000, on Dec. 27, 1867, $17,000, on the 28th of the same
month, $10,000, and on the 30th, $48,025. He directed these
remittances to be applied to the payment of his note and to be
credited thereon. It is now no longer disputed that the first
three of these remittances were so applied. The last two, with
the interest thereon, constitute the sum now in controversy.
On Jan. 1, 1868, Hopkins suspended business, insolvent. At
that time he owed A. T. Stewart & Co., $231,515 on account,
and unsecured. His liabilities to others amounted to more than
$500,000. A petition in bankruptcy was filed against him February 29. He was adjudicated a bankrupt March 30. On April
30 Jordan was appointed trustee.
AB to the foregoing facts there is no dispute.
In August, 1868, on what day the record does not show,
Stewart & Co. commenced this suit for the foreclosure of the
mortgages, claiming as due the full amount of the note, less the
payment of $25,000.
The answer, besides other defenses not pertinent to any con·
tention now raised, averred that Hopkins had paid on the note,
not only the said sum of $25,000, but also the remittances above
mentioned, making the total amount paid thereon $110,025;
and, after alleging that said payments were made in fraud of
the bankrupt act, demanded, by way of counterclaim, a judgment against Stewart & Co. therefor.
The reply admitted that Hopkins requested Stewart & Co. to
credit the remittances on his mortgage debt, and averred that
they were held subject to his order, and continued to be so held,
up to the time when the rights of Jordan, trustee, attached,
subject to such law of set-off as is provided in the bankrupt act.
[t nowhere appeared in the pleadings that Hopkins was indebted to the plaintiffs on any unsecured claim, or in any other
way, except upon the note for $100,000. No unsecured debt of
Hopkins was pleaded as a set-off or otherwise.
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The Superior Court found that the mortgages were valid, and

the first lien on the premises therein described, and that there

was due thereon, including interest, the sum of $75,957.06. It

rendered a final decree that unless that sum with interest be

paid within one hundred and eighty days therefrom to Stewart

& Co., the mortgaged premises should be sold.

The court further found that when Hopkins made the last

two remittances, of $10,000 and $48,025, respectively, it was

with the intent and the express instruction in writing to Stewart

& Co. to apply them in discharging the mortgage claim; that

Stewart & Co. refused to do so, but assumed, without his au-

thority or consent, to apply and did apply them to his credit

on the general account against him for merchandise; and that

Stewart & Co. had no right to make such application; and that

the remittances remained in their hands as his moneys from

the several days of their payment until Feb. 29, 1868, when the

title of Jordan as trustee attached thereto. It also found that the

said two several sums were not subject to any claim of set-off

or cross-demand, or of mutual debts or credits, on the part of

Stewart & Co., under § 20 of the Bankrupt Act, or otherwise.

The court, therefore, rendered a decree in favor of Jordan,

trustee, against Stewart & Co., for $58,025, the aggregate of
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the last two remittances, with interest, amounting in all to

$75,981.36.

The case was carried, by the petition in error of Stewart &

Co., and the cross-petition in error of Jordan, trustee, to the

Supreme Court of Ohio, by which the decree of the Superior

Court was affirmed.

Stewart & Co. thereupon brought the case here by writ of

error. Some of the members of the firm have died, and Libby

and another are its surviving members.

Mr. Justice WOODS, after stating the facts, delivered the

opinion of the court.

The only question to which our attention is directed by the

plaintiffs is that of set-off under the twentieth section of the act

of March 2, 1867, c. 176 (14 Stat. 517), which is as follows:

"In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the

parties, the account between them shall be stated, and one debt

set off against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed

or paid, but no set-off shall be allowed of a claim in its nature

not provable against the estate; Provided, that no set-off shall

The Superior Court found that the mortgages were valid, and
the first lien on the premises therein described, and that there
was due thereon, including interest, the sum of $75,957.06. It
rendered a final decree that unless that sum with interest be
paid within one hundred and eighty days therefrom to Stewart
& Co., the mortgaged premises should be sold.
The court further found that when Hopkins made the last
two remittances, of $10,000 and $48,025, respectively, it was
with the intent and the express instruction in writing to Stewart
& Co. to apply them in discharging the mortgage claim ; that
Stewart & Co. refused to do so, but assumed, without his authority or consent, to apply and did apply them to his credit
on the general account against ·him for merchandise; and that
Stewart & Co. had no right to make such application; and that
the remittances remained in their hands as his moneys from
the several days of their payment until Feb. 29, 1868, when the
title of Jordan as trustee attached thereto. It also found that the
said two several sums were not subject to any claim of set-off
or cross-demand, or of mutual debts or credits, on the part of
Stewart & Co., under § 20 of the Bankrupt Act, or otherwise.
The court, therefore, rendereii a decree in favor of Jordan,
trustee, against Stewart & Co., for $58,025, the aggregate of
the last two remittances, with interest, amounting in all to
$75,981.36.
The case was carried, by the petition in error of Stewart &
Co., and the cross-petition in error of Jordan, trustee, to the
Supreme Court of Ohio, by which the decree of the Superior
Court was affirmed.
Stewart & Co. thereupon brought the case here by writ of
error. Some of the members of the firm have died, and Libby
and another are its surviving members.
Mr. Justice WOODS, after stating the facts, delivered the
opinion of the court.
The only question to which our attention is directed by the
plaintiffs is that of set-off under the twentieth section of the act
of March 2, 1867, c. 176 (14 Stat. 517), which is as follows:
''In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits bctwt•en the
parties, the account between them shall be stated. and one debt
set off against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed
or paid, but no set-off shall be allowed of a claim in its nature
not provable against the e.state; Provided, that no set-off shall
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be allowed in favor of any debtor to the bankrupt of a claim

purchased by or transferred to him after the filing of the peti-

tion. '' This provision was in force at the time of the trial, and

is now substantially incorporated in § 5073 of the Revised

Statutes.

The contention of the plaintiffs is that they were entitled un-

der this section to set off an unsecured account due them from

Hopkins against the $58,025 remitted to them by him with direc-

tions to credit it on his mortgage debt, and which they refused

so to apply.

Waiving the difficulty that they have not pleaded that account

as a set-off, we shall consider the question made by them. That

account is a claim provable against the bankrupt estate, and it

was not purchased by or transferred to them after the filing

of the petition in bankruptcy. The controversy is, therefore,

reduced to this issue: Were that account and the money trans-

mitted by Hopkins to them, and held and not applied by them

to the mortgage debt, mutual credits, or mutual debts which

could be set off against each other under the twentieth section

of the Bankrupt Actt

The plaintiffs insist that the term "mutual credits" is more

comprehensive than the term "mutual debts" in the statutes
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relating to set-off; that credit is synonymous with trust, and the

trust or credit need not be money on both sides; that where there

is a deposit of property on one side without authority to turn

it into money, no debt can arise out of it; but where there are

directions to turn it into money it may become a debt, the reason

being that when turned into money it becomes like any other

mutual debt. They say that the first of the two remittances

under consideration is not proved to have been other than money,

but as it was only $10,000 its application to the note could not

be required. The larger remittance was in drafts, and their ap-

plication could not be required. But there was authority to turn

them into money, and that to get the money on them it was

necessary that the drafts should be indorsed by the plaintiffs,

and that the indorsement to and collection by them put the

money received in the same plight as if the drafts had been sent

to them for collection. We cannot assent to these views, and

they receive but little support from the adjudged cases.

Ex parte Deeze (1 Atk. 228) arose under the twenty-eighth

section of the statute 5 Geo. II, c. 30, which provides that "when

it shall appear to the said commissioners [in bankruptcy] or

be allowed in favor of any debtor to the bankrupt of a claim
purchased by or transferred to him after the filing of the petition.'' This provision was in force at the time of the trial, and
is now substantially incorporated in § 5073 of the Revised
Statutes.
The contention of the plaintiffs is that they were entitled under this section to set off an unsecured account due them from
Hopkins against the $58,025 remitted to them by him with directions to credit it on his mortgage debt, and which they refused
so to apply.
Waiving the difficulty that they have not pleaded that account
as a set-off, we shall consider the question made by them. That
account is a claim provable against the bankrupt estate, and it
was not purchased by or transferred to them after the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy. The controversy is, therefore,
reduced to this issue: Were that account and the money transmitted by Hopkins to them, and held and not applied by them
to the mortgage debt, mutual credits, or mutual debts which
could be !Wt off against each other under the twentieth section
of the Bankrupt Act T
The plaintiffs insist that the term "mutual credits" is more
comprehensive than the term "mutual debts" in the statutes
relating to set-off; that credit is synonymous with trw1t, and the
trust or credit need not be money on both sides; that where there
is a deposit of property on one side without authority to turn
it into money, no debt can arise out of it; but where there are
directions to turn it into money it may become a debt, the reason
being that when turned into money it becomes like any other
mutual debt. They say that the first of the two remittances
under consideration is not pro~ed to have been other than money,
but as it was only $10,000 its application to the note could not
be required. The larger remittance was in drafts, and their application could not be required. But there was authority to turn
them into money, and that to get the money on them it was
neces~1ry that the drafts should be iudorsed by the plaintiffs,
and that the indorsement to and collection by them put the
money received in the same plight as if the drafts had been sent
to them for collection. We cannot assent to these views, and
they receive but little support from the adjudged cases.
Ex parte Deeze (1 Atk. 228) arose under the twenty-eighth
section of the statute 5 Geo. II, c. 30, which provides that ''when
it &hall appear to the said commissionen [in bankruptcy] or
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the major part of them, that there hath been mutual credit

given by the bankrupt and any other person, or mutual debts

between the bankrupt and any other person, at any time before

such person became bankrupt, the said commissioners, or the

major part of them or the assignees of such bankrupt's estate,

shall state the account between them, and one debt shall be set

against another, and what shall appear to be due on either side

on the balance of said account, and on setting such debts against

one another, and no more shall be claimed on either side re-

spectively." In that case, a packer claimed to retain goods not

only for the price of packing them, but for a sum of £500 lent

to the bankrupt on his note. Lord Hardwicke determined that

he had such right on the ground of mutual credits, holding that

the words "mutual credits" have a larger effect than "mutual

debts," and that under them many cross-claims might be al-

lowed in cases of bankruptcy, which in common cases would be

rejected.

But this ruling was subsequently made narrower by Lord

Hardwicke himself, in Ex parte Ockenden (id. 235), and was

in effect overruled in Rose v. Hart, 8 Taunt. 499. In that case

trover was brought for cloths deposited by the bankrupt pre-

viously to his bankruptcy, with the defendant, a fuller, for the

purpose of being dressed. It was held that the defendant was
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not entitled to detain them for his general balance for such

work done by him for the bankrupt previously to his bankruptcy,

for there was no mutual credit within that section. And the

court declared that the term "mutual credits" in the act meant

only such as must in their nature terminate in debts.

The rule established in this case, as to the nature of the cred-

its which can be the subject of set-off, has been declared in other

cases. Smith v. Hodson, 4 T. R. 211; Easum v. Cato, 5 Barn. &

Aid. 861. The effect of the authorities is, that the term "mutual

credits" includes only such, where a debt may have been within

the contemplation of the parties.

These authorities make it clear that, even under the Bank-

rupt Act of 5 Geo. II, the plaintiffs would have no right to the

set-off claimed by them. And they lose sight of the controlling

fact that the money and the drafts which they turned into

money were remitted, with express directions to apply them on

a specific debt. Without the consent of Hopkins they could

never be changed into a debt due to him from the plaintiffs,

and that consent has never been given.

the major part of them, that there hath b,een mutual credit
given by the bankrupt and any other person, or mutual debts
between the bankrupt and any other person, at any time before
such person became bankrupt, the said commissioners, or the
major part of them or the assignees of such bankrupt's estate,
shall state the account between them, and one debt shall be set
against another, and what shall appear to he due on either side
on the balance of said account, and on setting such debts against
one another, and no more shall be claimed on either side respectively." In that case, a packer claimed to retain goods not
only for the price of packing them, but for a sum of £500 lent
to the bankrupt on his note. Lord Hardwicke determined that
he had such right on the ground of mutual credita, holding that
the words "mutual credits" have a larger effect than "mutual
debts,'' and that under them many cro&C1--claims might be allowed in cases of bankruptcy, which in common cases would be
rejected.
But this ruling was subsequently made narrower by Lord
Hardwicke himself, in Ex parte Ocken den (id. 235), and was
in effect overruled in Rose v. Hart, 8 Taunt. 499. In that case
trover was brought for cloths deposited by the bankrupt previously to his bankruptcy, with the defendant, a fuller, for the
purpose of being dressed. It was held that the defendant was
not entitled to detain them for his general balance for such
work done by him for the bankrupt previously to his bankruptcy,
for there was no mutual credit within that section. And the
court declared that the term "mutual credits" in the act meant
only such as must in their nature terminate in debts.
The rule established in this case, as to the nature of the credits which can be the subject of set-off, has been declared in other
cases. Smith v. Hodson, 4 T. R. 211; Easum v. Cato, 5 Barn. &
Aid. 861. The effect of the authorities is, that the tenn ''mutual
credits'' i~cludes only such, where a debt may have been within
the contemplation of the parties.
These authorities make it clear that, even under the Bankrupt Act of 5 Geo. II, the plaintiffs would have no right to the
set-off claimed by them. And they lose sight of the controlling
fact that the money and the drafts which they turned into
money were remitted, with express directiODB to apply them on
a specific debt. Without the consent of Hopkins they could
never be changed into a debt due to him from the plaintiffs,
and that consept has never been given.
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Whether or not he had the right to direct the application is

immaterial. There was no legal obstacle to the application as

directed. The fact that he gave the direction imposed on the

plaintiffs the obligation to apply the money as directed, or to

return it to him.

They had no better right to refuse to make the application and

to retain the money and set off against it the debt due to them

from Hopkins, than if they had been directed to pay the money

on a debt due from him to another of his creditors, or than they

had to apply to the payment of his debt to them money which

he left with them as a special deposit.

Hopkins sent them the money and drafts, upon the faith and

trust that they would be applied according to his instructions.

The refusal so to apply them did not change the relations of the

parties to this fund, nor make that a debt which before such re-

fusal was a trust. To so hold would be to permit a trustee to

better his condition by a refusal to execute a trust which he had

assumed. Winslow v. Bliss (3 Lans. (N. Y.) 220) and Scam-

mon v. Kimball (92 U. S. 362), cited by the plaintiffs to sup-

port their contention, are cases where a bank or banker was

allowed to set off the money of a depositor against a debt due

from him to the bank. The answer to these authorities is that
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the relation between a bank and its general depositor is that of

debtor and creditor. When he deposits moneys with the bank,

it becomes his debtor to the amount of them. Foley v. Hill,

2 H. L. Cas. 28; Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 10 Wall. 152;

Bullard v. Randall, 1 Gray (Mass.), 605. When, therefore, he

becomes indebted to the bank, it is a case of mutual debt and

mutual credit, which may well be set off against each other.

But in this case there was no deposit. The relation of banker

and depositor did not arise, consequently there was no debt.

When A. sends money to B., with directions to apply it to a

debt due from him to B., it cannot be construed as .a deposit,

even though B. may be a banker. The reason is plain. The con-

sent of A. that it shall be considered a deposit, and not a pay-

ment, is necessary and is wanting.

Another answer to the contention of the plaintiffs is found

in the language of the twentieth section of the Bankrupt Act

of March 2, 1867, c. 176, which differs materially from that of

the twenty-eighth section of 5 Geo. II, c. 30. In our act the

terms "credits" and "debts" are used as correlative. What is

a debt on one side is a credit on the other, so that the term

Whether or not he had the right to direct the application is
immaterial. There was no legal obstacle to the application as
directed. The fact that he gave the direction imposed on the
plaintiffs the obligation to apply the money as directed, or to
return it to him.
They had no better right to refuse to make the application and
to retain the money and set off against it the debt due to them
from Hopkins, than if they had been directed to pay the money
on a debt due from him to another of bis creditors, or than they
had to apply to the payment of his debt to them money which
he left with them as a special deposit.
Hopkins sent them the money and drafts, upon the faith and
trust that they would be applied according to his instructions.
The refusal so to apply them did not change the relations of the
parties to this fund, nor make that a debt which before such refusal was a trust. To so hold would be to permit a trustee to
better his condition by a refusal to execute a trust which he had
assumed. Winslow v. Bliss (3 Lans. (N. Y.) 220) and Scammon v. Kimball (92 U. S. 362), cited by the plaintiffs to support their contention, are cases where a bank or banker W88
allowed to set off the money of a depositor against a debt due
from him to the bank. The answer to these authorities is that
the relation between a bank and its general depositor is that of
debtor and creditor. When he deposits moneys with the bank,
it becomes his debtor to the amount of them. Foley v. Hill,
2 H. L. Cas. 28; Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 10 Wall. 152;
Bullard v. Randall, 1 Gray (Mass.), 605. When, therefore, be
becomes indebted to the bank, it is a case of mutual debt and
mutual credit, which may well be set off against each other.
But in this case there was no deposit. The relation of banker
and depositor did not arise, consequently there was no debt.
When A. sends money to B., with directions to apply it to a
debt due from him to B., it cannot be construed as .a deposit,
even though B. may be a banker. The reason is plain. The consent of A. that it shall be considered a deposit, and not a payment, is necessary and is wanting.
Another answer to the contention of the plaintiffs is found
in the language of the twentieth section of the Bankrupt Act
of March 2, 1867, c. 176, which differs materially from that of
the twenty-eighth section of 5 Geo. II, c. 30. In our act the
terms ''credits'' and ''debts'' are used as correlative. What is
a debt on one side is a credit on the other, so that the term
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"credits" can have no broader meaning than the term "debts."

We find no warrant in the language of the section or its context

for extending the term "credits" so as to include trusts. Gen-

erally we know that "credit" and "trust" are not synonymous

terms. They have distinct and well-settled meanings, and we see

no reason why they should be confounded in interpreting the

twentieth section of the Bankrupt Act.

To authorize a set-off there must be mutual credits or mutual

debts. The remitting of certain money assets by Hopkins to the

plaintiffs, to be applied by them according to his instructions,

did not make them his debtors, but his trustees. So that there

were in the case no mutual credits or debts. The indebtedness

was all on the side of Hopkins. The plaintiffs owed him noth-

ing. They held his money in trust to apply it as directed by

him.

They refused to make the application as he directed. They

held it, therefore, subject to his order. They continued so to

hold it until the rights of the trustee in bankruptcy attached,

and until he sought to recover it by his counter-claim filed in

this case.

The only contention of the plaintiffs set up in this court is

that the Supreme Court of Ohio approved of the action of the
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Superior Court of Cincinnati, in refusing to allow the plain-

tiffs to set off the unsecured debt due to them by Hopkins against

funds intrusted to them by him for an entirely different pur-

pose. We are of opinion that the decision of the Superior Court

was correct. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio must,

therefore, be affirmed.26*

Ex parte WHITING—Re DOW et al.

2 Low. 472

(District Court, Massachusetts. March, 1876)

LOWELL, J. The facts, as I understand them, are, that in

1874 the firm of Dow, Hunt & Co., the bankrupts, of which firm

A. C. Cushing was a partner, borrowed $3,000 of a savings bank,

for which they, as a firm, and Cushing and the petitioner, Whit-

ing, individually, gave their joint and several promissory note.

This note the petitioner paid to the bank in full, after the failure

of Dow, Hunt & Co., but before their bankruptcy. The parties

credits" can have no broader meaning than the term "debts.,,
We find no warrant in the language of the section or its context
for ex tending the term "credits" 80 88 to include trusts. Generally we know that "credit" and "trust" are not synonymous
terms. They have distinct and well-settled meanings, and we see
no reason why they should be confounded in interpreting the
twentieth section of the Bankrupt Act.
To authorize a set-off there must be mutual credits or mutual
<lebts. The remitting of certain money assets by Hopkins to the
plaintiffs, to be applied by them according to his instructions,
<lid not make them his debtors, but his trustee.s. So that there
were in the case no mutual credits or debts. The indebtedness
was all on the side of Hopkins. The plaintiffs owed him nothing. They held his money in trust to apply it as directed by
him.
They refused to make the application as he directed. They
held it, therefore, subject to his order. They continued 80 to
hold it until the rights of the trustee in bankruptcy attached,
and until he sought to recover it by his counter-claim filed in
this case.
The only contention of the plaintiffs set up in this court is
that the Supreme Court of Ohio approved of the action of the
Superior Court of Cincinnati, in refusing to allow the plaintiffs to set off the unsecured debt due to them by Hopkins against
funds intrusted to them by him for an entirely different purp06e. We are of opinion that the decision of the Superior Court
was correct. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio must,
therefore, be affirmed.26•
u

differ in their mode of looking at this note. The petition repre-

ss See Morris v. Windsor Trust

Co., 213 N. T. —, 106 N. E. 753.

Ex parte WHITING-Re DOW et al.
2 Low. 472
(District Court, Massachusetts. March, 1876)
LOWELL, J. The facts, as I understand them, are, that in
1874 the firm of Dow, Hunt & Co., the bankrupts, of which firm
A. C. Cushing WBB a partner, borrowed $3,000 of a savings bank,
for which they, as a firm, and Cushing and the petitioner, Whiting, individually, gave their joint and several promissory note.
This note the petitioner paid to the bank in full, after the failure
of Dow, Hunt & Co., but before their bankruptcy. The parties
differ in their mode of looking at this note. The petition repre.
20& See Morris v. Windsor Trust
Co., 213 N. Y. - , 106 N. E. 753.
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sente it as signed by Dow, Hunt & Co., and Cushing, as prin-

cipals, and by the petitioner as surety, while the answer repre-

sents it to be the note of Dow, Hunt & Co. as principals, and

Cushing and the petitioner as co-sureties, and alleges that the

money went to the firm exclusively. Upon the face of the note

I should suppose that the answer puts the contract correctly,

and I shall so consider the ease for the purposes of the present

decision, though it is a point upon which evidence outside of

the note is of course admissible. In 1875, the petitioner lent

$1,396 to the firm of Dow, Hunt & Co., and Cushing transferred

to him eight shares of the capital stock of the Hingham Steam-

boat Company as collateral security, which Whiting promised to

return on payment of the $1,396 with interest. This debt was

overdue and unpaid at the time of the bankruptcy. This stock

is worth more than $1,396 and interest, and the assignee has

offered to pay the amount of that debt upon a reconveyance of

the stock. The question is, whether Mr. Whiting can hold the

surplus proceeds of the shares by way of set-off against Cush-

ing's other debt to him, for contribution as co-surety of the note

above mentioned.

I have had occasion more than once to look carefully at the

cases on the subject of mutual credit in bankruptcy; and while
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the decisions in this country agree entirely, as far as they go,

with those made in England, the subject has been more fully

considered in that country, as is natural, the bankrupt law hav-

ing been in force there for a much greater length of time. The

leading cases on the subject are Rose v. Hart, 8 Taunt. 499;

Young v. Bank of Bengal, 1 Moore, P. C. 150, much more fully

reported 1 Deacon, 622; Naoroji v. Chartered Bank of India,

L. R. 3 C. P. 444; Astley v. Gurney, L. R. 4 C. P. (Ex. Ch.)

714. All those cases should be studied. The result of them is,

that a creditor who at the time of the bankruptcy, has in his

hands goods or chattels of the bankrupt with a power of sale,

or choses in action with a power of collection, may sell those

goods or collect those claims, and set them off against the debt

the bankrupt owes him; and this, although the power to sell or

to collect were revocable by the bankrupt before his bankruptcy;

or, in other words, the occurrence of bankruptcy in such cases

gives a sort of lien which did not exist before. This has been

the law ever since Rose v. Hart, 8 Taunt. 499. Before that de-

cision, it was admitted even in cases where there was no power

of sale. Young v. Bank of Bengal, ubi supra, adds this limita-

sent& it as signed by Dow, Hunt & Co., and Cushing, as principals, and by the petitioner as surety, while the answer represents it to be the note of Dow, Hunt & Co. as principals, and
Cushing and the petitioner as c0-sureties, and alleges that the
money went to the firm exclusively. Upon the face of the note
I should suppose that the answer puts the contract correctly,
and I shall so consider the case for the purposes of the present
decision, though it is a point upon which evidence outside of
the note is of course admissible. In 1875, the petitioner lent
$1,396 to the firm of Dow, Hunt & Co., and Cushing transferred
to him eight shares of the capital stock of the .Hingham Steamboat Company SB collateral security, which Whiting promised to
return on payment of the $1,396 with interest. This debt was
overdue and unpaid at the time of the bankruptcy. This stock
is worth more than $1,396 and interest, and the assignee has
offered to pay the amount of that debt upon a reconveyance of
the stock. The question is, whether Mr. Whiting can hold the
surplus proceeds of the shares by way of set-off against Cushing 's other debt to him, for contribution as c0-surety of the note
above mentioned.
I have had occasion more than once to look carefully at the
cases on the subject of mutual credit in bankruptcy; and while
the decisions in this country agree entirely, as far as they go,
with those made in England, the subject has been more fully
considered in that country, as is natural, the bankrupt law having been in force there for a much greater length of time. The
leading cases on the subject are Rose v. Hart, 8 Taunt. 499:
Young v. Bank of Bengal, 1 Moore, P. C. 150, much more fully
reported 1 Deacon, 622; Naoroji v. Chartered Bank of India,
L. R. 3 C. P. 444; Astley v. Gurney, L. R. 4 C. P. (Ex. Ch.)
714. All those cases should be studied. The result of them is,
that a creditor who at the time of the bankruptcy, has in his
hands goods or chattels of the bankrupt with a power of sale,
or choses in action with a power of collection, may sell those
goods or collect th<lBe claims, and set them off against the debt
the bankrupt owes him; and this, although the power to sell or
to collect were revocable by the bankrupt before his bankruptcy ;
or, in other words, the occurrence of bankruptcy in such cases
gives a sort of lien which did not exist before. This has been
the law ever since Rose v. Hart, 8 Taunt. 499. Before that decision, it was admitted even in cases where there was no power
of sale. Young v. Bank of Bengal, ubi supra, adds this limit.a-
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tion, and this only, that if the right to sell the pledge does not

arise until after the bankruptcy, then there is no set-off for

the surplus; for the reason that the assignee might redeem in-

stantly, before any such power existed, and the creditors shall

not be prejudiced by any failure or neglect to redeem; or, to

put it in another way, that the rights of the parties are fixed

at the date of the bankruptcy.

I have not overlooked the fact that in Young v. Bank of

Bengal a good deal is said about the agreement to return the

surplus. In this case there is an agreement to return the shares

when the debt is paid. I do not consider the case cited to stand

on this ground, but on that already mentioned, that the credit

did not exist at the date of the bankruptcy. See that case ex-

plained by Parke, B., one of the judges who decided it, in Alsager

v. Currie, 12 M. & W. 751, and by the judges in the late cases

above cited. I apprehend that, when shares are conveyed in this

way as collateral security, the law implies a promise to return

them on the payment of the debt, and its expression cannot prop-

erly affect the case. In all the cases there has been either an

express or an implied promise by the agent or other person hav-

ing the property, that he would faithfully account for it and

pay over its proceeds; but this does not prevent a set-off in

bankruptcy. And the weight of authority is that a promise of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

this sort does not bar a set-off, either under the ordinary stat-

utes or under the bankrupt act, unless the property has been

intrusted to the agent for a particular purpose inconsistent with

such an application of the surplus, so that this would be a fraud

or breach of trust: see Key v. Flint, 8 Taunt. 21; Buchanan

v. Findlay, 9 P. & C. 738, for cases of this sort; and, for the

general rule, Cornfroth v. Rivett, 2 M. & S. 510; Eland v. Carr,

1 East, 375; Atkinson v. Elliott, 7 T. R. 378.

In this case, the debt of $1,396 was overdue and unpaid, and

by a statute of Massachusetts Mr. Whiting had a right to sell

the shares after giving a certain notice. This law enters into

the contract of the parties; and though there is no evidence of a

power of sale conferred by Mr. Cushiug (the form of the trans-

fer was not put in evidence), yet they will be taken to have

understood that there would be a power of sale in accordance

with the statute. On the day of the bankruptcy, Cushing was

indebted to the petitioner for one-half the note of the firm actu-

ally paid by his co-surety, the petitioner, two weeks or more be-

fore that time. This makes out a case of mutual credit upon the

tion, and this only, that if the right to sell the pledge does not
arise until after the bankruptcy, then there is no set-off for
the surplus; for the reason that the assignee might redeem instantly, before any such power existed, and the creditors shall
not be prejudiced by any failure or neglect to redeem; or, to
put it in another way, that the rights of the parties are tixed
at the date of the bankruptcy.
I have not overlooked the fact th.at in Young v. Bank of
Bengal a good deal is said about the agreement to return the
surplus. In this case there is an agreement to return the shares
when the debt is paid. I do not consider the case cited to stand
on this ground, but on that already mentioned, that the credit
did not exist at the date of the bankruptcy. See that case explained by Parke, B., one of the judges who decided it, in Alsager
v. Currie, 12 M. & W. 751, and by the judges in the late cases
above cited. I apprehend that, when shares are conveyed in this
way as collateral security, the law implies a promise to return
them on the payment of the debt, and its expression cannot properly affect the case. In all the cases there has been either an
express or an implied promise by the agent or other person having the property, that he would faithfully account for it and
pay over its proceeds; but this does not prevent a set-off in
bankruptcy. And the weight of authority is that a promise of
this sort does not bar a set-off, either under the ordinary statutes or under the bankrupt act, unless the property has been
intrusted to the agent for a particular purpose inconsistent with
such an application of the surplus, so that this would be a fraud
or breach of trust: see Key v. Flint, 8 Taunt. 21; Buchanan
v. Findlay, 9 P. & C. 738, for cases of this sort; and, for the
general rule, Cornfroth v. Rivett, 2 l\I. & S. 510; Eland v. Can-,
1 East, 375; Atkinson v. Elliott, 7 T. R. 378.
In this case, the debt of $1,396 was overdue and unpaid, and
by a st.atute of MassachuseUs Mr. Whiting had a right to sell
the shares after giving a certain notice. ThiS law enters into
the contract of the pl:rties; and though there is no evidence of a
power of sale conferred by Mr. Cushing (the form of the transfer was not put in evidence), yet they will be taken to have
understood that there would be a power of sale in accordance
with the statute. On the day of the bankruptcy, Cushing was
indebted to the petitioner for one-half the note of the firm actually paid by his co-surety, the petitioner, two weeks or more before that time. This makes out a case of mutual credit upon the
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authorities cited and the others which have followed them: a

debt due from Cushing to the petitioner, and choses in action

of Cushing's, with a present power of sale in the petitioner's

hands.

Petition granted.

In re HARPER

175 Fed. 412

(District Court, N. D. New York. January 4, 1910)

RAY, District Judge. On the 26th day of February, 1908, an

authoritie8 cited and the others which have followed them: a
debt due from Cushing to the petitioner, and choses in action
of Cushing 's, with a present power of sale in the petitioner's
bands.

• •

Petition granted.

involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against the above-

named bankrupt, Howard E. Harper, by Peninsular Paint &

Varnish Company, and this petition alleged that such company

In re HARPER

was a creditor of said Howard E. Harper. March 12, 1908, said

Harper filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and filed sched-

175 Fed. 412

ules in which he states that said Peninsular Paint & Varnish

Company is a creditor to the amount of about $3,500, but also

(District Court, N. D. New York. January 4, 1910)

sets forth that the said company is indebted to him in the sum

of $6,500. The nature of this last-mentioned alleged indebted-

ness will be referred to later. On his voluntary petition Harper

was adjudicated a bankrupt on the 16th day of March, 1908, and

thereafter, and on the 27th day of March, 1908, the two proceed-

ings were consolidated, and Harper was adjudicated a bankrupt
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under the involuntary petition, also without answer or objec-

tion. No issue was raised as to the validity of the claim of the

Peninsular Paint & Varnish Company by Harper or any of his

creditors. After adjudication and consolidation such proceed-

ings were had that a trustee was duly appointed. He qualified

and entered on the discharge of his duties. Thereafter the said

company, hereafter called the "Peninsular Company," filed its

duly itemized and verified claim with the referee. It is in due

form, and is a valid proof of claim on its face. Certain cred-

itors, at the first meeting of creditors, filed objections thereto;

but, for the purpose of electing a trustee, it was temporarily

allowed, with the understanding that later the trustee should

file objections, so as to test the validity of the claim. On the

29th day of July, 1908, the trustee filed his petition for the re-

examination of such claim of the Peninsular Company. Sep-

tember 23, 1908, said company moved for an order quashing the

RAY, District Judge. On the 26th day of February, 1908, an
involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against the abovenamed bankrupt, Howard E. Harper, by Peninsular Paint &
Varnish Company, aud this petition alleged that such company
was a creditor of said Howard E. Harper. March 12, 1908, said
Harper filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and filed schedules in which he states that said Peninsular Paint & Varnish
Company is a creditor to the amount of about $3,500, but also
sets forth that the said company is indebted to him in the sum
of $6,500. The nature of this last-mentioned alleged indebtedness will be referred to later. On his voluntary petition Harper
was adjudicated a bankrupt on the 16th day of :March, 1908, and
thereafter, and on the 27th day of l\farch, 1908, the two proceedings were consolidated, and Harper was adjudicated a bankrupt
under the involuntary petition, also without answer or objection. No issue was raised as to the validity of the claim of the
Peninsular Paint & Varnish Company by Harper or any of his
creditors. After adjudication and consolidation such proceedings were had that a trustee was duly appointed. He qualified
and entered on the discharge of his duties. Thereafter the said
company, hereafter called the "Peninsular Company," filed its
duly itemized and verified claim with the referee. It is in due
form, and is a valid proof of claim on its face. Certain creditors, at the first meeting of creditors, filed objections thereto ;
but, for the purpose of electing a trustee, it was temporarily
allowed, with the understanding that later the trustee should
file objections, so as to test the validity of the claim. On the
29th day of July, 1908, the trustee filed his petition for the reexamination of such claim of the Peninsular Company. September 23, 1908, said company moved for an order quashing the
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objection filed by such creditors and dismissing the said petition

of the trustee. The motion was based upon the petitions and

proceedings for adjudication, the schedules of the bankrupt, the

proof of claim of the Peninsular Company, the objections thereto,

the said petition of the trustee, certain testimony given by the

bankrupt on his examination in the proceedings, and on the

petition filed by the trustee for a settlement of the estate of

such bankrupt. The referee denied the motion to quash the

objections and dismiss the petition of the trustee to re-examine

the claim of said Peninsular Company, and this proceeding for

a review of that decision follows:

The claim of the Peninsular Company, amounting to $3,391.17,

after deducting payments and credits for discount, shortage,

and merchandise returned between October 10,1906, and October

23, 1907, is for goods, wares, and merchandise sold and delivered

to said Harper between October 13, 1906, and July 18, 1907,

"of the reasonable value and stipulated price of $6,272.87, no

part of which has been paid, except the sum of $2,881.70, leaving

a balance due, owing, and unpaid of $3,391.17, a statement of

which account is hereto annexed and made a part of this proof;

that said debt exists upon an open account and became due on

the 5th day of June, 1907, that day being the average due date

of the items of said account." • • •
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A statement of items is annexed as referred to, in the claim.

The objections filed by the creditors contain no denial of any

allegation of the claim, but set up counterclaims alleged to exist

in favor of Harper against said Peninsular Company connected

with and growing out of the same transaction or transactions set

forth in the claim. • • •

The affidavit of Harper, referred to in such objection and an-

nexed thereto, so far as material, reads as follows:

'' Rensselaer County, City of Troy—ss.:

"Howard E. Harper, being duly sworn, says that he is the

bankrupt above named, and that the claim existing in his favor

against the Peninsular Paint & Varnish Company, which claim

is scheduled as an asset of the bankrupt estate herein, consists

in substance of the following items:

"First. Damages sustained by deponent by reason of the

false and fraudulent representations made by said Peninsular

Paint & Varnish Company to deponent, by which deponent was

induced to engaged in business in the city of Troy, N. Y., in or

about the month of August, 1906, as the local representative of

H. A A. Bankruptcy—39

objection filt!d by such creditors and dismissing the said petition
of the trustee. The motion was based upon the petitions and
proceedings for adjudication, the schedules of the bankrupt, the
proof of claim of the Peninsular Company, the objections thereto,
the said petition of the trnstee, certain testimony given by the
bankrupt on his examination in the proceedings, and on the
petition filed by the trustee for a settlement of the estate of
such bankrupt. The referee denied the motion to quash the
objections and dismiss the petition of the trustee to re-examine
the claim of said Peninsular Company, and this proceeding for
a rcvic>w of that decision follows:
The claim of the Peninsular Company, amounting to $3,391.17,
after deducting payments and credits for discount, shortage,
and merchandise returned between October 10, '1906, anu October
23, 1907, is for goods, wares, and merchandise sold and delivered
to said Harper between October 13, 1906, and July 18, 1907,
''of the reasonable value and stipulated price of $6,272.87, no
part of which has been paid, except the sum of $2,881. 70, leaving
a balance due, owing, and unpaid of $3,391.17, a statement of
which account is hereto annexed and made a part of this proof;
that said debt exists upon an open account and became due on
the 5th day of June, 1907, that day being the average due date
of the items of said account.'' • • •
A statement of items is annexed as referred to. in the claim.
The objections filed by the creditors contain no denial of any
allegation of the claim, but set up counterclaims alleged to exist
in favor of Harper against said Peninsular Company connected
with and growing out of the same transaction or transactions set
forth in the claim. • • •
The affidavit of Harper, referred to in such objection and annexed thereto, so far as material, reads as follows :
"Rensselaer County, City of Troy~.:
''Howard E. Harper, being duly sworn, says that he. is the
baukrupt above named, and that the claim existing in his favor
against the Peninsular Paint & Varnish Company, which claim
is scheduled as an asset of the bankrupt estate herein, consists
in substance of the following items :
"First. Damages sustained by deponent by reason of the
false and fraudulent representations made by said Peninsulnr
Paint & Varnish Company to deponent, by which deponent was
induced to engaged in business in the city of Troy, N. Y., in or
about the month of August, 1906, as the local representative of
H. 4 A. Baokruptcy-89
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said Peninsular Paint & Varnish Company in the sale of the

goods manufactured by said company. Said representations

were in substance to the effect that said company had business

in this locality amounting to $20,000 per year. Said representa-

tion was false, and was known to be false by said company when

it was made, and deponent relied upon such representation in

making the contract, which was then made for the purchase by

deponent of goods made by said Company. Deponent paid to

said company about $2,300 for the first car load of paint men-

tioned in said contract. The purchase price of the second car

load of paint mentioned in said contract amounted to about

$1,900, and that amount has not been paid by deponent, but is

included as a part of the claim of said company herein. By rea-

son of the false representations made by said company to depo-

nent, deponent has lost the $2,300 which he paid to said com-

pany, besides about 18 months' time and labor, which is worth

to deponent not less than $3,000. That the business of said

company in this locality did not amount to more than $5,000 a

year. That the gross profits of said business, if it had amounted

to $20,000 per year, would have been $4,000 per year, and the

net profits to deponent would have been at least $2,000 per year.

Said business amounted in fact to only $5,000 per year, and the
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gross profits thereof being but $1,000, there were not net profits

to deponent, but an actual loss, not only of said net profits, but

of money which deponent was obliged to borrow in order to carry

on said business. Said amount of borrowed money amounts to

at least $1,300, making the total losses sustained by reason of

said false and fraudulent representations of the said Peninsular

Paint & Varnish Company at least the sum of $6,600.

"Second. In and by the contract entered into between depo-

nent and said Peninsular Paint & Varnish Company, in or about

August, 1906, said company agreed to furnish to deponent the

services of a capable salesman to assist deponent in disposing

of the goods manufactured by said company in this locality for

certain periods of the year, specified in said contract. Said com-

pany failed and neglected to furnish such salesman at the period

specified in said contract, and when a salesman was eventually

furnished to deponent for a short time by said company said

salesman was incapable and inexperienced, and was of no assist-

ance whatever to deponent. That by reason of the failure of said

company to carry out its contract with deponent in respect

said Peninsular Paint & Varnish Company in the sale of the
goods manufactured by said company. Said representations
were in substance to the effect that said company had businea
in this locality amounting to $20,000 per year. Said representation was false, and was known to be false by said company when
it was made, and deponent relied upon such representation in
making the contract, which was then made for the purchase by
deponent of goods made by said Company. Deponent paid to
said company about $2,300 for the first car load of paint mentioned in said contre.ct. The purchase price of the second car
load of paint mentioned in said contract amounted to about
$1,900, and that amount has not been paid by deponent, but is
included as a part of the claim of said company herein. By reason of the false representations made by said company to deponent, deponent has lost the $2,300 which he paid to said company, besides about 18 months' time and labor, which is worth
to deponent not les.5 than $3,000. That the business of said
company in this locality did not amount to more than $5,000 a
year. That the gross profits of said business, if it had amounted
to $20,000 per year, would have been $4,000 per year, and the
net profits to deponent would have been at least $2,000 per year.
Said business amounted in fact to only $5,000 per year, and the
gross profits thereof being but $1,000, there were not net profits
to deponent, but an actual loss, not only of said net profits, but
of money which deponent was obliged to borrow in order to carry
on said business. Said amount of borrowed money amounts to
at least $1,300, making the total lo~es sustained by reason of
said false and fraudulent representations of the said Peninsular
Paint & Varnish Company at least the sum of $6,600.
''Second. In and by the contract entered into between depouent and said Peuinsular Paint & Varnish Company, in or about
August, 1906, said company agreed to fumish to deponent the
services of a capable salesman to assist deponent in disposing
of the goods manufactured by said company in this locality for
certain periods of the year, specified in said contract. Said company failed and negleeted to furnish such salesman at the period
specified in said contract, and when a salesman was eventually
furnished to deponent for a short time by said company said
salesman was incapable and inexperienced, and was of uo assistance whatever to deponent. That by reason of the failure of said
company to carry out its contract with deponent in respect
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herein referred to deponent has suffered damages in the sum of

at least $1,000.

"Howard E. Harper.

"Sworn to before me this 31st day of March, 1908.

"James W. Wright, Notary Public, Rens. Co."

•••

It will be noted that the affidavit of Harper does not deny the

sale and delivery and agreed price of the goods, wares, and

merchandise, or the account stated, but sets up two counterclaims.

The petition of the trustee admits the sale, etc., denies the ac-

count stated, and sets up, in substance, the same counterclaims.

The claim of the Peninsular Company is not based upon an

account stated That allegation may be wholly disregarded, and

we have a complete and valid proof of claim, which, in the

absence of objection, should and must be allowed as a valid

claim to the amount stated. The trustee does not deny the sale

and delivery of the goods to the bankrupt, the agreed price, the

value, the payments, or the balance due. He simply denies that

there was an account stated between the parties, which included

this account.

This reduces the questions involved here to the propositions:

(1) Whether or not valid actionable counterclaims or offsets are

alleged; and (2) if so, can they or either of them be used to
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reduce or extinguish the otherwise valid, provable, and proved

claim of the Peninsular Company?

•••

But this question is not very important here, as the undis-

puted facts show that the Peninsular Company is a creditor to

the amount stated, and the question is, really, whether the trus-

tee may prove and have liquidated an unliquidated claim for

damages, or claims for damages, of the nature stated, and if

such claims, or either of them, are sustained, use the recovery to

reduce or "wipe out" the claim of the Peninsular Company. If

the trustee had come into possession of a valid promissory note

of $3,000 made by the Peninsular Company, overdue, and be-

longing to the bankrupt and his estate after adjudication, is

there any question that he could set it up as a counterclaim or

offset to the claim of the Peninsular Company, and to that ex-

tent reduce its claim? I think not. Any debt, liquidated or

unliquidated, owing to the bankrupt from a creditor of his,

whether for damages or on contract, express or implied, which

passes to the trustee, may, of course, be used by Him to reduce

herein referred to depooent has suffered damages in the sum of
at least $1,000.
"Howard E. Harper.
"Sworn to before me this 31st day of March, 1908.
"James W. Wright, Notary Public, Rens. Co."

• • •

It will be noted that the affidavit of Harper does not deny the
sale and delivery and agreed price of the goods, wares, and
merchandise, or the account stated, but sets up two counterclaims.
The petition of the trustee admits the sale, etc., denies the account stated, and sets up, in substance, the same counterclaims.
The claim of the Peninsular Company is not based upon an
account stated. That allegation may be wholly disregarded, and
we have a complete and valid proof of claim, which, in the
absence of objection, should and must be allowed as a valid
claim to the amount stated. The trustee does not deny the sale
and delivery of the goods to the bankrupt, the agreed price, the
value, the payments, or the balance due. He simply deuies that
there was an account stated between the parties, which included
this account.
This reduces the questions involved here to the propositions:
(1) Whether or not valid actionable counterclaims or offsets are
alleged; and (2) if so, can they or either of them be used to
reduce or extinguish the otherwise valid, provable, and proved
claim of the Peninsular Company T

• • •

But this question is not very important here, as the undisputed facts show that the Peninsular Company is a creditor to
the amount stated, and the question is, really, whether the trustee may prove and have liquidated an unliquidated claim for
damages, or claims for damages, of the nature stated, and if
such claims, or either of them, are sustained, use the recovery to
reduce or ''wipe out'' the claim of the Peninsular Company. If
the trustee bad come into possession of a valid promissory note
of $3,000 made by the Peninsular Company, overdue, and belonging to the bankrupt and his estate after adjudication, is
there any question that he could set it up as a counterclaim or
offset to the claim of the Peninsular Company, and to that extent reduce its claim T I think not. Any debt, liquidated or
unliquidated, owing to the bankrupt from a creditor of his,
whether for damages or on contract, express or implied, which
p888es to the trustee, may, of course, be used by him to reduce
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the claim of such creditor when presented, or to extinguish it

altogether. § 68 of the bankruptcy act, as amended, provides:

"Set-Offs and Counterclaims.—(a) In all cases of mutual debts

or mutual credits between the estate of a bankrupt and a cred-

itor the account shall be stated and one debt shall be set off

against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid."

By § 70 of the act it is provided, in substance, that upon

his appointment and qualification the trustee shall be—

"vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, as

of the day he was adjudged a bankrupt, except in so far as it is

to property which is exempt, to all • • • (5) property

which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means

have transferred, or which might have been levied upon and sold

under judicial process against him; • • • (6) rights of ac-

tion arising upon contracts or from the unlawful taking or

detention of, or injury to his property.''

It is self-evident, I think, that rights of action for unliquidated

damages for false and fraudulent representations, or for a breach

of contract, whether assignable or not, are not regarded as prop-

erty under subdivision 5.

Do the objecting creditors set up, or does the trustee in his

petition set up or allege, "a right of action," existing in favor
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of Harper, prior to bis bankruptcy, "arising upon contract"?

Clearly neither of them set up a right of action arising from

the unlawful taking or detention of his property. Do the cred-

itors or trustee set up a right of action arising from injury to

the bankrupt's property? The first counterclaim is to recover

damages for false and fraudulent representations whereby the

bankrupt was induced to enter into a contract to purchase paints

and to enter on the business of selling or dealing in paints,

whereby it is alleged he lost the sum of $6,500. The second

counterclaim is to recover damages for a breach of contract in

not furnishing a capable salesman to assist Harper in the dis-

posal of goods manufactured by the Peninsular Company. Dam-

ages in the sum of $1,000 are alleged. In the first counterclaim

no breach of contract is alleged. It is a cause of action (if one is

sufficiently stated) to recover damages for false and fraudulent

representations made by the company, whereby, relying thereon,

the bankrupt, prior to bankruptcy, was induced to enter into a

certain contract to engage in a certain business, and in such

business purchase his stock of the Peninsular Company, all of

which he did, and because of the false and fraudulent representa-

the claim of such creditor when presented, or to extinguish it
altogether. § 68 of the bankruptcy act, as amended, provides:
''Set-Offs and Counterclaims.-( a) In all cases of mutual debts
or mutual credits between the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated and one debt shall be set off
against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid.''
By § 70 of the act it is provided, in substance, that upon
his appointment and qualification the trustee shall be-''vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, as
of the day he was adjudged a bankrupt, except in so far a.s it is
to property which is exempt, to all • • • ( 5) property
which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means
have transferred, or which might have been levied upon and sold
under judicial process against him; • • • ( 6) rights of action arising upon contracts or from the unlawful taking or
detention of, or injury to his property.''
It is self-evident, I think, that rights of action for unliquidated
damages for false and fraudulent representations, or for a breach
of contract, whether assignable or not, are not regarded as prop·
erty under subdivision 5.
Do the objecting creditors set up, or does the trustee in his
petition set up or allege, "a right of action," existing in favor
of Harper, prior to his bankruptcy, ''arising upon contract'' T
Clearly neither of them set up a right of action arising from
the unlawful taking or detention of his property. Do the creditors or trustee set up a right of action arising from injury to
the bankrupt's property T The first counterclaim is to recoYer
damages for false and fraudulent representations whereby the
bankrupt was induced to enter into a contract to purchase paint8
and to enter on the business of selling or dealing in paints,
whereby it is alleged he lost the sum of $6,500. The second
counterclaim is to recover damages for a breach of contract in
not furnishing a capable salesman to assist Harper in the disposal of goods manufactured by the Peninsular Company. Damages in the sum of $1,000 are alleged. In the first counterclaim
no breach of contract is alleged. It is a cause of action (if one is
sufficiently stated) to recover damages for false and fraudulent
representations made by the company, whereby, relying thereon,
the bankrupt, prior to bankruptcy, was induced to enter into a
certain contract to engage in a certain business, and in such
business purchase his stock of the Peninsular Company, all of
which he did, and because of the false and fraudulent representa-
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tions inducing such contract he lost $6,500. This is not a right

of action arising upon contract. Is it one arising from injury

to Harper's property? Code Civ. Proc. N. Y. § 3343, subd. 10,

provides:

"An injury to property is an actionable act whereby the

estate of another is lessened, other than a personal injury, or

the breach of a contract."

Was the making of these false and fraudulent statements an

"actionable act," within the meaning of this provision of the

law? No physical act is alleged which lessened the estate of

Harper, unless it be that the making of false and fraudulent

statements is a physical act, within the definition stated. The

representations did not lessen or diminish the estate of Harper

directly; but, the claim is, they induced Harper to enter into

a contract which otherwise he would not have made, and that

in the execution or attempted execution of same, without fault

gji his part and solely because of the fact that business conditions

and surroundings were not as represented, he lost $6,500, and

that thereby his estate was lessened to that extent. In other

words, the false and fraudulent representations made to Harper

by the Peninsular Company induced an act by Harper in the

execution of which he lost $6,500. The gravamen of the cause
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of action is the false and fraudulent representations, the acts

of making them; the result is damage by the loss of money be-

longing to Harper's estate, whereby such estate is diminished

or lessened.

[After discussing certain New York eases, the court continued:]

This would seem to be a plain holding that material false and

fraudulent representations which induce another to part with

his property constitute an actionable act causing injury to

property. If so, is it not a "right of action arising from an

injury to his property"? However, Harper was not induced by

the false and fraudulent representations to part with any prop-

erty, or to stop any work on his property, or to pay men for time

idle, and he lost no rental of property. He was induced by

such representations to enter into a certain contract with the

one making them, to purchase and engage in an attempt to sell

certain property—risk that property in business—and in and

by so doing, for the reason such representations were false, he

lost his money or property. His estate was lessened. In this

case the Peninsular Company not only made the representations,

but was the party to be benefited by the contract. Harper was

tions inducing such contract he lost $6,500. This is not a right
of action arising upon contract. ls it one arising from injury
to Harper's property Y Code Civ. Proc. N. Y. § 3343, subd. 10,
provides:
''An injury to property is an actionable act whereby the
estate of another is lessened, other than a parsonal injury, or
the breach of a contract.''
Was the making of these false and fraudulent statements an
·•actionable act,'' within the meaning of this provision of the
law Y No physical act is alleged which leS8<'ned the estate of
Harper, unless it be that the making of false and fraudulent
statements is a physical act, within the definition stated. The
r1·presentations did not lessen or diminish the estate of Harper
directly; but, the claim is, they induced Harper to enter into
a contract which otherwise he would not have made, and that
in the execution or attempted execution of same, without fault
1,n h!s part and solely because of the fact that business conditions
a 11d surroundings were not as represented, he lost $6,500, and
that thereby his estate was lessened to that extent. In other
words, the false and fraudulent representations made to Harper
i1y the Peninsular Company induced a.n act by Harper in the
1•xecutiou of which he lost $6,500. The gravamen of the cause
~; f action is the false and fraudulent representations, the act.s
o: maki11g them; the result is damage by the loss of money belonging to Harper's estate, whereby such estate is diminished
or lessened.
[After discussing certain New York cases, the court continued:]
This would seem to be a plain holding that material false and
fraudulent representations which induce another to part with
his property constitute an actionable act causing injury to
propi~rty. If so, is it not a "right of action arising from an
frjnry to his property" T However, Harper was not induced by
t Ji,, false and fraudulent representations to part with any property, or to stop any work on his property, or to pay men for time
i1lle, and he lost no rental of property. He was induced by
such rcpresenta tions to enter into a certain contract with the
01H· making them, to purchase and engage in an attempt to sell
C(·rtain property-risk that property in business-and in and
l1y so doing, for the reason such representations were false, he
lost his money or property. His estate was lessened. In this
case the Peninsnlnr Company not only made the representations,
but was the party to be benefited by the contract. Harper was
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to purchase of it his stock of goods, risk same in the business,

and pay therefor to the company. He did under that contract

purchase these goods mentioned in the claim of the Peninsular

Company presented as a claim to the trustee of Harper's estate

in bankruptcy. If Harper had not been adjudicated a bankrupt,

and had been sued by the Peninsular Company for the price or

value of the goods, he could have set up and pleaded this coun-

terclaim. §§ 500 and 501, Code of Civil Procedure. § 500 per-

mits the setting up of a counterclaim, and § 501 says:

"The counterclaim, specified in the last section, must tend, in

some Way, to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's recovery, and

must be one of the following causes of action against the plain-

tiff, or, in a proper case, against the person whom he repre-

sents, and in favor of the defendant, or of one or more defend-

ants, between whom and the plaintiff a separate judgment may

be had in the action:

"1. A cause of action, arising out of the contract or transac-

tion, set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plain-

tiff's claim, or connected with the subject of the action.

"2. In an action on contract, any other cause of action on

contract, existing at the commencement of the action."

This counterclaim, the one asserted by the trustee, does not
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arise on contract, and is not for damages for a breach of the

contract on which the Peninsular Company relies; but it is a

claim to recover damages resulting from the false and fraudu-

lent representations of the party who, in effect, sues on the con-

tract, who was a party thereto, and who induced the making

thereof; and the contention of Harper's trustee is that, having

been induced to enter into it by such false representations, and

under and pursuant to it to purchase the goods in question and

engage in the business of selling them, by reason of the falsity of

such statements, he (Harper) lost his money or property.

This cause of action for the damages sustained is one con-

nected with the subject of the action—that is, the claim of the

Peninsular Company here—even if it is not one arising out of

the contract or transaction on which that company bases its claim

as presented to the trustee. It is a cause of action to recover

damages sustained by reason of or as a consequence of the fraud

perpetrated in inducing the making of the very contract the

Peninsular Company relies upon as the basis of its claim, and

which damages were sustained in executing or performing that

very contract, so induced, for the benefit of the said company.

to purchase of it his stock of goods, risk aame in the bu.sines&,
and pay therefor to the company. He did under that contract
purchase these goods mentioned in the claim of the Peninsular
Company presented as a claim to the trustee of Harper's estate
in bankruptcy. Ii Harper had not been adjudicated a bankrupt,
and had been sued by the Peninsular Company for the price or
value of the goods, he could have set up and pleaded this counterclaim. §§ 500 and 501, Code of Civil Procedure. § 500 permits the setting up of a counterclaim, and§ 501 says:
"The counterclaim, specified in the last section, must tend, in
some way, to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's recovery, and
must be one of the foll-0wing causes of action against the plaintiff, or, in a proper case, against the person whom he represents, and in favor of the defendant, or of one or more defendants, between whom and the plaintiff a separate judgment may
be had in the action :
'' 1. A cause of action, arising out of the contract or transaction, set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connecte.d with the subject of the action.
"2. In an action on contract, any other cause of action on
contract, existing at the commencement of the action.''
This counterclaim, the one asserted by the trustee, does not
arise on contract, and is not for dam&ges for a breach of the
contract on which the Peninsular Company relies; but it is a
claim to recover damages resulting from the false and fraudulent reprcseutatious of the party who, in effect, sues on the contract, who was a party thereto, and who induced the making
thereof; and the coutention of Harper's trustee is that, having.
heen induced to enter into it by such f.alse representations, and
under and pursuant to it to purchase the goods in question and
engage in the business of selliug them, by reason of the falsity of
such statements, he (Harper) lost his money or property.
This cause of action for the damages sustained is one connected with the suhject of the action-that is, the claim of the
Peninsular Company here-even if it is not one arising out of
the eo11tract or transaction on which that company bases its claim
as presented to the trustee. It is a cause of action to recover
damages sustained by reason of or as a consequence of the fraud
perpetrated in inducing the making of the very oontract the
PeniDBular Company reli<'s upon as the basis of its claim, and
which damages were sustained in executing or performing that
very contract, so induced, for the benefit of the said company.
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All this is settled by the decision of the Court of Appeals of the

state of New York. Carpenter v. Manhattan Life Insurance

Company, 93 N. Y. 552, 556; Thomson v. Sanders, 118 N. Y. 252,

258, 259, 23 N. E. 374. The words "subject of the action"

mean "the facts constituting plaintiff's cause of action." Leh-

maier v. Griswold, 40 N. Y. Super. Ct. 100, cited and approved

Rothschild v. Whitman et al., 132 N. Y. 472, 476, 30 N. E. 858.

The facts constituting the Peninsular Company's claim are the

contract to sell goods, and the sale and delivery of said goods

pursuant thereto, and a breach thereof by nonpayment. The

counterclaim is that such contract was entered into because of

false and fraudulent representations made by the company and

relied on by the vendee or purchaser under the contract, result-

ing in great loss, because there was no market for the goods as

represented. True, the representations preceded the contract,

and the ordering and delivery of goods under it, and the loss;

but they were all connected and followed in regular sequence.

The case is not like Rothschild v. Whitman et al., 132 N. Y. 472,

30 N. E. 858.

I am therefore of the opinion, and hold, that the claim for

damages passed to the trustee, if he has one, and that, as the

Peninsular Company has presented its claim to the trustee, the

trustee may establish such counterclaim before the referee, unless
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some other mode of establishing and liquidating same is directed.

My attention is called to In re Becker Bros., 15 Am. Bankr.

R. 228, 139 Fed. 366. In that case the bankrupt had leased cer-

tain premises and was in possession. The landlord negligently

allowed water to come in upon the leased premises, whereby the

property of the bankrupt was injured. The landlord duly proved

his claim for rent in the bankruptcy proceedings, and the trustee

sought to counterclaim the alleged cause of action for such dam-

ages against the claims of the landlord for such rent. If under

the laws of Pennsylvania the negligence of the landlord in al-

lowing water to come in on the premises leased to the bankrupt,

to the injury of his property constituted and created "a right

of action in favor of such bankrupt, prior to his adjudication,

arising from injury to his property," such right of action passed

by operation of law to the trustee in bankruptcy, and it became

his duty to enforce it and collect the damages for the benefit of

the estate. It would be ridiculous to say that a right of action

for damages which passes to a trustee is not to be enforced and

collected by him for the benefit of the estate. If, then, the one

All this is settled by the decision of the Court of Appeals of the
state of New York. Carpenter v. Manhattan Life Insurance
Company, 93 N. Y. 552, 556; Thom.son v. Sanders, 118 N. Y. 252,
258, 259, 23 N. E. 374. The words "subject of the action"
mean "the facts constituting plaintiff's cause of action." Lehmaier v. Griswold, 40 N. Y. Super. Ct. 100, cited and approved
Rothschild v. Whitman et al., 132 N. Y. 472, 476, 30 N. E. 858.
The facts constituting the Peninsular Company's claim are the
contract to sell goods, and the sale and delivery of said goods
pursuant thereto, and a breach thereof by nonpayment. The
counterclaim is that such contract was entered into because of
false and fraudulent representations made by the company and
relied on by the vendee or. purchaser under the contract, resulting in great loss, because there was no market for the goods as
represented. True, the representations preceded the contract,
and the ordering and delivery of goods under it, and the loss;
but they were all connected and followed in regular sequence.
The case is not like Rothschild v. Whitman et al., 132 N. Y. 472,
30 N. E. 858.
I am therefore of the opinion, and hold, that the claim for
damages passed to the trustee, if he has one, and that, as the
Peninsular Company has presented its claim to the trustee, the
trustee may establish such counterclaim before the referee, unless
some other mode of establishing and liquidating same is directed.
My attention is called to In re Becker Bros., 15 Am. Bankr.
R. 228, 139 Fed. 366. In that case the bankrupt had leased certain premises and was in possession. The landlord negligently
allowed water to come in upon the leased premises, whereby the
property of the bankrupt was injured. The landlord duly proved
bis claim for rent in the bankruptcy proceedings, and the trustee
sought to counterclaim the alleged cause of action for such damages against the claims of the landlord for such rent. If under
the laws of Pennsylvania the negligence of the landlord in allowing water to come in on the premises leased to the bankrupt,
to the injury of his property constituted and created ''a right
of action in favor of such bankrupt, prior to his adjudication,
H rising from injury to his property,'' such right of action passed
hy operation of law to the trustee in bankruptcy, and it became
his duty to enforce it and collect the damages for the benefit of
the estate. It would be ridiculous to say that a right of action
for damages which passes to a trustee is not to be enforced and
collected by him for the benefit of the estate. If, then, the one
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liable to the estate in an action for damages has and presents a

claim against such estate, no matter what its character or how

it arises, provided it be one properly provable and allowable

against the estate in bankruptcy, are the trustee and referee to

allow it, and pay a dividend or dividends, and proceed by action

to enforce the claim for damages; or may the trustee establish

the claim for damages and use it to reduce or wipe out such cred-

itor's claim! The bankruptcy act itself says:

"In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the

estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated

and one debt shall be set off against the other, and the balance

only shall be allowed or paid.'' § 68a.

Subdivision "b" of the same section adds the limitation or

qualification, however, that:

"A set-off or counterclaim shall not be allowed in favor of

any debtor of a bankrupt which is not provable against the

estate."

This is not a limitation or restriction on the right of the

trustee to set up, prove, and use any claim he has and which

he may enforce against a creditor of the bankrupt presenting a

claim against the estate he represents, provided it be a "debt"

owing by such creditor to the bankrupt estate within the mean-
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ing of § 680. The plainly disclosed policy of the act is that

where a person is indebted to the bankrupt estate, and the trus-

tee seeks to enforce the indebtedness, the debtor to the estate

may set up as an offset or counterclaim only such just demands

as he has against the estate which are provable in bankruptcy as

a claim against the estate, unless it be one purchased or trans-

ferred to him after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, or

within four months before such filing, with a view to such use,

and with notice or knowledge that such bankrupt was insolvent

or had committed an act of bankruptcy. The debtor is limited

to claims provable in bankruptcy. There is no provision or sug-

gestion in the act that a claim against a creditor of the bankrupt

in the hands of the trustee, and which came to him by opera-

tion of law on his appointment, -cannot be used as an offset to

or counterclaim against the claim of such creditor of the bank-

rupt estate, unless such claim in the hands of the trustee be one

of a character provable in bankruptcy in case the one liable

thereon had been adjudicated a bankrupt.

Congress had a perfect right to provide that a debtor to the

estate shall not be allowed to offset or counterclaim demands or

liable to the estate in an action for damages has and presenta a
claim against such estate, no matter what its character or bow
it arises, provided it be one properly provable and allowable
against the estate in bankruptcy, are the trustee and referee to
allow it, and pay a dividend or dividends, and proceed by action
to enforce the dtaim for damages; or may the trustee establish
the claim for damages and use it to reduce or wipe out such creditor's claim T The bankruptcy act itself says:
"In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credita between the
estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated
and one debt shall be set off against the other, and the balance
only shall be allowed or paid.'' § 68a.
Subdivision "b" of the same section adds the limitation or
qualification, however, that:
''A set-off or counterclaim shall not be allowed in favor of
any debtor of a bankrupt which is not provable against the
estate.''
This is not a limitation or restriction on the right of the
trustee to set up, prove, and use any claim he has and whieh
he may enforce against a creditor of the bankrupt presenting a
claim against the estate he represents, provided it be a "debt'·
owing by such creditor to the bankrupt estate within the meaning of § 68a. The plainly discloeed policy of the act is that
where a person is indebted to the bankrupt estate, and the trustee seeks to enforce the indebtedness, the debtor to the estate
may set up as an offset or counterclaim only such just demands
as he has against the ~tate which are provable in bankruptcy as
a claim against the estate, unless it be one purchased or transferred to him after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, or
within four months before such filing, with a view to such use,
and with notice or knowledge that such bankrupt was insolvent
or had committed an act of bankruptcy. The debtor is limited
to claims provable in bankruptcy. There is no provision or suggestion in the act that a claim against a creditor of the bankrupt
in the hands of the trustee, and which came to him by operation of law on his appointment, ,cannot be used as an offset to
or counterclaim against the claim of such cl'editor of the bank·
rupt estate, unless such claim in the bands of the trustee be one
of .a character provable in bankruptcy in case the one liable
thereon had been adjudicated a bankrupt.
Congress bad a perfect right to provide that a debtor to the
estate shall not be allowed to offset or counterclaim demands or
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claims against the bankrupt, unless they be of the class and

character provable in bankruptcy, and also to provide what

claims and demands and causes of action, existing in favor of the

bankrupt at the time the petition was filed, shall pass to the

trustee in bankruptcy and be enforced by him, and also to pro-

vide the mode of enforcement. Is a claim for damages for false

and fraudulent representations a "debt," within the meaning

and intent of § 680 of the act? If so, there is no doubt of the

right of the trustee to offset or counterclaim same. § 1, subd.

11, of the act provides:

"'Debt' shall include any debt, demand, or claim provable

in bankruptcy."

It will be noted that some of these definitions in § 1 read "shall

mean," while others read "shall include." It was not intended

that definitions of words used in the act which read "shall in-

clude '' should exclude other meanings or definitions of the word,

or limit the ordinary and well-understood meanings. It was in-

tended, as the words used plainly indicate, to make sure that

they would be held to include what is expressed. If a statute

should be written prohibiting the sale of all intoxicating bev-

erages, and a section should be added saying, the words 1' intoxi-

cating beverages" as used herein shall include hard cider, would"

an intelligent court be justified in holding that the words "in-
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toxicating beverages,'' used in the act, had been defined to mean

hard cider, and nothing else, and that whisky, rum, brandy, and

other intoxicants were excluded, or not included 1 Yet cases may

be found where this very interpretation has been put upon § 1

of the bankruptcy act.

It is quite true that the word "debt," given its common-law

meaning, does not include a claim for unliquidated damages for

false and fraudulent representations. Jackson v. Bell, 31 N. J.

Eq. 554, 558; Duncan v. Lyon, 3 Johns. Ch. 351, 8 Am. Dec.

513; Berson v. Ewing, 34 Cal. 89, 23 Pac. 1112. However, the

word "debt" may include claims for unliquidated damages. In

re Brouillard, 20 R. I. 617, 40 Atl . 762. There Gen. Laws 1896,

c. 274, § 50, provided that a discharge in insolvency should re-

lease the insolvent from "all his provable debts." The same act

provided that claims for trover and torts might be proved. It

was held that the word "debts" was used in its generic and not

its strict legal sense, and that claims for damages for torts were

released. In Rosenbaum v. United States C. S., 61 N. J. Law,

543, 40 Atl. 591, 593, it was held that the statute providing for

claims against the bankrupt, unless they be of the claBS and
character provable in bankruptcy, and also to provide what
claims and demands and causes of action, existing in favor of the
bankrupt at the time the petition was filed, shall pass to the
trustee in bankruptcy and be enforced by him, and also to provide the mode of enforcement. Is a claim for damages for false
and fraudulent representations a ''debt,'' within the meaning
and intent of § 68a of the act T If so, there is no doubt of the
right of the trustee to offset or counterclaim same. § 1, subd.
11, of the act provides:
'' 'Debt' shall include any debt, demand, or claim provable
in bankruptcy."
It will be noted that some of these definitions in § 1 read "shall
mean," while others read "shall include." It was not intended
that definitions of words used in the act which read ''shall include'' should exclude other meanings or definitions of the word,
or limit the ordinary and well-understood meaninga It was intended, as the words used plainly indicate, to make sure that
they would be held to include what is exprf'.ssed. If a statute
should be written prohibiting the sale of all intoxicating beverages, and a section should be added saying, the words '' intoxicating beverages'' as used herein shall include bard cider, would ·
an intelligent court be justified in holding that the words ''intoxicating beverages,'' used in the act, had been defined to mean
hard cider, and nothing else, and that whisky, rum, brandy, and
other intoxicants were excluded, or not included 1 Yet cases may
be found where this very interpretation has been put upon § 1
of the bankruptcy act.
It is quite true that the word "debt,". given its common-law
meaning, does not include a claim for unliquidated damages for
false and fraudulent representations. Jackson v. Bell, 31 N. J.
Eq. 554, 558; Duncan v. Lyon. 3 Johns. Ch. 351, 8 Am. Dec.
513; Berson v. Ewing, 84 Cal. 89, 23 Pac. 1112. However. the
word "debt" may include claims for unliquidated damages. In
re Brouillard, 20 R. I. 617, 40 Atl. 762. There Gen. Laws 1896,
c. 274, § 50, provided that a discharge in insolvency should release the insolvent from ''all his provable debts. '' The same act
provided that claims for trover and torts might be proved. It
was held that the word "debts" was used in it.s generic and not
its strict legal sense, and that claiIDB for damages for torts were
released. In Ros6Ilbaum v. United States C. S., 61 N. J. Law,
543, 40 Atl. 591, 593, it was held that the statute providing for
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sale and the division of proceeds amongst the creditors of an in-

solvent corporation in proportion to their debts included claims

for unliquidated damages, and the word "debts" is used in its

broad and no restricted sense. Damages for taking land is a

debt due, when fixed and payable. Lowell v. Boston, etc., 106

Mass. 540.

In Berson v. Ewing, supra, the Civil Code provides that the

liquidating partner may collect, compromise, or release any debts

due the partnership, and pay or compromise any claims against

it; and it was held that "debts" included claims—that the

words were used synonymously. In New York the word "debts"

includes every claim and demand upon which a judgment for

a sum of money, or directing the payment of money, could be

recovered in an action. Code Civ. Proc. § 2514.

A Wisconsin statute, providing that the homestead should not

be liable to a forced sale '' for any debt,'' means debts arising on

contract and judgments for torts. Smith v. Omans, 17 Wis. 395,

397.

The words "debts contracted," as used in the Constitution

of Michigan, are words of large import, and include all kinds

, of claims arising not only on contract, but in tort. Mertz v.

Berry, 101 Mich. 32, 59 N. W. 445, 446, 24 L. R. A. 789, 45 Am.
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St. Rep. 379. See, also, Losee v. Bullard, 79 N. Y. 404; Munson

v. Genesee, etc., 37 App. Div. 207, 56 N. Y. Supp. 139.

The bankruptcy act has provided that such a claim as is set up

by this trustee shall pass to the trustee in bankruptcy as we have

seen. It contemplates that he will do his duty, and establish and

liquidate it in some court of competent jurisdiction. When so

liquidated, it is a debt owing by the one against whom it is as-

serted beyond all question. Thayer v. Southwick, 8 Gray (Mass.)

229; Crouch v. Gridley, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 250; Johnson v. Butler,

2 Iowa, 535, 545; In re Book, 3 Fed. Cas. 867, 868. When that

is done, the right of offset or counterclaim is perfect and com-

plete. Claims of creditors are proved before the referee or court.

§ 57, § 63 states what debts may be proved; § 64 states what

debts have priority; § 65 provides for the declaration and pay-

ment of dividends; § 66 takes care of unclaimed dividends; and

§ 67 takes care of liens. Then comes § 68, relating to "Set-Ofis

and Counterclaims,'' which is a limitation on the preceding sec-

tions relating to the allowance of claims and the declaration and

payment of dividends.

•••

sale and the division of proceeds amongst the creditors of an insolvent corporation in proportion to their debts included claims
for unliquidated damages, and the word ' 1 debts'' is used in its
broad and no restricted sense. Damages for taking land is a
debt due, when fixed and payable. Lowell v. Boston, etc., 106
Mass. 540.
In Berson v. Ewing, supra, the Civil Code provides that the
liquidating partner may collect, compromise, or release any debts
due the partnership, and pay or compromise any claims against
it; and it was held that "debts" included claJ.m.s-that the
words were used synonymously. In New York the word "debts"
includes every claim and demand upon which a judgment for
a sum of money, or directing the payment of money, could be
recovered in an action. Code Civ. Proc. § 2514.
A 'Visconsin statute, providing that the homestead should not
be liable to a forced sale 11 for any debt,'' means debts arising on
contract and judgments for torts. Smith v. Omans, 17 Wis. 395,
397.
The words ''debts contracted,'' as used in the Constitution
of Michigan, are words of large import, and include all kinds
of claims arising not only on contract, but in tort. Mertz v.
Berry, 101 Mich. 32, 59 N. W. 445, 446, 24 L. R. A. 789, 45 Am.
St. Rep. 379. See, also, Losee v. Bullard, 79 N. Y. 404; Munson
v. Genesee, etc., 37 App. Div. 207, 56 N. Y. Supp. 139.
The bankruptcy act has provided that such a claim BB is set up
by this trustee shall pass to the trustee ·in bankruptcy as we have
seen. It contemplates that he will do his duty, and establish and
liquidate it in some court of competent jurisdiction. When so
liquidated, it is a debt owing by the one against whom it is asserted beyond all question. Thayer v. Southwick, 8 Gray (Mass.)
229; Crouch v. Gridley, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 250; Johnson v. Butler,
2 Iowa, 535, 545; In re Book, 3 Fed. Ca.s. 867, 868. When that
is done, the right of offset or counterclaim is perfect and com·
plete. Claims of creditors are proved before the referee or court.
§ 57. § 63 states what debts may be proved; § 64 states what
debts have priority ; § 65 provides for the declaration and pay·
meut of dividends; § 66 takes care of unclaimed dividends; and
§ 67 takes care of liens. Then comes § 68, relating to ''Set-Offs
and Counterclaim~,'' which is a limitation on the preceding sections relating to the allowance of claims and the declaration and
payment of dividends.
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I do not doubt that the claims set up by the trustee here

and sought to be offset or eounterclaimcd passed to the trustee

hi bankruptcy. If he would enforce them, must he bring suit

thereon for the benefit of all the creditors, collect the entire

judgment for damages, if one is recovered, and apply the pro-

ceeds generally in marshaling the assets, or arc they to be treated

as debts owing by the creditor, and as subject to be offset when

liquidated or established, and the amount due, if anything, ascer-

tained 1 The latter is the construction the more favorable to the

one liable in damages. He is not compelled to pay the entire

recovery, and perhaps no part of it, depending on the amount

of his claim against the bankrupt estate. On the other hand, if

such a claim for damages is not regarded as the subject of off-

set within the meaning of § 68a, the trustee here must go to a

foreign state and bring suit, and take his chances of making col-

lection in case of recovery. §§ 23b, 60b, 67e. The Peninsular

Company having come into this court with its claim, it has either

made itself a party to the bankruptcy proceeding here, or has

instituted a proceeding in bankruptcy, probably the latter.

Coder v. Arts, 213 U. S. 223, 234, 235, 29 Sup. Ct. 436, 441,

53 L. ed. 772, where it is said:

"Arts appeared in the bankruptcy court, recognizing the title
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and possession of the trustee in bankruptcy, asserted his claim

upon the notes, and his right to have the assets so administered

and paid as to recognize the validity of the lien for the security

for his claim. We are of opinion that he thus instituted a pro-

ceeding in bankruptcy, as distinguished from a controversy aris-

ing in the course of bankruptcy proceedings."

In either case that claimant company is in this court seeking

a dividend from the estate, and it seems clear to me that under

the general policy and to answer the true purpose of the law the

claim of the trustee is to be regarded and treated as an alleged

debt of that company to the estate in bankruptcy, and, if estab-

lished, offset or counterclaimed. There is no legal or equitable

principle upon which it can be held that the creditor shall pay

such claims for damages in full, if established, for the benefit of

the estate, taking his percentage thereof by way of dividend on

his claim when, if such claim for damages had been reduced to

judgment against him prior to bankruptcy, he would be entitled

to wipe it out in whole or in part by offsetting his claims against

the bankrupt under § 68a. The cases all agree that a claim for

damages arising from fraud or false and fraudulent representa-

I do not doubt thnt the claims set np hy the trust<'r- here
and sought to be offset or countcrclainwd passed to the trustee
in bankruptcy. 1f he would t'nforce them, must he bring suit
thereon for the benefit of all the creditors, collect the entire
judgment for damages, if one is recovered, all(.l apply the protceds geucrally in marshaling the assets, or arc they to be treated
as <lf'hts owing by the creditor, and as subject to be offset when
liquidated or established, and the amount due, if anything, ascertained 1 The latter is the construction the more favorable to the
one liable in damages. He is not compelled to pay the entire
recovery, and perhaps no part of it, depending on the amount
of his claim against the bankrupt estate. On the other hand, if
such a claim for damages is not regarded as the subject of offset within the meaning of § 68a, the trustee here must go to a
foreign state and bring suit, and take his chances of making collection in case of recovery. §§ 23b, 60b, 61e. The Peninsular
Company having come into this court with its claim, it has t>ither
made itself a party to the bankruptcy proceeding here, or has
instituted a proceeding in bankruptcy, probably the latter.
Coder v. Arts, 213 U. S. 223, 234, 235, 29 Sup. Ct. 436, 441,
53 L. ed. 772, where it is said:
''Arts appeared in the bankruptcy court, recognizing the title
and possession of the trustee in bankruptcy, asserted his claim
upon the notes, and his right to have the assets so administered
and paid as to recognize the validity of the lien for the security
for his claim. We are of opinion that he thus instituted a pro,
cecding in bankruptcy, as distinguished from a controversy arisiug in the course of bankruptcy proceedings.''
In either case that claimant company is in this court seeking
a dividend from the estate, and it seems clear to me that under
the general policy and to answer the tn1e purpose of the law the
claim of the trustee is to be regarded and treated as an alleged
debt of that company to the estate in bankruptcy, and, if established, offset or counterclaimed. There is no legal or equitable
principle upon which it can be held that the creditor shall pay
such claims for damages in full, if established, for the benefit of
the estate, taking his percentage thereof by way of dividend on
his claim when, if such claim for damages had been reduce~i to
judgment against him prior to bankruptcy, he would be entitled
to wipe it out in whole or in part by offsetting bis claims against
the bankrupt under § 68a. The cases all agree that a claim for
damages arising from fraud or false and fraudulent representa-
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tions becomes a "debt" when reduced to judgment. The bank-

ruptcy act so treats such judgments. § 63a. In short, if the

bankrupt and the estate after adjudication owes A. $1,000 for

money loaned, and A. owes the bankrupt (and the estate after

adjudication) $1,000 on a judgment obtained for damages sus-

tained by reason of false and fraudulent representations, both

are debts, and must be offset under § 68a. Under the conten-

tion of the Peninsular Company here, in case such a cause of ac-

tion exists in favor of the estate, and recovery of judgment is had

by the trustee after bankruptcy, the creditor is not entitled to

the offset or counterclaim. I cannot assent that this is the mean-

ing and effect of the bankruptcy act.

•••

The order under review is affirmed.

KISKADDEN v. STEINLE

203 Fed. 375, 121 C. C. A. 559

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. February 4, 1913)

The trustee sought to have a claim of Steinle re-examined and

diminished, which had been allowed December 4, 1909. The

tions becomes a "debt" when reduced to judgment. The bankruptcy act so treats such judgments. § 63a. In short, if the
bankrupt and the estate after adjudication owes A. $1,000 for
money loaned, and A. owes the bankrupt (and the estate after
adjudication) $1,000 on a judgment obtained for damages sustained by reason of false and fraudulent representations, both
are debts, and must be offset under § 68a. Under the conten·
tiou of the Peninsular Company here, in case such a cause of action exists in favor of the estate, and recovery of judgment is had
by the trustee after bankruptcy, the creditor is not entitled to
the offset or counterclaim. I cannot assent that this is the mean·
ing and effect of the bankruptcy act.

• • •

The order under review is affirmed.

claim was for $16,549, with interest from October 23,1909. The

claim was based upon five promissory notes, two for $6,500 each

and three for $1,000 each, bearing date March 26, 1909, and
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falling due on different dates between that time and October

KISKADDEN v. STEINLE

26th following, with 6 per cent. interest. The notes were exe-

cuted by the C. C. Anderson Manufacturing Company (whose

203 Fed. 375, 121 C. C. A. 559

name was changed to the Fostoria Undermuslin Company) to

the order of A. V. Bauman, and were indorsed by Bauman.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

February 4, 1913)

Henry Hughes, and C. O. Frick. Bauman discounted the paper

and turned the money over to the Fostoria Company. When

the notes matured, the company was unable to pay them, and

they were taken up by Bauman and held by him until November

2, 1909, when they were assigned to Steinle. The facts alleged

in support of the right to have the claim diminished were, in

substance, that Bauman subscribed for 300 shares, of the par

value of $100 each, of the capital stock of the company, but did

not fully pay for the shares, and so is indebted to the company

for the balance remaining due upon his subscription; that Bau-

man was the real owner of the notes and the claim, but that, if

it should be found that they were in fact owned by Steinle, since

The trustee sought to have a claim of Steinle re-examined and
diminished, which had been allowed December 4, 1909. The
claim was for $16,549, with interest from October 23, 1909. The
claim was based upon five promissory notes, two for $6,500 each
and three for $1,000 each, bearing date March 26, 1909, and
falling due on different dates between that time and October
26th following, '\\ith 6 per cent. interest. The not.es were executed by the C. C. Anderson Manufacturing Company (whoee
name was changed to the Fostoria Undermuslin Company) to
the order of A. V. Bauman, and were indorsed by Bauman,
Henry Hughes, and C. 0. Frick. Bauman discounted the paper
and turned the money over to the Fostoria Company. When
the notes matured, the company was unable to pay them, and
they were taken up by Bauma.n and held by him until November
2, 1909, when they were assigned to Steinle. The facts alleged
in support of the right to have the claim diminished were. in
substance, that Bauman subscribed for 300 shares, of the par
value of $100 each, of the capital stock of the company, but did
not fully pay for the shares, and so is indebted to the company
for the balance remaining due upon his subscription; that Bauman was the real owner of the notes and the claim, but that, if
it should be found that they were in fact owned by Steinle, since
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he obtained the notes after maturity, the claim in his hands was

subject to a set-off to the extent of such balance.

In June, 1904, C. C. Anderson and Bauman formed a copart-

nership for the purpose of manufacturing muslin underwear,

acquiring a factory, with goods and stock, and conducting the

business at Fostoria, Ohio. They also purchased and removed

to this factory certain equipment and goods of a company in

Saginaw, Mich. In October, 1904, they incorporated a company

under the laws of Ohio, with an authorized capital stock of $100,-

000; Anderson and Bauman each subscribing for 44 shares, J.

J. Anderson for 10 shares, and Anna Rose G. Bauman and Helen

May Anderson for 1 share each, these five persons being also

the incorporators and directors. The company, through these

directors, thereupon purchased the partnership property, busi-

ness, and good will of Anderson and Bauman, and assumed the

firm's obligations for the consideration of 602 shares ($60,200

par value) of what was characterized as "the fully paid and non-

assessable stock" of the newly incorporated company. This was

to include the shares subscribed, '' and the issue of which was in

full satisfaction of the obligations assumed by them and each of

them by said subscription." In the summary of the evidence it

appears that the real estate turned over to the corporation was

purchased by Anderson and Bauman for $5,000; that the pur-
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chase of the articles at Saginaw was from a company that had

gone into liquidation, which, after disposing of part of its prop-

erty to others, sold the remainder to Anderson and Bauman for

$7,500. The referee found that the property and articles of

every kind turned over by the copartnership to the company in

payment of the 602 shares of stock cost the firm from $27,500

to $32,500. The company sold 200 shares of its so-called treasury

stock to Henry Hughes, one of the indorsers of the notes in dis-

pute, at $67.50 per share. This price was made and accepted

on the representation of Anderson and Bauman that they had

invested $40,000 in the property turned over to the company,

and the declared purpose was to sell the stock to Hughes at a

price "that would let him in on the same basis as Anderson and

Bauman," because "Hughes had originally intended to join the

partnership." The referee found that the fair and reasonable

value of all of the property, which Anderson and Bauman sold

to the company, "did not exceed the sum of forty thousand ($40,-

000) dollars," and that the overvaluation of the property "was

not due to error of judgment on the part of C. C. Anderson and

he obtained the notes after maturity, the claim in his hands was
subject to a set-off to the extent of such balance.
In June, 1904, C. C. Anderson and Bauman formed a copartnership for the purpose of manufacturing muslin underwear,
acquiring a factory, with goods and stock, and conducting the
business at Fnstoria, Ohio. They also purchased and removed
to this factory certain equipment and goods of a company in
Saginaw, :Mich. In October, 1904, they incorporated a company
under the laws of Ohio, with an authorized capital stock of $100,000; Anderson and Bauman each subscribing for 44 shares, J.
J. Anderson for 10 shares, and Anna Rose G. Bauman and Helen
May Anderson for 1 share each, these five persons being also
the incorporators and directors. The company, through these
directors, ther~upon purchased the partnership property, business, and good will of Anderson and Bauman, and assumed the
firm's obligations for the consideration of 602 shares ($60,200
par value) of what was characterized as ''the fully paid and nonassessable stock" of the newly incorporated company. This was
to include the shares subscribed, ''and the issue of which was in
full satisfaction of the obligations assumed by them and each of
them by said subscription." In the summary of the evidence it
appears that the real estate turned over to the corporation was
purchased by Anderson and Bauman for $5,000; that the purchase of the articles at Saginaw was from a company that had
gone into liquidation, which, after disposing of part of its property to others, sold the remainder to Anderson and Bauman for
$7,500. The referee found that the property and articles of
every kind turned over by the copartnership to the company in
payment of the 602 shares of stock cost the firm from $27,500
to $32,500. The company sold 200 shares of its so-called treasury
stock to Henry Hugh es, one <>f the indorsers of the notes in dispute, at $67.50 per share. This price was made and accepted
on the representation of Anderson and Bauman that they had
invested $40,000 in the property turned over to the company,
And the declared purpose was to sell the stock to Hughes at a
price ''that would let him in on the same basis as Anderson and
Hauman," because "Hughes had originally intended to join the
partnership.'' The referee found that the fair and reasonable
Yalue of all of the property, which Anderson and Bauman sold
to the company, "did not exceed the sum of forty thousand ($40,tirnn <loll a rs," and that the overvaluation of the property "was
1.ot due to error of judgment on the part of C. C. Anderson and
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A. V. Bauman and other directors of the corporation at the time

of the transaction. • • *"

Of the 602 shares of stock received for the sale of the property,

Bauman received 300 shares ($30,000 par value), and is still the

owner of the stock. The finding of the referee respecting these

shares is as follows: '' That at the time of the issue to him of

the said three hundred shares of stock" of the company "Bau-

man was aware of the overvaluation of the property of Ander-

son and Bauman, and that his half interest in the partnership,

for which he received the three hundred shares of stock of the

par value of one hundred ($100) dollars each, was worth not

to exceed twenty thousand ($20,000) dollars."

The referee ordered Steinle's claim of $16,549 to be reduced

in the sum of $10,000, letting it stand as "allowed against the

bankrupt" for $6,549, with interest. The court below reversed

the referee's order, denied the petition of the trustee to dis-

allow the claim, and dismissed the petition with costs. The case

was brought to this court upon appeal prayed and allowed within

10 days of the date of the order made by the court below.

WARRINGTON, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as

above). We shall consider the case under the objections urged

on behalf of appellee: (a) the case is not appealable; (b) no
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stock liability exists against Bauman; (c) such liability cannot

be set off against the claim of Steinle.26

•••

Alleged Stock Liability. No opinion was handed down in the

court below, and we have no means of ascertaining the views

A. V. Bauman and other directors of the corporation at the time
of the transaction. • • • ''
Of the 602 shares of stock received for the sale of the property,
Bauman received 300 shares ($30,000 par value), and is still the
owner of the stock. The finding of the referee respecting these
shares is as follows: ''That at the time of the issue to him of
the said three hun<lrcd Mhares of stock" of the company "Bauman w.as aware of the overvaluation of the property of Anderson and Bauman, and that his half interest in the partnership,
for which he received the three hundred shares of stock of the
par value of one hundred ($100) dollars each, was worth not
to exceed twenty thousand ( $20,000) dollars.''
The referee ordered Steinle 's claim of $16,549 to be reduced
in the sum of $10,000, letting it stand as ''allowed against the
bankrupt" for $6,549, with interest. The court below reversed
the referee's order, denied the petition of the trustee to disallow the claim, and dismissed the petition with costs. The case
was brought to this court upon appeal prayed and allowed within
10 days of the date of the order made by the court below.

of the learned trial judge, except as they were stated in the

arguments of counsel, and as they appear in their briefs. The

claims that no liability of Bauman exists in respect of the 300

shares of stock received by him, and that, if there be any such

liability, it cannot be set off against the claim of Steinle, present

questions of some difficulty. However, since the promissory notes

were past due when obtained' by Steinle, it is not disputed that

they were received by him subject to any defense of the com-

pany to which they would have been open in the hands of Bau-

man. If the facts are accepted, as in substance found by the

referee, that the overvaluation of the partnership property was

not due to error in judgment of Anderson and Bauman and the

26—The opinion on the first point

is omitted.

WARRINGTON, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as
above). We shall consider the case under the objections urged
on behalf of appellee : (a) the case is not appealable; ( b) no
stock liability exists against Bauman; (c) such liability cannot
be set off against the claim of Steinle. 26

• • •

Alleged Stock Liability. No opinion was handed down in the
court below, and we have no means of ascertaining the views
of the learned trial judge, except as they were stated in the
arguments of counsel, and as they appear in their briefs. The
claims that no liability of Bauman exista in respect of the 300
shares of stock receiv('d by him, and that, if there ~e any such
liability, it cannot be set off against the claim of Steinle, present
questions of some difficulty. However, since the promissory notes
were past due when obtained· by Steinle, it is not disputed that
they were received by him subject to any defense of the company to whieh they would have been open in the hands of Bauman. If the facts are accepted, as in substance found by the
refer~e, that the overvaluation of the partnership property was
not due to error in judgment of Anderson and Bauman and the
26-The opinion on the fl.rat point
is omitted.
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other directors of the corporation at the time of the transaction,

and that Bauman then knew that the portion of the property

he was transferring to the company was $10,000 less in value

than the par value of the stock he was receiving, we are met

with the question whether proof of the claim must be allowed

and payments made upon it out of the bankrupt's assets ratably

with the claims of the general creditors, who confessedly are not

indebted to the estate, without regard to the unpaid portion of

the Bauman stock. Could Bauman have retained the notes and

maintained this positiont As pointed out in the statement,

the corporation was organized under the laws of Ohio. Whether

Bauman is liable for the unpaid portion of the stock he received

is a local question, and is governed by the pertinent rule of de-

cision of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Black v. Zacharie & Co.,

3 How. 482, 511, 11 L. ed. 690; Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U.

S. 516, 523, 25 Sup. Ct. 306, 49 L. ed. 577; Detroit Trust Co. v.

Pontiac Savings Bank, 196 Fed. 29, 33, 115 C. C. A. 663 (C. C.

A. 6th Cir.); In re Jassoy Co., 178 Fed. 515, 516, 101 C. C. A.

641 (C C. A. 2d Cir.); Shaw v. Goebel Brewing Co., 202 Fed.

408 (C. C. A. 6th Cir.); Mishawaka Woolen Mfg. Co. v. West-

veer, 191 Fed. 465, 466, 112 C. C. A. 109 (C. C. A. 6th Cir.).

[The court concluded that under Ohio law Bauman was indebted
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to the corporation in the sum of $10,000, which the trustee could

recover; and continued as follows:]

The Right of Set-Off. Can Bauman's liability be enforced by

the trustee through the exercise of the right of set-off in a case

like this? At first blush it would seem that the language of

§ 68a of the Bankruptcy Act, in connection with the rule in the

Gates Case, would admit of the set-off claimed here; for § 68a

extends to "all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between

the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor," and, as stated, the

Ohio rule treats such liability as a debt due to the corporation.

However, we think the true interpretation of § 68, els. "a" and

"b", and of such rule is that, after the corporation becomes in-

solvent, any sum due upon a stock subscription is impressed with

the character of a trust in favor of all the creditors alike, except

only such as may have given credit to the company with knowl-

edge of the scheme of stock issue. Hence to apply such an un-

paid subscription as a set-off to an ordinary claim held by the

subscriber against the corporation would be to appropriate the

rights of the other creditors in the subscription debt to the ex-

clusive benefit of the person owing it; or, on the other hand, it

other directors of the corporation at the time of the transaction,
and that Bauman then knew that the portion of the property
he was transferring to the company was $10,000 less in value
than the par value of the stock he was receiving, we are met
with the question whether proof of the claim must be allowed
and payments made upon it out of the bankrupt's assets ratably
with the claims of the general creditors, who confessedly are not
indebted to the estate, without regard to the unpaid portion of
the Bauman stock. Could Bauman have retained the notes and
maintained this position t As pointed out in the statement,
the corporation was organized under the laws of Ohio. Whether
Bauman is liable for the unpaid portion of the stock he received
is a local question, and is governed by the pertinent rule of decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Black v. Zacharie & Co.,
3 How. 482, 511, 11 L. ed. 690; Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U.
S. 516, 523, 25 Sup. Ct. 306, 49 L. ed. 577; Detroit Trust Co. v.
Pontiac Savings Bank, 196 Fed. 29, 33, 115 C. C. A. 663 ( C. C.
A. 6th Cir.); In re Jassoy Co., 178 Fed. 515, 516, 101 C. C. A.
641 (C. C. A. 2d Cir.); Shaw v. Goebel Brewing Co., 202 Fed.
408 (C. C. A. 6th Cir.); Mishawaka Woolen Mfg. Co. v. West.
veer, 191 Fed. 465, 466, 112 C. C. A. 109 (C. C. A. 6th Cir.).
[The court concluded that under Ohio law Bauman was indebted
to the corporation in the sum of $10,000, which the trustee could
recover; and continued as follows:]
The Right of Set-Off. Can Bauman 's liability be enforced by
the trustee through the exercise of the right of set-off in a case
like this T At first blush it would seem that the language of
§ 68a of the Bankruptcy Act, in connection with the rule in the
Gates Case, would admit of the set-off claimed here; for § 68a
extends to ''all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between
the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor,'' and, as stated, the
Ohio rule treats such liability as a debt due to the corporation.
However, we think the true interpretation of § 68, els. ''a'' and
"b ", and of such rule is that, after the corporation becomes insolvent, any sum due upon a stock subscription is impressed with
the character of a trust in favor of all the creditors alike, except
only such as may have given credit to the company with knowledge of the scheme of stock issue. Hence to apply such an unpaid subscription as a set-off to an ordinary claim held by the
subscriber against the corporation would be to appropriate the
rights of the other creditors in the subscription debt to the exclusive benefit of the person owing it; or, on the other hand, it
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might, as respects his costockholders, subject him to the payment

of more than his ratable share of the bankrupt's debts. It can-

not be said, then, that the debts in question are in their nature

both mutual and in the same right; nor that after the bankruptcy

there was any reason for enforcing stockholders' liability or

Bauman's ratable share thereof except for the equal benefit of

nil the creditors.

In Sawyer v. Hoag, supra, 17 Wall, at p. 622, 21 L. e<L 731,

when passing upon a provision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867

(14 Stat. p. 526, § 20), similar to § 68 of the present act, Justice

Miller said:

'' This section was not intended to enlarge the doctrine of set-

off, or to enable a party to make a set-off in cases where the

principles of legal or equitable set-off did not previously author-

ize it. The debts must be mutual; must be in the same right.

The case before us is not of that character. The debt which the

appellant owed for his stock was a trust fund devoted to'the pay-

ment of all the creditors of the company. As soon as the com-

pany became insolvent, and this fact became known to the

appellant, the right of set-off for an ordinary debt to its full

amount ceased. It became a fund belonging equally in equity to

all the creditors, and could not be appropriated by the debtor
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to the exclusive payment of his own claim.''

To the same effect are Scammon v. Kimball, Assignee, 92 U. S.

366, 367, 23 L. ed. 483; Scovill v. Thayer, supra, 105 U. S. 153,

26 L. ed. 968; Babbitt v. Read (C. C.) 173 Fed. 712, 715;

In re Howe Mfg. Co. (D. C.) 193 Fed. 524, 527 r 1 Love-

land on Bankr. (4th ed.) p. 661, and note 4; Collier on

Bankr. (8th ed.) p. 796, and notes. And the rule that':unpaid

subscriptions to the stock of a corporation constitute a trust

fund for the benefit of its creditors" is stated in Fogg v. Blair,

139 U. S. at p. 125, 11 Sup. Ct. 476, 35 L. ed. 104, to be "the

settled doctrine of this court''; and, further, in Scovill v. Thayer,

105 U. S. 156, 26 L. ed. 968, it was held:

"Upon the bankruptcy of the company his obligation was to

pay to the assignees, upon demand, such an amount upon his

unpaid stock as would be sufficient, with the other assets of the

company, to pay its debts. He was under no obligation to pay

any more, and he was under no obligation to pay anything until

the amount necessary for him to pay was at least approximately

ascertained. Until then his obligation to pay did not become

complete."

might, as respects his costockholders, subject him to the payment
of more than his ratable share of the bankrupt's debts. It cannot be said, then, that the debt8 in question are in their nature
both mutual and in the same right; nor that after the bankruptey
there was any reason for enforcing stockholders' liability or
Bauman 's ratable share thereof except for the equal benefit of
all the creditors.
In Sawyer v. Hoag, supra, 17 Wall. at p. 622, 2f L. ed. 731,
when passing upon a provision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867
(14 Stat. p. 526, § 20), similar to§ 68 of the present act, Justice
Miller said :
·
' · This section was not intended to enlarge the doctrine of set.
off, or to enable a party to make a set-off in cases where the
priuciples of legal or equitable set-off did not previously authorize it. The debt8 must be mutual; must be in the same right.
The case before us is not of that character. The debt which the
appellant owed for his stock was a trust fund devoted to•the payment of all the creditors of the company. As soon as the company became ins~lvent, and this fact became known to the
appellant, the right of set-off for an ordinary debt to its full
amount ceased. It became a fund belonging equally in equity to
all the creditors, and could not be appropriated by the debtor
to the exclusive payment of his own claim."
To the same effect are Scammon v. Kimball, Assignee, 92 U.S.
366, 367, 23 L. ed. 483; Scovill v. Thayer, supra, 105 U. S. 153,
26 L. ed. 968; Babbitt v. &ad ( C. C.) 173 Fed. 712, 715;
In re Howe Mfg. Co. ( D. C.) 193 Fed. 524, 527; 1 Loveland on Bankr. (4th ed.) p. 661, and note 4; Collier on
Bankr. (8th ed.) p. 796, and notes. And the rule that ':unpaid
subscriptions to the stock of a corporation constitute a trust
fund for the benefit of its creditors" is stated in Fosig v. Blair,
139 U. S. at p. 125, 11 Sup. Ct. 476, 35 L. ed. 104, to be "the
settled doctrine of this court''; and, further, in Scovill v. Thayer,
105 U. S. 156, 26 L. ed. 968, it was held:
"Upon the bankruptcy of the company his obligation was to
pay to the assignees, upon demand, such an amount upon his
unpaid stock as would be sufficient, with the other assets of the
company, to pay its debts. He was under no obligation to pay
any more, and he was under no obligation to pay anything until
the amount necessary for him to pay was at least approximately
ascertained. Until then his obligation to pay did not become
complete.''
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We have still to consider an important case recently decided
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by the Supreme Court of Ohio. It is Niles, Assignee, v. Olszak

(87 Ohio St. 229, 100 N. E. 820, decided December 17, 1912),

which holds:

"A stockholder in a savings and loan association organized

under the laws of this state is entitled, when the association

becomes insolvent, to set off, as against its assignee for the bene-

fit of creditors, a claim for money which he has on deposit with

the association against his liability for the unpaid part of his

stock subscription."

That case is the nearest approach to this one of any other

decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio, and so dispenses with the

need of referring to other decisions of the court. We think the

learned judge announcing the opinion pointed out facts which

render the decision inapplicable here, when he said:

"The stock was not issued under the pretense of being or pur-

porting to be fully paid, when in fact it was not paid for.

There was no contrivance to release the debt for the stock, and

substitute a loan therefor. It is not a case in which a corpora-

tion had held itself out to the public as having a larger paid-up

capital than it actually had. • • * The statute prescribes

• • • that no such association shall commence business until

at least one-half of each subscription has been fully paid up.
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There is no claim that this was not done, and the presumption

is that it was done. The finding of facts shows that the associa-

tion was duly organized under the statute. There is no claim

that it ever pretended that any more than 50 per cent. of each

subscription had been paid in, or that any one ever gave credit

on the faith that all of its stock had been paid in full. • • *

It is common knowledge that many of the subscribers to the stock

of such savings associations make their deposits therein with

the intention and understanding that such deposits shall be

made and used for the purpose of paying for the stock. * • *"

Thus it may be fairly inferred that all creditors of the sav-

ings bank were chargeable with knowledge that only 50 per

cent. of its capital stock had been paid in, and that it was un-

derstood that the deposits should be applied to the payment of

the balance due on the subscriptions. This in principle agrees

with what we have already pointed out as recognized by the same

court in the Gates Case, and by this court in Rickerson Roller

Mill Co. v. Farrell Foundry & Machine Co., respecting the rights

of persons who extend credit to a corporation with knowledge

H. A A. Bankruptcy—40

We have still to consider au iruportaut case rcce11tly dc<:ided
by the Supreme Court of Ohio. It is Niles, A&:1ignee, v. Olszak
(87 Ohio St. 229, 100 N. E. 820, decided December 17, 1912),
which holds:
''A stockholder in a savings and loan association organized
under the laws of this state is entitled, when the association
becomes insolvent, to set off, as against its assignee for the be11cfit of creditors, a claim for money which he has on deposit with
the association against his liability for the unpaid part of his
stock subscription."
That case is the nearest approach to this one of any other
decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio, and so dispenses with the
need of referring to other deeisions of the court. We think the
le.arned judge announcing the opinion pointed out facts which
render the decision inapplicable here, when he said:
''The stock was not issued under the pretense of,being or purporting to be fully paid, when· in fact it was not paid for.
There was no contrivance to release the debt for the stock, and
substitute a loon therefor. It is not a case in which a corporation had held itself out to the public as having a larger paid-up
capital than it actually had. • • • The statute prescribes
• • • th.at no such association shall commence business until
at least 01ie-hal,f of each subscriptio-n has been fully paid up.
There is no claim that this was not done, and the presumption
is that it was done. The finding of facts shows that the association was duly organized under the statute. There is no claim
that it ever pretended that any more than 50 per cent. of each
subscription had been paid in, or that any one ever gave credit
on the faith that all of its stock had been paid in full. • • •
It is common knowledge that many of the subscribers to the stock
of such savings associations make their deposits therein with
the intention and understanding that such deposits shall be
made and used for the purpose of paying for the stock. • • • ''
Thus it may be fairly inferred that all creditors of the savings bank were chargeable with knowledge that only 50 per
cent. of its capital stock had been paid in, and that it was understood that the deposits should be applied to the payment of
the balance due on the subscriptions. This in principle agrees
with what we have already pointed out as recognized by the same
court in the Gates Case, and by this court in Rickerson Roller
:Mill Co. v. Farrell Foundry & Machine Co., respecting the rights
of persons who extend credit to a c<>rporation with knowledge
H. A A. B&nluuptc:y__.O

626

626

ADMINISTRATION

ADMINISTRATION

of the arrangement under which its stock subscriptions have been

made. It may well be that as to all such persons the unpaid

subscriptions do not constitute a trust fund, in the sense that

it is not open to set-off.

Furthermore, any suit rightly to enforce payment of unpaid

stock subscriptions would have to be of a plenary character (In

re Haley, 158 Fed. 74, 85 C. C. A. 404 [C. C. A. 6th Cir.]; In re

Remington Automobile & Motor Co., 153 Fed. 345, 347, 82 C. C.

A. 421 [C. C. A. 2d Cir.]); and it does not appear that Bauman

is a party to the present suit, although he appeared as a witness

and so had notice of it. We are thus led to believe that the set-

off was not permissible.

What, then, should be done with the claim of Steinle? We

have felt bound under the present record to assume that Bau-

man is solvent. If the claim be allowed and permitted now to

share in the assets, according to the undisputed statement of

counsel for appellee, Steinle would receive a sum nearly equal

to the amount found by the referee to be due from Bauman upon

his subscription. Still, if Bauman could meet his unpaid bal-

ance, not to speak of the liability of any of his costockholders, no

ultimate loss to the other creditors would ensue. If, on the

other hand, Bauman should not be able to pay anything re-
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maining due on his subscription, Steinle (who stands no better

than Bauman) would profit at the expense of the other cred-

itors. In the latter event, however, the reasons for denying the

set-off (or at least its equivalent in the nature of an equitable

defense) against the Steinle claim would cease; for nothing would

be gained by suit upon the subscription, and so nothing could

be lost by the general creditors by applying whatever sum is

really due from Bauman toward payment of the Steinle claim.

Rolling Mill Co. v. Ore & Steel Co., 152 U. S. 615, 616, 14 Sup.

Ct. 710, 38 L. ed. 565.

Since it would be obviously inequitable to permit the Steinle

claim to share ratably in the assets before properly disposing

of the question of Bauman's obligation and his ability to pay

it (In re Wiener & Goodman Shoe Co. (C C.) 96 Fed. 949, 950,

and In re Duryea Power Co. (D. C.) 159 Fed. 783, 784, the

underlying principles of which we regard as applicable), we are

constrained to hold that the order of the court below allowing

the claim should be reversed, with costs; that all proceedings

upon the Steinle claim be stayed, and all dividends that would

accrue on such claim, if allowed, be withheld and preserved,

of the arrangement under which its stock subscriptions have been
made. It may well be that as to all such persons the unpaid
subscriptions <lo not constitute a tnist fund, in the sense that
it is not open to set-otf.
Furthermore, any suit rightly to enforce payment of unpaid
stock subscriptions would have to be of a plenary character (In
re Haley, 158 Fed. 74, 85 C. C. A. 404 [C. C. A. 6th Cir.]; In re
Remington Automobile & Motor Co., 153 Fed. 345, 347, 82 C. C.
A. 421 [ C. C. A. 2d Cir.]); and it does not appear that Bauman
is a party to the present suit, although he appeared as a witness
and so had notice of it. We are thus led to believe that the setoff was not permissible.
'Vhat, then, should be done with the claim of SteinleT We
have felt bound under the present record to assume that Bauman is solvent. If the claim be allowed and permitted now to
share in the assets, according to the undisputed statement of
counsel for appellee, Steinle would r~ceive a sum nearly equal
to the amount found by the referee to be due from Bauman upon
his subscription. Still, if Bauman could meet his unpaid balanee, not to speak of the liability of any of his costockholders, no
ultimate loss to the other creditors would ensue. If, on the
other hand, Bauman should not be able to pay anything remaining due on his subs<>ription, Steinle (who stands no better
than Bauman) would profit at the expense of the other creditors. In the latter event, however, the reasons for denying the
set-off (or at least its equivalent in the nature of an equitable
defense) against the Steinle claim would cease; for nothing would
be gained by suit upon the subscription, and so nothing could
be lost by the general creditors by applying whatever sum is
really due from Bauman toward payment of the Steinle claim.
Rolling .Mill Co. v. Ore & Steel Co., 152 U. S. 615, 616, 14 Sup.
Ct. 710, 38 JJ. ed. 565.
Since it would be obviously inequitable to permit the Steinle
claim to share ratably in the assets before properly disposing
of the question of Bauman 's obligation and his ability to pay
it (In re ,\'.iener & Goodman Shoe Co. (C. C.) 96 14..,ed. 949, 950,
and In re Duryea Power Co. (D. C.) 159 Fed. 783, 784, the
underlying principles of which we regard as applicable), we are
eoustrained to hoJU that the order of the court below allowing
the claim should be reversed, with costs; that all proceeding:;i
upon the Steinle claim be stayed, and all dividends that would
ac<>rue on such claim, if allowed, be withheld and pi;eserved,
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until the Bauman debt and its availability be finally settled.

If such debt be collected by the trustee, Steinle's claim shall be

allowed in full; if by reason of his insolvency Baumauls debt

is not collectible in whole or in part, Steinle's claim shall be

accordingly reduced and the remainder allowed. An order will

be entered reversing the cause, and remanding it for further

proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion.

NORFOLK & W. RY. CO. v. GRAHAM

145 Fed. 809, 76 C. C. A. 385 «

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. May 1, 1906)

McDOWELL, District Judge. The following is an excerpt

until the Bauman debt and its availability be finally settled.
If such debt be collected by the trustee, Steinle 's claim shall be
allowed in full ; if by reason of his iusolvency Baumau 's debt
is not collectible in whole or in part, Steinle 's claim shall ht.
accordingly reduced an<l the remainder allowed. An order will
be entered reversing the cause, and remanding it for further
proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion.

from the opinion of the trial court:

"This was a suit in assumpsit instituted by John T. Graham,

trustee of the estate of 0. M. Page, a bankrupt, against the Nor-

NORFOLK & W. RY. CO. v. GRAHAM

folk & Western Railway Company, for the recovery of certain

moneys alleged to be due to said estate under a contract entered

- 145 Fed. 809, 76 C. C. A. 385

-

into between said Page and said railway company for the con-

struction of a certain portion of its roadbed in West Virginia.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. May 1, 1906)

The defendant pleaded nonassumpsit and also filed a notice of

recoupment under the West Virginia statute, under which it

sought to prove damages growing out of the contract or trans-

action upon which the suit was brought, to an amount equal to

the demand against it.
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'' The parties by mutual consent waived a jury and submitted

all matters of law and fact to the judgment of the court upon

an agreed statement of all facts, from which statement it appears

that 0. M. Page entered into a written contract on the 11th day

of August, 1902, with the defendant, by which he agreed to con-

struct for it, at certain prices therein named, § § 21 to 25

inclusive, of the Naugatuck Branch of the Ohio extension of its

railroad. That, by the terms of the said contract, on or about

the 15th day of each calendar month estimates of the work done

by Page during the preceding month were to be made, and an

advance payment of eighty-five per cent. (85%) thereof made

to him, the remaining fifteen per cent. (15%) to be retained by

the railway company as a compensation for or on account of

any damages which might be certified by its engineer to have

been sustained from any failure of the said Page to perform

said contract. That Page performed work and furnished mate-

McDOWELL, District Judge. The following is an excerpt
from the opinion of the trial court:
"This was a suit in assumpsit instituted by John T. Graham,
trustee of the estate of 0. M. Page, .a bankrupt, against the Norfolk & We.stern Railway Company, for the reeovery of certain
moneys alleged to be due to said estate under a contract entered
into between said Page and said railway comp.any for the construction of a certain portion of its roadbed in \Vest Virginia.
The defendant pleaded nonassumpsit and also filed a notice of
recoupment under the West Virginia statute, under which it
sought to prove damages growing out of the contract or transaction upon which the suit was brought, to an amount equal to
the demand against it.
"The parties by mutual consent waived a jury .and submitted
all matters of law and fact to the judgment of the court upon
an agreed statement of all facts, from which statement it appears
that 0. M. P.age entered into a written contract on the 11th day
of August, 1902, with the defendant, by which he agreed to construct for it, at certain prices therein named, § ~ 21 to 25
inclusive, of the Naugatuck Branch of the Ohio extension of its
railroad. That, by the terms of the said contract, on or about
the 15th day of each calendar month estimates <>f the work done
by Page during the preceding month were to be made, and an
advance payment of eighty-five per ceut. ( 85%) tht•reof made
to him, the remaining fifteen per cent. (15%) to be retained by
the railway company as a compensation for or on account of
any damages which might be certified by its engineer to have
been sustained from any failure of the said Page to perform
said contract. Th~t Page performed work and furnished mate-
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rials under said contract until the latter part of August, 1903,

during the whole of which time his total work amounted, ac-

cording to the terms of the contract, to thirty thousand seven

hundred and fifty dollars and eleven cents ($30,750.11), all of

which was paid him, excepting $4,612.52 of retained percent-

ages, and $3,428.25 worth of work estimated to have been done

in the month of August, making a total still in the hands of the

railway company, retained percentages and August estimate,

amounting to $8,040.77. That the retained percentages for the

month of May, 1903, amounted to $1,070.53; for the mouth of

June, $570.66; for the month of July, $651.13, and for the month

of August, $604.99; all of which percentages are embraced in

the sum total retained percentages of $4,612.52 above named,

and are separated into months only for the purpose of showing

what these percentages amounted to for the four months next

preceding the adjudication of Page as a bankrupt. That Page

broke his contract and abandoned his work on or about the 28th

or 29th day of August, 1903, and the railway company, through

its engineer construction work, branch lines, and in accordance

with the terms of said contract, immediately declared in writing

the same to be terminated and forfeited, which writing was filed

with the railway company, a copy thereof mailed to Page's last
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known address, and another copy, as provided in the contract,

posted at the front door of his office upon his work, on Septem-

ber 1, 1903. That a petition in bankruptcy was filed against

Page on the 1st day of September, 1903, and he duly adjudged

a bankrupt on the 10th day of said month. John T. Graham

was chosen as trustee in bankruptcy by the creditors, and, by

an order of the bankrupt court, was authorized and directed to

institute this suit.

"It was further agreed that Page was insolvent at the time

of his adjudication as a bankrupt, and that he was at that time

indebted to laborers who had performed work for him upon the

sections agreed to be constructed by him during the three months

next preceding such adjudication, in amounts aggregating five

thousand dollars ($5,000.00), but exceeding in no individual

case the sum of three hundred dollars ($300.00), all of whose

claims were proven in the bankrupt court, in accordance with

the provisions of the act of Congress. It was further agreed

that, after Page had abandoned his work and the railway com-

pany had declared his contract forfeited and at an end. it im-

mediately advertised for bids in the customary way for the com-

rials under said contract until the latter part of August, 1903,
during the whole of which time his total work amounted, according to the terms of the contract, to thirty th~usand seven
hundred and fifty dollars and eleven cents ($30,750.11), all of
which was paid him, excepting $4,612.52 of retained percentages, and $3,428.25 worth of work estimated to have- been done
in the month of August, making a total still in the hands of the
railway company, retained percentages and August estimate,
amounting to $8,040.77. That the retained percentages for the
month of May, 1903, amounted to $1,070.53 ; for the month of
June, $570.66; for the month of July, $651.13, and for the month
of August, $604.99; all of which percentages are embraced in
the sum total retained percentages of $4,612.52 above named,
and are separated into months only for the purpose of showing
what these percentages amounted to for the four months next
preceding the adjudication of Page as a bankrupt. That Page
broke his contract and abandoned his work on or about the 28th
or 29th day of August, 1903, and the railway company, through
its e11gineer construction work, branch lines, and in accordance
with the terms of said contract, immediately declared in writing
the same to be terminated and forfeited, which writing was filed
with the railway company, a copy thereof mailed to Page's last
known address, and another copy, as provided in the contract,
posted at the front door of his office upon his work, on September 1, 1903. That a petition in bankruptcy was filed against
Page on the 1st day of September, 1903, and he duly adjudged
a bankrupt on the 10th day of said month. John T. Graham
was chosen as trustee in bankruptcy by the creditors, and, by
an order of the bankrupt court, was authorized and directed to
institute this suit.
"It was further agreed that Page was insolvent at the time
of his adjudication as a bankrupt, and that he was at that time
indebted to laborers who had performed work for him upon the
sections agreed to be constructed by him during the three months
next preceding sucb adjudication, in amou!lts aggregating five
thousand dollars ($5,000.00), but exceeding in no individual
1~ase the sum of three hundred dollars ($300.00), all of whose
claims were proven in the bankrupt co.urt, in accordauc~ with
the provisions of the act of Congress. It was further agreed
that, aftt>r Page .had abandoned his work and the railway company had declared his contract forfeited and at an end, it immediately ndvertised for bids in the customary way for the com-
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pletion of the work that had been left unfinished by him. Many

contractors made bids thereon, but after the exercise of due care

and diligence in the premises upon the part of the railway com-

pany, one John T. McKinney was declared to be the lowest and

best bidder, and the contract for the completion of the aban-

doned work of 0. M. Page was given to the said McKinney.

The new contractor entered upon his work and prosecuted the

same with diligence, and under the reasonable supervision of

the railway company, to completion; but, i:i consequcr.ee [as it

was agreed] of the condition in which Page left the work that

had been abandoned by him, the railway company was com-

pelled to pay unto McKinney $11,112.SO more than it would

have been required to pay to Page upon the completion of said

work had he performed the same at the prices and in accordance

with the terms agreed upon by him.

"The defenses of the railway company were two: (1) That,

under the plea of non-assumpsit, and by the very terms of the

contract itself, it did not owe Page anything; because it had a

right to keep not only the retained percentages of $4,612.52, but

the August estimate of $3,428.25, as well; the title thereto never

having vested in Page, in consequence of his agreement that no

money was to become due or payable to him or demandable by
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him until after the whole work had been completed in a satis-

factory manner and certified by the engineer of the railway

company, which had not been done. (2) That, even if said re-

tained percentages and August estimate should be held to be a

debt due from the railway company to Page, still nothing would

be recoverable against the railway company in consequence of

its right to recoup, to the extent thereof, or offset against the

same, the damages occasioned to it by the very breach by Page

of the contract sued upon."

The declaration consisted of the common counts in assumpsit

and several special counts founded on the contract. It does not

appear whether or not the railway company knew of the bank-

ruptcy proceedings prior to the institution of this action. The

trial court ruled in favor of the railway as "to the fifteen per

cent. retained from the various monthly estimates. But, being

of opinion that defense as to the 85 per cent. of the August esti-

mate could only be made by way of counterclaim, and that

§57n, 30 Stat. 561 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3444], barred

such counterclaim, the judgment below was as to this item ad-

pletion of the work that had been left unfinished by him. l\lany
contractors made bids thereon, but after the exercise of due care
and diligence in the premises upon the part of the railway company, one John T. :McKinney was declared to be the lowest and
best bidder, and the contract for the completion of the abandoned work of 0. M. Page was given to the ~aid McKinney.
The new contractor entered upon his work and prosecuted the
same with diligence, and under the reasouable supervision of
the railway company, to completion; but, i:t conscque1:c:e [as it
was agreed] of the condition in which Page left the work that
had been abandoned by him, the railway company was compelled to pay unto McKinney $11,112.80 more than it would
have been required to pay to Page upon the completion of said
work had he performed the same at the prices and in accordance
with the terms agreed upon by him.
4
' The defenses of the railway company were two: ( 1) That,
under the plea of non-assumpsit, and by the very terms of the
contract itself, it did not owe Page anything; because it had a
right to keep not only the retained percentages of $4,612.52, but
the August estimate of $3,428.25, as well; the title thereto never
having vested in Page, in consequence of his agreement that no
money was to become due or payable to him or demandable by
him until after the whole work had been completed in a satisfactory manner and certified by the engineer of the railway
company, which had not been done. (2) That, even if said retained percentages and August estimate should be held to be a
debt due from the railway company to Page, still nothing would
be recoverable against the railway company in consequence of
its right to recoup, to the extent thereof, or offset against the
same, the damages occasioned to it by the very breach by Page
of the contract sued upon."
The declaration consisted of the common counts in assumpsit
and several special coui1ts founded on the contract. It does not
appear whether or not the railway company knew of the bankruptcy proceedings prior to the institution of this action. The
trial court ruled in favor of the railway as ·to the fifteen per
cent. retained from the various monthly estimates. But, being_
of opinion that defense as to the 85 per cent. of the August estimate could only he made by way of counterclaim, and that
§ 57n, 30 Stat. 561 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3444], barred
such counterclaim, the judgment below was as to this item ad-
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verse to the railway company. The opinion as to the effect of

the bankrupt act reads as follows:

"The only other feature necessary to be considered is as to

the applicability of the notice of recoupment filed with the plea

of nonassurnpsit. As the estate of Page, here represented by

the trustee, is that of a bankrupt, the question as to the avail-

ability of this notice is solvable only under the provisions of the

bankruptcy act, and under those provisions I must hold that it is

ineffectual. It is provided by Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 68b, 30

Stat. 565 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3450], that a set-off or counter

chum shall not be allowed in favor of any debtor of the bankrupt

which is not made provable against the estate. This account for

damages for failure to complete the bankrupt's contract is not

so provable, because of lapse of time, and therefore cannot now

be set off. It is not the character of the demand which precludes

the right to set it off, but the failure to prove it in the proceed-

ing in bankruptcy. Thus unliquidated claims may be set off

against liquidated claims, provided they are provable in bank-

ruptcy, and this, as I apprehend, requires that they be presented

and proved before the referee. See § 636, 30 Stat. 563 fU. S.

Comp. St. 1901, p. 3447] and the discussion thereof in Collier on

Bankruptcy (5th ed.) p. 488; Brandenburg on Bank (3d ed.)

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

§ 1005; Loveland on Bank (2d ed.) p. 282.

"Had the railway company chosen to liquidate and prove its

claim it would seem that it would have been entitled to set it off

against the debt due to the estate; but, not having proved its

claim within the time limited, or taken steps to have it allowed

in the bankruptcy proceedings, it cannot now be pleaded as a

virtual set-off in this proceeding.

"Let judgment be entered for $3,428.25, with interest thereon

from September 15, 1903."

As the railway company alone has filed assignments and sued

out writ of error, we shall deal only with the propositions de-

cided adversely to it. In view of the conclusion we have reached

it is unnecessary that we set out the reasons which lead us to

think unsound the contention made in behalf of the railway

company to the effect that the contract gave the company the

right to retain the 85 per cent. of the August, 1903, estimate as

liquidated damages. We agree with the trial court that the right

of the company to defeat the claim of the trustee could only be

asserted by way of counterclaim. We must therefore now con-

sider the question raised under the bankrupt act.

vene to the railway company. The opinion as to the effect of
the bankrupt act reads aa followa:
'' The only other feature necessary to be conside~d is as to
the applicability of the notice of recoupment filed with the plea
of nonassumpsit. As the estate of Page, here represented by
the trustee, is that of a bankrupt, the question as to the availability ot this notice is solvable only under the provisions of the
bankruptcy act, and under those provisions I must hold that it is
ineifectual. It is provided by Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 68b, 30
Stat. 565 [U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3450), that a set-off or counter
claim shall not be allowed in favor of any debtor of the bankrupt
which is not made provable against the estate. This account for
damages for failure to complete the bankrupt's contract is not
so provable, because of lapse of time, and therefore cannot now
be set off. It is not the character of the demand which precludes
the right to set it off, but the failure to prove it in the proceeding in bankruptcy. Thus unliquidnted claims may be set off
against liquidated claims, provided they are provable in bankruptcy, and this, as I apprehend, requires that they be presented
and proved before the referee. See § 63b, 30 Stat. :>63 [U. S.
Comp. St. 1901, p. 3447] and the discussion thereof in Collirr on
Bankruptcy (5th ed.) p. 488; Brandenburg on Bank ( 3d ed.)
§ 1005 ; Loveland on Bank ( 2d ed.) p. 282.
"Had the railway company chosen to liquidate and prove its
claim it would seem that it would have been entitled to set it off
against the debt due to the estate; but, not having proved its
claim within the time limited, or taken steps to have it allowed
in the bankruptcy proceedings, it cannot now be pleaded as a
virtual set-off in this proceeding.
''Let judgment be entered for $3,428.25, with interest thereon
from September 15, 1903."
As the railway company alone has filed assignments and sued
out writ of error, we shall deal only with the propositions deeided adversely to it. In view of the conclusion we have reached
it is unnecessary that we set out the reasons which lead us to
think unsound the cont.ention made in behalf of the railway
company to the effect that the contract gave the company the
right to retain the 85 per cent. of the August, 1903, estimate as
liquidated damages. We agree with the trial court that the right
of the company to defeat the claim of the trustee could only be
asserted by way of counterclaim. We must therefore now consider the question raised under the bankrupt act.
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§ 57n, 30 Stat. 561 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3444], is a new

provision, appearing for tjie first time in the act of 1898. The

argument relied on by defendant in error may be briefly ex-

pressed as follows: The counterclaim of the railway company,

while provable in its nature, was not proved in the bankruptcy

proceeding within the time allowed by § 57n, and it was there-

fore when asserted in the court below not a provable counter-

claim such as can be set off. So far as we have been able to dis-

cover there is no reported case which can be relied upon as a

precedent for the view taken by the court below, and none that

has more than a tendency to support the opposite view. As the

trial court read § 57«, it is a statute of limitations applicable

to the counterclaim of a debtor sued in an independent plenary

action brought by the trustee in bankruptcy. We cannot so con-

strue this provision. § 57 as a whole relates merely to the proof

and allowance of claims against the bankrupt in the bankruptcy

proceeding. The purpose of 57»i is to speed the conclusion of|

that proceeding. One who is the debtor and the creditor of.the

bankrupt, whose claim against exceeds his debt to the bankrupt,

must prove his claim in the bankruptcy proceeding within the;

time limit fixed by 57n, in order to share in the distribution ofi

the estate. In re Muskoka Co. (D. C.) 127 Fed. 886. But we

find no warrant for holding that his failure to thus prove it is
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a bar to the use of such claim in diminution of or to defeat the

claim of the trustee when asserted in an independent action. If

this clause of the act has the effect given it by the trial court,

it is as effective when relied on against the counterclaim of one

who has never heard of the bankruptcy proceeding, as it is when

relied on against the counterclaim of one who has had full knowl-

edge of such proceeding. And it is as effective in case the trustee

brings his action after the expiration of the time limit fixed by

§ 57n, as in case he brings such action while there is yet time for

the defendant to prove his counterclaim in the bankruptcy

proceeding.

If in the case at bar the railway company had no knowledge

of the bankruptcy proceeding until this action was brought,

§ 57n, as construed by the trial court, has the effect of depriv-

ing the company of a valuable right without an opportunity to

be heard. The fact that no exception is made in behalf of one

who first learns of the institution of the bankruptcy proceeding

after the time fixed by this clause seems to us sufficient of itself

for denying the clause effect in an independent action. But let

§ 57n, 30 Stat. 561 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. :3444], is a new
provision, appearing for t.he first time in the act of 1898. The
argument relied on by defendant in error may be briefly expressed as follows: The counterclaim of the railway company,
while provable in its nature, was not proved in the bankruptcy
proceeding within the time allowed by § 57n, and it was therefore when asser~d in the court below not a provable counterclaim such as can be set off. So far as we have been able to discover there is no reported case which can be relied upon as a
precedent for the view taken by the court below, and none that
has more than a tendency to support the opposite view. As the
trial court read § 57n, it is a statute of limitations applicable
to the counterclaim of a debtor sued in an independent plenary
action brought by the trustee in bankruptcy. We cannot so construe this provision. § 57 as a whole relates merely to the proof
and allowance of claims against the bankrupt in the bankruptcy
proceeding. The purpose of 57n is to speed the conclusion of
that proceeding. One who is the debtor and the creditor of. the
bankrupt, whose claim against exceeds his debt to the bankrupt,
must prove his claim in the bankruptcy proceeding within the
time limit fixed by 5711, in order to share in the distribution o
the estate. In re l\fuskoka Co. (D. C.) 127 l4~ed. 886. But we
find no warrant for holding that his failure to thus prove it is
a bar to the use of such claim in diminution of or to defeat the
claim of the trustee when a~erted in an independent action. If
this clause of the ad has the effect given it by the trial court,
it is as effective when relied on against the counterclaim of one
who has never heard of the bankruptcy proceeding, as it is when
relied on against the counterclaim of one who has had full knowledge of such proceeding. And it is as effective in case the trustee
brings his action after the expiration of the time limit fixed by
§ 57n, as in case he brings such action while there is yet time for
the defendant to prove his counterclaim in the bankruptcy
proceeding.
If in the case at bar the railway company had no knowledge
of the bankruptcy proceeding until this action was ·brought,
§ 57-n, as construed by the trial court, has the effect of depriving the company of a valuable right without an opportunity to
be heard. The fact that no exception is made in behalf of one
who first learns of the institution of the bankruptcy proceeding
after the time fixed by this clause seems to us sufficient of itself
for denying the clause effect in an independent action. But let
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it be assumed that in the ease at bar the company knew of the

bankruptcy proceeding in ample time, and failed to prove its

claim for the excess of its damages over the value of the unpaid

for work, simply because it regarded the claim as worthless.

Under this assumption, the discharge in bankruptcy, when

granted, will bar the claim for the excess as a liability against

Page (In re Hilton [D. C] 104 Fed. 981); and the failure of

the railway company to prove its claim deprives it of any pos-

sible right to share as a creditor in the distribution of the bank-

rupt estate (In re Shaffer [D. C] 104 Fed. 982). But we think

it cannot be true that such failure to prove the claim to the

excess in the bankruptcy proceeding leaves the company in the

position of a mere debtor. Statutes of limitation are strictly

construed. But even if the rule of construction were otherwise,

the language of the clause in question and its context seem to

us to plainly limit its effect to proceedings in bankruptcy. In

enacting the bankrupt act Congress could have had no reason

for requiring a debtor creditor, whose claim against exceeds his

debt to the bankrupt, to prove the excess and insist upon his

rights as a creditor of the estate. And hence there was no rea

son for penalizing such failure by imposing a limitation upon

the right of a person thus situated who does not wish to prove
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and claim the excess. The full purpose of § 57m seems to us to

be subserved when it is held that the limitation applies merely

to claims sought to be asserted in the bankruptcy proceeding.

We think the true solution of the question before us is that

the counterclaim which may be set off in an independent action

brought by the trustee is (subject to the restrictions of § 686,

30 Stat. 565 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3450]) one that is prov-

able in its nature, and need not necessarily be one that has been,

or may yet be, proved in the bankruptcy proceeding. § 20 of

the bankrupt act of 1867 provided:

"That in all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between

the parties the account shall be stated, and one debt set off

against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid;

but no set-off shall be allowed of a claim in its nature not prov-

able against the estate. • • •"

§ 68 of the present act reads, so far as now material:

"In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the

estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated

and one debt shall be set off against the other, and the balance

only shall be allowed or paid. A set-off or counterclaim shall

it be assumed that in the case at har the company knew of tht>
bankruptcy proceeding in ample time, and failed to prow its
claim for the excess of its damages over the value of the unpaid
for work, simply because it regarded the claim as worthless.
Under this assumption, the discharge in bankruptcy, when
granted, will bar the claim for the excess as a liability against
Page (In re Hilton [ D. C.] 104 Fed. 981) ; and the failure of
the railway company to prove its claim deprives it of any possible right to share as a creditor in the distribution of the bankrupt estate (In re Shaffer [D. C.] 104 Fed. 982) . But we think
it cannot be true that such failure to prove the claim to the
excess in the bankruptcy proceeding leaves the company in the
position of a mere debtor. Statutes of limitation are strictly
construed. But even if the rule of construction were otherwise,
the language of the clause in question and its context seem to
us to plainly limit its effect to proceedings in bankruptcy. In
enacting the bankrupt act CongreBB could have had no reason
fot requiring a debtor creditor, whose claim against exceeds his
debt to the bankrupt, to prove the excess and insist upon his1
rights as a creditor of the estate. And hence there was no rea.
son for penalizing su~h failure by imposing a limitation upon
the right of a person thus situated who does not wish to prove
and claim the excess. The full purpose of § 57n seems to us to
be subserved when it is held that the limitation applies merely
to claims sought to be asserted in the bankruptcy proceeding.
We think the true solution of the question before us is that
the counterclaim which may be set off in an independent action
brought by the trustee is (subject to the restrictions of § 68b,
30 Stat. 565 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3450]) one that is provable in its nature, and need not necessarily be one that has been,
or may yet be, proved in the bankruptcy proceeding. § 20 of
the bankrupt act of 1867 provided :
''That in all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between
the parties the account shall be stated, and one debt set off
against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or pa.id;
but no set-off shall be allowed of a claim in its nature not provable against the estate. • • • ''
§ 68 of the present act reads, so far as now material:
''In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the
estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated
and one debt shall be set off agaiDBt the other, and the balance
only shall be allowed or paid. A set-off or counterclaim shall
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not be allowed in favor of any debtor of the bankrupt which is

not provable against the estate."

In Morgan v. Wordell, 178 Mass. 350, 59 N. E. 1037, 55 L.

R. A. 33-41, Mr. Justice Holmes, said:

"The present statute leaves out the words 'in its nature,' but

we can have no doubt that it was intended to convey the same

idea as the longer phrase in the last preceding act, from which

in all probability its words were derived. 'Provable' means

provable in its nature at the time when the set-off is claimed,

not provable in the pending bankruptcy proceedings."

It may be true that Page's liability to the company was at

the time of the filing of the petition and at the date of the ad-

judication contingent. But before this liability was asserted as

a counterclaim it had become fixed and certain in amount. It

was certainly provable in nature when it was asserted in the

court below. The contention of defendant in error based on the

theory that the railway company is securing a preference seems

to us without merit. If a counterclaim is provable in its nature,

and if it was not acquired as forbidden by § 686, we find noth-

ing in the bankrupt act to prevent its use under the circum-

stances existing here.

•••
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We are of the opinion that the learned trial court erred in

rendering judgment against the railway company, and the judg-

ment below must be reversed, and the cause remanded.

Reversed.

WAGNER v. BURNHAM

224 Pa.- St. 586, 73 Atl. 990

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. May 10, 1909)

Assumpsit to recover balance due on a building contract by

Louis Wagner, as trustee in bankruptcy of Charles Gilpin,

against George Burnham and others. From an order discharg-

ing a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of de-

fense, plaintiff appeals.

MESTREZAT, J. We think the learned court below was

right in discharging the rule for judgment for want of a suffi-

not be allcm•ed in favor of any debtor of the bankn1pt which is
not provable against the eshtte."
In Morgan v. Wordell, 178 Mass. 350, 59 N. E. 1037, 55 L.
R. A. 33-41, :\Ir. Justice Holmes, said:
''The preSt>nt statute leaves out the words 'in its nature,' but
we can have no doubt that it was intended to convey the same
idea a8 the longer phrase in the last preceding act, from which
in all probability its words were derived. 'Provable' means
provable in its nature at the time when the set-off is claimed,
not provable in the pending bankruptcy proceedings.''
It may be true that Page's liability to the company was at
the time of the filing of the petition and at the date of the adjudication contingent. But before t11is liability was asserted as
a counterclaim it had become fixed and certain in amount. It
was certainly provable in nature when it was asserted in the
court below. The contention of defendant in error based on the
theory that the railway company is securing a preference seems
to us without merit. If a counterclaim is provable in its nature,
and if it was not acquired as forbidden by § 68b, we find nothing in the bankrupt act to prevent its use under the circumstances existing here.

• • •

We are of the opinion that the learned trial court erred in
rendering judgment against the railway company, and the judgment below must be reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reversed.

cient affidavit of defense. Charles Gilpin entered into a contract

with the defendants to tear down an old building and erect a

WAGNER v. BURNHAM
224 Pa.• St. 586, 73 A tl. 990
(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

l\lay 10, 1909)

Assumpsit to recover balance due on a building contract by
Louis Wagner, as trustee in bankruptcy of Charles Gilpin,
against George Burnham and others. From an order discharging a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense, plaintiff appeals.
MESTREZAT, J. We think the lean1ed court below was
right in discharging the rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense. Charles Gilpin entered into a contract
with the defendants to tear down an old building and erect a.
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new building in the city of Philadelphia. After performing

part of the work, he filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy,

and was duly adjudicated a bankrupt. The plaintiff is his trus-

tee in bankruptcy. At the date of the bankruptcy, Gilpin was

indebted to certain subcontractors for work done and materials

furnished who subsequently to that date entered mechanics'

liens against the property of the defendants to enforce their

claims. The defendants were compelled to pay these claims.

This suit was brought by the trustee to collect the amount due

Gilpin on the contract, and the defendants claim as a defense

a set-off for the amount which they were compelled to pay the

subcontractors on the mechanics' liens filed against their prop-

erty. The right to interpose this set-off as a defense in this

action and thereby defeat the plaintiff's recovery is the only

question in the case.

The right to the set-off depends upon the provisions of the

bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 1, 30 Stat. 544 [U. S.

Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418]), relative thereto. The part of the act

controlling the question is § 68, which provides, inter alia, as

follows: "In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits be-

tween the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall

be stated and one debt shall be set off against the other, and the
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balance only shall be allowed or paid. A set-off or counterclaim

shall not be allowed in favor of any debtor of a bankrupt which

is not provable against the estate.'' Is the counterclaim or set-

off of the defendants in this action allowable under this provi-

sion of the bankruptcy actt It is strenuously contended by the

plaintiff that the defendants' claim was contingent, uncertain,

was not provable against the bankrupt at the date of the adjudi-

cation in bankruptcy, and therefore cannot be allowed as a set-

off. This view, however, we think entirely overlooks the nature

and character of the defendants' claim as well before as at the

time it was interposed as a set-off. At the date of the adjudica-

tion the bankrupt was indebted to the subcontractors on the

claims which were subsequently paid by the defendants. The

primary liability for payment of these claims rested upon the

bankrupt, and the claims could have been enforced against him

to the extent of his liability to pay. By the law of this state,

however, the subcontractors had a lieu against the property of

the defendants for the work done and the materials furnished

by them. This property was made subject to a statutory lien to

secure the payment of the debts of the subcontractors, and by a

new building in the city of Philadelphia. After performing
part of the work, he filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy,
and was duly adjudicated a bankrupt. The plaintiff is his trustee in bankruptcy. At the date of the bankruptcy, Gilpin was
indebted to certain subcontractors for work done and materials
furnished who subsequently to that date entered mechanics'
liens against the property of the defendants to enforce their
claims. The defendants were compelled to pay these claims.
This suit was brought by the trustee to collect the amount due
Gilpin on the contract, and the defendants claim as a defense
a set-off for the amount which they were conipelled to pay the
subcontractors on the mechanics' liens filed against their property. The right to interpose this set-off as a defense in this
action and thereby defeat the plaintiff's recovery is the only
question in the case.
The right to the set-off depends upon the provisions of the
bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 1, 30 Stat. 544 [U. S.
Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418]), relative thereto. The part of the act
controlling the question is § 68, which provides, inter alia, as
follows: ''In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall
be stated and one debt shall be set off against the other, and the
balance only shall be allowed or paid. A set-off or counterclaim
sh.all not be allowed in favor of any debtor of a bankrupt which
is not provable against the estate.'' Is the counterclaim or setoff of the defendants in this action allowable under this provision of the bankruptcy act f It is strenuously contended by the
plaintiff that the defendants' claim was contingent, uncertain,
was not provable against the bankrupt at the date of the adjudication in bankruptcy, and therefore cannot be allowed as a setoff. This view, however, we think entirely overlooks the nature
and charactet· of the defendants' claim as well before as at the
time it was interposed as a set~off. At the date of the adjudication the bankrupt was indebted to the subcontractors on the
elaims which were subsequently paid by the defendants. The
primary liability for payment of these claims rested upon the
bankrupt, and the claims could have been enforced against him
to the extent of his liability to pay. By the law of this state,
however, the subcontractors had a lieu against the property of
the defendants for the work done and the materials fumished
by them. This property was made subject to a statutory lien to
secure the payment of the debts of the subcontractors, and by a
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"as of the date of the visible commencement upon the ground of

the work of building the structure or other improvement." The

lien of the subcontractor's claim, therefore, began with the com-

subsequent section of the statute the lien of the cl11im took Pffect
"as of the date of the visible commenceml Dt upon the ground of
the work of building the structure or other i111prow·me11t.'' The
lien of the subcontractor's claim, therefore, be~an with the commencement of the work on the defendant8' premist-s, nnd was, of
course, in full force and effect at the date of the aujudicatio11 in
bankruptcy. It was inchoate from the beginning, it is true, but
it was an existing claim or demand for which the defendants'
property was liable on failure of the contractor to pay. During
the time for filing the lien the subcontractors had a preferential
statutory claim in the nature of a nonperfected equitable lien
which was perfected by filing the lien after the adjudication in
bankruptcy, but within the statutory period. In re Grisslcr,
136 Fed. 754, 69 C. C. A. 406. The statute provides the method
for perfecting and enforcing the lie11:, and the bankruptcy of
the contractor does not prevent its enforcement. § 20 of the
mechanics' lien law of June 4, 1901 (P. L. 431, 3 Purdou 's ::ig.
[13th ed.] 2487), makes specific provision for the e11forceme11t
of the claim after the insolvency or bankruptcy of the contractor
as follows: ''When any such contract has been suspended or
ended, the right to file a claim or to sue under the contract shall
remain, and may be exercised with the same effect as if further
proceedings under such contract had been determi11ed by consent of all parties." The work was done and the materials were
furnished prior to the adjudication in bankruptcy. The subcontractors, therefore, had the right to file a lien and enforce it
under the terms and within the statutory period provided in the
act of 1901. The lien, however, of the subcontractors did not
arise or was not created by the filing of the claim in the common
pleas for the purpose of its enforcement, but came into existence
at the commencement of the improvement of the defendants'
property by the contractor. The claim, therefore, of the subcontractors, now held by the defendants and proposed to be set
off by them against the plaintiff's demand, existed in its inchoate
form at the date of the adjudication in bankruptcy, and was
subsequently perfected by filing a lien in conformity with the
provisions of the act of 1901. While the primary debtor of the
subcontractors was the contractor whose duty it was to pay the
claim, the property of the defendants, and hence the defendants
themselves, were the statutory sureties for the payment of the
debt of the bankrupt to the subcontractors. Bassett & Brown v.
Baird, 85 Pa. 384. A surety paying the debt of his principal
1

mencement of the work on the defendants' premises, and was, of

course, in full force and effect at the date of the adjudication in

bankruptcy. It was inchoate from the beginning, it is true, but

it was an existing claim or demand for which the defendants'

property was liable on failure of the contractor to pay. During

the time for filing the lien the subcontractors had a preferential

statutory claim in the nature of a nonperfected equitable lien

which was perfected by filing the lien after the adjudication in

bankruptcy, but within the statutory period. In re Grissler,

136 Fed. 754, 69 C. C. A. 406. The statute provides the method

for perfecting and enforcing the lien, and the bankruptcy of

'the contractor does not prevent its enforcement. § 20 of the

mechanics' lien law of June 4, 1901 (P. L. 431, 3 Purdou's Dig.

[13th ed.] 2487), makes specific provision for the enforcement

of the claim after the insolvency or bankruptcy of the contractor

as follows: "When any such contract has been suspended or

ended, the right to file a claim or to sue under the contract shall

remain, and may be exercised with the same effect as if further

proceedings under such contract had been determined by con-
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sent of all parties." The work was done and the materials were

furnished prior to the adjudication in bankruptcy. The subcon-

tractors, therefore, had the right to file a lien and enforce it

under the terms and within the statutory period provided in the

act of 1901. The lien, however, of the subcontractors did not

arise or was not created by the filing of the claim in the common

pleas for the purpose of its enforcement, but came into existence

at the commencement of the improvement of the defendants'

property by the contractor. The claim, therefore, of the sub-

contractors, now held by the defendants and proposed to be set

off by them against the plaintiff's demand, existed in its inchoate

form at the date of the adjudication in bankruptcy, and was

subsequently perfected by filing a lien in conformity with the

provisions of the act of 1901. While the primary debtor of the

subcontractors was the contractor whose duty it was to pay the

claim, the property of the defendants, and hence the defendants

themselves, were the statutory sureties for the payment of the

debt of the bankrupt to the subcontractors. Bassett & Brown v.

Baird, 85 Pa. 384. A surety paying the debt of his principal
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after bankruptcy may under the bankrupt act of 1898 set off

the amount so paid against his debt to the bankrupt. In re Dil-

lon (D. C.) 100 Fed. 627. It is clear, we think, that the claim

of the defendants sought to be set off in this action is for money

expended by them as quasi surety for the bankrupt, and is there-

fore a "mutual credit" within contemplation of §68 of the

bankrupt act. It should not be overlooked that the right of the

debtor to a set-off in an action brought against him by the trus-

tee is not based upon the rules of equitable set-off administered

in the state courts, but upon those rules which prevail in the

federal courts which are generally broader and more liberal in

permitting the set-off. These rules must be observed by the

state courts in construing the bankrupt act.

Is the proposed set-off "provable against the estate" of the

bankrupt within the meaning of § 68 of the act? This question

must receive an affirmative answer unless we interpret the sec-

tion differently from the decisions of two courts of the highest

respectability, one of which is a federal court whose construction

of an act of Congress we must accept. After a very careful con-

sideration of the bankruptcy act, we are satisfied that the con-

clusion of those courts is correct, and that a counterclaim '' prov-

able against the estate" of the bankrupt by his debtor in an
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action brought by the trustee is such claim as is provable in its

nature at the time the set-off is sought to be enforced. The

status of the claim at that date determines its provability in con-

templation of the act of Congress. This is conclusively shown by

Holmes, C. J., now a justice of the Supreme Court of the United

States, in the opinion in Morgan v. Wordell, 178 Mass. 350, 59

N. E. 1037, 55 L. R. A. 33. This was an action by a trustee of

a bankrupt, and the defense was set-off, the defendant claiming

that he occupied the position of a quasi surety who had paid

and therefore was subrogated to the claim of a joint creditor of

himself and the debtor. The right to a set-off under § 68 of the

bankrupt act was the question at issue, and in delivering the

opinion the chief justice said, inter alia: "The defendant also

claims a set-off by virtue of his covenant. We assume that it has

been adjudicated between the parties in the District Court that

the defendant has not a claim which he could prove in his own

name, and that this decision carries with it the corollary that

he could not prove his claim on the covenant against the estate.

If, therefore, the prohibition of a set-off of a claim 'which is not

provable against the estate' is to be taken with simple literalness

after bankruptcy may under the bankrupt act of 1898 set off
the amount so paid against his debt to the hankrupt. In r~ Dillon (D. C.) 100 Fed. 627. It is clear, we think, that the claim
of the defendants sought to be set off in this action is for money
expended by them as quasi surety for the bankrupt, and is therefore a ''mutual credit'' within contemplation of § 68 of the
bankrupt act. It should not be overlooked that the right of the
debtor to a set-off in an action brought against him by the tn1stee is not based upon the rules of equitable set-off administered
in the state courts, but upon those rules which prevail in the
federal courts which are generally broader and more liberal in
permitting the set-off. These rules must be observed by the
state courts in construing the bankrupt act.
Is the proposed set-off ''provable against the estate'' of the
bankrupt within the meaning of § 68 of the acU This question
must receive an affirmative answer unless we interpret the seetion differently from the decisions of two courts of the highest
respectability, one of which is a federal court whose construction
of an act of Congress we must accept. After a very careful consideration of the bankruptcy act, we are satisfied that the conclusion of those courts is correct, and that a counterclaim "provable against the estate'' of the bankrupt by his debtor in an
action brought by the trustee is such claim as is provable in its
nature at the time the set-off is sought to be enforced. The
status of the claim at that date determines its provability in contemplation of the ac\ of Congress. This is conclusively shown by
Holme.a, C. J ., now a justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the opinion in Morgan v. Wordell, 178 Mass. 350, 59
N. E. 1037, 55 L. R. A. 33. This was an action by a trustee of
a bankrupt, and the defense was set-off, the defendant claiming
that he occupied the position of a quasi surety who had paid
8.J!d therefore was subrogated to the claim of a joint creditor of
himself and the debtor. The right to a set-off under § 68 of the
bankrupt act ·was the question at issue, and in delivering the
opinion the chief justice said, inter alia: "The defendant also
claims a set-off by virtue of his covenant. We assume that it has
been adjudicated between the parties in the District Court that
the defendant has not a claim which he could prove in his own
name, and that this decision carries with it the corollary that
he could not prove his clBim on the covenant against the estate.
If, therefore, the prohibition of a set-off of a claim 'which is not
provable against the estate' is to be taken with simple literalneat
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as applying to any claim that could not be proved in the existing

bankruptcy proceedings, the defendant's set-off cannot be main-

tained. But wc are of opinion that the seemingly simple words

which we have quoted must be read in the light of their history

and in connection with the general provision at the beginning

of § 68 for a set-off of mutual debts 'or mutual credits,' and

that so read they interpose no obstacle to the defendant's claim.

The provision for the set-off of mutual credits is old. But, while

the provision as to mutual credits was thought to be more exten-

sive than that as to mutual debts, it was held that even the

broader phrase did not extend to claims which, when the moment

of set-off arrived, still were wholly contingent and uncertain,

such, for instance, as the claim upon this covenant would have

been if the defendant had not yet been called upon to pay any-

thing upon the original partnership debt. But the moment when

the set-off was claimed was the material moment. The defend-

ant's claim might have been contingent at the adjudication of

bankruptcy, and so not provable in the absence of special pro-

visions such as are to be found in the later bankrupt acts in

England and in the United States act of March 2, 1867 (14

Stat. 517, c. 176), although not in the present law, and yet if it

had been liquidated, as here, by payment, before the defendant
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was sued, he was allowed without question to set it off (citing

authorities). The limitations worked out by these decisions

were expressed in the section of the act of 1867 cited above, in

the words,'but no set-off shall be allowed of a claim in its nature

not provable against the estate.' These words, as it seems to us,

following the cases, refer yet to the nature of the claim at the

moment when it was sought to set it off, not to its nature at the

beginning of the pending bankruptcy proceedings, and did not

prevent a set-off of a claim which was liquidated at the later

moment merely because, when the bankruptcy proceedings

began, for some reason it did not admit of proof. * • •

'Provable' means provable in its nature at the time when the

set-off is claimed, not provable in the pending bankruptcy pro-

ceedings." This case is followed and approved by the United

States Circuit Court of Appeals in Norfolk & W. By. Co. v.

Graham, 145 Fed. 809, 813, 76 C. C. A. 385, 389. In that case it

is said, inter alia: "We think that the true solution of the ques-

tion before us is that the counterclaim which may be set off in

an independent action brought by the trustee is * * • one

that is provable in its nature, and need not necessarily be one

as applying to any claim that could not be proved in the existing
hankruptcy procl·edings, the defendant's set-off cannot be maintairwd. But we are of opinion that the seemingly si1r.plc words
which we have quoted must be read in the light of their history
aad in connection with the general provision at the beginning
of § 68 for a set-off of mutual debts 'or mutual credits,' and
that so read they interpose no obstacle to the defendant's claim.
The provision for the set-off of mutual credits is old. But, while
the provision as to mutual credits was thought to be more extensive than that as to mutual debts, it was held that even the
broader phrase did not extend to claims which, when the moment
of set-off arrived, still were wholly contingent and uncertain,
such, for instance, as the claim upon this covenant would have
been if the defendant had not yet been called upon to pay anything upon the original partnership debt. But the moment when
the set-off was claimed was the material moment. The defendant's claim might have been contingent at the adjudication of
bankruptcy, and so not provable in the absence of special provisions such as are to be found in the later bankrupt acts in
England and in the United States act of :March 2, 1867 (14
Stat. 517, c. 176), although not in the present law, and yet if it
had been liquidated, as here, by payment, before the defendant
was sued, he was allowed without question to set it off (citing
authorities). The limitations worked out by these decisions
were expressed in the section of the act of 1867 cited above, in
the words, 'but no set-off shall be allowed of a claim in its nature
not provable against the estate.' These words, as it seems to us,
following the cases, refer yet to the nature of the claim at the
moment when it was sought to set it off, not to its nature at the
beginning of the pending bankruptcy proceedings, and did not
prevent a set-off of a claim which was liquidated at the later
moment merely because, when the bankruptcy proceedings
began, for some reason it did not admit of proof. • • •
'Provable' means provable in its nature at the time when the
set-.off is claimed, not provable in the pending bankruptcy proceedings.'' This case is followed and approved by the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals in Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v.
Graham, 145 Fed. 809, 813, 76 C. C. A. 385, 389. In that case it
is said, in trr ali,a: "We think that the true solution of the qu1:stion before us is that the counterclaim which may be set off in
an independent action brought by the trustee is • • • one
that is provable in its nature, and need not necessarily be one
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that has been, or may yet be, proved in the bankruptcy proceed-

ing. • • • It may be true that Page's liability to the com-

pany was at the time of the filing of the petition and at the

date of the adjudication contingent. But, before this liability

was asserted as a counterclaim, it had become fixed and certain

in amount. It was certainly provable in its nature when it was

asserted in the court below."

It follows from what has been said that the judgment of the

common pleas should be affirmed.

The assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment is

affirmed.

NEW YORK COUNTY NAT. BANK v. MASSEY

192 U. S. 138, 48 L. Ed. 380, 24 Sup. Ct. 199

[See this case given on page 275, ante]

that has been, or may yet be, proved in the bankruptcy proceeding. • • • It may be true that Page's liability to the company was at the time of the filing of the petition and at the
date of the adjudication contingent. But, before this liability
was asserted as a counterclaim, it had become fixed and certain
in amount. It was certainly provable in its nature when it was
asserted in the court below."
It follows from what has been said that the judgment of the
common pleas should be affirmed.
The assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment is
affirmed.

GERMANIA SAVINGS BANK & TRUST CO. v. LOEB

188 Fed. 285, 110 C C. A. 263

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. May 2, 1911)

NEW YORK COUNTY NAT. BANK v. MASSEY

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court disal-

lowing the claim of appellant against the bankrupt's estate in

192 U. S. 138, 48 L. Ed. 380, 24 Sup. Ct. 199

default of the performance of certain conditions hereafter stated.

The proof of claim alleged an indebtedness of the bankrupt to

[See this case given on page 275, ante]

the bank of $10,387.39. The proof was construed as claim-
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ing that amount as a balance remaining of $20,000 loaned by

the bank, less $9,612.61 deposited by the bankrupt in the bank

and applied by the latter as an offset against the original indebt-

GERMANIA SAVINGS BANK & TRUST CO. v. LOEB

edness. It is alleged in such proof, with reference to the origin

of the debt, that on or about January 30, 1908, the bankrupt

188 Fed. 285, 110 C. C. A. 263

secured from claimant $20,000, upon representations that the

company had a paid-in capital stock of $80,000; that it was a

(Circuit· Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. May 2, 1911)

successful corporation, and had made profits in excess of $30,-

000; that on February 13th claimant first learned of the falsity

of said representations, and thereupon demanded back its money.

The trustee excepted to the claim upon the grounds, first, that

the bank had received a preference of a large amount within

four months before the bankruptcy, while the Mercantile Com-

pany was insolvent; and, second, that a large amount of the

bank deposits were made under an agreement, between the rep-

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court disallowing the claim of appellant against the bankrupt's estate in
default of the performance of certain conditions hereafter stated.
The proof of claim alleged an indebtedness of the bankrupt to
the bank of $10,387.39. The proof was construed as claiming that amount as a balance remaining of $20,000 loaned by
the bank, less $9,612.61 deposited by the bankrupt in the bank
and applied by the latter as an offset against the original indebtedness. It is alleged in such proof, with reference to the origin
of the debt, that on or about January 30, 1908, the bankrupt
secured from claimant $20,000, upon representations that the
company had a pai{l-in capital stock of $80,000; that it was a
successful corporation, and had made profits in excess of $30,000; that on February J3th claimant first learned of the falsity
of said representations, and thereupon demanded back its money.
The trustee excepted to the claim upon the grounds, first, that
the bank had received a preference of a large amount within
four months before the bankruptcy, while the Mercantile Company was insolvent; and, second, that a large amount of the
bank deposits were made under an agreement, between the rep-
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resentatives of the bankrupt and the bank respectively, that they

should be held as a special deposit, and that no right of offset

existed as to such amount.

The referee reported, in substance sufficient for this opinion,

the fact of the making of the loan of $20,000 about January 28,

1908: that about February 1st following it became known to

the officers of the Mercantile Company that one of its officers

was short in his accounts about $4,000, and had forged $6,000

of the stock of the company; that at least one of the officers of

the Mercantile Company knew that as much as $35,000 of the

capital stock of the company had not been paid for; that part

of this forged stock had been hypothecated with appellant; that

in order to avoid trouble with one of the stockholders, who had

become dissatisfied, the president of the Mercantile Company

had bought his stock, giving in part payment therefore the check

of the Mercantile Company upon the appellant bank; that, for

the purpose of ascertaining the exact condition of the company,

its attorney had ordered an inventory taken; that on February

5, 1908, the officers and agents of the appellant bank knew of

certain of the irregularities before stated, were advised of the

order for taking an inventory, and that the books of the Mer-

cantile Company were being audited, and had sufficient infor-

mation to put them upon inquiry respecting the insolvency of
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the Mercantile Company; that the latter was at the time actually

insolvent, and that its officers knew it; that on February 5th a

conference was had between the respective attorneys of the bank

and the bankrupt—the former having sent for the president of

the Mercantile Company, and the attorney appearing in his

stead, on account of the alleged illness of the president; that

both attorneys realized that the Mercantile Company was in a

critical condition; that the bank's attorney desired to protect its

interests, and that the attorney of the bankrupt "realized that it

would be dangerous at that time for any action to be started

against the company, and was willing to do anything reasonable

to prevent litigation;" that the bankrupt had at the time on

deposit in the bank $5,970.23; that the bankrupt's attorney

thought that, unless the bank could at once be satisfied, it would

refuse to cash checks for the money then on deposit; that the

bankrupt's attorney did not then know that his client was

insolvent, and stated that he was informed and believed that it

was solvent, that it owed not more than $65,000 and had $100,-

000 of assets, but that the exact condition could not be known

resentatives of the bankrupt and the bank respectively, that they
should be held as a special deposit, and that no right of offset
existed as to such amount.
The referee reported, in subetance sufficient for this opinion,
the fact of the making of the loan of $20,000 about .January 28,
1908; that about February 1st following it became kuown to
the officers of the Mercantile Company that one of its officers
was short in his accounts about $4,000, and had forged $6,000
of the stock of the company; that at least one of the officers of
the Mercantile Company knew that as much as $35,000 of the
capital stock of the company had not been paid for; that part
of this forged stock had been hypothecated with appellaut; that
in order to avoid trouble with one of the stockholders, who had
become diSMtisfied, the president of the Mercantile Company
bad bought his stock, giving in part payment therefore the check
of the Mercantile Company upon the appellant bank; that, for
the purpose of ascertaining the exact condition of the company,
its attorney had ordered an inventory taken ; that on February
5, 1908, the officers and agents of the appellant bank knew of
certain of the irregularities before stated, were advised of the
order for taking an inventory, and that the books of the Mercantile Company were being audited, and bad sufficient information to put them upon inquiry respecting the insolvency of
the Mercantile Company; that the latter was at the time actually
insolvent, and that its officers knew it; that on February 5th a
conference was had between the respecti \-e attorneys of the bank
and the bankrupt-the former having sent for the president of
the Mercantile Company, and the attorney appearing in his
stead, on account of the alleged illness of the president; that
both attorneys realized that the Mercantile Company was in a
critical condition; that the bank's attorney desired to protect its
interests, and that the attorney of the bankrupt "realized that it
would be dangerous at that time for any action to be started
against the company, and was willing to do anything reasonable
to prevent litigation;'' that the bankrupt had at the time on
deposit in the bank $5,970.23; that the bankrupt's attorney
thought that, unless the bank could at once be satisfied, it would
refuse to cash checks for the money then on deposit; that the
bankrupt's attorney did not then know that his client was
insolvent, and stated that he was informed and believed that it
was solvent, that it owed not more than $65,000 and had $100,~
000 of assets, but that the exact condition could not be known
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until the examination of the books and taking of inventory were

completed, and stated that if the bank were to take steps at that

time to protect its interests the collapse of the bankrupt's business

would result, and asked that no action be taken by the bank, but

that matters "remain as they are," under an arrangement that

the Mercantile Company should draw out no more than it should

subsequently deposit—thus always leaving a balance equal to

the existing balance, and thus the bank be not prejudiced in

case the Mercantile Company should prove insolvent; but that,

while the evidence did not show whether the bank's attorney

replied to this proposition, no objection was made to it, and that,

the bank having accepted subsequent deposits, the Mercantile

Company's attorney understanding the proposition was satis-

factory, the former was bound by the transaction.

It appeared that on February 11th the accounting of the Mer-

cantile Company's affairs was completed, showing that it owed

upwards of $138,000, instead of not more than $65,000, as be-

lieved by its attorney at the time of the conference of February

5th; that but $28,000 of the $80,000 capital stock subscribed had

actually been paid for; and that the inventoried assets amounted,

at the valuation placed upon them, to but slightly more than the

amount of the debts. The bank, upon learning this situation,
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on February 11th or 12th, refused to honor further checks of

the Mercantile Company, and its checks to the amount of more

than $6,000 drawn, and in part issued, for current expenses or

current debts, were accordingly either dishonored by the bank

or withheld from delivery, by reason of such notification from

the bank. On February 13th the latter demanded from the

Mercantile Company the return of the $20,000 borrowed, to-

gether with check for the balance of the latter's bank deposit,

with notice that the bank had already applied the same upon

said indebtedness. The creditors' petition for bankruptcy was

filed the next day.

The referee held that the arrangement by which the money

then on deposit should not be checked against did not constitute

a preference under the circumstances of the case, including the

fact that the bankrupt's attorney knew that if any of the rep-

resentations made to the bank, on which the $20,000 was bor-

rowed, were untrue, the latter could repossess itself of the money

then on deposit, and that he also must have known that in case

of insolvency proceedings the bank would have the right to off-

set the money then on deposit, and accordingly held that the

until the examination of the books and taking of inventory were
completed, and stated that if the bank were to take steps at that
time to protect its interests the collapse of the bankrupt's business
would result, and asked that no action be taken by the bank, but
that matters "remain as they are," under an arrangement that
the Mercantile Company should draw out no more than it should
subsequently deposit-thus always leaving a balance equal to
the existing balance, and thus the bank be not prejudiced in
case the Mercantile Company should prove insolvent; but that,
while the evidence did not show whether the bank's attorney
replied to this proposition, no objection was made to it, and that,
the bank having accepted subsequent deposits, the Mercantile
Company's attorney understanding the proposition was satisfactory, the former was bound by the transaction.
It appeared that on February 11th the accounting of the Mercantile Company's affairs was completed, showing that it owed
upwards of $138,000, instead of not more than $65,000, as believed by its attorney at the time of the conference of February
5th ; that but $28,000 of the $80,000 capital stock subscribed had
actually been paid for; and that the inventoried assets amounted,
at the valuation placed upon them, to but slightly more than the
amount of the debts. 'l'he bank, upon learning this situation,
on February 11th or 12th, refused to honor further checks of
the :\lercantile Company, and its checks to the amount of more
than $6,000 draw11, and in pa.rt issued, for current expenses or
current debts, were accordingly either dishonored by the bank
or withheld from delivery, by reason of such notification from
the bank. On February 13th the latter demanded from the
Mercantile Company the return of the $20,000 borrowed, together with check for the balance of the latter's bank deposit,
with notice that the bank had already applied the same upon
said indebtedness. The creditors' petition fo:r: bankruptcy was
filed the next day.
The referee held that the arrangement by which the money
then on deposit should not be checked against did not constitute
a preference under the circumstances of the case, including the
fact that the bankrupt's attorney knew that if any of the representations made to the bank, on which the $20,000 was borrowed, were untrue, the latter could repossess itself of the money
then on deposit, and that he also must have known that in case
of insolvency proceedings the bank would have the right to of?.
set the money then on deposit, and accordingly held that the
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bank was entitled to offset the balance on deposit February 5,

1908, against the bankrupt's indebtedness. The amounts de-

posited in the bank after February 5th and until February 13th,

less the amount of the checks cashed between those dates, was

$4,514.08. The referee held that the Mercantile Company had

the right to control its deposits made after February 5th, and

that in view of the talk between the attorneys "the bank must

receive the deposits as suggested, or decline them;" that it was

the intention of the attorney and other officers of the Mercantile

Company that the rights of both parties should be fixed on Feb-

ruary 5th; and that the subsequent deposits were made by the

agents of the Mercantile Company "with the understanding

that they were not to be molested by the bank and that they

would have the right to withdraw them as they saw fit;" and

that as the Mercantile Company's affairs were being conducted

by subordinate agents, who were striving to preserve the assets

and protect the interests of all creditors alike until the exact

condition of the business could be ascertained, the deposits made

after February 5th were not made in the ordinary business way,

but in such way as to create a trust relation, and thus to pre-

clude a right on the part of the bank to offset them against the

Mercantile Company's debt. It was accordingly ordered that

upon the payment of the latter balance ($4,514.08), deposited
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after February 5th, the bank might prove its claim for what

remained after making the offset of the balance previous to that

date, together with its claim for the $4,514.08 so to be paid in,

and that in default of such payment the entire claim should be

disallowed.

The referee's order was reviewed by the District Judge, upon

petitions therefor by both the bank and the trustee. The judge

agreed with the referee as to the facts relating to the deposit

balance of February 5th, but was of opinion that the agreement

and understanding that the bank should withhold the taking of

legal proceedings against the bankrupt until invoices should be

taken and the exact condition of the Mercantile Company ascer-

tained, and that the latter should not check against this balance,

in connection with the arrangement for further deposits to be

checked against, amounted to the giving of a preference to the

bank, under § 60 of the act, and accordingly held that the bank

had no right to offset the balance of February 5th against the

bankrupt's debt. As to the balance of deposits made after Feb-

ruary 5th, the judge approved the action of the referee in hold-
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bank was entitled to offset the balance on deposit February 5,
1908, against the bankrupt's indebtedne88. The amounts deposited in the bank after February 5th and until February 13th,
less the amount of the checks cashed between those dates, WBB
$4,514.08. The referee held that the Mercantile Company had
the right to control its deposits made after February 5th, and
that in view of the talk between the attorneys ''the bank must
receive the deposits as suggested, or decline them ; '' that it was
the intention of the attorney and other officers of the Mercantile
Company that the rights of both parties should be fixed on February 5th; and that the subsequent deposits were made by the
agents of the Mercantile Company ''with the understanding
that they were not to be molested by the bank and that they
would have the right to withdraw them as they saw fit;" and
that as the Mercantile Company's affairs were being conducted
by subordinate agents, who were striving to preserve the assets
and protect the interests of all creditors alike until the exact
condition of the business could be ascertained, the deposits made
after February 5th were not made in the ordinary business way,
but in such way as to create a trust relation, and thus to preclude a right on the part of the bank to offset them against the
Mercantile Company's debt. It. was accordingly ordered that
upon the payment of the latter balance ($4,514.08), deposited
after February 5th, the bank might prove its claim for what
remained after making the offset of the balance preVious to that
date, together with its claim for the $4,514.08 so to be paid in,
and that in default of such payment the entire claim should be
disallowed.
The referee's order was reviewed by the District Judge, upon
petitions therefor by both the bank and the trustee. The judge
agreed with the referee as to the facts relating to the .deposit
balance of February 5th, but was of opinion that the agreement
and understanding that the bank should withhold the taking of
legal proceedings against the bankrupt until invoices should be
taken and the exact condition of the Mercantile Company ascertained, and that the latter should not check against this balance,
in connection with the arrangement for further deposits to be
checked against, amounted to the giving of a preference to the
ba.nk, under § 60 of the act, and accordingly held that the bank
had no right to offset the balance of February 5th against th~
bankrupt's debt. As to the balance of deposits made after February 5th, the judge approved the action of the referee in holds. A A. Banllraptc7-4 l
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ing that such balance was a trust fund, and, while not in formal

terms confirming the referee's conclusions of fact, in effect did

so, holding that the bank's refusal to honor checks that were

drawn by the bankrupt against this subsequent balance, and its

attempt to apply the same to the indebtedness which the bank-

rupt owed the bank, amounted to a conversion. An order was

accordingly entered denying the offset of $5,970.23, but provid-

ing that upon the payment of that sum to the trustee the bank

might prove its claim for the entire amount of the debt, and that

in default of such payment the entire claim be disallowed, but

adjudging that the bank is a debtor to the estate of the bank-

rupt in the amount of $4,514.08, and rendering judgment in

favor of the trustee accordingly, with interest from February 5,

1908, with provision for the withholding of dividends upon the

bank's claim until the last-named sum, with interest, be paid, as

well as for issue of execution against the bank for any balance

thereof in case the item of $5,970.23, with interest, should not

be paid, or in case the dividends did not amount to $4,514.08,

with interest. The costs of the proceedings for review were ad-

judged against the bank. It is conceded by appellee that the

proper balance on deposit February 5, 1908, was $5,098.53, in-

stead of $5,970.23, as found by the referee.

KNAPPEN, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).
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The first question presented is whether the agreement of Feb-

ruary 5th between the Mercantile Company and the bank

created, as to the then existing deposit balance of $5,098.53, .a

preferential transfer within the meaning of the bankruptcy act.

§ 60a of the act provides that:

"A person shall be deemed to have given a preference, if,

being insolvent, he has, within four months before the filing of

the petition • • • made a transfer of any of his property,

ing that such balance was a trust fund, and, while not in formal
terms confirming the referee's conclusions of fact, in effect did
so, holding that the bank's refusal to honor checks that were
drawn by the bankrupt against this subsequent balance, and its
attempt to apply the same to the indebtedness which the bankrupt owed the bank, amounted to a conversion. An order was
accordingly entered denying the offset of $5,970.23, but pro·riding that upon the payment of that sum to the trustee the bank
might prove its claim for the entire amount of the debt, and that
in default of such payment the entire claim he disallowed, but
adjudging that the bank is a debtor to the estate of the bankrupt in the amount of $4,514.08, and rendering judgment in
favor of the trustee accordingly, with interest from February 5,
1908, with provision for the withholding Of dividends upon the
bank's claim until the last-nAmed sum, with interest, be paid, as
well as for issue of execution against the bank for any balance
thereof in case the item of $5,970.23, with interest, should not
be paid, or in case the dividends did not amount to $4,514.08,
with interest. The costs of the proceedings for review were adjudged against the bank. It is conceded by appellee that the
proper balancr on deposit February 5, 1908, was $5,098.53, inst.ead of $5,970.23, as found by the referee.

and the effect of the enforcement of such * • • transfer

will be to enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater per-

centage of his debt than any other of such creditors of the same

class."

§ 68a provides that:

"In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the

estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated

and one debt shall be set off against the other, and the balance

only shall be allowed or paid."

KNAPPEN, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).
The first question prrscntcd is whether the agreement of February 5th between the l\lercantile Company and the bank
created, as to the then existing deposit balanee of $5,098.53, .a
preferential transfer within the meaning of the bankruptcy act.
~ 60a of the act provide.s that:
''A person shall be deemed to have given a preference, if,
being insolvent, he has, within four months before the filing of
the petition • • • made a transfer of any of his property,
and the effect of the enforcement of such • • • transfer
will be to enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any other of such creditors of the same
class.''
~

68a provides that :

·'In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the
estate of a bunkrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated

and one debt shall be set off against the other, and the balance
only shall be ullowed or paid."
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It has been authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court,

in considering these two sections, that the balance of a regular

bank account at the time of filing the petition is a debt due to

the bankrupt from the bank, and in the absence of fraud or

collusion between the bank and the bankrupt, with the view of

creating a preferential transfer, the bank need not surrender

such balance, but may set it off against notes of the bankrupt

held by it, and may prove its claim for the amount remaining

due on the notes. N. Y. County National Bank v. Massey, 192

U. S. 138, 24 Sup. Ct. 199, 48 L. ed. 380.

The Massey Case is decisive of the question we are considering,

unless the case before us is distinguishable either by the fact

that the notes here in question were not due at the time of the

bankruptcy, or because of the existence of fraud or collusion

between the bank and the Mercantile Company, with the view of

creating a preferential transfer.

As to the nonmaturity of the notes:

The word '' debt,'' as used in § 68a includes any debt provable

in bankruptcy. Bankr. Act 1898, § 1, cl. 11; Loveland on Bank'

ruptcy (3d ed.) p. 369. And a debt is provable, whether due or

not at the time of bankruptcy. Bankr. Act 1898, § 63a (1). It

is thus immaterial to the application of § 68a whether or not the
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notes were due. Collier on Bankruptcy (8th ed.) p. 793; Love-

land on Bankruptcy (3d ed.) p. 372; Moch v. Market St. Na-

tional Bank (3d Circuit), 107 Fed. 897, 47 C. C. A. 49; In re

Semmer Glass Co. (2d Circuit), 135 Fed. 77, 67 C. C. A. 551.

A careful consideration of the record constrains us to the

opinion that there was no fraud or collusion between the bank

and the bankrupt for the purpose of creating a preferential

transfer with respect to the deposit balance in question. It is

not, and could not be, contended that there was any collusion

in respect to creating this balance. If collusion existed, it must

be found in the agreement between the bank and the Mercantile

Company that the deposit should remain in the bank during the

investigation of the solvency of the Mercantile Company, and for

the purpose of permitting the bank to apply this balance upon

its notes in case the Mercantile Company should turn out to be

insolvent. This question must be answered in the light of exist-

ing conditions. The suggestion that the balance be not drawn

upon came from the Mercantile Company's attorney, because he

thought such arrangement only fair to the bank as preventing

prejudice to it, through its failure to take action to protect its

It has been authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court,
in considering these two sections, that the balance of a regular
bank account at the time of filing the petition is a debt due to
the bankrupt from the bank, and in the absence of fraud or
collusion between the bank and the bankrupt, with the view of
creating a preferential transfer, the bank need not surrender
such balance, but may set it off against notes of the bankrupt
held by it, and may prove its claim for the amount remaining
due on the notes. N. Y. County National Bank v. Massey, 192
U. S. 138, 24 Sup. Ct. 199, 48 L. ed. 380.
The Massey Case is decisive of the questi<?n we arc considering,
unless the case before us is distinguishable either by the fact
that the notes here in question were not due at the time of the
bankruptcy, or because of the existence of fraud or collusion
between the bank and the Mercantile Company, with the view of
creating a preferential transfer.
AB to the nonma.turity of the notes:
The word ''debt,'' as used in § 68a includes any debt provable
in bankruptcy. Bankr. Act 1898, § 1, cl. 11; Loveland on Bankruptcy (3d ed.) p. 369. And a debt is provable, whether due or
not at the time of bankruptcy. Bankr. Act 1898, § 63a (1). It
is thus immat~rial to the application of § 68a whether or not the
notes were due. Collier on Bankruptcy (8th ed.) p. 793; Loveland on Bankruptcy (3d ed.) p. 372; Moch v. Market St. National Bank ( 3d Circuit), 107 Fed. 897, 47 C. C. A. 49; In re
Semmer Glass Co. (2d Circuit), 135 Fed. 77, 67 C. C. A. 551.
A careful consideration of the record constrains us to the
opinion that there was no fraud or collusion between the bank
and the bankrupt for the purpose of creating a preferential
transfer with respect to the deposit balance in question. It is
not, and could not be, contended that there was any collusion
in respect to creating this balance. If collusion existed, it must
be found in the agreement between the bank and the Mercantile .
Company that the deposit should remain in the bank during the
investigation of the solvency of the :Mercantile Company, and for
the purpose of permitting the bank to apply this balance upon
its notes in case the Mercantile Company should turn out to be
insolvent. This question must be answered in the light of existing conditions. · The suggestion that the balance be not drawn
upon came from the Mercantile Company's attorney, because he
thought such arrangement only fair to the bank as preventing
prejudice to it, through its failure to take action to protect its

644

644

AD.MINISTRATION

ADMINISTRATION

interests, including the possible repudiation of the credit as ob-

tained by misrepresentation. The Mercantile Company was at

the time actually insolvent. The bank had the power (as dis-

tinguished from the right) to refuse checks upon its deposit bal-

ance. If the Mercantile Company proved insolvent, or the credit

turned out to have been obtained by fraudulent misrepresenta-

tions, the bank had the right to so refuse. Such refusal would

naturally have tended to precipitate hostile action by the cred-

itors of the Mercantile Company, and when the condition of the

company was actually learned would naturally have brought

about bankruptcy proceedings. It was, to our minds, entirely

proper that the Mercantile Company should, in these circum-

stances, arrange for a continuance of the existing status, which,

should the Mercantile Company prove solvent, would be of bene-

fit to it, and, should it prove insolvent, would merely give the

bank the same rights as it would have if then existing insolvency

were recognized. The transaction in no sense amounted to a

hypothecation of this balance, as suggested by appellee's coun-

sel. The fact that the bank had reason to believe the Mercantile

Company was insolvent did not affect its right to set-off. In the

Massey Case a portion of the deposits held applicable by way of

set-off were made after the bank had knowledge of the debtor's
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insolvency. The testimony of the attorney of the Mercantile

Company, in our opinion, distinctly repels the inference of an

intent to give the bank a preference. We think the bank should

have been allowed to offset the deposit balance of February 5th

upon the bank's notes.

As to the balance of deposits made after February 5th:

If the bank held these deposits as trustee for the Mercantile

Company, the right to set off the same against the latter's notes

did not exist. Under the authority of Western Tie & Timber

Co. v. Brown, 196 U. S. 502, 25 Sup. Ct. "339, 49 L. ed. 571, the

bank was entitled to prove its debt with the set-off in question

eliminated, but remained a debtor to the bankrupt for the amount

of the deposits; and if such trust relation existed, the action

taken by the court in protection of the bankrupt's estate, with

respect to dividends on the bank's claim, in case of the latter's

failure to make payment of the trust fund, was proper, unless

as regards the award of execution for balance not covered by

dividends, as to which question we do not find it necessary to

express an opinion.

The alleged trust relation, including the conversion recognized

interests, including the pouible repudiation of the credit as obtained by misrepresentation. The Mercantile Company was a.t
the time actually insolvent. The bank had the power (as dis.tinguished from the right} to refuse checks upon its deposit balance. If the Mercantile Company proved insolvent, or the credit
turned out to have been obtained by fraudulent misrepresentations, the bank had the right to so refuse. Such refusal would
naturally have tended to precipitate hostile action by the creditors of the Mercantile C6mpany, and when the condition of the
company was actually learned would naturally have brought
about bankruptcy proceedings. It was, to our minds, entirely
proper that the Mercantile Company should, in these circumstances, arrange for a continuance of the existing status, which,
should the Mercantile Company prove solvent, would be of benefit to it, .and, should it prove insolvent, would merely give the
bank the same rights as it would have if then existing insolvency
were recognized. The transaction in no sense amounted to a
hypothccation of this balance, as suggested by appellee 's counsel. The fact that the bank had reason to believe the :Mercantile
Company was insolvent did not at!ect its right to set-off. In the
M'assey Case a portion of the deposits held applicable by way of
set-off were made after the bank had knowledge of the debtor's
insolvency. The testimony of the attorney of the .:\Ierca.ntile
Company, in our opinion, distinctly repels the inference of an
intent to give the bank a preference. We think the bank should
have been allowed to offset the deposit balance of February 5th
upon the bank's notes.
As to the balance of deposits made after February 5th :
If the bank held these deposits as trustee for the Mercantile
Company, the right to set off the same against the latter's notes
did not exist. Under the authority of Western Tie & Timber
Co. v. Brown, 196 U. S. 502, 25 Sup. Ct. '339, 49 L. ed. 571, the
bank was entitled to prove its debt with the set-off in question
eliminated, but remained a debtor to the bankrupt for the amount
of the deposits; and if such trust relation existed, the action
taken by the court in protection of the bankrupt's estate, with
respect to dividends on the bank's claim, in case of the latter's
failure to make payment of the trust f~d, was proper, unless
as regards the award of execution for balance not covered by
dividends, as to which question we do not find it necessary to
express an opinion.
The alleged trust relation, including the conversion recognized
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by the District Judge, rests upon the existence of an under-

standing between the bank and the Mercantile Company that

the latter should be at liberty to withdraw the entire amount

of its deposits made after February 5th, and that the bank should

not be at liberty to set off against the Mercantile Company's

notes any balance that should not be so drawn out, and that such

deposits were not made in the ordinary course of business, but

became in fact a special deposit. Upon a careful examination of

the record, we are constrained to hold that the evidence does not

warrant such conclusion. The referee has not found as a fact

that there was any agreement to that effect between the parties,

or even an understanding to that effect on the part of the bank.

As we read the record, there is no direct testimony of any ex-

press agreement or mutual understanding to that effect. There

is nothing in the testimony of the bank's attorney which, in our

opinion, warrants such inference. On the other hand, the attor-

ney for the Mercantile Company, while testifying to the state-

ment to the bank's attorney that he would see that the Mercantile

Company should not make withdrawals in excess of the new

deposits, does not state that the bank was even asked to agree

that all the new deposits might be checked against. The sub-

stance of the testimony of the Mercantile Company's attorney
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on this point is that he was anxious to have the banking rela-

tions continued without hostile steps upon the part of the bank,

and that in order to induce the latter to continue such relations

he agreed that the bank's status should not be impaired by

an attempt on the part of the Mercantile Company to with-

draw more than it should deposit. It is true that the Mercantile

Company's attorney testified that his "idea was that the propo-

sition was that the Block Mercantile Company should be abso-

lutely free to withdraw every cent that it deposited after that

date," and that "if there had been any scheme on the part of

the bank, or anything that would have kept us from using the

money during this investigation, I would have had to make some

other arrangement and found another place to deposit," and

that if he had understood in his own mind that his clients could

not withdraw against subsequent deposits he would not have ad-

vised them to make their deposits in the same bank. To the

definite question as to the bank's acceptance or rejection of

the suggestion he replied:

"I want to say this: That Mr. Hirsh [the bank's attorney]

was pressing me for information which I did not have, and I was

by the District Judge, rests upon the existence of an understamling between the bank and the l\Iereantile Company that
the latter should be at liberty to withdraw the entire amount
of its deposits made after February 5th, and that the bank should
not be at liberty to set off against the Mercantile Company's
notes any balance that should not be so drawn out, and that such
deposits were not made in. the ordinary course of business, but
became in fact a special deposit. Upon a careful examination of
the record, we are constrained to hold that the evidence does not
warrant such conclusion. The referee has not found as a fact
that there was any agreement to that effect between the parties,
or even an understanding to that effect on the part of the bank.
As we read the record, there is no direct testimony of any express agreement or mutual understanding to that effect. There
is nothing in the testimony of the bank's attorney which, in our
opinion, warrants such inference. On the other hand, the attorney for the l\Iercantile Company, while testifying to the statement to the bank's attorney that he would see that the Mercantile
Company should not make withdrawals in excess of the new
deposits, does not state that the bank was even asked to agree
that all the new deposits might be checked against. The substance of the testimony of the Mercantile Company's atton1ey
on this point is that he was anxious to have the banking relations continued without hostile steps upon the part of the bank,
and that in order to induce the latter to continue such relations
he agreed that the bank's status should not be impaired by
an attempt on the part of the Mercantile Company to with<lraw more than it should deposit. It is true that the Mercantile
Company's attorney testified that his ''idea was that the proposition was that the Block Mercantile Company should be absolutely free to withdraw every cent that it deposited after that
date," and that "if there had been any scheme on the part of
the bank, or anything that would have kept us from using the
money during this investigation, I would have had to make some
other arrangement and found another place to deposit," and
that if he had understood in his own mind that his clients could
not withdraw against subsequent deposits he would not have ad·vised them to make their deposits in the same bank. To the
definite question as to the bank's acceptance or rejection of
the suggestion he replied :
''I want to say this: That Mr. Hirsh [the bank's attorney]
was pressing me for information which I did not have, and I was
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holding him up until I could get it, so it looked to me like a

fair proposition. Now, as to whether that was accepted or re-

jected, in this way it must have been that I thought it was going

to go through. I mean by that certainly I would be permitted

to withdraw against deposits, or I never would have done it."

And again:

'' I have stated repeatedly in this examination that I could not

remember what answer that Mr. Hirsh made to my suggestion,

as to continuing present deposits intact and the subsequent de-

posits to be withdrawn.''

This testimony, in our opinion, falls short of evidencing a con-

tract or understanding whereby the Mercantile Company should,

under any and all circumstances, have the right to draw out all

the new deposits, or whereby the new deposits should be held

in any way as a special deposit differing from the ordinary bank

deposit. The attorney of the Mercantile Company seems not

unnaturally to have assumed that so long as the Mercantile

Company was continuing to do business in the usual way, and in

advance of a development of its insolvency, checks on the bank

account would be honored. But we find no agreement or mutual

understanding to that effect. Such course was in fact taken; for

it was not until after the accounting of the Mercantile Company's
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affairs was completed, showing that its financial condition was

much worse than believed by its attorney on February 5th, and

suggesting probable insolvency, and indicating that a portion

at least of the credit extended to the Mercantile Company was

procured by false representations, that the bank refused to honor

further checks. In our opinion there was, to say the least, no

room for finding an understanding between the bank and the

bankrupt that the bank waived its right of set off on account of

any balance that might remain after such situation was found

to exist. Nor do we think that the fact that the bankrupt's busi-

ness was during the examination of its affairs being managed by

subordinates, rather than by its usual officers, changed the nature

of the deposits from the ordinary relation. • • •

It follows, from the views we have expressed, that the order of

the District Court should bo. reversed, with directions to allow

the balance claimed in full after the application thereon, by way

of set-off, of the entire amount of bankrupt's deposit balance in

the bank.""

27—See Heyman v. Third Nat

Bank, 216 Fed. 685.

holding him up until I could get it, so it looked to me like a
fair proposition. Now, as to whether that was accepted or rejected, in this way it must have been that I thought it was going
to go through. I mean 'b y that certainly I would be permitted
to withdraw against deposits, or I never would have done it."
And again:
"I have stated repeatedly in this examination that I could not
remember what answer that Mr. Hirsh made to my suggestion,
as to continuing present deposits intact and the subsequent deposits to be withdrawn.''
This testimony, in our opinion, falls short of evidencing a COD·
tract or understanding whereby the Mercantile Company should,
under ~ny and all circumstances, have the right to draw out all
the new deposits, or whereby the new deposits should be held
in any way as a special deposit differing from the ordinary bank
deposit. The attorney of the Mercantile Company seems not
unnaturally to have assumed that so long as the Mercantile
Company was continuing to do business in the usual way, and in
advance of a development of its insolvency, checka on the bank
account would be honor<>d. But we find no agreement or mutual
understanding to that effect. Such course was in fact taken; for
it was not until after the accounting of the Mercantile Company's
affairs was completed, showing that its financial condition waa
much worse th.an believed by its attorney on February 5th, and
sug1iiesting probable insolvency, and indicating that a portion
at least of the credit extended to the Mercantile Company wu
procured by false representations, that the bank refused to honor
further checks. In our opinion there was, to say the least, DO
room for finding an understanding between the bank and the
bankrupt that the -bank waived its right of set off on account of
any balance that might remain after such situation was found
to exist. Nor do we think that the fact that the bankrupt's business was during the examination of its affairs being managed by
subordinates, rather than by its usual officers, changed the natUl'e
of the deposits from the ordinary relation. • • •
It follows, from the views we have expressed, that the order of
the District Court should L~ reversed, with directions to allow
the balance claimed in full after the application thereon, by way
of set-off, of the entire amount of bankrupt's deposit balance in
the bank. I I 27
27-See Heyman v. Third Nat.
Bank, 216 Fed. 68~.
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CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO. v. HALL

229 U. S. 511, 57 L. ed. 1306, 33 Sup. Ct. 885

EXEMPTIONS

[See this case given on page 497, ante.]

In re COHN

CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO. v. HALL

171 Fed. 568

(District Court, D. North Dakota, S. E. D. July 28, 1909)

229 U. S. 511, 57 L. ed. 1306, 33 Sup. Ct. 885

AMIDON, District Judge. The above bankrupt filed his vol-

untary petition in bankruptcy on the 5th day of December, 1908.

[See this case given on page 497, ante.]

About the 1st of July, 1908, he made final proof upon a govern-

ment homestead, and received his final receipt entitling him to

a patent therefor. All debts scheduled by the bankrupt were

incurred prior to the date of his making such final proof. In his

In re COHN

schedules he claimed the homestead as exempt both under the

laws of North Dakota and under § 2296 of the Revised Statutes

lTI Fed. 568

of the United States (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1398). The trus-

tee set the land off to him as his homestead, under the state

laws. One of his creditors filed exceptions before the referee

(District Court, D. North Dakota, S. E. D. July 28, 1909)

to this action of the trustee, and asked that an order be entered

denying the bankrupt's right to the land as a homestead, and

directing the trustee to take possession of the same and apply it
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to the satisfaction of the bankrupt's debts. This question was

fully presented before the referee, by counsel for the respective

parties, upon voluminous testimony. As the result of such hear-

ing, the referee found that the bankrupt prior to the time of the

filing of his petition in bankruptcy had removed from the state

of North Dakota, in which the homestead is situated, and taken

up his residence in the city of Minneapolis, in the state of Min-

nesota, and that he had thereby abandoned his homestead as an

exemption under the laws of the state of North Dakota, and lost

all right to claim the same as exempt under those laws; but the

referee further held that the homestead was exempt from the

claims of all creditors whose indebtedness was incurred prior to

the date of the making of final proof, and entered an order so

AMIDON, District Judge. The above bankrupt filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy on the 5th day of December, 1908.
About the 1st of July, 1908, he made final proof upon a government homestead, and received his final receipt entitling him to
a patent therefor. All debts scheduled by the bankrupt were
incurred prior to the date of his making such final proof. In his
schedules he claimed the homestead as exempt both under· the
laws of North Dakota and under § 2296 of the Revised Statutes
of the United States (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1398). The trustee set the land off to him as his homestead, under the state
laws. One of his creditors filed exceptions before the referee
to this action of the trustee, and asked that an order be entered
denying the bankrupt's right to the land as a homestead, and
directing the trustee to take possession of the same and apply it
to the satisfaction of the bankrupt's debts. This question was
fully presented before the referee, by counsel for the respective
parties, upon voluminous testimony. As the result of such hearing, the referee found that the bankrupt prior to the time of the
filing of his petition in bankruptcy had removed from the state
of North Dakota, in which the homestead is situated, and taken
up his residence in the city of :Minneapolis, in the state of Minnesot.a, and that he had thereby abandoned his homestead as an
exemption under the laws of the state of North Dakota, and lost
all right to claim the same as exempt under those laws; but the
referee further held that the homestead was exempt from the
claims of all creditors whose indebtedness was incurred prior to
the date of the making of final proof, and ent.ered an order so
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declaring, and directing that the homestead be applied only to

the payment of those debts, properly proven, which had arisen

since the bankrupt made final proof for his homestead. A cred-

itor whose claim accrued prior to the making of such final proof

excepted to this order of the referee, and at his request the order

has been certified to the court for review.

The bankrupt has filed no exceptions to the order of the ref-

eree, and cannot therefore be heard to object to any of its pro-

visions. If this were not the case, it is quite likely that he would

have just cause to complain of the order because it limits his

exemption from debts to those which accrued prior to the mak-

ing of his final proof; whereas, § 2296 of the Revised Statutes

declares that the homestead shall not'' in any event become liable

to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the issuing of

the patent therefor.'' There is no evidence presented here show-

"ing that any patent has ever been issued. It is the issuance of

the patent which fixes the time when the property shall become

liable to subsequent debts of the homesteader. Barnard v. Boiler,

105 Cal. 214, 38 Pac. 728; Wallowa National Bank v. Riley, 29

Or. 289, 45 Pac. 766, 54 Am. St. Rep. 794.

Qounsel for the objecting creditor contends that § 2296 of the

Revised Statutes is repealed by §§6 and 70, subd. 5, of the
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bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 548, 565 [U.

S. Comp St. 1901, pp. 3424, 3451]). § 6 simply provides that

the bankruptcy act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of

the exemptions which are prescribed by state laws. Plainly this

section deals solely with state laws. It is declarator}- in its

character. Its purpose is to save exemptions allowed by state

laws, not to abolish those allowed by federal law. Its language is

affirmative, and ought not to be given a negative effect, in the

absence of a clear manifestation of such a legislative purpose.

Potter's Dwarris, 69. § 70 declares that the trustee shall be

vested with the title of the bankrupt (except property which is

exempt), to all "(5) property which prior to the filing of the

petition he could by any means have transferred, or which

might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process

against him." The land in question does not come within the

provisions of either branch of this section. Down to the time

of final proof, the entryman could not transfer his homestead.

S § 2288 and 2291, Rev. St. (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 1385,

1390). Nor could any of the creditors whose claims have been

proven have levied upon or sold the homestead for the collec-

declaring, and directing that the homestead be applied only to
the payment of those debts, properly proven, which had arisen
since the bankrupt made final proof for his homestead. A creditor whose claim accrued prior to the making of such final proof
excepted to this order of the referee, and at his request the order
has been certified to the court for review.
The bankrupt has filed no exceptions to the order of the re!eree, and cannot therefore be heard to object to any of its provisions. If this were not the case, it is quite likely that he would
have just cause to complain of the order because it limits bis
exemption from debts to those which accrued prior to the making of his final proof; whereas, § 2296 of the Revised Statutes
declares that the homestead shall not ''in any event become liable
to the satisfaction of any debt c<>ntracted prior to the issuing of
the patent therefor.'' There is no evidence presented here show"ing that any patent has ever been issued. It is the issuance of
the patent which fixes the time when the property shall become
liable to subsequent debts of the homesteader. Barnard v. Boller,
105 Cal. 214, 38 Pac. 728; Wallowa National Bank v. Riley, 29
Or. 289, 45 Pac. 766, 54 Arn. St. Rep. 794.
C.ounsel for the objecting creditor contends that § 2296 of the
Revised Statutes is repealed by §§ 6 and 70, subd. 5, of the
bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 548, 565 [U.
S. Comp St. 1901, pp. 3424, 3451] ) . § 6 simply provides th11t
the bankruptcy act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of
the exemptions which are prescribed by state laws. Plainly this
section deals solely with state laws. It is declaratory in its
character. Its purpose is to save exemptions allowed by state
laws, not to abolish those allowed by federal law. Its language is
affirmative, and ought not to be given a negative effect, in the
absence of a clear manifestation of such a legislative purpose.
Potter's Dwarris, 69. § 70 declares that the trustee shall be
vested with the title of the bankrupt (except property which is
exempt), to all "(5) property which prior to the filing of the
petiµon he could by any means have transferred, or which
might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process
against him." The land in question does not come within the
provisions of either branch of this section. Down to the time
of final proof, the entryman could not transfer his homestead.
~§ 2288 and 2291, Rev. St. (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 1385,
1390). Nor could any of the creditors whose claims have been
proven have levied upon or sold the homestead for the collec-

EXEMPTIONS

649

EXEMPTIONS

641)

tion of their debts. Such action is clearly forbidden by § 2296

of the Revised Statutes. Seymour v. Sanders, Fed. Cas. No.

12,690; Baldwin v. Boyd, 18 Neb. 444, 25 N. W. 580; Shoemaker

v. Stimson, 16 Wash. 1, 47 Pac. 218; Jean v. Dee, 5 Wash. 580,

32 Pac. 460; Brown v. Kennedy, 12 Colo. 235, 20 Pac. 696. There

is certainly no such inconsistency between the bankruptcy act

and § 2296 of the Revised Statutes as would sustain a repeal of

§ 2296 by implication. Great Northern Railway Co. v. United

States, 155 Fed. 945, 961, 84 C. C. A. 93, and cases there cited.

In some of the cases there are general remarks to the effect

that the state law establishes the rule of exemption under the

bankruptcy act, and that only such exemptions in value and

kind as those laws permit can be claimed by the bankrupt. Steele

v. Buel, 104 Fed. 968, 44 C C. A. 287; In re Manning (D. C.)

112 Fed. 948; In re Wunder (D. C.) 133 Fed. 821. The question

before the court in these cases, however, was whether a specific

piece of property came rightfully within the terms of the state

law granting exemptions. In none of them was the question

raised whether a bankrupt was entitled to the protection of the

few federal laws granting to him special rights as against his

creditors. The question here presented therefore must be de-

termined, not upon such general observations as are found in
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these cases, but upon the provisions of the statutes themselves.

For example, Rev. St. U. S. § 1628 (U. S. Comp. St . 1901, p.

1122), declares that military uniforms, arms, and equipments

shall be exempt from all judicial process These articles are

not exempt under many of the state laws. Could it be reason-

ably contended that such articles pass to the trustee in bank-

ruptcy because they are not covered by state exemption laws?

I think not. The cardinal principle of the bankruptcy act is to

grant to creditors only those rights which would have been theirs

if bankruptcy had not supervened, and to save to the bankrupt

and his family every right and exemption which would have been

theirs as against creditors enforcing their claims by ordinary

judicial process. Thomas v. Woods, 170 Fed. . This prin-

ciple should not be departed from except in obedience to a com-

mand of the statute which is altogether clear. Such feeble in-

consistencies as are here brought to the notice of the court would

afford no justification for such action.

The decision of the referee must be affirmed, and it is so

ordered.

tion of their debt.a. Such action is clearly forbidden by § 2296
of the Revised Statutes. Seymour v. Sanders, Fed. Cas. No.
12,690; Baldwin v. Boyd, 18 Neb. 444, 25 N. W. 580; Shoemaker
v. Stimson, 16 Wash. 1, 47 Pac. 218; Jean v. Dee, 5 Wash. 580,
32 Pac. 460; Brown v. Kennedy, 12 Colo. 235, 20 Pac. 696. There
is certainly no such inconsistency between the bankruptcy net
and § 2296 of the Revised Statutes as would sustain a repeal of
§ 2296 by implication. Great Northern Railway Co. v. United
States, 155 Fed. 945, 961, 84 C. C. A. 93, and cases there cited.
In some of the cases there are general remarks to the effect
that the state law establishes the rule of exemption under the
bankruptcy act, and that only such exemptions in value and
kind as those laws permit can be claimed by the bankrupt. Steele
v. Buel, 104 Fed. 968, 44 C. C. A. 287; In re Manning (D. C.)
112 Fed. 948; In re Wunder (D. C.) 133 Fed. 821. The question
before the court in these cases, however, was whether a specific
piece of property came rightfully within the terms of the state
law granting exemptions. In none of them was the question
raised whether a bankrupt was entitled to the protection of the
few federal laws granting to him special rights as against his
creditors. The question here presented therefore must be determined, not upon such general observations as are found in
these cases, but upon the provisions of the statutes themselves.
For example, Rev. St. U. S. § 1628 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p.
1122), declares that military uniforms, arms, and equipments
shall be exempt from all judicial process These articles are
not exempt under many of the state laws. Could it be reasonably contended that such articles pass to the trustee in bankruptcy because they are not covered by state exemption laws T
I think not. The cardinal principle of the bankruptcy act is to
grant to creditors only those righU! which would have been theirs
if bankruptcy had not supervened, and to save to the bankrupt
and his family every right and exemption which would have been
theirs as against creditors enforcing their claims by ordinary
judicial process. Thomas v. Woods, 170 Fed. - - . This principle should not be departed from except in obedience to a command of the statute which is altogether clear. Such feeble inconsistencies as are here brought to the notice of the court would
afford no justification for such action.
The decision of the referee must be affirmed, and it is so
ordered.
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In re BAKER

In re BAKER

182 Fed. 392, 104 C. C. A. 602

182 Fed. 392, 104 C. C. A. 602

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. May 3, 1910)

WARRINGTON, Circuit Judge. This is a proceeding to re-

vise in matter of law a judgment denying to the petitioner a

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. May 3, 1910)

homestead exemption in certain real estate. The petitioner was

adjudged a bankrupt under voluntary proceedings begun July

31, 1908. He presented with his petition and schedules his claim

to the exemption under § 1702, Ky. St. (Russell's St. §4661).

His real estate consisted of an undivided one-fifth interest in

three parcels of land, which descended to him upon the death

of his brother in June, 1908. The lands were neither improved

nor susceptible of partition; and the trustee in bankruptcy, un-

der order of the referee made in November, 1908, sold the in-

terest of the bankrupt in the lands for $926, and set apart the

whole of the proceeds of sale to the bankrupt as exempt in lieu

of his claim to a homestead. Prior to the bankruptcy proceed-

ings some of the petitioner's creditors, whose claims antedated

the inheritance, commenced suits in attachment and otherwise

to subject the land to the payment of these debts. These cred-

itors objected to any allowance of a homestead, and the order

of the referee was set aside by the court below.
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In view of Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 548

(U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3424), the validity of the action of

the trustee in setting apart the bankrupt's exemption and the

rights of the bankrupt in that behalf are to be tested by the law

of Kentucky. The federal courts are accustomed in such cases

to follow the decisions of the court of last resort of the state

whose laws are so drawn in question. In speaking of the Consti-

tution and statutes of Texas respecting homestead exemptions in

a proceeding like the present one in Duncan v. Ferguson-Mc-

Kinney Dry Goods Co., 150 Fed. 269, 271, 80 C. C A. 157, 159,

Circuit Judge Shelby said:

'' It has been the policy of the state of Texas in its Constitu-

tion and legislation, as construed by the decisions of its Su-

preme Court, to favor by liberal interpretations the exemptions

in favor of debtors. These decisions, construing the state Con-

stitution and statutes, are as binding on this court as the Con-

stitution and statutes themselves."

See, also, McCarty v. Coffin, 150 Fed. 307, 310, 80 C. C. A

WARRINGTON, Circuit Judge. This is a proceeding to re·
vise in matter of law a judgment denying to the petitioner a
homestead exemption in certain real estate. The petitioner was
adjudged a bankrupt under voluntary proceedings begun Jul~·
31, 1908. He presented with his petition and schedules his claim
to the exemption under §1702, Ky. St. (Russell's St. §46611.
His real estate consisted of an undivided one-fifth intereRt i11
three parcels of land, which descended to him upon the death
of his brother in June, 1908. The lands were neither improved
nor susceptible of partition; and the trustee in bankruptcy, un·
der order of the referee made in November, 1908, sold the interest of the bankrupt in the lands for $926, and set apart the
whole of the proceeds of sale t.o the bankrupt as exempt in lieu
of his claim to a homestead. Prior to the bankruptcy proceedings some of the petitioner's creditors, whose claims antedated
the inheritance, commenced suits in attachment and otherwise
to subject the land to the payment of these debts. These cred·
itors objected to any allowance of a homestead, and the order
of the referee was set aside by the court below.
In view of Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 548
(U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3424), the validity of the action of
the trustee in setting apart the bankrupt's exemption and the
rights of the bankrupt in that behalf are to be tested by the law
of Kentucky. The federal courts are accustomed in such c8.S('S
to follow the decisions of the court of last resort of the state
whose laws are so drawn in question. In speaking of the Constitution and statutes of Texas respecting homestead exemptions in
a proceeding like the present one in Duncan v. Ferguson-McKinney Dry Goods Co., 150 Fed. 269, 271, 80 C. C. A. 157, 159,
Circuit Judge Shelby said:
"It has been the policy of the state of Texas in its Constitu·
tion and legislation, as const'rued by the decisions of its Su·
preme Court, to favor by liberal interpretations the exemptions
in favor of debtors. These decisions, construing the state Constitution and statutes, are as binding on this court as the Constitution and statutes themselves."
See, also, McCarty v. Coffin, 150 Fed. 307, 310, 80 C. C. A.
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195; In re Wood (D. C.) 147 Fed. 877, 878; Huenergardt v.

Brittain Dry Goods Co., 116 Fed. 31, 33, 53 C. C. A. 505; In re

Irvin, 120 Fed. 733, 734, 57 C. C. A. 147; In re Meriwether

(D. C.) 107 Fed. 102; In re Pope (D. C) 98 Fed. 722; Loveland

on Bankruptcy (3d ed.) § 177, p. 514.

Since the federal courts cannot administer or distribute ex-

empted property as an asset of the bankrupt's estate, or do more

than to set it apart to the bankrupt (Lockwood v. Exchange

Bank, 190 U. S. 294, 23 Sup. Ct. 751, 47 L. ed. 1061), this prac-

tice of the courts would seem to be in accord with the course

pursued by Mr. Justice Gray respecting a dower right under

the bankruptcy act of 1867 (Act March 2, 1867, c. 176, 14 Stat.

517) in Porter v. Lazear, 109 U. S. 84, 3 Sup. Ct. 58, 27 L. ed.

865. See, also, In re Petition of Carrie E. Hays (decided by this

court March 8, 1910) 181 Fed. 674.

The court below in terms recognized the binding effect in such

matters of decisions of courts of last resort of the states in which

the questions arise; but, as we understand his opinion the learned

judge did not think any rule of decision on the present issue

was settled in Kentucky. He said:

"At the outset I would emphasize that the homestead ex-

emption is purely statutory. It is created by statute, and it
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exists only as it is so created. The courts cannot adjudge that

to be such an exemption which is not such by the terms of the

statute according to their intent and meaning. They are con-

cerned solely with determining what that true intent and mean-

ing is. This court, however, is not entirely free to do this. It

is limited by any construction of the statute put forth by the

Kentucky Court of Appeals, at least if it clearly appears that

such is its construction, and there is no reason to think that in

any future case it will not adhere thereto. I recognize fully

this restriction upon me, and have no disposition to go beyond

it. But the proper standpoint from which to view any particu-

lar construction of the statute by that court, and to determine

accurately just what it is, is one's own construction. I will there-

fore at the first undertake for myself to ascertain the statute's

true intent and meaning."

We of course agree that where the decisions of the State

Court are in conflict, and point to no definite rule touching the

construction of a statute of the state, the federal courts are

quite as much at liberty to place their own construction upon

the statute as they would be if the State Court had not con-

195; In re Wood (D. C.) 147 Fed. 877, 878; Huenergardt v.
Brittain Dry Goods Co., 116 Fed. 31, 33, 53 C. C. A. 505; In re
irvin, 120 Fed. 733, 734, 57 C. C. A. 147; In re Meriwether
(D. C.) 107 Fed. 102; In re Pope (D. C.) 98 Fed. 722; Loveland
on Bankruptcy (3d ed.) § 177, p. 514.
Since the federal courts cannot administer or distribute exempted property as an asset of the bankrupt's estate, or do more
than to set it apart to the bankrupt (Lockwood v. Exchange
Bank, .190 U. S. 294, 23 Sup. Ct. 751, 47 L. ed. 1061), this practice of the courts would seem to be in accord with the course
pursued by Mr. Justice Gray respecting a dower right under
the bankruptcy act of 1867 (Act March 2, 1867, c. 176, 14 Stat.
517) in Porter v. Lazear, 109 U. S. 84, 3 Sup. Ct. 58, 27 L. ed.
865. See, also, In re Petition of Carrie E. Hays (decided by this
court March 8, 1910) 181 Fed. 674.
The court below in terms recognized the binding effect in such
matters of decisions of courts of last resort of the states in which
the questions arise; but, as we understand his opinion the learned
judge did not think any rule of decision on the present issue
was settled in Kentucky. He said:
"At the outset I would emphasize that the homestead exemption is purely statutory. It is created by statute,_ and it
exists only as it is so created. The courts cannot adjudge that
to be such an exemption which is not such by the terms of the
statute according to their intent and meaning. They are concerned solely with determining what that true intent and meaning is. This court, however, is not entirely free to do this. It
is limited by any construction of the statute put forth by the
Kentucky Court of Appeals, at least if it clearly appears that
such is its construction, and there is no reason to think that in
any future case it will u.ot adhere thereto. I recognize fully
this restriction upon me, and have no disposition to go beyond
it. But the proper standpoint from which to view any particular construction of the statute by that court, and to determine
accurately just what it is, is one's own construction. I will therefore at the first undertake for myself to ascertain the statute's
true intent and meaning."
We of course agree that where the decisionB of the State
Court are in conflict, and point to no definite rule touching the
construction of a statute of the state, the federal courts are
quite as much at liberty to place their own construction upon
the statute as they would be if the State Court had not con-
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strued it at all. But if there be a rule of decision which is

reasonably clear with respect to a given statute, we think the

federal courts are bound in a case like this to follow the rule,

rather than to undertake to determine upon their own interpre-

tation whether the State Court may not change the rule in the

future. The statute in question provides that:

"• • • there shall, on all debts or liabilities • • • be

exempt from sale under execution, attachment or judgment, ex-

cept to foreclose a mortgage given by the owner of a homestead,

or for purchase money due therefor, so much land including the

dwelling house and the appurtenances owned by debtors, who are

actual bona fide housekeepers with a family, resident in this

commonwealth, as shall not exceed in value one thousand dol-

lars; but this exemption shall not apply to sales under execution,

attachment or judgment, if the debt or liability existed prior to

the purchase of the land, or of the erection of the improvements

thereon.''

It is further provided in substance by § 1705 that where real

estate—

"in the opinion of the appraisers, is of greater value than one

thousand dollars, and not divisible without great diminution of

its value, then the same shall be sold, • • • and one thou-

sand dollars of the money * • • shall be paid to the defend-
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ant to enable him to purchase another homestead."

• mm

We do not feel called upon to comment on all the distinctions

urged by learned counsel to exist between a number of the deci-

sions cited in this opinion, and between some of them and others

cited in their brief. Enough has been adduced to show what

we conceive to be the plain trend of decision of the Court of

Appeals, and also why we regard those decisions as controlling

in the present case.

The judgment of the court below is reversed, with direction

that the order of the referee be affirmed, with costs.

strued it at all. But if there be a rule of decision which is
reasonably clear with respect to a given statute, we think the
federal courts are bound in a case like this to follow the rule.
rather than to undertake to determine upon their own intcrpreta tion whether the State Court may not change the rule in the
future. The statute in question provides that:
'' • • • there shall, on all debts or liabilities • • • be
exP.mpt from sale under execution, attachment or judgment, except to foreclose a mortgage given by the owner of a homestead,
or for purchase money due therefor, so much land including the
dwelling house and the appurtenances owned by debtors, who are
actual bona fide housekeepers with a family, resident in this
commonwealth, as shall not exceed in value one thousand dollars; but this exemption shall not apply to sales under execution,
attachment or judgment, if the debt or liability existed prior to
the purchase of the land, or of the erection of the improvements
thereon.''
It is further provided in substance by § 1705 that where real
estate''in the opinion of the appraisers, is of greater value than one
thousand dollars, and not divisible without great diminution of
its value, then the same shall be sold, • • • and one thousand dollars of the money • • • shall be paid to the defendant to enable him to purchase another homestead."

• • •

We do not feel called upon to comment on all the distinctions
urged by learned counsel to exist between a number of the deci·
sions cited in this opinion, and between some of them and others
cited in their brief. Enough has been adduced to show what
we conceive to be the plain trend of decision of the Court of
Appeals, and also why we regard those decisions as controlling
in the present case.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, with direction
that the order of the referee be affirmed, with costs.

CHAPTER IV

COMPOSITIONS

ZAVELO v. REEVES

227 U. S. 625, 57 L. ed. 676, 33 Sup. Ct. 365

[See this case given on page 391, ante.]

In re HOXIE et al.

180 Fed. 508

CHAPTER IV

(District Court, D. Maine. July 2, 1910)

HALE, District Judge. The bankrupts were duly adjudicated

on the 15th day of March, 1910, upon an involuntary petition

filed February 26, 1910. At the first meeting of creditors, claims

of 44 creditors, amounting to $9,146.59, were filed. Claims of

COMPOSITIONS
ZAVELO v. REEVES

certain other creditors, duly scheduled, have not yet been pre-

sented for allowance. Appraisers have been appointed, and have

227 U. S. 625, 57 L. ed. 676, 33 Sup. Ct. 365

filed their report, showing the value of the assets of the bankrupts

to be: Real estate, $5,300, which is under mortgage for more

[See this case given on page 391, ante.]

than that amount; personal property, $4,481.95. The appraisers

report that the basis of their valuation is partly at cost price and

partly at possible selling value. After the bankrupts filed their

In re HOXIE et al.

schedule and were examined they offered a composition at the

rate of 15 per cent. A majority in number of all the creditors

180 Fed. 508

whose claims have been allowed, namely, 29 creditors, represent-

ing $5,362.06, have accepted in writing the offer of composition.

(District Court, D. Maine. July 2, 1910)

The referee reports the above facts. He recommends that the
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composition will be for the best interests of the creditors; that it

is made in good faith, and not procured by any means, promises,

or acts prohibited by the bankrupt law; and that the bankrupts

have not been guilty of any act, or of any failure in duty, which

would be a bar to their discharge. He also assigns certain rea-

sons which have influenced him in coming to his conclusion.

It is provided by § 12<Z of the bankruptcy act of 1898 (Act

July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 550 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3427])

that the judge shall confirm a composition if satisfied (1) that

653

HALE, District Judge. The bankrupts were duly adjudicated
on the 15th day of March, 1910, upon an involuntary petition
filed February 26, 1910. At the first meeting of creditors, claims
of 44 creditors, amounting to $9,146.59, were filed. Claims of
certain other creditors, duly scheduled, have not yet been presented for allowance. Appraisers have been appointed, and have
filed their report, showing the value of the assets of the bankrupts
to be: Real estate, $5,300, which is under mortgage for more
than that amount; personal property, $4,481.95. The appraisers
report that the basis of their valuation is partly at cost price and
partly at possible selling value. After the bankrupts filed their
schedule and were examined they offered a composition at the
rate of 15 per cent. A majority in number of all the creditors
whose claims have been allowed, namely, 29 creditors, representing $5,362.06, have accepted in writing the offer of composition.
The referee reports the above facts. He recommends that the
composition will be for the best interests of the creditors; that it
is made in good faith, and not procured by any means, promises,
or acts prohibited by the bankrupt law; and that the bankrupts
have not been guilty of any act, or of any failure in duty, which
would be a bar to their discharge. He also assigns certain reasons which have influenced him in coming to his conclusion.
It is provided by § 12d of the bankn1ptcy act of 1898 (Act
July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 550 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3427])
that the judge shall confirm a composition if satisfied (1) that
653

COMPOSITIONS

654

COMPOSITIONS

it is for the best interests of the creditors. There being no

question of the bankrupts having been guilty of any act or of

any failure in duty which would be a bar to their discharge, and

the offer and acceptance having been in good faith, the single

question before the court is whether or not the confirmation of

the composition is for the best interests of all the creditors.

The English rule appears to be that the approval of the major-

ity of the creditors to the offer is final. Under our statute such

approval is evidence, prima facie, that the composition is for the

best interests of the creditors; and the burden is upon those who

attack the composition. The same rule prevailed under the bank-

ruptcy act of 1867 (Act March 2, 1867, c. 176, 14 Stat . 517). In

Ex parte Jewett, 2 Low. 393, Fed. Cas. No. 7,303, Judge Lowell

said:

"In the absence of fraud and concealment, the question for

the court seems to be, not whether the debtor might have offered

more, but whether his estate would pay more in bankruptcy."

Substantially the same issue is before the court under the pres-

ent act. Adler v. Jones, 109 Fed. 967, 48 C. C. A. 761; Adler v.

Hammond, 104 Fed. 862, 44 C. C. A. 229; In re Waynesboro

Drug Co. (D. C.) 157 Fed. 101.

Certain creditors object to the confirmation of the composi-

tion, and file specifications of objections. The examination of the
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bankrupts, and all papers relating to the estate, are before me.

It is for the court to determine whether the nonassenting cred-

itors have met the burden of showing that the offer of composi-

tion is inadequate, and that a substantially larger sum may rea-

sonably be expected to result from the administration of the as-

sets under the regular course, of bankruptcy proceedings. A sum

less than $1,500 is required to carry out the offer of composition.

The appraisal shows assets amounting to about $4,500. The

learned counsel for the bankrupts urge that the evidence shows

the appraisal to be largely in excess of the available value of the

property. It is not necessary to discuss in detail the different

views taken by counsel touching this matter, or the testimony

to it. It is in evidence that since the adjudication the business

of the bankrupt firm continues to be carried on, and that many

of the creditors who have accepted the offer continue to supply

the bankrupts with goods, and to do business with them. It

is urged that they are willing to accept the offer for the reason

that their profits in future from the conduct of the business will

fully repay them for their losses in bankruptcy. I do not esteem

it is for the best interests of the creditors. There being no
question of the bankrupts having been guilty of any act or of
any failure in duty which would be a bar to their discharge. and
the offer and acceptance having been in good faith, the single
question before the court is whether or not the confirmation of
the composition is for the best interests of all the creditors.
The English rule appears to be that the approval of the majority of the creditors to the offer is final. Under our statute such
approval is evidence, prima facie, that the composition is for the
best interests of the creditors; and the burden is upon those who
attack the composition. The same rule prevailed under the bankruptcy act of 1867 (Act March 2, 1867, c. 176, 14 Stat. 517) . In
Ex pe.rte Jewett, 2 Low. 393, Fed. Cas. No. 7,303, Judge Lowell
B&id:

''In the absence of fraud and concealment, the question for
the court seems to be, not whether the debtor might have offered
more, but whether his estate would pay more in bankruptcy. ' '
Substantially the same issue is before the court under the present act. Adler v. Jones, 109 Fed. 967, 48 C. C. A . 761; Adler v.
Hammond, 104 Fed. 862, 44 C. C. A. 229; In re Waynesboro
Drug Co. (D. C.) 157 Fed. 101.
Certain creditors object to the confirmation of the composition, and file specifications of objections. The examination of the
bankrupts, and all papers relating to the estate, are before me.
It is for the court to determine whether the nonassenting creditors have met the burden of showing that the offer of composition is inadequate, and that a substantially larger sum may reasonably be expected to result from the administration of the aasets under the regular coul'86. of bankruptcy proceedings. A sum
less than $1,500 is required to carry out the offer of composition.
The appmisal shows assets amounting to about $4,500. The
learned counsel for the bankrupts urge th.at the evidence shows
the appraisal to be largely in excess of the available value of the
property. It is not necessary to discuss in detail the di1ferent
views taken by counsel touching this matter, or the testimony
to it. It is in evidence that since the adjudication the business
of the bankrupt firm continues to be carried on, and that many
of the creditors who have accepted the offer continue to supply
the bankrupts with goods, and to do busine.ss with them. It
is urged that they are willing to accept the offer for the reason
that their profits in future from the conduct of the business will
fully repay them for their losaes in bankruptcy. I do not esteem
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it to be my duty to discuss the evidence in detail, or to decide
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what induced the assenting creditors to assent. The bankruptcy

law does not make their decision conclusive, but only prima facie.

Their assent does not relieve the court from passing on the ques-

tion whether the composition is for the best interests of all

the creditors. This question is addressed to the judicial discre-

tion of the court, and from its conclusion either party may

appeal. Adler v. Hammond, supra.

Upon a careful review of the examination of the bankrupts,

the schedules, and all the evidence before me, I cannot avoid

the conclusion that the nonassenting creditors have met the bur-

den of showing that the acceptance of the composition will not

be for the best interests of all the creditors. The whole testimony

leads me to the conclusion that the assets should produce nearly

double the offer of 15 per cent. It is with hesitation that I

come to a conclusion opposed to that of the painstaking and com-

petent referee, who assigns some very good reasons for coming

to his conclusions. Some of the reasons which he assigns, how-

ever, are not tenable, and would enlarge the inquiry beyond its

legitimate scope.

The offer of composition is not confirmed.

In re MESSENGILL

113 Fed. 366
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(District Court, E. D. North Carolina. January 27, 1902)

PUENELL, District Judge. The referee for the Fourth di-

vision of the district certifies the following as having arisen in

the course of the proceedings to consider a proposition of com-

position pertinent to the proceedings. The facts are certified

that the creditor purchased several claims after the debts had

been allowed. No pleadings or evidence accompany the referee's

certificate. The question for consideration is thus stated:

"In determining whether or not a majority of the creditors,

it to be my duty to discuss the evidence in detail, or to decide
what induced the assenting creditors to assent. The bankruptcy
law does not make their decision conclusive, but only prima. facie.
Their assent does not relieve the court from passing on the <}Uestion whether the composition is for the best interests of all
the creditors. This question is addressed to the judicial discretion of the court, and from its conclusion either party may
appeal. Adler v. Hammond, supra.
Upon a careful review of the examination of the bankrupts,
the schedules, and all the evidence before me, I cannot avoid
the conclusion that the nonassenting creditors have met the burden of showing that the acceptance of the composition will not
be for the best interests of all the creditors. The whole testimony
leads me to the conclusion that the assets should produce nearly
double the offer of 15 per cent. It is with hesitation that I
come to a conclusion opposed to that of the painstaking and competent referee, who assigns some very good reasons for coming
to his conclusions. Some of the reasons which he assigns, however, are not tenable, and would enlarge the inquiry beyond its
legitimate scope.
The offer of composition is not confirmed.

whose claims represent a majority of the indebtedness of this

estate in bankruptcy, have signified their agreement in writing

to accept 30% offer of composition, should E. F. Young, to whom

In re MESSENGILL

a large number of creditors have sold their claims, be counted

as one creditor, or as the number who have assigned claims to

113 Fed. 366

himt The referee holds that he should be counted as one cred-

itor, and the bankrupt excepted and appealed to the district

(District Court, E. D. North Carolina. January 27, 1902)
PURNELL, District Judge. The referee for the Fourth division of the district certifies the following as having arisen in
the course of the proceedings to consider a proposition of composition pertinent to the proceedings. The facts are certified
that the creditor purchased several claims after the debts had
been allowed. No pleadings or evidence accompany the referee's
certificate. The question for consideration is thus stated:
''In determining whether or not a majority of the creditors,
whose claims represent a majority of the indebtedness of this
estate in bankruptcy, have signified their agreement in writing
to accept 30% offer of composition, should E. F. Young, to whom
a large number of creditors have sold their claims, be counted
as one creditor, or as the number who have assigned claims to
him T The referee holds that he should be counted as one creditor, and the bankrupt excepted and appealed to the district
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judge. And the said question is certified to the judge for his
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opinion thereon."

The foregoing decision of the referee is affirmed. § 12, Bank-

ruptcy Act, should be strictly construed. In re Rider, 96 Fed.

808, 3 Am. Bankr. R. 178. Where a claim has been assigned

after proof, the real owner alone can vote. In re Frank, Fed.

fas. No. 5,050; Loveland, Bankr. § 105. He is one creditor,

holding several claims.

In re RIDER

96 Fed. 808

(District Court, N. D. New York. October 6, 1899)

At the argument it was conceded that the accepting creditors

did not represent a majority in number and amount of all the

judge. And the said question is certified to the judge for bis
opinion thereon.''
The foregoing decision of the referee is affirmed. § 12, Bankru pt<'y Act, should be strictly construed. In re Rider. 96 Fed.
808, 3 Am. Bankr. R. 178. Where a claim bas bee11 assig111:'J
a ftn proof, the real owner alone can vote. In re Frank. Fed.
<'as. No. 5,050; Loveland, Bankr. § 105. He is one creditor,
hol<ling several claims.

creditors whose claims have been allowed, but only such a ma-

jority of those whose claims were allowed at the first meeting of

creditors. At the date of the argument, September 19th, not less

than 30 creditors had proved their debts aggregating $8,554, and

but 12 or 13 creditors representing $4,210 had signed the com-

position agreement. The claims of Holmes Rider, the father of

In re RIDER
96 Fed. 808

(District Court, N. D. New York.

October 6, 1899)

the bankrupt, for $2,600, and of his mother-in-law for $446, are

included in the above amount of $4,210. The referee, who has

made a most careful and exhaustive return upon the law and

facts, reports as follows: "At that session of April 15th the
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bankrupt was examined by his creditors. • • • After such

examination and partly during the session of the meeting, but

not as a part of the proceedings thereof, the bankrupt presented

the proposed written composition herein to 11 of the 15 creditors

in attendance, whose claims aggregated $3,745.44 of the $4,089.02

proved and allowed at that time, all of whom accepted the com-

position in writing at that time and place by instrument dated

that day." It does not appear that the paper was presented to

the remaining four creditors who had proved their debts. It was

not presented to the general creditors at all and they had no

formal information that a composition was on foot, except the

notice that it would be presented to the court for confirmation.

The composition proposed was to pay 30 per cent., one-third in

cash, one-third in four months and one-third in six months. The

deferred payments were to be evidenced by the notes of the bank-

rupt indorsed by his father. There is a marked dispute as to

the value of the bankrupt's estate, the contesting creditors in-

At the argument it was conceded that the accepting creditors
did not represent a majority in number and amount of all the
creditors whose claims have been allowed, but only such a .majority of those whose claims were allowed at the first meeting of
creditors. At the date of the argument, September 19th, not le.as
than 30 creditors had proved their debts aggregating $8,554, and
but 12 or 13 creditors representing $4,210 had signed the ~om
position agreement. The claims of Holmes Rider, the father of
the bankrupt, for $2,600, and of his mother-in-law for $446, are
included in the above amount of $4,210. The referee, who has
made a most careful and exhaustive return upon the law and
facts, reports as follows: ''At that session of April 15th the
bankrupt was examined by his creditors. • • • After such
examination and partly during the session of the meeting, but
not as a part of the proceedings thereof, the b&nkrupt presenred
the proposed written composition herein to 11 of the 15 creditors
in attendance, whose claims aggregated $3,745.44 of the $4,089.02
proved and allowed at that time, all of whom accepted the composition in writing at that time and place by instrument dated
that day." It does not appear that the paper was pre.sented to
the remaining four creditors who had proved their debts. It was
not presented to the general creditors at all and they had no
formal information that a composition was on foot, except the
notice that it would be presented to the court for confirmation.
The composition proposed was to pay 30 per cent., one-third in
cash, one-third in four months and one-third in six months. The
deferred payments were to be evidenced by the notes of the bankrupt indorsed by his father. There is a marked dispute as to
the value of the bankrupt's est.ate, the contesting creditors in-
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sisting that it will pay much more than 30 per cent. The referee
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recognizes the possibility that this contention is well founded,

but is of the opinion "that if the composition could be paid

wholly in cash and without any part thereof being deferred, the

creditors will realize more from a confirmation thereof than they

will to have the estate administered in bankruptcy.'' Owing to

the long delay occasioned by the contest the notes originally

deposited are not now available as some of them have already

become due. The amount deposited by the bankrupt for costs

is also inadequate. The financial responsibility of Holmes Eider

is assailed, but the referee finds that he is worth from $7,000 to

$8,000 over and above his present liabilities.

COXE, District Judge (after stating the facts as above). The

effect of a composition is to supersede the bankruptcy proceed-

ings and reinvest the bankrupt with all his property free from

the claims of creditors. As an abstract proposition, considered

for a moment apart from the provisions of the statute, it is en-

tirely clear that a condition so plainly in derogation of common-

sisting that it will pay much more than 30 per cent. The referee
recognizes the possibility that this contention is well fou1;ded,
but is of the opinion ''that if the composition could L1~ paid
wholly in cash and without any part thereof being deferred, the
creditors will realize more from a confirmation thereof than they
will to have the estate administered in bankruptcy." Owing to
the long delay occasioned by the contest the notes originally
deposited are not now available as some of them have already
become due. The amount deposited by the bankrupt for costs
is also inadequate. The financial responsibility of Holmes Rider
is assailed, but the referee finds that he is worth from $7,000 to
$8,000 over and above his present liabilities.

law rights should not be permitted, unless it is reasonably certain

that the creditors approve and that they will fare at least as well

as they would were the estate administered in the usual course.

It would be manifestly unfair and opposed to the basic principle

of our institutions to permit a minority to dictate terms to a
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majority and compel them, in invitum, to take what the bank-

rupt chooses to offer, or nothing. Indeed, it has been considered

a somewhat dangerous exercise of legislative power to compel

even a minority to surrender all claim upon the debtor's estate at

the dictation of the majority. Certainly no previous law has

permitted a minority to force a compromise. Always the safe-

guard of a majority against favoritism and fraud has been pre-

served. The amendment of 1874 to the law of 1867 provides

that'' such resolution shall, to be operative, have been passed by

a majority in number and three-fourths in value of the creditors

of the debtor assembled at such meeting, and shall be confirmed

by the signatures thereto of the debtor and two-thirds in num-

ber and one-half in value of all the creditors of the debtor." 18

Stat. 183, c. 390, § 17. A law which compels a creditor, against

his will, to accept in discharge of his debt just what the debtor

sees fit to offer, should be strictly construed. Loveland, Bankr.

p. 549; In re Shields, Fed. Cas. No. 12,784.

The present law should be cpnstrued in the light of similar

H. & A. Bankruptcy—4 2

COXE, District Judge (after stating the facts as above). The
effect of a composition is to supersede the bankruptcy proceedings and reinvest the bankrupt with all his property free from
the claims of creditors. As an abstract proposition, considered
for a moment apart from the provisions of the statute, it is entirely clear that a condition so plainly in derogation of commonlaw rights should not be permitted, unless it is reasonably certain
that the creditors approve and that they will fare at least as well
as they would were the estate administered in the usual course.
It would be manifestly unfair and opposed to the basic principle
of our institutions to permit a minority to dictate terms to a
majority and compel them, in invitum, to take what the bankrupt chooses to offer, or nothing. Indeed, it has been considered
a somewhat dangerous exercise of legislative power to compel
even a minority to surrender all claim upon the debtor's estate at
the dictation of the majority. Certainly no previous law has
permitted a minority to force a compromise. Always the safeguard of a majority against favoritism and fraud has been preserved. The amendment of 1874 to the law of 1867 provides
that ''such resolution shall, to be operative, have been passed by
a majority in number and three-fourths in value of the creditors
of the debtor assembled at such meeting, and shall be confirmed
by the signatures thereto of the debtor and two-thirds in number and one-half in value of all the creditors of the debtor.'' 18
Stat. 183, c. 390, § 17. . A law which compels a creditor, against
his will, to accept in discharge of his debt just what the debtor
sees fit to offer, should be strictly construed. Loveland, Bankr.
p. 549; In re Shields, Fed. Cas. No. 12,784.
The present law should be cpnstrued in the light of similar
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prior enactments and any doubt should be resolved against those

who seek to deprive creditors of the right to have the debtor's

property applied to the payment of his debts. Nothing short of

an absolutely plain and unambiguous provision will convince the

court that congress intended for the first time, it is thought, in

the history of bankruptcy legislation to vest such unusual and

dictatorial powers with a minority of the creditors. It may be

assumed that the language of § 12 is not as perspicuous as could

be desired, but, read as a whole, the intention of congress seems

plain to permit a compromise only when sanctioned by a ma-

jority in number and amount of the creditors whose claims have

been allowed, after due notice to them of the bankrupt "s proposi-

tion. If the construction contended for by the bankrupt be ac-

cepted it will lead to most inequitable results. Take, for illus-

tration, a case where there are thirty creditors and only three

have proved their debts, for equal amounts, at the time the com-

position is offered. If the bankrupt obtains the consent of two

of them the composition must be confirmed, although the remain-

ing twenty-eight creditors may be in open opposition.

§ 12 is easily capable of a construction compatible with the in-

tent and purpose which has always ruled proceedings of this

kind. After the bankrupt has been examined and filed a list
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of his creditors he "may offer terms of composition t6 his cred-

itors." This plainly implies that the offer should be made to

all his creditors whether they have proved their debts or not. It

is not essential that proofs shall be made before, or at, the first

meeting. They may be made at any time within a year after the

adjudication and it is not necessary that they shall be filed, in

the first instance, with the referee. § 57, c. n.

After the terms are thus made known to all the creditors they

have a reasonable time to decide whether they will accept the

offer or not. But in order to qualify themselves to vote upon

the proposition they are required to prove their claims. The

reason for this is obvious; it excludes from the voting all but

bom fide creditors; it excludes all those who are too indifferent

to present their claims and all whose claims are unliquidated,

fictitious or exorbitant; it gives all creditors notice no matter

what may be the nature of their claims and permits them to

qualify, if they desire to do so, and assent to the compromise or

oppose it, or, if they so elect, they may simply withhold their

assent. After a fair opportunity has been given to all and the

requisite majority of those whose claims have been allowed have

prior enactments and any doubt should be resolved against thoee
who seek to deprive creditors of the right to have the debtor 'a
property applied to the payment of his debts. Nothing short of
an absolutely plain and unambiguous provision will convince the
court that congress intended for the first time, it is thought, in
the history of bankruptcy legislation to vest such unusual and
dictatorial powers with a minority of the creditors. It may be
assumed that the language of § 12 is not as perspicuous as eou.ld
be desired, but, read as a whole, the intention of congress seems
plain to permit a compromise only when sanctioned by a majority in number and amount of the creditors whose claims have
been allowed, after due notice to them of the bankrupt "s proposition. If the construction contended for by the bankrupt be accepted it will lead to most inequitable results. Take, for illustration, a case where there are thirty creditors and only three
have proved their debts, for equal amounts, at the time the composition is oft'ered. If the bankrupt obtains the consent of two
of them the composition must be confirmed, although the remaining twenty-eight creditors may be in open opposition.
§ 12 is easily capable of a construction compatible with the intent a11d purpose which has always ruled proceedings of this
kind. After the bankrupt has been examined and filed a list
of his creditors he '' may offer terms of composition to liis creditors.'' This plainly implies that the offer should be made to
all his creditors whether they have proved their debts or not. It
is not essential that proofs shall be made before, or at, the first
meeting. They may be made at any time within a year after the
adjudication and it is not necessary that they shall be filed, ·in
the first instance, with the referee. § 57, c. n.
After the terms are thus made known to all the creditors they
have a reasonable time to decide whether they will accept the
offer or 11ot. nut in order to qualify themselves to vote upon
the proposition they are required to prove their claims. The
reason for this is obvious; it excludes from the voting all but
bmia fide creditors; it excludes all those who are too indifferent
to present their claims and all whose claims are unliquidated,
fietitious or exorbitant; it gives all creditors notice no matter
whnt may be the nature of their claims and permits them to
qualify, if they dt>sire to do so, and assent to the compromise or
oppose it, or. if they so elect, they may simply withhold their
a~e11t.
After a fair opportunity has been given to all and the
r1•quisite mnjority of those whose claims have been allowed have
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accepted it in writing an application to confirm the composition

may be filed. Even then the composition may be rejected if the

judge be convinced that it is not for the best interests of the

creditors.

A construction which permits the bankrupt to select a time

when but few creditors have proved and then to present his

terms only to such creditors as he believes to be friendly to his

interests, keeping the general creditors in the dark until he has

obtained a majority of the few who have proved, is contrary to

the intent and spirit of the law. It would enable a few active

and friendly creditors on the spot so to manipulate the proceed-

ings that the necessary majority could be secured while distant

creditors were wholly ignorant of the proposed settlement. That

the Supreme Court entertain views similar to the foregoing may

be inferred from form No. 60 (18 Sup. Ct. xlvi.), adopted pur-

suant to general order 38 (Id. x.).

Without pursuing the subject further the court is constrained

to deny the application to confirm this composition. The reasons

for this conclusion may be briefly stated as follows:

First. It is not approved by a majority in number and amount

of creditors whose claims have been allowed.

Second. No notice was given to the general creditors of the

bankrupt.
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Third. The composition was not presented to all the cred-

itors whose claims were allowed.

Fourth. At the present time the consideration deposited is

not in form to be distributed.

Fifth. The amount deposited as costs is inadequate.

Motion denied.

In re LEVY

110 Fed. 744

(District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania. July, 1901)

A majority in number and amount of bankrupt's creditors

signed an acceptance of the offer of composition, whereby it was

agreed to pay 25 cents on the dollar. Subsequently a number

of the creditors who had agreed to accept such composition came

into court, and desired to file a paper, asking leave to withdraw

their acceptance, and that the application for the composition

be dismissed; stating that when they signed the acceptance they

were not aware of all the facts in the case.

accepted it in writing an application to confirm the composition
may be filed. Even then the composition may be rejected if the
judge be convinced that it is not for the best interests of the
creditol'B.
A construction which permits the bankrupt to select a time
when but few creditors have proved and then to present his
terms only to such creditors as he believes to be friendly to his
interests, keeping the genera.I creditors in the dark until he has
obt.ained a majority of the few who have proved, is contrary to
the intent and spirit of the law. It would enable a few active
and friendly creditors on the spot so to manipulate the proceedings that the necesaary majority could be secured while distant
creditors were wholly ignorant of the proposed settlement. That . ·
the Supreme Court entertain views similar to the foregoing may
be inferred from form No. 60 ( 18 Sup. Ct. xlvi.), adopted pursuant to general order 38 (Id. x.) .
Without pursuing the subject further the court is constrained
to deny the application to confirm this composition. The reasons
for this conclusion may be briefly stated as follows:
First. It is not approved by a majority in number and .amount
of creditors whose claims have been allowed.
Second. No notice was given to the general creditors of the
bankrupt. _
Third. The composition was not presented to all the creditol'B whose claims were allowed.
Fourth. At the present time the consideration deposited is
not in form to be distributed.
Fifth. The amount deposited as costs is inadequate.
Motion denied.
In re LEVY
110 Fed. 744

(District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania.. July, 1901)
A majority in number and amount of bankrupt's creditors
signed an acceptance of the offer of composition, whereby it was
agreed to pay 25 cents on the dollar. Subsequently a number
of the creditors who had agreed to accept such composition came
into court, and desired to file a paper, asking leave to withdraw
their acceptance, and that the application for the composition
be dismissed; stating that when they signed the acceptance they
were not aware of all the facts in the ca.ee.
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BUFFINGTON, District Judge (orally). These creditors

voluntarily came into court, accepted the proposed composition,

and asked the court to act in the matter, and confirm the com-

position. They procured the court to act, and they are now

estopped from interfering with the further conduct of the case in

the matter of this composition. Had they alleged fraud or mis-

representation in the procuring of their signatures to the accept-

ance, the case would be different. They are presumed to have

had the same knowledge when they signed as they have now. The

application for their withdrawal will be refused, and the court

will proceed to pass upon the merits of the proposed composition.

If it is not for the best interests of the creditors, it can be shown

on the hearing before the referee.

Mccormick v. solinsky

152 Fed. 984, 82 C. C. A. 134

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. April 15, 1907)

PER CURIAM. On the case made, the contract by the Cit-

izens' National Bank of Beaumont, under which it advanced the

BUFFINGTON, District Judge (orally). These creditors
voluntarily came into court, accepted the proposed co111position,
and asked the court to act in the matter, and confirm the composition. They procured the court to act, and tht>y are uow
estopped from interfering with the further conduct of the case in
the matter of this composition. Had they alleged fraud or misrepresentation in the procuring of their signatures to the acceptance, the case would be different. They are presumed to have
had the same knowledge when they signed as they have uow. The
application for their withdrawal will be refused, and the court
will proceed to pass upon the merits of the proposed composition.
If it is not for the best in~rest.s of the creditors, it can be shown
on the hearing before the referee.

money to pay the composition to creditors in the bankruptcy of

E. N. Brown, was illegal, because a part of the consideration

thereof was that the bank's debt against the bankrupt should be

McCORMICK v. SOLINSKY

paid in full, notwithstanding the composition.
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Solinsky was a party to the illegal contract, and therein

152 Fed. 984, 82 C. C. A. 134

agreed as a part of the inducement that he would return to the

bank the amounts received by him under the composition as one

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. April 15, 1907)

of the creditors of the bankrupt, Brown. The present suit, be-

ing one to recover from Solinsky the amounts received by him

under the composition, is clearly a suit to recover moneys know-

ingly advanced under an illegal contract.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore affirmed.

In re GRIFFIN

180 Fed. 792

(District Court, N. D. Georgia. May 27, 1910)

NEWMAN, District Judge. The above bankrupt, M. M.

Griffin, has applied to the court for the confirmation of a com-

position, which he has offered to his creditors and which has

been accepted by a majority in number and amount. Objection

PER CURIA?.!. On the case made, the contract by the Citizens' National Bank of Beaumont, undl'r which it ad,·a.nced the
money to pay the composition to creditors in the bankruptcy of
E. N. Brown, was illegal, because a part of the consideration
thereof was that the bank's debt against the bankrupt should be
paid in full, notwithstanding the comp08ition.
Solinsky was a party to the illegal contract, and therein
agreed as a part of the inducement that he would return to the
bank the amounts received by him under the composition as one
of the creditors of the bankrupt, Brown. The present suit, being one to recover from Solinsky the amounts received by him
under the composition, is clearly a suit to recover moneys knowingly advanced under an illegal contract.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore affirmed.
In re GRIFFIN
180 Fed. 792
(District Court, N. D. Georgia. May 27, 1910)
NEWMAN, District Judge. The above bankrupt, M. :M.
Griffin, has applied to the court for the confirmation of a composition, whieh he has offered to his Cl't'ditors and which has
been accepted by a majority in number and amount. Objection
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is made to the confirmation of the composition by the Silvcy-

Smith Hat Company for the following reason:

"Because said bankrupt obtained the property on credit from

them upon a materially false statement in writing, made to them

for the purpose of obtaining such property on credit; such state-

ment being made on June 28, 1909, and being, as therein shown,

made 'for the purpose of obtaining credit,' and standing 'good

as to each purchase now and hereafter, unless there should be a

material change, in which case [I or we] will .notify them before

making purchases from them.' Copy of said statement is hereto

attached and made a part hereof, marked 'Exhibit A.' On such

statement these objectors sold said bankrupt goods from time to

time, and at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed said

bankrupt was and is indebted to these objectors on account of

such purchases, as shown by statement of account hereto at-

tached and made a part hereof, marked 'Exhibit B,' to which

reference is prayed as often as may be necessary. Said state-

ment was materially false, in that said bankrupt represented

therein one house and lot located in Manchester, Georgia, of the

value of $1,000, as among his assets. Said house and lot was

at the time the property of said bankrupt's wife, and is still her

property.''
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It appears, from the written statement of the bankrupt made

to the objectors, which is in evidence, that among other assets

shown by the statement, which amounted in all to $3,450, he

claimed to have a house and lot located in Manchester, Ga., where

he was doing business, of the value of $1,000. He now acknowl-

edges that he did not own this house and lot, but that it belonged

to his wife. That this was a material statement is clear, and that

it was untrue is now equally clear.

§ 14 of the bankrupt act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat. 550, c. 541

[U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3427]), as amended in 1903 (Act Feb.

5, 1903, c. 487, § 4, 32 Stat. 797 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909,

p. 1310]), makes one of the grounds of objection to discharge:

"(3) Obtained property on credit from any person upon a

material false statement, in writing, made to such person for the

purpose of obtaining such property on credit."

§ 12 of the act provides:

"The judge shall confirm the composition if satisfied that

* * * (2) the bankrupt has not been guilty of any of the

acts, or failed to perform any of the duties, which would be a

bar to his discharge."

is made to the confirmation of the composition by the SilveySmith Hat Company for the following reason:
"Because said bankrupt obtained the property on credit from
them upon a materially false statement in writing, made to them
for the purpose of obtaining such property on credit; such statement being made on June 28, 1909, and being, as therein shown,
made 'for the purpose of obtaining credit,' and standing 'good
as to each purchase now and hereafter, u11lcss there should be a
material change, in which case [I or we] will .notify them before
making purchases from them.' Copy of said statement is hereto
attached and made a part hereof, marked 'Exhibit A.' On such
statement these objectors sold said bankrupt goods from time to
time, and at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed said
bankrupt was and is indebted to these objectors on account of
such purchases, as shown by statement of account hereto attached and made a part hereof, mmokcd 'Exhibit B,' to which
reference is prayed as often as may be necessary. Said s_tatement was materially false, in- that said bankrupt represented
therein one house and lot located in Manchester, Georgia, of the
value of $1,000, as among his assets. Said house and lot was
at the time the property of said bankrupt's wife, and is still- her
property."
It appears, from the written statement of the bankrupt made
to the objectors, which is in evidence, that among other assets
shown by the statement, which amounted in ~11 to $3,450, he
claimed to have a house and lot located in Manchester, Ga., where
he was doing business, of the value of $1,000. He now acknowledges that he did not own this house and lot, but that it belonged
to his wife. That this was a material statement is clear, and that
it was untrue is now equally clear.
§ 14 of the bankrupt act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat. 550, c. 541
[ U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3427]), as amended in 1903 (Act Feb.
5, 1903, c. 487, § 4, 32 Stat. 797 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909,
p. 1310]), makes one of the grounds of objection to discharge:
'' ( 3) Obtained property on credit from any person upon a
material fal~ statement, in writing, made to such person for the
purpose of obtaining such property on credit.''
§ 12 of the act provides:
''The judge shall confirm the composition if satisfied that
• • • (2) the bankrupt has not been guilty of any of the
acts, or failed to perform any of the duties, which would be a
liar to his discharge."
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It may be that to sustain the objection will prevent the

creditors from getting as much as they would if the composition

was accepted, but this cannot be considered in passing upon this

objection. As Judge J. B. McPheraon, in the District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in a case very much

like this (In re Godwin, 122 Fed. 11l), said:

"It is very likely that the creditors may lose by the defeat of

the proposed composition; but this consideration cannot be al-

lowed to influence the court in deciding whether the bankrupt

has been 'guilty of any of the acts, or failed to perform any of

the duties, which would be a bar to his discharge.' Bankr. Act

July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 12, cl. 'd' (U. S. Comp. St . 1901, p. 3427).

I agree with the learned referee that the testimony establishes

the fact satisfactorily that the bankrupt has committed one of

the offenses specified in § 14, cl. 'b.' He has 'with fraudulent

intent to conceal his true financial condition and in contempla-

tion of bankruptcy destroyed, concealed or failed to keep books

of account or records from which his true condition might be

ascertained.' This being so, I think the act requires me to refuse

approval of the composition, without regard to the question

whether the creditors would be benefited thereby; and the fact

that only one creditor is actively objecting, while a large ma-
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jority is in favor of taking what the bankrupt offers, is of no

importance in the present inquiry."

The objection must be sustained, and the confirmation of the

composition refused.

It may be that to sustain the objection will prevent the
creditors from getting 88 much 88 they would if the composition
was accepted, but this cannot be considered in p888ing upon this
objection. As Judge J. B. McPherson, in the District Court
for the Eastern District of Pehnsylvani1t, in a case very much
like this (In re Godwin, 122 Fed. 111), said :
"It is very likely that the creditors may lose by the defeat of
the proposed composition ; but this consideration cannot be allowed to influence the court in deciding whether the bankrupt
has been 'guilty of. any of the acts, or failed to perform any of
the duties, which would be a bar to his discharge.' Banlcr. .Act
July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 12, cl. 'd' (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3427).
I agree with the learned referee that the testimony establishes
the fact satisfactorily that the bankrupt has committed one of
the offenses specified in § 14, cl. 'b.' He bas 'with fraudulent
intent to conceal his true financial condition and in contemplation of bankruptcy destroyed, concealed or failed to keep books
of account or records from which his true condition might be
ascertained.' This being so, I think the act requires me to refuse
approval of the composition, without regard to the question
whether the creditors would be benefited thereby; and the fact
that only one creditor is actively objecting, while a large majority is in favor of taking what the bankrupt offers, is of no
importance in the present inquiry."
The objection must be sustained, and the confirmation of the
composition refused.

CHAPTER V

DISCHARGE

In re CHANDLER

138 Fed. 637, 71 C. C. A. 87

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. April 11, 1905)

On October 27, 1902, the bankrupt was discharged from his

debts by the court below. On October 23, 1903, a petition was

filed by William H. Rhodes, John Gray, and Edward G. Pauling

to revoke the discharge upon certain grounds therein stated.

The only allegation in the petition with respect to the character

OllAPTll V

of the petitioners is '' that they are creditors of Frank R. Chan-

dler, who has heretofore been adjudicated a bankrupt." To the

DISCHARGE

petition a demurrer was interposed, and sustained by the Dis-

trict Court, and the petition dismissed. The proceeding here is

to review and revise that ruling of the District Court.

In re CHANDLER

HUMPHREY, District Judge. § 146 of the bankruptcy act

of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 550, as amended by Act Feb. 5,

138 Fed. 637, 71 C. C. A. 87

1903, c. 487, 32 Stat. 797 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1903, p. 411],

provides that objections to discharge of bankrupts may be made

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

April 11, 1905)

by '' parties in interest.'' The averment in the petition that the

objectors are creditors is not such a statement as shows to the

court that the petitioners are "parties in interest," within the

meaning of the law. The petition does not make such a show-

ing that the court can say that the rights of the petitioners were
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affected by the discharge. No facts are averred which would

justify the legal conclusion that the petitioners are "parties in

interest." It is not averred that they were creditors at the time

of the bankruptcy. The character of their debt is not shown. It

is not averred that their debt was provable in bankruptcy or was

proved in the proceedings. The debt or debts they represent,

from all that appears from the petition, may have been created

since the discharge, or they may have become purchasers of the

debts which were discharged, without right to attack the dis-
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On October 27, 1902, the bankrupt was discharged from his
debt.s by the court below. On October 23, 1903, a petition was
filed by William H. Rhodes, John Gray, and Edward G. Pauling
to revoke the discharge upon certain grounds therein stated.
The only allegation in the petition with respect to the character
of the petitioners is ''that they are creditors of Frank R. Chandler, who has heretofore been adjudicated a bankrupt.'' To the
petition a demurrer was interposed, and sustained by the District Court, and the petition dismissed. The proceeding here is
to review and revise that ruling of the District Court.

HUMPHREY, District Judge. § 14b of the bankruptcy act
.of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 550, as amended by Act Feb. 5,
1903, c. 487, 32 Stat. 797 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1903, p. 411),
provides that objections to discharge of bankrupts may be made
by ''parties in interest.'' The averment in the petition that the
objectors are creditors is not such a statement as shows to the
court that the petitioners are ''parties in interest,'' within the
meaning of the law. The petition does not make such a showing that the court can say that the right.s of the petitionel'B were
affected by the discharge. No facts are averred which would
justify the legal conclusion that the petitioners are ''parties in
interest." It is not averred that they were creditors at the time
of the bankruptcy. The character of their debt is not shown. It
is not averred that their debt was provable in bankruptcy or was
proved in the proceedings. The debt or debts they represent,
from all that appears from the petition, may have been created
since the discharge, or they may have become purchasers of the
debts which were discharged, without right to attack the dis-
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charge. We are of opinion that the petition should have shown

that the petitioners had at the time provable debts against the

bankrupt, which were affected by the discharge of the bankrupt.

Otherwise they are not'' parties in interest,'' within the meaning

of the statute.

•••

The decree is affirmed.1

GILPIN v. MERCHANTS' NAT. BANK

165 Fed. 607, 91 C. C. A. 445

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. November 21, 1908)

charge. We are of opiuion that the petition should have shown
that the petitioners had at the time provable <lebts against the
bankrupt, which were affected by the discharge of the bankrupt.
Otherwise they are not ''parties in interest,'' within the me.aning
of the statute.

• • •

The decree is affirmed.1

GRAY, Circuit Judge. This is a petition by a bankrupt, to

revise for error of law the decree of the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, reversing the

referee's report and sustaining one of the creditor-appellee's ex-

GILPIN v. MERCHANTS' NAT. BANK

ceptions to his application for discharge. The sole exception thus

sustained, was to the effect that the referee had erroneously held

165 Fed. 607, 91 C. C. A. 445

that the "materially false statement" in writing, mentioned in

clause (3) of § 146 of the bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. November 21, 1908)

541, 30 Stat . 550 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3427], amended by

Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, § 4, 32 Stat. 797 [U. S. Comp. St.

Supp. 1907, p. 1026]), must, in order to constitute a bar to

the discharge of the bankrupt, be intentionally or knowingly
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untrue. The facts of the case as summarized from the findings

made by the referee, and elsewhere disclosed in the record, are

as follows:

The bankrupt was engaged in the construction of buildings,

at Baltimore, in places near New York City, and Philadelphia.

His main office was in Philadelphia, where his books were kept

by his bookkeeper. The bankrupt was chiefly engaged in the

actual supervision of the building work he had in hand, and paid

little or no attention to his books. He collected money, paid

notes, and in a general way knew the condition and progress

of each of his building contracts. He intrusted the keeping of his

books to his bookkeeper, and in September, 1905, the posting

of his books was some months behind. During that month, the

bankrupt went to the Merchants' National Bank, at Philadel-

1—As to the right of the trustee

to interpose objections, see In re

Hockman, 205 Fed. 330.

GRAY, Circuit Judge. This is a petition by a bankrupt, to
revise for error of law the decree of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, reversing the
referee's report and sustaining one of the creditor-appellee 's ex.
ceptions to his application for discharge. The sole exception thus
sustained, was to the effect that the referee had erroneously held
that the ''materially false statement'' in writing, mentioned in
clause (3) of § 14b of the bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c.
541, 30 Stat. 550 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3427], amended by
Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, § 4, 32 Stat. 797 [U. S. Comp. St.
Supp. 1907, p. 1026] ), must, in order to constitute a bar to
the discharge of the bankrupt, be intentionally or knowingly
untrue. The facts of the case as summarized from the findings
made by the referee, and elsewhere disclosed in the record, are
as follows:
The bankrupt was engaged in the construction of buildings,
at Baltimore, in places near New York City, and Philadelphia.
His main office was in Philadelphia, where his books were kept
by his bookkeeper. The bankrupt was chiefly engaged in the
actual supervision of the building work he had in hand, and paid
little or no attention to his books. He collected money, paid
notes, and in a general way knew the condition and progress
of each of his building contracts. He intrusted the keeping of his
books to his bookkeeper, and in September, 1905, the posting
of his books was some months behind. During that month, the
bankrupt went to the Merchants' National Bank, at Philadel1-As to the right of the truatee
to int.erpoae objections, see In re
Hockman, 205 Fed. 330.
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phia, (the excepting creditor and appellee) and stated that he

wished to open an account, and would require accommodations

not to exceed $10,000. The bank informed him that they would

like to have a statement, and gave him one of their blank forms,

to be filled out and signed by him. This form the bankrupt took

to his office, and there signed the same in blank, instructing his

bookkeeper to fill it out and send it to the bank. He signed it in

blank before it was filled out, for the reason that he was obliged

to return to Baltimore without delay. He says he instructed

the bookkeeper to make an exact statement for the bank, to which

the bookkeeper replied that he could not, but that he would make

an approximate statement and send it to the bank. The state-

ment was made by the bookkeeper, and upon it was written the

word "approximate," and it was sent by the bookkeeper to the

bank. Upon this statement, and upon a note which the bankrupt

was to obtain from one Stokes, of Baltimore, as collateral, the

bank extended the accommodation desired. This note was never

obtained for the bank from Stokes. About October 3, 1905, and

after the said statement of September 28th had been filed by the

bank, the note of the bankrupt for $7,500, due 30 days after date,

was discounted. After two renewals and a payment of $1,000

on account, and the further discount of a 10 days' note of $2,500,
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the bank, on the 9th day of February, 1906, renewed the entire

amount then due, viz., $9,000, for 30 days, which is still unpaid.

The adjudication of bankruptcy was entered February 26,

1906. The approximate statement sent by the bookkeeper to

the bank was materially inconsistent with the bankrupt's books,

as they stood at the time the bankruptcy occurred. There is

nothing in the referee's report to show how the books actually

stood at the time the statement was prepared by the bookkeeper.

There is no evidence that the bankrupt ever saw this statement

after it was filled out, that the bank ever showed it to him, or

interrogated him in regard to it, or that he ever asked to see it.

This statement showed a net worth of $43,569.27. The bankrupt

himself made up from his books, during the course of his exami-

nation, a statement showing that his net worth at that time was

$45,698.09. This statement, however, in all its items fails to

coincide with the statement made up by the bookeeper and de-

livered to the bank.

The referee finds that, although the falsity of the statement

sent to the bank has been proved, the fact that the bankrupt

phia, (the excepting creditor and appellee) and stated that he
wished to open au account, and would require accommodations
not to exceed $10,000. The bank informed him that they would
like to have a statement, a.nd gave him one of their blank foru1s,
to be filled out and signed by him. This form the bankrupt took
to bis office, and there signed the same in blank, instructing his
bookkeeper to fill it out and send it to the bank. He signed it in
blank before it was filled out, for the reason that be was oblige<l
to return to Baltimore without delay. Ile says he instructed
the bookkeeper to make an exact statement for the bank, to which
the bookkeeper replied that he could not, but that he would make
an approximate statement and send it to the bank. The statement was made by the bookkeeper, and upon it was written the
word ''approximate,'' and it was sent by the bookkeeper to the
bank. Upon this statement, and upon a note which the bankrupt
was to obtain from one Stokes, of Baltimore, as collateral, the
bank extended the accommodation desired. This note was never
obtained for the bank from Stokes. About October 3, 1905, and
after the said statement of September 28th had been filed by the
bank, the note of the bankrupt for $7,500, due 30 days after date,
was discounted. After two renewals and a payment of $1,000
on account, and the further discount of a 10 days' note of $2,500,
the bank, on the 9th day of February, 1906, renewed the entire
amount then due, viz., $9,000, for 30 days, which is still unpaid.
The adjudication of bankruptcy was entered February 26,
1906. The approximate statement sent by the bookkeeper to
the bank was materially inconsistent with the bankrupt's books,
as they stood at the time the bankruptcy occuITed. There is
nothing in the referee's report to show how the books actually
stood at the time the statement was prepared by the bookkeeper.
There is no evidence that the bankn1pt ever saw this statement.
after it was filled out, that the bank ever showed it to him, or
interrogated him in regard to it, or that he ever asked to see it.
This statement showed a net worth of $43,569.27. The bankrupt
himself made up from his books, during the course of his examination, a statement showing that his net worth at that time was
$45,698.09. This statement, however, in all its itt>rns fails to
coincide with the statement made up by the bookeeper and delivered to the bank.
The referee finds that, although the falsity of the statemeut
sent to the bank has been proved, the fact that the bankrupt
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knew it to be false, or did not know it to be true, was not proved,

and says:

'' There is no evidence to support the contention that the bank-

rupt knew or had any reason to believe that the statement sent

to the bank by the bookkeeper was false, or that the bankrupt

intended in any way to deceive the bank."

The referee, therefore, reported that a decree of discharge of

the bankrupt should be entered. To the finding of the referee,

as stated, the appellee filed its exception, and the court below,

after considering the same, reversed the finding of the referee

and directed that an order be entered, sustaining the said objec-

tion to the bankrupt's discharge.

§ 14 of the bankrupt act prescribed the conditions upon which

a discharge may be granted to the bankrupt by the court of

bankruptcy in which the proceedings are depending, and pro-

vides that the court shall hear and investigate the merit of the

application and discharge the bankrupt, unless he has—

"(1) committed an offense punishable by imprisonment, as herein

provided; or (2) with intent to conceal his financial condition,

destroyed, concealed, or failed to keep books of account or rec-

ords from which such condition might be ascertained; or, (3)

obtained property on credit from any person upon a materially
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false statement in writing made to such person for the purpose

of obtaining such property on credit; or (4), at any time.sub-

sequent to the first day of the four months immediately preced-

ing the filing of the petition transferred, removed, destroyed, or

concealed, or permitted to be removed, destroyed, or concealed

any of his property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his

creditors; or (5) in voluntary proceedings been granted a dis-

charge in bankruptcy within six years; or (6), in the course of

the proceedings in bankruptcy refused to obey any lawful order

of or to answer any material question approved by the court."

The single question of law presented for our consideration is

clearly defined in the following extracts from the opinion of the

court below:

"I accept and shall act upon the finding of the referee that

the bankrupt either did not actually know what the statement

contained, or did not know that it was materially false, and that

he did not have a conscious intention to deceive the bank."

In concluding, the court said as follows:

"The other matter that may properly need a moment's con-

sideration is the effect that should be given to the word 'false'

knew it to be false, or did not know it to be true, was not proved,
and says:
''There is no evidence to support the contention that the bankrupt knew or had any reason to believe that the statement sent
to the bank by the bookkeeper was false, or that the bankrupt
intended in any way to deceive the bank.''
The referee, therefore, reported that a decree of discharge of
the bankrupt should be entered. To the finding of the referee,
as stated, the appellee filed its exception, and the court below,
after considering the same, reversed the finding of the referee
and directed that an order be entered, sustaining the said objection to the bankrupt's discharge.
§ 14 of the bankrupt act prescribed the conditions upon which
a discharge may be granted to the bankrupt by the court of
bankruptcy in which the proceedings are depending, and provides that the court shall hear and investigate the merit of the
application and discharge the bankrupt, unless he bas'' ( 1) committed an offense punishable by imprisonment, 88 herein
provided; or (2) with intent to conceal bis financial condition,
destroyed, concealed, or failed to keep books of account or records from which such condition might be ascertained; or, (3)
obtained property on credit from any person upon a materially
false statement in writing made to such person for the purpose
of obtaining such property on credit; or ( 4), at any time. subsequent to the first day of the four months immediately preced·
ing the filing of the petition transferred, removed, destroyed, or
concealed, or permitted to be removed, destroyed, or concealed
any of his property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his
creditors; or (5) in voluntary proceedings been granted a discharge in bankruptcy within six years; or ( 6), in the course of
the proceedings in bankruptcy refused to obey any lawful order
of or to answer any material question approved by the court."
The single question of law presented for our consideration is
clearly defined in the following extracts from the opinion of the
court below:
''I accept and shall act upon the finding of the referee that
the bankrupt either did not actually know what the statement
contained, or did not know that it was materially f.alse, and that
he did not have a conscious intention to deceive the bank."
In concluding, the court said 88 follows:
''The other matter that may properly need a moment's consideration is the effect that should be given to the word 'false'
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in clause 3. In my opinion the argument for the bankrupt must

rest wholly upon the conclusion that this word should bear. It

is unquestionably a flexible word. Sometimes it means incorrect,

or not true; sometimes it includes the idea of wickedness or

fraud—as in § 28, where a false oath is evidently a corruptly

false oath, such as would subject the affiant to a prosecution for

perjury. That 'false' means no more in clause 3 than 'not true,'

I have tried to establish in the preceding pages of this opinion,

and if I have failed hitherto to give good reasons to my belief

I am sure that I shall not strengthen the argument by stating

them again in somewhat different words.

"The decision of the referee is reversed and the clerk is di-

rected to enter an order sustaining the first objection of the

Merchants' National Bank to the bankrupt's discharge."

Addressing ourselves to the question thus distinctly raised, it

is to be remarked that of the six reasons for refusing a discharge

to the bankrupt, as set forth in § 146 of the bankrupt act, the

five that relate to the conduct of the bankrupt, unless we exclude

the third, with which we are here concerned, all imply a willful

and fraudulent act on the part of the bankrupt, or, as in the case

of the sixth, a willful and intentional defiance of a lawful order

of the court. And they all imply conduct that is immoral, or at

least unworthy in one seeking the reward of honesty that is in-
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tended to be conferred by a discharge. In the recent case, In re

A. B. Carton & Co. (D. C.) 148 Fed. 63, 66, Judge Hough in the

District Court for the Southern District of New York, adopts as

a terse statement of his views, the following language:

'' The policy of the bankruptcy act is founded on equal rights

and privileges to all creditors; it is not intended as a means to

punish the bankrupt at the option of the defrauded creditor only.

Discharge from debts is a matter of favor and not a matter of

right. Honesty on the part of a bankrupt is rewarded by a dis-

charge. Fraud and dishonesty are stamped with disapproval

of a discharge. Contumacy on the witness stand, a previous dis-

charge within six years, obtaining money upon false statements,

and the commission of an offense punishable by imprisonment

under the act, are all valid objections to a discharge, and are not

limited to the defrauded creditors alone, but may be urged by

any and all creditors. It is the fraudulent conduct that is

aimed at, and not retaliation for the individual loss."

"We fail to perceive any sufficient ground for denying to the

third reason for refusing a discharge to the bankrupt, the gen-

in clause 3. In my opinion the argument for the bankrupt must
rest wholly upon the conclusion that this word should bear. It
is unquestionably a flexible word. Sometimes it mNrns incorrect,
or not true ; sometimes it includes the idea of wickedness ·or
fraud--u in § 29, where a false oath is evident1y a corruptly
false oath, such as would subject the affiant to a prosecution for
perjury. That 'false' means no more in clause 3 than 'not true,'
I have tried to establish in the preceding pages of this opinion,
and if I have failed hitherto to give good reasons to my belief
I am sure that I shall not strengthen the argument by stating
them again in somewhat ditferent words.
''The decision of the referee is reversed and the clerk is directed to enter an order sustaining the first objection of the
Merchants' National Bank to the bankrupt's discharge."
Addressing ourselves to the question thus distinctly raised, it
is to be remarked that of the six reasons for refusing a discharge
to the bankrupt, as set forth in § 14b of the bankrupt act, the
five that relate to the conduct of the bankrupt, unless we exclude
the third, with which we are here concerned, all imply a willful
and fraudulent act on the part of the bankrupt, or, as in the case
of the sixth, a willful and intentional defiance of a lawful order
of the court. And they all imply conduct that is immoral, or at
least unworthy in one seeking the reward of honesty that is intended to be conferred by a discharge. In the recent case, In re
A. B. Carton & Co. (D. C.) 148 Fed. 63, 66, Judge Hough in the
District Court for the Southern District of New York, adopts as
a terse statement of his views, the following language:
'•The policy of the b&nkruptcy act is founded on equal rights
and privileges to all creditors; it is not intended as a means to
punish the bankrupt at the option of the defrauded creditor only.
Discharge from debts is a matter of favor and not a matter of
right. Honesty on the part of a bankrupt is rewarded by a discharge. Fraud and dishonesty are stamped with disapproval
of a discharge. Contumacy on the witness stand, a previous diseharg~ within six years, obtaining money upon false statements,
and the commission of an offense punishable by imprisonment
under the act, are all valid objections to a discharge, and are not
limited to the defrauded creditors alone, but may be urged by
any and all creditors. It is the fraudulent conduct that is
aimed at, and not retaliation for the individual loss."
We fail to perceive any sufficient ground for denying to the
third reason for refusing a discharge to the bankrupt, the gen-
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eral characteristic of personal misconduct that attaches to all

the others, as set forth in the said section of the bankrupt act. It

would indeed be a harsh construction, and at variance with the

general policy of the bankruptcy act, that would make the eon-

duct described in clause 3 an exception in this respect to the

whole category of acts which may severally deprive the bankrupt

of his privilege of discharge. It is a construction which should

not unnecessarily be made.

But apart from the incongruity imported into this section of

the bankruptcy act by such construction, it seems to us clear thftt

the plain language of this third clause of § 146 requires that the

written statement made by the bankrupt, for the purpose of ob-

taining credit, etc., should be knowingly and intentionally un-

true, in order to constitute a bar to the discharge of the bank-

rupt. In other words, "false statement" connotes a guilty scien-

ter on the part of the bankrupt. This primary and ordinary

meaning of the word "false" cannot be ignored. It is the pri-

mary meaning given in the ordinary lexicons of the English

language. Webster gives as its primary meaning:—"Uttering

falsehood; unveracious; given to deceit; dishonest." As an ad-

jective, it is correlative with the noun "falsehood." To charge

a person with making a false statement, is equivalent to charg-
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ing him with uttering a falsehood, and imputes moral delin-

quency to the person so charged. It is true that the word may

have a secondary meaning in certain collocations, and be merely

equivalent to "untrue" or "incorrect." But this is not the or-

dinary or usual signification attached to the word. To charge a

person with making false entries in books of account, means

something more than that incorrect or untrue entries have been

made, and it has been so held by the courts in the consideration

of offenses of that character. The last edition of Bouvier's Law

Dictionary says of the word "false," that when "applied to

the intentional act of a responsible being, it implies a purpose

to deceive.'' In Black's Law Dictionary, under the title '' false.''

it is said: "In law, this word means something more than un-

true; it means something designedly untrue and deceitful, and

implies an intention to perpetrate some treachery or fraud."

In a recent and well accepted publication called "Words and

Phrases," the word "false" is thus defined:—"False means that

which is not true, coupled with a lying intent." Wood v. The

State, 48 Ga. 192, 297, 15 Am. Rep. 664. "False in juris-

eral characteristic of personal misconduct that attaches to all
the others, as set forth in the said section of the bankrupt act . . It
would indeed be a harsh construction, and at }·ariance with the
general policy of the bankruptcy act, that would make the conduct described in clause 3 an exception in this respect to the
whole category of acts which may severally deprive the bankrupt
of his privilege of discharge. It is a construction which should
not unnecessarily be ma.de.
But apart from the incongruity imported into this section of
the b&run:uptcy act by such construction, it seems to us clear that
the plain language of this third clause of§ 14b requires that the
written statement made by the bankrupt, for the purpose of obtaining credit, etc., should be knowingly and intentionally untn1e, in order to constitute a bar to the discharge of the bankrupt. In other words, ''false statement'' connotes a guilty scienter on the part of the bankrupt. This primary and ordinary
meaning of the word ''false'' cannot be ignored. It is the primary meaning given in the ordinary lexicons of the English
language. Webster gives as its primary meaning:-'' Uttering
falsehood; unveracious; given to deceit; dishonest." As an adjective, it is correlative with the noun ''falsehood.'' To char~
a person with making a false statement, is equivalent to charging him with uttering a falsehood, and imputes moral delinquency to the person so charged. It is true that the word may
have a secondary meaning in certain collocations, and be merely
equivalent to "untrue" or "incorrect." But this is not the ordinary or usual signification attached to the word. To charge a
person with making false entries in books of account, means
something more than that incorrect or untrue entries have been
made, and it has been so held by the courts in the consideration
of offenses of that character. The last edition of Bouvier's Law
Dictionary says of the word ''false,'' that when ''applied to
the intentional act of a responsible being, it implies a purpose
to deceive." In Black's Law Dictionary, under the title "false,"
it is said: "In law, this word means something more than untrue; it means something designedly untrue and deceitful, and
implies an intention to perpetrate some treachery or fraud.,,
In a recent and well accepted publication called "Words and
Phrases," the word "false" is thus defined:-'' False means that
which is not true, coupled with a lying intent." Wood v. The
State, 48 Ga. 192, 297, 15 Am. Rep. 664. "False in juri•
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prudence usually imports something more than the vernacular

sense of 'erroneous' or 'untrue.'"

prudence usually imports something more than the vernacular
of 'erroneous' or 'untrue.' "
This aml other citations in the petitioner's brief, establish a
jurisprudential meaning to the word "false" at variance with
that adopted by the learned judge of the court below.
No good reason has been suggested why Congress should have
made such au exception to the character of the acts enumerated,
2s severally barring the discharge of the bankrupt, by using the
word ''false'' in some other than its primary and obvious meaning.
But it is not without significance to inquire why an incorrect
statement, innocently made to one creditor, should bar the dis.
charge of the bankrupt as to all his other debts, whatever be its
effect as to the debt of that particular creditor. In re Carton &
Co., supra, the court says:
"It is the act of issuing a materially false statement and the
fraudulent intent of the man who issues it, that the statute seeks
to punish by refusing a discharge. It should not depend upon
the whim or good nature of any particular creditor to whom the
false statement was made, whether the offending bankrupt should
be given or refused his discharge. Any 'party in interest' who
chooses to· bring the wrongful act to the attention of the court,
and proves that it was wrong within the meaning of the statute, is entitled so to do."
We fully concur in the meaning thus attributed to the clause
in question. The bankrupt who has made to a creditor, for the
purpose of obtaining credit, a false statement,-that is, oue intentionally and knowingly untrue, is unworthy of the privilege of
a discharge :under the act, and the court will act upon information brought to it of such an act by any party in interest. It
will be at once conceded on all hands, that such a bankrupt is
unworthy, and shauld not receive the favor accorded by the
law to the hone.st but unfortunate debtor. Some of the cases
cited by the appellee conflict with the view here stated, but the
weight of authority, as of reason, supports it.
We think that the court below erred in finding that the word
''false'' means no more in clause 3 than ''not tnie, '' and the
ordor of the said court is hereby revised in matter of law, by
directing that the first specification of grounds of opposition to
the discharge of the bankrupt, filed by the Merchants' National
Bank, be dis,missed, and that the bankrupt receive his discharge
s1•f:se

This and other citations in the petitioner's brief, establish a

jurisprudential meaning to the word "false" at variance with

that adopted by the learned judge of the court below.

No good reason has been suggested why Congress should have

made such an exception to the character of the acts enumerated,

as severally barring the discharge of the bankrupt, by using the

word '' false'' in some other than its primary and obvious mean-

ing.

But it is not without significance to inquire why an incorrect

statement, innocently made to one creditor, should bar the dis-

charge of the bankrupt as to all his other debts, whatever be its

effect as to the debt of that particular creditor. In re Carton &

Co., supra, the court says:

"It is the act of issuing a materially false statement and the

fraudulent intent of the man who issues it, that the statute seeks

to punish by refusing a discharge. It should not depend upon

the whim or good nature of any particular creditor to whom the

false statement was made, whether the offending bankrupt should

be given or refused his discharge. Any 'party in interest' who

chooses to bring the wrongful act to the attention of the court,
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and proves that it was wrong within the meaning of the stat-

ute, is entitled so to do."

We fully concur in the meaning thus attributed to the clause

in question. The bankrupt who has made to a creditor, for the

purpose of obtaining credit, a false statement,—that is, one in-

tentionally and knowingly untrue, is unworthy of the privilege of

a discharge under the act, and the court will act upon informa-

tion brought to it of such an act by any party in interest. It

will be at once conceded on all hands, that such a bankrupt is

unworthy, and should not receive the favor accorded by the

law to the honest but unfortunate debtor. Some of the cases

cited by the appellee conflict with the view here stated, but the

weight of authority, as of reason, supports it.

We think that the court below erred in finding that the word

"false" means no more in clause 3 than "not true," and the

order of the said court is hereby revised in matter of law, by

directing that the first specification of grounds of opposition to

the discharge of the bankrupt, filed by the Merchants' National

Bank, be dismissed, and that the bankrupt receive his discharge
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in accordance with the recommendation of the referee in that

behalf.'

in accordance with the recommendation of the referee in that
behalf.I

DIMOCK v. REVERE COPPER CO.

117 U. S. 559, 29 L. ed. 994

DIMOCK v. REVERE COPPER CO.

(United States Supreme Court . April 5, 1886)

This case came here by a writ of error to the Supreme Court

117 U. S. 559, 29 L. ed. 994

of New York, having been decided in the Court of Appeals, and

the record remitted to the Supreme Court that judgment might

be finally entered there.

The action was brought in that court on a judgment in favor

of the Revere Copper Company, plaintiff, against Anthony W.

Dimock, rendered in the Superior Court of the Commonwealth

of Massachusetts, for the county of Suffolk, on the 1st day of

April, 1875.

The defendant, Dimock, pleaded, in bar in this action, a dis-

charge in bankruptcy, by the District Court of the United States

for the District of Massachusetts, rendered on the 26th day of

March, 1875, five days before judgment in the State Court.

The case being submitted to the New York Supreme Court in

special term, without a jury, that court found the following facts

and conclusions of law thereon:

"As Findings of Fact.
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'' First. That the plaintiff is, and at the times hereinafter men-

tioned was, a corporation, duly organized and existing under and

by virtue of the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

"Second. That on or about the 13th day of January, 1874,

the Revere Copper Company of Boston, Massachusetts, the plain-

tiff herein, commenced an action in the Superior Court of the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts, within and for the county of

Suffolk, a court of general jurisdiction, against Anthony W. Di-

mock, the defendant herein, by the issue of a writ of attachment

(United States Supreme Court. April 5, 1886)
This case came here by a writ of error to the Supreme Court
of New York, having been decided in the Court of Appeals, and
the record remitted to the Supreme Court that judgment might
be finally entered there.
The action was brought in that court on a judgment in favor
of the Revere Copper Company, plaintiff, against Anthony W.
Dimock, rendered in the Superior Court of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, for the county of SuJfolk, on the 1st day of
April, 1875.
The defendant, Dimock, pleaded, in bar in this action, a discharge in bankruptcy, by the District Court of the United States
for the District of Massachusetts, rendered on the 26th day of
March, 1875, five days before judgment in the State Court.
The case being submitted to the New York Supreme Court in
special term, without a jury, that court found the following facts
and conclusions of law thereon:

against the goods, estate, and body of the said defendant, and

which said writ was duly served on said defendant, and the sum-

mons to appear in said action was duly served upon him per-

sonally, and that the said defendant thereafter duly appeared

in said action by attorney; that the cause of action was an in-

dorsement of said Dimock of two promissory notes made in the

2—The principal case is annotated

in 20 L. B. A. (N. 8.) 1023.

"As Finding• of Fact.
''First. That the plaintiff is, and at the times hereinafter mentioned was, a corporation, duly organized and existing under and
by virtue of the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
"Second. That on or about the 13th day of January, 1874,
the Revere Copper Company of Boston, Massachusetts, the plaintiff herein, commenced an action in the Superior Court of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, within and for the county of
Suffolk, a court of general jurisdiction, against Anthony W. Dimock, the defendant herein, by the issue of a writ of attachment
against the goods, estate, and body of the said defendant, and
which said writ was duly served on said defendant, and the summons to appear in said action was duly served upon him per·
sonally, and that the said defendant thereafter duly appeared
in said action by attorney; that the cause of action was an indorsement of said Dimock of two promissory notes made in the
2-The principal cue is annotated ,
in 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1023.
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city of New York to the order of plaintiff by the Atlantic Mail

Steamship Company, and dated December 19, 1872.

"Third. That on or about June 23, 1874, the said defendant,

Anthony W. Dimock, filed a petition in bankruptcy, and was duly

adjudicated a bankrupt, in the District Court of the United

States for the District of Massachusetts, and that such proceed-

ings were thereafter had that, on or about March 26, 1875, the

said Dimock was discharged from all debts and claims provable

against his estate, and which existed on the 23d day of June,

1874.

"Fourth. That such proceedings were had in the aforesaid

action in the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massa-

chusetts that on or about April 1st, 1875, the plaintiff duly re-

covered judgment in said action against the defendant for the

sum of three thousand five hundred and ninety-five dollars and

fifteen cents ($3,595.15), and that said judgment was upon that

day duly entered.

"Fifth. That no part of said judgment has been paid, and

the whole thereof is now due and payable to the plaintiff.''

"As Conclusions of Law.

"I. That the said proceedings in bankruptcy are no bar to

the present action, and constitute no defense herein.
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"II. That the plaintiff should have judgment against the de-

fendant for the sum of three thousand five hundred and ninety-

city of New York to the order of plaintiff by the Atlantic Mail
Steamship Company, and dated Decembt~r 19, 1872.
"Third. That on or about June 23, 1874, the said defendant,
Anthony W. Dimock, filed a petition in ba.nkrnptcy, and was duly
adjudicated a bankrupt, in the District Court of the United
States for the District of Massachusetts, and that such proceed·
ings were thereafter had that, on or about March 26, 1875, the
said Dimock was discharged from all debts and claims provable
against his estate, and which existed on the 23d day of June,
1874.
''Fourth. That such proceedings were had in the aforeeaid
action in the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of M.aasa.
chusetts that on or about April 1st, 1875, the plaintiff duly recovered judgment in said action against the defendant for the
sum of three thousand five hundred and ninety-five dollars and
fifteen cents ($3,595.15), and that said judgment was upon that
day duly entered.
''Fifth. That no part of said judgment has been paid, and
the whole thereof is now due and payable to the plaintiff.''

five dollars and fifteen cents ($3,595.15) with interest from April

1st, 1875, amounting to one thousand one hundred and forty-two

dollars and ninety-six cents ($1,142.96), making in all four thou-

sand seven hundred and thirty-eight dollars and eleven cents

($4,738.11), together with the costs of this action, to be taxed,

and an allowance, in addition to costs, amounting to the sum of

seventy-five dollars."

The judgment rendered on these findings was reversed by the

Supreme Court in general term, and that judgment was in

turn reversed by the Court of Appeals, which restored the judg-

ment of the special term. 90 N. Y. 33.

Mr. Justice MILLER, after stating the facts as above reported,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The only questiou considered at all these trials was whether

the discharge of the defendant in the bankruptcy proceeding is,

under the facts found by the court, a bar to the present action;

"As Conclusion& of Law.
''I. That the said proceedings in bankruptcy are no bar to
the present action, and constitute no defense herein.
''II. That the plaintiff should have judgment against the defendant for the sum of three thousand five hundred and ninetyfive dollars and fifteen cents ( $3,595.15) with interest from April
1st, 1875, amounting to one thousand one hundred and forty-two
dollars and ninety-six cen ta ($1,142.96), making in all four thousand seven hundred and thirty-eight dollars and eleven cents
($4,738.11), together with the costs of this action, to be taxed,
and an allowance, in addition to costs, amounting to the sum of
seventy-five dollars.''
The judgment rendered on these findings wBS reversed by the
Supreme Court in general term, and that judgment was in
turn reversed by the Court of Appeals, which restored the judgment of the special tenn. 90 N. Y. 33.
Mr. Justice MIJJT;ER, after stating the facts aa above reported,
delivered the opinion of the court.
The only question considered at all these trials was whether
the discharge of the defendant in the bankruptcy proceeding is,
under the facts found by the court, a bar to the present action ;
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and, as the decision by the New York court against the plaintiff

in error as to the effect of that order of discharge is to refuse to

him a right claimed under the laws of the United States, this

court has jurisdiction to review the decision.

The Superior Court of Massachusetts had jurisdiction of the

suit of the Copper Company against Dimock, both as regards the

subject-matter and the parties. This jurisdiction was rendered

complete by service of process and by the appearance of the

defendant. All this was before the beginning of the bankruptcy

proceeding. Nothing was done to oust this jurisdiction, and the

case accordingly proceeded in due order to the rendition of the

judgment which is the foundation of this action. It is not argued

that this judgment was void, or that the court was ousted of its

jurisdiction by anything done in the bankruptcy court. No such

argument could be sustained if it were made. In the case of

Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U. S. 521, which was very similar to this on

the point now before the court, it was said: '' The court in that

case had acquired jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-

matter of the suit. It was competent to administer full justice,

and was proceeding according to the law which governed such

a suit to do so. It could not take judicial notice of the pro-

ceedings in bankruptcy in another court, however seriously they
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might affect the rights of parties to the suit already pending. It

was the duty of that court to proceed to a decree between the

parties before it, until by some proper pleadings in the case it

was informed of the changed relations of any of the parties to

the subject-matter of the suit. Having such jurisdiction, and

performing its duty as the case stood in that court, we are at a

loss to see how its decree can be treated as void." The court

then goes on to show, that, if the assignee had brought his right,

acquired pendente lite, to the notice of the court, it would have

been protected. Hill v. Harding, 107 U. S. 631.

So here, if Dimock had brought his discharge to the attention

of the Superior Court at any time before judgment, it would

have been received as a bar to the action, and, under proper

circumstances, even after judgment, it might be made the foun-

dation for setting it aside and admitting the defense. Ray v.

Wight, 119 Mass. 426: Page v. Cole, 123 Mass. 93; Golden v.

Blaskopf, 126 Mass. 523. Nothing of the kind was attempted.

The question before the Massachusetts court for decision, at the

moment it rendered its judgment, was, whether Dimock was then

indebted to the Copper Company. Of Dimock and of this ques-

and, as the decision by the New York court agaim•t the plaintiff
in error as to the etfect of that order of discharge is to refuse to
him a right claimed under the laws of the United States, this
court bas jurisdiction to review the decision.
The Superior Court of Massachusetts had jurisdiction of the
suit of the Copper Company agai~st Dimock, both as regards the
subject-matter and the parties. This jurisdiction was rendered
complete by service of process and by the appearance of the
defendant. All this was before the beginning of the bankruptcy
proceeding. Nothing was done to oust this jurisdiction, and the
case accordingly proceeded in due order to the rendition of the
judgment which is the foundation of this action. It is not argued
that this judgment was void, or that the court was ousted of its
jurisdiction by anything done in the bankruptcy court. No such
argument could be sustained if it were made. In the case of
Eyster v. Gatf, 91 U. S. 521, which was very similar to this on
the point now before the court, it was said: ''The court in that
case had acquired jurisdiction of the parties and of the subjectmatter of the suit. It waa competent to administer full justice,
and was proceeding accordinf{ to the law which governed such
a suit to do so. It could not take judicial notice of the proceedings in bankruptcy in another court, however seriously they
might affect the rights of parties to the suit already pending. It
was the duty of that court to proceed to a decree between the
parties before it, until by some proper pleadings in the case it
was informed of the changed relations of any of the parties to
the subject-matter of the suit. Having such jurisdiction, and
performing its dut1 as the case stood in that court, we are at &
loss to see how its decree can be treated as void." The coort
then goes on to show, that, if the assignee had brought his right,
acquired pend.ente lite, to the notice of the court, it would have
been protected. Hill v. Harding, 107 U. S. 631.
So here, if Dimock had brought his discharge to the attention
of the Superior Court at any time before judgment, it would
have been received as a bar to the action, and, under proper
circumstances, even after judgment, it might be made the foundation for setting it aside and admitting the defense. Ray v.
Wight, 119 Mass. 426; Page v. Cole, 123 M.ass. 93; Golden v.
Blaskopf, 126 Mass. 523. Nothing of the kind was attempted.
The question before the Massachusetts court for decision, at the
moment it rendered its judgment, was, whether Dimock was then
indebted to the Copper Company. Of Dimock and of this ques-
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tion it had complete jurisdiction, and it was bound to decide it

on the evidence before it. Its decision was, therefore, conclusive,

as much so as any judgment where the jurisdiction is complete.

It concluded Mr. Dimock from ever denying that he was so in-

debted on that day, wherever that judgment was produced as

evidence of the debt. If he had the means at that time to prove

that the debt had been paid, released, or otherwise satisfied, and

did not show it to the court, he cannot be permitted to do it in

this suit; and the fact that the evidence that he did not then

owe the debt was the discharge in bankruptcy, made five days

before, does not differ from a payment and receipt in full or a

release for a valuable consideration. Cromwell v. Sac County,

94 U. S. 351; also, Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 134. A

still stronger case of the validity of judgments of a State Court,

in their relation to bankruptcy proceedings, had pendente lite, is

that of Davis v. Friedlander, 104 U. S. 570. In the case of

Thatcher v. Rockwell, 105 U. S. 467, 469, the Chief Justice, after

alluding to these and other cases, says, they "establish the doc-

trine that, under the late bankrupt law, the validity of a pend-

ing suit, or of the judgment or decree thereon, was not affected

by the intervening bankruptcy of one of the parties; that the

assignee might or might not be made a party; and whether he
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was so or not he was equally bound with any other party acquir-

ing an interest pendente lite."

It is said, however, that, though the defendant had his dis-

charge before the judgment in the State Court was rendered,

and might have successfully pleaded it in bar of that action

and did not do so, the judgment now sued on is the same debt,

and was one of the debts from which, by the terms of the bank-

rupt law, he was discharged under the order of the bankruptcy

court, and to any attempt to enforce that judgment the discharge

may be shown as a valid defense. That is to say, that the failure

of the defendant to plead it when it was properly pleadable,

when, if he ever intended to rely on it as a defense, he was

bound to set it up, works him no prejudice because, though he

has a dozen judgments rendered against him for this debt after

he has received his discharge, he may at any time set it up as

a defense when these judgments are sought to be enforced.

Upon the same principle, if he had appeared in the State Court

and pleaded his discharge in bar, and it had been overruled as

a sufficient bar, he could, nevertheless in this action on that

judgment, renew the defense.

H. & A. Bankruptcy—43

tion it had complete jurisdiction, and it was bound to decide it
on the evidence before it. Its decision was, therefore, conclusive,
as much so as any judgment where the jurisdiction is complete.
It concluded Mr. Dimock from ever denying that he was so indebted on that day, wherever that judgment was produced as
evidence of the debt. If he had the means at that time to prove
that the debt had been paid, released, or otherwise satisfied, and
did not show it to the court, he cannot be permitted to do it in
this suit ; and the fact that the evidence that he did not then
owe the debt was the discharge in bankruptcy, made five days
before, does not differ from a payment and receipt in full or a
release for a valuable consideration. Cromwell v. Sac County,
94 U. S. 351; also, Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 134. A
still stronger case of the validity of judgments of a State Court,
in their relation to bankruptcy proceedings, had pendc-nte lite, is
that of Davis v. Friedlander, 104 U. S. 570. In the case of
Thatcher v. Rockwell, 105 U. S. 467, 469, the Chief Justice, after
alluding to these and other cases, says, they ''establish the doctrine that, under the late bankrupt law, the validity of a pending suit, or of the judgment or decree thereon, was not affected
by the intervening bankruptcy of one of the parties; that the
assignee might or might not be made a party; and whether he
was so or not he was equally bound with any other party acquiring an interest pendente lite."
It is said, however, that, though the defendant had his discharge before the judgment in the State Court was rendered,
and might have successfully pleaded it in bar of that action
and did not do so, the judgment now sued on is the same debt,
and was one of the debts from which, by the terms of the bankrupt law, he was discharged under the order of the bankruptcy
court, and to any attempt to enforce that judgment the discharge
may be shown as a valid defense. That is to say, that the failure
of the defendant to plead it when it was properly pleadable,
when, if he ever intended to rely on it as a defense, he was
bound to set it up, works him no prejudice because, though he
has a. dozen judgments rendered against him for this debt after
he has received his discharge, he may at any time set it up as
a defense when these judgments are sought to be enforced.
Upon the same principle, if he had appeared in the State Court
and pleaded his discharge in bar, and it had been overruled as
a sufficient bar, he could, nevertheless in this action on that
judgment, renew the defense.
H . .I: A. Bankruptcy-4 8
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But in such case, his remedy would not lie in renewing the

struggle in a new suit on such judgment, but in bringing the

first judgment for review before this court where his right under

the discharge would have been enforced then, as he seeks to do it

now, after submitting to that judgment without resistance and

without complaint.

We are of opinion that, having in his hands a good defense

at the time judgment was rendered against him, namely, the

order of discharge, and having failed to present it to a court

which had jurisdiction of his case and of all the defenses which

he might have made, including this, the judgment is a valid judg-

ment, and that the defense cannot be set up here in an action

on that judgment. The case of Steward v. Green, 11 Paige, 535,

seems directly in point. So also are Hollister v. Abbott, 11

Foster, 31 N. H. 442, and Bradford v. Rice, 102 Mass. 472.

It is clear that until the judgment of the Massachusetts court

is set aside or annulled by some direct proceeding in that court,

its effect cannot be defeated as a cause of action, when sued in

another state, by pleading the discharge as a bar which might

have been pleaded in the original action.

The judgment of the New York court is affirmed*

3—"The execution was issued
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after the discharge in bankruptcy,

and appellee filed his motion to

quash on the ground that the judg-

ment was a partnership debt of the

firm of Munder & 8tevenson. Tes-
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But in such case, his remedy would not lie in renewing the
struggle in a new suit on such judgment, but in bringing the
first judgment for revie":V before this court where his right under
the discharge would have been enforced then, as he eeeb to do it
now, after submitting to that judgment without resistance and
without complaint.
We are of opinion that, having in his hands a good defenee
at the time judgment was rendered against him, namely, the
order of discharge, and having failed to pl"'e861lt it to a court
which had jurisdiction of his case and of all the defenaes which
he might have made, including this, the judgment is a valid judgment, and that the defense cannot be set up here in an action
on that judgment. The case of Steward v. Green, 11 Paige, 535,
seems directly in point. So also are Hollister v. Abbott, 11
Foster, 31 N. H. 442, and Bradford v. Rice, 102 Maas. 472.
It is clear that until the judgment of the M8888.Chusetta court
is set aside or annulled by some direct proceeding in that court,
its effect cannot be defeated as a cause of action, when sued in
another state, by pleading the discharge as a bar which might
have been pleaded in the original action.
The judgment of the New York court is affirmed.•

timony was introduced, over the ob-

jection of appellant, tending to

prove that, though the notes upon

which the judgment was rendered

were signed individually, they were

in fact obligations of the firm, and

that the consideration therefor went

to the firm. * • *

"The effect of the discharge in

bankruptcy was to release the mem-

bers of the firm individually and as

partners from all the provable debts

of the firm save those specially ex-

cepted by the terms of the statute,

such as judgments in actions for

fraud or false pretense, etc.

"The discharge is the judgment

of a court of competent jurisdiction

nnd cannot be collaterally attacked.

Collier on Bankruptcy, p. 785; Black

on Bankruptcy, p. 88; Loveland on

Bankruptcy, p. 785; Puller v. Pease,

144 Mass. 390; Corey v. Bipley, 57

Me. 69; Bailey v. Carruthera, 71 Me.

172; Howland v. Canon, 28 Ohio

St., 625; Milhous v. Aicardi, 51 Ala.

594; Stevens v. Brown, 49 Miss.

597; Brady v. Brady, 71 Oa. 71;

Talbott v. Suit, 68 Md. 443.

"It is contended by counsel for

appellant that the discharge was not

effective to release appellee from

liability individually from the part-

nership debts because he failed to

include his individual assets in the

schedules. If it has been shown to

the bankruptcy court that appellee

owned property not included in the

schedules, that would have been

ground for refusal of the discharge,

or for revocation of the discharge by

3-' ' The execution waa il!lued
after the diacharge in bankruptc7,
and appellee filed hi.a motion tlo
quash on the ground th&t the judgment wu a partnership debt of the
flrm of Munder & St.evenaon. Testimony was introduced, over the ob·
jeetion of appellant, t.ending to
prove that, though the notes upon
which the judgment wu rendered
were 11igned individually, they were
in fact obligations of the fl.rm, and
that the consideration therefor went
to the fl.rm. • • •
' ' The effect of the discharge in
bankruptcy waa to release the mem·
hers of the firm individually and as
partners from all the provable debt.
of the fl.rm save those specially excepted by the teJ'DlB of the atatut.e,
such a11 judgment• in action11 for
frand or false preten!t!, etc.
'' 'fhe discharge is the judgment
of a court of competent jurisdiction
nnd cannot be collaterally attacked.

Collier on Bankruptc7, p. 7~; Bl&ck
on Bankruptc7, p. 88; Loveland on
Bankruptq, p. 786; Fuller v. Peue,
144 Maae. 390; Cof81 v. Riple:r1 :>7
Me. 69; Bailey v. Carruthers, 71 Me.
172; Howland "'· Canon, 28 Ohio
St., 625; Milhous v. Aicardi, 51 Ala.
594; Stevens v. Brown, 49 Miaa.
597; Brad7 v. Brady, 71 Ga. 71;
Talbott v. Sui*, 68 Md. ffS.
''It i11 contended by counsel for
appellant that the discharge waa not
effective to release appellee horn
liability individually from the partnership debt!! becauae he failed to
include his individual uaets in the
schedules. If it baa been ahown to
the bankruptcy court that appellee
cwned property not included in the
scbedulea, that would have been
ground for refuaal of the di.llCbarge.
or for revocation of the discharge by
that court after it had been granted;
but that question should have been
litigated in the bankruptcy eonrt,
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CITIZENS' LOAN ASS'N v. BOSTON & M. R. R.

196 Mass. 528, 82 N. E. 696

CITIZENS' LOAN ASS 'N v. Bt)STON & M. R. R.

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Nov. 27, 1907)

Plaintiff and defendant are domestic corporations. On Feb-

196 Mass. 528, 82 N. E. 696

ruary 27, 1905, and for a long time prior thereto, Steven J.

Wescott was in the employ of defendant as a conductor. On

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Nov. 27, 1907)

that day Wescott, for a valuable consideration, and as security

for the payment of a note given by him to plaintiff, and for

money loaned, assigned to plaintiff all claims which he might

thereafter have against defendant for moneys becoming due

between that date and January 1, 1908, for services.

RUQG, J. The single question presented by this appeal is

whether an assignment of wages to be earned in an existing em-

ployment, given before bankruptcy, without fraud, and upon

sufficient consideration, to secure a valid subsisting debt, and

duly recorded, can be enforced, after the discharge in bank-

ruptcy of the assignor, as to wages earned in the course of the

original employment, by the creditor, who has not proved his

Plaintiff and defendant .are domestic corporations. On February 27, 1905, and for a long time prior thereto, Steven J.
Wescott was in the employ of defendant as a conductor. On
that day Wescott, for a valuable consideration, and as security
for the payment of a note given by him to plaintiff, and for
money loaned, assigned to plaintiff all claims which he might
thereafter have against defendant for moneys becoming due
between that date and January 1, 1908, for services.

debt in bankruptcy. A debt is not extinguished by a discharge

in bankruptcy. The remedy upon the debt, and the legal, but

not the moral, obligation to pay, is at an end.4 The obligation

itself is not canceled. Champion v. Buckingham, 165 Mass. 76,

42 N. E. 498; Heather v. Webb, 2 C. P. D. 1. An assignment
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of future earnings, which may accrue under an existing employ-

ment, is a valid contract and creates rights, which may be en-

forced both at law and in equity, whichever may in a par-

ticular case be the appropriate forum. Tripp v. Brownell, 12

and the judgment of that court in

granting the discharge is conclusive

of the right to contest it on that

ground.

"The discharge operates only

upon such debts as were provable,

and the question whether or not a

particular debt has been released by

it is left to be determined by the

court in which action is brought to

enforce the debt. It was proper,

therefore, for the court to enter

upon an inquiry whether or not the

debt in controversy was in fact a

RUGG, J. The single question presented by this appeal is
whether an assignment of wages to be earned in an existing employment, given before bankruptcy, without fraud, and upon
sufficient consideration, to secure a valid subsisting debt, and
duly recorded, can be enforced, after the discharge iu bankruptcy of the assignor, as to wages earned in the course of the
original employment, by the creditor, who has not proved his
debt in bankruptcy. A debt is not extinguished by a discharge
in bankruptcy. The remedy upon the debt, and the legal, but
not the moral, obligation to pay, is at an end. 4 The obligation
itself is not canceled. Champion v. Buckingham, 165 Mass. 76,
42 N. E. 498; Heather v. ·webb, 2 C. P. D. 1. An assignment
of future earnings, which may accrue under an existing employment, is a valid contract and creates rights, which may be enforced both at law and in equity, whichever may in a particular case be the appropriate forum. Tripp v. Brownell, 12

provable claim against the estate of

the bankrupt and was discharged.

Collier on Bankruptcy, p. 191; Love-

land on Bankruptcy, p. 760; In re

Bhutassel, 96 Fed. 597; In re Mus-

sey, 99 Fed. 71; In re Wright, No.

18065, Fed. Cases." Young v.

Stevenson, 73 Ark. 480, 482. See

also Custard v. Wigderson, 130 Wis.

412.

4—Cf. Matthewson v. Needham,

81 Kans. 340, 26 L. B. A. (N. 8.)

274.

and the judguient of that court in
granting the discharge ia conclusive
of the right to conte&t it on that
ground.
'' The discharge operates only
upon such debts as were provable,
and the question whether or not a
particular debt has been released by
it is left to be dete!'mined by the
court in which action i1 brought to
enforce the debt. It was proper,
therefore, for the court t.o enter
upon an inquiry whether or not the
debt in controversy waa in fact a

provable claim against the estate of
the bankrupt and was discharged.
Collier on Bankruptcy, p. 191; Love·
land on Bankruptcy, p. 760; In re
Rbutat11el, 96 Fed. 597; In re Mus·
sey, 99 Fed. 71 ; In re Wright, No.
18065, Fed. Cues." Young v.
StevenBOn, 73 Ark. 480, 482. Bee
also Custard v. Wigdenon, 130 Wia.
ill.
4-Cf. MatthewBOn v. Needham,
81 Kans. 340, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.)
27~
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Cush. 376; Weed v. Jewett, 2 Mete. 608, 37 Am. Dec. 115;

Brackett v. Blake, 7 Mete. 335, 41 Am. Dec. 442; Hartey v.

Tapley, 2 Gray, 565; Gardner v. Hoeg, 18 Pick. 168; Taylor v.

Lynch, 5 Gray, 49; Lannan v. Smith, 7 Gray, 150; St. Johns v.

Charles, 105 Mass. 262; Lazarus v. Swan, 147 Mass. 330, 333, 17

N. E. 665; James v. Newton, 142 Mass. 366, 8 N. E. 122, 56

Am. Rep. 692. These cases proceed upon the theory that the

worker under contract for service, though indefinite as to time

and compensation and terminable at will, has an actual and real

interest in wages to be earned in the future by virtue of his con-

tract. He may recover for an unjustifiable interference with

such an employment, as for an injury to any other vested prop-

erty right. Morgan v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 59 N. E. 125,

52 L. R. A. 115, 83 Am. St. Rep. 289; Berry v. Donovan, 188

Mass, 353, 74 N. E. 603, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 899, 108 Am. St.

Rep. 499. It is plain that one may sell wool to be grown upon

his own sheep, or a crop to be produced upon his own land, but

not that to be grown or produced upon the sheep or land of an-

other. No more can one assign wages, where there is no con-

tract for service. Jones v. Richardson, 10 Mete. 481; Low v.

Pew, 108 Mass. 347, 11 Am. Rep. 357. But profitable employ-

ment is a reality. Wages to be earned by virtue of an existing
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employment are no more shadowy or insubstantial than the fleece

of next spring or the crop of the following autumn. Money to

accrue from such service is not a bare expectancy or mere pos-

sibility, but a substance capable of grasp and delivery. It con-

stitutes a present, existing, right of property, which may be sold

or assigned as any other property. Although not in the manual

possession of the assignor, it is in his potential possession. The

transfer of this potential possession creates the assignee a lienor

upon the property right. The holder of such an assignment

stands upon a firmer plane than the mortgagee of future ac-

quired property, who has only the right by contract to act be-

times in the future for his protection. Wasserman v. McDon-

nell, 190 Mass. 326, 76 N. E. 959. The assignee of wages to be

earned under an existing contract gets a present right, perfect

in itself, requiring no future action on his part. Contracts for

personal service are of such a character that their breach is in

appropriate cases enjoined. Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G., M. &

G. 604; Duff v. Russell, 133 N. Y. 678, 31 N. E. 622; Whitwood

Chemical Co. v. Hardman [1891] 2 Ch. 416. See Phila. Base

Ball Club v. Lejoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 Ati. 973, 58 L. R. A. 227,

Cush. 376; Weed v. Jewett, 2 Mete. 608, 37 Am. Dec. 115;
Brackett v. Blake, 7 Mete. 335, 41 Am. Dec. 442; Hartey v.
Tapley, 2 Gray, 565; Gardner v. Hoeg, 18 Pick. 168; Taylor v.
Lynch, 5 Gray, 49; Lannan v. Smith, 7 Gray, 150; St. Johns v.
Charles, 105 Mass. 262; Lazarus v. Swan, 147 Mass. 330, 333, 17
N. E. 665; James v. Newton, 142 Mass. 366, 8 N. E. 122, 56
Am. Rep. 692. These cases proceed upon the theory that the
worker under contract for service, though indefinite as to time
and compensation and terminable at will, haB an actual and real
interest in wages to be earned in the future by virtue of his contract. He may recover for an unjustifiable interference with
such an employment, as for an injury to any other vested property right. Morgan v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 59 N. E. 125,
52 L. R. A. 115, 83 Am. St. Rep. 289; Berry v. Donovan, 188
Mass, 353, 74 N. E. 603, 5 L. R. A. (N. S .) 899, 108 Am. St.
Rep. 499. It is plain that one may sell wool to be grown upon
his own sheep, or a crop to be produced upon his own land, but
not that to be grown or produced upon the sheep or land of another. No more can one assign wages, where there is no contra.ct for service. Jones v. Richardson, 10 Mete. 481; Low v.
Pew, 108 Mass. 347, 11 Am. Rep. 357. But profitable employment is a reality. Wages to be earned by virtue of a.u existing
employment are no more shadowy or insubstantial than the fleece
of next spring or the crop of the following autumn. :Money to
accrue from such service is not a bare expectancy or mere possibiHty, but a substance capable of grasp and delivery. It constitutes a present, existing, right of property, which may be sold
or assigned 88 any other property. Although not in the manual
possession of the assignor, it is in his potential possession. The
transfer of this potential possession creates the assignee a lienor
upon the property right. The holder of such an assignment
stands upon a firmer plane than the mortgagee of future acquired property, who has only the right by contract to act betimes in the future for his protection. Wasserman v. l\IcDonnell, 190 Mass. 326, 76 N. E. 959. The assignee of wages to be
earned under an existing contract gets a present right, perfect
in itself, requiring no future action on his part. Contracts for
personal service are of such a character that their breach is in
appropriate cases enjoined. Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G., :M. &
G. 604; Duff v. Russell, 133 N. Y. 678, 31 N. E. 622; Whitwood
Chemical Co. v. Hardman [1891] 2 Ch. 416. See Phil.a. Base
Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 Atl. 973, 58 L. R. A. 227,
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90 Am. St. Rep. 627. It may be taken for granted that the right

to future wages to be earned under such a contract does not pass

to the trustee in bankruptcy. Nor are we dealing here with a

contract as to labor in terms or spirit contrary to public policy,

as in Parsons v. Trask, 7 Gray, 473, 66 Am. Dec. 502. But on

the contrary, assignments of wages are recognized as valid by

statute. Rev. Laws, c. 189, §§ 32, 33, 34; Id. c. 102, §§51, 57

to 67, both inclusive; Id. c. 106, § 63. The present case is not

affected by St. 1905, p. 224, c. 308, or St. 1906, p. 366, c. 390.

Specific performance of contracts to labor like that in ques-

tion will not be enforced. Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310-318,

11 C. C. A. 209, 25 L. R. A. 414; Robertson v. Baldwin, 165

U. S. 275, 17 Sup. Ct. 326, 41 L. ed. 715. It is only where labor

has been voluntarily performed that the question now presented

can arise. It is possible that an agreement to execute an assign-

ment, falling short of the creation of a lien, is, when the wages

have been actually earned, enforceable in equity, even after a

subsequent bankruptcy or insolvency. We do not decide this,

however. Edwards v. Peterson, 80 Me. 367, 14 Atl. 936, 6 Am.

St. Rep. 207; Stott v. Franey, 20 Or. 410, 26 Pac. 271, 23 Am.

St. Rep. 132. At lowest the assignment in question became "a

specific equitable lien on the fund" (Triste v. Child, 21 Wall.
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441, 22 L. ed. 623), or was "an independent collateral agree-

ment given by way of guaranty or other security" for the main

debt, and there is no reason why such an agreement should not

outlive the remedy upon the debt, to secure which it was given

(Shaw v. Silloway, 145 Mass. 503, 507, 14 N. E. 783). In either

event, it was not dissolved by the bankruptcy. We have consid-

ered the contrary authorities of In re West (D. C.) 128 Fed. 205,

In re Home Discount Co. (D. C.) 147 Fed. 538, and Leitch v.

Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 95 Minn. 35, 103 N. W. 704, with the

deference to which they are entitled.5 They proceed upon con-

siderations as to the effect of an assignment of wages and the

rights vesting thereunder in the assignee, as well as public pol-

icy pointed out in the latter case, which are inconsistent with

what we conceive to be sound reasoning, and opposed to the

numerous decisions of this court above cited concerning rights

acquired under assignments of wages. In the absence of a de-

cision to the same effect by the Supreme Court of the United

5—See also Id re Ludeke, 171 R. A. (N. 8.) 375, 137 Am. St Hep.

Fed. 292; Levi v. Loevenhart & Co., 377.

138 Ky. 133, 127 S. W. 748, 30 L.

90 Am. St. Rep. 627. It nrny he taken for granted that the right

to future wages to be earned under such a contract does not pass
to the trustee in bankruptcy. Nor are we dealing here with a
contract as to labor in terms or spirit contrary to public policy,
as in Parsons v. Trask, 7 Gray, 473, 66 Am. Dec. 502.· But on
the contrary, assignments of wages are recognized as valid by
statute. Rev. Laws, c. 189, §§ 32, 33, 34; Id. c. 102, §§ 51, 57
to 67, both inclusive; Id. c. 106, § 63. The present case is not
affected by St. 1905, p. 224, c. 308, or St. 1906, p. 366, c. 390.
Specific performance of contracts to labor like that in questi<>n will not be enforced. Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310-318,
11 C. C. A. 209, 25 L. R. A. 414; Robertson v. Baldwin, 165
U. S. 275, 17 Sup. Ct. 326, 41 L. ed. 715. It is only where labor
has been voluntarily performed that the question now presented
can ariSe. It is possible that an agreement to execute an assignment, falling short of the creation of a lien, is, when the wages
have been actually earned, enforceable in equity, even after a
subsequent bankruptcy or insolvency. We do not decide this,
however. Edwards v. Peterson, 80 .Me. 367, 14 Atl. 936, 6 Am.
St. Rep. 207; Stott v. Franey, 20 Or. 410, 26 Pac. 271, 23 Am.
St. Rep. 132. At lowest the assignment in question became "a
specific equitable lien on the fund" ( Triste v. Child, 21 'Vall.
441, 22 L. ed. 623), or was ''an independent collateral agreement given by way of guaranty or other security" for the main
<lebt, and there is no reason why. such an agreement should not
outlive the remedy upon the debt, to secure which it was given
(Shaw v. Silloway, 145 Mass. 503, 507, 14 N. E. 783). In either
event, it was not dissolved by the bankruptcy. We have considered the coutrary authorities of In re \Vest (D. C.) 128 Fed. 205,
In re Home Discount Co. (D. C.) 147 Fed. 538, and Leitch v.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 95 ~Hnn. 35, 103 N. W. 704, with the
deference to which they are entitled.!\ They proceed upon considerations as to the effect of an assignment of wages and the
rights vesting thereunder in the assignee, as well as public policy pointed out in the latter case, which are inconsistent with
·what we conceive to be sound reasoning, and opposed to the
rn1merous decisions of this court above cited concerning rights
11e(1uired undP,r assiignmcnts of wages. In the absence of a decision to the same effect by the Supreme Court of the United
5-See also In re Ludeke, 171
Fed. 292; Levl v. Loeveobart & Co.,
138 Ky. 133, 127 s . W. 748, 30 L.

R. A. (N. S.) 375, 137 Am. St. Rep.
377.
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States, we cannot accede to them as authoritative. Nor do we

perceive anything inconsistent with the conclusion we have

reached, in Clark v. Clark, 17 How. 315, 15 L. ed. 77, East

Lewisburg v. Marsh, 91 Pa. 96, Christian & Craft Grocery Co.

v. Michael & Lyons, 121 Ala. 84-87, 25 South. 571, 77 Am. St.

Rep. 30, Williams v. Chambers, 10 Q. B. 337, and Hanover Nat.

Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 192, 22 Sup. Ct. 857, 46 L. ed. 1113,

which are cited as generally supporting authorities In re Home

Discount Co., ubi supra.

The assignment to the plaintiff is a lien which was preserved

by § 67d of the bankruptcy act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat . 564,

c. 541 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3450]), and was not affected by

the discharge in bankruptcy of the assignor. This conclusion

is supported by Mallin v. Wenham, 209 Ill. 252, 70 N. E. 564,

65 L. R. A. 602, 101 Am. St. Rep. 233.

Judgment affirmed.8

EVANS v. STAALLE

88 Minn. 253, 92 N. W. 951

(Supreme Court of Minnesota. Jan. 9, 1903)

START, C. J. Action in the District Court of the county of

Murray to enforce a resulting trust in favor of the plaintiff as

a creditor of the defendant's husband, Christ Staalle, hereafter

States, we cannot accede to them 88 authoritative. Nor do we
perceive anything inconsistent with the conclusion we have
reached, iu Clark v. Clark, 17 How. 315, 15 L. ed. 77, East
Lewisburg v. Marsh, 91 Pa. 96, Christian & Craft Grocery Co.
v. Michael & Lyons, 121 Ala. 84-87, 25 South. 571, 77 Am. St.
Rep. 30, Williams v. Chambers, 10 Q. B. 337, and Hanover Nat.
Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 192, 22 Sup. Ct. 857, 46 L. ed. 1113,
which are cited 88 generally supporting authorities In re Home
Discount Co., ubi supra.
The assignment to the plaintiff is a lien which was preserved
by § 67 d of the bankruptcy act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat. 564,
c. 541 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3450] ), and was not affected by
the discharge in bankruptcy of the assignor. Thia conclusion
is supported by Mallin v. Wenham, 209 Ill 252, 70 N. E. 564,
65 L. R. A. 602, 101 Am. St. Rep. 233.
Judgment affirmed.e
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designated as the "debtor." The facts, in brief, as established

by the verdict of the jury and the findings of the trial judge,

are substantially these: In the year 1892 the debtor was in-

. EVANS v. STAALLE

debted to the plaintiff in the aggregate sum of $117.25, and on

November 11, 1897, the plaintiff duly recovered and docketed a

88 Minn. 253, 92 N. W. 951

judgment against him therefor in the sum of $224.17, including

interest and costs. On March 19, 1901, execution was duly is-

(Supreme Court of Minnesota. Jan. 9, 1903)

sued on the judgment, and returned wholly unsatisfied. On

November 28 and December 19, 1900, respectively, land aggre-

gating 1G0 acres, being the two tracts of 80 acres each described

in the complaint, was conveyed to the defendant by the then

owners thereof. The debtor paid one-third of the consideration

for the conveyance of such tracts of land, and the title was taken

in the name of the defendant as grantee to hinder and defraud

the creditors of the debtor. This action was commenced in

6—See note to principal case in

14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1025.

START, C. J. Action in the District Court of the county of
Murray to enforce a resulting trust in favor of the plaintiff as
a creditor of the defendant's husband, Christ Staalle, hereafter
designated as the ''debtor.'' The facts, in brief, as established
by the verdict of the jury and the findings of the trial judge,
are substantially these: In the year 1892 the debtor was indebted to the plaintiff in the aggregate sum of $117.25, and on
Novi>m her 11, 1897, the plaintiff duly recovered and docket.ed a
judgment against him therefor in the sum of $224.17, including
interest and costs. On March 19, 1901, execution was duly issued on the judgment, and returned wholly unsatisfied. On
November 28 and December 19, 1900, respectively, land aggregating 160 acres, being the two tracts of 80 acres e.ach described
in the complaint, was conveyed to the defendant by the then
owners thereof. The debtor paid one-third of the consideration
for the conveyance of such tracts of land, and the title was taken
in the name of the defendant as grantee to hinder and defraud
the creditors of the debtor. This action was commenced in
6--See note to principal case in
14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1025.
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April, 1901, and the complaint alleged, with others, the facts

we have stated. The answer of the defendant to the complaint

admitted that the tracts of land described in the complaint were

conveyed to her at the dates stated in the complaint, and denied

the other allegations thereof. On April 6, 1902, the defendant

moved the court for leave to serve an amended and supplemental

answer, setting up the fact that on November 16, 1901, the

debtor, Christ Staalle, was discharged in bankruptcy from all

of his debts existing on January 19, 1901, on which day he nic-

his petition for adjudication under the act of congress relatii.i;

to bankruptcy. The motion was denied, and the trial proceeded

upon the original pleadings. The trial court, as a conclusion of

law, directed judgment in favor of the plaintiff to the effect that

the defendant holds the title to an undivided one-third of the

two tracts of land here in question in trust for the plaintiff to

the amount of his judgment, which is a lien thereon, and, fur-

ther, that the plaintiff is entitled to a lien on a third tract of

land to the extent of $51.92, as to which it is unnecessary to

state the facts. Judgment was so entered, from which the de-

fendant appealed.

1. The first assignment of error to be considered is that the

complaint does not allege facts constituting a cause of action,
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because it does not state that the debtor was ever the owner of

any interest in the land in question, nor that he was ever the

owner of any of the consideration paid therefor, nor any facts

tending to show any intention to defraud any of his creditors,

or that any of them were defrauded. No one of these objections

to the complaint is well taken. The complaint alleges that the

land in question was conveyed to the defendant, and that the

purchase price thereof was paid by the judgment debtor, and

the title thereto taken in the name of the defendant to defraud

creditors. Upon these facts there presumptively arose a trust

in favor of the creditors of the debtor at the time such convey-

ance was made. It was only necessary to allege such facts in

the complaint. Gen. St. 1894, § 4281; Rogers v. McCauley, 22

Minn. 384. It was sufficient to allege in the complaint that the

debtor paid the purchase price, without also alleging that he

was the owner thereof. The legal title to the land was vested

in the defendant by the conveyance to her, and no interest or trust

in the land resulted in favor of the debtor by reason of his pay-

ing part of the purchase price or otherwise. Subject to the trust

in favor of then existing creditors, the defendant became, by the

April, 1901, and the complaint alleged, with others, the facts
we have stated. The answer of the defendant to the complaint
admitted that the tracts of land described in the complaint were
conveyed to her at the dates stated in the complaint, and denied
the other allegations thereof. On April 6, 1902, the defendant
moved the court for leave to serve an amended and supplemental
answer, setting up the fact that on November 16, HIUl, ti1t·
debtor, Christ Staalle, was discharged in bankruptcy from all
of his debts existing on January 19, 1901, on which <lay he tii···
his petition for adjudication under the act of congress relati1.,;:
to bankruptcy. The motion was denied, and the trial proceeded
upon the origin.al pleadings. The trial court, as a conclusion of
law, directed judgment in favor of the plaintiff to the effect that
the defendant holds the title to an undivided one-third of the
two tracts of land here in question in trust for the plaintiff to
the amount of his judgment, which is a lien thereon, and, further, that the plaintiff is entitled to a lien on a third tract of
land to the extent of $51.92, as to which it is unnecessary to
state the facts. Judgment was so entered, from whi('h the defendant appealed.
1. The first assignment of error to be considered is that the
complaint does not allege facts constituting a cause of action,
because it does not state that the debtor was ever the owner of
any interest in the land in question, nor that he was ever the
owner of any of the consideration paid therefor, nor any facts
tending to show any intention to defraud any of his creditors,
or that any of them were defrauded. No one of these objections
to the complaint is well taken. The complaint alleges that the
land in question was conveyed to the defendant, and that the
purchase price thereof was paid by the judgment debtor, and
the title thereto taken in the name of the defendant to defraud
creditors. Upon these facts there presumptively arose a trust
in favor of the creditors of the debtor at the time such conveyance was made. It was only necessary to allege such facts in
the complaint. Gen. St. 1894, § 4281 ; Rogers v. :McCauley, 22
Minn. 384. It was sufficient to aUege in the complaint that the
debtor paid the purchase price, without also alleging that he
was the owner thereof. The legal title to the land was vested
in the defendant by the conveyance to her, and no interest or trust
in the land resulted in favor of the debtor by reason of his paying part of the purchase price or otherwise. Subject to the trust
in favor of then existing creditors, the defendant became, by the
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conveyance, the absolute owner of the land. Gen. St. 1894,

§ 4281. Such being the effect of the conveyance to the defendant,

it would have been absurdly untrue to have alleged in the com-

plaint that the debtor had some interest in the land.

2. The order of the court denying the defendant's motion to file

a supplemental answer pleading the debtor's discharge in bank-

ruptcy is urged as error. The trial court, in the exercise of a

fair discretion, might well have denied the motion on the ground

that it was not made with reasonable promptness. But, this

aside, the order was right on the merits, for the debtor's dis-

charge was immaterial. No title to the land passed to the trus-

tee in bankruptcy. The discharge in bankruptcy did not pay

or extinguish the plaintiff's debt, nor relieve the defendant's

land from the trust with which it was charged by operation of

law for the payment of the debt. The only effect of the dis-

charge was to relieve the debtor from all legal obligations to

pay the debt, leaving all liens or trusts securing the debt unim-

paired. Lowell, Bankr. §§ 242-244; Smith v. Stanehfield, 84

Minn. 343, 87 N. W. 917. Now, when the land in this case was

conveyed to the defendant upon a consideration paid by the

debtor, a trust in favor of the plaintiff as a creditor attached to

the land to the extent necessary to satisfy his debt, which could
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be defeated only by disproving any fraudulent intent. This

trust could be enforced after the debtor's discharge, although

all personal remedies against him to secure payment of the debt

had been thereby extinguished, precisely the same as a mortgagee

may foreclose his lien on the mortgaged premises, and thereby

secure payment of his debt, although an action to recover it

from the mortgagor be barred by the statute of limitations.

Slingerland v. Sherer, 46 Minn. 422, 49 N. W. 237.

•••

Judgment affirmed.

BROWN & BROWN COAL CO. v. ANTEZAK

164 Mich. 110, 128 N. W. 774

(Supreme Court of Michigan. Dec. 7, 1910)

This action was commenced by attachment in the justices'

court of Detroit, December 30, 1907. On January 2, 1908, the

attached property was released upon the giving of the statutory

bond. On February 8, 1908, judgment was rendered in favor

conveyance, the · absolute owner of the land.

Gen. St. 189·l,

§ 4281. Such being the effect of the conveyance to the defendant,
it would have been absurdly untrue to have alleged in the com-

plaint that the debtor had some interest in the land.
2. The order of the court denying the defendant's motion to file
a supplemental answer pleading the debtor's discharge in bankruptcy is urged as error. The trial court, in the exercise of a
fair discretion, might well have denied the motion on the ground
that it was not made with reasonable promptness. But, this
aside, the order was right on the merits, for the debtor's discharge was immaterial. No title to the la.ud passed to the trustee in ba.nkruptcy. The discharge in bankruptcy did not pay
or extinguish the plaintiff's debt, nor relieve the defendant's
land from the trust with which it was charged by operation of
law for the payment of the debt. The only effect of the discharge was to relieve the debtor from all legal obligations to
pay the debt, leaving all liens or trusts securing the debt unimpaired. Lowell, Bankr. § § 242-244; Smith v. Stanchfield, 84
:\!inn. 343, 87 N. W. 917. Now, when the land in this case was
conveyed to the defendant upon a consideration paid by the
debtor, a trust in favor of the plaintiff as a creditor attached to
the land to the extent necessary to satisfy his debt, which could
be defeated only by disproving any fraudulent intent. This
trust could be enforced after the debtor's discharge, although
all personal remedies against him to secure payment of the debt
had been thereby extinguished, precisely the same as a mortgagee
may foreclose his lien on the mortgaged premises, and thereby
secure payment of his debt, although an action to recover it
from the mortgagor be barred by the statute of limitations.
Slingerland v. Sherer, 46 llinn. 422, 49 N. W. 237.

• • •

Judgment affirmed.
BROWN & BROWN COAL CO. v. ANTEZAK
164 Mich. 110, 128 N. W. 774
(Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 7. 1910)

This action was commenced by attachment in the justices'
court of Detroit, December 30, 1907. On January 2, 1908. the
attached property was released upon the giving of the statutory
bond. On February 8, 1908, judgment was rendered in favor

DISCHARGE 681

DISCHARGE

681

of the plaintiff for $405.94 and costs. On March 2, 1908, an

appeal was taken to the Circuit Court for the county of Wayne.

In perfecting the appeal the usual statutory bond was given;

one John Knuth becoming surety thereon. While said appeal

was pending and 13 months after it was taken, the defendant,

on April 7, 1909, filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy in the

United States District Court. On July 16, 1909, the appeal not

having been prosecuted or determined, plaintiff made a motion

to dismiss. On July 26, 1909, defendant secured an order stay-

ing proceedings in the Wayne Circuit Court until the final de-

termination of the bankruptcy proceedings in the United States

District Court. In the bankruptcy proceeding the judgment

here in question was listed as a liability of the bankrupt, and a

final discharge was by him obtained on September 21, 1909. On

October 4, 1909, defendant filed an amended plea, giving notice

of his discharge, and on December 10, 1909, the case came on

for trial in the Wayne Circuit Court. No defense upon the

merits was interposed by defendant, but it was urged in his be-

half that his discharge in the bankruptcy proceeding operated,

not only to cancel his indebtedness to plaintiff, but likewise re-

leased the surety upon the appeal bond. It was conceded upon

the trial that, unless the discharge of defendant released the

surety, plaintiff was entitled to a judgment for the amount of
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the judgment in the justice court, with interest. There being

no question of fact involved, by consent of counsel, the case was

tried by the court without a jury. A verdict was directed for

defendant, upon which judgment was entered. Plaintiff has re-

moved the case to this court by writ of error.

BROOKE, J. (after stating the facts as above). From the

foregoing statement of facts, it will be seen that the only ques-

tion to be determined is whether or not the discharge which

defendant obtained in the bankruptcy proceedings operates as

a bar to the taking of a judgment against his surety upon the

appeal bond. The obligation of the bond is as follows:

"Whereas, judgment was rendered on the 26th day of February,

A. D. 1908, by Louis Ott, one of the justices of the peace in and

for the county of Wayne, in favor of the above-named Brown

& Brown Coal Company, as plaintiff, and against the above-

bounden Stanislaus Antezak, as defendant, for the sum of

of the plaintiff for $405.94 and costs. On :!\larch 2, 1908, an
appeal was taken to the Circuit Court for the county of Wayne.
In perfecting the appeal the usual statutory bond was given;
one John Knuth becoming surety thereon. While said appeal
was pending and 13 months after it was taken, the defendant,
on April 7, 1909, filed a volw1tary petition in bankruptcy in the
United States District Court. On July 16, 1909, the appeal not
having been prosecuted or determined, plaintiff made a motion
to dismiss. On July 26, 1909, defendant secured an order staying proceedings in the Wayne Circuit Court until the final determination of the bankruptcy proceedings in the United States
DistI·ict Court. In the bankruptcy proceeding the judgment
here in question was listed as a liability of the bankrupt, and a
final discharge was by him obtained on September 21, 1909. On
October 4, 1909, defendant filed an amended plea, giving notice
of his discharge, and on December 10, 1909, the case ca.me on
for trial in the Wayne Circuit Court. No defense upon the
merits was interposed by defendant, but it was urged in his behalf that his discharge in the bankruptcy proceeding operated,
not only to cancel his indebtedness to plaintiff, but likewise released the surety upon the appeal bond. It was conceded upon
the trial that, unless the discharge of defendant released the
surety, plaintiff was entitled to a judgment for the amount of
the judgment in the justice court, with interest. There being
no question of fact involved, by con.sent of counsel, the case was
tried by the court without a jury. A verdict was directed for
defendant, upon which judgment was entered. Plaintiff has removed the case to this court by writ of error.

405.94 dollars, damages, and 3.00 dollars, costs of suit, and

whereas the above-bounden Stanislaus Antezak, conceiving him-

BROOKE, J. (after stating the facts as above). From the
foregoing statement of facts, it will be seen that the only question to be determined is whether or not the discharge which
defendant obtained in the bankruptcy proceedings operates as
a bar to the taking of a judgment against his surety upon the
appeal bond. The obligation of the bond is as follows:
''Whereas, judgment was rendered on the 26th day of February,
A. D. 1908, by Louis Ott, one of the justice.s of the peace in and
for the county of Wayne, in favor of the above-named Brown
& Brown Coal Company, as plaintiff, and against the abovebounden Stanislaus Antezak, as defendant, for the sum of
405.94 dollars, damages, and 3.00 dollars, costs of suit, and
whereas the above-bounden Stanislaus Antezak, conceiving him-
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self aggrieved by said judgment, has appealed therefrom to the

Circuit Court for the county of Wayne: Now, therefore, the

condition of the above obligation is such, that if Ihe above-

bounden Stanislaus Antezak shall prosecute his said appeal with

all due diligence to a decision in the said Circuit Court. and if

a judgment be rendered against him in the said Circuit Court,

shall pay the amount of such judgment, including all the costs,

with interest thereon, and in case the said appeal shall be dis-

continued or dismissed, if the said Stanislaus Antezak shall pay

the amount of said judgment rendered against him in said jus-

tice court, including all costs with interest thereon, then this

obligation to be void, otherwise in force. [Signed] Stanislaus

Antezak. [Seal.] [Signed] John Knuth. [Seal.]"

§ 16, National Bankruptcy Law 1898, provides: "The liabil-

ity of a person, who is a co-debtor with or guarantor or in any

manner, a surety for a bankrupt, shall not be altered by the

discharge of such bankrupt." Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat.

550 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3428).

This identical question was considered in the case of Knapp

v. Anderson, 15 N. B. R. 316. The language of the bankrupt

act of 1867 is, in effect, the same as that of the act of 1898

above quoted. Act March 2, 1867, c. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. 533.
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The court, after discussing the obligation of an indorser, said:

"So with the surety. He agrees to pay if the event happens

which matures his obligation to pay. He assumes to pay, and

incurs the obligation to do so, which may become absolute. The

design of an undertaking and the effect of it are proper matters

of consideration on the question. The undertaking stays all pro-

ceedings, and the effect is to prevent the creditor from enforcing

his judgment by execution, and in that mode obtaining his debt

out of the property of his debtor. The sureties in the under-

taking prevent him from availing himself of this right and op-

portunity, to which he is entitled by the law of the land and by

his superior diligence. This right can be destroyed in all cases

if the debtor, by appeal, and by subsequent proceedings in bank-

ruptcy before a judgment of affirmance, can release himself and

his sureties as well. It was doubtless to prevent such and kin-

dred results that the law declared the discharge should not re-

lease or affect any person liable for the same debt for or with

the bankrupt, either as partner, contractor, indorser, surety, or

otherwise. It is a personal relief given to the applicant, or

forced upon him, and not to those equally bound with him to

self aggrieved by said judgment, has appealed therefrom to the
Circuit Court for the county of Wayne: Now, therf'fOri, tht>
condition of the above obligation is such, that if the abo.-ebounden Stanislaus Antezak shall prosecute his said appeal with
all due diligence to a decision in the said Circuit Court. aud if
a judgment be rendered against him in the said Cirr.nit C(lurt.
shall pay the amount of such judgment, including all tht> costs.
with interest thereon, and in case the said appeal shall be discoutinued or dismissed, if the said Stanislaus Antezak shall pay
the amount of said judgment rendered against him in said justice court, in~luding all costs with interest thereon, then this
obligation to be void, otherwise in force. [Signed] Stanislaus
Ante?.ak:. [Seal.] [Signed] John Knuth. [Seal.]"
§ 16, National Bankruptcy Law 1898, providl's: ''The liability of a person, who is a co-debtor with or guarantor or in any
manner, a surety for a bankrupt, shall not be altered by the
discharge of such bankrupt." Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat.
550 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3428).
This identical question was considered in the case of Knapp
v. Anderson, 15 N. B. R. 316. The language of the bankrupt
act of 1867 is, in effect, the same as that of the act of 1898
above quoted. Act March 2, 1867, c. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. 533.
The court, after discussing the obligation of an indorser, said:
"So with the surety. He agrees to pay if the event happens
wh'ich matures his obligation to pay. He assumes to pay, and
incurs the obligation to do so, which may become absolute. The
design of an undertaking and the effect of it are proper matters
of consideration on the question. The undertaking stays all proceedings, and the effect is to prevent the creditor from enforcing
bis judgment by execution, and in that mode obtaining his debt
out of the property of his debtor. The sureties in the undertaking prevent him from availing himself of this right and opportunity, to which he is entitled by the law of the land and by
his superior diligence. This right can be destroyed in all ca&•s
if the debtor, by appeal, and by subsequent proceedings in bankruptcy before a judgment of affirmance, can release himself and
his sureties as well. It was doubtless to prevent such and kindrecl resul~ that the law declared the discharge should not release or affect any person liable for the same debt for or with
the bankrupt, either as partner, contractor, indorser, surety, or
otheTWise. It is a person.al relief given to the applicant1 or
forced upon him, and not to those equally bound with him to
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answer his creditor. * * * A surety is rarely primarily lia-

ble. His obligation usually depends upon a contingency, which

is either an event to occur, or the failure of the principal to pay

or to do the act required."

In Holyoke v. Adams, 10 N. B. R. 270, it was held that a dis-

charge in bankruptcy did not release the sureties upon a bond

given in attachment proceedings, commenced more than four

months before the bankruptcy proceedings were launched.

The case of In re Wm. Albrecht, 17 N. B. R. 287, Fed. Cas.

No. 145, arose in Michigan, and the opinion was written by

Judge Brown, later Justice of the United States Supreme Court.

In that case, the authorities are reviewed, and the conflict be-

tween them is noted. The court concludes: "I deem it incon-

sistent with the general purpose of the act to hold that the lien

of the creditor, lawfully acquired by his diligence, shall be lost

by the debtor giving a bond to satisfy the judgment, an action

entirely beyond the control of the creditor, and one which was

designed to secure, not to defeat, the ultimate payment of the

debt. • * • But under the construction given by the Mas-

sachusetts courts, the preference of the attaching creditor is lost,

if the debtor is sufficiently responsible to obtain a bond, while

it is preserved, if his situation is so desperate as to make the
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release of the property impossible."

In Hill v. Harding, 107 U. S. 631, 2 Sup. Ct. 404, 27 L. ed.

493, Mr. Justice Gray, speaking for the court, said: "The stay

does not operate as a bar to the action, but only as a suspension

of proceedings until the question of the bankrupt's discharge

shall have been determined in the United States Court sitting

in bankruptcy. After the determination of that question in that

court, the court in which the suit is pending may proceed to

such judgment as the circumstances of the case may require.

If the discharge is refused, the plaintiff, upon establishing his

claim, may obtain a general judgment If the discharge is

granted, the court in which the suit is pending may then deter-

mine whether the plaintiff is entitled to a special judgment for

the purpose of enforcing an attachment made more than four

months before the commencement of the proceedings in bank-

ruptcy, or for the purpose of charging sureties upon a bond

given to dissolve such an attachment." This case was again

before the United States Supreme Court (130 U. S. 699, 9 Sup.

Ct. 725, 32 L. ed. 1083), where it said: "If the bond was

executed before the commencement of proceedings in bank-

answer his creditor. • • • A surety is rarely primarily liable. His obligation usually depends upon a contingency, which
is either an event to occur, or the failure of the principal to pay
or to do the act required.''
In Holyoke v. Adams, 10 N. B. R. 270, it was held that a discharge in bankruptcy did not release the sureties upon a bond
given in attachment proceedings, commenced more than four
months before the bankruptcy proceedings were launched.
The case of In re 'Vm. Albrecht, 17 N. B. R. 287, Fed. Cas.
No. 145, arose in Michigan, and the opinion was written by
Judge Brown, later Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
In that case, the authorities are reviewed, and the conflict between them is noted. The court concludes: ''I deem it inconsistent with the general purpose of the act to hold that the lien
of the creditor, lawfully acquired by his diligence, shall be lost
by the debtor giving a bond to satisfy the judgment, an action
entirely beyond the control of the creditor, and one which · was
designed to secure, not to defeat, the ultimate payment of the
debt. • • • But under the construction given by the Massachusetts courts, the preference of the attaching creditor is lost,
if the debtor is sufficiently responsible to obtain a bond, while
it is preserved, if his situation is so desperate as to make the
release of the property impossible.''
In Hill v. Harding, 107 U. S. 631, 2 Sup. Ct. 404, 27 L. ed.
493, Mr. Justice Gray, speaking for the court, said: "The stay
does not operate as a bar to the action, but only as a suspension
of proceedings until the question of the bankrupt's discharge
shall have been determined in the United States Court sitting
in bankruptcy. After the determination of that question in that
court, the court in which the suit is pending may proceed to
such judgment as the circumstances of the case may require.
If the discharge is refused, the plaintiff, upon establishing his
claim, may obtain a general judgment If the discharge is
granted, the court in which the suit is pending may then determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to a special judgment for
the purpose of enforcing an .attachment made more than four
months before the commencement o.f the proceedings in bankruptcy, or for the purpose of charging sureties upon a bond
given to dissolve such an attachment.'' This case was again
before the United States Supreme Court (130 U. S. 699, 9 Sup.
Ct. 725, 32 L. ed. 1083), where it said: ''If the bond was
executed before the commencement of proceedings in bank-
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ruptcy, the discharge of the bankrupt protects him from liability

to the obligees, so that, in an action on the bond against him and

his sureties, any judgment recovered by the plaintiffs must be

accompanied with a perpetual stay of execution against him;

but his discharge does not prevent that judgment from being

rendered generally against them''—citing Wolf v. Stix, 99 U. S.

1, 25 L. ed. 309.

A very well considered case involving the question in dispute

will be found in Fisse v. Einstein, 5 Mo. App. 78. After dis-

cussing the Massachusetts decisions and those of some other

states to the contrary, the court says: "To hold that the surety

in this appeal is to be released because there can be no formal

entry of judgment against his principal in the Appellate Court,

though there is a solemn admission in that court of the perfect

correctness and justice of the judgment from which this appeal

is taken, is to denaturalize the transaction, and to give an inter-

pretation to the appeal bond quite foreign to its scope and mean-

ing. It is to say that the surety, whilst engaging to pay the

judgment appealed from if the judgment debtor becomes in-

solvent, is to be released merely because the judgment debtor

becomes insolvent. * * • The insolvency of the principal is

the very contingency against which the appeal bond was in
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tended to provide." See, also, Farrell v. Finch, 40 Ohio St.

337; Cyc. vol. 5, p. 401, and cases cited.

We do not overlook the fact that several states, notably Mas-

sachusetts (see Carpenter v. Turrell, 100 Mass. 452, and Hamil-

ton v. Bryant, 114 Mass. 543), have given a different construc-

tion to the statute. This is, however, a federal statute, and we

are of opinion that the construction it has received in the fed-

eral courts should control, if that construction is not inconsistent

with our own decisions and is, as we believe it to be, in accord-

ance with the principles of justice.

It is urged that no federal question is involved. While in one

sense that may be true, yet, under the record as it stands, the

only obstacle to the recovery of a judgment by the plaintiff

against both principal and surety is the fact that a federal law

says that under a certain contingency (which has arisen) the

principal is relieved from the debt. That same law, in terms,

and as construed by the federal courts, says that the release of

the principal shall not operate to discharge his surety. Nor is

this construction one which is unduly harsh as to the surety. In

signing the obligation, he may be presumed to have had in mind

ruptcy, the discharge of the bankrnpt protects him from liability
to the obligees, so that, in an action on the bond against him and
his sureties, any judgment recovered by the plaintiffs must be
accompanied with a perpetual stay of execution against him;
but his discharge does not prevent that judgment from being
rendered generally against them "-citing Wolf v. Sti.1:, 99 U.S.
1, 25 L. ed. 309.
A very well considered case involving the question in dispute
will be found in Fisee v. Einstein, 5 Mo. App. 78. After discussing the Massachusetts decisions and those of some other
states to the contrary, the court says: "To hold that the surety
in this appeal is to be released because there can be no formal
entry of judgment against his principal in the Appellate Court,
though there is a solemn admission in that court of the perfect
correctness and justice of the judgment from which this appeal
is taken, is to denaturalfae the transaction, and to give an interpretation to the appeal bond quite foreign to its scope and meaning. It is to say that the surety, whilst engaging to pay the
judgment appealed from if the judgment debtor becomes insolvent, is to be released merely because the judgment debtor
becomes insolvent. • • • The insolvency of the principal is
the very contingency against which the appeal bond was in·
tended to provide.'' See, also, Farrell v. Finch, 40 Ohio St.
337; Cyc. vol. 5, p. 401, and cases cited.
We do not overlook the fact that several states, notably Musachusetts (see Carpenter v. Turrell, 100 Mass. 452, and Ha.mil·
ton v. Bryant, 114 Mass. 543), have given a different eonstruetion to the statute. This is, however, a federal statute, and we
are of opinion that the constrnction it has received in the fed·
eral courts should control, if that construction is not inconsistent
with our own decisions and is, as we believe it to be, in accord·
ance with the principles of justice.
It is urged that no federal question is involved. While in one
sense that may be true, yet, under the record as it stands, the
only obstacle to the recovery of a judgment by the plaintiff
against both principal and surety is the f.act that a federal law
S;&YS that under a certain contingency (which bas arisen) the
principal is relieved from the debt. That same law, in terms,
and as construed by the federal courts, says that the release of
the principal shall not operate to discharge his surety. Nor is
this constrnction one which is unduly harsh as to the surety. In
signing the obligation, he may be presumed to have had in mind
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the contingency that his principal might become bankrupt, thus

making the surety's liability upon the bond certain.

We have not heretofore discussed the conditions of the bond

itself. The first condition is: "That if the above-bounden

Stanislaus Antezak shall prosecute his said appeal with all due

diligence to a decision in the said Circuit Court," etc. Now,

did the principal comply with this condition of his bondt In-

stead of prosecuting his appeal, he voluntarily sought relief

through bankruptcy in the Federal Court, and interposed that

proceeding first for the purpose of securing a stay of proceed-

ings, and finally as an absolute bar to a recovery These acts

are clearly inconsistent with his obligation as expressed in the

bond. Whether or not they constitute such a breach thereof as

would render the surety liable we do not decide, for, in our

view of the decisions, the liability of the surety would remain

the same even th6ugh the bankruptcy were involuntary.

Our attention is called to the case of Bryant v. Kinyon, 127

Mich. 152, 86 N. W. 531, 53 L. B. A. 801. We there held that

a discharge in bankruptcy released the surety upon a capias

bond. The condition of that bond is that th« principal "shall

pay the costs and condemnation of the court or render himself

into the custody of the sheriff," etc.
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The right of the surety to surrender his principal extends

eight days from the commencement of suit on the recognizance,

after the timely and regular issue and return "not found" of

a body execution. If the debt for which the original suit was

brought is extinguished by the bankruptcy proceeding, no body

execution can ever issue, and the contingency which fixes the

liability of the surety can never arise. The case at bar does not

present this difficulty. Here, as stated by the United States

Supreme Court, a judgment may issue against the principal ac-

companied by a perpetual stay of execution, and the surety may

be compelled to answer according to the terms of his obligation.

The judgment is reversed, and a new trial ordered.7

7—On motion to amend judgment

the court amended the opinion to

read as follows: "The judgment is

reversed, and the ease is remanded

to the circuit court, where judgment

will be entered for the plaintiff in

the amount of the judgment in the

justice's court, with interest." 164

Mich. 116, 130 N. W. 305.

the contingency that his principal might become bankrupt, thus
making the surety's liability upon the bond certain.
We have not heretofore discussed the conditions of the bond
it.aelf. The first condition is: ''That if the above-bounden
Stanislaus Antezak shall proeecute. his said appeal with all due
diligence to a decision in the said Circuit Court," etc. Now,
did the principal comply with this condition of his bond T Instead of prosecuting his appeal, he voluntarily sought relief
through bankruptcy in the Federal Court, and interposed that
proceeding first for the purpose of securing a stay of proceedi11gs, and finally as an absolute bar to a recovery These acts
are clearly inconsistent with his obligation as expressed in the
bond. Whether or not they constitute such a breach thereof as
would render the surety liable we do not decide, for, in our
view of the decisions, the liability of the surety would remain
the same even though the bankruptcy were involuntary.
Our attention is called to the case of Bryant v. Kinyon, 127
Mich. 152, 86 N. W. 531, 53 L. R. A. 801. We there held that
a discharge in bankruptcy released the surety upon a capias
bond. The condition of that bond is that the principal ''shall
pay the costs and condemnation of the court or render himself
into the custody of the sheriff,'~ etc.
The right of the surety to surrender his principal extends
eight days from the commencement of suit on the recognizance,
after the timely and regular issue and return "not found" of
a body execution. If the debt for which the original suit was
brought is extinguished by the bankruptcy proceeding, no body
execution can ever issue, and the contingency which fixes the
liability of the surety can never arise. The case at bar does not
present this difficulty. Here, as stated by the United States
Supreme Court, a judgment may issue against the principal accompanied by a perpetual stay of execution, and the sur~ty may
be compelled to answer according to the terms of his obligation.
The judgment is r.eversed, and a. new trial ordered.7
7--0n motion to amend judgment
the court amended the opinion to
rend as follows: ''The judgment is
reversed, and the case is remanded
to the circuit court, where judgment

will be entered for the plaintiff in
the amount of the judgment in the
justice's court, with interest.'' 164
Mich.. 116, 130 N. W. 305.
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BLUTHENTHAL v. JONES

208 U. S. 64, 52 L. ed. 390, 28 Sup. Ct . 192

BLUTHENTHAL v. JONES

(United States Supreme Court. January 6, 1908)

Mr. Justice MOODY delivered the opinion of the court:

208 U. S. 64, 52 L. ed. 390, 28 Sup. Ct. 192

This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the state of

Florida. The plaintiffs in error were judgment creditors of

Miles C. Jones, the intestate of the defendant in error. The

creditors sought to enforce the judgment by a levy of execution.

The question in the case is whether Jones was discharged from

the debt by a discharge in bankruptcy granted to him on Novem-

ber 7, 1903, by the District Court for the southern district of

Florida, on proceedings which were begun on August 3, 1903.

The debt was one provable in the bankruptcy proceeding, and,

it is conceded, would be barred by the discharge, were it not

that there had been a prior proceeding in bankruptcy in another

district court, which, it is contended, had the effect of exempting

the debt from the operation of the discharge. In the year 1900.

Jones filed his petition in bankruptcy in the District Court for

the southern district of Georgia. Bluthenthal & Biekart, the

plaintiffs in error, objected to the discharge in that proceeding,

and it was refused on December 3, 1900. Bluthenthal & Biekart,

at the time of the first proceeding, were creditors of Jones in
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respect of what may be assumed, for the purposes of this case,

to be the same indebtedness now in question. The ground of the

refusal does not appear. It may be assumed to have been, how-

ever, one of the two grounds specified in § 14 of the bankruptcy

act [30 Stat. at L. 550, c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p.

3427] before it was amended by the act of February 5, 1903

[32 Stat. at L. 797, c. 487, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1907,

p. 1026] ; that is to say, either that the bankrupt has committed

an offense punishable by imprisonment, or, with fraudulent in-

tent and in contemplation of bankruptcy, destroyed, concealed,

or failed to keep books of accounts. Though Bluthenthal &

Biekart were notified of the proceedings on the second petition

for bankruptcy and their debt was scheduled, they did not prove

their claim or participate in any way in those proceedings. They

now claim that their debt was not affected by the discharge on

account of the adjudication in the previous proceedings.

§ 1 of the bankruptcy act defines a discharge as "the release

of a bankrupt from all of his debts which are provable in bank-

(United StateJJ Supreme Court. January 6, 1908)

'

Mr. Justice MOODY delivered the opinion of the court:
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the state of
Florida. The plaintiffs in error were judgment creditors of
Miles C. Jones, the intestate of the defendant in error. The
creditors sought to enforce the judgment by a levy of execution.
The question in the case is whether Jones was discharged from
the debt by a dischairge in bankruptcy granted to him on Novem·
ber 7, 1903, by the District Court for the southern district of
Florida, on proceedings which were begun on August 3, 1903.
The debt was one provable in the bankruptcy proceeding, and,
it is conceded, would be barred by the discharge, were it not
that there had been a prior proceeding in bankruptey in another
district court, which, it is contended, had the effect of exempting
the debt from the operation of the discharge. In the year 1900,
Jones filed his petition in bankruptcy in the District Court for
the southern district of Georgia. Bluthenthal & Bickart, the
plaintiffs in error, objected to the discharge in that proceeding,
and it was refused on December 3, 1900. Bluthenthal & Bickart)
at the time of the first proceeding, were creditors of Jones in
respect of what may be a881lmed, for the purposes of this case,
to be the same indebtedness now in question. The ground of the
refusal does not appear. It may be assumed to have been, how·
ever, one of the two grounds specified in § 14 of the bankruptcy
act [30 Stat. at L. 550, c. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p.
3427) before .it was amended by the act of February 5, 1903
[32 Stat. at L. 797, c. 487, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1907,
p. 1026] ; that is to say, either that the bankrupt has committed
an offense punishable by imprisonment, or, with fraudulent in·
tent and in contemplation of bankruptcy, destroyed, concealed,
or failed to keep books of accounts. Though Bluthenthal &
Bickart were notified of the proceedings on the second petition
for ba1:kruptcy and their debt was scheduled, they did not prove
their claim or participate in any way in those proceedings. They
now claim that their debt was not affected by the discharge on
account of the adjudication in the previous proceedings.
§ 1 of the bankruptcy act defines a discharge as "the release
of a bankrupt from all of his debts which are provable in bank·
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ruptcy, except such as are excepted by this act." § 14 of the

amended act, which was applicable to the second proceedings,

provides that after due hearing the court shall discharge the

bankrupt, unless he has committed one of the six acts specified

in that section. § 17 of the amended act provides that a dis-

charge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his

provable debts, with four specified exceptions, which do not

cover this case. The discharge appears to have been regularly

granted, and, as the debt due to Bluthenthal & Bickert is not

one of the debts which, by the terms of the statute, are excepted

from its operation, on the face of the statute the bankrupt was

discharged from the debt due to them. There is no reason shown

in this record why the discharge did not have the effect which

it purported to have. Undoubtedly, as in all other judicial pro-

ceedings, an adjudication refusing a discharge in bankruptcy,

finally determines, for all time and in all courts, as between

those parties or privies to it, the facts upon which the refusal

was based. But courts are not bound to search the records of

other courts and give effect to their judgments. If there has

been a conclusive adjudication of a subject in some other court,

it is the duty of him who relies upon it to plead it or in some

manner bring it to the attention of the court in which it is
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sought to be enforced. Plaintiffs in error failed to do this.

When an application was made by the bankrupt in the District

Court for the southern district of Florida, the judge of that

court was, by the terms of the statute, bound to grant it, unless

upon investigation it appeared that the bankrupt had committed

one of the six offenses which are specified in § 14 of the bank-

ruptcy act as amended. An objecting creditor might have

proved upon that application that the bankrupt had committed

one of the acts which barred his discharge, either by the produc-

tion of evidence or by showing that in a previous bankruptcy

proceeding it had been conclusively adjudicated, as between him

and the bankrupt, that the bankrupt had committed one of such

offenses. If that adjudication had been proved, it would have

taken the place of other evidence and have been final upon the

parties to it. But nothing of this kind took place. Bluthenthal

& Bickart intentionally remained away from the court and

allowed the discharge to be granted without objection.

Since the debt due to the plaintiffs in error was a debt prov-

able in the proceedings before the District Court of Florida,

and was not one of the debts exempted by the statute from the

ruptcy, except such as are excepted by this act." § 14 of th1·
amended act, which was appli<>a hle to the second proceedi!lgs,
provides that after due hearing the court shall discharg-<' the
bankrupt, unless he has committed one of the six acts sp1~cified
in that section. § 17 of the amende1l act provides that a discharge in ba.nkruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his
provable debts, with four specified exceptions, which do not
cover this case. The discharge appears to have been regularly
granted, and, as the debt due to Bluthenthal & Bickert is not
one of the debts which, by the terms of the statute, are excepted
from its operation, on the face of the statute the bankrupt was
discharged from the debt due to them. There is no reason shown
in this record why the discharge did not have the effect which
it purported to have. Undoubtedly, as in all other judicial proceedings, an adjudication refUBing a discharge in bankruptcy,
finally determines, for all time and in all courts, as between
those parties or privies to it, the facts upon which the refusal
was based. But courts are not bound to search the records of
other courts and give effect to their judgments. If there has
been a conclUBive adjudication of a subject in some other court,
it is the duty of him who relies upon it to plead it or in some
manner bring it to the attention of the court in which it is
sought to be enforced. Plaintiffs in error failed to do this.
When an application was made by the bankrupt in the District
Court for the southern district of Florida, the judge of that
court was, by the terms of the statute, bound to grant it, unless
upon i.Ilvestigation it appeared that the bankrupt had committed
one of the six offenses which are specified in § 14 of the bankruptcy act as amended. An objecting creditor might have
proved upon that application that the bankrupt had committed
one of the acts which barred his discharge, either by the production of evidence or by showing that in a previous bankruptcy
proceeding it had been conclUBively adjudicated, as between him
and the bankrupt, that the bankrupt had committed one of such
offenses. If that adjudication had been proved, it would have
taken the place of other evidence and have been final upon the
parties to it. But nothing of this kind took place. Bluthenthal
& Bickart intentionally remained away from the court and
allowed the discharge to be granted without objection.
Since the debt due to the plaintiffs in error was a debt provable in the proceedings before the Di.strict Court of Florida,
a.nd was not one of the debts exempted by the statute from the
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operation of the discharge, it was barred by that discharge. The

Supreme Court of the State of Florida so held, and its judg-

ment must be affirmed.

HARGADINE-McKITTRICK DRY GOODS CO. v. HUDSON

122 Fed. 232, 58 C. C. A. 596

operation of the discharge, it was barred by that discharge. The
Supreme Court of the State of Florida so held, and its judgment must be affirmed.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit . March 23, 1903)

On the 31st day of December, 1901, the Hargadine-McKit-

trick Dry Goods Company, plaintiff in error, brought this action

HARGADINE-McKITTRICK DRY GOODS CO. v. HUDSON

at law [in the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern

district of Missouri] against John Robert Hudson, the defendant

122 Fed. 232, 58 C. C. A. 596

in error, founded on the record of a judgment recovered by the

plaintiff against the defendant in the District Court of Burnett

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. March 23, 1903)

county, Tex., on the 10th day of April, 1891, for the sum of $10.-

939.92. The defendant answered, admitting the recovery of the

judgment, and setting up these defenses: (1) That, being a resi-

dent and citizen of the state of Colorado, he was on the 29th day

of January, 1900, duly adjudged a bankrupt by the United States

District Court for the District of Colorado, and that on the 17th

day of April, 1900, he was duly discharged as a bankrupt by

the order of that court from the payment of all debts provable

against his estate on the 26th day of January, 1900; (2) that

the plaintiff, prior to the 11th day of August, 1900, appeared
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before the referee in bankruptcy having charge of the defend-

ant's estate in bankruptcy, and filed for allowance against the

defendant's estate a claim founded on the identical judgment

sued on in this action, which claim was, upon due hearing and

consideration, disallowed by the referee, and that the plaintiff

filed a petition for a review of the order and judgment of the

referee by the United States District Court for the District of

Colorado, whereupon the referee, on the petition of the plaintiff,

duly certified the claim and his ruling thereon to the District

Court for review, and upon full hearing and consideration that

court, on the 25th day of February, 1901, confirmed the ruling

of the referee and entered judgment disallowing the plaintiff's

claim based on the judgment. The plaintiff's replication ad-

mits that it filed for allowance against the estate of the bank-

rupt its claim, based on the judgment in suit, and that the same

was disallowed by the referee, and upon review was also disal-

lowed by the District Court; but it alleges the ruling of the

On the 31st day of December, 1901, the Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Company, plaintiff in error, brought this action
at law [in the Circuit Court of the United States for the ~rn
district of Missouri] against John Robert Hudson, the defendant
in error, founded on the record of a judgment recovered by the
plaintiff against the defendant in the District Court of Buniett
county, Tex., on the 10th day of April, 1891, for the sum of $10,939.92. The defendant answered, admitting the recovery of the
judgment, and setting up these defenses: ( 1) That, being a resident and citizen of the state of Colorado, he was on the 29th day
of January, 1900, duly adjudged a bankrupt by the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado, and that on the 17th
day of April, 1900, he was duly discharged as a bankrupt by
the order of that court from the payment of all debts provable
against his estate on the 26th day of January, 1900; (2) that
the plaintiff, prior to the 11th day of August, 1900, appeared
before the referee in bankruptcy having charge of the defendant's estate in bankn1ptcy, and filed for allowance against the
defendant's estate a claim founded on the identical judgment
sued on in this action, which claim was, upon due hearing and
consideration, disallowed by the referee, and that the plaintiff
filed a petition for a review of the order and judgment of the
referee by the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado, whereupon the referee, on the petition of the plaintiff,
duly certified the claim and his ruling thereon to the District
Court for revi~w, and upon full hearing and consideration that
court, on the 25th day of February, 1901, confirmed the ruling
of the referee and entered judgment disallowing the plaintiff's
claim based on the judgment. The plaintitf 's replication admits that it filed for allowance against the estate of the bankrupt its claim, based on the judgment in suit, and that the same
was disallowed by the referee, and upon review was also di.sallowed by the District Court; but it alleges the ruling of the
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referee in the cause, and the judgment of the District Court

affirming the referee's ruling, proceeded upon the ground that

the plaintiff's cause of action on the judgment was barred by

the statute of limitations of the state of Colorado, and avers that

it was not barred by the statute of limitations of the state of

Texas, wherein the judgment was rendered, or of the state of

Missouri. The replication further set up that the debt which

was the foundation of the judgment sued on was created by

fraud. On motion of the defendant the portions of the replica-

tion which we have epitomized were stricken out; the "motion

to strike" seemingly performing the office of a demurrer. By

agreement of the parties a jury was waived, and the cause tried

before the court, which made a general finding in favor of the

defendant and rendered judgment (C. C.; 111 Fed. 361), ac-

cordingly, and the plaintiff sued out this writ of error.

CALDWELL, Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff having voluntarily gone into the bankrupt court,

and submitted itself to the jurisdiction of that court, and filed

its claim against the bankrupt's estate founded on the judgment

here in suit, and that court having disallowed the claim and en-

referee in the cause, and the judgment of the District Court
affirming the referee's ruling, proceeded upon the grouu<l that
the plaintiff's cause of action on the judgment was barred by
the statute of limitations of the state of Colorado, and avers that
it was not barred by the statute of limitations of the state of
Texas, wherein the judgment was rendered, or of the state of
.Missouri. The replication further set up that the debt which
was the foundation of the judgment sued on was created by
fraud. On motion of the defendant the portions of the replication which we have epitomized were stricken out; the ''motion
to strike'' seemingly performing the office of a demurrer. By .
agreement of the parties a jury was waived, and the cause tried
before the court, which made a general finding in favor of the
defendant and rendered judgment ( C. C. ; 111 Fed. 361), accordingly, and the plaintiff sued out this writ of error.

tered judgment accordingly, and that judgment remaining in
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full force and virtue, constitutes a complete bar to this action.

It is not material upon what ground that court rested its judg-

ment. It unquestionably had jurisdiction of the parties and the

subject-matter, and, if either party conceived its judgment was

for any reason erroneous, the remedy was by appeal, and not by

a suit on the same cause of action in another jurisdiction against

the bankrupt.

But if, as is claimed by the plaintiff in error, the United

States District Court for the District of Colorado disallowed the

claim upon the ground that it was barred by the statute of lim-

itations of that state, that court committed no error in so doing.

The bankrupt was a resident and citizen of the state of Colorado.

If he had been sued on the record of the judgment here in suit

before he was adjudged a bankrupt, either in the state or United

States Court in Colorado, he could have successfully interposed

the statute of limitations of that state as a defense to the action.

And when he was adjudged a bankrupt, and the plaintiff filed

its claim before the referee, it was open to that officer in like

manner to interpose the statute of limitations of the state of

H. & A. Bankruptcy—44

CALDWELL, Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above,
delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff having voluntarily gone into the bankrupt court,
and submitted itself to the jurisdiction of that court, and filed
its claim against the bankrupt's estate founded on the judgment
here in suit, and that court having di.sallowed the claim and entered judgment accordingly, and that judgment remaining in
full force and virtue, constitutes a complete bar to this action.
It is not material upon what ground that court rested its judgment. It unquestionably had jurisdiction of the parties and the
subjectrmatter, and, if either party conceived its judgment was
for any reason erroneous, the remedy was by appeal, and not by
a suit on the same cause of action in another jurisdiction against
the bankrupt.
But if, as is claimed by the plaintiff in error. the United
States District Court for the Di.strict of Colorado disallowed the
claim upon the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations of that state, that court committed no error in so doing.
The bankrupt was a resident and citizen of the state of Colorado.
If he had been sued on the record of the judgment here in suit
before he was adjudged a bankrupt, either in the state or United
States Court in Colorado, he could have successfully interposed
the statute of limitations of that state as a defense to the action.
And when he was adjudged a bankrupt, and the plaintiff filed
its claim before the referee, it was open to that officer in like
manner to interpose the statute of limitations of the state of
H. Is A. Bankrvptc:r-••
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Colorado as a defense to the claim. There is no support in rea-

son or authority for the contention that no debt barred by the

statute of limitations of the state where the bankruptcy proceed-

ing is pending is provable in bankruptcy, or discharged by a

discharge in bankruptcy, if by the laws of any other state the

debt would not be barred. For the purposes of the administra-

tion and settlement of the bankrupt's estate, and determining

its liabilities, the statute of limitations of the state where the

bankrupt proceedings are pending is applicable, and is the stat-

ute of limitations by which the rights of creditors must be de-

termined.

It comes to this: Can the trustee in bankruptcy plead the

statute of limitations to a claim against the bankrupt's estate

that was barred by the law of the state of the bankrupt's resi-

dence before he was adjudged a bankrupt f It is clear the trus-

tee cannot plead the statute of limitations of any other state,

and, if he cannot plead the statute of the state in which the

debtor resided and was adjudged a bankrupt, then there is no

bar to claims against a bankrupt's estate. The statute of lim-

itations of the state of the bankrupt's residence, and in which

he was adjudged a bankrupt, like the exemption laws of the

state, governs and determines the rights of creditors in the ad-
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ministration of the bankrupt's estate. So far forth as relates to

the statute of limitations, the rights of a creditor of the bank-

rupt are not in any manner changed or abridged by allowing

the trustee in bankruptcy to plead in bar of the creditor's claim

the very same statute of limitations that the bankrupt himself

could have successfully pleaded, if an action on the claim had

been brought against him before he was adjudged a bankrupt.

The judgment of the District Court against the plaintiff on

the plea of the statute of limitations is as effectual for all pur-

poses as if it had been rendered on a plea of payment. The

plaintiff's claim was barred before the adjudication in bank-

ruptcy, and we have no occasion, therefore, to inquire whether

the statute would continue to run after the adjudication and

the appointment of the trustee. Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S.

27, 7 Sup. Ct. 788, 30 L. ed. 864; McDonald v. State of Nebraska,

41 C. C. A. 278, 101 Fed. 171.

But it is contended that the debts of the bankrupt, barred by

the statute of limitations of the state in which he was adjudged

a bankrupt, are not provable debts, and are not, therefore,, af-

fected by the bankrupt's discharge. This is rather a startling

Colorado as a defense to the claim. There is no support in reason or authority for the contention that no debt barred by the
statute of limitations of the state where the bankruptcy proceeding is pending is provable in bankruptcy, or discharged by a
discharge in bankruptcy, if by the laws of any other state the
debt would not be barred. For the purposes of the administration and settlement of the bankrupt's estate, and determining
its liabilities, the statute of limitations of the state where the
bankrupt proceedings are pending is applicable, and is the statute of limitations by which the rights of creditors must be determined.
It comes to this: Can the trustee in bankruptcy plead the
statute of limitations to a claim again.st the bankrupt's estate
that was barred by the law o~ the state of the bankrupt's residence before he was adjudged a bankrupt! It is clear the trnstee cannot plead the statute of limitations of any other state,
and, if he cannot plead the statute of the state in which the
debtor resided and was adjudged a bankrupt, then there is no
bar to claimB against a bankrupt's estate. The statute of llinitations of the state of the bankrupt's residence, and in which
he was adjudged a bankrupt, like the exemption laws of the
state, governs and detennines the right.a of creditors in the administration of the bankrupt's estate. So far forth as relates to
the statute of limitations, the rights of a creditor of the bankrupt are not in any manner changed or abridged by allowing
the trustee in bankruptcy to plead in bar of the creditor's claim
the very same statute of limitations that the bankrupt himself
could have successfully pleaded, if an action on the claim had
been brought against him before he was adjudged a bankrupt.
The judgment of the District Court against the plaintiff on
the plea of the statute of limitations is as effectual for all purposes as if it had been rendered on a plea of payment. The
plai11tiff 's claim was barred before the adjudication in bankruptcy, and we have no occasion, therefore, to inquire whether
the statute would continue to run after the adjudication and
the appointment of the trustee. Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S.
27, 7 Sup. Ct. 788, 30 L. ed. 864; McDonald v. State of Nebraska:
41 C. C. A. 278, 101 Fed. 171.
But it is contended that the debts of the bankrupt, barred by
the statute of limitations of the state in which he was adjudged
a bankrupt, are not provable debts, and are not, therefore, affected by the bankrupt's discharge. This is rather a startling
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proposition. We are not surprised that no authorities are cited

to support it. If this were the law, it would result in this

curious anomaly: that, while all recent and live debts of the

bankrupt would be discharged, no outlawed debts would be dis-

charged, because they could not have been successfully proved

if the trustee had chosen to plead the statute of limitations.

This would be giving to stale and outlawed claims a preference

over live debts, and would leave the creditors free to sue and

recover on these outlawed claims in any jurisdiction where the

bankrupt could not for any reason successfully plead the statute

of limitations, which is precisely what the plaintiff is seeking to

do in this case.

Debts are not the less provable, within the meaning of the

bankrupt act, because the statute of limitations may be success-

fully pleaded against their allowance. As well say that a debt

was not suable because the statute of limitations might be

pleaded to an action upon it. The plaintiff's judgment was a

provable debt, and the fact that a recovery upon it might be

defeated by the plea of payment, or a plea of the statute of

limitations, or any other plea in bar, did not take it out of the

class of provable debts. The term "provable debts" does not

mean only such debts as are valid, and against the allowance of

which no defense can be successfully interposed.
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A discharge in bankruptcy, that discharges the debts of the

bankrupt in one state, discharges them in all the states. The

Constitution of the United States empowers Congress to estab-

lish "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout

the United States." The very purpose of a national bankrupt

act is to give force and effect to the proceedings in bankruptcy,

including the bankrupt's discharge, "throughout the United

States." Its efficacy is not dependent on the varying statute of

limitations of the several states.

The allegation in the replication that the debt which was the

foundation of the judgment sued on was created by fraud is

unavailing. Whether, after suing and recovering judgment on

its promissory notes, and afterwards suing the bankrupt's estate

in the bankrupt court on the record of that judgment, and after-

wards bringing this action on the same record, it is now open to

the plaintiff to say the original debt was created by fraud, we

do not stop to consider. The provision of the present bankrupt

law applicable to the point now under consideration is as fol-

lows:

proposition. We are not surprised that no authorities are cited
to support it. If this were the law, it would result in this
curious anomaly: that, while all recent and live debts of the
bankrupt would be discharged, no outlawed debts would be discharged, because they could not have been successfully proved
if the trustee had chosen to plead the statute of limitations.
This would be giving to stale and outlawed claims a preference
over live debts, and would leave the creditors free to sue and
recover on these outlawed claims in any jurisdiction where the
bankrupt could not for any reason successfully plead the statute
of limitations, which is precisely what the plaintiff is seeking to
do in this case.
Debts are not the less provable, within · the meaning of the
bankrupt act, because the statute of limitations may be successfully pleaded against their allowance. As well say that a debt
was not suable because the statute of limitations might be
pleaded to an action upon it. The plaintiff's judgment was a
provable debt, and the fact that a recovery upon it might be
defeated by the plea of payment, or a plea of the statute of
limitations, or any other plea in bar, did not take it out of the
class of provable debts. The term "provable debts" does not
mean only such debt:s as are valid, and against the allowance of
which no defense can be successfully interposed.
A discharge in bankruptcy, that discharges the debts of the
bankrupt in one state, discharges them in all the states. The
Constitution of the United States empowers Congress to establish "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout
the United States." The very purpose of a national bankrupt
act is to give force and effect to the proceedings in bankruptcy,
including the bankrupt's discharge, "throughout the United
States." Its efficacy is not dependent on the varying statute of
limitations of the several states.
The allegation in the replication that the debt which was the
foundation of the judgment sued on was created by frau<l is
unavailing. Whether, after suing and recovering judgment on
its promissory notes, and afterwards suing the bankrupt's estate
in the bankrupt court on the record of that judgment, and afterwards bringing this action on the same record, it is now open to
the plaintiff to say the original debt was created by fraud, we
do not stop to consider. The provision of the present bankrupt
law applicable to the point now under consideration is as follows:
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'' § 17a. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt

from all of his provable debts except • • • (2) judgments

in actions for frauds. • • •"

By this provision it is only "judgments in actions for frauds"

that are excepted from the operation of a discharge. The judg-

ment here sued on was rendered on promissory notes, and no

suggestion of fraud was ever made or heard of until the filing

of the replication in this case, more than 11 years after the giv-

ing of the notes, and more than 10 years after the rendition

of the judgment thereon.

Decisions construing the bankrupt act of 1867 (Act March 2,

1867, c. 176; 14 Stat. 517) have no application to the present

act on this subject. The language of that act was: "No debt

created by fraud. * * *" This act left the question of

fraud in the creation of the debt open to inquiry after the bank-

rupt obtained his discharge, and proved to be a fruitful source

of bitter and protracted litigation. In the light of that experi-

ence Congress has limited the exception to "judgments in ac-

tions for frauds." This language leaves no room for construc-

tion. It is as plain as the English language can make it.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

SANTA ROSA BANK v. WHITE et al.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

139 Cal. 703, 73 Pac. 577

(Supreme Court of California. Aug. 4, 1903)

SMITH, C. This is a suit on a promissory note of the appel-

lant and the other defendants for the sum of $3,675.53, with

interest, etc. The plaintiff had judgment, from which, and from

an order denying the appellant defendant's motion for a new

"§ 11a. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt
from all of his provable debts except • • • (2) judgments
in actions for frauds. • • • ''
By this provision it is only ''judgments in actions for frauds''
that are excepted from the operation of a discharge. The judgment here sued on was rendered on promissory notes, and no
suggestion of fraud was ever made or heard of until the filing
of the replication in this case, more than 11 years after the giving of the notes, and more than 10 years after the rendition
of the judgment thereon.
Decisions construing the bankrupt act ·of 1867 (Act March 2,
1867, c. 176; 14 Stat. 517) have no application to the present
act on this subject. The language of that act was: "No debt
created by fraud. • • • '' This act left the question of
fraud in the creation of the debt open to inquiry after the bankrupt obtained his discharge, and proved to be a fruitful source
of bitter and protracted litigation. In the light of that experience Congress has limited the exception to ''judgments in actioDB for frauds." This language leaves no room for construction. It ie as plain as the English language can make it.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed_

trial, the appeal is taken.

The defense is a discharge of the defendant in bankruptcy,

under the act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [U. S. Comp.

St. 1901, p. 3418]. The effect of this was to "release" the de-

SANTA ROSA BANK v. WHITE et al.

fendant "from all of his provable debts," with the exceptions

named in § 17 of the act, c. 541, 30 Stat. 550, [U. S. Comp. St.

139 Cal. 703, 73 Pac. 577

1901, p. 3428 J, which, so far as material, reads as follows: "A dis-

charge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his

(Supreme Court of California. Aug. 4, 1903)

provable debts, except such as * • * have not been duly

scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name of

the creditor, if known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had

SMITH, C. This is a suit on a promissory note of the appellaut and the other defendants for the sum of $3,675.53, with
interest, etc. The plaintiff had judgment, from which, and from
an order denying the appellant defendant's motion for a new
trial, the appeal is taken.
The defense is a discharge of the defendant in bankruptcy,
under the act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [U. S. Comp.
St. 1901, p. 3418]. The effect of this was to "release" the defendant "from all of his provable debts," with the exceptions
nHml'd in § 17 of the act, c. 541, 30 Stat. 550, [U. S. Comp. St.
l 901, p. 3428 J, which, so far as material, reads as follows: ''A dis·
charge in bankruptcy shall release a bankn1pt from all of bis
provable debts, except such as • • • have not bee?1 duly
scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the nHme of
the creditor, if known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had
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notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings iu bankruptcy."

It was held by the court, in effect, that the debt sued on comes

within the exception" stated. The contrary is claimed by the ap-

pellant, for the reason, among others, that it appears from the

evidence that the plaintiff's debt was not known to him when he

prepared his schedules, or until after his discharge, which was

more than a year after the adjudication of bankruptcy. The

only evidence on this point is the defendant's own testimony.

But his explanation of the matter is not unreasonable, and, as

there is no finding on the point, it must be assumed that the

court regarded the question as immaterial; which, indeed, is the

ground now taken by respondent's counsel. It will be assumed,

therefore, that the fact is as stated by appellant in his testi-

mony. The question involved is therefore purely one of con-

struction, and may be thus stated: Does the exception cited

include all debts not scheduled, whether known or unknown to

the bankrupt, or only such as were known to him J The question

is not without difficulty, but the grammatical structure of the

provision seems to require the former construction, and we see

nothing in the terms of the provision or in the other provisions

of the act, whether considered in themselves or in connection with

the former law, to indicate a different intention. Sutherland on
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Stat. Cons. § 267; Broom's Leg. Max. 652. Under the former

law, the omission of a debt from the schedule, whether intention-

ally or otherwise, did not affect the validity of the discharge

(Rev. St. § 5119); and the effect of the new provision is simply

to establish a different rule. In the only cases involving this pro-

vision we have been able to find, the question now presented was

not involved, nor do they seem to throw any light upon it. Tyr-

rel v. Hammerstein (Sup.) 67 N. Y. Supp. 717; Collins v. Mc-

Walters (Sup.) 72 N. Y. Supp. 203; In re Rhutassel (D. C.)

96 Fed. 597.

The other contentions of the appellant are more obviously un-

tenable. They are: (1) That the provision in question is to be

construed as requiring only constructive notice to the creditor

to exclude him from the exception; (2) that the evidence did not

justify the finding that plaintiff did not have actual notice; (3)

that the plaintiff was at liberty to present his claim for proof

and allowance when he discovered the pendency of the bank-

ruptcy proceedings, which was more than a year after the ad-

judication of bankruptcy; and (4) that the plaintiff's claim as

to the effect of the defendant's discharge constituted a collateral

notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings iu bankruptcy."
It W88 held by the court, in effect, that the debt sued on comes
within the exception· stated. The contrary is claimed by the appellant, for the reason, among others, that it appears from the
evidence that the plaintiff's debt was not known to him when he
prepared his schE:dules, or until after his discharge, which was
more than a year after the adjudication of bankruptcy. The
only evidence on this point is the defendant's own testimony.
But his explanation of the matter is not unreasonable, and, as
there is no finding on the point, it must be assumed that the
court regarded the question 88 immaterial; which, indeed, is the
ground now taken by respondent's couusel. It will be assumed,
therefore, that the fact is 88 stated by appellant in his testimony. The question involved is therefore purely one of construction, and may be thus stated: Does the exception cited
include all debts not scheduled, whether known or unknown to
the bankrupt, or only such as were known to him T The question
is not without difficulty, but the grammatical structure of the
provision seems to require the former construction, and we see
nothing in the terms of the provision or in the other provisions
of the act, whether considered in themselves or in connection with
the former law, to indicate a different intention. Sutherland on
Stat. Cons. § 267; Broom's Leg. Max. 652. Under the former
law, the omission of a debt from the schedule, whether intentionally or otherwise, did not affect the validity of the discharge
(Rev. St. § 5119) ; and the effect of the new provision is simply
to establish a different rule. In the only caaes involving this provision we have been able to find, the question now presented was
not involved, nor do they seem to throw any light upon it. Tyr.
rel v. Hammerstein (Sup.) 67 N. Y. Supp. 717; Collins v. Mc\\' alters (Sup.) 72 N. Y. Supp. 203; In re Rhutassel (D. C.)
96 Fed. 597.
The other contentions of the appellant are more obviously untenable. They are: ( 1) That the provision in question is t.o be
construed as requiring only constructive notice to the creditor
to exclude him from the exception: (2) that the evidence did not
justify the finding that plaintiff <lid not have actual notire; (3)
that the plaiutiff was at liberty to present his claim for proor
au<l allowance when he discovered the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings, which was more than a year after the adjudication of bankruptcy; and ( 4) that the plaintiff's claim as
to the effect of the defendant's discharge constituted a collateral
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attack on the decree, which was inadmissible. But as to the first

contention, we think it clear that in the expression "notice or

actual knowledge" the latter term is used as explanatory of the

former, and that actual knowledge is required in order to exclude

the creditor from the exception (Collins v. McW alters [Sup ]

72 N. Y. Supp. 205); and as to the second, the evidence, we

think, was sufficient to justify the findings. The third contention

is disposed of by the express provisions of § 57, subd. 2, of the

act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 560 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901,

p. 3443], and the fourth by those of § 17, which expressly except

the debts specified from the effect of the decree. In the corre-

sponding provision of the Revised Statutes (§ 5119) there was a

similar provision as to the effect of the discharge, with excep-

tions stated, and it was held that as to the plea of discharge the

exception might be shown in a collateral action (Forsyth v. Veh-

meyer, 177 U. S. 177, 20 Sup. Ct. 623, 44 L. ed. 723) ; and the

same has been held with reference to the existing act (Gee v.

Gee, 84 Minn. 384, 87 N. W. 1116, In re Rhutassel [D. C] 96

Fed. 597). The numerous cases cited by appellant's counsel re-

fer to other provisions of the former act and to other questions.

We advise that the judgment and order appealed from be

affirmed.
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We concur: GRAY, C; CHIPMAN, C.

PER CURIAM. For the reasons given in the foregoing opin-

ion, the judgment and order appealed from are affirmed.8

THOMPSON v. JUDY

169 Fed. 553, 95 C. C. A. 51

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. April 19, 1909)

SEVERENS, Circuit Judge. On March 30, 1907, J. D. Mc-

Clintock obtained a judgment in the Circuit Court of Bourbon

attack on the decree, which was inadmissible. But as to the first
contention, we think it clear that in the expression ''notice or
actual knowledge'' the latter term is used as explanatory of the
former, and that actual knowledge is required in order to exclude
the creditor from the exception (Collins v. McWalters [Sup.]
72 N. Y. Supp. 205) ; and as to the second, the evidence, we
think, was sufficient to j11stify the findings. The third contention
is disposed of by the express provisions of § 57, subd. 2, of the
act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 560 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901,
p. 3443], and the fourth by those of § 17, which expressly except
the debts specified from the effect of the decree. In the cor~
sponding provision of the Revised Statutes ( § 5119) there was a
similar provision as to the effect of the discharge, with exceptions stated, and it was held that as to the plea of discharge the
exception might be shown in a collateral action (Forsyth v. Veh·
mcyer, 177 U. S. 177, 20 Sup. Ct. 623, 44 L. ed. 723) : and the
same baa been held with reference to the existing act (Gee v.
Gee, 84 Minn. 384, 87 N. \V. 1116, In re Rhutassel [D. C.] 96
Fed. 597). The numerous cases cited by appellant's eounsel refer to other provisions of the former act and to other questions.
We advise that the judgment and order appealed from ™'
affirmed.

county, Ky., against Wyatt A. Thompson for $1,500, damages for

a false and malicious libel published in a newspaper by the de-

We concur: GRAY, C.; CHIP!dAN, C.

fendant and others in April, 1906. On June 24, 1907, Thompson

filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, and listed

the said claim of J. D. McClintock as one of his liabilities. Mc-

PER CURIAl\f. For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion, the judgment and order appealed from are affirmed.8

8—See Birkett v. Columbia Bank,

195 U. S. 345.

THOMPSON v. JUDY
169 Fed. 553, 95 C. C. A. 51
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. April 19, 1909)
SEVERENS, Circuit Judge. On March 30, 1907, J. D. l\k
Clintock obtained a judgment in the Circuit Court of Bourhon
county, Ky., against Wyatt A. Thompson for $1,500, damages for
a false and malicious libel published in a newspaper by the defendant and others in April, 1906. On June 24, 1907, Thompson
filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, and listed
the said claim of J. D. l\IcClintock as one of his liabilitiee. Mc8-See Birkett v. Columbia Bank,
195 U. 8. 3.tS.
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Clintock afterwards proved his claim in the case. On October 8,

1907, Thompson received his discharge in bankruptcy. On Oc-

tober 14,1907, a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum was issued from

the Bourbon Circuit Court, and was executed on October 22,

1907, by the arrest of said Thompson, who was delivered into

the custody of George W. Judy, jailer of Bourbon county. On

October 23, 1907, Thompson filed his petition in the United

States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky for

a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the indebtedness

upon which the capias was issued, namely, the judgment for

damages for libel, had been discharged in bankruptcy. The writ

was issued against Judy, the jailer of Bourbon county, and the

petitioner was admitted to bail. Thereafter Judy filed his re-

sponse, setting forth the proceedings in the Circuit Court of

Bourbon county, and on final hearing Judge Cochran, who was

presiding in the court below, held that the judgment in question

was not discharged by proceedings in bankruptcy, and ordered

that the petition for habeas corpus be dismissed and the peti-

tioner be remanded to the state custody. From that order this

appeal is taken.

The sole question in the case is whether the proceedings in

bankruptcy operated to discharge the liability of the petitioner,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

which was the foundation of the judgment of the Bourbon Cir-

cuit Court, and the solution of it depends upon the construction

of § 17 of the bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat.

550 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3428]), which is as follows:

"§17. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt

from all of his provable debts, except such as (1) are due as a tax

levied by the United States, the stale, county, district, or mu-

nicipality in which he resides; (2) are liabilities for obtaining

property by false pretenses or false representations, or for will-

ful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another;

(or for alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or

support of wife or child, or for seduction of an unmarried fe-

male, or for criminal conversation); (3) have not been duly

scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name of the

creditor if known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had notice

or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy; or (4)

were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or

defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary ca-

pacity."

The foregoing is § 17 of the act as amended by Act Feb. 5,

Clintock afterwards proved his claim in the case. On October 8,
1907, Thompson received his discharge in bankruptcy. On October 14, 1907, a writ of capias ad satis/aoie11dum was issued from
the Bourbon Circuit Court, and was executed on October 22,
1907, by the arrest of said Thompson, who was delivered into
the custody of George W. Judy, jailer of Bourbon county. On
October 23, 1907, Thompson filed his petition in the United
States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky for
a writ of h.a.beas corpus on the ground that the indebtedness
upon which the capias wl}s issued, namely, the judgment for
damages for libel, had been discharged in bankruptcy. The writ
was issued against Judy, the jailer of Bourbon county, and the
petitioner was admitted to bail. Thereafter Judy filed his response, setting forth the proceedings in the Circuit Court of
Bourbon county, and on final hearing Judge Cochran, who was
presiding in the court below, held that the judgment in question
was not discharged by proceedings in bankruptcy, and ordered
that the petition for habeas corpus be dismissed and the petitioner be remanded to the state custody. From that order this
appeal is taken.
The sole question in the case is whether the proceedings in
bankruptcy operated to discharge the liability of the petitioner,
which was the foundation of the judgment of the Bourbon Circuit Court, and the solution of it depends upon the construction
of § 17 of the bankruptcy act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat.
550 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3428]), which is as follows:
'' § 17. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt
from all of his provable debt.s, except such as ( 1) are due as a tax
levied by the Unikd States, the siale, county, district, or municipality in which he resides; (2) are liabilities for obtaining
property by false prdenses or false representations, or for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another;
(or for alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or
support of wife or child, or for seduction of an unmarried female, or for criminal conversation); (3) have not been duly
scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name of the
creditor if known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had notice
or actual knowledge of the· proceedings in bankruptcy; or ( 4)
were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or
defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity."
The foregoing is § 17 of the act as amended by Act Feb. 5,
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1903, c. 487, § 5, 32 Stat. 798 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907. p.

1026). That part of clause 2 which excepts from the operation

of the discharge "liabilities" for willful and malicious injuries

to the person or property of another is the provision here in-

volved. That clause in the original act was the same, except

that instead of the word "liabilities" the word "judgments"

was employed. And the matter in dispute is, What was the con-

sequence of the amendment which substituted "liabilities" for

"judgments"?

Before the amendment, a liability for such a cause was not

excepted unless it had been reduced to judgment. By the

amendment it is excepted without being reduced to judgment.

The contention of the appellant is that when a judgment has

been obtained the liability is merged therein, and the claim no

longer adheres to the liability, but is transmuted into another

species of right, which was excepted by the original act, but,

since the amendment, is no longer excepted. But notwithstand-

ing the ingenuity of the argument by which this contention is

sought to be maintained, we are of opinion that the intention of

Congress was to declare that such liability should be excepted

whether a judgment had been rendered upon it or not. The

general doctrine of merger of the cause of action by judgment
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cannot, of course, be disputed. No suit or proceeding can there-

after be brought upon the original liability, but only for the en-

forcement of the judgment. The power of the court cannot be

again invoked to adjudicate the question of liability. It is for

the interest of the public that litigation shall come to an end,

and the inconvenience of preserving the original liability as a

continuing cause of action would be great. The pursuit must

proceed along the line adopted, and the satisfaction of the claim

must be sought through the judgment. But this rule of law

prevails only to the extent that the reason for it exists. It does

not prevent the recognition in the judgment of the attributes of

the original cause of action. For the purposes of relief, the judg-

ment embodies those attributes and gives ground for their en-

forcement. The rights of the parties are established, and are in

no wise diminished thereby. So, when the judgment is general

in form, it is often necessary to go behind it and see upon what

liability it is founded, to the end that the characteristics of the

cause of action may be impressed upon it. Such instances will

recur to the mind of every lawyer. Indeed, Congress required

this in this identical act when it excepted judgments for the par-

1903, c. 487, §5, 32 Stat. 798 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907. p.
1026). That part of clause 2 which excepts from the operation
of the discharge ''liabilities'' for willful and malicious injuries
to the person or property of another is the provision here involved. That clause in the original act was the same, except
that instead of the word ''liabilities'' the word ''judgments''
was employed. And the matter in dispute is, What was the consequence of the amendment which substituted ''liabilities'' for
''judgments'' T
Before the amendment, a liability for such a <:>ause was not
excepted unle.ss it had been reduced to judgment. By the
amendment it is excepted without being reduced to judgment.
The contention of the appellant is that when a judgment has
been obtained the liability is merged therein, and the claim no
longer adheres to the liability, but is transmuted into another
species of right, which was excepted by the original act, but,
since the amendment, is no longer excepted. But notwithstanding the ingenuity of the argument by which this contention is
sought to be maintained, we are of opinion that the intention of
Congress was to declare that such liability should be excepted
whether a judgment had been rendered upon it or not. The
general doctrine of merger of the cause of action by judgment
cannot, of course, be disputed. No suit or proceeding can thereafter be brought upon the original liability, but only for the enforcement of the judgment. The power of the court cannot be
again invoked to adjudicate the question of liability. It is for
the interest of the public that litigation shall come to an end,
and the inconvenience of preserving the original liability as a
continuing cause of action would be great. The pursuit must
proceed along the line adopted, and the satisfaction of the claim
must be sought through the judgment. But this rule of law
prevajls only to the extent that the reason for it exists. It does
not prevent the recognitidn in the judgment of the attributes of
the original cause of action. For the purposes of relief, the judgment embodies those attributes and gives ground for their enforcement. The rights of the parties are established, and are in
no wise diminished thereby. So, when the judgment is general
in form, it is often necessary to go behind it and see upon what
liability it is founded, to the end that the characteristic.a of the
cause of action may be impressed upon it. Such instances will
recur to the mind of every lawyer. Indeed, Congress required
tliis in this identical act when it excepted judgments for the par.

DISCHARGE

DISCHARGE

697

697

ticular causes of action mentioned in clause 2 of § 17. Now, we

cannot resist the impression that Congress in making this amend-

ment was looking to the substantial nature of the liability, and

regarded the question as to whether a judgment had been ren-

dered upon it as immaterial, that its intrinsic nature had not

been altered and was in reality the cause of action intended by

the original exception, and that Congress meant to protect that

from the discharge. Apparently the requirement in the original

act that the claim should have been reduced to judgment was

intended to obviate the delay which a proceeding in the bank-

ruptcy court for the liquidation of the damages would involve.

And, finally, it would seem that in plain English a judgment on

such a cause of action is a "liability" therefor.

But the appellant raises another question, which is whether a

willful and malicious libel is an injury "to the person or prop-

erty of another," and argues that by this language is meant a

physical injury to his person, and not merely an injury to a

right which the law attaches to the person. The question is

therefore one of construction. It is true that in modern, par-

lance the words "personal injury" are often used to designate

a physical injury to the party. But usually, when there is any

attempt to put the matter into legal phraseology, these and
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equivalent words are understood to import the meaning in

which they have long been used by recognized authorities,

whether in legal text-books and commentaries or precise defini-

tion by courts, in classifying the rights of individuals. In 1

Blackstone's Com. 129 et seq., the author classifies and dis-

tinguishes those rights which are annexed to the person, jura

personarum, and acquired rights in external objects, jura rerum;

and in the former he includes personal security, which consists

"in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life,

his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation." And he

makes the corresponding classification of remedies. The idea

expressed is that a man's reputation is a part of himself, as his

body and his limbs are, and that detraction of it is an injury to

liis personality, and Chancellor Kent in his twenty-fourth lecture

shows that the same classification of rights was expressed in our

colonial legislation and has always been observed, and on p. • 16

of the second volume of his Commentaries, he says:

"As a part of the rights of personal security, the preservation

of every person's good name from the vile arts of detraction is

justly included The laws of the ancients, no less than those of

ticular causes of action mentioned in clause 2 of § 17. Now, we
cannot resist the impression that Congress in making this amendment was looking to the substantial nature of the liability, and
regarded the question as to whether a judgment had been rendered upon it as immaterial, that its intrinsic nature had not
been altered and was in reality the cause of action intended by
the original exception, and that Congress meant to protect that
from the discharge. Apparently the requirement in the original
act that the claim should have been reduced to judgment was
intended to obviate the delay which a proceeding in the bankruptcy court for the liquidation of the damages would involve.
And, finally, it would seem that in plain English a judgment on
such a cause of action is a "liability" therefor.
But the appellant raises another question, which is whether a
willful and malicious libel is an injury ''to the person or property of another,'' and argues that by this language is meant a
physical injury to his person, and not merely an injury to a.
right which the law attaches to the person. The question is
therefore one of coDBtruction. It is true that in modern. parlance the words ''personal injury'' are often used to designate
a physical injury to the party. But usually, when there is any
attempt to put the matter into legal phraseology, these and
ec:uivalent words are understood to import the meaning in
which they have long been used by recognized authorities,
whether in legal text-books and commentaries or precise definition by courts, in cla&<iifying the rights of individuals. In 1
Blackstone's Com. 129 et seq., the author classifies and distinguishes those rights which are annexed to the person, jura
personarum, and acquired rights in external objects, jura rerum;
~.nd in the former be includes personal security, which consists
''in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life,
his limbs, bis body, his health, and his reputation.'' And he
makes the corresponding classification of remedies. The idea
expressed is that a man's reputation is a part of himself, as his
body and bis limbs are, and that detraction of it is an injury to
his personality, and Chancellor Kent in his twenty-fourth lecture
shows that the same classification of rights was expressed in our
colonial legislation and has always been observed, and on p. • 16
of the second volume of his Commentaries, he says:
"As a part of the rights of personal security, the preservation
of every person's good name from the vile arts of detraction is
justly included. The laws of the ancients, no less than those of
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modern nations, made private reputation one of the objects of

their protection."

The reasonable presumption is that Congress, being engaged

in framing a statute so much requiring precision of terms, ex-

pected its language to be interpreted by long-settled usage in

legal nomenclature. We shall not particularly refer to the many

decisions of courts where this subject has been considered, but

will limit our references to cases where this particular language

of the bankruptcy act and its construction were involved. Mc-

Donald v. Brown, 23 R. I. 546, 51 Atl. 213, 58 L. R. A. 768, 91

Am. St. Rep. 659; Sanderson v. Hunt, 116 Ky. 435, 76 S. W. 179;

McChristal v. Clisbee, 190 Mass. 120, 76 N. E. 511, 3 L. R. A.

(N. S.) 702.

We are not aware of any decision of the Federal Courts upon

this precise question, but there are several which seem to point

to the conclusion that the injuries contemplated in § 17 of the

bankrupt act are not restricted to those which are inflicted upon

the physical person of the party, but extend to those inherent

rights of the person, which stand in the same class as his right

to security from violence done to his body. Tinker v. Colwell,

193 U. S. 473, 24 Sup. Ct. 505, 48 L. ed. 754; In re Freche (D. C.)

109 Fed. 620; In re Maples (D. C.) 105 Fed. 919. And see
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Leicester v. Hoadley, 66 Kan. 172, 71 Pac. 318, 65 L. R. A. 523.

The order of the Circuit Court must be affirmed, with costs.9

PETERS v. UNITED STATES ex rel. KELLEY

177 Fed. 885, 101 C. C. A. 99

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. January 28, 1910)

After relatrix was adjudged a bankrupt by the court below,

and before she was discharged, appellant as sheriff took her into

custody under an execution against her body. The execution was

issued by virtue of a judgment entered against her in favor of

Michael Burke by the Circuit Court of Champaign county, I11.,

before her voluntary petition in bankruptcy was filed. On her

petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court, she

modern nations, made private reputation one of the objects of
their protection.''
The reasonable presumption is that Congress, being engaged
in framing a statute so much requiring precision of terms, expected its language to be interpreted by long-settled usage in
legal nomenclature. We shall not particularly refer to the many
decisions of courts where this subject has been considered, but
will limit our references to cases where this particular language
of the bankruptcy act and its construction were involved. :\IcDonald v. Brown, 23 R. I. 546, 51 Atl. 213, 58 L. R. A. 768, 91
Am. St. Rep. 659; Sanderson v. Hunt, 116 Ky. 435, 76 S. W. 179 ;
~foChristal v. Clisbee, 190 Mass. 120, 76 N. E. 511, 3 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 702.
We are not aware of any decision of the Federal Courts upon
this precise question, but there are several which seem to point
to the conclusion that the injuries contemplated in § 17 of the
bankrupt act are not restricted to thoee which are inflicted upon
the physical person of the party, but extend to those inherent
rights of the person, which stand in the same class as his right
to security from violence done to his body. Tinker v. Colwell,
193 U. S. 473, 24 Sup. Ct. 505, 48 L. ed. 754; In re Freche (D. C.)
109 Fed. 620; In re Maples (D. C.) 105 Fed. 919. And see
Leicester v. Hoadley, 66 Kan. 172, 71 Pac. 318, 65 L. R. A. 523.
The order of the Circuit Court must be affirmed, with costs. 9

was temporarily released from custody, pending her application

PETERS v. UNITED STATES ex rel. KELLEY

for a discharge in bankruptcy. After her discharge in bank-

ruptcy was granted, the District Court considered her petition

177 Fed. 885, 101 C. C. A. 99

for the writ, the sheriff's return, and certain testimony, and

9—See Friend v. Talcott, 228 U.

S. 27.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. January 28, 1910)
After relatrix was adjudged a bankrupt by the <'Ourt below,
and before she was discharged, appellant as shPritf took her into
custody under an execution against her body. The execution was
issued by virtue of a judgment entered against her in favor of
l\lichael Burke by the Circuit Court of Champaign county, Ill.,
before her voluntary petition in bankruptcy was filed. On her
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court, she
was temporarily released from custody, pending her application
for a discharge in bankruptcy. After her discharge in bankruptcy was granted, the District Court considerPd her petition
for the writ, the sheriff's return, and certain testimony, and
9-See Friend v. Talcott, 228 U.

s.
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thereupon entered the order appealed from, finally discharging

relatrix from the custody of the sheriff.

§ 17 of the bankruptcy act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 550

(U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3428), as amended in 1903 (Act Feb.

5, 1903, c. 487, § 5, 32 Stat. 798 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909,

p. 1310]), provides that "A discharge in bankruptcy shall re-

lease a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as

• * * (2) are liabilities * • * for willful and malicious

injuries to the person or property of another."

The sheruT's return exhibited the record of the proceedings

and judgment of the Champaign county Circuit Court. On the

hearing, relatrix admitted that the proceedings and judgment

were correctly stated in the return.

Burke's declaration was in three counts. The first was the

common-law count for trespass vi et armis. The second stated

that Burke was 11 years old, and was attending a public school

in Champaign county, of which relatrix was the teacher; that

relatrix, under pretense of inflicting punishment upon him for

some alleged infraction of the rules, kept him after school, and

then and there, without any just or sufficient excuse, unlawfully,

willfully, wantonly, and maliciously struck and beat him vio-

lently with a certain stick or club; that the punishment admin-
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istered as aforesaid was grossly and maliciously excessive;

whereby he was permanently injured, etc. The third also de-

tailed a "wanton and malicious" assault with a stick and club.

Relatrix pleaded the general issue; also that the alleged assault

was only a moderate and proper punishment of Burke as pupil

by relatrix as teacher; and, further, that the alleged assault

occurred while relatrix was making a proper defense against an

assault by Burke.

On issues so tendered, and closed by Burke's general replica-

tion, the jury returned a general verdict of guilty and assessed

Burke's damages at $1,800. Judgment in due form was entered.

Relatrix prayed an appeal to the Appellate Court of Illinois, but

the appeal was never perfected; and no bill of exceptions, pre-

serving the evidence and the instructions of the court to the

jury, was ever filed.

At the habeas corpus hearing the District Court permitted

relatrix, over appellant's objection, to go into her side of the

merits of the alleged assault. Appellant introduced no evidence

touching the original occurrence on which the declaration was

based.

thereupon entered the order appealed from, finally discharging
relatrix from the custody of the sheriff.
§ 17 of the bankruptcy act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 550
( U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3428), as amended in 1903 (Ad Feb.
5, 1903, c. 487, § 5, 32 Stat. 798 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909,
p. 1310 J), provides that "A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as
• • • (2) are liabilities • • • for willful and malicious
injuries to the person or property of another.''
The sheriff's return exhibited the record of the proceedings
and judgment of the Champaign county Circuit Court. On the
hearing, relatrix admitted that the proceedings and judgment
were correctly stated in the return.
Burke's declaration was in three counts. The first was the
common-law count for trespass vi et armis. The second stated
that Burke was 11 years old, and was attending a public school
in Champaign county, of which relatrix was the teacher; that
relatrix, under pretense of inflicting punishment upon him for
some alleged infraction of the rules, kept him after school, and
then and there, without any just or sufficient excuse, unlawfully,
willfully, wantonly, and maliciously struck and beat him violently with a certain stick or club; that the punishment administered as aforMB.id was grosSly and maliciously excessive ;
whereby he was permanently injured, etc. The third also detailed a ''wanton and malicious'' assault with a stick and club.
Relatrix pleaded the general issue; also that the alleged assault
was only a moderate and proper punishment of Burke as pupil
by relatrix as teacher; and, further, that the alleged assault
occurred while relatrix was making a proper defense against an
assault by Burke.
On issues so tendered, and closed by Burke's general replication, the jury returned a general verdict of guilty and assessed
Burke's damages at $1,800. Judgment in due form was entered.
Relatrix prayed an appeal to the Appellate Court of Illinois, but
the appeal was never perfected; and no bill of exceptions, preserving the evidence and the instructions of the court to the
jury, was ever filed.
At the habeas corpus hearing the District Court permitted
relatrix, over appellant's objection, to go into her side of the
merits of the alleged assault. Appellant introduced no evidence
touching the original occurrence on which the declaration was
based.
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BAKER, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

If the District Court and this court were at liberty to inquire

de novo into the question whether relatrix inflicted a willful

and malicious injury upon the person of her 11 year old pupil,

a fair answer could not be given from this record. Relatrix

and her witnesses gave their present version of her side of the

story (some of them admitting on cross-examination that they

were adding matters not testified to by them in the State Court):

but the boy and his witnesses did not attend the hearing in the

District Court. We could not properly pass upon the truth of

the original charge de novo, without considering the testimony

in support of the charge.

Relatrix's direct adversary in the District Court was not the

boy, but the sheriff; and he evidently thought he was doing

his full duty as a disinterested officer of the law when in re-

sponse to the demand that he show cause why he detained rela-

trix in custody he produced the writ he held and the record of

the proceedings and judgment on which the writ was issued.

And so he was; for a writ of habeas corpus cannot lawfully be

used as a means of bringing the original parties into court to

relitigate their original controversy—it cannot even be used law-

fully to review and revise alleged errors of law or fact in the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

original litigation. "No court may properly release a prisoner

under conviction and sentence of another court, unless for want

of jurisdiction of the cause or person, or for some other matter

rendering its proceedings void. Where a court had jurisdiction,

mere errors which have been committed in the course of the pro-

ceedings cannot be corrected upon a writ of habeas corpus,

which may not in this manner usurp the functions of a writ of

error." Kaizo v. Henry, 211 U. S. 146, 29 Sup. Ct. 41, 53 L.

ed. 125, and cases there cited. Also Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet.

193, 7 L. ed. 650, and In re Lennon, 166 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct.

658, 41 L. ed. 1110.

The character of the "liability," as that word is used in

amended § 17 (2) of the bankruptcy act, is not changed by the

fact that the liability was reduced to judgment. Tinker v. Col-

well, 193 U. S. 473, 24 Sup. Ct. 505, 48 L. ed. 754; Boynton v.

Ball, 121 U. S. 457, 466, 7 Sup. Ct. 981, 30 L. ed. 985; Wiscon-

sin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 292, 8 Sup. Ct. 1370, 32 L.

ed. 239. The question, therefore, is whether the judgment of the

State Court is conclusive evidence of a liability of relatrix for

BAKER, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).
If the District Court and this court were at liberty to inqui~
de novo into the question whether relatrix inflicted a w·i!lful
and malicious injury upon the person of her 11 year old pupil.
a fair answer could not be giv&n from this record. Rdatrix
and her witnesses gave their present version of hn side of thi:
story (some of them admitting on cross-examination that they
were adding matters not testified to by them in the State Court) :
but the boy and his witnesses did not attend the hearing in the
District Court. We could not properly pass upon the truth of
the original charge de novo, without considering the testimony
in support of the charge.
Relatrix 's direct adversary in the District Court was not the
boy, but the sheriff; and he evidently thought he was doing
his full duty as a disinterested officer of the law when in response to the demand that he show cause why he detained relatrix in custody he produced the writ he held and the record of
the proceedings and judgment on which the writ was issued.
And so he was; for a writ of habeas corpus cannot lawfully be
used as a means of bringing the original parties into court to
relitigate their original controversy-it cannot even be used lawfully to review and revise alleged errors of law or fact in the
original litigation. "No court may properly release a prisoner
under conviction and sentence of another court, unless for want
of jurisdiction of the cause or person, or for some other matter
rendering its proceedings void. Where a court had jurisdiction,
mere errors which have been committed in the course of the pro<.'eedings cannot be corrected upon a writ of habeas corpus,
which may not in this manner usurp the functions of a writ of
eITor." Kaizo v. Henry, 211 U. S. 146, 29 Sup. Ct. 41, 53 L.
ed. 125, and cases there cited. Also Ex pa.rte Watkins, 3 Pet.
193, 7 L. ed. 650, and In re Lennon, 166 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct.
658, 41 L. ed. 1110.
The character of the "liability," as that word is used in
amended § 17 (2) of the bankruptcy act, is not changed by the
fact that the liability was reduced to judgment. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, 24 Sup. Ct. 505, 48 L. ed. 754; Boynton v.
Ball, 121 U. S. 457, 466, 7 Sup. Ct. 981, 30 L. ed. 985; Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 292, 8 Sup. Ct. 1370, 32 L.
ed. 239. The question, therefore, is whether the judgment of the
State Court is conclusive evidence of a liability of relatrix for
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a willful and malicious injury to the person of the judgment

plaintiff.

""Willful and malicious injury," ill the bankruptcy act and

everywhere in the law, does not necessarily involve hatred or

ill will as a state of mind, but arises from "a wrongful act, done

intentionally, without just cause or excuse." "In order to come

within that meaning as a judgment for a willful and malicious

injury to person or property, it is not necessary that the cause

of action be based upon special malice, so that without it the

action could not be maintained." Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S.

473, 485, 24 Sup. Ct. 505, 508, 48 L. ed. 754.

In the second and third counts of the declaration the charge

was explicitly made that relatrix inflicted the injury willfully

and maliciously; that she intentionally overstepped her author-

ity as teacher, and administered an excessive punishment with-

out just cause or excuse. By her pleas of denial, of authority as

teacher, and of self-defense, she accepted the gage; and the jury

found her guilty. What the evidence was, what the instructions

were, we do not know; nor, if the second and third were the

only counts, could we inquire, for unquestionably a judgment

thereon would be conclusive that in fact and in law the relatrix

had inflicted a willful and malicious injury upon the person of
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the judgment plaintiff.

Relatrix contends that under the first count, for trespass

vi et armis, a recovery could be had without proof of a willful

and malicious injury, and thereupon insists that it was not erro-

neous for the District Court to inquire de novo into the real na-

ture of the alleged assault. If the assumption as to the charac-

ter of the first count were warranted, the predicated result would

not follow. The most that would be authorized (if anything)

would be to show that at the trial in the State Court no evidence

was introduced in support of the second and third counts, and

that the evidence which was introduced under the first count

did not tend to prove a willful and malicious injury. This,

not on the theory of disputing the record or questioning the ad-

judication, but on the theory that the record was ambiguous, and

that therefore evidence dehors the record was proper and nec-

essary to disclose what in truth had been adjudicated. The

assumption, however, is unwarranted, for by the law of Illinois

(as generally elsewhere) a judgment for damages under a count

of trespass vi et armis cannot lawfully be rendered except upou

proof of a willful and malicious injury. Jernberg v. Mix, 199

a willful irn<l malicious injury to the person of the judgment
µlain tiff.
''Willful anti malicious injury," iu the bankruptcy act and
everywhere in the law, does not necessarily involve hatred or
ill \\'ill as a state of mind, but arises from "a wrongful act, done
intt-ntioually, without just cause or excuse." "In order to come
within that meaning as a judgment for a willful and malicious
injury to person or property, it is not necessary that the cause
of action be based upon special malice, so that without it the
action could not be maintained." Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S.
473, 485, 24 Sup. Ct. 505, 508, 48 L. ed. 754.
In the second and third counts of the declaration the charge
was explicitly made that relatrix inflicted the injury willfully
and maliciously; that she intentionally overstepped her authority as teacher, and administered an excessive punishment without just cause or excuse. By her pleas of denial, of authority as
teacher, and of self-defense, she accepted the gage; and the jury
found her guilty. \Vhat the evidence was, what the instructions
were, we do not know; nor, if the second and third were the
ouly counts, could we inquire, for unquestionably a judgment
thereon would be conclusive that in fact and in law the relatrix
had inflicted a willful and malicious injury upon the person of
the judgment plaintiff.
Rclatrix contends that under the first rount, for trespass
vi et armis, a recovery could be had without proof of a willful
and malicious injury, and thereupon insists that it was not erroneous for the District Court to inquire de noro into the real nature of the alleged assault. If the assumption as to the character of the first count were warranted, the predicated result would
!lot follow. The most that would be authorized (if anything)
would be to show that at the trial in the State Court no evidence
was introduced in support of the second and third counts, and
that the evidence which was introduced under the first count
did not tend to prove a willful and malicious injury. This,
not on the theory of disputing the record or questioning the ad ~
judica.tion, but on the theory that the record was ambiguous, an<l
that therefore evidence dehors the record was proper and necessary to disclose what in truth had been adjudicated. The
assumption, however, is unwarranted, for by the law of Illinois
(as generally elsewhere) a judgment for damages under a count
of trespass vi et armis cannot lawfully be rendered except upon
proof of a willful and malicious injury. Jernberg v. Mix, 199
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Ill. 254, 65 N. E. 242; Gilmore v. Fuller, 198 Ill. 143, 65 N. E.

84, 60 L. R. A. 286; Forsyth v. Vehmeyer, 176 Ill. 365, 52 N. E.

55; In re Mullen, 118 Ill. 551, 9 N. E. 208; In re Murphy, 109

Ill. 31; Paxton v. Boyer, 67 Ill. 133, 16 Am. Rep. 615; Razor v.

Kinsey. 55 Ill. App. 605; Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, 24

Sup. Ct. 505, 48 L. ed. 754; McChristal v. Clisbee, 190 Mass.

120, 76 N. E. 511, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 702. And the full faith

and credit to which the judgment of the State Court is entitled

would not be rendered if a doubt were entertained that the

jury under proper instructions based their verdict on sufficient

evidence.

The order appealed from is reversed, and the cause is remanded

to the District Court with the direction to dismiss the petition.10

GROSSCUP, Circuit Judge (dissenting). The policy of the

Bankruptcy Law is to discharge all honest debtors who have

fallen into insolvency, that they may have another opportunity

in the race of life. The debtors excepted from this general policy

Ill. 254, 65 N. E. 242; Gilmore v. Fuller, 198 Ill. 143, 65 N. E.
84, 60 L. R. A. 286; Forsyth v. Vehmeyer, 176 Ill. 365, 52 N. E.
55; In re Mullen, 118 Ill. 551, 9 N. E. 208; In re Murphy. 10~
Ill. 31; Paxton v. Boyer, 67 Ill. 133, 16 Am. Rep. 615; Razor \'.
Kinsey, 55 Ill. App. 605; Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, 24
Sup. Ct. 505, 48 L. ed. 754; McChristal v. Clisbee, 190 ~lass.
120, 76 N. E. 511, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 702. And the full faith
and credit to which the judgment of the State Court is entitled
would not be rendered if a doubt were entertained that the
jury under proper instructions based their verdict on sufficient
evidence.
The order appealed from is reversed, and the cause is remanded
to the District Court with the direction to dismiss the petition. 10

are those who have become such through "fraud," or through

the obtaining of property "by false pretenses or false repre-

sentations, '' or through the committing of '' willful and malicious

injuries to the person or property of another." Under the old

bankruptcy law, the exception founded on fraud could only be
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made out by the disclosure of "a fraud involving moral turpi-

tude or intentional wrong,'' and did not extend to a mere fraud

implied by law. Hennequin v. Clews, 111 U. S. 676, 681, 4 Sup.

Ct. 576, 28 L. ed. 565; Forsyth v. Vehmeyer, 177 U. S. 177, 20

Sup. Ct. 623, 44 L. ed. 723 (quotation from Tinker v. Colwell,

193 U. S. 488, 24 Sup. Ct. 509, 48 L. ed. 754). The Supreme

Court does not hold that "fraud," as the word is employed in

the present bankruptcy act, is met by anything less than the fore-

going, for it says (Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 489, 24 Sup. Ct

.

509, 48 L. ed. 754):

'' Assuming that the same holding would be made in regard to

the fraud mentioned in the present act, it is clear that the cases

are unlike. The implied fraud which the Court in the above-

cited cases released was of such a nature that it did not impute

10—The concurring opinion of N. Y. 175 (wrongful conversion of

Seaman, Circuit Judge, is omitted. stocks), acc. Cf. Tompkins v. Wil-

McChristal v. Clisbee, 190 Mass. 120, Hams, 137 App. Div. 521, 128 N. Y.

3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 702, 5 Ann. Cas. Supp. 152.

769; Kavanaugh v. Mclntyre, 210

GROSSCUP, Circuit Judge (dissenting). The policy of the
Bankruptcy Law is to discharge all honest debtors who haw
fallen into insolvency, that they may have another opportunity
in the race of life. The debtors excepted from this geueral policy
are those who have become such through ''fraud,'' or through
the obtaining of property "by false pretenses or false representations,'' or through the committing of ''willful and malicious
injuries to the person or property of another." Under the old
bankruptcy law, the exception founded on fraud could only be
made out by the disclosure of ''a fraud involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong," and did not extend to a mere fraud
implied by law. Hennequin v. Clews, 111 U. S. 676, 681, 4 Sup.
Ct. 576, 28 L. ed. 565; Forsyth v. Vehmeyer, 177 U.S. 177, 20
Sup. Ct. 623, 44 L. ed. 723 (quotation from Tinker v. Colwell,
193 U. S. 488, 24 Sup. Ct. 509, 48 L. ed. 754). The Supreme
Court does not hold that ' ' fraud,'' as the word is employed in
the present bankruptcy act, is met by anything less than the foregoing, for it says (Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 489, 24 Sup. Ct.
509, 48 L. ed. 754):
''Assuming that the same holding would be made in regard to
the fraud mentioned in the present act, it is clear that the cases
are unlike. The implied fraud which the Court in the abovecited cases released was of such a nature that it did not impute
10-The concurring opinion of
Circuit Judge, is omitted.
McChristal v. Clisbee, 190 Mase. 120,
3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 702, 5 Ann. Cu.
769; Kavanaugh v. Mcintyre, 210
SEAMAN,

N. Y. 175 (wrongful conversion of
stocks), acc. Cf. Tompkins v. Williams, 137 App. Div. 521, 122 N. Y.
Supp. 152.
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either bad faith or immorality to the debtor, while in a judg-

ment founded upon a cause of action, such as the one before us

[crim. con.] the malice which is implied is of that very kind

which does involve moral turpitude.''

And, of course, a debtor who has become such through the ob-

taining of property by false pretenses or false representations

(the second element of the list of exceptions), necessarily has

become such debtor by bad faith, or conscious wrong. Up to this

point then, so far as the Supreme Court has construed the pres-

ent bankruptcy act, the exceptions are founded upon the ele-

ment of bad faith or conscious wrong involved in the debts from

which release is asked.

Is the third exception, "willful and malicious injuries to the

person or property of another,'' to receive a like interpretation?

I am deeply impressed with the belief that such will be the inter-

pretation put upon it by the Supreme Court when the question

is squarely presented to that Court. This impression is founded,

first, upon the care that the court has taken in Tinker v. Col-

well to exclude any contrary impression; for in every sentence

of the court's opinion, stress is laid upon the element of actual

bad faith and moral turpitude involved in the particular debt

before the court.
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"The judgment here mentioned comes, as we think," says the

court, "within the language of the statute reasonably construed.

The injury for which it was recovered is one of the grossest

which can be inflicted upon the husband, and the person who

perpetrates it knows it is an offense of the most aggravated char-

acter; that it is a wrong for which no adequate compensation

can be made, and hence personal and particular malice towards

the husband as an individual need not be shown, for the law

implies that there must be malice in the very act itself, and we

think Congress did not intend to permit such an injury to be re-

leased by a discharge in bankruptcy." (The italics are my own.)

I am also impressed that it is the interpretation that, to

carry out the intention of Congress, ought to be put upon the

phrase as used in the bankruptcy act. The exception is in the na-

ture of a denial—the denial of something that all others obtain.

And it seems to me that Congress meant that this denial should

be interposed, not upon any mere fiction of the law, or any

mere empty implication of the law, but only upon the disclosure

of something, in the transaction out of which the debt arose, that

gives to it the color of bad faith or conscious wrong doing.

either bad faith or immorality to the debtor, while in a judgment founded upon a cause of action, such as the one before us
[crim. con.] the malice which is implied is of that very kind
which does involve moral turpitude.''
And, of course, a debtor who has become such through the obtaining of property by false pretenses or false representations
(the second element of the list of exceptions), necessarily has
become such debtor by bad faith, or conscious wrong. Up to this
point then, so far as the Supreme Court has construed the present bankruptcy act, the exceptions are founded upon the element of had faith or conscious wrong involved in the debts from
which release is asked.
Is the third exception, ''willful and malicious injuries to the
person or property of another,'' to receive a like interpretation T
I am deeply impressed with the belief that such will be the interpretation put upon it by the Supreme Court when the question
is squarely presented to that Court. This impression is founded,
first, upon the care that the court has taken in Tinker v. Colwell to exclude any contrary impression; for in every sentence
of the court's opinion, stress is laid upon the element of actual
bad faith and moral turpitude involved in the particular debt
before the court.
'·The judgment here mentioned comes, as we think,'' says the
court, "within the language of the statute reasonably construed.
The injury for which it was recovered is one of the gros.~t
which can be inflicted upon the husband, and the person who
perpetrates it knows it is an offense of the most aggravated character; that it is a wrong for which no adequate compensation
can be made, and hence personal and particular malice towards
the husband as an individual need not be shown, for the law
implies that there must be malice in the very act itself, and we
think Congress did not intend to permit such an injury to be released by a discharge in bankruptcy.'' (The italics are my own.)
I am also impressed that it is the interpretation that, to
carry out the intention of Congress, ought to be put upon the
phrase as us<>d in the bankruptcy act. The exception is in the nature of a denial-the denial of something that all others obtain.
And it seems to me that Congress meant that this denial should
be interposed, not upon any mere fiction of the law, or any
mere empty implication of the law, but only upon the disclosure
of something, in the transaction out of which the debt arose, that
gives to it the color of bad faith or conscious wrong doing.
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The case before us is that of a school teacher, who, in the

lawful exercise of her power to inflict punishment, has inflicted

excessive punishment. I say this is the case before us, because

unless such be a "willful and malicious injury'- within the

meaning of the bankruptcy act, the judgment in the trespass suit

is not conclusive upon the bankruptcy court; for, by the law of

Illinois and most common law jurisdictions, under the issue

raised by the first count (trespass vi et armis for simple assault

and battery), the pleas of moderate castigavit and son assault

demesne, and the replication de injuria, a recovery could be had

for an excess of force employed by the relatrix beyond reasonable

chastisement, assuming, of course, that the evidence submitted

warranted such recovery. Ayres v. Kelley, 11 Ill. 17; Fortune

v. Jones, 30 1ll. App. 116; Hannen v. Edes, 15 Mass. 347; Ben-

nett v. Appleton, 25 Wend. 371; Devine v. Rand, 38 Vt. 621.

And, for the purpose of this appeal, the scope of that judgment,

where doubt or ambiguity exists, must be construed most strongly

against him who invokes it as res judicata; from which it fol-

lows, that the verdict returned, being a general verdict (and

being as applicable to the first count as to the second or third

counts) is as applicable to a case of mere excess of force, ini-

tially lawful, employed beyond reasonable chastisement, though
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without any conscious or designed wrong-doing, aa it would be

to a case of assault originating in conscious wrong-doing.

No one pretends that a school teacher chastising a pupil, or a

master of a vessel punishing some member of his crew, or an

individual resisting an assault, may not, without actual malice,

go beyond the force actually needed and therefore make them-

selves liable to a civil action for trespass vi et armis. In each of

these cases, the malice imputed may be the mere "fiction of

malice"—a fiction created to give the complaining party a stand-

ing for a civil suit in the form of action selected. There is in

such conduct, unless of course actual malice is shown, no bad

faith or conscious wrong—nothing indeed that distinguishes the

moral quality of the act from the moral quality of the owner

of a factory who allows his employees to come into contact with

defective machinery, or the owner of a carriage who takes in a

passenger with knowledge that he has a defective vehicle, or.

as put by Justice Peckham in Tinker v. Colwell, supra, "one

who negligently drives through a crowded thoroughfare and neg-

ligently runs over an individual, would not, as I suppose, be

within the exception."

The case before us is that of a school teacher, who, in the
lawful exercise of her power to inflict punishment, has inflicted
excessive punishment. I say this is the case before us, because
unless such be a ''willful and malicious injury'' within the
meaning of the bankruptcy act, the judgment in the trespass suit
is not conclusive upon the bankruptcy court; for, by the law of
Illinois and most common law jurisdictions, under the issue
raised by the first count (trespass vi et annis for simple assault
and battery), the pleas of moderate castigavit and son assault
dememe, and the replication de injuria, a recovery could be had
for an excess of force employed by the relatri.x beyond reasonable
chastisement, assuming, of course, that the evidence submitted
warranted such recovery. Ayres v. Kelley, 11 Ill. 17; Fortune
v. Jones, 30 Ill. App. 116; Hannen v. Edes, 15 Mass. 347; BenPett v. Appleton, 25 Wend. 371; Devine v. Rand, 38 Vt. 621.
And, for the purpose of this appeal, the scope of that judgment,
where doubt or ambiguity exists, must be construed most strongly
against him who invokes it as res judicata; from which it follows, that the verdict returned, being a general verdict (and
being as applicable· to the first count as to the second or third
counts) is as applicable to a case of mere excess of force, initially lawful, employed beyond reasonable chastisement, though
without any conscious or designed wrong-doing, as it would be
to a case of ~ault originating in conscious wrong-doing.
No one pretends that a school teacher chastising a pupil, or a
master of a vessel punishing some member of his crew, or an
individual resisting an assault, may not, without actual malice,
go beyond the force actually needed and therefore make themselves liable to a civil action for trespass -vi et armis. In each of
these cases, the malice imputed may be the mere ''fiction of
malice''-a fiction created to give the complaining party a standing for a civil suit in the form of action selected. There is in
such conduct, unless of course actual malice is shown, no bad
f aitli or conscious wrong-nothing indeed that distinguishes the
moral quality of the act from the moral quality of the owner
of a factory who allows his employees to come into cont.act with
defective machinery, or the owner of a carriage who takes in a
passenger with knowledge that he has a defective vehicle, or.
as put by Justice Peckham in Tinker v. Colwell, supra, "one
who ne.gligently drives through a crowded thoroughfare and negligently runs over an individual, would not, as I suppose, be
within the exception.''
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True, in In re Murphy, 109 Ill. 31, it was said that malice was

the gist of an action of trespass for assault and battery; but

it was not ruled that mere malice, as a fiction of law, was the

same thing as conscious wrong-doing. The facts in In re Murphy

are not given. The case relied on as a precedent was First Na-

tional Bank of Flora v. Burkett, 101 Ill. 392, 40 Am. Rep. 209,

in which it was said:

"It (malice) in some cases implies a wrong inflicted on an-

other, with an evil intent or purpose, and this is the sense in

which it is employed in the statute."

And for anything appearing in In re Murphy, it was that

kind of malice that was there shown. Indeed, the court says,

speaking of the facts before it (as already said, the facts are

not reported):

"Here there was an intent to do harm, and an unlawful exe-

cution of that intent, resulting in the infliction of a wrong and

injury upon another. Under such circumstances was malice

the gist of the action?"

And that this, in its application to the state insolvent law,

is as far as the Supreme Court of Illinois meant to go (consid-

ering the case as one of actual malice and not mere malice by

fiction of law) is shown by that court in the subsequent case of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Jernberg v. Mix, 199 lll. 254, 256, 65 N. B. 242, where it is said:

"The term 'malice,' as used in the act in question (the in-

solvent act) applies to that class of wrongs which are inflicted

with an evil intent, design or purpose. It implies that the guilty

party was actuated by improper or dishonest motives, and re-

quires the intentional perpetration of an injury or a wrong on

another.''

Let me not be misunderstood. As I understand the Supreme

Court of the United States in Tinker v. Colwell, and the Su-

preme Court of Illinois in the cases just spoken of, a distinction

is observed, where the bankruptcy and insolvent laws are in-

volved, between malice as a fiction of law and malice arising from

bad faith or conscious wrong-doing. Indeed, in the suppositi-

tious case stated by Justice Peckham, the form of action might

have been trespass vi et armis or trespass on the case, that is to

say might have been an action implying malice by fiction of law,

or an action not implying malice at all, depending, on the elec-

tion of the plaintiff, whether he counted upon the negligence or

upon the forcible invasion of his right to security as the basis

of recovery. Percival v. Hickey, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 257, 9 Am.

H. & A. Bankruptcy—45

True, in In re l\lurphy, 109 Ill. 31, it was said that malice was
the gist of an action of trespass for assault and battery; but
it was not ruled that mere malice, as a fiction of law, was the
same thing as conscious wrong-doing. The facts in In re Murphy
are not given. The case relied on as a precedent was First National Bank of Flora v. Burkett, 101 Ill. 392, 40 Am. Rep. 209,
in which it was said:
"It (malice) in some cases implies a wrong inflicted on another, with an evil intent or purpose, and this is the sense in
which it is employed in the statute.''
And for anything appearing in In re Murphy, it was that
kind of malice that was there shown. Indeed, the court says,
speaking of the facts before it (as already said, the facts are
not reported) :
"Here there was an intent to do harm, and an unlawful execution of that intent, resulting in the infliction of a wrong and
injury upon another. Under such circumstances was malice
the gist of the action T"
And that this, in its application to the state insolvent law,
is as far as the Supreme Court of Illinois meant to go ( considering the case as one of actual malice and not mere malice by
fiction of law) is shown by that court in the subsequent caae of
Jernberg v. Mix, 199 Ill. 254, 256, 65 N. E. 242, where it is said:
·'The term 'malice,' as used in the act in question (the insolvent act) applies to that class of wrongs which are inflicted
with an evil intent, design or purpose. It implies that the guilty
party was actuated by improper or dishonest motives, and re- .
quires the intentional perpetration of an injury or a wrong on
another.''
Let me not be misunderstood. As I understand the Supreme
Court of the United States in Tinker v. Colwell, and the Supreme Court of Illinois in the cases just spoken of, a distinction
is observed, where the bankruptcy and insolvent laws are involved, between malice as a fiction of law and malice arising from
bad faith or conscious wrong-doing. Indeed, in the supposititiollil case stated by Justice Peckham, the form of action might
have been trespass vi et arm.is or trespass on the case, that is to
say might have been an action implying malice by fiction of law,
or an action not implying malice at all, depending, on the election of the plaintiff, whether he counted upon the negligence or
upon the forcible invaaion of his right to security as the basis
of recovery. Percival v. Hickey, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 257, 9 Am.
H. & A. Bankruptcy-fG
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Dec. 210. That Congress intended that discharge from debts,

under this exception to the general policy of the bankruptcy law,

should be granted or denied, not according to the real inherent

quality of the transaction out of which the debt arose, but wholly

in accordance with the accident whether recovery is sought in one

form of action or another, I cannot believe; for whether, as a

mere fiction of law, there be malice or not, the moral character

of the wrong complained of is the same, the evidence alone de-

termining the animus of the act. And in the case before us, the

evidence alone can determine whether or not the excessive pun-

ishment was due to an honest mistake of judgment or want of

due care, or whether it was due to motives of ill-will, hatred and

malevolence.

I am giving expression to this dissent because, in my judg-

ment the majority opinion misinterprets Tinker v. Colwell (and

in that decision there were four dissenting justices); and be-

cause this misinterpretation, unless this clause of the bankruptcy

act is construed by the Supreme Court, is liable to be followed

by what seems to me an unjust, if not unauthorized, applica-

tion of the law.

One other phase of this question has thus far wholly gone

unnoticed. The phrase, in the bankruptcy act, is "willful and
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malicious injuries." If this means that willfulness and malice,

even though the malice be merely a fictitious malice, must con-

cur, then the case of a school teacher, master of a vessel, or party

assaulted, who uses more force than what is needed, but does it

without consciousness of such excess, cannot be said to be willful,

for "willful" means conscious intention. And to put such an

interpretation upon the phrase—joining the two words as char-

acterizing the act—brings, this third exception into line with

the first and second exceptions, to-wit, "fraud" and the obtain-

ing of property by "false pretenses or false representations."

I am not sure that the order appealed from in this case should

be affirmed. That might preclude the holder of the judgment

from showing, in some appropriate way, that the injury was

actually malicious. But the judgment from which this is a dis-

sent, on the other hand, accepts the judgment in the trespass suit

as res judicata, and thereby forestalls any appropriate inquiry

as to whether the injury was without actual malice, bad faith,

or conscious wrong-doing.

Dec. 210. That Congress intended that discharge from debtst
under this exception to the general policy of the bankruptcy law,
should be granted or denied, not according to the real inherent
quality of the transaction out of which the debt arose, but wholly
in accordance with the accident whether recovery is sought in one
form of action or another, I cannot believe; for whether, as a
mere fiction of law, there be malice or nott the moral character
of the wrong complained of is the same, the evidence alone determining the animus of the act. And in the case before us, the
evidence alone can determine whether or not the excessive punishment was due to an honest mistake of judgment or want of
due care, or whether it was due to motives of ill-will, hatred and
malevolence.
I am giving expression to this dissent because, in my judgment the majority opinion misinterprets Tinker v. Colwell (and
in that decision there were four dissenting justices) ; and because this misinterpretation, unless this clause of the bankruptcy
act is construed by the Supreme Court, is liable to be followed
by what seems to me an unjust, if not unauthorized, application of the law.
One other phase of this question has thus far wholly gone
unnoticed. The phrase, in the bankruptcy act, is "willful and
malicious injuries.'' If this means that willfulness and malice,
even though the malice be merely a fictitious malice, must concur, then the case of a school teacher, master of a v~I. or party
assaulted, who uses more force than what is needed, but does it
without consciousness of such excess, cannot be said to be willful,
for ''willful'' means eouscious intention. And to put such an
interpretation upon the phrase-joining the two words as characterizing the act-brings. this third exception into line with
the first and second exceptions, to-wit, ''fraud'' and the obtain.
ing of property by ''false pretenses or false representations.''
I am not sure that the order appealed from in this case should
be affirmed. That might preclude the holder of the judgment
from showing, in some appropriate way, that the injury was
actually malicious. But the judgment from which this is a dissent, on the other hand, accepts the judgment in the trespass suit
as res judicata, and thereby forestalls any appropriate inquiry
as to whether the injury was without actual malice, bad faith,
or conscious wrong-doing.
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DUNBAR v. DUNBAR

DUNBAR v. DUNBAR

190 U. S. 340, 47 L. ed. 1084, 23 Sup. Ct. 757

[See this case given on page 424, ante.]

190 U. S. 340, 47 L. ed. 1084, 23 Sup. Ct. 757

In re WARTH

200 Fed. 408, 118 C. C. A. 560

[See this case given on page 424, ante.]

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. November 11, 1912)

NO YES, Circuit Judge. The District Court properly re-

strained the petitioner from enforcing her judgment in case,

but only in case, it was dischargeable. And whether it were dis-

In re WARTH

chargeable depends upon the real nature of the action in which

the judgment was obtained. Its form was immaterial.

200 Fed. 408, 118 C. C. A. 560

The action was in form for breach of promise to marry. The

seduction was in form but an aggravation of the damage. The

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. November 11, 1912)

strict rule of the common law that a woman who consents can-

not complain directly of the greatest possible wrong, had to be

adhered to. But the action while in form upon contract was in

substance for the gross fraud which the man perpetrated in

taking advantage of the confidential relation established by the

marriage engagement to accomplish the woman's dishonor. The

substantial damages which the petitioner obtained were not for

the deprivation of the matrimonial alliance, but for the loss of

character and the ever-continuing shame and sorrow.
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It has been the policy of the Bankruptcy Act to discharge

honest debtors but not to afford a shield to willful wrongdoers

and to avoid the possibility that seducers might take advantage

of it, Congress in 1903 passed an amendment providing that lia-

bility for "the seduction of an unmarried female" should not

be discharged. The provision is broad and we have no doubt

applies and was intended to apply to every case where there is

liability for seduction whether the action to enforce such lia-

bility be based, as is permitted in some states, directly upon the

essential wrong, or by reason of the limitations of the common

law, be founded upon the incident—the refusal to marry. To

say that Congress intended to distinguish between these cases

is to say that it intended to further favor seducers in those juris-

dictions where they are already favored by adherence to an

artificial form of action which often operates to prevent the en-

forcement of a morally just demand.

NOYES, Circuit Judge. The District Court properly restrained the petitioner from enforcing her judgment in case,
but only in case, it was dischargeable. And whether it were dischargeable depends upon the real nature of the action in which
the judgment was obtained. Its form was immaterial.
The action was in form for breach of promise to marry. The
seduction was in form but an aggravation of the damage. The
strict rule of the common law th.at a woman who consents cannot complain directly of the greatest possible wrong, had to be
adhered to. But the action while in form upon contract was in
substance for the gross fraud which the man perpetrated in
taking advantage of the confidential relation established by the
marriage engagement to accomplish the woman :s dishonor. The
substantial damages which the petitioner obtained were not for
the deprivation of the matrimonial alliance, but for the loss of
character and the ever-continuing shame and sorrow.
It has been the policy of the Bankruptcy Act to discharge
honest debtors but not to afford a shield to willful wrongdoers
and to avoid the possibility that seducers might take advantage
of it, Congress in 1903 passed an amendment providing that liability for ''the seduction of an unmarried fem ale'' should not
. be discharged. The provision is broad and we have no doubt
applies and was intended to apply to every case where there is
liability for seduction whether the action to enforce such liability be based, as is permitted in some state.s, directly upon the
essential wrong, or by reason of the limitations of the common
law, be founded upon the incident-the refusal to marry. To
say that Congress intended to distinguish between these cases
is to say that it intended to further favor seducers in those jurisdictions where they are already favored by adherence to an
artificial form of action which often operate.s to prevent the enforcement of a morally just demand.
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The contention is made that as the action is in form for

breach of contract some portion of the damages awarded must

have been for the loss of the matrimonial alliance and that as the

judgment cannot be split up all must be discharged. As already

pointed out, however, the real wrong for which the plaintiff re-

covered was for the seduction, and in the absence of any showing

to the contrary it will be presumed that the substantial dam-

ages were awarded for that.

The order of the District Court is reversed with costs.11

GEE v. GEE

84 Minn. 384, 87 N. W. 1116

(Supreme Court of Minnesota. Nov. 22, 1901)

The contention is made that aa the action is in form for
breach of contract some portion of the damages awarded must
have been for the loss of the matrimonial alliance and that as the
judgment cannot be split up all must be discharged. As already
pointed out, however, the real wrong for which the plaintiff recovered was for the seductiou, and in the absence of any showing
to the contrary it will be presumed that the substantial damages were awarded for that.
The order of the District Court is reversed with cost.s. 11

LOVELY, J. Plaintiff and defendant formed a partnership

on the 30th of July, 1896, for the purpose of buying and selling

grain on commission. Plaintiff was to give no attention to the

GEE v. GEE

business. Defendant was personally to conduct the same, and

receive $60 per month therefor. Such connection continued un-

84 Minn. 384, 87 N. W. 1116

til January 7th following, when it was dissolved by mutual con-

sent. Thereafter an action was brought by plaintiff against

(Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 22, 1901)

his partner for an accounting, which was submitted to a referee.

The referee heard the evidence, and made findings ou which

judgment was ordered against the defendant for a substantial
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sum, which was duly entered and docketed. In September of the

following year defendant made application for the benefits of

the federal bankrupt act, in which he properly scheduled his

liabilities, including plaintiff's judgment, and, upon proceedings

duly had. was legally discharged. The judgment against de-

fendant still remaining of record, under the provisions of c. 262,

Gen. Laws 1899, he moved the District Court in which it was

docketed to discharge the same. At the hearing of this motion

it was claimed by plaintiff that the judgment was excepted from

the discharge in bankruptcy, and he was given leave to bring

suit thereon, which he did. Defendant answered, setting up his

discharge in bankruptcy. Plaintiff, by reply, alleged that the

judgment referred to was for defendant's fraud and misap-

propriation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, which facts,

under his claim, excepted the judgment from the effect of the

11—Followed in In re Grounds,

215 Fed. 280.

LOVELY, J. Plaintiff and defendant formed a partnership
on the 30th of July, 1896, for the purpose of buying and selling
grain on commission. Plaintiff was to give no attention to the
business. Defendant was personally to conduct the same, and
receive $60 per month therefor. Such connection continued un·
til January 7th following, when it was dissolved by mutual consent. Thereafter an action was brought by plaintiff against
his partner for an accounting, which was submitted to a referee.
The referee heard the evidence, and made findings on which
judgment was ordered against the defendant for a substantial
sum, which was duly entered and docketed. In September of the
following year defendant made application for the benefits of
the federal bankrupt act, in which he properly scheduled his
liabilities, including plaintiff's judgment, and, upon proceedings
duly had, was legally discharged. The judgment against def endant still remaining of record, under the provisions of c. 262,
Gen. Laws 1899, he moved the District Court in which it was
docketed to discharge the same. At the hearing of this motion
it was claimed by plaintiff that the judgment was excepted from
the discharge in bankruptcy, and he was given leave to bring
suit thereon, which he did. Defendant answered, setting up his
discharge in bankruptcy. Plaintiff, by reply, alleged that the
judgment referred to was for defendant's fraud and misappropriation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, which facts,
under his claim, excepted the judgment from the effect of the
11-Followed in In re Grounda,
215 Fed. 280.
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bankruptcy discharge. The action was tried to the District

Court for St. Louis county, which, after having made findings

of fact and law in favor of defendant, ordered judgment thereon.

Plaintiff moved for a new trial upon a settled case, which was

denied. From this order, plaintiff appeals.

Under plaintiff's contention, the disposition of this appeal is

within a very narrow compass, depending upon the construc-

tion of that portion of the federal bankrupt act of 1898 which

excepts from the discharge "judgments in actions for frauds,

• * • or debts created by fraud, * * * in any fiduciary

capacity." 30 Stat. 550, § 17, els. 2, 4. Plaintiff insists, first,

that the action for accounting was based upon the fraudulent acts

of the defendant in the misappropriation of partnership funds

and property. His theory is that the partnership was controlled

by an agreement under which defendant was authorized to with-

draw $60 per month for his services, and no more; also that it

was defendant's duty to render an account from month to

month, which he did not do. Other than the connection between

the partnership agreement and general allegations of deficit

and misappropriation of funds by defendant, there was nothing

in the complaint in the suit before the referee which would

justify the claim that fraud was litigated therein. It was an
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ordinary equitable action for an accounting between partners,

sounding in contract (3 Pom. Eq. Jur. p. 1431), and asking for

a money judgment. Neither do we think the findings of the

referee justify the claim that defendant was guilty of defraud-

ing plaintiff in the conduct of the partnership business. It was

found by the referee that during the period of the partnership

defendant "converted" a certain sum of money, which counsel

claims ex vi termini indicates fraud; but it is clear from the re-

maining findings that the word "converted" was used in no such

sense, but to describe conduct not inconsistent with honesty and

good faith. From which it follows that neither the findings nor

the judgment entered thereon in the suit before the referee es-

tablished any fraud by defendant in the management of the

partnership business. As distinguished from the previous United

States bankruptcy acts, the act of 1898 provides for two sep-

arate classes of exceptions from the discharge of the bankrupt,

viz., one in which the judgment must be for fraud, and the other

in which the debt must have arisen upon embezzlement, misap-

propriation, or fraud in a "fiduciary capacity." It is probable,

as held in Re Rhutassel (D. C.) 96 Fed. 597, that it was the

bankruptcy discharge. The action was tried to the District
Court for St. Louis county, which, after having made findings
of fact and law in favor of defendant, ordered judgment thereon.
Plaintiff moved for a new trial upon a settled case, which was
denied. 1'~rom this order, plaintiff appeals.
Under plaintiff's contention, the disposition of this appeal is
within a very narrow compass, depending upon the construction of that portion of the federal bankrupt act of 1898 which
excepts from the discha:rge ''judgments in actions for frauds,
• • • or debts created by fraud, • • • in any fiduciary
capacity." 30 Stat. 550, § 17, els. 2, 4. Plaintiff insists, first,
that the action for accounting was based upon the fraudulent acts
of the defendant in the misappropriation of partnership funds
and property. His theory is that the partnership was controlled
by an agreement under which defendant was authorized to withdraw $60 per month for his services, and no more; also that it
was defenda.nt 's duty to render an account from month to
month, which he did not do. Other than the connection between
the partnership agreement and general allegations of deficit
and misappropriation of funds by defendant, there was nothing
in the complaint in the suit before the referee which would
justify the claim that fraud was litigated therein. It was an
ordinary equitable action for an accounting between partners,
sounding in contract (3 Porn. Eq. Jur. p. 1431), and asking for
a money judgment. Neither do we think the findings of the
referee justify the claim that defendant was guilty of defrauding plaintiff in the conduct of the partnership business. It was
found by the referee that during the period of the partnership
defendant "converted" a certain sum of money, which counsel
claims ex vi termini indicates fraud; but it is clear from the re·
maining findings that the word "converted" was used in no such
sense, but to describe conduct not inconsistent with honesty and
good faith. From which it follows that neither the findings nor
the judgment entered thereon in the suit before the referee established any fraud by defendant in the management of t~e
partnership business. As distinguished from the previous United
States bankruptcy acts, the act of 1898 provides for two separate classes of exceptions from the discharge of the bankrupt,
viz., one in which the judgment must be for fraud, and the other
in which the debt must have arisen upon embezzlement, misappropriation, or fraud in a "fiduciary capacity." It is probable,
as held in Re Rhutassel (D. C.) 96 Fed 597, that it was the
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purpose of the present bankruptcy act to provide that in the

first class of cases the fraud should be shown or evidenced by a

judgment, or at least disclosed in the judgment roll, while in

the case of debts for "fraud in a fiduciary capacity" proof of

the fiduciary capacity would furnish the test of the exception

which would apply to cases of violation of express trusts. But

it is not necessary in this case to anticipate a decision of the

Supreme Court of the United States in that respect, for the trial

judge, not having before it a judgment for fraud, fully consid-

ered the weight of evidence on that question, and found that

there was no fraud, upon testimony that amply supports his

conclusions in that respect, and forecloses any further inquiry

upon that issue here, leaving for us the simple duty of constru-

ing the meaning of the provision that excepts '' fraud in a fidu-

ciary capacity" from the operation of the bankruptcy dis-

charge. So that it only remains to be considered whether, un-

der the partnership agreement, a violation of the obligations im-

posed upon the defendant by its provisions for payment and

account for moneys received, as well as the defendant's with-

drawal of more money than his salary, was a breach of a fidu-

ciary relation, within the purview of the bankruptcy exception

referred to. In the national acts of bankruptcy for 1841 and
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1867 the discharge of the bankrupt excepts him from a debt of

a similar nature. In both of these acts the word "fiduciary"

was employed as a designation of the relation from which a dis-

charge would not operate, and such term has received authorita-

tive interpretation from the highest tribunal in the land, which

concededly has final jurisdiction in such matters. The term "fi-

duciary" in the provisions of these acts has been held by the

United States Supreme Court, as well as other courts, to apply

to what may be understood as technical or express, rather than

implied, trusts, and as excluding from such interpretation frauds

by commission men, brokers, agents, etc. Neal v. Clark, 95 U.

S. 704, 24 L. ed. 586; Hennequin v. Clews, 111 U. S. 676, 4 Sup.

Ct. 576, 28 L. ed. 565; Palmer v. Hussey, 87 N. Y. 303; Id,, 119

U. S. 96, 7 Sup. Ct. 158, 30 L. ed. 362; Noble v. Hammond, 129

U. S. 65, 9 Sup. Ct. 235, 32 L. ed. 621. The implied trust rela-

tion existing between partners, under which their liabilities to

each other must be determined, does not bring their affairs

within the definition of the excepted term, "fiduciary," in the

bankruptcy act, under the construction given in the above deci-

sions. In a leading case in a court of high authority, which had

purposE.- of the present bankruptcy act to provide that in the
first class of eases the fraud should be shown or evidenced by a
judgment, or at least disclosed in the judgment roll, while in
the case of debts for "fraud in a fiduciary capacity" proof of
the fiduciary capacity would furnish the test of the exception
which would apply to cases of violation of express trusts. But
it is not necessary in this case to anticipate a decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in that respect, for the trial
judge, not having before it a judgment for fraud, fully considered the weight of evidence on that question, and found that
there was no fraud, upon testimony that amply supports his
conclusions in that respect, and forecloses any further inqll.iry
upon that issue here, leaving for us the simple duty of construing the meanin_g of the provision that excepts ''fraud in a fiduciary capacity'' from the operation of the bankruptcy dis.
charge. So that it only remains to be considered whether, under the partnership agreement, a violation of the obligations imposed upon the defendant by its provisions for payment and
account for moneys received, as well as the defend.ant's withdrawal of more money than his salary, was a breach of a fiduciary relation, within the purview of the bankruptcy exception
referred to. In the national acts of bankruptcy for 1841 and
1867 the discharge of the bankrupt excepts him from a debt of
a similar nature. In both of these acts the word "fiduciary"
was employed as a designation of the relation from which a discharge would not operate, and such term has received authoritative interpretation from the highest tribunal in the land, which
concededly bas final jurisdiction in such matters. The term '' fi.
duciary'' in the provisions of these acts has been held by the
United States Supreme Court, as well as other courts, to apply
to what may be understood as technical or express, rather th~
implied, trusts, and as excluding from such interpretation frauds
by commission men, brokers, agents, etc. Neal v. Clark, 95 U.
S. 704, 24 L. ed. 586; Hennequin v. Clews, 111 U. S. 676, 4 Sup.
Ct. 576, 28 L. ed. 565; Palmer v. Hussey, 87 N. Y. 303; Id., 119
U. S. 96, 7 Sup. Ct. 158, 30 L. ed. 362; Noble v. Hammond, 129
U. S. 65, 9 Sup. Ct. 235, 32 L. ed. 621. The implied trust relation existing between partners, under which their liabilities t.o
each other must be determined, does not bring their affairs
within the definition of the excepted term, "fiduciary," in the
bankruptcy act, under the construction given in the above decisions. In a leading case in a court of high authority, which had
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previously decided that implied as well as express trusts were

embraced in the exception of the bankruptcy act referred to, it

was held that even under such interpretation the exception of

the act would not extend to an implied trust between the mem-

bers of a partnership (Hill v. Shiebley, 68 6a. 556); and we

are clearly of that opinion. While the collocation of language

in which the term "fiduciary" is used in the former acts is not

precisely the same as in the act of 1898, there is no reason to

apprehend that a different construction will be given to that

word than by the previous decisions in the court of final juris-

diction in such matters. In re Basch (D. C.) 97 Fed. 761;

Bracken v. Milner (C. C.) 104 Fed. 522.

The order appealed from is affirmed.

ZAVELO v. BEEVES

227 U. S. 625, 57 L. ed. 676, 33 Sup. Ct. 365

[See this case given on page 391, ante.]

ALLEN & CO. v. FEBGDSON

previously decided that implied as well as express trusts were
embraced in the exception of the baukruptcy act referred to, it
was held that even under such interpretation the exception of
the act would not extend to an implied trust between the members of a partnership (Hill v. Shiebley, 68 Ga. ;)56); and we
are clearly of that opinion. While the collocation of language
in which the term ''fiduciary'' is used in the former acts is not
precisely the same as in the act o.f 1898, there is no reason to
apprehend that a different construction will be given to that
word than by the previous decisions in the court of final jurisdiction in such matters. In re Basch (D. C.) 9i Fed. i61;
Bracken v. l\filner (C. C.) 104 Fed. 522.
The order appealed from is affirmed.

18 Wallace, 1, 21 L. ed. 854

(United States Supreme Court. October Term, 1873)

P. H. Allen & Co. sued A. H. Ferguson upon a promissory

ZAVELO v. REEVES

note, dated March 20th, 1867, payable one day after date, with

interest.

227 U.S. 625, 57 L. ed. 676, 33 Sup. Ct. 365
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Ferguson appeared and pleaded his discharge in bankruptcy

in bar to the action.

[See this case given on page 391, ante.]

The plaintiffs replied a new promise in writing made while the

proceedings in bankruptcy were pending. This promise the

ALLEN & CO. v. FEliGUSON

plaintiffs averred that they relied upon, and in consequence of

it made no efforts to collect their debt. The alleged promise

18 Wallace, 1, 21 L. ed. 854

was contained in the following letter, which the plaintiffs made

part of their replication, viz.:

"Crockett's Bluff, Arkansas, January 7th, 1868.

"Messrs. T. H. Allen & Co.

"Dear Sir: I avail myself of this opportunity to give you a

fare statement of my pecuniary affa'res. First, I failed to make

a crop; secondly, find myself involved as security to the amount

of five or eight thousand dollars; was sued, and judgments was

(United States Supreme Court. October Term, 1873)

P. H. Allen & Co. sued A. H. Ferguson upon a promissory
note, dated March 20th, 1867, payable one day after date, with
interest.
Ferguson appeared and pleaded his discharge in bankruptcy
in bar to the action.
The plaintiffs replied a new promise in writing made while the
proceedings in bankruptcy were pending. This promise the
plaintiffs averred that they relied upon, and in con.sequence of
it made no efforts to collect their debt. The alleged promise
was contained in the following letter, which the plainti.ffs made
part of their replication, viz. :
''Crockett's Bluff, Arkansas, January 7th, 1868.
''Messrs. T. H. Allen & Co.
"Dear Sir: I avail myself of this opportunity to give you a
fare statement of my pecuniary affa 'res. First, I failed to make
a crop; secondly, find myself involved as security to the a.mount
of five or eight thousand dollars; was sued, and judgments was
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render'd against me at the last turm of our co'rt for about

$4000, a sum suf'ic'ent to sell all the avai'ble property that I

am in possession of. I lost about $3000 by persons taking the

bankrupt law. This is my situation. I was, as you can re"dily

conclude, in a bad fix. To remain as I was, at that time, my

property would be sold to pay security debts, and my just cred-

itors would not get any part of it, and that I would be redused

to insolvency and still ju'gments against me. As a last resort

concluded to render a skedule myself in order to forse a pro-

rater division of my affects. The five bales cotton I shipt you

was all my crop, to pay you for the meat that you had sent me,

to enable me to make the little crop that I did make. The cash

that I requested you to send me was, for myself and William

Ferguson, to pay his hands for labor; and one hundred and fifty

yards of the bag'ing was for W. Ferguson, and one barel of the

sait. I have been absent from home for the last two weeks; got

home last night, and has not sean him yet, but suppose he has

shipt you some cotton. If he has not doue so, I will see that he

sends you cotton at once. Be satisf'ed; all will be right. I in-

tend to pay all my just debts, if money can be "made out of

hired labor. Security debt I cannot pay. I shall have a hard

time, I suppose, this se'son, but will do the best I can.
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"Jan. 8.—Since the above was writ'en I have seen William

Ferguson. He says he ship'ed you two bales cotton, ten or

twelve days ago, and ship'ed in my name, as the baggin' was

order'd by me for him. William Ferguson will be in Memphis

betwixt this and the first of March, and will call and see you on

bisness matters betwixt me and you'self. All will be right be-

twixt me and my just creditors. Don't think hard of me. At-

tribet my poverty to the unprincipel'd Yankey. Let me heare

from you as usel.

;' Yours, very respectfully,

'A. H. Ferguson."

To this replication the defendant demurred. The demurrer

was sustained by the Circuit Court, and this appeal was taken

by the plaintiffs.

Mr. Justice HUNT delivered the opinion of the court.

The question is, does the letter of the defendant, set forth in

the replication, contain a sufficient promise to pay the debt in

suit?

render'd against me at the last turrn of our co'rt for about
$4000, a sum suf 'ic 'ent to sell all the avai 'ble property that I
am in possession of. I lost about l\13000 by persons taking the
bankrupt law. This is my situation. I was, as you can re "dily
conclude, in a bad fix. To remain as I was, at that time, my
property would be sold to pay security debts, and my just cred·
itors would not get any part of it, and that I would be redUSt'd
to insolvency and still ju 'gments against me. As a last resort
concluded to render a skedule myself in order to forse a prorater division of my affects. The five bales cotton I shipt you
was all my crop, to pay you for the meat that you had sent me,
to enable me to make the little crop that I did make. The cash
that I requested you to send me was, for myself and 'Villiam
Ferguson, to pay his hands for labor; and one hundred and fifty
yards of the bag 'ing was for 'V. Ferguson, and one barel of the
salt. I have been absent from home for the last two weeks; got
home last night, and bas not sean him yet, but suppose he has
shipt you some cotton. If be has not done so, I will see that he
sends you cotton at once. Be satis{'ed; aU will be right. I intend to pay all my just debts, if money can be ·made out of
kwed labor. Security debt I cannot pay. I shall have a hard
time, I suppose, this se 'son, but will do the best I can.
"Jan. 8.-Since the above was writ'en I have seen William
Ferguson. He says he ahip'ed you two bales cotton, ten or
twelve days ago, and ship 'ed in my name, as the baggin' was
order'd by me for him. William Ferguson will be in Memphis
betwixt this and the first of March, and will call and see you on
bisness matters betwixt me and you 'self. A.U will be right betwixt me and my just creditors. Don't think hard of me. Attribet my poverty to the unprincipel 'd Yankey. Let me he.are
from you as usel.

;'Yours, very respectfully,
'A. H.

FERGUSON . ',

To this replication the defendant demuITed. The demurrer
was sustained by the Circuit Court, and this appeal was taken
by the plaintiffs.
Mr. Justice HUNT delivered the opinion of the court.
The question is, does the letter of the defendant, set forth in
the replication, contain a sufficient promise to pay the debt in
suit T
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All the authorities agree in this, that the promise by which

a discharged debt is revived must be clear, distinct, and un-

equivocal. It may be an absolute or a conditional promise, but

in either case it must be unequivocal, and the occurrence of the

condition must be averred if the promise be conditional. The

rule is different in regard to the defense of the statute of limi-

tations against a debt barred by the lapse of time. In that case,

acts or declarations recognizing the present existence of the

debt have often been held to take a case out of the statute. Not

so in the class of cases we are considering. Nothing is sufficient

to revive a discharged debt unless the jury are authorized by

it to say that there is the expression by the debtor of a clear

intention to bind himself to the payment of the debt. Thus,

partial payments do not operate as a new promise to pay the

residue of the debt . The payment of interest will not revive the

liability to pay the principal, nor is the expression of an in-

tention to pay the debt sufficient. The question must be left to

the jury with instructions that a promise must be found by

them before the debtor is bound. (Hilliard on Bankruptcy, 264

to 266, where the cases are collected.)

The plaintiffs in error contend that such promise is to be found

in the letter of the defendant, forming a part of their replica-
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tion. They rely chiefly on these expressions: "Be satisfied; all

will be right. I intend to pay all my just debts, if money can

be made from hired labor. Security debt I cannot pay," and on

the postscript where he adds, "All will be right betwixt me and

my just creditors."

There can be no more uncertain rule of action than that which

is furnished by an intention to do right. How or by whom is

the right to be ascertained? What is right in a particular case?

Archbishop Whately says: "That which is conformable to the

supreme will is absolutely right, and is called right simply,

without reference to a special end. The opposite to right is

wrong." This announces a standard of right, but it gives no

practical aid. What may be right between the defendant and

his creditors is as difficult to determine as if he had no such

standard. It is not absolutely certain that it is right for a

creditor, seizing hs debtor, to say, Pay me what thou owest, or

that it is wrong for the debtor to resist such an attack. It is

not unnatural that the creditor should think that payment of the

debt was right, and that it was the only right in the case. It is

equally natural that the debtor should entertain a different opin-

All the authorities agree in this, that the promise by which
a discharged debt is revived must be clear, distinct, and unequivocal. It may be an absolute or a conditional promise, but
in either case it must be unequivocal, and the occurrence of the
condition must be averred if the promise be conditional. The
rule is dllferent in regard to the defense of the statute of limitations against a debt barred by the lapse of time. In that case,
acts or declarations recognizing the present existence of the
debt have often been held to take a case out of the statut.e. Not
so in the class of cases we are considering. Nothing is sufficient
to revive a discharged debt unless the jury are authorized by
it to say that there is the expression by the debtor of a clear
intention to bind himself to the payment of the debt. Thus,
partial payments do not operate as a new promise to pay the
residue of the debt. The payment of int.erest will not revive the
liability to pay the principal, nor is the expression of an intention to pay the debt sufficient. The question must be left to
the jury with instructions- that a promise must be found by
them before the debtor is bound. (Hilliard on Bankruptcy, 264
to 266, where the cases are collected.)
The plaintiffs in error contend that such promise is to be found
in the letter of the defendant, forming a part of their replication. They rely chiefly on these expressions: ''Be satisfied; all
will be right. I intend to pay all my just debts, if money can
be made from hired labor. Security debt I cannot pay,'' and on
t.he postscript where he adds, ''All will be right betwixt me and
my just creditors.''
There can be no more uncertain role of action than that which
is furnished by an intention to do right. How or by whom is
the right to be ascertained f What is right in a particular case T
Archbishop Whately says: ''That which is conformable to the
supreme will is absolutely right, and is called right simply,
without reference to a special end. The opposite to right is
wrong." This announces a standard of right, but it gives no
practical aid. ;wbat may be right between the defendant and
his creditors is as difficult to determine as if he had no such
standard. It is not absolutely certain that it is right for a
creditor, seizing hs debtor, to say, Pay me what thou owest, or
that it is wrong for the debtor to resist such an attack. It is
not unnatural that the creditor should think that payment of the
debt was right, and that it was the only right in the case. It is
equally natural that the debtor should entertain a different opin-
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ion. The law holds it to be right that a debtor shall devote

his entire property to the payment of his debts, and when he has

done this that after-acquired property shall be his own. to be

held free from the obligation of all his debts, just debts as wel]

as unjust, principal debts as well as security debts. Neither

the supreme will, so far as we can ascertain it, nor the laws of

the land, require that a debtor whose family is in need, or who

is himself exhausted by a protracted struggle with poverty and

misfortune, should prefer a creditor to his family; that he should

appropriate his earnings to the payment of a debt from which

the judgment of the law has released him, rather than to the

support of his family or to his own comfort. What an honest

man should or would do under such circumstances it is not

always easy to say. When, therefore, the debtor in this case

said to the plaintiff: "Be satisfied; I intend to do right; all

will be right betwixt my just creditors and myself," he cannot

be understood as saying that he would certainly pay his debt,

much less that he would pay it immediately, as the plaintiff

assumes. What is or what may be right depends upon many

circumstances. The principle is impracticable as a rule of ac-

tion to be administered by the courts. There is no standard

known to us by which we are able to say that it is wrong in the
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defendant not to pay the plaintiff's debt.

We are of the opinion that the letter produced does not con-

tain evidence of a promise to pay the debt in suit, and that

the judgment appealed from must be affirmed.12

12—See Matthewson v. Needham,

81 Kuia. 340, 2« L. B. A. (N. a)

274.

ion. The law holds it to be right that a debtor shall de,·ote
his entire property to the payment of his debts, and when he has
done this that after-acquired property shall be his own. to lxheld free from the obligation of all his debts, just debts as well
as unjust, principal debts as well as security debts. Neither
the supreme will, so far aa we can ascertain it, nor the laws of
the ]and, require that a debtor whose family is in need, or who
is himself exhausted by a protracted struggle with poverty and
misfortune, should prefer a creditor to his family; that he should
appropriate his earnings to the payment of a debt from which
the judgment of the law has released him, rather than to the
support of his family or to his own comfort. What an honest
man should or would do under such circumatances it is not
always easy to say. When, therefore, the debtor in this ~
said to the plaintiff: ''Be satisfied ; I intend to do right; all
will be right betwixt my just creditors and myself," he cannot
be understood as saying that he would certainly pay his debt.
much leae that he would pay it immediately, 88 the plaintiff
assumes. What is or what may be right depends upon many
circumstances. The principle is impracticable as a rule of ac·
tion to be administered by the courts. There is no standard
known to us by which we are able to say that it is wrong in the
defendant not to pay the plaintiff's debt.
We are of the opinion that the letter produced does not con·
tain evidence of a promise to pay the debt in suit, and that
the judgment appealed from must be affirmed. ti
12-See Matt.hewaon v. Needham,
81 Kana. 840, 26 L. R. A. (N. 8.)
27'-
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STATUTES

STATUTE OP 13 ELIZABETH

Ch. 5

11. For the avoiding and abolishing of feigned, covinous, and fraudu-

STATUTES

lent feoffments, gifts, grants, alienations, conveyances, bonds, suits, judg-

ments, and executions, as well of lands and tenements as of goods and

chattels, more commonly used and practised in these days than hath been

seen or heard of heretofore: which feoffments, gifts, grants, alienations,

conveyances, bonds, suits, judgments, and executions have been and are

devised and contrived of malice, fraud, covin, collusion, or guile, to the end,

purpose, and intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors and others of

their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, accounts, damages, penalties,

forfeitures, heriots, mortuaries, and reliefs, not only to the let or hinderance

of the due course and execution of law and justice, but also to the over-

throw of all true and plain dealing, bargaining, and chevisance between

man and man, without the which no commonwealth or civil society can be

maintained or continued:

t 2. Be it therefore declared, ordained, and enacted by the authority of

this present Parliament, that all and every feoffment, gift, grant, alienation,

bargain and conveyance of lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods

and chattels, or of any of them, or of any lease, rent, common, or other

profit or charge out of the same lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods, and

chattels, or any of them, by writing or otherwise, and all and every bond,

suit, judgment, and execution, at any time had or made sithence the be-
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ginning of the Queen's Majesty's reign that now is, or at any time here-

after to be had or made, to or for any intent or purpose before declared and

expressed, shall be from henceforth deemed and taken (only as against that

person or persons, his or their heirs, successors, executors, administrators

and assigns, and every of them, whose actions, suits, debts, accounts, dam-

ages, penalties, forfeitures, heriots, mortuaries, and reliefs, by such guileful

covinous, or fraudulent devices and practices as is aforesaid, are, shall, or

might be in any wise disturbed, hindered, delayed, or defrauded), to be

clearly and utterly void, frustrate, and of none effect; any pretence, color,

feigned consideration, expressing of use, or any other matter or thing to

the contrary, notwithstanding.

I 3. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that all and

every the parties to such feigned, covinous, or fraudulent feoffment, gift,

grant, alienation, bargain, conveyance, bonds, suits, judgments, execution?,

and other things before expressed, and being privy and knowing of the

same, or any of them, which at any time after the tenth day of June next

coming shall wittingly and willingly put in ure, avow, maintain, justify, or

defend the Bame, or any of them, as true, simple, and done, had, or made,

bona fide and upon good consideration; or shall alien or assign any of the

lands, tenements, goods, leases, or other things before mentioned, to him or

them conveyed as is aforesaid, or any part thereof; shall incur the penalty

and forfeiture of one year's value of the said lands, tenements, and heredita-

ments, leases, rents, commons, or other profits of or out of the same; and the

whole value of the said goods and chattels; and also so much money as are or
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STATUTE OF 13 ELIZABETH
Ch. 5
I 1. For the avoiding and abolishing of feigned, covinollB, and fraudulent feoffmenta, gifta, granta, alienations, conveyancea, bonds, suits, judg·
ments, and executions, aa well of la.nd.I and tenementa BB of goods and
chattels, more commonly used and practised in these days than hath been
seen or heard of heretofore: which feoffments, gifts, grants, alienations,
conveyances, bonds, auita, judgmenta, and executions have been and are
devised and contrived of malice, fraud, covin, collusion, or guile, to the end,
purpose, and intent t~ delay, hinder, or defraud credit.oni and others of
their just and lawful actiona, 1uita1 debts, accounts, damages, penalties,
forfeitures, heriota, mortuaries, and reliefs, not only to the let or hinderance
C'f the due course and execution of law and justice, but also to the over·
throw of all true and plain dealing, bargaining, and cheviaance between
man and man, without the which no commonwealth or chil society can be
maintained or continued:
t 2. Be it therefore declared, ordained, and enacted by the authority of
thia present Parliament, that all and every feoffment, gift, graut, alienatiou,
bargain and conveyance of lands, tenements, hereditaments, goodB
and chattels, or of any of them, or of any lease, rent, common, or other
profit or charge out of the a&me lands, tenementa, hereditaments, gooda, and
chattell, or any of them, by writing or otherwise, and all and every bond,
a11it, judgment, and execution, at any time had or made sithence the beginning of the Queen's Majesty's reign that now is, or at any time hereafter to be had or made, to or for any intent or purpose before declared and
expre18ed, shall be from henceforth deemed and taken (only as against that
person or pereona, his or their heirs, succeBBOrs, execut.ors, administrators
and aa.igna, and every of them, whoee actions, suits, debts, aceounta, damages, penaltie1, forfeitures, heriota, mortuaries, and reliefs, by such guileful
covinou1, or fraudulent devices and practices 811 is &foresaid, are, shall, or
might be in any wise disturbed, hindered, delayed, or defrauded), to be
clearl7 and utterly void, frustrate, and of none effect; any pretence, color,
feigned consideration, expreeaing of uee, or any other matter or thing t.o
the contrary, notwithstanding.
I 3. And be it further enacted b7 the authority aforesaid, that all and
9Vef1 the parties t.o such feigned, covinou., or fraudulent feoffment, gift,
grant, alienation, bargain, eonve7ance1 bonds, suite, judgments, execution!!,
and other things before expre118ed, and being Rrivy and knowing of the
aame, or any of them, which at any time after the tenth day of June next.
coming shall wittingly and willingly put in ure, arnw, maintain, justify, or
defend the 1&me, or any of them, as true, simple, and done, had, or made,
bona fiM and upon good consideration; or shall alien or assign any of the
Janda, tenements, gooda; leases, or other things before mentioned, to him or
them conveyed aa is aforesaid·, or any part thereof; shall incur the penalty
and forfeiture of one year's value of the said lands, tenements, and hereditaments, leases, rents, commons, or other profit.a of or out of the 1ame; and the
whole value of the said goods and ehattela; and also so much money aa are or
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shall be contained in any such covinous and feigned bond, the one moiety

whereof to be to the Queen'b Majesty, her heirs and successors, and the other

moiety to the party or parties grieved by such feigned and fraudulent feoff-

ment, gift, grant, alienation, bargain, conveyance, bonds, suits, judgments,

executions, leases, rents, commons, profits, charges, and other things afore-

said, to be recovered in any of the Queen's courts of record, by action of

debt, bill, plaint, or information, wherein no essoin, protection, or wager of

law shall be admitted for the defendant or defendants; and also being

thereof lawfully convicted, shall suffer imprisonment for one-half year

without bail or mainprise.

I 6. Provided also, and be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, that

this act, or anything therein contained, shall not extend to any estate or

interest in lands, tenements, hereditaments, leases, rents, commons, profits,

goods, or chattels, had, made, conveyed, or assured, or hereafter to be had,

made, conveyed, or assured, which estate or interest is or shall be upon good

consideration and bona fide lawfully conveyed or assured to any person or

persons, or bodies politic or corporate, not having at the time of such convey-

ance or assurance to them made any manner of notice or knowledge of

such covin, fraud, or collusion as is aforesaid; anything before mentioned

to the contrary hereof, notwithstanding.

NEW YORK STATUTE OF 1829 i

(New York Eev. Stat. 1829, Part II, Ch. VII, Title III)
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11. Every conveyance of assignment, in writing or otherwise, of any

estate or interest in lands, or in goods or things in action, or of any rents

or profits issuing therefrom, and every charge upon lands, goods, or things

1hall be contained in any such covinoua and feigned bond, the one moiet7
whereof to be to the Queen'• Majeety, her heirs and succeasors, and the other
moiety to the party or partiee grieved by such feigned and fraudulent feoffment, gift, grant, alienation, bargain, conveyance, bonda, suits, judgments,
executions, leases, rents, commou, proftte, charges, and other things aforeeaid, to be recovered in any of the Queen 'a courts of re~ord, by action of
debt, bill, plaint, or information, wherein no eesoin, protection, or wager of
law shall be admitted for the defendant or defendant!i; and also being
thereof lawfully convicted, shall suffer imprisonment for one-half year
without bail or mainpriJle.
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I 6. Provided alao, and be it enacted by the authority aforeeaid, that
this act, or anything therein contained, shall not ex'tend to an;r estate or
interest in Janda, tenements. hereditamenta, leaae1, rents, commons, profit!,
gooda, or chattels, had, made, conveyed, or assured, or hereafter to be had,
made, con-reyed, or auured, which estate or intereet iB or ahall be upon good
consideration and bona fide lawfully conveyed or assured to an7 pereon or
per10D11, or bodies politic or corporate, not having at the time of auch conveyance or aeaurance to them made any manner of notice or knowledge of
auch covin, fraud, or collusion as is aforeeaid; anything before mentioned
to the contrary hereof, notwithstanding.
•

•

•

•

•
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•

•

•
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•
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in action, or upon the rents or profits thereof, made with the intent to

NEW YORK STATUTE OF 1829 t
(New York Rev. Stat. 1829, Part II, Ch. VII, Title III)

hinder, delay or defraud creditors or other persons of their lawful suits,

damages, forfeitures, debts, or demands, and every bond or other evidence

of debt given, suit commenced, decree or judgment suffered, with the like in-

tent, as against the persons so hindered, delayed, or defrauded, shall be void.

t 3. Every conveyance, charge, instrument, or proceeding declared to be

void, by the provisions of this chapter, as against creditors or purchasers,

shall be equally void against the heirs, successors, personal representatives,

or assignees of such creditors or purchasers.

{4. The question of fraudulent intent in all cases arising undeT the

provisions of this chapter shall be deemed a question of fact and not of

law; nor shall any conveyance or charge be adjudged fraudulent as against

creditors or purchasers solely on the ground that it was not founded on a

valuable consideration.

§ 5. The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed in any manner

to affect or impair the title of a purchaser for a valuable consideration,

unless it shall appear that such purchaser had previous notice of the fraudu-

lent intent of his immediate grantor, or of the fraud rendering void the

title of such grantor.

1 These provisions, In somewhat altered phraseology, are to be found

In the present Consolidated Laws. c. 50 (Real Property Law), 5| 263-266;

c. 45 (Personal Property Law), II 36, 31. They have furnished the pat-

tern for the legislation of many states. Bigelotc, fraudulent Conveyance*

(Knowlton't edj, pp. H, K.

t 1. Every coneyance of uaignment, in writing or otherwiM, of any
estate or intereet in Janda, or in goods or things in aetion, or of any rentll
or profitll inuing therefrom, and every charge upon lands, goods, or thillgl
in action, or upon the rents or profits thereof, made with the intent to
hinder, delay or defraud creditors or other persons of their lawful suits,
damages, forfeitures, debts, or demands, and every bond or other evideuea
of debt given, suit commenced, decree or judgment suffered, with the like intent, as against the persons ao hindered, delayed, or defr&uded, shall be void.
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•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

13. Every conveyance, charge, inatrument, or proceeding declared to be
void, by the provisions of this chapter, u against creditors or purchuers,
shall be equally void against the heirs, l!IUceesaors, personal repreaentatil'tl!,
or auigneee of such crediton or purehaeen.
t 4. The question of fraudulent intent in all cases arising under the
provisions of this chapter shall be deemed a question of fact and not of
law; nor shall &ny conveyance or charge be adjudged fraudulent as against
creditors or purchasers solely on the ground that it was not founded on a
valuable consideration.
I 5. The provisions ot this rhapter shall not be con1trued in any manner
to affect or impair the title of a purchaser for a valuable consideration,
unlese it 11hall appear that such purchaeer had previoua notice of the fraudulent intent of bis immediate grantor, or of the fraud rendering void the
title of such grantor.
1 These provlalom1, In somewhat altered phrueology are to be found
In the present Consolidated Law•. c. 60 (Real Property Law), fl H3-H6;
c. 46 (Personal Property Law), II 36, 37. They have furntahed tlae pattern for the legislation of many eta.tu. B•11elotA1, l'rowltllnt Co1111erallCfl
(KMteU011'• od.), f'P· ~. II.

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY LAW

(ACT OF JULY 1. 1898. CH. 541; 30 Stat, at L. 544; 1 Fed. Stat. Aaaat. 525)

AS AMENDED BY

THE ACT OF FEBRUARY 5. 1903, CH. 487 (32 Stat, at L. 197; 10 Fed. Stit.

Annot. 38); THB ACT OF JUNE 15. 1906. CH. 3333 (34 Stat, at L.

267; 1909 Supp. Fed. Stat. Annot. 55); AND THE ACT OF

JUNE 25. 1910. CH. 412 (36 Stat, at L. 838;
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1912 Supp Fed. Stat. Annot. 21)

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY LAW
(ACT OF JULY I, 1898, CB. SU; 30 Stat. at L. 544; I fed. Stat. ADnot. 525)
AS AMENDED IY

THE ACT OF FEBRU.UY 5, 1903, CB. 487 (32 Stat. at L. 197; 10 Fed. Stat.
ADnot. 38); THE ACT OF JUNE IS, 1906, CB. 3333 (34 Stat. at L.
267; 1909 SDpp. Feel. Stat. Aanot. SS); AND THI ACT OF
JUNE 25, 1910, CB. 412 (36 Stat. at L. 838;
1912 SDpp Feel, Stat. Annot. 21)

-

AN ACT

To Establish a Uniform System or Bankruptcy Throughout the

Unites States

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representative* of the United

States of America in Congress assembled,

CHAPTEE I

AN ACT

definitions

11. Meaning of Words and Phrases.—a The words and phrases used

iu this Act and in proceedings pursuant hereto shall, unless the same be In-

To

ESTABLISH A

consistent with the context, be construed as follows: (1) "A person

UNJJ'OBK

SYSTEM

or

BANKRUPTCY TUBOUOHOUT THE

UNJTl:l> STATES

against whom a petition has been filed" shall include a person who has

filed a voluntary petition; (2) "adjudication" shall mean the date of the

entry of a decree that the defendant, in a bankruptcy proceeding, is a

Be it enacted by the Senate and HOWie of Repreaentativu of the United
Stat ea of A merioa in COftgru1 auembldd,

bankrupt, or if such decree is appealed from, then the date when such

decree is finally confirmed; (3) "appellate courts" shall include the eirerit

CHAPTEB I

courts of appeals of the United States, the supreme courts of the Terri-

tories, and the Supreme Court of the United States; (4) "bankrupt" shall

DBJ'JNITIONS

include a person against whom an involuntary petition or an application

to set a composition aside or to revoke a discharge has been filed, or who

11. MEANJNO

01' WORDS AND PHRASES.-&

The words and phraaee used

has filed a voluntary petition, or who has been adjudged a bankrupt; (5)

"clerk" shall mean the clerk of a court of bankruptcy; (6) "corpora

tions" shall mean all bodies having any of the powers and privileges of

private corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships, and shall

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

include limited or other partnership associations organized under laws mak

ing the capital subscribed alone responsible for the debts of the associa

tion; (7) "court" shall mean the court of bankruptcy in which the proceed

ings are pending, and may include the referee; (8) "courts of bankruptcy"

shall include the district courts of the United States and of the Territories,

the supreme court of the District of Columbia, and the United States court

of the Indian Territory, and of Alaska; (9) "creditor" shall include any-

one who owns a demand or claim provable in bankruptcy, and may include

his duly authorized agent, attorney, or proxy; (10) "date of bankruptcy,"

or "time of bankruptcy," or "commencement of proceedings," or "bank-

ruptcy," with reference to time, shall mean the date when the petition was

filed; (11) "debt" shall include any debt, demand, or claim provable in

bankruptcy; (12) "discharge" shall mean the release of a bankrupt from

all of his debts which are provable in bankruptcy, except such as are ex-

cepted by this Act; (13) "document" shall include any book, deed, or

1—Those portions of the Act 1903, 1906 and 1910 are Indicated

which remain as originally enacted by the use of ttalict; the original

In 1898 are printed In Roman type; form of the amended sections I*

changes made by the amendments of given In the footnotes.

H. & A. Bankruptcy—48
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1u this Act and in proceedings pursuant hereto shall, unless the same be in·

coueiswnt with the context, be construed as follows:
(1) ''A peraon
against whom a petition baa been filed'' shall include a person who has
filed a voluntary petition; (2) "adjudication" shall mean the date of the
entry of a decree that the defendant, in a bankruptcy proceeding, is a
bankrupt, or if such decree is appealed from, then the date when such
decree is finally confirmed; (3) "appellate courts'' shall include the circl'it
courts of appeals of the United States, the supreme courts of the Territories, and the Supreme Court of the United States; ( 4) "bankrupt" shall
include a person against whom a.n involuntary petition or an application
to set a composition aaide or to re,·oke a discharge bas been filed, or who
baa filed a voluntary pet'tion, or who has been adjudged a bankrupt; (5)
"clerk" shall mean the clerk of a court of bankruptcy; (6) "corpora
tions" shall mean all bodies having any of the powers and privileges of
private corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerahips, and shall
include limited or other partnership associations organized under laws mak·
ing the capital subscribed alone responsible for the debta of the aBBociation; ( 7) "court" shall mean the court of bankruptcy in which the proceed·
inga are pending, and may include the referee; (8) "courts of bankruptcy"
shall inelude the district eourt8 of the United States and of the Territories,
the supreme court of the District of Columbia, and the United States court
of the Indian Territory, and of Alaska; (9) "creditor" shall include 11.ny·
one who owns a demand or claim provable in bankruptcy, and may include
hia duly authorized agent, attorney, or proxy; ( 10) "date of bankruptcy,"
or ''time of bankruptcy,'' or ''commencement of proceedings,'' or ''bank·
ruptcy,'' with reference to time, shall mean the date when the petition waa
filed; (11) ''debt'' shall include any debt, demand, or claim provable in
bankruptcy; {12) "diacharge" shall mean the release of a bankrupt from
all of his debts which are provable in bankruptcy, except such as 11.re ex ·
cepted by this Act; (13) "document" shall include any book, deed, or
1-Those portions ot the Act
which remain as orlglnally enacted
In 1898 are printed In Roman type;
change1 made by the amendments of
H. 6 A. B&nkruptcy-48

1903, 1906 and 1910 are lodlca tcd
by the use or Italic•; the original
form or the amended aectlona I•
given In the tootDotea.
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instrument in writing; (14) "holiday" shall include Christmas, the Fourth

of July, the Twenty-second of February, and any day appointed by the

President of the United States or the Congress of the United States as a

holiday or as a day of public fasting or thanksgiving; (15) a person shall

be deemed insolvent within the provisions of this Act whenever the aggre-

gate of his property, exclusive of any property which he may have con-

veyed, transferred, concealed, or removed, or permitted to be concealed or

removed, with intent to defraud, hinder or delay his creditors, shall not, at

a fair valuation, be sufficient in amount to pay his debts; (16) "judge"

shall mean a judge of a court of bankruptcy, not including the referee;

(17) "oath" shall include affirmation; (18) "officer" shall include clerk,

marshal, receiver, referee, and trustee, and the imposing of a duty upon or

the forbidding of an act by any officer shall include his successor and any

person authorized by law to perform the duties of such officer; (19)

"persons" shall include corporations, except where otherwise specified, and

officers, partnerships, and women, and when used with reference to the

commission of acts which are herein forbidden shall include persons who

are participants in the forbidden acts, and the agents, officers, and members

of the board of directors or trustees, or other similar controlling bodies of

corporations; (20) "petition" shall mean a paper filed in a court of bank-

ruptcy or with a clerk or deputy clerk by a debtor praying for the benefits

of this Act, or by creditors alleging the commission of an act of bankruptcy

by a debtor therein named; (21) "referee" shall mean the referee who has
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jurisdiction of the case or to whom the case has been referred, or any one

acting in his stead; (22) "conceal" shall include secrete, falsify, and

mutilate; (23) "secured creditor" shall include a creditor who has security

for his debt upon the property of the bankrupt of a nature to be assignable

under this Act, or who owns such a debt for which some indorser, surety, or

other persons secondaiily liable for the bankrupt has such security upon the

bankrupt's assets; (24) "States" shall include the Territories, the Indian

Territory, Alaska, and the District of Columbia; (25) "transfer" shall in-

clude the Bale and every other and different mode of disposing of or

parting with property, or the possession of property, absolutely or condi-

tionally, as a payment, pledge, mortgage, gift, or security; (26) "trustee"

shall include all of the trustees of an estate; (27) "wage-earner" shall

mean an individual who works for wages, salary, or hire, at a rate of com-

pensation not exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars per year; (28)

words importing the masculine gender may be applied to and include cor-

porations, partnerships, and women; (29) words importing the plural num-

ber may be applied to and mean only a single person or thing; (30) words

importing the singular number may be applied to and mean several per-

sons or things.

CHAPTEB II

CREATION OF COURTS OF BANKRUPTCY AND THEIR JURISDICTION

{ 2. That the courts of bankruptcy as hereinbefore defined, viz, the dis-

trict courts of the United States in the several States, the supreme court

of the District of Columbia, the district courts of the several Territories, and

the United States courts in the Indian Territory and the District of Alaska,

are hereby made courts of bankruptcy, and are hereby invested, within their

instrument in "'riting; (14) "holiday'' shall include Chriatmaa, the Fourth
of July, tlie T11cnty-second of February, and any day appointed by the
President of the United States or the Congress of the United State& u &
holiday or as a day of public fasting or thanksgiving; (15) a person ahall
be deemed iuso)\·cnt within the pro\·il!ions of this Act whenever the aggregate of hi~ property, exclusive of any property which he may have con·
vcyed, transferred, concooled, or removed, or permitted to be concealed or
removed, with intent to defraud, hinder or delay hia creditors, shall not, at
a fair valuation, be sufficient in amount to pay his debta; (16) "judge"
shall mean a judto:e of a court of bankruptcy, not including the referee;
(17) "oatJ1'' shall include affirmation; (18) "officer" shall include clerk,
marshal, reeeher, referee, and trustee, and the impoaing of a duty upon or
the forbidding uf an act by any officer shall include his succeuor and any
person authorized by law to perform the duties of aueh officer; (19)
"persons" shull include corporations, except where otherwise specified, and
officers, partnerships, and women, and when used with reference to the
commission of acts which are herein forbidden ahall include persona who
are participants in the forbidden acts, and the agents, officers, and memberl
of the board of directors or trustees, or other similar controlling bodies of
corporations; (20) "petition'' shall mean a paper filed in a court of bank·
ruptcy or with a clerk or deputy clerk by a debtnr praying for the beneftbl
of this Act, or by creditors alleging the commission of an act of bankruptcy
by a debtor therein named; (21) "referee" shall mean the referee who bu
jurisdiction of the case or to whom the case baa been referred, or any one
acting in his 11teatl; (22) "eonceal" shall include 11ecrete, falsify, and
mutilate; (23) "secured t•reditor" shall include a creditnr who bu eecurity
for his debt upon the property of the bankrupt of a nature to be aaaignable
under this Act, or who owns sul'b a debt for which some in1loreer1 surety, or
other persons seconclaiily liable for the bankrupt has such security upon the
bankrupt 'a assets; (24) "States" shall include the Territories, the Indian
Territory, Alaska, and the District of Columbia; ( 25) "transfer'' ahall include the sale and every otht>r and different mode of disposing of or
parting with property, or the vossession of property, absolutely or condi·
tionally, as a payment, pletlge, mortgage, gift, or security; (26) "trustee"
shall include all of the trustees of an estate; (27) "wage-earner" shall
mean an individual who works for wages, salary, or hire, at a rate of eom·
pensation not exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars per year; (28}
words importing the masculine get11ler may be applied to and include cor·
porations, partnerships, and women; (29) words importing the plural num·
her may be applied to and mean only a single person or thing; (30) words
importing the singular number may be applied to and mean eeveral per·
aona or things.
CHAPTER II .
CB.SATION

or

COURTS 01' BANKRUPTCY AND THEIB JUJUBDIOTlON

12. That the courts of bankruptcy as hereinbefore defined, viz, the di1·
trict courts of the United States in the se¥eral States, the supreme court
of the District of Columbia, the district courts of the several Territories, and
tho United States c·ourts in the Indian Territory and the District of Alaska,
arl' hereby made courts of b1Wkruptcy, and arc hereby in\·ested, within their
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respective territorial limits as now established, or as they may be hereafter

ehanged, with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them

to exercise original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings, in vacation in

chambers and during their respoctive terms, as they are now or may be

hereafter held, to (1) adjudge persons bankrupt who have had their prin-

cipal place of business, resided, or had their domicile within their respec-

tive territorial jurisdictions for the preceding six -months, or the greater por-

tion thereof, or who do not have their principal place of business, reside, or

have their domicile within the United States, but have property within their

jurisdictions, or who have been adjudged bankrupts by courts of competent

jurisdiction without the United States, and have property within their juris-

dictions; (2) allow claims, disallow claims, reconsider allowed or disallowed

claims, and allow or disallow them against bankrupt estates; (3) appoint

receivers or the marshals, upon application of parties in interest, in case the

courts shall find it absolutely necessary, for the preservation of estates, to

take charge of the property of bankrupts after the filing of the petition and

until it is dismissed or the trustee is qualified; (4) arraign, try, and punish

bankrupts, officers, and other persons, and the agents, officers, members of

the board of directors or trustees, or other similar controlling bodies, of

corporations for violations of this Act, in accordance with the laws of

procedure of the United States now in force, or such as may be hereafter

enacted, regulating trials for the alleged violation of laws of the United
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States; (5) authorize the business of bankrupts to be conducted for lim-

ited periods by receivers, the marshals, or trustees, if necessary in the best

interests of the estates; and allow such officers additional compensation for

such services,* as provided in section forty-eight of this Act; * 2 (6) bring in

and substitute additional persons or parties in proceedings in bankruptcy

when necessary for the complete deteimination of a matter in controversy;

(7) cause the estates of bankrupts to be collected, reduced to money and

distributed, and determine controversies in relation thereto, except as herein

otherwise provided; (8) close estates, whenever it appears that they have

been fully administered, by approving the final accounts and discharging

the trustees, and reopen them whenever it appears they were closed before

being fully administered; (9) confirm or reject compositions between

debtors and their creditors, and set aside compositions and reinstate the

cases; (10) consider and confirm, modify or overrule, or return, with

instructions for further proceedings, records and findings certified to them

by referees; (11) determine all claims of bankrupts to their exemptions;

(12) discharge or refuse to discharge bankrupts and set aside discharges

and reinstate the cases; (13) enforce obedience by bankrupts, officers,

and other persons to all lawful orders, by fine or imprisonment or fine

and imprisonment; (14) extradite bankrupts from their respective districts

to other districts; (15) make such orders, issue such process, and enter

such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as may be

2—12 (5) originally read as fol- dltional compensation for such serv-

lowi: "(5) authorize tbe business of Ices, but not at a greater rate than

bankrupts to be conducted for 11m- In this Act allowed trustees for

lted periods by receivers, the mar- similar services."

shall, or trustees, If necessary in tbe Tbe amendment of 1910 struck out

best interests of tbe estates." the last clause added by the amend-

The amendment of 1003 added the ment of 1903 and substituted the

words: "and allow such officers ad- words between the asterisks.

r88pective territorial li.mjta u now established, or u they may be hereafter
ehanged, with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them
to exercise original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings, in \"&cation in
chambers and during their respoctive terms, as they are now or may be
hereafter held, to (1) adjudge persons bankrupt who ha,·e had their principal plaee of business, resided, or had their domicile within their respective territorial jurisdictions for the preceding six monthi;, or the greater portion thereof, or who do not have their principal place of bu.sioeaa, reside, or
have their domicile within the United States, but have property within their
jurisdictions, or who ha\·e been adjudged bankrupts by courts of competin'
juriadiction without the United States, and have property within their jurisdictions; (2) allow claims, disallow cla.im.!1, reconsider allowed or disnllowed
claims, and allow or disallow them against bankrupt eetates; (3) appoint
receivers or the marshals, upon application of parties in interest, in c88e the
court.a shall tind it absolutely necessary, for the preservation of estates, to
take charge of the property of bankrupts alter the filing of the petition and
until it is dismissed or the trustee is qualified; ( 4) arraign, try, and punish
ban.krupta, officers1 and other per80ns, and the agents, officers, members of
the board of directors or trusteee 1 or other similar controlling bodies, of
corporations for violations of this Act, in accordance with the laws of
procedure of the United States now in force, or such as may be hereafter
enacted, regulating trials for the alleged violation of laws of the United
States; (5) authorize the business of bankrupts to be conducted for limited periods by receivers, the marshals, or trustces1 if necessary in the best
interest.a of the esta'tee; and allow such officers additi-Onal compensation for
81lcA aervices, • a1 provided in section f orty-ei17ht of this Act; • 2 (6) bring in
and substitute additional persons or parties in proceedings in bankruptcy
when necessary for the complete dete1 ruination of a matter in controversy;
(7) cause the estates of baukrurts to be colle•·tcd, reduced to money and
distributed, and determine controversies in relation thereto, except as herein
otherwise provided; ( 8} dose est:1ws, whe1H~\·er it appears that they ha,·e
been fully arlministcred, by approving the final accounts and discharging
the trustees, and reopen them whenever it nppears they were cloeeJ before
being fully administered; (9} coufirm or reject compositions Letween
debtors and their creditors, and set aside compositions and reinstate the
caaea; (10) eonl!ider and confirm, modify or overrule, or return, with
instructions for further proceedings, records and findings certified to them
by relel"e09; ( 11) determine all claims of bankrupts to their exemptions;
(12) di!lcharge or refuse to disrharge bankrupts and set asicie discharges
and reinstate the cases; ( 13) enforce obedience by bankrupts, ollicers1
and other peT80ns to all lawful orders, by fine or imprisonment or fine
and imprisonment; (14) extradite bankrupts from thc>ir respective districts
to other districts; ( 15} make such orders, issue such process, and enter
such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as may be
2-1 2 ( 5) orlglna Jly read as fol·
low1: "(5) authorize the buRlnen ot
bankrupts to be conducted for limited ~rlods by receivers. the mnrshal1, or tru1tec11, If neeeRi<ary In the
bellt lnterestll ot the estates."
The amendment of 1003 added the
worit1 : "and allow 1uch otncers ad-

dJtlonal compemmtlon for such sen·let>e, but not nt n greater rate than
In thl11 Act ullol\·ed trustt'l'S tor
slm liar l!ervlces."
The amendment or l!llO >1truck 011t
the last clause Added by the amendment of 1903 and sub!ltltutelf the
words between the asterisks.
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necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act; (16) punish

persons for contempts committed before referees; (17) pursuant to the

recommendation of creditors, or when they neglect to recommend the ap-

pointment of trustees, appoint trustees, and upon complaints of creditors,

remove trustees for cause upon hearings and after notices to them; (18)

tax costs, whenever they are allowed by law, and render judgments there-

for against the unsuccessful party, or the successful party for cause, or in

part against each of the parties, and against estates, in proceedings in

bankruptcy; (19) transfer cases to other courts of bankruptcy; and (20)

exercise ancillary jurisdiction over persons or property within their respec-

tive territorial limits in aid of a receiver or trustee appointed in any bank-

ruptcy proceedings pending in any other court of bankruptcy.*

.Nothing in this section contained shall be construed to deprive a court

of bankruptcy of any power it would possess were certain specific powers

not herein enumerated.

CHAPTEB in

BANKRUPTS

necessary for the enforcement of the provisioos of this Act; (16) puniah
perso1111 for contempts committed before refereee; ( 17) puniuant to the
recommendation of creditors, or when they neglect to recommend the appointment of trustees, appoint trustees, and upon complaints of creditors,
remove trustees for cause upon hearings and after notices to them; (18)
tax costs, wbene,.er they are allowed by law, and render judgmenta therefor ag11.inst the unsucccBSful party, or the succesaful party for <:auae, or iD
part against each of the parties, and against estates, in proceedings in
bankruptcy; (19) transfer caaee to other court.a of bankruptcy; and (:2tJ)
e:rerciae ancillary jur'8diction over persons or property within their ruJU!.;·
ti116 territorial limiu in aWl of a receiver or trudee appoi11ted in any bankruptcy proceedings pending in any otl&er court of banlcrvptcy.a
Nothing in this aection contained shall be construed to deprh-e a court
of bankruptcy of any power it would poaBeBS were certain 1peci1ic powera
not herein enumerated.

§ 3. Acts or Bankruptcy.—a Acts of bankruptcy by a person shall

consist of his having (1) conveyed, transferred, concealed, or removed, or

CHAPTER III

permitted to be concealed or removed, any part of his property with intent

to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, or any of them; or (2) trans-

BANDUPTS
ferred, while insolvent, any portion of his property to one or more of his

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

creditors with intent to prefer such creditors over his other creditors; or

(3) suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain a prefer-

ence through legal proceedings, and not having at least five days before a

sale or final disposition of any property affected by such preference vacated

or discharged such preference; or (4) made a general assignment for the

benefit of his creditors; or, being insolvent, applied for a receiver or trustee

for his property or because of insolvency a receiver or trustee has been put

in charge of his property under the laws of a State, of a Territory, or of

the United States;* or (5) admitted in writing his inability to pay his

debts and his willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt on that ground.

b A petition may be filed against a person who is insolvent and who has

committed an act of bankruptcy within four months after the commission

of such act. Such time shall not expire until four months after (1) the

date of the recording or registering of the transfer or assignment when the

act consists in having made a transfer of any of his property with intent

to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors or for the purpose of giving a

preference as hereinbefore provided, or a general assignment for the benefit

of his creditors, if by law such recording or registering is required or per-

mitted, or, if it is not, from the date when the beneficiary takes notorious,

exclusive, or continuous possession of the property unless the petitioning

creditors have received actual notice of such transfer or assignment.

c It shall be a complete defense to any proceedings in bankruptcy insti-

tuted under the first subdivision of this section to allege and prove that the

party proceeded against was not insolvent as defined in this Act at the time

8—12 (20) was added by the 4—The Italicized words were added

amendment of 1910. by the amendment of 1903.

13. ACTS OJ' BANKRUPTCY.-& Acts of bankruptcy by a person shall
consist of bis having (1) conveyed, transferred, coneealed, or removed, or
permitted to Le eoncealed or remo,·ed, any part of bis property with intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, or any of them; or (2) transferred, while insolvent, any portion of his property to one or more of his
creditors with intent to prefer such creditors over ha other creditora; or
( 3) suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain a preferenee through legal prot•eediogs, and not ha\•ing at least five days before a
sale or final disposition of any property af'f'eeted by such preference vaeated
or diseharged such preference; or ( 4) made a general ll88ignment for the
benefit of his ereditors; or, being i11solvent, applied for a recefrer or trustee
for Ais property or becauati of insolvency a receiver or trustee has been put
in charge of his Jiropcrty wider the laws of a State, of a Territory, <>r of
the United States;• or (5) admitted in writing hia inability to pay his
debt.a and hie willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt on that ground.
b A petition may be filed against a person who is insolvent and who has
committed an act of bankruptey within four months after the commission
of sueh act. Such time shall not expire until four months after (1) the
date of the recording or registering of the tranafer or aBSignment when the
act eonsi11t8 in hnving made a tranafer of any of bis property with intent
to hin<ler, deluy, or defraud bis creditors or for the purpose of giving a
preference ns h<'reinhefore pro,.ided, or a general a11Signment for the benefit
of his creditors, if by law such recording or registering is required or permitt<'d, or, if it is not, from the date when the beneficiary takes notorious,
exclusive, or continuous possession of the property unless the petitioning
crt'<litors have received a('tual notice of sueh transfer or assignment.
c It shall be a complt'te defense to any proceedings in bankruptcy instituted under the first subdivision of this section to allege and prove that the
party proceeded agai1111t was not insolvent as define1t in this Act at the time
8-t 2 ( 20) wu
nmendment of HllO.

added

by

the

4-Tbe lt1tllcl1ed words were 11tldt>d
b1 the amendment of 1903.
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of the filing the petition against him, and if solvency at such date is proved

by the alleged bankrupt the proceedings shall be dismissed, and under said

subdivision one the burden of proving solvency shall be on the alleged

bankrupt.

d Whenever a person against whom a petition has been filed as herein-

before provided under the second and third subdivisions of this section takes

issue with and denies the allegation of his insolvency, it shall be his duty to

appear in court on the hearing, with his books, papers, and accounts, and

submit to an examination, and give testimony as to all mutters tending to

establish solvency or insolvency, and in case of his failure to so attend and

submit to examination the burden of proving his solvency shall rest upon

him.

e Whenever a petition is filed by any person for the purpose of having

another adjudged a bankrupt, and an application is made to take charge of

and hold the property of the alleged bankrupt, or any part of the same,

prior to the adjudication and pending a hearing on the potitiou, the pe-

titioner or applicant shall file in the same court a bond with at least two

good and sufficient sureties who shall reside within the jurisdiction of said

court, to be approved by the court or a judge thereof, in such sum as the

court shall direct, conditioned for the payment, in case such petition is dis-

missed, to the respondent, his or her personal representatives, all costs,

expenses, and damages occasioned by such seizure, taking, and detention
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of the property of the alleged bankrupt.

If such petition be dismissed by the court or withdrawn by the petitioner,

the respondent or respondents shall be allowed all costs, counsel fees,

expenses, and damages occasioned by such seizure, taking, or detention of

such property. Counsel fees, costs, expenses, and damages shall be fixed and

allowed by the court, and paid by the obligors in such bond.

§ 4. Who May Become Bankrupts.—a Any person, except a municipal,

railroad, insurance, or banking corporation, phall be entitled to the benefits

of this Act as a voluntary bankrupt.

b Any natural person, except a wage-earner or a person engaged chiefly

in farming or the tillage of the soil, any unincorporated company, and any

moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, except a municipal, railroad,

insurance, or banking corporation, owing debts to the amount of one thou-

sand dollars or over, may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt upon default

or an impartial trial, and shall be subject to the provisions and entitled to

the benefits of this Act.

Tlie bankruptcy of a corporation shall not release its officers, directors,

or stockholders, as such, from any liability under the laws of a State or

Territory or of the United States.'

5—I 4 originally read as follows:

"a Any person who owes debts, ex-

cept a corporation, shall be entitled

to the benefits of this Act as a volun-

tary bankrupt, b Any natural person,

except a wage-earner or a person en-

of the filing the petition against him, and if solvency at such date is proved
by the alleged bankrupt the proceedings shall be diami1111Cd, and under eaid
subdivision one the burden of proving soh·ency shall be on the alleged
bankrupt.
d Whenever a person against whom a petition has been filed aa hereinbefore provided under the second and third subdivisions of this seetion takes
U.ue with and denies the allegation of his inaoh-ency, it shall be hia duty to
appear in court on the hearing, with his books, papen1, and accounts, and
submit to an examination, and give testimony as to all matters tending to
eetablish solvency or in&oll"ency, and in caae of his failure to so attend anti
submit to examination the burden of proving his solvenry shall reet upon
him.
e Whenever a petition i11 flied by any peraon for the purpose of h&\'ing
another adjudged a bankrupt, and an application is made to take charge of
and hold the property of the alleged bankrupt, or any part o{ the aame,
prior to the adjudication and pending a bearing on the petition, the petitioner or applicant shall file in the same court a bond with at least two
good and suffirient sureties who shall re1ide within the jurisdiction of eaid
court, to be approved by the court or a judge thereof, in 111ch sum as the
court shall direct, conditioned for the payment, in Cl\.lle 1ucb petition ia dil·
miseed, to the respondent, hie or her personal representatives, all costs,
expen&e81 and damages occasioned ·by such seizure, taking, and detention
of the property of the alleged bankrupt.
If such petition be dismiMed by the court or withrlrawn by the petitioner,
the respondent or respondents shall be allowed all costs, counsel fees,
expenses, and damages occasioned by such sei1ure, taking, or detention of
such property. Counsel fees, cost.s, expenses, and damages shall be fi.J::ed and
allowed by the court, and paid by the obligors in such bond.
I 4. WHo MAY BECOME BAJSKRUPTS.-a Any pen1on, except a mu1&icipal,
railroad, insurance, or banking corporation, ttball be entitled to the benefits
of this Act as a voluntary bankrupt.
b Any natural person, except a wage-<1arner or a person engaged chie6y
in farming or the tillage of the soil, any unincorporated company, Rnd any
fnO'l&eyed, business, or commercial corporation, except a municipal, railroad,
in.nlrance, or banking corporation, owing debts to the amount of one thou·
sand dollars or over, may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt upon default
or an impartial trial, and shall be subject to the provi!ions and entitled to
the benefits of this Act.
The bankniptcy of a corporation ahall 11ot relt'a.!le it.. o!Jfcen, d4rector•,
or atockholtlers, as such, from a11y liability 1rnder the laws of a State or
Territory or of the United States.II

gaged chiefly In farming or the tillage

of the soli, any unincorporated com-

pany, and any corporation engaged

principally In manufacturing, trading,

printing, publishing, or mercantile pur-

suits, owing debts to the amount of

one thousand dollars or over, may be

adjudged an Involuntary bankrupt

upon default or an impartial trial,

and shall be subject to the provisions

and entitled to the benefits of this

Act. Private bankers, but not na-

tional banks or banks Incorporated

under State or Territorial laws, may

be adjudged Involuntary bankrupts."

~I 4 originally read 1111 followe :
"a Any penon who owH debt11. ex·
cept a c:"orporotlon. shall be entltkd
to the benenta of tbl1 Act 011 n voluntary hankrupt. b Any nntural 1wrson.
ex('ept a wage-earner or a prr11on en·
gn~"d c:"hlcfly In farmlng or the tlllage
of the soil, any unincorporated company, and any c:"Orporatlon engaged
principally In manufacturing, trading,
prl.Dtin,g, publlahing, or mercantile pur-

1mlta, owing debtll to the amount of
one tbouund dollars or over, may be
adjudged on Involuntary be.nkrupt
upon default or nn Impartial trial.
nnd ~hall be 11ubject to the provisions
and l'ntltled to tbe beneftt11 of this
A<'t.
Prll"nte bankers, but not national b8nk11 or banks lncorporatl'd
under State or Territorial law11, may
be adjudged Involuntary bankrupta."'
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{ 5. Partners.—a A partnership, during the continuation of the part-

nership business, or after its dissolution and before the final settlement

thereof, may be adjudged a bankrupt.

b The creditors of the partnership shall appoint the trustee; in other

respects so far as possible the estate shall be administered as herein provided

for other estates.

c The court of bankruptcy which has jurisdiction of one of the partners

may have jurisdiction of all the partners and of the administration of the

partnership and individual property.

d The trustee shall keep separate accounts of the partnership property

and of the property belonging to the individual partners.

e The expenses shall be paid from the partnership property and the

individual property in such proportions as the court shall determine.

f The net proceeds of the partnership property shall be appropriated

to the payment of the partnership debts, and the net proceeds of the indi-

vidual estate of each partner to the payment of his individual debts. Should

any surplus remain of the property of any partner after paying his indi-

vidual debts, such surplus shall be added to the partnership assets and be

applied to the payment of the partnership debts. Should any surplus of

the partnership property remain after paying the partnership debts, such

surplus shall be added to the assets of the individual partners in the pro-

portion of their respective interests in the partnership.
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g The court may permit the proof of the claim of the partnership estate

against the individual estates, and vice versa, and may marshal the assets

of the partnership estate and individual estates so as to prevent preferences

and secure the equitable distribution of the property of the several estates.

h In the event of one or more but not all of the members of a partner-

ship being adjudged bankrupt, the partnership property shall not be admin

istered in bankruptcy, unless toy consent of the partner or partners not

adjudged bankrupt; but such partner or partners not adjudged bankrupt

shall settle the partnership business as expeditiously as its nature will

permit, and account for the interest of the partner or partners adjudged

bankrupt.

i 6. Exemptions of Bankrupts.—a This Act shall not affect the allow-

ance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the State laws

in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the State wherein they

have had their domicile for the six months or the greater portion thereof

immediately preceding the filing of the petition.

§ 7. Duties or Bankrupts.—a The bankrupt shall (1) attend the first

meeting of his creditors, if directed by the court or a judge thereof to do

so, and the hearing upon his application for a discharge, if filed; (2)

comply with all lawful orders of the court; (3) examine the correctness of

all proofs of claims filed against his estate; (4) execute and deliver such

papers as shall be ordered by the court; (5) execute to his trustee transfers

of ajl his property in foreign countries; (6) immediately inform his trustee

Tbe amendment of 1903 added the

word "mrnlng" after "publishing" In

the list of classes of corporations sub-

ject to Involuntary bankruptcy under

14b, and added the following provi-

sion: "Tbe bankruptcy of a corpora-

tion shall not release its officer?, dl

15. P.a.RTNERS.-a A partnership, during the continuation of the part·
nenhip bueinesa, or after its dissolution and before the final aettlement
thereof, may be adjudged a bankrupt.
b The creditors of the partnership shall appoint the trustee; in other
r011peets so far as possible the estat.e shall be administered as herein provided
for other eetat.es.
c The court of bankruptcy which baa jurisdiction of one of the partnena
may have jurisdiction of all the partners and of the administration of the
partnership and individual property.
d The trustee shall keep separate accounts of the partnership property
and of the property belonging to the individual partners.
e The expenses shall be paid from the partnership property and the
individual property in such proportions as the court shall determine.
f The net proceeds of the partnership property shall be appropriated
to the payment of the partnership debts, and the net proceeds of the individual estate of each partner to the payment of his individual debts. Should
any surplus remain of the property of any partner after paying his indi·
vidual debts, such surplus shall be added to the partnership aaaet.a and be
applied to the payment of the partnership debt.a. Should any surplus of
the partnership property remain after paying the partnership debts, such
surplus shall be added to the al.l8ets of the individual partners in the pro·
portion of their · respective interests in the partnership.
g The court may permit the proof of the claim of the partnership estate
against the individual estatee, a:nd vice versa, and may manihal the aaset3
of the partnership estat.e and individual estates so as to prenmt preferences
and eccure the equitable distribution of the property of th\? severnl est.at.ei;.
h In the event of one or more but not all of the members of a partner·
ship being adjudged bankrupt, the partnership property shall not be ndmin
istered in bankruptcy, unless by consent of the partner or partners not
adjudged bankrupt; but such partner or partners not adjudged bankrupt
shall settle the partnership busine!'s as exi.ieditioualy as it.a nature will
permit, and account for the interest of the partner or partners adjudged
bankrupt.
16. EDMPTIONS or BANKRUPTS.-a This Act shall not affect the allow·
ance to bankrupts of the exemptions whieb are preecribed by the State lami
in force at the time of the filing of the petition in th" State wherein they
have had their domicilo for the six months or the greater portion thereof
immediately preceding the filing of tho petition.
I 7. DUTIES or BANKRUPTS.-& The bankrupt shall (1) attend the tint
meeting of his creditors, if directed by the court or a judge tJjereof to do
so, and the hearing upon his application for a discharge, if filed; (2)
comply with all lawful orders of the court; (3) examine the corrednelll!I of
all proofs of claims filed against his estate; ( 4) e~ecute and deliver such
papers as shall be ordered by the court; (5) execute to hie trust.ea tranafm
of aJl his property in foreign countries; ( 6) immediately inform his truat.ee

rectors, or stockholders, as such, from

any liability under tbe laws of a Statt

or Territory or of the United States."

The other changes were made by

tbe amendment of 1910.

The amendment of 1903 added the
word "mlnlng" after "publishing•· In
the llMt of cla11ees of corporations sub·
Ject to Involuntary bankruptcy under
I 4b. and added the following prov!·
slon : "The bankruptcy of a corpora·

tlon shall not release lta omeers. di
rectors, or 11tockholders. ae such, from
any liability under the laws of a State
or Territory or of the Unltl.'d 8tatl"s."'
The other changes were made by
the amendment of 1910.
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of any attempt, by his creditors, or other persons, to evade the provisions of

this Act, coming to his knowledge; (7) in case of any person having to his

knowledge proved a false claim against his estate, disclose that fact imme-

diately to his trustee; (8) prepare, make oath to, and file in court within

ten days, unless further time is granted, after the adjudication, if an invol-

untary bankrupt, and with the petition if a voluntary bankrupt, a schedule

of his property, showing the amount and kind of property, the location

thereof, its money value in detail, and a list of his creditors, showing their

residences, if known, if unknown, that fact to be stated, the amounts due

each of them, the consideration thereof, the security held by them, if any,

and a claim for such exemptions as he may be entitled to, all in triplicate,

one copy of each for the clerk, one for the referee, and one for the trustee;

and (9) when present at the first meeting of his creditors, and at such other

times as the court shall order, submit to an examination concerning the con-

ducting of his business, the cause of his bankruptcy, his dealings with his

creditors and other persons, the amount, kind, and whereabouts of his

property, and, in addition, all matters which may affect the administration

and settlement of his estate; but no testimony given by him shall be offered

in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding.

Provided, however, That he shall not be required to attend a meeting of

bis creditors, or at or for an examination at a place more than one hundred

and fifty miles distant from his home or principal place of business, or to
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examine claims except when presented to him, unless ordered by the court,

or a judge thereof, for cause shown, and the bankrupt shall be paid his

actual expenses from the estate when examined or required to attend at any

place other than the city, town, or village of his residence.

§ 8. Death or Insanity of Bankrupts.—a The death or insanity of a

bankrupt shall not abate the proceedings, but the same shall be conducted

and concluded in the same manner, so far as possible, as though he had not

died or become insane: Provided, That in case of death the widow and chil-

dren shall be entitled to all rights of dower and allowance fixed by the laws

of the State of the bankrupt's residence.

§ 9. Protection and Detention op Bankrupts.—a A bankrupt shall be

exempt from arrest upon civil process except in the following cases: (1)

When issued from a court of bankruptcy for contempt or disobedience of its

lawful orders; (2) when issued from a State court having jurisdiction, and

served within such State, upon a debt or claim from which his discharge in

bankruptcy would not be a release, and in such case he shall be exempt from

such arrest when in attendance upon a court of bankruptcy or engaged in

the performance of a duty imposed by this Act.

b The judge may, at any time after the filing of a petition by or against

a person, and before the expiration of one month after the qualification of

the trustee, upon satisfactory proof by the affidavits of at least two persons

that such bankrupt is about to leave the district in which he resides or has

his principal place of business to avoid examination, and that his departure

will defent the proceedings in bankruptcy, issue a warrant to the marshal,

directing him to bring such bankrupt forthwith before the court for exami-

nation. If upon hearing the evidence of the parties it shall appear to the

court or a judge thereof that the allegations are true and that it is necessary,

he shall order such marshal to keep such bankrupt in custody not exceeding

ten days, but not imprison him, until he shall be examined and released or

of any attempt, by his creditors, or other persons, to evade the provisiona of
this Act, coming to his knowledge; (7) in case of any person having to his
knowledge proved a false claim against his estate, discfose that fact immediately to his trustee; (8) prcvare, make oath to, and file in court within
ten day1, unless further time is granted, after the adjudication, if an in\·oluntary bankrupt, and with the petition if a voluntary bankrupt, a schedule
of bis property, showing the amount 11nd kind of property, the locatiou
thereof, its money value in detail, and a llllt of his creditors, showing their
residences, if known, if unknown, that fact to be stated, the amounts due
each of them, the consideration thereof, the security held by them, if any,
and a claim for such exemptions as he may be entitled to, all in triplicate,
one copy of each for the clerk, one for the referee, and one for the trustee;
and (9) when present at the first mee_ting of his creditors, and nt su<·h other
times as the court shall order, submit to an examination concerning the con·
ducting of his busineBB, the cause of his bankruptcy, his dealings with his
ereditors and other persons, the amount, kind, and whereabouts of his
property, and, in addition, all matters which may affect the administration
and settlement of hi~ estate; but no testimony given by him shall be offered
in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding.
PrQVided, hou·ever, That he shall not be required to attend a meeting of
his creditors, or at or for an examination at a place more than one hundred
and fifty miles distant from his home or principal place of business, or to
examine claims except when presente<l to him, unless ordered by the court,
or a judge thereof, for cause shown, and the bankrupt shall be paid bis
actual expenses from the estate when examined or required to attend at any
place other than the eity, town, or village of his residence.
I 8. DEATH OR INSANITY OF BANKRUPTS.-a The death or insanity of a
bankrupt shall not abate the proceedings, but the same shall be conducted
and concluded in the same manner, so far as possible, as though he had not
died or become insane: Provided, That in case of death the widow and children shall be entitled to all rights of dower and allowance fixed by the Jaws
of the State of the bankrupt's residence.
§ 9. PROTECTION AKD DETENTION OP BANKRUPTS.-a A bankrupt shall be
exempt from arrest upon civil process except in the following cases: ( 1)
When iBSued from a court of bankruptcy for contempt or disobedience of its
lawful orders; (2) when issued from a State court having jurisdiction, and
served within such State, upon a debt or claim from which his discharge in
bankrupt.cy would not be a release, and in such case he shall be exempt from
such arrest when in attendance upon a court of bankruptcy or engaged in
the performance of a duty imJiosed by this Act.
b The judge may, at any time after the filing of a petition by or against
a person, and before the expiration of one month after the qualification of
the trustee, upon satisfactory proof by the affidavits of at least two persons
that sul'h bankrupt is about to leave the district in which he resides or haa
his prinripal plare of business to avoid examination, and that his departure
will defeat the proceedings in bankruptcy, issue a warrant to the marshal,
direet ing him to bring such bankrupt forth\Tith before the court for examination. If upon hearing the evidence of the parties it shall appear to the
court or a judge thereof that the allegations are true and that it is necessary,
be shall order such marshal to keep such bankrupt in custody not exceeding
ten days, but not imprison him, until he &ball be examined and released or
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not exceeding in all ten days, as required by the court, and for his obedience

to all lawful orders made in reference thereto.

{ 10. Extradition or Bankrupts.—a Whenever a warrant for the appre-

hension of a bankrupt shall have been issued, and he shall have been found

within the jurisdiction of a court other than the one issuing the warrant,

he may be extradited in the same manner in which persons under indictment

are now extradited from one district within which a district court has juris-

diction to another.

111. Suits By and Against Bankrupts.—a A suit which is founded

upon a claim from which a discharge would be a release, and which is pend

ing against a person at the time of the filing of a petition against him, shall

be stayed until after an adjudication or the dismissal of the petition; if such

person is adjudged a bankrupt, such action may be further stayed until

twelve months after the date of such adjudication, or, if within that time

such person applies for a discharge, then until the question of such discharge

is determined.

b The court may order the trustee to enter his appearance and defend

any pending suit against the bankrupt.

c A trustee may, with the approval of the court, be permitted to prosecute

as trustee any suit commenced by the bankrupt prior to the adjudication,

with like force and effect as though it had been commenced by him.

d Suits shall not be brought by or against a trustee of a bankrupt estate
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subsequent to two years after the estate has been closed.

§ 12. Compositions, When Confirmed.—a A bankrupt may offer, either

before or after adjudication, terms of composition to his creditors after,

but not before, he has been examined in open court or at a meeting of his

creditors, and has filed in court the schedule of his property, and the list of

his creditors required to be filed by bankrupts. In composition* before adju-

dication the bankrupt shall file the required schedules, and thereupon the

court shall call a meeting of creditors for the allowance of claims, examina

tion of the bankrupt, and preservation or conduct of estates, at which meet-

ing the judge or referee shall preside; and action upon the petition for

adjudication shall be delayed until it shall be determined whether suck

composition shall be confirmed.*

b An application for the confirmation of a composition may be filed is

the court of bankruptcy after, but not before, it has been accepted in writ-

ing by a majority in number of all creditors whose claims have been allowed,

which number must represent a majority in amount of such claims, and the

consideration to be paid by the bankrupt to his creditors, and the money

necessary to pay all debts which have priority and the cost of the proceedings,

have been deposited in such place as shall be designated by and subject to

the order of the judge.

c A date and place, with reference to the convenience of the parties

in interest, shall be fixed for the hearing upon each application for the con-

firmation of a composition, and such objections as may be made to its

confirmation.

d The judge shall confirm a composition if satisfied that (1) it is for the

6—The words In Italics were added

by the amendment of 1910.

give bail conditioned for his apvearauce for e:xaminut;on, from time to time.
not exceeding in all ten days, as required by the court, and for his obedience
to all lawful orders made in reference thereto.
I 10. Ex.TRADITION or BANKBUPTS.-a Whenever a warrant for the apprehension of a bankrupt shall have been issued, and he shall have been foUDd
within the jurisdiction of a court other than the one i.uuing the warrant,
he may be extradited in the same manner in which persons under indictment
are now extradited from one district within which a distTict court has juri.sdiction to another.
I 11. SUITS BY ..6.ND AOA.lNST B.lNDUPTS.-a A suit which is foUllded
upon a claim from which a dillcharge would be a release, and which is pend
ing against a person at the time of the filing of a petition against him, shall
be stayed until after an adjudication or the di.smi88&l of the petition; if surb
person is adjudged a bankrupt, such action may be further stayed until
twelve months after the date of such adjudication, or, if within that time
such person applies for a discharge, then until the question of such diacharge
is determined.
b The court may order the trustee to enter hia appearance and defenJ
any pending snit against the bankrupL
c A trustee may, with the approval of the court, be permitted to proeecute
as trustee any suit commenced by the bankrupt prior to the adjudication,
with like force and etrect aa though it had been commenced by him.
d Suits shall not be brought by or against a trustee of a bankrupt et1tate
subsequent to two years aft.er the estate hu been cloeed.
112. CoMPOSJTIONS, WHEN CoNFIBMED.-a A bankrupt may offer, eitl&er
before or after adjudication, terma of composition to hia creditors after,
but not before, he has been examined in open court or at a meeting of his
creditors, and h<U filed in court the schedule of his property, and tM list of
hie creditors required to be filed by bankrupt.a. IA compoaitio~ before ad;.dication the bankrupt sl&all file tl&e required acl&edvlu, and tl&erevpoft CM
c011rt shall call a n.eeting of creditora for tl&e allowance of claHiu, eumiMtion of the bankrupt, and preaeroation or conduct of estates, at w1'ic1' meeting tlae judge or referee slaall preaide; and action vpon tlae petition for
adjud\caHon slaall be dekiyed Uftfil it shall be determ\Red wl&etller swcl
composition slaall be c01afinned.•
b An application for the conilrmation of a composition may be filed in
the court of bankruptcy aft.er, but not before, it baa been a.ccepted in writing by a majority in number of all creditors whoae claims have been allowed,
which number must represent a majority in amount of such claim8, and the
consideration to be paid by the bankrupt to his creditor&, and the money
necessary to pay all debts which have priority and the coat of the proceedings.
have been deposited in such place aa ahall be deeignat.ed by and subject to
the order of the judge.
c A date and place, with reference to the convenience of the partiee
in interest, shall be fixed for the hearing upon eaeh application for the confirmation of a composition, and auch objections aa may be made to ita
confirmation.
d The judge shall con1lrm a composition if aatided that ( 1) it ia for tlu!
6-The words In ttallca were added
by the amendment of 1910.
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best interests of the creditors; (2) the bankrupt has not been guilty of any

729

of the acts or failed to perform any of the duties which would be a bar to

his discharge; and (3) the offer and its acceptance are in good faith and

have not been made or procured except as herein provided, or by any means,

promises, or acts herein forbidden.

e Upon the confirmation of a composition, the consideration shall be

distributed as the judge shall direct, and the case dismissed. Whenever a

composition is not confirmed, the estate shall be administered in bankruptcy

as herein provided.

§ 13. Compositions, When Set Aside.—a The judge may, upon the

application of parties in interest filed at any time within six months after

a composition has been confirmed, set the same aside and reinstate the case

if it shall be made to appear upon a trial that fraud was practiced in the

procuring of such composition, and that the knowledge thereof has come to

the petitioners since the confirmation of such composition.

§ 14. Discharge, When Granted.—a Any person may, after the expira-

tion of one month and within the next twelve months subsequent to being

adjudged a bankrupt, file an application for a discharge in the court of

bankruptcy in which the proceedings are pending; if it shall be made to

appear to the judge that the bankrupt was unavoidably prevented from filing

it within such time, it may be filed within but not after the expiration of

the next six months.

b The judge shall hear the application for a discharge and such proofs
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and pleas as may be made in opposition thereto by the trustee or other

parties in interest, at such time as will give the trustee or parties in

interest a reasonable opportunity to be fully heard, and investigate the

merits of the application and discharge the applicant unless he has (1)

committed an offense punishable by imprisonment as herein provided; or

(2) with intent to conceal his fiuaneial condition, destroyed, concealed,

or failed to keep books of account or records from which such condition

might be ascertained; or (3) obtained money or property on credit upon a

materially false statement in writing, made by him to any person or his rep-

resentative for the purpose of obtaining credit from such person; or (4) at any

time subsequent to the first day of the four months immediately preceding

the filing of the petition transferred, removed, destroyed, or concealed, or

permitted to be removed, destroyed, or concealed, any of his property, with

intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors; or (5) in voluntary proceed-

ings been granted a discharge in bankruptcy within six years; or (6) in the

course of the proceedings in bankruptcy refused to obey any lawful order of)

or to answer any material question approved by the court: Provided, That

a trustee shall not interpose objections to a bankrupt's discharge until he

shall be authorized so to do at a meeting of creditors called for that purpose."1

7—| 14b originally read as follows:

"b The Judge shall hear the applica-

tion for a discbarge, and such proofs

mid pleas as may be made in opposi-

tion thereto by parties in interest, at

such time as will give parties In in-

terest n reasonable opportunity to be

fully beard, and investigate the mer-

best int.eresta of the creditors; (2) the bankrupt has not been guilty of any
of the acts or failed to perform any of the duties which would be a bar to
bis discharge; and (3) the offer and its acceptance are in good faith and
have not been made or procured except a11 herein provided, or by any means,
promisce, or acts herein forbidden.
e Upon the confirmation of a composition, the consideration shall be
dilltributed as the judge shall direct, and the cue dismissed. Whenever a
composition is not confirmed, the estate shall be administered in bankruptcy
aa h~rein provided.
f 13. Co-KPOSITIONB, WHEN SET Asmz.-a The judge may, upon the
application of parties in interest filed at any time within six months after
a composition has been confirmed, set the same aside and reinl\tate the ca11e
if it shall be made to appear upon a trial that fraud was practiced in the
procuring of such composition, and that the knowledge thereof baa come to
the petitioners since the confirmation of such composition.
114. DISCHARGE, WHEN GRANTED.-& Any person may, after the expiration of one month and within the next twelve months subsequent to being
adjudged a bankrupt, file an application for a discharge in the court of
bankruptcy in which the proceedings are pending; if it shall be made to
appear to the judge that the bankrupt was unavoidably prevented from filing
it within such time, it may be filed within but not after the expiration of
the next six months.
b The judge shall hear the application for a discharge and such proofs
and pleaa as may be made in opposition thereto by the trustee or other
parties in interest, at 11uch time a11 will give the trwtee or parties in
interest a reasonable opportunity to be fully heard, and inve11tigate the
meritB of the application and discharge the applicant unless he has ( 1)
committed an oft'enae punishable by imprisonment as herein provided; or
( 2) with intent to conceal his flnaneial condition, destroyed, concealed,
or failed to keep books of account or records from which suc.1& condition
might be aacertained; or (~) obtained money or property 011 credit upon a
materially fallle atatttment in writmg, made by J.im to any peraon or l&ia repreaentative for the purpoae of obtaining credit from suc.1& person; or ( 4) at any
time aubsequept to the firat day of the four montla.t immediately preceding
the filing of the petition tranaferred, removed, deatroyed, or concealed, or
permitted to be removed, deatroyed, or concealed, any of hia property, with
i11tent to hinder, delay, or defraud hi$ creditars; or ( 5) in voluntary proceedit1_qa been granted a di8charge in bankruptcy within six years; or (6) in the
course of the proceedings in bankruptcy refuaed to obey any lawful order ofi
or to answer any material queation approved by the court: Provided, That
a trustee al&all 11ot interpose objectiona to a bankrupt's di.~charge until 1&e
.~hall be authorized so to do at a meeting of creditor.~ called /or that purpose.1

its of the application and discbarge

the applicant unless be has (1) com-

mitted an offense punishable by im-

prisonment as herein provided; or

(2) with fraudulent Intent to conceal

his true financlnl condition and in

contemplation of bankruptcy, de-

stroyed, concealed, or fulled to keep

books of account or records from

which his true condition might be

ascertained."

The amendment of 1903 changed it

14b originally read aa follow•:
judge shall hear the application for a discharge, and such proofs
n nd plt•as as may be made In opposlllnn thereto by parties In Interest. at
s11d1 time as wlll give parties In lntPr<'Rt n reason1tble opportunity to be
fully !ward. 1tnd lnTeatlgate the merits of the application and dtacharre
the applicant unleea be bu (1) com7~

'"h The

mltted an olrense p11nlsl111hle by Im·
prlaonment ai; hl'rl'lo provided; or
(2) with frandukot Intent to conceal
his true flnanclnl crm•lltloo nod lo
contemplation
of hRnkruptcy, destroyed. concealed, or fnlled to keep
books of account or records from
wbkh hltl true condition might be
aacertalned."
The amendment of 1903 chanaed It
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c The confirmation of a composition shall discharge the bankrupt from
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his debts, other than those agreed to be paid by the terms of the composition

and those not affected by a discharge.

i 15. Discharge, Whin Revoked.—a The judge may, upon the appli-

cation of parties in interest who have not been guilty of undue laches, filed

at any time within one year after a discharge shall have been granted, revoke

it upon a trial if it shall be made to appear that it was obtained through the

fraud of the bankrupt, and that the knowledge of the fraud has come to the

petitioners since the granting of the discharge, and that the actual facts

did not warrant the discharge.

§ 16. Co-Debtors or Bankrupts.—a The liability of a person who is a

co-debtor with, or guarantor or in any manner a surety for, a bankrupt shall

not be altered by the discharge of such bankrupt.

§17. Debts Not Affected by a Discharge.—a A discharge in bank-

ruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except sueh

as (1) are due as a tax levied by the United States, the State, county, dis-

trict, or municipality in which he resides; (2) are liabilities for obtaining

property by false pretenses or false representations, or for willful and

malicious injuries to the person or property of another, or for alimony due

or to become due, of for maintenance or support of wife or child, or fof

seduction of an unmarried female, or for criminal conversation; (3) have

not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name of

the creditor if known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had notice or
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actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy; or (4) were created

by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting

as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity.*

to read as follows: "The Judge shall

hear the application for a discharge,

and sucli proofs and pleaa as may be

made in opposition thereto by parties

in Interest, at such time as will give

parties in Interest a reasonable op-

c The confirmation of a composition shall diacharge the bankrupt from
his debts, other than those agreed to be paid by the terms of the compOllition
and those not affected by a diacharge.
I 15. DISCllAIWI:, WHEN REVOJUJ>.-a The judge may, upon the application of parties in intere11t who have not been guilty of undue laches, filed
at any time within one year after a discharge shall have been grant.ed, revoke
it upon a trial if it shall be made to appear that it was obtained through the
fraud of the bankru'pt, and that the knowledge of the fraud has come to the
petitioners since the granting of the diaeharge, and that the actual faeta
did not warrant the discharge.
f 16. Co-DEBTORS OF BANUliM'S.-a The liability of a person who is a
co-debtor with, or guarantor or in any manner a surety for, a bankrupt shall
not be altered by the discharge of such bankrupt.
f 17. DEBTS NOT .AJ'n:cTED BY A D1scuARGL-a A discharge in bankruptcy shall releaae a bankrupt from all of hi8 provable debta, except such
as (1) are due as a tax levied by the United Stat.es, the State, county, district, or municipality in which be resides; (2) are liabilities for obtainin~
property by false pretenaee or fal!.'e representations, or for willful and
malicious injuriea to the person or property of another, or for alimony dw.'1
or to becom" due, of' for maintenance or support of v:'ife or child, or fQ!ft
1eductio11 of an 1111 married female, or for crimiHal co111:ersatio11,· (S) b&¥e
not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name of
the creditor if known to the bankrupt, unlees such creditor had notice or
actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy; or ( 4) were creat.ed
by his fraud, embeulement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting
as an oillcl'r or in any fiduciary capacity.•

portunity to be fully beard, and In-

vestigate the merits of tbe applica-

tion and discharge tbe applicant un-

less be has (I) committed sn of-

fense punishable by Imprisonment as

herein provided; or (2) with Intent

to conceal bis financial condition, de-

stroyed, concealed, or failed to keep

books of account or records from which

such condition might be ascertained;

or (3) obtained property on credit

from any person upon a materially

false statement In writing made to

such person for the purpose of obtain-

ing sucb property on credit; or (4) at

any time subsequent to the first day

of tbe four months immediately pre-

ceding the filing of the petition trans-

ferred, removed, destroyed, or con-

cealed, or permitted to he removed,

destroyed, or concealed any of his

property with intent to hinder, delay,

or defraud bis creditors; or (5) in

voluntary proceedings been granted a

discharge in bankruptcy within six

years; or (6) In tbe coarse of the

proceedings in bankruptcy refused to

obey any lawful order of or to answer

any material question approved by the

court."

The other changes were made by the

amendment of 1910.

8—| 17 originally read as follows:

"A discbarge In bankruptcy shall re-

lease a bankrupt from all of his prov-

able debts, except such as (1) are

due as a tax levied by the United

to read as follows : "The judge shall
hear the application for a discharge,
and such proofs and pleaa as may be
mnde In opposition thereto by parties
In lntereat, at such time as will gtve
parties In lntort>st a reaaooable opportunity to be fully beard, and fn.
nstlgate the merits of the appUcatlon and dlRcharge the applicant unle11a he has ( 1) committed an offense punl~hnt.le by Imprisonment as
herein provided ; or (2) with intent
to conrt>al his flnanclal condition, destroyed. conc('nled, or failed to keep
books or 1H·ro11nt or records from which
such condition might be ascertained;
or (3) obtained property on credit
from an~· pt>rMon upon a materially
false stakm<'nt In writing made to
sul'l1 person for the purpose of obtaining such property on credit; or (4) at
any time subsequent to the t1rst day
of the !our months Immediately preceding the filing or the petition transfrrred. r<'IDOl"ed. destroyed, or concealed, or permitted to be removed,
destroyed, or conc1•nlrd any of bla
propl'rty with Intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud his cr,,dltors; or (5) 1n
voluntary proceedings been granted a
discharge in bankruptcy within .ix

years; or (6) In the coune of the
proceedings In bankruptcy refused to
obey any lawful order of or to answer
any material question approvt'd by the
court."
The other changes were made by the
amendment of 1910.
8-f 17 originally read as rouo... :
"A discharge 1n bankr11ptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of bl11 provable debts, except 11uch as ( 1) are
due as a tax levied by the United
Statee, the State, county, district.
or municipality In which he resides ;
(2)
are Judgments In actions for
frauds, or obtaining property by falae
preten~es or false representations, or
for willful Rod malicious Injuries to
the pPrson or prop<"rty of another ;
(8) have not been duly achedoled lD
time tor proof and allowance, wlth the
name of the c1·eclltor If known to the
bankrupt, unll'ss sucb creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the pro<"ee<llngs ln bankruptcy: or (4) were
crl'n ted by bis fraud, embeazlement.
mlsRpproprlntlon, or defalcation while
acting as an omcer or In any l!duclar7
c:ipaclty."
The chan&ea were made by the
amendment of 1908.
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CHAPTEB IV

CHAPTE1' IV

COURTS AND PROCEDURE THEREIN

118. Process, Pleadings, and Adjudications.—a Upon the filing of a

COURTS AND PROCEDURE THEllEDl

petition for involuntary bankruptcy, service thereof, with a writ of sub-

pcena, shall be made upon the person therein named as defendant in the

same manner that service of such process is now had upon the commence-

ment of a suit in equity in the courts of the United States, except that it

shall be returnable withia fifteen days, unless the judge shall for cause fix

a longer time; but in case personal service can not be made, then notice

shall be given by publication in the same manner and for the same time as

provided by law for notice by publication in suits io enforce a legal or equit-

able lien in courts of the United States, except that, unless the judge shall

otherwise direct, the order shall be published not more than once a week

for tuso consecutive weeks, and the return day shall be ten days after the

I 18. PRocJtSs, PLL\DINGS, AND ADJUDICATIONs.-a Upon the filiDg of a
petition for inl"oluntary bankruptcy, sen·ice thereof, with a writ of sub·
pama, shall be made upon the person therein named u defendant in the
aame manner that service of such process is now had upon the commence·
ment of a suit in equity in the courta of the Unite(l States, except that it
shall be returnable withia tlfkien days, unless the judge shall for cause fill:
a longer time; but in case personal service can not be made, then notice
shall be given by publication in the same manner and for the same time aa
provided by law for notice by publication in suita to enforce a legal or equit·

last publication unless the judge shall for cause fix a longer time.*

b The bankrupt, or any creditor, may appear and plead to the petition

within five days after the return day, or within such further time as the

court may allow.i*

c All pleadings setting up matters of fact shall be verified under oath.

d If the bankrupt, or any of his creditors, shall appear, within the time

limited, and controvert the facts alleged in the petition, the judge shall

determine, as soon as may be, the issues presented by the pleadings, without
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the intervention of a jury, except in cases where a jury trial is given by

this Act, and makes the adjudication or dismiss the petition.

e If on the last day within which pleadings may be tiled none are filed

by the bankrupt or any of his creditors, the judge shall on the next day,

if present, or as soon thereafter as practicable, make the adjudication or

dismiss the petition.

f If the judge is absent from the district, or the division of the district

in which the petition is pending, on the next day after the last day on which

pleadings may be filed, and none have been filed by the bankrupt or any

of his creditors, the clerk shall forthwith refer the case to the referee.

g Upon the filing of a voluntary petition the judge shall hear the peti-

tion and make the adjudication or dismiss the petition. If the judge is

absent from the district, or the .division of the district in which the petition

is filed at the time of the filing, the clerk shall forthwith refer the case to

the referee.

§ 19. Jury Trials.—a A person against whom an involuntary petition

has been filed shall be entitled to have a trial by jury, in respect to the ques-

0—| 18a originally read as follows:

"Upon the filing of a petition for

Involuntary bankruptcy, service there-

of, with a writ of subpoena, shall be

made upon the person therein named

as defendant In the same manner that

service of such process Is now had

upon the commencement of a suit In

equity In the courts of the United

States, except that It shall be return-

able within fifteen days, unless the

judge shall for cause fix a longer

time: but In case personal service can

not be made, then notice shall be

given by publication In the same man-

ner and for the same time as provided

by law for notice by publication In

suits In equity In courts of the United

States."

The change was made by the amend-

ment of 1903.

10—Before the amendment of 1903,

the time to plead was ten days after

the return day. Instead of five.

able lien in courts of the United States, except that, unleas tlie judge shall
otheru:i8e direct, the order shalt be published not more than once a week
for two consecutive weeks, and the return day shall be ten days after the
fo.st publication unless the judge shall for cawe fix a longer time.'
b The bankrupt, or any creditor, may appear and plead to the petition
within fitJe d11.ys after the return day, or within sueh further time as the
eouri may allow.10
c All pleadings setting up matters of fact shall be verified under oath.
d If the bankrupt, or any of his creditors, shall appear, within the time
limited, and controvert the facts alleged in the petitlon, the judge shall
determine, aa soon as may be, the i88ues presented by the pleadings, without
the intenention of a jury, except in cases where a jury trial is given by
this Act, and makes the adjudication or dismiBB the petition.
e If on the last day within which pleadings may be filed none are filed
by the bankrupt or any of his creditors, the judge shall on the next day,
if present, or as soon thereafter as practicable, make the adjudication or
dismiss the petition.
f If the judge is absent from the district, or the division of the district
in which the petition is pending, on the next day aft.er the last day on which
pleadings may be filed, and none have been filed by the bankrupt or any
of his creditors, the clerk shall forthwith refer the case to the referee.
g Upon the filing of a voluntary petition the judge shall hear the peti·
tion and make the adjudication or dismiss the petition. If the judge is
aLsent from the district, or the .division of the district in which the petitio•
is filed at the time of the filing, the clerk shall forthwith refer the case to
tho referee.
I 19. Juuy TRIALS.-a A person against whom an involuntary petition
has been filed shall be entitled to have a trial by jury, in respect to the ques·
9-1 18a orlgtnall1 read as follows:
"Upon the filing of a petition for
Involuntary bankruptcy, service there·
of, with a writ of subpoena, shall be
made upon the person therein named
us defendant In the same manner that
service of such process ta now bad
upon the commencement of a 11ult In
t•qulty lo the courts of the United
States, except that !t shall be return·
able within 11.rteen da71. unleBI the
Judie aball for cause ftx a lon1er

time: but In case personal service can
not be made, then notice shall be
given by publication In the same manner and for the same time ns provided
by In w for notice by publlca tlon In
suits In equity In ·courts of the United
Sta tea.'"

The change was made by the amendment of 100:1.
10-Before the nmcndment or llJO:l,
the time to plead was ten days after
the return day, Instead of n~e.
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tidn of his insolvency, except as herein otherwise provided, and any act of

bankruptcy alleged in such petition to have been committed, upon filing a

written application therefor at or before the time within which an answer

may be filed. If such application is not filed within such time, a trial by

jury shall be deemed to have been waived.

b If a jury is not in attendance upon the court, one may be specially

summoned for the trial, or the case may be postponed, or, if the case is

pending in one of the district courts within the jurisdiction of a circuit

court of the United States, it may be certified for trial to the circuit court

sitting at the same place, or by consent of parties when sitting at any other

place in the same district, if such circuit court has or is to have a jury

first in attendance.

c The right to submit matters in controversy, or an alleged offense

under this Act, to a jury shall be determined and enjoyed, except as provided

by this Act, according to the United States laws now in force or such as

may be hereafter enacted in relation to trials by jury.

5 20. Oaths, Affirmations.—a Oaths required by this Act, except upon

hearings in court, may be administered by (1) referees; (2) officers author-

ized to administer oaths in proceedings before the courts of the United

States, or under the laws of the State where the same are to be taken; and

(3) diplomatic or consular officers of the United States in any foreign

country.
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b Any person conscientiously opposed to taking an oath may, in lieu

thereof, affirm. Any person who shall affirm falsely shall be punished as for

the making of a false oath.

§ 21. Evidence.—a A court of bankruptcy may, upon application of any

officer, bankrupt, or creditor, by order require any designated person, in-

cluding the bankrupt and his wife, to appear in court or before a referee

or the judge of any State court, to be examined concerning the acts, con-

duct, or property of a bankrupt whose estate is in process of administration

under this Act.

Provided, That the wife may be examined only touching business tran-

sacted by her or to which she is a party, and to determine the fact whether

she lias transacted or been a party to any business of the 6anirupt.ii

b The right to take depositions in proceedings under this Act shall be

determined and enjoyed according to the United States laws now in force,

or such as may be hereafter enacted relating to the taking of depositions,

except as herein provided.

c Notice of the taking of depositions shall be filed with the referee in

every case. When depositions are to be taken in opposition to the allowance

of a claim notice shall also be served upon the claimant, and when in oppo-

sition to a discharge notice shall also be served upon the bankrupt.

d Certified copies of proceedings before a referee, or of papers, when

issued by the clerk or referee, shall be admitted as evidence with like force

11—121a originally rend as fol- In court or before a referee or the

lows: "A court of bankruptcy may, judge of any State court, to be ex-

upon application of any officer, bank- amlned concerning the acts, conduct

rupt, or creditor, by order require or property of a bankrupt whose estate

any designated person. Including the Is In process of administration under

bankrupt, wbo la a competent witness this Act."

under the laws of the State In which The change was made by the

the proceedings are pending, to appear ment of 1903. >

tion of his ineolvency, except aa herein otberwiae provided, and any act of
bankruptcy alleged in 8Uch petition t.o have been eommittecl, upon filing &
written application therefor at or before the time within "hich an answer
may be filed. If such application is not filed within f'lll'h time, a trial t.r
jury shall be deemed t.o ha\·e been waived.
b If a jury is not in attendance upon the court, one may be spl"r. ially
summoned for the trial, or the case may be postponed, or, if the rase is
pending in one of the district courtB within the jurisdiction of a rir('11it
court of the United States, it may be certified for trial to the circuit comt
sitting at the same place, or by consent of parties when sitting at any other
place in the same district, if such circuit court has or is to ha\"e a jury
flrat in attendance.
c The right to submit mattel'll in controversy, or an alleged offenae
under this Act, to a jury shall be determined and enjoyed, except aa provided
by this Act, according to the United States laws now in force or such as
may be hereafter enacted in relation to trials by jury.
f 20. 0ATH8, AP'FIR.MATIONS.-a Oaths required by this Act, except upon
hearings in court, may be administered by ( 1) referee&; ( :?) officers authorized to administer 011ths in proceedings before the courtB of the United
States, or under the laws of the State where the aame are to be taken; and
(3) diplomatic or consular officers of the United States in any foreign
country.
b Any person conscientiously opposed to taking an oath may, in lieu
thereof, affirm. Any person ''"ho shall affirm falsely shall be punished aa for
the making of a false oath.
I 21. EVIDENCE.-& A eourt of bankruptcy may, upon application of any
officer, bankrupt, or creditor, by order require -any deeignated peraon, including the bankrupt and hi8 wife, to appear in court or before a referee
or the judge of any State court, to be examined concerning the acts, <'Onduct, or property of a b&nkrupt whose estate is in process of administration
under this Act.
Provided, That tlae wife may be ezamined only toucAing busineu tran·
aacted by her or to which she i3 a party, and to dBtermine the fact whetlaer
she has tr011sacted or been a party to any busineB& of the bankrNpt.11
b The right to take depositions in proceedings under this Act shall he
determined and enjoyed according to the United States laws now in foroo,
or such as may be hereafter enacted relatmg to the taking of depositions,
except as herein pro'"ided.
c Notice of the taking of depositions shall be filed with the referee in
every case. When depositions are to be taken in opposition to the allowance
of a claim notice shall also be serv.-d upon the claimant, and when in opposition to a discharge notice shall also be served upon the bankrupt.
d Certified copies of proceedings before a referee, or of papers, when
issued by the clerk or referee, shall be admitted 88 evidence with like force

11-1 21n ortglnnlly r1>nd as follows: "A court of bankruptcy may,
upon appllc11tlon of nny officer, bankrupt, or creditor, by order require
any designated person, Including the
bankrupt, who II! 11 competent wltn1>81
under the laws of the State In which
the proceedlnp are pending, to appear

In court or before a refert>e or tbe
judge of any State court. to be examlnl'd concerning the 1tctll, ronduct.
or property of a bankrupt whose estate
Is In procesa of admtnllltratlon under
tbl11 Act."
The change wu made b7 the amendment of 1903.
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and effect as certified copies of the records of district courts of the United

States are now or niay hereafter be admitted as evidence.

e A certified copy of the order approving the bond of a trustee shall

constitute conclusive evidence of the vesting in him of the title to the

property of the bankrupt, and if recorded shall impart the same notice that

a deed from the bankrupt to the trustee if recorded would .have imparted

had not bankruptcy proceedings intervened.

f A certified copy of an order confirming or setting aside a composition,

or granting or setting aside a discharge, not revoked, shall be evidence of

the jurisdiction of the court, the regularity of the proceedings, and of the

fact that the order was made.

g A certified copy of an order confirming a composition shall constitute

evidence of the revesting of the title of his property in the bankrupt, and

if recorded shall impart the same notice that a deed from tne trustee to the

bankrupt if recorded would impart.

§ 22. Reference op Cases after Adjudication.—a After a person has

been adjudged a bankrupt the judge may cause the trustee to proceed with

the administration of the estate, or refer it (1) generally to the referee or

specially with only limited authority to act in the premises or to consider

and report upon specified issues; or (2) to any referee within the territorial

jurisdiction of the court, if the convenience of parties in interest will be

served thereby, or for cause, or if the bankrupt does not do business, reside,

or have his domicile in the district.
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b The judge may, at any time, for the convenience of parties or for

cause, transfer a case from one referee to another.

( 23. Jurisdiction of United States and State Courts.—a The United

States circuit courts shall have jurisdiction of all controversies at law and

in equity, as distinguished from proceedings in bankruptcy, between trustees

as such and adverse claimants concerning the property acquired or claimed

by the trustees, in the same manner and to the same extent only as though

bankruptcy proceedings had not been instituted and such controversies had

been between the bankrupts and such adverse claimants.

b Suits by the trustee shall only be brought or prosecuted in the courts

where the bankrupt, whose estate is being administered by such trustee,

might have brought or prosecuted them if proceedings in bankruptcy had

not been instituted, unless by consent of the proposed defendant, except

suits for the recovery of property under section sixty, subdivision b; section

sixty-seven, subdivision e; and section seventy, subdivision e.12

c The United States circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction

with the courts of bankruptcy, within their respective territorial limits, of

the offenses enumerated in this Act.

i 24. Jurisdiction of Appellate Courts.—a The Supreme Court of

the United States, the circuit courts of appeals of the United States, and

12—123b originally read as fol-

lows: "Suits by the trustee shall only

be brought or prosecuted In the courts

where the bankrupt, whose estate Is

l-elnjr administered by sueh trustee,

might have brought or prosecuted

them If proceedings In bankruptcy had

and eft'ect a11 certified copies of the recordll of district courts of the Unit.ed
States are now or may hereafter be admitted as evidence.
e A certified copy of the order approving the bond of a trustee shall
C"onstitute conclusive evidence of the vesting in him of the title to the
property of the bankrupt, and if recorded shall impart the same notice that
a deed from the bankrupt to the trustee if recorded would .have imparted
had not bankruptcy pro<'eedings inte"ened.
f A certified copy of an order confirming or setting aside a composition,
or granting or setting a.side a diseharge, not revoked, shall be evidence of
the jurisdiction of the court, the regularity of the proceedings, and of the
fact that the order was made.
g A certified copy of an order confirming a composition shall conatitute
eviden<'e of the re\·esting of the title of his property in the bankrupt, and
if recorded shall impart the Bame notice that a deed from the trustee to the
bankrupt if ret'orded would impart.
f 22. REFER&NCE OP' CASES AFTER ADJUDICATION.-a After a pereon bas
been adjudged a bankrupt the judge may cau11e the trustee to proceed with
the administration of the estate, or refer it ( 1) generally to the referee or
epeciaUy with only limited authority to act in the premises or to consider
and report upon spooifted issues; or (2) to any referee within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, if the convenience of partiea in interest will be
served thereby, or for cause, or if the bankrupt does not do business, reside,
or have his domicile in the diatrict.
b The judge may, at any time, for the convenience of parties or for
cause, transfer a case from one referee to another.
I 23. JuarSDICTJON OF UNITED STATES AND STATE Cou&Ts.-a The United
States circuit courts shall have jurisdiction of all controverai88 at law and
in equity, as distinguished from proceedings in bankruptcy, between trustees
as such and adverse claimants concerning the property acquired or claimed
by the trusteee, in the same manner and to the aame extent only as though
bankruptcy proceedings had not been instituted and such controversiea had
been between the bankrupts and such adverse claimants.
b Suite by the trustee shall only be brought or prosecuted in the courts
where the bankrupt, whose estate is being administered by such trustee,
might have brought or pr0&ecuted them if proceedings in bankruptcy had
not been instituted, unless by consent of the proposed defendant, e:e06pt
B'Uits for the recovery of property under section si:ety, subdivision b; section
&i:ety-seven, subdiviston e; and section seventy, subdivi.!i011 e.12
c The United States circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction
with the courts of bankruptcy, within their respective territorial limits, of
the offenses enumerated in this Act.
f 24. JURISDICTION OP' APPELLATE CoURTS.-a The Supreme Court of
the United States, the circuit courts of appeals of the United States, anrl

not been Instituted, unless by consent

of the proposed defendant"

The amendment of 1003 added the

words, "except suits for the recovery

of property under section sixty, sub

division b. and section sixty-seven,

subdivision e."

The amendment of 1910 added also

the words "and section seventy, sub-

division e."

12-f 23b orlgtnally read as fol·
lows : "Suits by the trustee aball only
be brought or prosecuted In the courts
where the bankrupt. whose eatate 111
beln~ administered by such trustee.
might have brought or prosecuted
them 1f proceedings In bankrupt<'Y had
not been Instituted, unles11 by consent
of the propoeed defendant."

The amendment of 1903 added th~
words. "except suits tor the recovery
of property under aectton 1bty, sub
division b. and section alxty-seven,
subdivision e."
The nml•ndment of 1910 added also
the words "and section seventy, subdJvlRlon e."
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the supreme courts of the Territories, in vacation in chambers and during

their respective terms, as now or as they may be hereafter held, are hereby

invested with appellate jurisdiction of controversies arising in bankruptcy

proceedings from the courts of bankruptcy from which they have appellate

jurisdiction in other cases. The Supreme Court of the United States shall

exercise a like jurisdiction from the courts of bankruptcy not within any

organized circuit of the United States and from the supreme court of the Dis-

trict of Columbia,

b The several circuit courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction in equity,

either interlocutory or final, to superintend and revise in matter of law the

proceedings of the several inferior courts of bankruptcy within their juris-

diction. Such power shall be exercised on due notice and petition by any

party aggrieved.

§ 25. Appeals and Writs of Error.—a That appeals, as in equity cases

may be taken in bankruptcy proceedings from the courts of bankruptcy to

the circuit court of appeals of the United States, and to the supreme court

of the Territories, in the following cases, to wit, (1) from a judgment

adjudging or refusing to adjudge the defendant a bankrupt; (2) from a

judgment granting or denying a discharge; and (3) from a judgment allow-

ing or rejecting a debt or claim of five hundred dollars or over. Such appeal

shall be taken within ten days after the judgment appealed from has been

rendered, and may be heard and determined by the appellate court in term
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or vacation, as the case may be.

b From any final decision of a court of appeals, allowing or rejecting a

claim under this Act, an appeal may be had under such rules and within suck

time as may be prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the

following cases and no other:

1. Where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of two thousand

dollars, and the question involved is one which might have been taken on

appeal or writ of error from the highest court of a State to the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

2. Where some Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States shall

certify that in his opinion the determination of the question or questions

involved in the allowance or rejection of such claim is essential to a uniform

construction of this Act throughout the United States.

c Trustees shall not be required to give bond when they take appeals or

sue out writs of error.

d Controversies may be certified to the Supreme Court of the United

States from other courts of the United States, and the former court may

exercise jurisdiction thereof and issue writs of certiorari pursuant to the

provisions of the United States laws now in force or such as may be here-

after enacted.

§ 26. Arbitration or Controversies.—a The trustee may, pursuant to

the direction of the court, submit to arbitration any controversy arising in

the settlement of the estate.

b Three arbitrators shall be chosen by mutual consent, or one by the

trustee, one by the other party to the controversy, and the third by the two

bo chosen, or if they fail to agree in five days after their appointment the

court shall appoint the third arbitrator.

0 The written finding of the arbitrators, or a majority of them, as to

the supremo courts of the Territoriea, in vacation in chambers and duriDg
their respective terms, u now or u they may be hereafter held, are hereby
inveeted with appellate jurisdiction of control"eraiee arising in bankruptcy
proceedings from the courts of bankruptcy from which they have appellate
jurisdiction in other ca.sea. The Supreme Court of the United States shall
exercise a like jurisdiction from the court.a of bankruptcy not within any
organized circuit of the United Stat.ea and from the supreme court of the District of Columbia.
b The several circuit courts ot·appeals shall have jurisdiction in equity,
either interlocutory or final, to superintend and revise in matt.er of law the
proceedings of the sel"ernl inferior courts of bankruptcy within their jurisdiction. Such power shall be exercised on due notice and petition by any
party aggrieved.
I 25. APPEALS AND Wa1ni OF &uwa.-a That appeals, as in equity caaea
may be taken in bankruptcy proceedings from the courts of ba.nkruptey to
the circuit court of appeals of the United Stat.es, and to the supreme court
of the Territories, in the following caaes, to wit, (1) from a judgment
adjudging or refusing to adjudge the defendant a bankrupt; (2) from a
judgment granting or denying a discharge; and (3) from a judgment allowing or rejecting a debt or claim of five hundred dollan or over. Such appeal
shall be taken within ten days after the judgment appealed from has been
rendered, and may be heard and determined by the appellate court in t.erm
or vacation, as the case may be.
b From any final decision of a court of appeals, allowing or rejecting a
claim under this Act, an appeal may be had under such rules and within 1ua
time as may be prescribed by the Supreme Court of the Unit.ed Stat.ea, in the
following cases and no other:
1. Where the amount in controveny exceeds the sum of two thousand
dollars, and the question im·olved is one which might hal"e been taken on
appeal or writ of error from the highest court of a State to the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
2. Where eome Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Sta.tee shall
certify that in his opinion the determination of the question or questiona
involved in the allowance or rejection of such claim ia essential to a uniform
construction of this Act throughout the United Stat.ea.
c Trustees shall not be required to gil"e bond when they take appeals or
sue out writs of error.
d Controveri;ies may be certified to the Supreme Court of the United
States from othn courts of the United States, and the former court may
exercise jurisdiction thereof and issue writs of certiorari pUl'lluant to tbs
provisions of the United States laws now in force or such as may be hereafter enacted.
I 26. AllBITR.ATION or CONTROVERSIES.-& The trust.ee may, purauant to
the direction of the court, submit to arbitration any controversy arising in
the settlement of the estate.
b Three arbitrators shall be chosen by mutual consent, or one by the
trustee, one by the other party to the controversy, and the third by the two
so chosen, or if they fail to agree in five days after their appointment the
court shall appoint the third arbitrator.
o The written finding of the arbitraton, or a majoritf of them, u to
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the issues presented, may be filed in court and shall have like force and

effect as the verdict of a jury.

S 27. Compromises.—a The trustee may, with the approval of the court,

compromise any controversy arising in the administration of the estate upon

such terms as he may deem for the best interests of the estate.

§ 28. Designation of Newspapers.—a Courts of bankruptcy shall by

order designate a newspaper published within their respective territorial

districts, and in the county in which the bankrupt resides or the major part

of his property is situated, in which notices required to be published by

this Act and orders which the court may direct to be published shall be

inserted. Any court may in a particular case, for the convenience of parties

in interest, designate some additional newspaper in which notices and orders

in such case shall be published.

§ 29. Offenses.—a A person shall be punished, by imprisonment for a

period not to exceed five years, upon conviction of the offense of having

knowingly and fraudulently appropriated to his own use, embezzled, spent,

or unlawfully transferred any property or secreted or destroyed any docu-

ment belonging to a bankrupt estate which came into his charge as trustee.

b A person shall be punished, by imprisonment for a period not to

exceed two years, upon conviction of the offense of having knowingly and

fraudulently (1) concealed while a bankrupt, or after his discharge, from

his trustee any of the property belonging to his estate in bankruptcy; or
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(2) made a false oath or account in, or in relation to any proceeding in

bankruptcy; (3) presented under oath any false claim for proof against

the estate of a bankrupt, or used any such claim in composition personally or

by agent, proxy, or attorney, or as agent, proxy, or attorney; or (4) re-

ceived any material amount of property from a bankrupt after the filing of

the petition, with intent to defeat this Act; or (5) extorted or attempted to

extort any money or property from any person as a consideration for acting

or forbearing to act in bankruptcy proceedings.

c A person shall be punished by fine, not to exceed five hundred dollars,

and forfeit his office, and the same shall thereupon become vacant, upon

conviction of the offense of having knowingly (1) acted as a referee in a

case in which he is directly or indirectly interested; or (2) purchased, while

a referee, directly or indirectly, any property of the estate in bankruptcy

of which he is referee; or (3) refused, while a referee or trustee, to permit

a reasonable opportunity for the inspection of the accounts relating to the

affairs of, and the papers and records of, estates in his charge by parties

in interest when directed by the court so to do.

d A person shall not be prosecuted for any offense arising under this Act

unless the indictment is found or the information is filed in court within one

year after the commission of the offense.

{ 30. Rules, Forms, and Orders.—a All necessary rules, forms, and

orders as to procedure and for carrying this Act into force and effect shall

be prescribed, and may be amended from time to time, by the Supreme Court

of the United States.

§ 31. Computation of Time.—a Whenever time is enumerated by days in

this Act, or in any proceeding in bankruptcy, the number of days shall be

computed by excluding the first and including the last, unless the last fall on

a Sunday or holiday, in which event the day last included shall be the next

day thereafter which is not a Sunday or a legal holiday.

the i8suee presented, may be filed in court and shall have like force and
effect as the verdict of a jury.
I 27. CoMPROHISES.-a The trustee may, with the approval of the court,
compromi8e any controversy arising in the adminl8tration of the estate upon
such terms as he may deem for the best interests of the estate.
I 28. DESIGNATION OF NEWSPAPERS.-& Courts of bankruptcy shall by
order designate a newspaper published within their re8pective territorial
districts, and in the county in which the bankrupt reei<lea or the major part
.of his property ia situated, in which notices required to be publiahed by
this Act and orders which the court may direct to be published shall be
inserted. Any court may in a particular case, for the convenience of parties
in interest, designate some additional newspaper in which notices and orders
in such case shall be published.
f 29. 0Fn:NSES.-a A person shall be punished, by impri99nment for a
period not to exceed five years, upon conviction of the otfenee of having
knowingly and fraudulently appropriated to his own uae, embe:r.zled, spent.,
or unlawfully transferred 8.!lY property or secreted or destroyed any document belonging to a bankrupt estate which came into hie charge aa trustee.
b A person shall be punished, by imprisonment for a period' not to
exceed two years, upon conviction of the offenee of having knowingly and
fraudulently (1) concealed while a bankrupt, or after hia dieeharge, from
hie trustee any of the property belonging to hie estate in bankruptcy; or
(2) made a false oath or account in, or in relation to any proceeding in
bankruptcy; ( 3) presented under' oath any false claim for proof againat
the estate of a bankrupt, or use<l any such claim in composition personally or
by agent, proxy, or attorney, or as agent, proxy, or attorney; or ( 4) re·
ceived any material amount of property from a bankrupt after the filing of
the petition, with intent to defeat this Act; or (5) extorted or attempted to
extort any money or property from any peraon aa a conaideration tor acting
or forbearing to act in bankruptcy proceedings.
c A person shall be punished by fine, not to exceed five hundred dollars,
and forfeit hie office, and the same shall thereupon become \'&eant, upon
conviction of the offense of having knowingly (1) acted as a referee in a
case in which he i11 directly or indirectly interested; or (2) purchued, while
a referee, directly or indirectly, any property of the estate in bankruptcy
of which he is referee; or (3) refuaed, while a referee or trustee, to permit
a reasonable opportunity for the inspection of the accounts relating to the
aft'aira of, and the papers and records of, estates in his charge by parties
in interest when directed by the court ao to do.
d A person shall not be prosecuted for any offense arising under this Act
unlel!ll the indictment is found or the information is filed in court within one
year after the commission of the oft'ense.
I 30. RULES, FORMS, AND ORDF..RS.-a All neceeaary rulee, forms, and
orders as to procedure and for ca'rrying this Act into force and effect shall
be prescribed, 1LI1d may be amen<led from time to time, by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
§ 31. CoMPUTATION OF Tn.u:.-a Whenever time is enumerated by day!! in
this Act, or in any proceeding in bankruptcy, the number of days shall be
computed by P.xcluding the first and including the last, unleaa the laat fall on
a Sunday or holiday, in which event the day laat included shall be the next
day thereafter which ia not a Sunday or a legal holiday.
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{ 32. Transfer or Cases.—a In the event petitions are filed against

the same person, or against different members of a partnership, in different

courts of bankruptcy each of which has jurisdiction, the cases shall be

transferred, by order of the courts, relinquishing jurisdiction, to and be

consolidated by the one of such courts which can proceed with the same for

the greatest convenience of parties in interest.

I 32. T!tANSPDl or CASES.-a In the event petitions are filed against
the same person, or against different members of a partnership, in different
courts of bankruptcy each of which has juriadiction, the cases shall be
transferred, by order of the courts, relinquishing jurisdiction, to and be
consolidated by the one of such courts which can proceed with the 1&111e for
the greatest convenience of parties in interest.

CHAPTEB V

CHAPTER V

OFFICERS, THEIR DUTIES AND COMPENSATION

§ 33. Creation or Two Offices.—a The offices of referee and trustee

01'1'ICEB8, THJCIB DUTIES AND OOl!PSNSATION

are hereby created.

§ 34. Appointment, Removal, and Districts of Eeferees.—a Courts

of bankruptcy shall, within the territorial limits of which they respectively

have jurisdiction, (1) appoint referees, each for a term of two years, and may,

in their discretion, remove them because their services are not needed or

for other cause; and (2) designate, and from time to time change, the limits

of the districts of referees, so that each county, where the services of a ref-

eree are needed, may constitute at least one district.

I 35. Qualifications of Referees.—a Individuals shall not be eligible

to appointment as referees unless they are respectively (1) competent to

perform the duties of that office; (2) not holding any office of profit or

emolument under the laws of the United States or of any State other than

commissioners of deeds, justices of the peace, masters in chancery, or notaries
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public; (3) not related by consanguinity or affinity, within the third degree

as determined by the common law, to any of the judges of the courts of

bankruptcy or circuit courts of the United States, or of the justices or judges

of the appellate courts of the districts wherein they may be appointed;

and (4) residents of, or have their offices in, the territorial districts for

which they are to be appointed.

§ 36. Oaths of Office of Referees.—a Referees shall take the same

oath of office as that prescribed for judges of United States courts.

{ 37. Number of Referees.—a Such number of referees shall be ap-

pointed as may be necessary to assist in expeditiously transacting the bank-

ruptcy business pending in the various courts of bankruptcy.

§38. Jurisdiction of Referees.—a Referees respectively are hereby

invested, subject always to a review by the judge, within the limits of their

districts as established from time to time, with jurisdiction to (1) consider

all petitions referred to them by the clerks and make the adjudications or

dismiss the petitions; (2) exercise the powers vested in courts of bankruptcy

for the administering of oaths to and the examination of persons as witnesses

and for requiring the production of documents in proceedings before them,

except the power of commitment; (3) exercise the powers of the judge for

the taking possession and releasing of the property of the bankrupt in the

event of the issuance by the clerk of a certificate showing the absence of a

judge from the judicial district, or the division of the district, or his sick-

ness, or inability to act; (4) perform such part of the duties, except as to

questions arising out of the applications of bankrupts for compositions or

discharges, as are by this Act conferred on courts of bankruptcy and as shall

be prescribed by rules or orders of the courts of bankruptcy of their re-

spective districts, except as herein otherwise provided; and (5) upon the

t 33.

or Two On1ca.-a The ofticea of referee and truatee
are hereby created.
134. APPOINTMENT, RBKOVAL, .A.ND DISTBICTS 01' B.lcn:&&u.-a Courbl
of bankruptcy shall, within the territorial limits of which they reepectively
have jurisdiction, ( l) appoint referees, each for a term of two yean., and may,
in their discretion, remove them because their aervieell are not needed or
for other cause; and (2) designate, and from time to time cha.nge, the limits
of the districts of refereea, so that each county, where the ee~cea of a referee are needt>d, may constitute at lean one district.
I 35. QuAr.tnCATIONS or REJ'a.:us.-a Individuals sh&ll not bfl eligible
to appointment aa refereee unleee they are respectively (1) competent to
perform the duties of that otlloe; ( 2) not holding any office of profit or
emolument under the laws of the United States or of any Stat.e other than
commissioners of deeds, juatict!ll of the peace, maatera in <'hancery, or no~ries
public; ( 3) not related by consanguinity or affinity, within the third degree
as determined by the common law, to any of the judges of the courts of
bankruptey or circuit courts of the United States, or of the justi.cee or ju~s
of the appellate courts of the diatricta wherein they may be appointed;
and ( 4) reaidenbl of, or have their offices in, the territorial diatrieta for
which they are to be appointed.
I 36. OATHS or OFFICE OF REPDns.-a Referees shall take the aame
oath of office 88 that prescribed for judges of United St.ates courts..
137. NuMBn or REFER.US.-& Such number of referees shall be ap·
pointed 88 may be neceesary to UBiat in expeditiously transacting the bank·
rupt<'y business pending in the various courts of bankruptcy.
I 38. JURISDICTION OF R:uERDS.-a Referees respectively are hereby
invested, subject always to a review by the judge, within the limits of tbeir
districts BB established from time to time, with jurisdiction to (1) consider
all petitions referred to them by the clerks and make the adjudicatiorui or
di.amiss the petitions; (2) exercise the powers vested in courts of bankruptcy
for ihe administering of oath11 to and the examination of persona aa witn81l81!!
and for requiring the production of documents in proceedings before them,
except the power of commitment; (3) exerciae the powera of the judge for
the taking pos~ession and releasing of the property of the bankrupt in the
event of the issuance by the clerk of a certifl<'ate showing the abeenee of a
judge from the judil•inl dil'trict, or the division of the district, or his sick·
ness, or inability to act; (4) perform such p&rt of the duties, except as t-0
questions arising out of the applications of bankrupts for <'Ompoeitions or
discharges, as are by this. Act conferred on courts of bankruptcy and as shall
be prescribed by rules or orders of the court.a of bankruptcy of their respective diatricts, exoept aa herein otherwise pro'fided; and (5) upon the
CB.L\TION
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application of the trustee during the examination of the bankrupts, or other

proceedings, authorise the employment of stenographers at the expense of the

estates at a compensation not to exceed ten cents per folio for reporting and

transcribing the proceedings.

§39. Duties of Beferees.—a Beferees shall (1) declare dividends and

prepare and deliver to trustee dividend sheets showing the dividends declared

and to whom payable; (2) examine all schedules of property and lists of

creditors filed by bankrupts and cause such as are incomplete or defective

to be amended; (3) furnish such information concerning the estates in proc-

ebs of administration before them as may be requested by the parties in

interest; (4) give notice to creditors as herein provided; (5) make up records

embodying the evidence, or the substance thereof, as agreed upon by the par-

ties in all contested matters arising before them, whenever requested to

do so by either of the parties thereto, together with their findings therein,

and transmit them to the judges; (6) prepare and file the schedules of prop-

erty and lists of creditors required to be filed by the bankrupts, or cause

the same to be done, when the bankrupts fail, refuse, or neglect to do so;

(7) safely keep, perfect, and transmit to the clerks the records, herein

required to be kept by them, when the cases are concluded; (8) transmit

to the clerks such papers as may be on file before them whenever the same

are needed in any proceedings in courts, and in like manner secure the return

of such papers after they have been used, or, if it be impracticable to trans-
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mit the original papers, transmit certified copies thereof by mail; (9) upon

application of any party in interest, preserve the evidence taken or the sub-

stance thereof as agreed upon by the parties before them when a stenog-

rapher is not in attendance; and (10) whenever their respective offices are

in the same cities or towns where the courts of bankruptcy convene, call upon

and receive from the clerks all papers filed in courts of bankruptcy which

have been referred to them.

b Beferees shall not (1) act in cases in which they are directly or in-

directly interested; (2) practice as attorneys and counselors at law in any

bankruptcy proceedings; or (3) purchase, directly or indirectly, any property

of an estate in bankruptcy.

§ 40. Compensation of Beferees.—a Beferees shall receive as full com-

pensation for their services, payable after they are rendered, a fee of fifteen

dollars deposited with the clerk at the time the petition is filed in each case,

except when a fee is not required from a voluntary bankrupt, and twenty-

five cents for every proof of claim filed for allowance, to be paid from the

estate, if any, as a part of the eost of administration, and from estates which

have been administered before them one per centum commission on all

moneys disbursed to creditors by the trustee, or one-half of one per centum

on the amount to be paid to creditors upon the confirmation of a compo-

sition.ia

13—140a originally read as fol-

lows: "Referees shall receive as full

compensation for their services, pay-

able after they are rendered, a fee of

ten dollars deposited with the clerk at

application of the trustee during the examination of the bankrupts, or other
proceedings, a.uthori:..e the employment of stenographers at the expense of the
•tat.ea at a compensation not to exceed ten cents per folio for reporting and
tran&eribing the proceedinga.
I 39. DUTIES m· REFEBEES.--a Referees shall ( 1) declare dividend• and
prepare and deli,·er to tru1tee dividend sheets showing the dividends declared
&Dd to whom payable; ( 2) examine all schedules of property and lists of
creditors filed by bankrupts and cau1e such u are incomplete or defective
to be amended; ( 3) furnish such information concerning the eat.a.tea in procebS of a<lmiuiatration before them aa may be requested by the parties in
interest; ( 4) give notice to credit.on u herein provided; ( 5) make up records
embodying the evidence, or the aubatance thereof, aa agreed upon by the parties in all contested matters arising before them, whenever requested to
do so by either of the parties thereto, together with their ftndinga therein,
anc.l traJl.8Dlit them to the judges; (6) prepare &nd file the schedules of property and lists of creditors required to be filed by the bankrupts, or cause
the same to be done, when the bankrupts fail, refuse, or neglect to do ao;
(7) safely keep, perfect, and transmit to the clerks the records, herein
required to be kept by them, when the cues are concluded; (8) transmit
to the clerks aucb pa.pen aa may be on file before them whenever the same
are needed in any proceedings in courta, and in like manner secure the return
of such papers after they have been used, or, if it be impracticable to traD.8mit the original papers, transmit certified copiee thereof by mail; (9) upon
application of any party in interest, preaerve the evidence taken or the substance thereof as agreed upon by the parties before them when a at.cnog·
rapher is not in attendR.nce; and (10) whenever their reepeetive offices are
'in the same cities or towns where the courts ot bankruptcy convene, e&ll upon
and receive from the clerks all papers filed in courte of bankruptcy which
have been referred to them.
b Referees shall not ( 1) act in cases in which they are directly or indirectly intel'eeted; (2) practice as attorneys and eounselon at law in any
bankruptcy proceeding9; or ( 3) purchase, directly or indirectly, any property
of an e11tate in bankruptcy.
I 40. COKPENSATION or Ruu:a:s.-a Refereee shall receive as full compensation for their services, payable after they are rendered, a fee of fifteen
dollar& deposited with the clerk at the time the petition is filed in each case,
except when a fee ia not required from a voluntary bankrupt, and twenty'ftve cent& for every proof of claim flled for allowance, to be paid from the
utate, if any, aa a part of the aoat of admiliiltratio1&, and from estate& which
have been administered before them one per centum commiaaion on all
mo11t'Y' d-i$buraed to creditors by the trustee, or one-half of one per centum
on the amount to be paid to crediton upon the eonflnnation of a compo·
aition.ta

the time the petition Is filed In each

case, except when a fee Is not required

from a voluntary bankrupt, and from

estates which have been administered

H. A A. Bankruptcy—4T

before them one per centum commis-

sions on sums to be paid as dividends

and commissions, or one-half of one

per centum on the amount to be paid

to creditors upon the confirmation of

a composition."

The Changs was made by the amend-

ment of 1903.

13-1 40a originally read a11 follows: "Referees shall receive as full
compensation tor their 1ervlce1, payable after they ore rendered, a fee of
ten dollar11 dep011lted wltb the clerk at
the time the petition ls ftled In each
ca11e. except when a fee ls not required
from a voluntary bankrupt, and from
eatat~ which have been administered
H. & A. Bankruptcy-'T

before them one per centum commls·
alona on 1u1119 to be paid aa dividend•
and eommlaalons, ·or one-halt of one
per centum on the amount to be paid
to creditors upon the confirmation ot
a composition."
Tbe ehan1• was made by the amend·
meat Of 1908.
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b Whenever a case is transferred from one referee to another the judge

shall determine the proportion in which the fee and commissions therefor

shall be divided between the referees.

c In the event of the reference of a case being revoked before it is con-

cluded, and when the case is especially referred, the judge shall determine

what part of the fee and commissions shall be paid to the referee.

§ 41. Contempts before Referees.—a A person shall not, in proceedings

before a referee, (1) disobey or resist any lawful order, process, or writ;

(2) misbehave during a hearing or so near the place thereof as to obstruct

the same; (3) neglect to produce, after having been ordered to do so, any

pertinent document; or (4) refuse to appear after having been subpoenaed,

or, upon appearing, refuse to take the oath as a witness, or, after having

taken the oath, refuse to be examined according to law: Provided, That no

person shall be required to attend as a witness before a referee at a place

outside of the State of his residence, and more than one hundred miles from

such place of residence, and only in case his lawful mileage and fee for one

day's attendance shall be first paid or tendered to him.

b The referee shall certify the facts to the judge, if any person shall

do any of the things forbidden in this section. The judge shall thereupon,

in a summary manner, hear the evidence as to the acts complained of, and,

if it is such as to warrant him in so doing, punish such person in the same

manner and to the sauie extent as for a contempt committed before the
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court of bankruptcy, or commit such person upon the same conditions as if

the doing of the forbidden act had occurred with reference to the process of,

or in the presence of, the court.

§ 42. Records of Referees.—a The records of all proceedings in each

case before a referee shall be kept as nearly as may be in the same manner

as records are now kept in equity cases in circuit courts of the United

States.

b A record of the proceedings in each case shall be kept in a separate

book or books, and shall, together with the papers on file, constitute the rec-

ords of the case.

c The book or books containing a record of the proceedings shall, when

the case is concluded before the referee, be certified to by him, and, together

with such papers as are on file before him, be transmitted to the court of

bankruptcy and shall there remain as a part of the records of the court.

§43. Referee's Absence or Disability.—a Whenever the office of a

referee is vacant, or its occupant is absent or disqualified to act, the judge

may act, or may appoint another referee, or another referee holding an

appointment under the same court may, by order of the judge, temporarily

fill the vacancy.

§ 44. Appointment of Trustees.—a The creditors of a bankrupt estate

shall, at their first meeting after the adjudication or after a vacancy has

occurred in the office of trustee, or after an estate has been reopened, or

after a composition has been set aside or a discharge revoked, or if there

is a vacancy in the office of trustee, appoint one trustee or three trustees

of such estate. If the creditors do not appoint a trustee or trustees aa

herein provided, the court shall do so.

§ 45. Qualifications of Trustees.—a Trustees may be (1) individuals

who are respectively compotent to perform the duties of that office, and

reside or have an office in the judicial district within which they are ap-

b Whenever a case is transferred from one referee to another the judge
•hall determine the proportion in which the fee and commisaiona therefor
1hall be divided between the referees.
c In the event of the reference of a caae being revoked before it ii con·
eluded, and when the case is especially referred, the judge aha.ll de~rmine
what part of the fee and commiaeions shall be paid to the referee.
I 41. CoNTJtKPTS B:UOR.E Runus.-a A person shall not, in proceedings
before a referee, (1) disobey or resist any lawful order, procesa, or 1fl'it;
(2) misbehave during a hearing or eo near the place thereof as to obstruct
the same; (a) neglect to produce, after having been ordered to do so, any
pertinent document; or ( 4) refuse to appear after having been subpmued,
or, upon appearing, refuse to take the oath as a witness, or, after having
taken the oath, refuse to be examined according to law: Prov;ded, That no
peraon shall be required to attend as a witnees before a referee at a place
outside of the State of his residence, and more than one hundred milm from
1ucb place of residence, and only in case his lawful mileage and fee for one
day 'a att~ndance shall be first paid or tendered to him.
b The referee shall certify the facts to the judge, if any penon shall
do any of the things forbidden in this section. The judge shall thereupon,
in a summary manner, hear the evidence as to the a.eta complained of, and,
if it is such as to warrant him in so doing, punish such person in the same
manner and to the same extent as for a contempt committed before the
court of bankrnptcy, or commit such person upon the same conditions aa if
the doing of the forbidden act had occurred with reference to the proeea of,
or in the presence of, the court.
I 42. RECORDS OF REFERELS.-a The records of all proceedings in each
case before a referee shall be kept as nearly aa may be in the aame man111Jr
as records are now kept in equity caees in circuit courts of the United
States.
b A record of the proceedings in each case shall be kept in a eeparate
book or books, and shall, together with the papen on file, constitute the reoorde of the case.
c The book or books containing a record of the proceedings shall, when
the <'&ee is concluded before the referee, be certified to by him, and, together
with such papers as are on file before him, be transmitted to the court of
bankruptcy and shall there remain as a part of the records o! the court.
I 43. R:uuu:'s ABSENCE OR DISABILJTY.-a Whenever the office of a
referee ia vacant, or its occupant is absent or disqualified to act, the judge
may act, or may appoint another referee, or another referee holding an
appointment under the same court may, by order of the judge, temporarily
fill the vacancy.
I 44. APPOINTMENT OJ' TRUSTEES.-& The creditors of a bankrupt estate
shall, at their first meeung after the adjudication or after a vacancy bu
occurred in the office of trustee, or after an estate baa been reopened, or
after a composition has been set aside or a discharge revoked, or if there
is a vacancy in the office of trustee, appoint one trust.ea or three trusteel
of such estate. If the cr<"ditors do not appoint a trustee or trustee. u
herein provided, the court shall do so.
f 45. QuALil'ICATIO.Ss 01• TRUSTEES.-a Trustees may be (1) individuala
who are respectirnly competent to perfonn the dutiee of that office, and
reside or have an office in the judici&l district within whi~ ther an ap-
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pointed, or (2) corporations authorized by their charters or by law to act

in such capacity and having an office in the judicial district within which

they are appointed.

§ 46. Death or Removal or Trustees.—a The death or removal of a

trustee shall not abate any suit or proceeding which he is prosecuting or

defending at the time of his death or removal, but the same may be pro-

ceeded with or defended by his joint trustee or successor in the same manner

as though the same had been commenced or was being defended by such

joint trustee alone or by such successor.

§ 47. Duties or Trustees.—a Trustees shall respectively (1) account for

and pay over to the estates under their control all interest received by them

upon property of such estates; (2) collect and reduce to money the property

of the estates for which they are trustees, under the direction of the court,

and close up the estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best

interests of the parties in interest; and such trustees, as to all property in

the custody or coming into the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be

deemed vested with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor holding

a lien by legal or equitable proceedings thereon; and also, as to all property

not in the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be deemed vested with all

the rights, remedies, and powers of a judgment creditor holding an execu-

tion duly returned unsatisfied;1* (3) deposit all money received by them

in one of the designated depositories; (4) disburse money only by check or
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draft on the depositories in which it has been deposited; (5) furnish such

information concerning the estates of which they are trustees and their

administration as may be requested by parties in interest; (6) keep regular

accounts showing all amounts received and from what sources and all

amounts expended and on what accounts; (7) lay before the final meeting

of the creditors detailed,statements of the administration of the estates;

(8) make final reports and file final accounts with the courts fifteen days

before the days fixed for the final meetings of the creditors; (9) pay divi-

dends within ten days after they are declared by the referees; (10) report to

the courts, in writing, the condition of the estates and the amounts of money

on hand, and such other details as may be required by the courts, within

the first month after their appointment and every two months thereafter,

unless otherwise ordered by the courts; and (11) set apart the bankrupt's

exemptions and report the items and estimated value thereof to the court

as soon as practicable after their appointment.

b Whenever three trustees have been appointed for an estate, the con-

currence of at least two of them shall be necessary to the validity of their

every act concerning the administration of the estate.

c The trustee shall, within thirty days after the adjudication, file a

certified copy of the decree of adjudication in the office where conveyances

of real estate are recorded in every county where the bankrupt owns real

estate not exempt from execution, and pay the fee for such filing, and he

shall receive a compensation of fifty cents for each copy so filed, which,

together with the filing fee, shall be paid out of the estate of the bankrupt

as a part of the costs and disbursements of the proceedings."

14—The Italicized words In | 47a IS—I 47c was added by the amend-

(2) wen added by the amendment of ment of 1808.

1910.

pointed, or (2) corporations authorized by their charters or by law to act
in such capacity and having an office in the judicial district within which
they are appointed.
I 46. DEATH O& REMOVAL OJ' TRUSTEES.-& The death or removal of a
truatee shall not abate any suit or proceeding which he is proaecuting or
defending at the time of his death or removal, but the same may be pro·
ceeded with or defended by hia joint trustee or successor in the same manner
as though the same had been commenced or was being defended by such
joint trustee alone or by such aucceeeor.
I 47. DUTIES or TausTJ:.Es.-a Trustees shall respectively (1) account for
and pay over to the estates under their control all interest received by them
upon property of such estates; (2) collect and reduce to money the property
of the estates for which they are trustees, under the direction of the court,
and close up the estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best
interests of the parties in interest; and svch tnuteu, aa to aU property m
the custody or coming i11to the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be
deemed vested with all the rights, romedies, and powers of a creditor holding
a lien by legal or equitable proceed'1&gs thereon; and alao, aa to all property
not in the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be deemed vuted with all
the r•ghts, remedies, a11d pow61'a of a judgment creditor holding an neou·
tion duly retur11ed unsatiafied;u (3) depoeit all money received by them
in one of the designated depositories; ( 4) disburse money only by check or
draft on the depoaitories in which it has been deposited; ( 5) furnish such
information concerning the estates of which they are trustee. and their
administration as may be requested by parties in interest; (6) keep regular
accounts showing all amounts receive<l and from what sources and all
amounts expended and on what accounts; (7) lay before the final meeting
of the creditors detailed , statements of the administration of the eetatea;
( 8) make final reports and file final a.ecounts with the courts fifteen days
before the days fixe<l for the final meetings of the creditors; (9) pay divi·
dends within ten days after they are declared by tho referees; ( 10) report to
the courts, in writing, the condition of the estates and the amounts of money
on hand, and such other details 88 may be required by the courts, within
the first month after their appointment and every two months thereafter,
unless otherwise ordered by the courts; and ( 11) set apart the bankrupt's
exemptions and report the items and estimated value thereof to the court
as soon as practicable after their appointment.
b Whenever three trustees have been appointed for an estate, the concurrence of at least two of them shall be necessary to the validity of their
every act concerning the administration of the estate.
c TM trustee shall, within thirty days after th8 adjudication, 'fUe a
certified copy of the decree of adjudication in the office where conveyancu
of real estate are recorded in every county where the bankrupt oum.t real
utate Mt exempt from ezecution, and pay the fee for auch filing, and he
ahall receive a compensation of fifty centa for each copy 10 filed, whkh,
together with the filing fee, shall be paid out of the utate of the bcmkrupC
aa a part of th8 oosta and disbursements of th8 proc8edings.n
14---ll'be ltallcl1ed words ln I 47a
(2) were added bJ the amendment of
1910.

Iii-I 47c waa added bJ the amend·
ment ot 1908.
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148. Compensation or Trustees, Receivers and Marshals —a

Trustees shall receive for their services, payable after they are rendered, a

fee of five dollars deposited with the clerk at the time the petition is filed in

each case, except when a fee is not required from a voluntary bankrupt,

and such commissions on all moneys disbursed or turned over to any person,

including lien holders, by them, as may be allowed by the courts, not to ex-

ceed six per centum on the first five hundred dollars or less, four per

centum on moneys in excess of five hundred dollars and less than fifteen

hundred dollars, two per centum on moneys in excess of fifteen hundred dol-

lars and less than ten thousand dollars, and one per centum on moneys m

excess of ten thousand dollars. And in case of the confirmation of a com-

position after the trustee has qualified the court may allow him, as com-

pensation, not to exceed one-half of one per centum of the amount to be paid

the creditors on such composition.**

b In the event of an estate being administered by three trustees instead

of one trustee or by successive trustees, the court shall apportion the fees

and commissions between them according to the services actually rendered,

so that there shall not be paid to trustees for the administering of any

estate a greater amount than one trustee would be entitled to.

c The court may, in its discretion, withhold all compensation from any

trustee nho has been removed for cause.

d Receivers or marshals appointed pursuant to section two, subdivision

three, of this Act shall receive for their services, payable after they are
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rendered, compensation by way of commissions upon the moneys disbursed or

turned over to any person, including lien holders, by them, and also upon the

moneys turned over by them or afterwards realised by the trustees from

property turned over in kind by them to the trustees, as the court may allow,

not to exceed six per centum on the first five hundred dollars or less, four

per centum on moneys in excess of five hundred dollars and less than one

thousand five hundred dollars, two per centum on moneys in excess of one

thousand five hundred dollars and less than ten thousand dollars, and one

16—i 48a originally read aa fol-

lows: "Trustees shall receive, as full

compensation for tbelr services, par-

tible after the; are rendered, a fee of

live dollars deposited with the clerk

148. CoMPXNSATlON OJ' 'f&OSTP81 BEcsJvDS .A.ND K.u8B.AL8..........
Trustees shall receive for their 1ervice11, payable aft.er they are rendered, a
fee of five dollara depo11ited with the clerk at the time the petition is filed in
each case, except when a fee ia not required from a •;oluntary bankrupt,
and 81lch commwions
all 1R<>ft611' d'6burud or turned over to any perlOll,
focludillg lie1t 1'oldera, by tlaem, as may be allowed by the courta, not to ex·
eeed 1i:t per centum on tAe firlt fit1e lwndf"ed dollars or leu, fou.r per
centum on moneys in ett"8 of five 11.auulred dollar• c1"d leu t1'a1t fl'{tee11
hu11dred dollars, tu:o per ce11tum on moneya i11 ezce88 of fifteen hundred dol·
lara a.lid leu than ten tlwuaand dollara, ud one per centum on money1 in
exce88 of ten thousand dollan. ..dlld in caae of tAe confit"mation of a com·
poaition after tl&e tnutee ha6 quali/led tl&e covrt may t.Ulow llim, a1 com·
pensation, Mt to exceed one-Ital/ of 011e per centum of t1'e amou.nt to be paid
tile credit-Ora 011 .nccll cot1tpa.it'6ft.1•
b In the event of an e9tate being administered by three trustees instead
of one trustee or by succeuive trU11tees, the court shall apportion the feee
and commill8ions between them according to the services actually rendered,
BO that there shall not be paid to trustees for the administering of 1Il1
estate a greater amount than one trustee would be entitled to.
c The court may, in it& dilcretion, withhold all compensation from any
trustee who baa been removed for cabse.
d Receiver• or maraMJ. appoiMted pur.ruaRt to section two, S'Mbdii.'1.rioft
three, of thiB Act allaU rectritle for tle.eir aervicea, payable after they are
rendered, compensation by tvay of <'Ommu.tiona vpoo tile m01teya diabvratd or
turned over t-0 any perMn, inchwfing Zieft l&oldera, bJ tAewl, and alBo vpon tlie
mo11ey1 tuNted over by t~ or aftertvarda realved by tile tnastee.9 frf)ff6
property tvr11ed oi·er in kind by them te the t""teea, aa tl&e covrt may allow:,
not t-0 exceed ai:t per ce1'tvm on the 'first tiff hi111dred dollars or le&1, fovr
per centum <>n moneys in e.rceu of fh:e llundred doUar.! alld less tlaa1t OM
thousand fit'e lmndred dollars, two per ce11tum on moneya in ezce" of OM
thousand five hundred dollar• and us1 tlaan. ten tllouaand dollars, and Olle

°"

at the time the petition is filed In each

cast1, except when a fee is not required

from a voluntary bankrupt, and from

estates which they have administered,

such commissions on sums to be paid

as dividends and commissions as may

be allowed by the courts, not to ex-

ceed three per centum on the drat five

thousand dollars or lesa, two per

centum on the second five thousand

dollars or part thereof, and one per

centum on such sums in excess of ten

thousand dollars."

The amendment of 1908 changed it

to read as followa: "Trustees shall

receive for their services, payable after

they are rendered, a fee of Ave dollars

deposited with the clerk at the time

the petition la filed in each case, except

when a fee la not required from a

voluntary bankrupt, and from estates

which they have administered snob

commissions on all moneys disbursed

by them as may be allowed by the

courts, not to exceed six per centum

on the first five hundred dollars or

less, four per centum on moneys In ex-

cess of five hundred dollars and less

than fifteen hundred dollara, two per

centum on moneys In excess of fifteen

hundred dollars and leas than ten

thousand dollara, and one per centum

on moneys In excess of ten thousand

16-1 48a originally read u
fol·
lows : "Trustees shall reeelve, u tun
1·otnp('ni<atlon tor their 11ervlee1, paynhk nft('r they are rendered, a tee of
live dollars deposited with the clerk
ut the time the petition Is ftled In each
l'USe. t>Xeept when a fee Is not required
from n voluntary bankrupt, and from
eetat<>11 whleh they have admlnl1tered,
sueh commlsslom1 on 11um11 to be paid
n!'I dh·ldeods and commissions as may
Jl{• n ll!lwed by the courts, not to eJ:·
eet'd thrl'e per eeotnm on the ftrst ftve
thou~and
dollsrs or leRA, two per
l'Pntnm on the second fi'l"e thou1&nd
dollurs or part therPof, and one per
<·c•otum on such sums In exceB& of ten
thouiinnd dollars."
The amendment of 1908 changed It
to rend ns follows: "TruRtees shall
reC'elvr for thl'ir services, paynble after
they are rendered, a fee or ft'l"e dollar&
deposited with the clerk at the time
the petition Is ftled ID each ease, except

when a fee 11 not required from a
voluntary bankrupt, and from estates
whleh tbe7 have administered sa<.'11
commlasloas on alt moneys dl1buned
by them u may be allowed by tile
courts, not to eseeed slx per ceotum
on the first five hundred dollara or
lea. tour per centum on moneys In eseeu ot live hundred dollars and le•
than fifteen bundl't'd dollar11, two per
centum on moneys In escees of fifteen
hundred dollars and less than tea
thousand dollara, and one per eentum
on money& In excess of ten thousand
dollars. And ln case of the eooftrm•·
tloo of a composition after thf
trustee hu qualified the eourt ma1
allow him, as compensation. not to
es~ one-half of one per cl'ntum
of the amount to be paid the credltol'I
on auch composition."
The other cbanree were made bJ tile
amendment of 1910.

BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1898 741

BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1898

741

per centum on moneys in excess of ten thousand dollar*: Provided, That

in case of the confirmation of a composition such commissions shall not exceed

one-half of one per centum of the amount to be paid creditors on such com-

positions: Provided further, Thai when the receiver or marshal acts as a

mere custodian and does not carry on the business of the bankrupt as pro-

vided in clause five of section two of this Act, he shall not receive nor be

allowed in any form or guise more than two per centum on the first thou-

sand dollars or less, and one-half of one per centum on all above one thousand

dollars on moneys disbursed by him or turned over by him to the trustee

and on moneys subsequently realized from property turned over by him in

kind to the trustee: Provided further, Thai before the allowance of com-

pensation notice of application therefor, specifying the amount asked, shall

be given to creditors in the manner indicated in section fifty-eight of this

Act.n

e Where the business is conducted by trustees, marshals, or receivers, as

provided in clause five of section two of this Act, the court may allow such

officers additional compensation for such services by way of commissions

upon the moneys disbursed or turned over .to any person, including lien

holders, by them, and, in cases of receivers or marshals, also upon the moneys

turned over by them or afterwards realized by the trustees from property

turned over in kind by them to the trustees; such commissions not to exceed

six per centum on the first five hundred dollars or less, four per centum on

moneys in excess of five hundred dollars and less than, one thousand five
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hundred dollars, two per centum on moneys in excess of one thousand five

hundred dollars and less than ten thousand dollars, and one per centum on

moneys in excess of ten thousand dollars: Provided, That in case of the

confirmation of a composition such commissions shall not exceed one-half

of one per centum of the amount to be paid creditors on such composition:

Provided further, That before the allowance of compensation notice of

application therefor, specifying the amount asked, shall be given to creditors

in the manner indicated in section fifty-eight of this Act.1*

§49. Accounts and Papebs of Trustees.—a The accounts and papers

of trustees shall be open to the inspection of officers and all parties in

interest.

§ 50. Bonds of Referees and Trustees.—a Referees, before assuming

the duties of their offices, and within such time as the district courts of the

United States having jurisdiction shall prescribe, shall respectively qualify

by entering into bond to the United States in such sum as shall be fixed

by such courts, not to exceed five thousand dollars, with such sureties as

shall be approved by such courts, conditioned for the faithful performance

of their official duties.

b Trustees, before entering upon the performance of their official duties,

and within ten days after their appointment, or within such further time,

not to exceed five days, as the court may permit, shajl respectively qualify

by entering into bond to the United States, with such sureties as shall be

approved by the courts, conditioned for the faithful performance of their

official duties.

c The creditors of a bankrupt estate, at their first meeting after the

17—| 48d was added by the amend-

ment of 1910.

18—| 48e was added by tbe amend-

ment of 1910.

per centum 011 moneys in ezcesa of ten thOU8a11d dollar.~: Provided, That
in caae of the confirmation of a composition such commianon.s ahaU not exceed
om-half of 011e per centum of the amount to be pawt creditors on wch com·
positions: Provided further, That when the receit:er or marshal act1 as a
men' ctUtodian 011d doe• 11ot carry on the bwiness of the bankrupt a1 protJided in clause five of section two of this Act, he 1ihall not receive nor be
allowed tn any form or guise more tlwrn two per centum on the first tllOK·
sand dollara or leaa, and 011e-half of one per centum on all above one thouaand
dollar. on mo11ey1 diaburaed by him or tur11ed ouer by him to the truateo
and on moneys aubaequently realized from property turued over by him in
k1nd to the truatee: Provwted furfMr, That before the allowance of com·
peruati<m notice of application there/or, specifying the amount asked, shall
be gi1:en to creditora in the manner i11dicated in aection fifty-eight of thia
Act.n
e Where the businesa ia co11ducted by tnutecs, marahal.t, or receivers, a.a
provided in cla"8e five of sectio-n two of tlaia Act, the court may allow such
officers additional compensation for such services by way of commission.s
upon the moneys diaburaed or tun1ed over .to any persO'fl., ~lading li8'11o
holdera, by them, and, in casea of rece1vera or marahal.t, alao upon the m<>f&6ya
turned over by them or afterwards reali.red by the tnuteea from property
tun1ed over in kind by tht1m to the trustees; wch commiaaiona not to exceed
.V per c.mtum on th6 (Wat ft1Je hundred dollara or leu, f <1Ur per centum <m
money• in ezceu of five hundred dollars and le11 tMn one thousand five
11undred dollara, two per centum on money• in ezceu of one .thousand five
hundred dollara trnd leBB than ten thmuand dollara, and one per centum on
mont1y1 it1 ezce88 of ten thousand dollara: Provided, That in case of the
co11firmation of a composiiion nch commiasiona shall not ezceed 011e-half
of one per centum of the amou11t to be paid creditors 011 such composltion:
Provided further, That before the allowance of compe11saticm riotice of
application there/or, specifying the amount tUked, shall be give11 to creditors
iu the manner illdic.cted i11 section fifty-eight of this .dct.u
I 49. ACCOUNTS AND PAPERS or TRUSTEES.-a The accounts -and paper11
of trustees shall be open to ~e inspection of officers and all parties in
interest.
I 50. BONDS m· REFEREES AND TRUSTEES.-a Referees, before aS11uming
the duties of their offices, and within Buch time 8B the district court& of the
United 8tates having jurisdiction shall prescribe, shall respectively qualify
by entering into bond to the United States in such sum as shall be fixed
by such courts, not to exceed five thousand dollars, with such sureties as
shall be approved by such court&, conditioned for the faithful performance
of their official duties.
b Trustees, before entering upon the performance of their official duties,
and within ten days after their appointment, or within such further time,
not to exceed five days, as the court may permit, shiµl respectively qualify
by entering into bond to the United States, with such sureties as shall be
apvroved by the courts, conditioned for the faithful performance of their
official duties.
c The creditors of a bankrupt estate, at their ti.rat meeting after the
17- 1 48d wu added bJ the amend·
meDt of 1910.

18--1 48e wH added by the amend·
meDt of 1910.
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adjudication, or after a vacancy has occurred in the office of trustee, or

after an estate has been reopened, or after a composition has been set aside

or a discharge revoked, if there is a vacancy in the office of trustee, shall fix

the amount of the bond of the trustee; the; may at any time increase the

amount of the bond. If the creditors do not fix the amount of the bond

of the trustee as herein provided the court shall do so.

d The court shall require evidence as to the actual value of the property

of sureties.

e There shall be at least two sureties upon each bond,

f The actual value of the property of the sureties, over and above their

liabilities and exemptions, on each bond shall equal at least the amount of

such bond.

g Corporations organized for the purpose of becoming sureties upon

bonds, or authorized by law to do bo, may be accepted as sureties upon the

bonds of referees and trustees whenever the courts are satisfied that the

rights of all parties in interest will be thereby amply protected.

h Bonds of referees, trustees, and designated depositories shall be filed

of record in the office of the clerk of the court and may be sued upon in the

name of the United States for the use of any person injured by a breach

of these conditions.

i Trustees shall not be liable, personally or on their bonds, to the United

States, for any penalties or forfeitures incurred by the bankrupts under
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this act, of whose estates they are respectively trustees.

j Joint trustees may give joint or several bonds.

k If any referee or trustee shall fail to give bond, as herein provided

and within the time limited, be shall be deemed to have declined his appoint-

ment, and such failure shall create a vacancy in his office.

1 Suits upon referees' bonds shall not be brought subsequent to two

years after the alleged breach of the bond.

m Suits upon trustees' bonds shall not be brought subsequent to two

years alter the estate has been closed.

§ 51. Duties of Clerks.—a Clerks shall respectively (1) account for,

as for other fees received by them, the clerk's fee paid in each case and

such other fees as may be received for certified copies of records which may

be prepared for persons other than officers; (2) collect the fees of the

clerk, referee, and trustee in each case instituted before filing the petition,

except the petition of a proposed voluntary bankrupt which is accompanied

by an affidavit stating that the petitioner is without, and can not obtain,

the money with which to pay such fees; (3) deliver to the referees upon

application all papers which may be referred to them, or, if the offices of

such referees are not in the same cities or towns as the offices of such clerks,

transmit such papers by mail, and in like manner return papers which were

received from such referees after they have been used; (4) and within ten

days after each case has been closed pay to the referee, if the ease was

referred, the fee collected for him, and to the trustee the fee collected for

him at the time of filing the petition.

% 52. Compensation of Clerks and Marshals.—a Clerks shall respec-

tively receive as full compensation for their service to each estate, a filing

fee of ten dollars, except when a fee is not required from a voluntary bank-

rupt.

adjudication, or after a vacancy has occurred in the oftiee of truatee, or
after an e8tate has been reopened, or after a composition baa bee& set aside
or a discharge revoked, if there is a vacancy in the office of tru1tee, llhall h
the amount of the bond of the tru8tee; they may at an1 time increue tbe
amount of the bond. It the creditora do not fix the amount of the bond
of the trustee as herein provided the court shall do BO.
d The court shall require evidence aa to the actual value of the property
of sureties.
e There shall be at leaat two suretiM upon each bond.
f The actual value of the property of the sureties, over and above their
liabilities and exemption•, on each bond shall equal at leut the amount of
such bond.
g Corporationa organized for the purpoae of becoming aureti• opoa
bonds, or authorued by law to do eo, may be accepted u auretiee upon tllB
bonds of referees and trustee& whenever the court& are satisfied ~at tbe
rights of all parties in intereet will be thereby amply protected.
h Bonda of refereea, truateea, and deeignated depoaitoriea ah.all be &led
of record in the office of the c}erk of the court and may be aued upoa in tbe
name of the United States for the uae of any person injured by a bread!
of theee conditions.
i Trustees shall not be liable, personally or on their bonds, to tbe Unit.eel
States, for any penalties or forfeitures incurred by the bankrupt.a under
this act, of whose estate• they are respectively trustees.
j Joint truatees may give joint or several bond&
k I1' any referee or trustee shall fail to give bond, as herein proricJ.d
and within the time limited, he ahall be deemed to have declined hia appointment, and auch failure ahall create a ,·acancy in hia oftice.
1 Suits upon referees' bonds shall not be brought subeequent to two
years after the alleged breach of the bond.
m Suits upon trustees' bonds ahall not be brought subaequent to two
years after the estate has been closed.
I 51. DUTIES or Cu:&s:s.-a Clerks shall reepectively (1) account for,
aa for other feaa received by them, the clerk 'a fee paid in each cue and
such other fees as may be received for certified copies of records which may
be prepared for persons other than officer&; ( 2) collect the feee of the
clerk, referee, and trustee in each case instituted before filing the petitiOJL,
except the petition of a proposed voluntary bankrupt which is accompanied
by an affidavit stating that the petitioner is without, and can not obtain,
the money with which to pay such fees; (3) deliver to the referees upon
application all papers which may be referred to them, or, if the 011lce1 of
such referees are not in the same cities or towna as the offices of 90eJt clerb,
transmit such papers by mail, and in like manner return papel'll which were
received from such referees aft.er they have been uaed; ( ') and within tea
days after e~h case. has been closed pay t.o the referee, it the cue wu
referred, the fee colleet.ed for him, and t.o the trustee the fee collected for
him at the time of filing the petition.
I 52. CoMPENSATION OJ' CLERKS AND MARSHALS.--a Clerb ahall reapee·
tively receive aa full compensation for their service to each estate, a &ing
fee of ten dollars, except when a fee ia not required from a volUDtary bank·
rupt.
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b Marshals shall respectively receive from the estate where an adjudi-

cation in bankruptcy is made, except as herein otherwise provided, for the

performance of their services in proceedings in bankruptcy, the same fees,

and account for them in the same way, as they are entitled to receive for

the performance of the same or similar services in other cases in accordance

with laws now in force, or such as may be hereafter enacted, fixing the com-

pensation of marshals.

153. Duties of Attorney-General.—a The Attorney-General shall

annually lay before CongTess statistical tables showing for the whole coun-

try, and by States, the number of cases during the year of voluntary and

involuntary bankruptcy; the amount of the property of the estates; tho

dividends paid and the expenses of administering such estates; and such

other like information as he may deem important.

i 54. Statistics or Bankriiptcy Proceedings.—a Officers shall furnish

in writing and transmit by mail such information as is within their knowl-

edge, and as may be shown by the records and papers in their possession,

to the Attorney-General, for statistical purposes, within ten days after being

'requested by him to do so.

CHAPTER VI

CREDITORS

§ 55. Meetings of Creditors.—a The court shall cause the first meeting

of the creditors of a bankrupt to be held, not less than ten nor more than

b Marshals shall respectively receive from the eetate where an a•ljudication in bankruptcy is made, except as herein otherwise provided, for the
performance ol their services in proceedings in bankruptcy, the same fees,
and account for them in the same way, as they are entitled to receive for
the performance of the same or similar services in other ca~es in accordance
with laws now in force, or such 88 may be hereafter enacted, fixing the compeneation of marshals.
I 53. DUTIES 01' ATTOBNZV-GBNEBAL.-a The Attorney-General shall
annually lay before Congress statistical tables showing for the whole country, and by States, the number ol cases during the year of \'olµntary nncl
involuntary bankruptcy; the amount of the property of the estates; tho
dividends paid and the expenses of administering such estates; and such
other like information as be may deem important.
I 54. &rA'l'IBTICS OP BANKBUPTCY PB00DD1Nos.-a Officers shall furnish
in writing and transmit by mail such information 88 ia within their knowledge, and aa may be shown by the records and papen in their poaseesion,
to the Attorney-General, for statiatical purpoBeS, within ten days after being
"requested by him to do BO.

thirty days after the adjudication, at the county seat of the county in
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which the bankrupt has had his principal place of business, resided, or had

OHAPTEB VI

his domicile; or if that place would be manifestly inconvenient as a place

CBBDITOBS

of meeting for the parties in interest, or if the bankrupt is one who does

not do business, reside, or have his domicile within the United States, the

court shall fix a place for the meeting which is the most convenient for par-

ties in interest If such meeting should by any mischance not be held within

such time, the court shall fix the date, as soon as may be thereafter, when

it shall be held.

b At the first meeting of creditors the judge or referee shall preside,

and, before proceeding with the other business, may allow or disallow the

claims of creditors there presented, and may publicly examine the bankrupt

or cause him to be examined at the instance of any creditor.

c The creditors shall at each meeting take such steps as may be pertinent

and necessary for the promotion of the best interests of the estate and the

enforcement of this Act.

d A meeting of creditors, subsequent to the first one, may be held at

any time and place when all of the creditors who have secured the allowance

of their claims sign a written consent to hold a meeting at such time and

place.

e The court shall call a meeting of creditors whenever one-fourth or

more in number of those who have proven their claims shall file a written

request to that effect; if such request is signed by a majority of such cred-

itors, which number represents a majority in amount of such claims, and

contains a request for such meeting to be held at a designated place, the

court shall call such meeting at such place within thirty days after the date

of the filing of the request.

I 55. llDTINos OJ' CBUITORS.-a The court shall cause the :flnt meetmg
of the credit.on of a bankrupt to be held, not leas than ten nor more than
thirty days after the adjudication, at the county seat of the county in
which the bankrupt baa had hie principal place of busine88, resided, or had
his domicile; or if that place would be manifestly inconvenient BB a place
of meeting for the parties in interest, or if the bankrupt is one who does
not do busineas, reside, or have his domicHe within the United States, the
court shall 4x a place for the meeting lvhich is the moat convenient for parties in interest. If such meeting should by any mischance not be held within
such time, the court shall 4x the date, as soon as may be thereafter, when
it shall be held.
b At the first meeting of creditors the judge or referee shall preside,
and, before proceeding with the other business, may allow or disallow the
claims of creditors there presented, and may publicly examine the bankrupt
or cause him to be ex:nmined at the instance of any creditor.
c The creditors shall at each meeting take such steps as may be pertinent
and nece11Sary for the promotion of the best interest.a of the estate 11.Dd the
enfozcement of thia Act.
d A meeting of creditors, subsequent to the first one, may be held at
11.ny \ime and place when all of the creditors who have eecured the allowance
of their elaims sign a written consent to hold a meeting at such time and
place.
e The court shall call a meeting of creditors whenever one-fourth or
more in number of those who have proven their claims shall file a written
reque9t to that effect; if such request is signed by a majority of auch creditors, which number represents a majority in amount of such claims, and
contains a request for such meeting to be held at a designared place, the
court shall call auch meeting at such place within thirty days after the date
of the ftling of the request.
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f Whenever the affairs of the estate are ready to be closed a final meet

ing of creditors shall be ordered.

S 56. Voters at Meetings or Creditors.—a Creditors shall pass upon

matters submitted to them at their meetings by a majority vote in number

and amount of claims of all creditors whoFe claims have been allowed and

are present, except as herein otherwise provided.

b Creditors holding claims which are secured or have priority shall not,

in respect to such claims, be entitled to vote at creditors' meeting?, nor

shall such claims be counted In computing either the number of creditors

or the amount of their claims, unless the amounts of such claims exceed

the values of such securities or priorities, and then only for such excess.

§ 57. Proof and Allowance or Claims.—a Proof of claims shall con-

sist of a statement under oath, in writing, signed by a creditor setting

forth the claim, the consideration therefor, and whether any, and, if so

what, securities are held therefor, and whether any, and, if so what, pay-

ments have been made thereon, and that the sum claimed is justly owing

from the bankrupt to the creditor.

b Whenever a claim is founded upon an instrument of writing, such

instrument, unless lost or destroyed, shall be filed with the proof of claim.

If such instrument is lost or destroyed, a statement of such fact and of the

circumstances of such loss or destruction shall be filed under oath with the

claim. After the claim is allowed or disallowed, such instrument may be

withdrawn by permission of the court, upon leaving a copy thereof on
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file with the claim.

c Claims after being proved may, for the purpose of allowance, be filed

by the claimants in the court where the proceedings are pending or before

the referee if the case has been referred.

d Claims which have been duly proved shall be allowed, upon receipt

by or upon presentation to the court, unless objection to their allowance

shall be made by parties in interest, or their consideration be continued

for cause by the court upon its own motion.

e Claims of secured creditors and those who have priority may be

allowed to enable such creditors to participate in the proceedings at cred

itors' meetings held prior to the determination of the value of their securi-

ties or priorities, but shall be allowed for such sums only as to the courts

seem to be owing over and above the value of their securities or priorities.

f Objections to claims shall be heard and determined as soon as the

convenience of the court and the best interests of the estates and th*

claimants will permit.

g The claims of creditors who have received preferences, voidable under

section sixty, subdivision b, or to whom conveyances, transfers, assignments,

or incumbrances, void or voidable under section sixty-seven, subdivision e,

have been made or given, shall not be allowed unless such creditors shall

surrender such preferences, conveyances, transfers, assignments, or incum-

brances.1*

h The value of securities held by secured creditors shall be determined

by converting the same into money according to the terms of the agree-

ment pursuant to which such securities were delivered to such creditors or

10—The Italicized words In 167g

were added by the amendment 6f

1003.

f Whene\'er the atrairs of the estate are ready to be closed a final meet·
ing of creditors shall be ordered.
I 56. VOTERS AT MEETINGS OP' CRWITORB.-a Credito1a shall pass upon
matters submitted to them at their meetings by a majority vote in number
and amount of claims of nil creditors whoFe claims have been allowed and
are present, except ns herein otherwise provided.
b Creditors holding claims which are seeured or have priority shall not,
in re8}>ect to such claiillll, be entitled to vot.e at creditors' meeting!!, nor
shall BUch claims Le counted in computing either the number of creditors
or the amount of their claims, unless the amonot.a of such claims exceed
the values of such securiti~ or prioritiea, and then only for such exclllS.
157. PRoor A~D ALLOWANCE OJ' CLAIMS.-& Proof of claims shall con·
silt of a statement under oath, in writing, signed by a creditor eetting
forth the claim, the consideration therefor, and whether any, and, if so
what, eecurities are held therefor, and whether any, and, it to what, pay·
ments have been made thereon, and that the sum claimed is justly owing
from the bankrupt to the creditor.
b Whenever a claim is founded upon an i~trument of writing, sueh
instrument, unless lost or destroyed, shall be filed with the proof of claim.
If such instrument is lost or destroyed, a statement of such fact and of the
circumstances of s11eh loss or destruction shall be filed under oath with the
claim. After the claim is allowed or disallowed, such instrument may be
withdrawn by permission of the court, upon leaving a copy thereof on
file with the claim.
c Claims after being proved may, for the purpose of allowance, be filed
by the claimants in the court where the proceeding& are pending or befort
the referee if the case has been referred.
d Claims which have been duly proved ahall be allowed, upon receipt
by or upon preeentation to the court, unless objection to their allowanCP
shall be made by parties in interest, or their consideration be continul'll
for cause by the court upon its own motion.
e Claims of secured creditors and those who have priority ma;r be
allowed to enable such creditors to participate in the proceedings at creditors' meetings held prior to the determination of the value of their aecuri·
ties or priorities, but shall be allowetl for such sums only as to the courtll
seem to be owing over and above the value of their securities or priorities.
f Objections to claims shall be beard and determined as soon u the
ronvenience of the court and the best interests of the eatatea and Ult
claimants will permit.
g The claims of creditors who have received preferences, \loidable uftder
section aizty, aubditJisi-On b, or to u.•hom con\leyance8, tran~fen, auignmenu,
or incumbrance8, void or \loidable under 8ection aixty·se11en, .nlbdivifton e,
have been made or given, shall not be allowed unless such creditors t1ball
surrender mch preferences, conveyancea, tranafers, a8aignmenu, or i11CM-mbrancea.u
h The value of securities held by secured creditors shall be determined
hy ronverting the same into money according to the terms of the agre9meut pursuant to which such securities were delivered to such creditor1 or
Hl- The ttallcl•ed words lo I 117g
w<'re added by the amendment of
1!103.
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by such creditors and the trustee, by agreement, arbitration, compromise,

or litigation, as the court may direct, and the amount of such value shall

be credited upon such claims, and a dividend shall be paid only on the

unpaid balance.

i Whenever a creditor, whose claim against a bankrupt estate is secured

by the individual undertaking of any person, fails to prove such claim, such

person may do so in the creditor's name, and if he discharge such under-

taking in whole or in part he shall be subrogated to that extent to the

rights of the creditor.

j Debts owing to the United States, a State, a county, a district, or

a municipality as a penalty or forfeiture shall not be allowed, except for

the amount of the pecuniary loss sustained by the act, transaction, or pro-

ceeding out of which the penalty or forfeiture arose, with reasonable and

actual costs occasioned thereby and such interest aa may have accrued

thereon according to law.

k Claims which have been allowed may be reconsidered for cause and

reallowed or rejected in whole or in part, according to the equities of the

case, before but not after the estate has been closed.

1 Whenever a claim shall have been reconsidered and rejected, in

whole or in part, upon which a dividend has been paid, the trustee may

recover from the creditor the amount of the dividend received upon the

claim if rejected in whole, or the proportional part thereof if rejected only
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in part.

m The claim of any estate which is being administered in bankruptcy

against any like estate may be proved by the trustee and allowed by the

court in the same manner and upon like terms as the claims of other creditors.

n Claims shall not be proved against a bankrupt estate subsequent to

one year after the adjudication; or if they are liquidated by litigation and

the final judgment therein is rendered within thirty days before or after

the expiration of such time, then within sixty days after the rendition of

such judgment: Provided, That the right of infants and insane persons

without guardians, without notice of the proceedings, may continue six

months longer.

i 58. Notices to Creditors.—a Creditors shall have at least ten days'

notice by mail, to their respective addresses as they appear in the list of

creditors of the bankrupt, or as afterwards filed with the papers in the

case by the creditors, unless they waive notice in writing, of (1) all exam-

inations of the bankrupt; (2) all hearings upon applications for the con-

firmation of compositions; (3) all meetings of creditors; (4) all proposed

sales of property; (5) the declaration and time of payment of dividends;

(6) the filing of the final accounts of the trustee, and the time when and

the place where they will be examined and passed upon; (7) the proposed

compromise of any controversy; (8) the proposed dismissal of the pro-

ceedings, and (9) there shall be thirty days' notice of all applications for

the discharge of bankrupts.™

20—1 58a originally read as fol-

lows: "Creditors shall have at least

ten days- notice by mall, to their re-

spective addresses as they appear In

the list of creditors of the bankrupt,

or as afterwards filed with the papers

In the case by the creditors, unless

b1 such creditors and the trustee, by agreement, a.rbitration, compromise,
or litigation, as the court may direct, and the amount of such value shall
be credited upon such claims, and a dividend shall be paid only on the
unpaid balance.
i Whenever a creditor, whose claim against a bankrupt eetate is secured
by the individual undertaking of any person, fails to prove such claim, such
person may do eo in the creditor's name, and if he discharge such undertaking in whole or in part he shall be eubrogated to that extent to the
rights of the creditor.
j Debts owing to the United States, a State, a county, a district, or
a municipality as a penalty or forfeiture shall not be allowed, except for
the amount of the pecuniary loss sustained by the act, transaction, or pro·
ceeding out of which the penalty or forfeiture arose, with reuonable and
actual costs oeeaaioned thereby and such intereat u ma1 have accrued
thereon according to law.
k Claims which have been allowed may be reconsidered for cauee and
reallowed or rejected in whole or in part, according to the equities of the
caae, before but not after the estate has been closed.
1 Whenever a claim shall have been reconsidered and rejected, in
whole or in part, upon which a dh'idend has been paid, the trustee may
recover from the creditor the amount of the dividend received upon the
claim if rejected in whole, or the proportional part thereof if rejected only
in part.
m The claim of any estate which is being administered in bankruptcy
againat any like estate may be proved by the trustee and allowed b1 the
court in the same manner and upon like terms as the claims of other creditors.
n Claims shall not be proved against a bankrupt estate subsequent to
one 1ear after the adjudication; or if they are liquidated by litigation and
the final judgment therein is rendered within thirty days before or after
the expiration of such time, then within sixty days after the rendition of
such judgment: Provided, That the right of infants and insane persons
without guardians, without notice of the proceedings, may continue si.J:
months longer.
I 58. NOTICES TO C&J:DITORS.-a Creditors shall have at least ten days'
notice by ma.ii, to their respective addresses as they appear in the list of
creditors of the bankrupt, or as afterwards filed with the papers in the
ca&e by the creditors, unlese they waive notice in writing, of (1) all exam·
inations of the bankrupt; (2) all hearings upon applications for the con·
ft.nnation of compositions; ( 3) all meetings of creditors; ( 4) all proposed
sales of property; (5) the declaration and time of payment of dividends;
(6) the filing of the final accounts of the trustee, and the time when and
the place where they will be examined and passed upon; (7) the proposed
compromise of any controversy; (8) the proposed dismi888l of the proceedings, and (9) there .tilt.all be thi.rly days' notice of all application& for
IM discharge of banlcrwpts.20

they waive notice in writing, of (1)

all examinations of the bankrupt; (2)

all hearings upon applications for the

confirmation of compositions or the

discharge of bankrupts; (3) all meet-

20--t 58a originally read as folloW'll : "Credi ton shall have at least
ten days' notice by mall, to thPfr re·
1pecttve addresses u they appear In
the U1t of creditors of the bankrupt.
or u atterwarde tiled with the papen

In the case by the creditors, unleu
they waive notice In writing. of (1)
all examinations of the bankrupt; (2)
ell hearings upon applications for the
conftrmatton of compo1ltlon1 or the
dlacharge of bankrupts; (3) all meet-
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b Notice to creditors of the first meeting shall be published at least once

and may be published such number of additional times as the court maj

direct; the last publication shall be at least one week prior to the date fixed

for the meeting. Other notices may be published as the court shall direct.

c All notices shall be given by the referee, unless otherwise ordered by

the judge.

§ 59. Who Mat File and Dismiss Petitions.—a Any qualified person

may file a petition to be adjudged a voluntary bankrupt.

b Three or more creditors who have provable claims against any person

which amount in the aggregate, in excess of the value of securities held by

them, if any, to five hundred dollars or over; or if all of the creditors of

such person are less than twelve in number, then one of such creditors whose

claim equals such amount may file a petition to have him adjudged a bank-

rupt

c Petitions shall be filed in duplicate, one copy for the clerk and one

for service on tho bankrupt.

d If it be averred in the petition that the creditors of the bankrupt are

less than twelve in number, and lees than three creditors have joined as

petitioners therein, and the answer avers the existence of a larger number of

creditors, there shall be filed with the answer a list under oath of all the

creditors, with their addresses, and thereupon the court shall cause all such

creditors to be notified of the pendency of such petition and shall delay the

hearing upon such petition for a reasonable time, to the end that parties in
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interest shall have an opportunity to be heard; if upon such hearing it shall

appear that a sufficient number have joined in such petition, or if prior to or

during such hearing a sufficient number shall join therein, the case may be

proceeded with, but otherwise it shall be dismissed.

e In computing the number of creditors of a bankrupt for the purpose

of determining how many creditors must join in the petition, such creditors

as were employed by him at the time of the filing of the petition or are

related to him by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree, as deter-

mined by the common law, and have not joined in the petition, shall not be

counted.

f Creditors other than original petitioners may at any time enter their

appearance and join in the petition, or file an answer and be heard in opposi-

tion to the prayer of the petition.

g A voluntary or involuntary petition shall not be dismissed by the

petitioner or petitioners or for want of prosecution or by consent of parties

until after notice to the creditors, and to that end the court shall, before

entertaining an application for dismissal, require the bankrupt to file a lilt,

under oath, of all his creditors, with their addresses, and shall cause notice

to be sent to all such creditors of the pendency of such application, and

shall delay the hearing thereon for a reasonable time to allow all creditor!

and parties in interest opportunity to be heard.™

Ings of creditors; (4) sll proposed

sales of property: (5) the declaration

and time of payment of dividends; (6)

the filing of the final accounts of the

trustee, and the time when and the

place where they will be examined and

passed upon; (7) the proposed com-

promise of any controversy, and (8)

the proposed dismissal of the proceed-

ings."

The lengthening of the time of no-

tice of applications for discharge »u

made by the amendment of 1910.

21—The italicized words In f 5»g

were added by the amendment of 1910.

b Notice to creditor• of the first meeting shall be published at leut onee
and may be pnbliehed such number of addition&! times as the court may
direct; the last publication shall be at least one week prior to the date bed
for the meeting. Other notices may be published as the court shall direct.
c All notices shall be given by the referee, unleee otherwise ordered by
the judge.
I 59. WHO MAY FIL• AND DIBKJSS Pttm:ONS.-6 Any quaillled penou
may file a petition to be adjudged a voluntary bankrupt.
b Three or more creditors who have provable claims againat any penon
which amount in the aggregate, in exceee of the value of securities held by
them, if any, to five hundred dollars or over; or if all of the creditors of
such person are less than tweh-e in number, then one of 1uch creditors wboee
claim equals such amount may flle a petition to have him adjudged a bank·
rupt.
c Petitions shall be flled in duplicate, one copy for the clerk: and one
for serviee on tho bankrupt.
d If it be averred in the petition that the creditors of the bankrupt are
less than iweh-e in number, and leM than three creditors have joined u
petitioners therein, and the answer avers the existence of a larger number of
creditors, there shall be flled with the an1wer a liat under oath of all the
credit.ors, with their addreaees, and thereupon the court 11hall cauee all auch
credit.ors t.o be notified of the pendency of such petition and ahall delay the
hearing upon such petition for a reasonable time, t.o the end that parties in
intereet ahall have an opportunity t.o be heard; if upon such hearing it ahal1
appear that a sufficient number have joined in such petition, or if prior to or
during such hearing a sufficient number shall join therein, the case may be
proceeded with, but other'l'l•iee it shall be dismisaed.
e In computing the number of creditors of a bankrupt for the purpo19
of determining how many creditors must join in the petition, auch crediton
M were employed by him at the time of the filing of the petition or are
related to him by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree, aa deter·
mined by the common law, and have not joined in the petition, shall not be
counted.
f Credit.ors other than original petitioners ma;r at any time enter their
appearance and join in the petition, or file an answer and be heard in oppoei·
tion to the prayer of the petition.
g A voluntary or involuntary petition shall not be dismialled by the
petitioner or petitioners or for want of proeecution or by coneent of parties
until after notice to the creditors, a11d to tha.t end t"Ae court 11'all, ~f'1't
entertaini11g an application. for dtam'81al, reqvirt: t'M bankrupt to ~ o ltrt,
under oath, of all his creditora, with their addre11u, tmd alaall ooue MM
to be aent to all· sucA creditor• of t1'e pendenoy of euc1& appHcation, -4
altall delay the hearing thereott for a r6CJ&011Gble time to aUot0 all or~tor•
and parties in interest opportu1'ity to be laeard.11
Inga of credltor11 ; ( 4) a II propotled
aalee ot property; (5) the declaration
and time of payment of dividends; (6)
the filing of the ftnal arcounts of the
truatee, and the time when and the
place where they wlll be examined and
pueed upon; (7) the proposed compromlae of &DJ controver11. and (8)

tbe proposed dlaml-1 of the proceed·
lnp."

Tbe lengthenlnir ot the ttme of DDtlce of appJtcattona tor dl8cbargoe wu
made bJ the amendment or 1910.
21-The ltallched worda In I He
were added bJ the amendment of ltlO.
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§ 60. Preferred Creditors.—a A person shall be deemed to have given

a preference if, being insolvent, he has, within four months before the filing

of the petition, or after the filing of the petition and before the adjudu-ation,

procured or suffered a judgment to be entered against himself in favor of

any person, or made a transfer of any of his property, and the effect of the

enforcement of such judgment or transfer will be to enable any one of his

creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any other of such

creditors of the same class. Where the preference consists in a transfer, such

period of four months shall not expire until four months after the date of the

recording or registering of the transfer, if by law such recording or register-

ing is required."

b If a bankrupt shall have procured or suffered a judgment to be entered

against him in favor of any person or have made a transfer of any of hi*

property, and if, at the time of the transfer, or of the entry of the judg-

ment, or of the recording or registering of the transfer if by lata recording

or registering thereof is required, and being within four months before the

filing of the petition in bankruptcy or after the filing thereof and before the

adjudication, the bankrupt be insolvent and the judgment or transfer then

operate as a preference, and the person receiving it or to be benefited thereby,

or his agent acting therein, shall then have reasonable cause to believe that

the enforcement of such judgment or transfer would effect a preference, it

shall be voidable by the trustee and he may recover the property or its value

from such person. And for the purpose of such recovery any court of bank-
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ruptcy, as hereinbefore defined, and ariy state court which would have had

jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened, shall have concurrent juris-

diction."

c If a creditor has been preferred, and afterwards in good faith gives

the debtor further credit without security of any kind for property which

becomes a part of the debtor's estate, the amount of such new credit remain-

ing unpaid at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy may be set off

against the amount which would otherwise be recoverable from him.

d If a debtor shall, directly or indirectly, in contemplation of the filing

of a petition by or against him, pay money or transfer property to an attor-

ney and counselor at law, solicitor in equity, or proctor in admiralty for

services to be rendered, the transaction shall be reexamined by the court on

petition of the trustee or any creditor and shall only be held valid to the

22— The Italicized words In f 60a

were added by the amendment of 1003.

23— 160b originally read as fol-

lows: "If a bankrupt shall have given

a preference within four months be-

fore the filing of a petition, or after

f 60. PR!:FEl!RED CRF.DITORs.-a A person shall be deemerl to ham given
a preference if, being insolvent, be has, within four montru before the filwg
of the petition, or after the filing of the petition and before the adjudicotio11,
procured or suffered a judgment to be entered against himself in favor of
any person, or made a transfer of any of his property, and the effeet of the
enforcement of such judgment or transfer will be to enable any one of his
creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any other of such
ereditors of the same class. Where the preference consists in a trans/er, sud•
pedod of four 111011ths shall not expire until four m011ths after the date of the
record wig or registeri11g of the trans{er, if by law such recording or regi..,kr·
ing is required.22
b If a bankrupt shall have proe1jred or suf{BTed a judgme11t to be entered
against him in fa1:or of any person or have made a tra11sfer of a11y of hi.~
property, and if, at the time of the tra11sfer, or of the entry of the judgment, or of the recording or registering of the trans/er if by law recordi~g
or registering thereof is required, a11d being \\ithin four months before the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy or after the filing thereof and before the
adjudication, th6 bankrupt be insolvent and the judgment or tra11sfer the11
operate as a preference, and the person recei\'ing it or to be benefited thereby,
or his agent acting therein, shall then have reasonable caui;e to believe that
th6 enforcement of such judgment or tra11.~fer would effect a prefere11ce, it
shall be voidable by the trustee and he may recover the property or its value
from such person. ..f 11d for the purpose of such recovery any court of bankruptcy, a.! hereinbefore defined, and any state court whkh 40ould have had
jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened, shall have cone1.1rrent jurisdiction.ta
c If a creditor bas been preferred, and afterwards in good faith gives
the debtor further credit without security of any kind for property which
becomes a part of the debtor's estate, the amount of such new credit remaining unpaid at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy may be set off
against the amount which would otherwise be recoverable from him.
d If a debtor shall, directly or indirectly, in contemplation of the filing
of a petition by or against him, pay money or transfer property to an attorney and coum;elor at law, solicitor in equity, or proctor in admiralty for
services to be rendered, the tranaaction shall be reexamined by the court on
petition of the trustee or any creditor and shall only be held \'alid to the

the filing of the petition and before

the adjudication, and tbe person re-

ceiving It, or to be benefited thereby,

or his agent acting therein, shall have

bad reasonable cause to believe that It

was Intended thereby to give a prefer-

ence, it shall be voidable by tbe trustee,

and he may recover the property or Its

value from such person."

The amendment of 1903 changed It

to read as follows: "If a bankrupt

shall have given a preference, and the

person receiving It, or to be benefited

thereby, or bis agent acting therein,

shall have had reasonable cause to be-

lieve that It was intended thereby to

give a preference, it shall be voidable

by the trustee, and he may recover

tbe property or Its value from such

person. And, for the purpose of such

recovery, any court of bankruptcy, as

hereinbefore defined, and any State

conrt which would have had jurisdic-

tion if bankruptcy had not Intervened,

shall have concurrent Jurisdiction."

The other changes were made by the

amendment of 1910.

22-The Italicized words In I 60a
were added by the amendment of 1903.
23-1 60b originally read as fol·
lows: "If a bankrupt shall have given
a preference within four months be·
fore the ftllng of a petition. or after
the ftllng of the petition and before
the adjudication, and the person receiving It, or to be benefited thereby,
or hie agent acting therein, shall have
bad re&11onable cause to believe that It
wa11 Intended thereby to give a preference. It shall be voidable by the trustee,
and be may rc>cover the property or Its
value from 1m<"h person."
The amendment of 1903 chan~d it
to read as follows : "If a b&Dkrupt

shall have given a preference, and the
peraon receiving It, or to ht! benefited
thereby, or bis agent acting therein,
shall have bad reasonable c11use to believe that It was Intended thereby to
give a preference, It shnll be voidable
by the trustee. and he may recover
the property or Its value from such
person. And, tor the purpose ot such
recovery. any court of bankruptcy, as
herelnbefore detlned, and any State
court which would bave bad jurlsdlc:-tlon If bankruptcy bad not Intervened,
shall have concurrent jurisdiction."
The other changes were made by the
amendment ot 1910.
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extent of a reasonable amount to be determined by the court, and the excess

may be recovered by the trustee for the benefit of the estate.

extent of a reuonable amount to be determined by the court, and the seem
may be recovered by the trustee for the benefit of the eetate.

CHAPTEB VII

ESTATES

{ 61. Depositories for Monet.—a Courts of bankruptcy shall designate,

CHAPTER VII

by order, banking institutions as depositories for the money of bankrupt

estates, as convenient as may be to the residences of trustees, and shall

require bonds to the United States, subject to their approval, to be given

by such banking institutions, and may from time to time as occasion may

require, by like order increase the number of depositories or the amount of

any bond or change such depositories.

§ 62. Expenses of Administering Estates.—a The actual and necessary

expenses incurred by officers in the administration of estates shall, except

where other provisions are made for their payment, be reported in detail,

under oath, and examined and approved or disapproved by the court If

approved, they shall be paid or allowed out of the estates in which they were

incurred.

{ 63. Debts Which May Bb Proved.—a Debts of the bankrupt which

may be proved and allowed against his estate which are (1) a fixed liability,

as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing

at the time of the filing of the petition against him, whether then payable

or not, with any interest thereon which would have been recoverable at that
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date or with a rebate of interest upon such as were not then payable and

did not bear interest; (2) due as costs taxable against an involuntary bank-

rupt who was at the time of the filing of the petition against him plaintiff

in a cause of action which would pass to the trustee and which the trustee

declines"to prosecute after notice; (3) founded upon a claim for taxable

costs incurred in good faith by a creditor before the filing of the petition in

an action to recover a provable debt; (4) founded upon an open account,

or upon a contract express or implied; and (5) founded upon provable debts

reduced to judgments after the filing of the petition and before the con-

sideration of the bankrupt's application for a discharge, less costs incurred

and interests accrued after the filing of the petition and up to the time of the

entry of such judgments.

b Unliquidated claims against the bankrupt may, pursuant to applica-

tion to the court, be liquidated in such manner as it shall direct, and may

thereafter be proved and allowed against his estate.

§ 64. Debts Which Have Priority.—a The court shall order the trustee

to pay all taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States,

State, county, district, or municipality in advance of the payment of divi-

dends to creditors, and upon filing the receipts of the proper public officers

for such payment he shall be credited with the amount thereof, and in case

any question arises as to the amount or legality of any such tax the same

shall be heard and determined by the court.

b The debts to have priority, except as herein provided, and to be paid

in full out of bankrupt estates, and the order of payment shall be (1) the

actual and necessary cost of preserving the estate subsequent to filing the

petition; (2y the filing fees paid by creditors in involuntary cases, an4

f 61. DEPOBITORll!'.8 FOR MONEY.-a Courts of bankruptcy ahall deaignate,
by order, banking institutions aa depoaitories for the money of bankrupt
est.ates, as convenient as may be to the residences of trustees, a.nd shall
require bonde to the United States, mbject to their approval, kl be given
by such banking institutions, and may from time to time 8.8 occuion may
require, by like order in<.'rease the number of depositories or the amount of
any bond or change such depositories.
I 62. ExP!tNSES OF ADMINISTERING EsTATES.-a The actual and neoeasary
expenses incurred by officers in the adminil!tration of est.ates ahall, except
where other provisions are made for their payment, be reported in detail,
under oat.h, and examined and approved or disapproved by the court. If
approved, they shall be paid or allowed out of the estatea in which they were
incurred.
I 63. DEBTS WHICH MAY Bii PROVED.-& Debts of the bankrupt which
may be proved and allowed agaiMt h i11 estate which are ( 1) a fixed liability,
as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owmc
at the time of the filing of the petition against him, whether then payable
or not, with any interest thneon which would have been recoverable at that
date or with a rebate of intcrf.'st upon such as were not then payable and
did not bear interest; (2) due as costs taxable against an involuntary bani·
rupt who was at the time of the ti.ling of the petition against him plaintif
in a cause of action whi<'h would pass to the trustee and which the troltee
declines"to prosecute after notice; (3) founded upon a claim for taD.ble
cost.a in<.'urred in good faith by a creditor before the filing of the petition in
an action to recover a provable debt; ( 4) founded upon an open account,
or upon a contract express or implied; and ( 5) founded upon provable debts
reduced to judgments after the ti.ling of the petition a.nd before the consideration of the bankrupt's application for a discharge, lees coats incarred
and interests a<.'crued after the filing of the petition and up to the time of tM
entry of such judgmenta.
b Unliquidated claims against the bankrupt may, pursuant to applica·
tion to the court, be liquidated in such manner as it shall direct, and may
thereafter be proved and allowed against his est.ate.
f 64. DEBTS WHJCH HAVE PRIORITY.-& The court shall order the trustee
to pay all taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United State&,
State, county, district, or municipality in advance of the payment of divi·
denda to creditors, and upon filing the receipt.a of the proper public offieen
for such payment he shall be credited with the amount thereof, and in eaN
any question arises as to the amount or legality of any such tax the same
shall he heard and determined by the court.
b The debts to have priority, except as herein provided, and to be paid
in full out of bankrupt estates, and the order of payment shall be (1) the
actual and necessary cost of preserving the e11tate subsequent to filing tbe
petition i (2) the filing fees paid by creditors in involuntary cues, an4,

BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1898

BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1898 749

749

where property of the bankrupt, transferred or concealed by him either

before or after the filing of the petition, shall have been recovered for the

benefit of the estate of the bankrupt by the efforts and at the expense of one

or more creditors, the reasonable expenses of such recovery; « (3) the cost

of administration, including the fees and mileage payable to witnesses as

now or hereafter provided by the laws of the United States, and one reason

able attorney's fee, for the professional services actually rendered, irrespec-

tive of the number of attorneys employed, to the petitioning creditors in

involuntary cases, to the bankrupt in involuntary cases while performing

the duties herein prescribed, and to the bankrupt in voluntary cases, as the

court may allow; (4) wages due to workmen, clerks, traveling or city sales-

men,** or servants which have been earned within three months before the

date of the commencement of proceedings, not to exceed three hundred dollars

to each claimant; and (5) debts owing to any person who by the laws of

the States or the United States is entitled to priority.

c In the event of the confirmation of a composition being set aside, or a

discharge revoked, the property acquired by the bankrupt in addition to

his estate at the time the composition was confirmed or the adjudication was

made shall be applied to the payment in full of the claims of creditors for

property sold to him on credit, in good faith, while such composition or

discharge was in force, and the residue, if any, shall be applied to the pay-

ment of the debts which were owing at the time of the adjudication.

165. Declaration and Payment of Dividends.—a Dividends of an
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equal per centum shall be declared and paid on all allowed claims, except

such as have priority or are secured.

b The first dividend shall be declared within thirty days after the adjudi-

cation, if the money of the estate in excess of the amount necessary to pay

the debts which have priority and such claims as have not been, but prob-

ably will be, allowed equals five per centum or more of such allowed claims.

Dividends subsequent to the first shall be declared upon like terms as the first

and as often as the amount shall equal ten per centum or more and upon

closing the estate. Dividends may be declared oftener and in smaller propor-

tions if the judge shall so order. Provided, That the first dividend shall

not include more than fifty per centum of the money of the entate in excess

of the amount necessary to pay the debts which have priority and such claims

as probably will be allowed: And provided further, That the final dividend

shall not be declared within three months after the first dividend shall be

declared.2*

c The rights of creditors who have received dividends, or in whose favor

final dividends have been declared, shall not be affected by the proof and

allowance of claims subsequent to the date of such payment or declarations

of dividends; but the creditors proving and securing the allowance of such

claims shall be paid dividends equal in amount to those already received by

the other creditors if the estate equals so much before such other creditors

are paid any further dividends.

d Whenever a person shall have been adjudged a bankrupt by a court

24— The Italicized words in 164b

(2) were added by tbe amendment of

1903.

25— Tbe Italicized words In 164b

(4) were added by tbe amendment ot

1006.

26—The Italicized words In 165b

were added by the amendment of 1903.

where property of the bankrupt, trm1sferred or ooncealed by him eithM
bfJfore or after the filing of the petition., shall htwe been recovered for the
benefit of the estate of the bankrupt by the efforts and at the expen&e of one
or more creditors, the rM&011able expeMes of such recover.11; 24 (3) the cost
of administration, including the fees and mileage payable to witneeses aa
now or hereafter pro,·ided by the laws of the United Stafes, and one reason·
able attorney's fee, for the professional services actually rendered, irrespec·
tive of the number of attorneys employed, to the petitioning creditors in
in,·oluntary cases, to the bankrupt in involuntary cases while performing
the duties herein preseribed, and to the bankrupt in \'oluntary cases, aa the
court may allow; (4) wages due to workmen, clerks, traveling or city salu·
men,2e or servants which have been earned within three months before the
date of the commencement of proceedings, not to exceed three hundred dollars ·
to each claimant; and (5) debt.s owing to any person who by the laws of
the States or the United States is entitled to priority.
c In the event of the confirmation of a composition being set aside, or a
discharge revoked, the property acquired by the bankrupt in addition to
hie estate at the time the composition was confirmed or the adjudication waa
made shall be applied to the payment in full of the claims of creditors for
property sold to him on credit, in good faith, while such composition or
discharge was in force, and the residue, if any, shall be applied to the payment of the debts which were owing at the time of the adjudication.
t 65. DECLARATION AND PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS.-a Dividends of an
equal per centum shall be declared and paid on all allowed claims, except
such aa ha,·e priority or are secured.
b The first dividend shall be declared iwithin thirt~· days after the adjudi cation, if the money of the estate in exce!ls of the amount nel'essary to pay
the debts which have priority and such claims as have not been, but probably will be, allowed equals five per centum or more of such allowed claims.
Dividends subsequent to the first shall be declared upon like terms as the first
and aa often as the amount shall equal ten per centum or more and upon
closing the estate. Dividends may be declared oftener and in smaller proportions if the judge shall so order. Provided, That the first dividend shall
flOt include more than fift.I/ per centum of the mo11ey of the estate in e:rcus
of the amount necessary to JIUY the debts u:hich have priority and such claim&
as probably will be allowed: And provided fu.rther, That the final dividend
shall not be deckired within three months after the first dividend shall be
declared.H
c The rights of creditors who have receh·ed dividends, or in whose favor
final dividends have been declared, shall not be affected by the proof and
allowance of elaims subsequent to the date of such payment or declarations
of dividends; but the creditors proving and E<ecuring the allowance of sueh
claims shall be paid divi1lends equal in amount to those already received by
the other creditors if the estate equals so much before such other creditors
are paid any further dividends.
d Whenever a person shall have been adjudged a bankrupt by a court
24-'rhe Italicized words lo I 6-tb
were added by the amendment of
1903.
2~Tbe ltallclled worda ln I 64b
( 2)

( 4) were ndded by tbe amendment of
1906.
26--The Italicized words ln I 66b
Wl!re added by the amendmeut ot 1903.
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without the United States and also by a court of bankruptcy, creditor!

residing within the United States shall first be paid a dividend equal to that

received in the court without the United States by other creditors before

creditors who have received a dividend in such courts shall be paid any

amounts.

e A claimant shall not be entitled to collect from a bnnlrrupt estate any

greater amount than shall accrue pursuant to the provisions of this Act

{ 66. Unclaimed Dividends.—a Dividends which remain unclaimed for

six months after the final dividend has been declared shall be paid by the

trustee into court

b Dividends remaining unclaimed for one year shall, under the direction

of the court, be distributed to the creditors whose claims have been allowed

but not paid in full, and after such claims have been paid in full the balance

shall be paid to the bankrupt: Provided, That in case unclaimed dividends

belong to minors such minors may have one year after arriving at majority

to claim such dividends.

§ 67. Liens.—a Claims which for want of record or for other reasons

would not have been valid liens.as against the claims of the creditors of tie

bankrupt shall not be liens against his estate.

b Whenever a creditor is prevented from enforcing his rights as against

a lien created, or attempted to be created, by his debtor, who afterwards

becomes a bankrupt, the trustee of the estate of such bankrupt shall be
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subrogated to and may enforce such rights of such creditor for the benefit of

the estate.

c A lien created by or obtained in or pursuant to any suit or proceeding

at law or in equity, including an attachment upon mesne process or a judg-

ment by confession, which was begun against a person within four month*

before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy by or against such peison shall

be dissolved by the adjudication of such person to be a bankrupt if (T) it

appears that said lien was obtained and permitted while the defendant was

insolvent and that its existence and enforcement will work a preference, or

(2) the party or parties to be benefited thereby had reasonable cause to

believe the defendant was Insolvent and in contemplation of bankruptcy, or

(S) that such lien was sought and permitted in fraud of the provisions of

this Act; or if the dissolution of such lien would militate against the best

interests of the estate of such person the same shall not be dissolved, but the

trustee of the estate of such person, for the benefit of the estate, shall be

subrogated to the rights of the holder of such lien and empowered to perfect

and enforce the same in his name as trustee with like force and effect as

such holder might have done had not bankruptcy proceedings intervened.

d Ijens given or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of or

in fraud upon this Act, and for a present consideration, which have been

recorded according to law, if record thereof was necessary in order to impart

notice, shall, fo the extent of such present consideration only, not be affected

by this Act."

e That all conveyances, transfers, assignments, or incumbrances of his

property, or any part thereof, made or given by a person adjudged a bank-

rupt under the provisions of this Act subsequent to the passage of this Act

27—The ltallciaed words In 167d

were added by the amendment of 1910.

without the United State& and alao by a court of bankruptry, crediton
residing within the United StateB shall first be paid a dividend equal to tli.at
received in the court without the United States by other creilitors before
creditors who have received a dividend in such courta shall be paid &ZJ]'
amounte.
e A claimant ~hall not be entitled to collect from n b:rnkTupt estate any
greater amount than shall acrrue pursuant to the prot"isions of this Act.
166. UNCLAIMED DrvtoENos.-0: Dividends which remain unclaimed for
six months after the final dividend baa been declared shall be paid by the
trustee into court.
b Dividend11 remaining unclaimed for one year shall, under thtJ direetio11
of the court, be distributed to the creditors whose claims have been allowed
but not paid in full, a.nd after sueh claims have been paid in full the balance
shall be paid to the bankrupt: Provided, That in case unclaimed dit"idends
belong to minors such minors may have one year after arriving at majority
to claim such dividends.
I 67. LIENS.-a Claims which for want of record or for other reuo111
would not ha,·e been \'&lid liens.as against the claims of the creditors of th•
bankrupt shall not be liens against bis estate.
b Whene\·er a creditor is prevented from enforcing his right8 as again1t
a lien created, or att.empted to be created, by his debtor, who afterwards
becomes a bankrupt, the trustee of the estate of such bankrupt shall be
subrogated to and may enforce sueh righte of such creditor for the benefit of
the e9tate.
c A lien created by or obtained in or pursuant to any suit or proceeding
at law or in equity, including an attachment upon meene procEISs or a judg·
ment by confession, whi<.'h was begun against a person within four month!
before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy by or against such pe1aon shall
be dis!-olved by the adjudication of such person to be a bankrupt if ·ci)ir
--appe11rs that said lien WM obtained and permitted while the defendant ne
inBOlvent and that ite e."tistenre and enforcement will \\'Ork a preference, or
(2) the pnrty or parties to be benefited thereby had reasonable cawie to
believe the defendant was lmolvent and in contemplation of bankruptcy, or
(S) that sueh lien was sought and permitted in fraud of the provisions of
this Act; or if the diMolution of su<'h lien would militate against the be9t
interest8 of the est.ate of such person the same shall not be di11SOlved, but the
trustee of the est.ate of such person, for the benefit of the estate, shall be
s.ubrogated to the righte of the holder of such lien and empowered to perfec:t
and enforce the same in his name as trUBtee with like force and effect &B
such holder might hat"e done had not bankruptcy proceedings intervened.
d Liens given or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of or
in fraud upon this Act, and for a present consideration, which have been
recorded according to law, if record thareof was necesaary in order to imparl
notice, ~hnll, to the extent of S"U<'h present c011Bideration only, not be a.lfeded
by this Act.2T
e That all conveyan<·es, transfers, aseignments, or incumbran<'es of hie
property, or any part thereof, made or given by a penion adjudged a bank·
rupt under the provisions of this Act subsequent to the paaage of this Act
27-The ttallct1ed words tn I 6Td
were added b7 the amendment of 1910.
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and within four months prior to the filing of the petition, with the intent and

purpose on his part to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, or any of

them, shall be null and void as against the creditors of such debtor, except

as to purchasers in good faith and for a present fair consideration; and all

property of the debtor conveyed, transferred, assigned, or encumbered as

aforesaid shall, if he be adjudged a bankrupt, and the same is not exempt

from execution and liability for debts by the law of his domicile, be and

remain a part of the assets and estate of the bankrupt and shall pass to his

said trustee, whose duty it shall be to recover and reclaim the same by legal

proceedings or otherwise for the benefit of the creditors. And all convey-

ances, transfers, or incumbrances of his property made by a debtor at any

time within four months prior to the filing of the petition against him, and

while insolvent, which are held null and void as against the creditors of such

debtor by the laws of the State, Territory, or District in which such property

is situate, shall be deemed null and void under this Act against the creditors

of such debtor if he be adjudged a bankrupt, and such property shall pass

to the assignee and be by him reclaimed and recovered for the benefit of the

creditors of the bankrupt. For the purpose of such recovery any court of

bankruptcy as hereinbefore defined, and any State court which would have

had jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened, shall have concurrent

jurisdiction.2*

t That all levies, judgments, attachments, or other liens, obtained through
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legal proceedings against a person who is insolvent, at any time within four

months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against him, shall be

deemed null and void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the property

affected by the levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien shall be deemed

wholly discharged and released from the same, and shall pass to the trustee

as a part of the estate of the bankrupt, unless the court shall, on due notice,

order that the right under such levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien

shall be preserved for the benefit of the estate; and thereupon the same may

pass to and shall be preserved by the trustee for the benefit of the estate as

aforesaid. And the court may order such conveyance as shall be necessary

to carry the purposes of this section into effect: Provided, That nothing

herein contained shall have the effect to destroy or impair the title obtained

by such levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien, of a bona fide purchaser

for value who shall have acquired the same without notice or reasonable

cause for inquiry.

J 68. Set-Ojts and Counterclaims.—a In all cases of mutual debts or

mutual credits between the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account

shall be stated and one debt shall be set off against the other, and the bal-

ance only shall be allowed or paid.

b A set-off or counterclaim shall not be allowed in favor of any debtor

of the bankrupt which (1) is not provable against the estate; or (2) was

purchased by or transferred to him after the filing of the petition, or within

four months before such filing, with a view to such use and with knowledge

or notice that such bankrupt was insolvent, or had committed an act of

bankruptcy.

§ 69. Possession op Property.—a A judge may, upon satisfactory proof,

28—The Italicized words In i 67e

were added by the amendment of 1908.

s.nd within four months prior to the filing of the petition, with the int.ent ancl
purpose on hi.a part to hinder, delay, or defraud hie creditors, or any of
them, shall be null and void as against the creditors of such debtor, except
as to purchasers in good faith and for a present fair consideration; and all
property of the debtor conveyed, transferred, assigned, or encumbeM<l BB
aforesaid shall, if he be adjudged a bankrupt, and the same ii; not exempt
from execution and liability for debts by the law of hie domicile, be and
remain a part of the a88ets and eetat.e of the bankrupt and shall pass to his
said truat.ee, whose duty it shall be to recover and reclaim the same by legal
proceedings or otherwise for the benefit of the creditors. And all conveyances, transfers, or incumbrances of his property made by a debtor ut any
time within four months prior to the filing of the petition against him, and
while inaolvent, which are held null and void aa againllt the creditors ot such
debtor by the laws of the Stat.e, Territory, or District in which such property
is situate, shall be deemed null and void under this Act against the creditors
of auch debtor if he be adjudged a bankrupt, and such property shall p888
to the 888ignee and be by him reclaimed and recovered for the benefit of the
creditors of the bankrupt. F'or the f"lrpose of auch. recovery any court of
bankruptcy as hereinbefore defined, arnl any State court which would have
had jvri.Bdiction if bankruptcy had not intM'1!ened, sh.all have co11current
juriadlction.zs
f That all levies, judgment&, attachment&, or other liens, obtained through
legal proceedings against a person who is insolvent, at any time within four
months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against him, shall be
deemed null and void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the property
ai?ect.ed by the levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien shall be deemed
wholly discharged and released from the same, and shall pass to the trustee
aa a part of the estat.e of the bankrupt, unless the court shall, on due notice,
order that the right under such levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien
shall be preserved for the benefit of the estate; and thereupon the same may
pase to and shall be preserved by the trustee for the benefit of the estate a.s
aforesaid. And the court may order such conveyance as shall be necessary
to carry the purposea of this section into effect: Provided, That nothing
herein contained shall have the etiect to destroy or impair the title obtained
by such levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien, of a bona fide purehaaer
for value who shall have acquired the same without notice or reasonable
cause for inquiry.
I 68. SE'l'·OFFs AND CouNTPllCLAIMS.-a In all cues of mutual debts or
mutual credit& between the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account
shall be stated and one debt shall be set off against the other, and the ha.lance only shall be allowed or paid.
b A aet-off or count.erclaim shall not be allowed in favor of any debtor
of the bankrupt which (1) is not provable against the estat.e; or (2) was
purchased by or transferred to him after the filing of the petition, or within
four months before such filing, with a view to such use and with knowledge
or notice that such bankrupt -was insolvent, or had committed an act of
bankruptcy.
169. POSSESSION OP' PRoPEBTY.-a A judge may, upon satiafactory proof,
28-Tbe ltallclzed words In I 67e
were added by the amendment of 1908.
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by affidavit, that a bankrupt against whom an involuntary petition has been

filed and is pending has committed an act of bankruptcy, or has neglected or

is neglecting, or is about to so neglect his property that it has thereby

deteriorated or is thereby deteriorating or is about thereby to deterio-

rate in value, issue a warrant to the marshal to seize and hold it

subject to further orders. Before such warrant is issued the petitioners

applying therefor shall enter into a bond in such an amount as the judge

shall fix, with such sureties as he shall approve, conditioned to indemnify

such bankrupt for such damages as he shall sustain in the event such seizure

shall prove to have been wrongfully obtained. Such property shall be re-

leased, if such bankrupt shall give bond in a sum which shall be fixed by the

judge, with such sureties as he shall approve, conditioned to turn, over such

property, or pay the value thereof in money to the trustee, in the event he is

adjudged a bankrupt pursuant to such petition.

§ 70. Title to Property.—a The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt,

upon his appointment and qualification, and his successor or successors, if

he shall have one or more, upon his or their appointment and qualification,

shall in turn be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, as

of the date he was adjudged a bankrupt, except in so far as it is to property

which is exempt, to all (1) documents relating to his property; (2) interests

in patents, patent rights, copyrights, and trade-marks; (3) powers which

he might have exercised for his own benefit, but not those which he might
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have exercised for some other person; (4) property transferred by him in

fraud of his creditors; (5) property which prior to the filing of the petition

he could by any means have transferred or which might have been levied

upon and sold under judicial process against him: Provided, That when any

bankrupt shall have any insurance policy which has a cash surrender value

payable to himself, his estate, or personal representatives, he may, within

thirty days after the cash surrender value has been ascertained and stated

to the trustee by the company issuing the same, pay or secure to the trustee

the sum so ascertained and stated, and continue to hold, own, and carry

such policy free from the claims of the creditors participating in the distri-

bution of his estate under the bankruptcy proceedings, otherwise the policy

shall pass to the trustee as assets; and (6) rights of action arising upon

contracts or from the unlawful taking or detention of, or injury to, his

property.

b All real and personal property belonging to bankrupt estates shall

be appraised by three disinterested appraisers; they shall be appointed by,

and report to, the court Real and personal property shall, when practicable,

be sold subject to the approval of the court; it shall not be sold otherwise

than subject to the approval of the court for less than seventy-five per centum

of its appraised value.

c The title to property of a bankrupt estate which has been sold, as

herein provided, shall be conveyed to the purchaser by the trustee.

d Whenever a composition shall be set aside, or discharge revoked, the

trustee shall, upon his appointment and qualification, be vested as herein

provided with the title to all of the property of the bankrupt as of the date

of the final decree setting aside the composition or revoking the discharge.

e The trustee may avoid any transfer by the bankrupt of his property

which any creditor of such bankrupt might have avoided, and may recover

by affidavit, that a bankrupt againat whom an involuntary petition has been
filed and is pending has committed an art of bankruptcy, or has negle<'ted or
is neglecting, or is about to so neglect his property that it has therC'b.Y
deteriorated or is thereby deteriorating or is about thereLy to deteriorate in value, iMue a warrant to the marshal to seize and hold it
subjert to further orders. Before such warrant is iBSued the petitioners
ap11lying therefor shall enter into a bond in eut•b an amount as the jn<l~e
!<hall fix, with such sureties a.ti he shall approve, conditionPd to in1ie111nify
such bankrupt for such damages aa he shall sustain in the event such seizure
shall prove to have been wrongfully obtained. Such property shall be TE'·
leased, if such bankrupt shall give bond in a sum which shall be fi.J:ed by the
judge, with such suretiee as he sha11 appro\"e, conditioned to tum over sueh
property, or pay the value thereof in money to the trustee, in the event he is
adjudged a bankrupt pursuant to such petition.
I 70. TITLE TO PROPERTY.-& The trustee ot the estate of a bankrupt,
upon his appointment and qualification, and his succftl80r or euc~rs, if
he shall ha\"e one or more, upon his or their appointment and qualification,
shall in turn be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, as
ot the date he 'lf&s adjudged a bankrupt, except in so far as it is to property
wbieh is exempt, to all (1) documents relating to his property; (2) interests
in patents, patent rights, eopyrights, and trade-marks; (3) powers which
he might ha\"e exercised for his own benefit, but not those which he might
have exercised for some other person; ( 4) property transferred by him in
fraud of his creditors; ( 5) property whirh lirior to the filing of the petition
he could by any means have transferred or which might ha\"e been levied
upon and sold under judicial process against him: PrOt!ided, That when any
bankrupt shall have any insurance policy which has a cash surrender value
payable to himself, hie estate, or personal representatives, he may, within
thirty days after the cash surrender value has been ascertained and stated
to the tru1<tt'e by the company issuing the same, pay or secure to the trustee
the sum so asrertained and sfated, and continue to hol1i, own, and ca.rry
such poliry free from the claims of the creditors participating in the distribution of his estate under the bankruptcy proceedings, otherwise the policy
shall pass to the trustee u asaets; and ( 6) rights of action arising upon
contrarts or from the unlawful taking or detention of, or injury to, his
property.
b All real and personal property belonging to bankrupt estates shall
be appraised by three disinterested appraisers; they shall be appointed by,
and rP,port to, the court. Real and personal property shall, when practicable,
be sold subj<'<'t to the approval of the court; it shall not be sold otherwise
then subject to the approval of the court for less than se\·enty -five per eentum
of its appraised value.
c The title to property of a bankrupt estate which has been sold, as
herein provided, shall be conveyed to the purchaser by the trustee.
d Whenever a eomposition shall be set aside, or discharge revoked, the
trustee shall, upon his appointment and qualification, be veated as herein
provided with the title to all of the property of the bankrupt as of the date
of the final decree setting aside the composition or revoking the discharge.
e The trustee may avoid any tra.nafer by the bankrupt of his property
which any creditor of such bankrupt might have avoided, and may recover
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the property so transferred, or its value, from the person to whom it was

transferred, unless he was a bona fide holder for value prior to the dnto of

the adjudication. Such property may be recovered or its value collected

from whoever may have received it, except a bona fide holder for value, for

the purpose of suck recovery any court of bankruptcy as hereinbefore defined,

and any State court which would have had jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not

intervened, shall have concurrent jurisdiction.™

t Upon the confirmation of a composition offered by a bankrupt, the title

to his property shall thereupon revest in him.

[§ 70^]. THB TIMS WHEN THIS ACT SHALL GO INTO EFFECT

a This Act shall go into full force and effect upon its passage: Provided,

the propcrtf' so transferred, or it.a value, from the person to whom it was
transferred, unless he was a bona fide holder for value prior to the cbte of
the adjudication. Such property may be recovered or it.a value collected
from whoe,·er uiay have received it, except a bona tide holder for value. For
the pvrpoae of such rec<>Very any court of ba11krvptcy as herein be/ure Jefined,
and any State court which would have had juriadictwm if bankruptcy lwd uot
intervened, shall have ooncurrent juriadictio".:11
f Upon the confirmation of a composition offered by a bankrupt, the title
to hia property shall thereupon reveet in him.

however, That no petition for voluntary bankruptcy shall be filed within one

month of the passage thereof, and no petition for involuntary bankruptcy

shall be filed within four months of the passage thereof.

b Proceedings commenced under State insolvency laws before the pas

sage of this Act, shall not be affected by it.

1 71. That the clerks of the several district courts of the United States

shall prepare and keep in their respective offices complete and convenient

indexes of all petitions and discharges in bankruptcy heretofore or here-

after filed in the said courts, and shall, when requested so to do, issue cer-

tificates of search certifying as to whether or not any such petitions or dis-

charges have been filed; and said clerks shall be entitled to receive for such
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certificates the same fees as now allowed by law for certificates as to judg-

ments in said courts: Provided, That said bankruptcy indexes and dockets

shall at all times be open to inspection and examination by all persons or

corporations without any fee or charge therefor.so

S 72. That neither the referee, receiver, marshal, nor trustee shall in any

form or guise receive, nor shall the court allow him, any other or further

compensation for his services than that expressly authorized and prescribed

in this Act."-

29— The Italicized words In 170e

were added by the amendment of 1903.

30— i 71 was added by the amend-

ment of 1903.

31— | 72 was added by the amend-

ment of 1903 In the following form:

[§ 70¥.2].

TH& TUUI: WHEN THIS ACT SHALL GO INTO U'FPJCT

a Thia Act shall go into full force and effect upon ita passage: Provided,
however, That no petition for voluntary bankruptcy 1hall be filed within ono
month of the passage thereof, and no petition for involuntary bankruptcy
shall be filed within four month1 of the passage thereof.
b Proceedings commenced under State insolvency laws before the pa1eage of thia Act, 1hall not be affected by it.
I 71. Tlaat the clerks of the several district courts of the United States
shall prepare and keep ,,. thetr reapective offtces complete and convet1~nt
i11dere1 of all petitibns and diacharge1 in bankruptcy heretofore or hereafter /fled in the aatd courb, and aholl, !VMn requested 10 to do, ilsue certiflcatea of search cert1.fying as to u·hether or not any BUch peHtio11s or di&·
<harges hove been filed; and said clerks shall be entitled to receive for such
certificatsa the same feea as now allowed by law for certifioates as to judgmtJ11t1 in aaid courts: Provtded, That said ba1ikruptcy illdexes and docketa
ahall at all time1 be open to inapection and e.raminati<m by all peraona or
corporationa without any fee or charge therefor.so
I 72. That neither the referee, receiver, marshal, nor tnutee shall in any
form or fl1'U8 receive, nor ahall the court allow h'm, a.ny other or further
compensation for hi.a servicea than that expresaly authoriaed and prescribed
in Hau ..4ct.u

"That neither the referee nor the

trustee shall In any form or guise

receive, nor shall the conrt allow

them, any other or further compensa-

tion for their services than that ex-

pressly authorised and prescribed in

this Act."

The receiver and marshal were in-

cluded In It by the amendment of 1910.

I 19 of the amendatory Act of Feb-

ruary S, 1903, is as follows: "That

the provisions of this amendatory

Act shall not apply to bankruptcy

cases pending when this Act takes

H. & A. Bankruptcy—48

effect, but such cases shall be adjudi-

cated and disposed of conformably to

the provisions of the said Act of July

first eighteen hundred and ninety-

eight"

114 of the amendatory Act of June

25, 1910 Is as follows: "That the

provisions of this amendatory Act

shall not apply to bankruptcy cases

pending when this Act takes effect, but

such cases shall be adjudicated and

disposed of conformably to the provi-

sions of said Act approved July first,

eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, as

amended by said Act approved Feb-

ruary fifth, nineteen hundred and

three, and as further amended by said

29---The Italicised worda In I 70e
l1;ere added by the amendment of 1908.
:-l0-1 TI WH a.dded by the amendment of 1908.
31-1 72 waa added bJ the amend·
ment of 1903 In the following form:
'"That neither the referee nor the
trustee shall In any form or guise
receive, nor shall the court allow
them, any other or further compenutlon for their aerncea than that ezpreasly authorised and prescribed in
this Act."
The receiver and manhal were included In It by the amendment of 1910.
I 19 of the amendatory Act of February IS, 1903, la aa follows : "That
the provleiona ot this amendator1
Act shall not apply to bankruptcy
caaea pending when this Act takes
H. A A. Bankruptcy-4 8

ell'ect. but aucb caaea eball be adjudicated and dlaposed of conformably to
the provialona of the said Act of July
ftnt, eighteen hundred and ninety.
eight."
I 14 of the amendatory Act of Jnne
25, 1910 Is aa tollowa: "That the
provislona of this amendatory Act
1hall not apply to bankruptcy <'n111•s
pending when thl~ Act takes ell'ect, but
aucb cases shall be adjudicated and
d.lsposetl of conformably to the provlslone of said Ac.-t approved July ftrst,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, as
amended by said Act approv1•d Fc•l>·
ruary ftfth, nineteen hundred and
three, and aa turther ami:-nded by said
Act approved June ftfteenth, nlnt:tef'n
hundred and alx."
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duties of . . ................ . .. . . .. . . ....... . .......... . .. . .. .... 7
death or insanity of .......... . .. . ......... . ... . . . . . ....... . ... . 8
protection and detention of. . . ..... . . . ........... . . . .•... .. ..... . 9
extradition of . . . ......... .. ... . ...... . ........................ 10
suits by and against ............ . .. . ... .. ... .. . . ............... 11
compositions . . .. ........... . ..... . ... . .... . ................ 12, 13
discharges, application for .. ... . ...... .. .... . ... . .............. . 14
codebtors' liability not affected by discharge ... .. ...... . ......... 16
debte not affected by discharge ............................... . .. 17
courts and procedure to declare, etc ...... . ... . ... . . . . : ........ 18·32
creditors, meetings, claims of, etc ..... .. ... .. .. . ... . ..... . .... 55·60
estates o'f ..... . ... . ..... . ... . . .. . .......... . . . ............ . 61·70
BANKRUPTCY, with reference to time, what to mean .. . ........ . .. 1(10)
jurisdiction of courts . ... . ... . . . ..... . . . ..... . .. . ..... . .. . .. . .. . . 2
acts of ..... .. ........ .. .... . ... . ............ . ............... .. 3
of corporation not to release its officers, etc . . . . ... . ... . . . .... .. . . 4b
proceH, pleading, and jurisdiction ... . ... . ........ . ...... . ... . 18-32
creditors .... . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . .. .................... . ........ 55-60
e11tates ...... . ............ . . ............. . .......... . . .. ... 61-70
BOARD OF DIRECTORS, punishment of, by courts of bankruptcy .. .. 2 (4)
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BSCTION
BONA FIDE PURCHASER, for value, etc., title obtained by lien, etc,

not affected 67f

BOND, in bankruptcy proceedings 50

when petitioner to give 3e

trustees not to give, on appeals 25c

of referees 50a

of trustees 50b, 50c

to be given by depositories of money of bankrupt estates 61

to indemnify, to be given on taking bankrupt's property 69

of bankrupt, to recover possession of property 69

CIRCUIT COURTS, jurisdiction of controversies between trustee and

adverse claimant 23a

concurrent with courts of bankruptcy 23c

CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS, granted appellate jurisdiction over

courts of bankruptcy 24

appeal to Supreme Court from decision of 25

CLAIMS, what are provable 63a

unliquidated may be liquidated and allowed 63b

CLERK, definition of 1(5)

in bankruptcy proceedings, duties of 51

CODEBTOR, liability of, not affected by bankrupt's discharge 16

COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS, definition of 1(101
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COMPENSATION, in bankruptcy proceedings, of trustees 48,72

of referees 40,72

of clerks and marshals 52,72

additional, to receivers, marshals, and trustees 2(5), 48

COMPOSITIONS, courts of bankruptcy to confirm or reject 2(9)

when, may be offered 12a

application for confirming 12b

may be set aside 13

confirmation of, a discharge from debts 14c

payment of claims accruing after, when discharge revoked, etc 64c

COMPROMISE, trustees may compromise controversies, etc 27

CONCEAL, definition of 1(22)

CONTEMPT, in bankruptcy proceedings, before referee 2(16),41

proceedings to punish 41b

CONVEYANCES, to defraud, void 67e, 70a(4)

void under State laws, etc 67e, 70e

CORPORATIONS, definition of 1(6)

punishment of, by courts of bankruptcy •. 2(4)

bankruptcy of, not to release officers, etc 4b

may be sureties on bonds of trustees and referees 50g

COSTS, judgments for 2(18)

allowance of, on dismissing petition 3e

COUNSEL FEES, allowance of, on dismissing petition 3e

COUNSELOR AT LAW, payments to, by bankrupt, may be re-

examined — 60d

COUNTERCLAIMS, between bankrupt and creditor 68

BONA FIDE PURCHASER, for value, etc., title obtained by lien, ek,
not affected .... . ........ . ..... . ........•. . . . ... . ........... . .. 61 f
BOND, in bankruptcy proceedings ...............................•... 50
when petitioner to give .... . ......... . ....•... . .............. . .. 3e
trustees not to give, on appeals ............ . .................... 25e
of referees ........ . ............. . ..... .. ....... . ............. • 50a
of trustees . . .... . . . .. . . . . ... ... ..... . ......... . . . ... . . . .. . 50b, 50c
to be gh·en by depositories of money of bankrupt estates . . .. .. . ... . 61
to indemnify, to be given on taking bankrupt's property .. . ....... . 69
of bankrupt, to recover possession of property .......... . ....... . . 611
CIRCUIT COURTS, jurisdiction of controversies between trustl'e and
adverse claimant ....... . .... . ...... . .......... . . . .... . .. .. ...... 23a
concurrent with court8 of bankruptcy .......... . ... . ....... . .... 23c
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS, granted appellate jurisdiction over
courts of bankruptcy .... . . . ... . ........ . .. . .. . .. .. .... ... .....•.. 24
appeal to Supreme Court from decision of . .....•............. . ... 25
CLAIMS, what are provable . .. .. . ... . ...•.......... . ...... . . . ..... 63a
unliquidated may be liquidated and allowed ...... .. ......... .. . . 63b
CLERK, definition of .. . ...... . . . . .. . . . . . ...••. . . . .......... . ..... 1 ( 5)
in bankruptcy proceedings, duties of ..... . . . .. . ... . . .. . . . . .... . . 51
CODEBTOR, liability of, not affected by bankrupt's discharge . . .. .. . .. . 16
CO~L\IENC EMENT OF PROCEEDINGS, definition of. ...... ..... . . 1(101
COMPENSATION, in bankruptcy proceedings, of trustees .......... . 48, 72
of referees ... . .. . ................. . . . ..... . ............ . ... 40, 72
of clt'rks and marshals .. . ............... . . . .. . .. . . ......... . 52, 72
additional, to receivers, marshals, and trustees . .. . ........... 2(5) , 48
COMPOSITIONS, !'ourts of bankruptcy to confirm or reject . . . .. . . .. . 2(9)
when, may be offered .... . . . .. . ...... . ........... . .........• . . 12a
application for confirming ... . .. . . . .... .. . . . . ...... . ... . . .. .. . . . 12b
may be set aside . ......... . ................................ . ... 13
confirmation of, a discharge from debts ......... . ............... . He
payment of claims accruing after, when discharge revoked, etc .... . Mc
CO.MPRO.l\flSE, trustees may compromise control·ersies, etc ....... . . . .. 27
CONCEAL, definition of ..... . .......... . ........ . ....... . ....... 1 (22)
CONTEMPT, in bankruptcy proceedings, before referee .... . .. . ... 2(16) ,U
proceedings to punish . . ... . .. . . . .......• . ... . .. . ......... . ... . 4lb
CONVEYANCES, to defraud, void ........... . . . .... . ........ 67e, 70a(4)
void undn State laws, etc .... . ........ . .. . .. . •............ 67e, 70e
CORPORATIONS, definition of. ... . .... . ........ . .. . .... . . . . ... .. . 1 ( 6)
punishment of, by courts: of bankruptcy .. . . . ........... ·•.... . .. 2(4)
bankruptcy of, not to rd ease officers, etc ...................... . .. 4b
may be sureties on bonds of trustees and referees . ..... . .... .. .. . 50g
COSTS, judgments for ......... . .......... . . .. .. . .......... . ..... 2 ( 18)
allowance of, on dismissing petition ..... . .. . . . . ................. 3e
COUNSEL FEES, allowance of, on dismissing petition .... . ..... . .. ... 3e
COFNSELOR AT LAW, payments to, by bankrupt, may be reexamined .... . ...... . . . .. ·- .............. . . . ...... ·....... . ..... 60d
COUNTERCLAIMS, between bankrupt and creditor . . ...............•. 68

INDEX TO BANKRUPTCY ACT 757

INDEX TO BANKRUPTCY ACT

757

SECTION

COURTS (see Courts of Bankruptcy; Pleading and Practice; United

SUtes Courts).

to determine issues, where facts controverted 18d

decision, where pleadings not filed 18e

to hear and adjudicate voluntary petitions 18g

COURTS OF BANKRUPTCY, definition of 1(8)

when an appeal may be taken from decisions 25

transfer of cases commenced in different 32

to appoint and remove referees, etc 34

CREDITORS, definition of 1(8)

of bankrupt, time and place of meeting 55

claims, proof and allowance of 57

notices to; waiver 58

who may file a petition 59

notice to, not joined in petition 59d

computing number of 59e

notice of dismissal 59g

preferred, who deemed .60

examination of payments to attorneys, etc., on application 60d

notices to, of pendency of petition 59d

other than original, appearance of 59f

set-offs between bankrupts' estate and 68
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CRIMES AND OFFENSES, courts of bankruptcy to punish violations

of act 2(4)

in bankruptcy proceedings, making false oath or affirmation 20b

DAMAGES, allowance of, on dismissing petition 3e

DATE OF BANKRUPTCY, definition of 1(10)

DEATH, of bankrupt, not to abate proceedings 8

of trustee, suits not to abate *6

DEBTS, definition of 1(H)

confirmation of composition, a discharge from 14c

not affected by discharge • 17

allowable against estate 63

having priority -64

due the United States, allowance of 57j

DEFINITIONS 1

DETOSITIONS, in bankruptcy cases, laws governing 21b, 21c

DEPOSITORIES, for money of bankrupt estates 61

DETENTION, of bankrupt for purposes of examination 9b

DISCHARGE, definition of 1(12)

application for l*a

hearing of 14b

from debts, on confirmation of composition 14c

when revoked 15

of bankrupt, not to affect codebtor*s liability 16

debts not affected by 17

on revocation, payment of claims accruing after composition 64c

DISTRICT COURTS (see United SUtes courts).

made courts of bankruptcy 2

HOTION

OOURTB (see Court& of Bankruptcy; Pleading and Practiet>; United
Sta tea Courts).
to determine ieeuee, where fact& control'erted .•... . .......... . . .. 18d
decision, where pleadings not filed .. . ... ....... ........... • . . .. . 18e
to hear and adjudicate voluntary petition& ... .. ...... . .. .. . .. . .. 18g
COURTS OF BANKRUPTCY, definition of .... . ..... . .... . ......... 1 (8)
when an appeal may be taken from decisions ... . ... . .... . . ... .... 25
transfer of cases commenced in different . .. .. . ....... . .. . ........ 32
to appoint and remove referees, etc ............. . ... . .....•.... .. 34
CREDITORS, definition of ....... ... . .. . .. ...... ... . . .. . .......... l l 9)
of bankrupt, time and place of meeting ......... .. . . .... . ... . .... 55
claims, proof and allowance of .. . ... . ..... • ........ . ............ 57
notices to; waiver . . . ........ .. .... . ... , •. , . . ........•... . ..... 58
who may file a petition .. .. . .. .. ... . ............ . . , ... .. .. .. ..... 59
notice to, not joined in petition . .. .. .......... .. . . ......... . .. . 59d
computing number of ....... .. ........ . .... . ............ . . . . . .. 59e
notice of dismissal ....... . . .. . . . . . .. .... .. . . .......... . .. ... . 59g
preferred, who deemed ............... . ..... . .... . .. .. .... . ... . .. 60
examination of payment. to attorneys, etc., on application .. . .. .. . 60d
notice• to, of pendency of petition .... . .. . ... . . . .... . ..... . .. . . :59d
other than original, appearance of .. . .... . .. . ........ . ....... .. . 59f
set-off's between bankrupt&' estate and .. . ... ... ... . ....... ... .. . 68
CRIMES AND OFFENSES, court& of bankruptcy to punish \'iolation~
of art ... . ......... . ........... . . .. . . ..... . .. . ...... . ......... . 2(4)
in bankruptcy proceedings, making false oath or affirmation . .. ... 20b
DAMAGJ<:S, allowance of, on dismissing petition .... . ...... . . . ... . .... 3e
DATE OF BANKRUPTCY, definition of . ......... . .. . ..... . .• . .. . 1(10)
DEATH, of bankrupt, not to abate proceedings .. . . .. .. .. .. . ........... 8
of trustee, suits not to abate ... ........ . ..... . ................ . 46
DEBTS, definition of . . ..... . ....... . . . ... , ... ... . .. ........... • . 1 ( 11)
confirmation of composition, a discharge from •• . ...• .. • . .... . ... Uc
not affected by discharge ................ . ........... ·..•... .. ... 17
allowable against estate .. .. ................•............... . . . . 63
having priority .. . . ...... . ... . ... . .............•• . ............. 64
due the United Statee, allowance of .... ..... ... . . . . .. ... . .. . . . . . 57j
DEl:-1~ITIONS .. .... . .. ... . .... . . . .. . ......... . ........... . ... . •... 1
DEPOSITIONS, in bankruptcy cases, laws governing ... . . . ........ 21b, 21c
DEPCSITORIES, for money of bankrupt estates . . . . .......... . .. .. . .. 61
DETENTION, of bankrupt for purposee of examination .... . ... , •.. . . . . 9b
DISCHARGE, definition of . ... .. . . . . ..•.... . .. .. .......... • ...... 1 ( 12 I
application for .. . .... . .. . • . . . . . ... . ... . .. . .. . . , ·: .... . • • .. . .. 14a
hearing of .. .. . . .. . . . .. . .. . ..... , . .. .. ..... .. .. . . .. .•.... . 14b
fr om debts, on confirmation of composition .... . ............... . . Uc
when re\•oked .. .... . ...... .. . .. .................... . ...... . .... 15
of bankrupt, not to affect codebtor's liability ....... . . .. .. . ....... 16
debts not affected by ....... . . . . ...... . . . .. .. . . ....• . ........ . . 17
on re\•ocation, payment of claims accruing after comp-0sition .. . . . . 64c
DISTRICT COURTS (see United States courts) .
made courts of bankruptcy ............. . .. . ...•... .. : . . .... . . ... 2
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DIVIDENDS, declaration and payment of 65

creditors receiving, not affected by proof of subsequent claims, etc -65c

preference to certain creditors, etc 65d

limit to right to collect 65«

unclaimed 66

DOCUMENT, definition of 1(13)

DOWER, death of bankrupt, not to affect widow, etc 8

ESTATES, bankrupt, depositories for money 61

expenses of administering 62

debts which may be proved 63s

allowance of unliquidated claims 63b

debts which have priority 64

declaration and payment of dividends 65

unclaimed 66

liens 67

set-offs and counterclaims .68

possession of 60

title to 70

EVIDENCE, compulsory attendance of witnesses 21a

depositions, laws governing 21b, 21c

EXEMPTIONS, of bankrupts, allowed by State laws, etc 6

EXTRADITION, by courts of bankruptcy, from one district to an-
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other 2(14)

of bankrupts 10

FINES (see Crimes and offenses), in bankruptcy matters 29c

FORMS, in bankruptcy matters, to be prescribed by Supreme Court.. . .30

FRAUD, practice of, grounds for setting composition aside 13

GUARANTOR, liability of, not affected by bankrupt's discharge 16

HOLIDAY, definition of 1(14)

INCUMBRANCES, to defraud, void 67e

INFANTS, time for proving claims against bankrupt 57n

INSANE, person, time for proving claims against bankrupt 57n

bankrupt becoming, not to abate proceedings 8

INSOLVENT, definition of 1(15)

filing of petition against 3b

from when to date 3b

failure to prove, a complete defense 3c

liens created while, to be dissolved 67c

INSURANCE POLICY, of bankrupt, how may be retained 70a(5)

INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPT, who may become 4b

JUDGE, definition of 1(16)

JUDGMENT, lien created by, when dissolved 67c, 67f

JURISDICTION, of courts of bankruptcy 2

of circuit court in suits between trustee and adverse claimant 23a

concurrent between circuit courts and courts of bankruptcy 23c

courts of bankruptcy and State courts 67e, 70e

of appellate courts 24

of referees 38

over one partner, sufficient, etc So

B&CTl.ON

DIVIDENDS, declaration and payment of. ..... . .... . ....... . ........ 65
creditors receiving, not affected by proof of subeequent claims, etc . . 65c
preference to certain crediton1, etc ..•...•. . .. . .... . ..... .. ..•.•. 65d
limit to right to collect .... ... ............ .. .. . ................ 65e
unclaimed ................... . ........ . .. . . . ............... . .. 66
DOCUMENT, definition of. ... . ..... .. ..... .. ... . .. . .... . .... . ... 1(13)
DOWER, death of bankrupt, not to affect widow, etc . . ......... . .... . ... 8
ESTATES, bankrupt, dep08.itories for money .. .. .. . ........ . ...... . .. 61
expenses of administering .... .. ......... . ..........•.....•..... 62
debts which may be proved .. . .. . ......................... . .... 63a
allowance of unliquidated claims .......... . ..... . ............. 63b
debts which have priority .... .. . ... . .. . ........................ 64
declaration and payment of dividend• .... . ..... . ........ . ....... 65
unclaimed ....... . . . .. . ..... . .. . ... . •......... . .. . ........ 66
liena ....... . ...........•.............. . .................... . . 67
set-oft'a and counterclaim& .. . ............. . ..................... 68
poaae11ion of ............................. . .. . . . ............... 69
title to . . ... . . .. ....... . ... . . .. ........... . .. . ................ 70
EVIDENCE, compulsory attendance of witne1&e1 .. . ............. .. .. 21a
depoaitiona, laws governing .... . ........................... 21b, 21c
EXEMPTIONS, of bankrupt•, allowed by State laws, etc ... . ..... . . . .. . 6
EXTRADITION, by courta of bankruptcy, from one diatrict to an·
other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... . . . . 2 ( 14)
of bankrupt• . ............ . .. . ........................... . ..... 10
FINES (eee Crimee and oft'enees), in bankruptcy matters ....... . .... . 29c
FORMS, in bankruptcy matter&, to be prescribed by Supreme Court .... 30
FRAUD, practice of, grounds for setting composition aside ............. 13
GUARANTOR, liability of, not aff'ected by bankrupt's discharge ..... . .. 16
HOLIDAY, definition of. ..... . .. . ............................... 1(14)
JNCUMBRANCES, to defraud, void ................................. 67e
INFANTS, time for proving claims against bankrupt ....... . .... . . . . 57n
INSANE, peraon, time for proving claims against bankrupt ........ .. 57n
bankrupt becoming, not to abate proceedings .... . ..... . ....... . ... 8
INSOLVENT, definition of . ....... . .. . ... . ... . . . .............. .. . 1 ( t:S)
filing of petition against . . .. . . ......... . ...... . ... . ..••...... . . 3b
from when to date ........................................ 3b
failure to prove, a complete defense . .. . .. . ...........• . .. . . . . . ... 3e
liene created while, to be dissolved ... . ..... . ................... 67c
INSURANCE POLICY, of bankrupt, how may be retained ......... 70a(5)
INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPT, who may become .................... . 4b
JUDGE, definition of ...... . ... . .............. . ........... . ...... 1(16)
JUDGMENT, lien created by, when dissolved . . ... . . . .......... . . 67c, 87f
JURISDICTION, of courte of bankruptcy ....... . .. .. ............. . .... 2
of circuit court in 11uits between trustee and adverse claimant .. . .. 23a
concurrent between cirruit courts and courts of bankruptcy ..... . 23c
courts of bankruptcy and State courts . ...... . ...... .. . . 67e, 70e
of appellate courts . . . .... . .... . . .. .. . ..... . .. .. ................ 24
of referee& . ................ . . . .......................... . . ..... 38
over one partner, sufficient, etc ............ . .. . ................ . . 5c
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JURY, person against whom petition filed, entitled to trial by 19

SEcn'ION
LEVIES, obtained within four months, etc., void 67f

LIENS, unrecorded claims not, etc 67a

trustees subrogated to rights of creditor 67b

created within four months of filing petition to be dissolved 67c

given in good faith, etc., not affected 67d

conveyances, etc., to defraud 67e

created through legal proceedings, void, etc 67 f

purchaser for value, etc., not affected 67f

MARSHALS, courts of bankruptcy, to appoint as custodians 2(3)

compensation of 52b, 48

additional 2(5),48

MASCULINE GENDER, words importing,.how construed 1(28)

MEETINGS, bankrupt to attend creditors', etc 1

of bankrupt's creditors 55

holders of secured claims not entitled to vote at 56b

MINORS, time for claiming dividend 66b

NEWSPAPERS, designation of, to publish bankruptcy notices 28

NOTICES, to creditors 58

to creditors not joined in petition 59d

petitions not to be dismissed without 59g

NUMBER, words importing plural, how construed 1(29)
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singular, how construed 1(30)

OATH, definition of 1(17)

by whom administered in bankruptcy matters 20a

of office of referees 36

OFFICER, definition of 1(18)

PAPERS, of trustees, open to inspection, etc 49

PARTNERSHIP, may be adjudged bankrupt 5

PERSONS, definition' of 1(19)

PETITION, definition of 1(20)

of "A person against whom a petition has been filed" 1(1)

against insolvent, when filed 3b

from when to date 3b

involuntary bankruptcy, service of 18a

to be adjudged voluntary bankrupt, who may file 59a

involuntary bankrupt 59b

to be in duplicate 59c

notice to creditors not joined 59d

hearings on 59d

PLEADINQ AND PRACTICE, involuntary bankruptcy, service of

petition 18a

voluntary bankruptcy, hearing on filing petition 18g

involuntary bankruptcy, jury trials 19

oaths and affirmations 20

evidence 21

reference of cases after adjudication 82k

transfer of cases to different referee 22b

jurisdiction of United States and State courts 23a

JURY, person against whom petition filed, entitled to trial by ..... . .. . . 19
LEVIES, obtained within four months, etc., void ................ .. ... 67f
LIENS, unrecorded claims not, etc ..... . .......... .. ................ 67a
trustees subrogated to rights of creditor .......... . ............. 67b
created within four months of filing petition to be dissolved ....... 67c
given in good faith, etc., not affected .... ......... ... ..... . ..... 67d
conveyances, etc., to defraud .. . . . ............ .. . ... . . ..... ... .. 67e
created through legal proceedings, void, etc .... .. ................ 67f
purchaser for value, etc., not affected ..... . ...... . .......... 6 7f
MARSHALS, courts of bankruptcy, to appoint as custodians ......... 2(3)
compensation of ............ . ... .. ......... . ...... . ........ 52b, 48
additional .. . . .. ............... . .... . ................. . .. 2 ( 5), 48
M.ASOULINE GENDER, words importing,_how construed .......... . . 1(28)
MEETINGS, bankrupt to attend creditors', etc .. ... . . . .. . ............. 7
of bankrupt's creditors ..... . . ... ............ . .................. 55
holders of secured claims not entitled to vote at .... . ......... . .. 56b
MINORS, time for claiming dividend . .. .... . ........... . ........ . .. 66b
NEWSPAPERS, designation of, to publish bankruptcy notices .... . ... . 28
NOTICES, to creditors .... . .. . .. . . . . .. . ............................. 58
to creditors not joined in petition . . .. . ..... . ................. . . . 59d
petitions not to be dismissed without ....................... .. .. 59g
;NUMBER, words importing plural, how construed . ................. 1 (29)
singular, how construed .................... . ................ 1 (30)
OATH, definition of ......... . ......•.. .. ............••.......... 1(17)
by whom administered in bankruptcy mattere . ....... . ...... . . .. 20a
of office of referees ...... . .. . .. . ............................... 36
OFFICER, definition of . . ...... . .. . ........... . ...... ... ........ 1 ( 18)
PAPERS, of trustees, open to inspection, etc .......... . .. . .... , ...... 49
PARTNERSIDP, may be adjudged bankrupt ......................... . . 5
PER..c;;()NS, definition of .......................................... 1 (19)
PETITION, definition of ............. . ..... . ......... . ........... 1(20)
of "A person against whom a petition hae been flied" . ... .... 1 ( 1)
against insolvent. when filed ... . .... . ............ . .. . ........ .. . 3b
from wh<>n to date ....... . ... . .....• .. ...................... 3b
involuntary bankruptey, service of ............. ... .. ... ..... .. . 18a
to be adjudged voluntary bankrupt, who may 6le . .. .. . ........... 59a
involuntary bankrupt .... .. . .. ........... .. .. . ...... . . . . . 59b
to be in duplicate . ... . .. . .. . . . ............................ . ... 59c
notice to creditors not joined .. . .............. . ...... . ......... 59d
hearings on . ......... .... . . . .. ........... ... .............. . ... 59d
PLEADING AND PRACTICE, involuntary bankruptcy, service of
petition .... . .. .. ........... . ...... . .......... . ...... . ...... . .. 18a
voluntary bankruptcy, hearing on filing petition . ... . . ... . ....... 18g
involuntary bankruptcy, jury trials ............... . ............. 19
oaths and affirmations ..................................... .. .. 20
evidence .... . ... . .. .. .............. . ..... . .. . ........... . ... . . 21
reference of casee after adjudication ....... .. ...... . ...... .. ... 22a
tranafer of casee to different referee ............................. 22b
jurisdiction of United State1 and State courts .. ...... . ........... 23a
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suits of trustees, where brought 23b

Sl:CTIO!'
appellate courts, jurisdiction of 24

1Uits of tru1Jtee1, where broUiht ....... .. .. . ... . .. . ... . . . . ... . . 23L

appeals and writs of error 25

arbitration of controversies 86

compromise 27

notices, how published 28

punishment for misappropriating property, etc 29

rules, forms, and orders, promulgation of 30

computation of time 31

transfer of cases 32

POLICY OF INSURANCE, of bankrupt, how may be retained 70a(5)

POSSESSION, of bankrupt's property, when taken 89

release of, on giving bond 69

PREFERENCE, defined 60a

transferring property, etc., while insolvent 3a(2)

through legal proceedings 3a (3)

PREFERRED CREDITORS, claims not to be allowed unless preference

surrendered 37g

who deemed such, etc -. 60a

when preference voidable 60b

giving further credit, etc 60c

set-off of new credit 60c
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PROOF, against bankrupt, of creditors' claims, of what to consist 57a
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RECEIVERS, courts of bankruptcy to appoint 3(3)

additional compensation of 2(5),48

RECORDS, in bankruptcy proceedings, of referees, etc 39a(5),42

REFEREE, definition of 1(21)

in bankruptcy proceedings, creation of office, etc 33

duties of 39
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transfer of cases from one to another 22b
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MOTION

not to abate on death of trustee 46

upon bonds of trustees and referees, when brought 501,50m

lien created pursuant to, when dissolved 67f

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, appellate jurisdiction

over courts of bankruptcy, etc 24

over circuit courts of appeals.. . ". 25b

certification of cases to, by United States courts 25d

to prescribe rules, forms, and orders for bankruptcy courts 30

SURETIES (see Bonds), on bonds of trustees and referees 50d-g

liability of, not affected by bankrupt's discharge 16

TAXES, owing by bankrupt, payment of 64a

TERRITORIES, district courts of, made courts of bankruptcy 2

TIME, bankruptcy act, computation of days 31

when to take effect 70Vi(a)

TIME OF BANKRUPTCY, definition of 1(10)

TITLE, to bankrupt's property vested in trustee 70

TRANSFER, definition of 1(25)

of cases commenced in different courts 32

to defraud, void 67e

void under State laws 67e

TRIALS, by jury, in involuntary bankruptcy cases 19

TRUSTEE, definition of 1(26)
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appointment; qualifications 44,45

death or removal 46

in bankruptcy proceedings, specification of duties 47

compensation 48

additional 8(6), 48 I

accounts and papers, open to inspection, etc 49

appearance of ..lib

time of bringing suit against lid

in settling partnership estate, appointment of 5b

may compromise controversies, etc 27

title of property vested in 70

UNITED STATES COURTS (see Courts).

VENUE, transfer of cases from one court of bankruptcy to another. .2(19)

VOLUNTARY BANKRUPT, who may become 4a

VOTING, at creditors' meetings 56a

holders of secured claims not entitled 56b

WAGE-EARNER, definition of 1(27)

WAGES, entitled to priority of payment 64b(4)

WIFE of bankrupt may be examined 21a

WITNESSES, in bankruptcy proceedings, refusing to testify, etc 41a

WORDS (see Definitions).

importing masculine gender 1(28)
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singular number 1(30)

WRITS OF ERROR, when allowed to review decisions of bankruptcy
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CALLAGHAN AND COMPANY
BY

SUPPLEMENT

TO

HOLBROOK & AIGLER'S

CASES ON BANKRUPTCY

GRATIOT COUNTY STATE BANK v. JOHNSON

— U. S. —, 63 L. ed. —, 39 Sup. Ct. 263

SUPPLEMENT

(United States Supreme Court. March 17, 1919)

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The trustee in bankruptcy of the St. Louis Chemical Com-

TO

pany brought suit in a state court of Michigan against the Gratiot

County State Bank to recover, as illegal preferences, payments

made to it within four months before the filing of the involun-

tary petition. The bank denied the allegation that the Chemical

HOLBROOK & AIGLER'S

Company was insolvent when the payments were made. To

establish that fact, the trustee offered in evidence the adjudica-

tion together with the petition on which it was based and the

special master's report which it confirmed. The latter found

CASES ON BANKRUPTCY

that the debtor had been insolvent for four months or more be-

fore the filing of the petition and had made, while so insolvent,

certain preferences. The bank was not actually a party to the

bankruptcy proceedings and had taken no part therein. The

trial court held that this evidence was not only admissible but

GRATIOT COUNTY STATE BANK v. JOHNSON

established conclusively that the debtor was insolvent through-

out the four months; and it entered judgment for the trustee

-

U. S. -, 63 L. ed. -, 39 Sup. Ct. 263
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which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Michigan. John-

son v. Gratiot County State Bank, 193 Mich. 452. The case

(United States Supreme Court. March 17, 1919)

comes here on writ of certiorari. 243 U. S. 645. The only ques-

tion presented is whether the state courts erred in holding that

the record of the adjudication made the fact of insolvency at

the time of the payments res judicata as against the bank.

1

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The trustee in bankruptcy of the St. Louis Chemical Company brought suit in a state court of Michigan against the Gratiot
County State Bank to recover, as illegal preferences, payments
made to it within four months before the filing of the involuntary petition. The bank denied the allegation that the Chemical
Company was insolvent when the payments were made. To
establish that fact, the trustee offered in evidence the adjudication together with the petition on which it was based and the
special master's report which it confirmed. The latter found
that the debtor had been insolvent for four months or more before the filing of the petition and had made, while so insolv~nt,
certain preferences. The bank was not actually a party to the
bankruptcy proceedings and had taken no part therein. The
trial court held that this evidence was not only admissible but
established conclusively that the debtor was insolvent throughout the four months; and it entered judgment for the trustee
which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Michigan. Johnson v. Gratiot County State Bank, 193 Mich. 452. The case
comes here on writ of certiorari. 243 U. S. 645. The only question presented is whether the state courts erred in holding that
the record of the adjudication made the fact of insolvency at
the time of the payments res judicata as against the bank.
1

2

2

JURISDICTIO~

JURISDICTION

First. The trustee contends that adjudication in bankruptcy,

being in the nature of a judgment in rem, establishes not only

the status of the debtor as a bankrupt, but also the essential

findings of fact on which that judgment was based. The ad-

judication is, for the purpose of administering the debtor's prop-

erty, that is, in its legislative effect, conclusive upon all the world.

Compare Shawhan v. Wherritt, 7 How. 627, 643. So far as it

declares the status of the debtor, even strangers to the decree

may not attack it collaterally. Michaels v. Post, 21 Wall. 398,

428. New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co.,

91 U. S. 656, 661, 662. Compare Hebert v. Crawford, 228 U. S.

204, 208, 209. But an adjudication in bankruptcy, like other

judgments in rem, is not res judicata as to the facts or as to the

subsidiary questions of law on which it is based, except as be-

tween parties to the proceeding or privies thereto. Manson v.

Williams, 213 U. S. 453, 455.1 This court applied the principle

in Wood v. Davis, 7 Cranch, 271, where a judgment that a mulat-

to woman was born free was held, as between strangers, not con-

clusive that her children were free. The rule finds abundant

illustration in cases dealing with decedents' estates, Tilt v. Kel-

sey, 207 U. S. 43, 52"; Brigham v. Payerweather, 140 Mass. 411;

and in cases involving the marriage status, Luke v. Hill, 137 Ga.
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159; Burlen v. Shannon, 3 Gray 387; Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo.

454, 469; Corry v. Lackey, 105 Mich. 363; Belknap v. Stewart,

38 Neb. 304; Gill v. Read, 5 R. I. 343.

Second. The trustee contends, however, that since by §§ 18b

and 59f of the Bankruptcy Act, any creditor is entitled to in-

tervene in the bankruptcy proceedings, the bank should be con-

sidered a party thereto. These sections are permissive, not man-

datory. They give to a creditor, who fears that he will be pre-

judiced by an adjudication of bankruptcy, the right to con-

test the petition. Whether he does so or not, he will be bound,

like the rest of the world, by the judgment, so far as it is strictly

an adjudication of bankruptcy. But he is under no obligation

to intervene, and the existence of the right is not equivalent to

actual intervention. Unless he exercises the right to become a

party, he remains a stranger to the litigation and, as such, un-

affected by the decision of even essential subsidiary issues. In

1—The court here cites, in the Cas. No. 12,455; Silvey & Co. v. Tift,

margin: In re Henry Ulfelder Cloth- 123 Ga. 804; Durant v. Abendroth,

ing Co. (D. C.) 98 Fed. 409, 413, 97 N. Y. 132; Lewis v. Sloan, 68 N.

414; In re Schick, 2 Ben. 5, Fed. C. 557, 562, 563.

First. The trustee contends that adjudication in bankruptcy,
being in the nature of a judgment in rem, establishes pot 011ly
the status of the debtor a.;; a bankrupt, but also the essential
findings of fact on which that judgment was based. The adjudication is, for the purpose of administering the debtor's property, that is, in its legislative effect, conclusive upon all the world.
Compare Shawhan v. Wherritt, 7 How. 627, 643. So far as it
declares the status of the debtor, even strangers to the decree
may not attack it collaterally. Michaels v. Post, 21 Wall. 398,
428. New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co.,
91 U. S. 656, 661, 662. Compare Hebert v. Crawford, 228 U. S.
204, 208, 209. But an adjudication in bankruptcy, like other
judgments in rem, is not res judicata as to the facts or as to the
•mbsidiary questions of law on which it is based, except as between parties to the proceeding or privies thereto. 'Manson v.
Williams, 213 U. S. 453, 455. 1 This court applied the principle
in Wood v. Davis, 7 Cranch, 271, where a judgment that 11 mulatto woman was born free was held, as between strangers, not conclusive that her children were free. The rule finds abundant
illustration in cases dealing with decedents' estates, Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U. S. 43, 52'; Brigham v. Fayerweather, 140 Mass. 411 ;
and in cases involving the marriage status, Luke v. Hill, 137 Ga.
159; Burlen v. Shannon, 3 Gray 387; Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo.
454, 469; Corry v. Lackey, 105 Mich. 363; Belknap v. Stewart,
38 Neb. 304; Gill v. Read, 5 R. I. 343.
Second. The trustee contends, however, that since by § § 18b
and 59f of the Bankruptcy AC't, any creditor is entitled to intervene in the bankruptcy proceedings, the bank should be considered a party thereto. These sections are permissive, not mandatory. They give to a creditor, who fears that hP. will be prejudiced by an adjudication of bankruptcy, the right to contest the pt>tition. Whether he does so or not, he will be bound,
like the rest of the world, by the judgment, so far as it is strictly
an adjudication of bankruptcy. But he is under no obligation
to intervene, and the existence of the right is not equivalent to
actual intervention. Unless he exercises the right to become a
party, he remains a stranger to the litigation and, as such, unaffected by the derision of even essential subsidiary issues. In
1-The court .here l'ites, in the
margin: In re Henry Ulfelder Clothing Co. (D. C.) 98 Fed. 409, 413,
414; In re Schick, 2 Ben. 5, Fed.

Cas. No. 12,455; Silvey & Co. v. Tift,
123 Ga. 804; Durant v. Abendroth,
97 N. Y. 132; Lewis v. Sloan, 68 N.
557, 562, 563.

c.

EFFECT OF ADJUDICATION

El<,FECT OF ADJUDICATION

3

3

re McCrum, 214 Fed. 207, 213; Cullinane v. Bank, 123 Iowa,

340, 342. The rule is general that persons who might have

made themselves parties to a litigation between strangers, but

did not, are not bound by the judgment.2 Compare Western

Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U. S. 105, 115. No good reason

exists for making an exception in the case of bankruptcy pro-

ceedings.

The purpose of Congress in expressly authorizing creditors,

as well as the debtor, to answer an involuntary petition in bank-

ruptcy was to guard against an improvident adjudication and

to protect those whose peculiar interests might be prejudiced

iby establishing the status of bankruptcy. See Blackstone v.

Everybody's Store, 207 Fed. 752, 756; Jackson v. Wauchula

Mfg. & Timber Co., 230 Fed. 409, 411. The grant of this right

of intervention was harmonized with the general purpose of

Congress to secure a prompt adjudication, by requiring that

the appearance and answers of creditors be made within five

days after the return day on the petition. Had the adjudica-

tion been made determinative also of claims of the several credi-

tors against the estate or of claims of the estate against indi-

vidual creditors, such expedition in proceedings would be im-

possible, if each of the many widely scattered creditors is to
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be afforded a fair opportunity to be heard. Furthermore, to

require every creditor to acquaint himself with the issues raised

in every proceeding in bankruptcy against his debtors, in order

to determine whether a decision on any such issue might con-

ceivably affect his interests; and, if so, either to participate in

the litigation, or, at his peril, suffer the decision of every question

therein litigated to become res judicata as against him, would

be an intolerable hardship upon creditors. And the resulting

volume of litigation would often so delay the adjudication as to

defeat the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act.

The unreasonableness of the rule contended for by the trustee

is well illustrated in cases of alleged fraudulent preference. The

claim may be made in respect to any creditor paid off within

four months of the filing of an involuntary petition, that he

received a fraudulent preference. Is every such former creditor

to be deemed an existing creditor within the meaning of §§ 18b

2—The court here cites, in the Mo. 43, 55; Hickox v. Eastman, 21

margin: Lee v. School District, 149 S. D. 591, 595; Carney v. Emmons,

Iowa 345, 354; Weber v. Mick, 131 9 Wis. 114, 117.

I1L 520, 529; State v. Johnson, 123

re McCrum, 214 Fed. 207, 213; Cullinane v. Bank, 123 Iowa,
340, 342. The rule is general that persons who might have
made themselves parties to a litigation between strangers, !Jut
did not, are not bound by the judgment.2 Compare Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U. S. 105, 115. No good reason
exists for making an exception in the case of bankruptcy proceedings.
The purpose of Congress in expressly authorizing creditors,
as well as the debtor, to answer an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was to guard against an improvident adjudication and
to protect those whose peculiar interests might be prejudiced
1by establishing the status of bankruptcy. See Blackstone v.
Everybody's Store, 207 Ped. 752, 756; Jackson v. \Vauchula
Mfg. & Timber Co., 230 Fed. 409, 411. The grant of this right
of intervention was harmonized with the general purpose of
Congress to secure a prompt adjudication, by requiring that
the appearance and answers of creditors be made within five
days after the return day on the petition. Had the adjudication been made determinative also of claims of the several creditors against the estate or of claims of the estate against individual creditors, such expedition in proceedings would be impossible, if each of the many widely scattered creditors is to
be afforded a fair opportunity to be heard. Furthermore, to
require every creditor to acquaint himself with the issues raised
in every proceeding in bankruptcy against his debtors, in order
to determine whether a decision on any such issue might conceivably affect his interests; and, if so, either to participate in
the litigation, or, at his peril, suffer the decision of every questif')n
therein litigated to become res judicata as against him. would
be an intolerable hardship upon creditors. And the resulting
volume of litigation would often so delay the adjudication as to
defeat the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act.
The unreasonableness of the rule contended for by the trustee
is well illustrated in cases of alleged fraudulent preference. The
claim may be made in respect to any creditor paid off within
four months of the filing of an involuntary petition, that he
received a fraudule~t preference. Is every such former creditor
to be deemed an existing creditor within the meaning of §§ 18b
2-Tbe court here cites, in
margin: Lee v. School District,
Iowa 345, 354; Weber v. Mick,
Ill. 520, 529; State v. Johnson,

the
149
131
123

Mo. 43, 55; Hickox v. Eastman, 21
S. D. 591, 595; Carney v. Emmona,
9 Wis. 114, 117.

4

4

JURISDICTION

JURISDICTION

and 59f and a party to the bankruptcy proceeding? Compare

Keppel v. Tiffin Savings Bank, 197 U. S. 356. And shall the

decision of the bankruptcy court be binding on all these former

creditors in respect to individual claims, although that court

could not (without consent) obtain jurisdiction of any creditor

who is not a resident of the district in which it sits, Acme Har-

vester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U. S. 300, 311; and

would not (prior to the Act of February 5, 1903, c. 487, §§8,

13, 32 Stat. 797, 798, 800) have had jurisdiction, even as against

a resident creditor, of a claim to recover a fraudulent pref-

erence; such claim being enforceable (without consent) only in

courts of general jurisdiction, Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 17S

U. S. 524; Wall v. Cox, 181 U. S. 244; Jaquith v. Rowley, 188

U. S. 620, and, even now, only by plenary suit, Louisville Trust

Co. v. Comingor, 184 U. S. 18; Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U. S.

102, 113.

The decisions of the lower federal courts upon which the state

court relied 3 in holding that §§ 18b and 59f made all creditors

parties to the proceeding so as to render the adjudication bind-

ing on them as to all essential issues, clearly misconceived the

intention of Congress. The allegation in the involuntary peti-

tion that the bank was among those who had received preferences,
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did not impose upon it the duty to appear and answer; and

since it did not do so, even a finding to that effect by the bank-

ruptcy court would not have bound it. The Supreme Court of

Michigan erred in holding that the adjudication in bankruptcy

established conclusively as against the bank that the debtor was

insolvent at the time the payments were made. We have no

occasion to consider whether the record introduced was admis-

sible merely as evidence of insolvency. Reversed.

3—The court here says, in the

margin: '' Cook v. Robinson, 194 Fed.

785; In re American Brewing Co.,

112 Fed. 752; Bear v. Chase, 99 Fed.

920. See also Lazarus v. Eagen (D.

C.) 206 Fed. 518. In re Hecox, 164

Fed. 823, also relied upon, is a case

of a different character. There, as

in Shawhan v. Wherritt, 7 How. 627,

643, one not actually a party to the

proceeding sought to attack the legis-

lative effect of the adjudication—

/

and 59f and a party to the bankruptcy proceedingT Compare
Keppel v. 'l'iffin Savings Bank, 197 U. S. 356. And shall the
decision of the bankruptcy court be binding on all t lwse former
creditors in respect to individual claims, although ihat court
could not (without consent) obtain jurisdiction of a11.' creditor
who is not a resident of the district in which it sits, Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U. S. 300, 311; and
would not (prior to the Act of February 5, 1903, c. 487, §§ 8,
13, 32 Stat. 797, 798, 800) have had jurisdiction, even as against
a resident creditor, of a claim to recover a fraudulent preference; such claim being enforceable (without consent) only in
courts of general jurisdiction, Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178
U. S. 524; Wall v. Cox, 181 U. S. 244; Jaquith v. R-0wley, 188
U. S. 620, and, even now, only by plenary suit, Louisville Trust
·Co. v. Comingor, 184 U. S. 18; Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U. S.
102, 113.
The decisions of the lower federal eourts upon which the state
court relied a in holding that §§ 18b and 59f made all creditors
parties to the procerding so as to render the adjudication binding on them as to all essential issues, clearly misconceived the
intention of Congress. The alle.gation in the involuntary petition that the bank was among those who bad received preferences,
did not impose upon it the duty to appear and answer; and
since it did not do so, even a finding to that effect by the bankruptcy court would not have bound it. The Supreme Court of
Michigan erred in holding that the adjudieation in bankruptey
established conclusively as against the bank that the debtor was
insolvent at the time the payments were made. We have no
occasion to consider whether the record introduced was admissible merely as evidence of insolvency.
Reversed.

and it was properly held to be con-

clusive. Hackney v. Hargreavea

Bros. (Hackney v. Raymond Bros.

Clarke Co.) 68 Neb. 633, 639, in-

volved only the admissibility of the

schedule of liabilities as evidence

tending to prove insolvency.''

3-The court here eays, in the
margin: ''Cook v. Robin~on, 194 Fed.
785; In re American Brewing Co.,
112 Fed. 752; Bear v. Chase, 99 Fed.
920. See also Luarus v. Eagen (D.
C.) 206 Fed. 518. In re Hecox, 164
Fed. 823, also relied upon, is a case
of a different eharacter. There, as
in Shawhan v. Wherritt, 7 How. 627,
643, one not actually a party to the

proceeding sought to attack the legi5·
lative effect of the adjudi<'ationand it was properly beld to be conclusive.
Hackney v. Hargreaves
Bros. (Hackney v. Raymond Bros.
Clarke Co.) 68 Neb. 633, 639, involved only the admissibility of ihe
S<"hedule of liabilities aa evidence
tending to prove insolvency.''
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WHAT STATE LAWS ARE SUSPENDED

5

5

STELLWAGEN v. CLUM

245 U. S. 605, 62 L. ed. 507, 38 Sup. Ct. 215

(United States Supreme Court. February 4, 1918)

STELL,VAGEN v. CLUM

Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.

This ease is here upon certificate from the United States Cir-

245 U. S. 605, 62 L. ed. 507, 38 Sup. Ct. 215

cuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. From the state-

ment accompanying the certificate it appears that Steilwagen,

(United States Supreme Court. February 4, 1918)

trustee for Margaret Zengerle, filed a petition in the United

States District Court to require the surrender and transfer to

him of a quantity of white pine lumber and balance due upon

a certain open account then in possession of Clum as trustee

in bankruptcy of the Georgian Bay Company. The order was

denied, the petition dismissed, and appeal taken to the Circuit

Court of Appeals.

The questions are whether certain provisions of the statutes

of Ohio are suspended by virtue of the Bankruptcy Act of

1898. The facts upon which the questions arise, and in view

of which they are to be answered, are thus stated:

"The Georgian Bay Company, an Ohio corporation, was at

the time of the transactions in dispute engaged in the whole-

sale and retail lumber business at Cleveland, Ohio. February

2, 1910, the company delivered to appellant's predecessor (A.
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L. McBean), as trustee for Margaret Zengerle and the Dime

Savings Bank of Detroit, its bill of sale, describing 433,500

feet of white pine lumber then in the company's yards, and

stating a total price of $14(013; crediting the trustee with cer-

tain promissory notes of the company for a like sum and payable

in different amounts, to the order of Margaret Zengerle, C. M.

Zengerle, agent, and the Dime Savings Bank, respectively.

Neither the bill of sale nor a copy was filed with the recorder

of Cuyahoga county, Ohio; but the lumber so in terms sold con-

sisted of piles (stacked in the ordinary way) which were to be

and at the time in fact were each distinctly marked: 'Sold to

A. L. McB., Agt.' May 3, 1910, the company with consent of

McBean sold this lumber and certain of its own lumber then

in the yards, to Sehuette & Co. of Pittsburgh. Payment was

to be made by Sehuette & Co., part in cash, part in notes matur-

ing at fixed times between date of sale and the following Sep-

tember 10th and the balance in cash on or before October 1st.

Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is here upon certificate from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. From the statement accompanying the certificate it appears that Steilwagen,
trustee for Margaret Zengerle, filed a petition in the United
States District Court to require the surrender and transfer to
him of a quantity of white pine lumber and balance due upon
a certain open account then in possession of Clum as trustee
in bankruptcy of the Georgian Bay Company. The order was
denied, the petition dismissed, and appeal taken to the Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The questions are whether certain provisions of the statutes
of Ohio are suspended by virtue of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898. The facts upon which the questions arise, and in view
of which they are to be answere1l, are thus stated:
"The Georgian Bay Company, au Ohio corporation, was at
the time of the transactions in dispute engaged in the wholesale and retail lumber business at Cleveland, Ohio. February
2, 1910, the company delivered to appellant's predecessor (A.
L. McBean), as trustee for Margaret Zengerle and the Dime
Savings Bank of Detroit, its bill of sale, describing 433,500
feet of white pine lumber then in the company's yards, and
stating a total price of $14,.013; crediting the trustee with certain promissory notes of the company for a like sum and payable
in different amounts, to the order of Margaret Zengerle, C. M.
Zengerle, agent, and the Dime Savings Bank, respectively.
Neither the bill of sale nor a copy wa.~ filed with the recorder
of Cuyahoga county, Ohio; but the lumber so in terms sold consisted of piles (stacked in the ordinary way) whi<'h were to be
and at the time in fact were each distinctly marked: 'Sold to
A. L. l\foB., Agt.' l\fay 3, 1910, the company with consent of
McBean sold this lumber and certain of its own lumber then
in the yar(ls, to Schuette & Co. of Pittsburgh. Payment was
to be rna<l<' h:· 8chuette & Co., part in cash, part in notes maturing at fixP1l timPs between date of sale and the following September 10th and the balance in cash on or before October 1st.

6

6

JURISDICTION

JURISDICTION

Two days later, May 5th, the Georgian Bay Company trans-

ferred to appellant 'the balance, twenty-five per cent. of invoice

value or what may show due on the 1st of October, A- D. 1910,

of the purchase price of the lumber' (so sold to Schuette & Co.),

to secure payment in full of all moneys that should be advanced

by, and 'payment pro rata of all moneys' then owing to, the Dime

Savings Bank, Mrs. Zengerle and C. M. Zengerle, agent; and

any surplus remaining was to be returned to the company.

Schuette & Co., while owing a balance of $7,500 on portions of

the lumber it had received, rejected the rest; this can be identi-

fied and is worth about $4,000. It was the transfer of this bal-

ance and the surrender of this rejected lumber that appellant

sought in the court below.

"October 31, 1910, the Georgian Bay Company made a general

assignment for the benefit of its creditors, which was properly

filed the following November 7th; and on the 9th of that month

the company was adjudicated a bankrupt. At the time there

remained due from the bankrupt to Mrs. Zengerle $7,100. C. M.

Zengerle is the husband of Margaret Zengerle, and was the presi-

dent of the Georgian Bay Company; the notes payable to his

wife represented loans of money belonging to her; and in nego-

tiating those loans and in the transaction had under the bill of
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sale, he acted as her agent and as president of the company.

The theory of the court below was that the bill of sale (February

2, 1910) was intended merely as security and, not having been

deposited in accordance with Sec. 4150 (2 Bates' Ann. Ohio

Stat. p. 2302) concerning chattel mortgages, was null and void;

that the transfer (May 5th) of balance accruing October 1st

from Schuette & Co. was made with intent to hinder and delay

creditors, when, according to the laws and the rule of judicial

decision of the state of Ohio, the Georgian Bay Company was

insolvent, though not according to the Bankruptcy Act; that

Margaret Zengerle was, through her agent, C. M. Zengerle,

chargeable with knowledge of such intent and insolvency, and the

Savings Bank was not; that as to Margaret Zengerle the transfer

was null and void and so was set aside, but that the Savings

Bank was entitled to be paid out of the balance of the Schuette

account. No appeal was taken from the portion of the decree

which allowed recovery by the Savings Bank."

The statutes of the state of Ohio in question are §§6343

and 6344 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio as amended April 30,

1908, 99 Ohio Laws, 241, 242. These sections were arranged

Two days later, May 5th, the Georgian Bay Company transferred to appellant 'the balance, twenty-five per cent. of invoice
value or what may show due on the 1st of October, A.. D. 1910,
of the purchase price of the lumber' (so sold to Schuette & Co.),
to secure payment in full of all moneys that should be advanced
by, and 'payment pro rata of all moneys' then owing to, the Dime
Savings Bank, Mrs. Zengerle an~ C. M. Zengerle, agent; and
any surplus remaining was to be returned to the company.
Schuette & Co., while owing a balance of $7,500 on portions of
the lumber it had received, rejected the rest; this can be identified and is worth about $4,000. It was the transfer of this balance and the surrender of this rejected lumber that appellant
sought in the court below.
"October 31, 1910, the Georgian Bay Company made a general
assignment for the benefit of its creditors, which was properly
filed the following November 7th; and on the 9th of that month
the company was adjudicated a bankrupt. At the time there
remained due from the bankrupt to Mrs. Zengerle $7,100. C. l-1.
Zengerle is the husband of Margaret Zengerle, and was the president of the Georgian Bay Company; the notes payable to his
wife represented loans of money belonging to her; and in negotiating those loans and in the transaction had under the bill of
sale, he acted as her agent and as president of the company.
The theory of the court below was that the bill of sale (February
2, 1910) was intended merely as security and, not having been
deposited in accordance with Sec. 4150 (2 Bates' Ann. Ohio
Stat. p. 2302) concerning chattel mortgages, was null and void;
that the trans£ er (May 5th) of balance accruing October 1st
from Schuette & Co. was made with intent to hinder and delay
creditors, when, according to the laws and the n1le of judicial
decision of the state of Ohio, the Georgian Bay Company was
.insolvent, though not according to the Bankruptcy Act; that
Margaret Zengerle was, through her agent, C. M. Zengerle,
chargeable with knowledge of such intent and insolvency, and the
Savings Bank was not; that as to Margaret Zengerle the transfer
was null and void and so was set aside, but that the Savings
Bank was entitled to be paid out of the balance of the Schuette
account. No appeal was taken from the portion of the decree
which allowed recovery by the Savings Bank."
The statntrs of the state of Ohio in question are §§ 6343
and 6344 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio as amended April 30,
1908, 99 Ohio Laws, 241, 242. These sections were arranged
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under the General Code of Ohio approved February 15, 1910,

wherein they appear as §§ 11102 to 11107 inclusive. (These

sections are given in the certificate, as they stood February 2,

1910, and are found in the margin.1)

The claim is stated to be that § 6343 when considered in

connection with the chapter concerning insolvent debtors is sus-

pended by the Bankruptcy Act. Reliance is had for this con-

1—Sec. 6343. Every sale, convey-

ance, transfer, mortgage, or assign-

ment, made in trust or otherwise by

a debtor or debtors, and every judg-

under the General Code of Ohio approved February 15, 1910,
wherein they appear as §§ 11102 to 11107 inclusive. (These
sections are given in the certificate, as they stood February 2,
1910, and are found in the margin. 1 )
The claim is stated to be that § 6343 when considered in
connection with the chapter concerning insolvent debtors is suspended by the Bankruptcy Act. Reliance is had for this con-

ment suffered by him or them

against himself or themselves in con-

templation of insolvency, and with a

design to prefer one or more credi-

tors to the exclusion in whole or in

part of others, and every sale, con-

veyance, transfer, mortgage or as-

signment made, or judgment pro-

cured by him or them to be ren-

dered, in any manner, with intent

to hinder, delay or defraud creditors,

shall be declared void as to creditors
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of such debtor or debtors at the suit

of any creditor or creditors, and in

any suit brought by any credi-

tor or creditors of such debtor

or debtors for the purpose of

declaring such sale void, a re-

ceiver may be appointed who shall

take charge of all the assets of such

debtor or debtors, including the

property so sold, conveyed, trans-

ferred, mortgaged, or assigned,

which receiver shall administer all

the assets of the debtor or debtors

for the equal benefit of the cred-

itors of the debtor or debtors in

proportion to the amount of their

respective demands, including those

which are unmatured.

Provided, however, that the pro-

visions of this section shall not ap-

ply unless the person, or persons

to whom such sale, conveyance,

transfer, mortgage or assignment be

made, knew of such fraudulent in-

tent on the part of such debtor or

debtors, and i rovided farther, that

nothing in this section contained

shall vitiate or affect any mortgage

made in good faith to secure any

debt or liability created simultane-

ously with such mortgage, if such

mortgage be filed for record in the

county wherein the property is sit-

uated, or as otherwise provided by

law, within three (3) days after

its execution, and where, upon fore-

closure or taking possession of such

property, the mortgagee fully ac

counts for the proceeds of such prop

erty.

Every sale or transfer of any por-

tion of a stock of goods, wares or

merchandise otherwise than in the

ordinary course of trade in the reg-

ular and usual prosecution of the

seller's or transferrer's business, or

1-Sec. 6343. Every sale, conveyance, transfer, mortgage, or assign·
ment, made in trust or otherwise by
a debtor or debtors, and every judg·
ment suffered by him or them
against himself or themselves in con·
templation of insolvency, and with a
design to prefer one or more creditors to the exclusion in whole or in
part of others, and every sale, conveyance, transfer, mortgage or aa·
signment made, or judgment procured by him or them to be rendered, in any manner, with intent
to hinder, delay or defraud creditors,
shall be declared void as to creditors
of such debtor or debtors at the suit
of any creditor or creditors, and in
any suit brought by any creditor or creditors of such debtor
or debtors for the purpose of
dt"Claring such sale void, a recei \·er may be appointed who shall
take charge of all the &88Cts of such
debtor or debtors, including the
property so sold, conveyed, transferred, mortgaged, or assigned,
which receiver shall administer all
the asaets of the debtor or debtors
for the equal benefit of the creditors of the debtor or debtors in
proportion to the amount of their
respective demands, including those
which are unmatured.
Provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall not ap·
ply unless the pnson, or persons
to whom surh sale, c-0nvcyanc.c,
transfer, mortri:nge or a11signmeut be
made, kncw of such fraudulent in·
tent on the part of such debtor or

debtors, and l rovided further, that
nothing in this S'eetion eontained
shall vitiate or affect any mortgage
made in good faith to secure any
debt or liability created simultane·
ously with such mortgage, if such
mortgage be filed for record in the
county wherein the propcrty is situated, or as otherwise provided by
law, within three ( 3) days after
its execution, and where, upon fore·
closure or taking possession of such
property, the mortgagee fully ae
counts for the proceeds of such prop
erty.
Every sale or transfer of any port ion of a stock of goods, warea or
merchandise otherwise than in the
ordinary course of trade in the reg·
ular and usual prosecution of the
seller's or transferrer's business, or
the sale or transfer of an entire
stock in bulk shall be presumed to
be made with the intent to hinder,
delay or defraud creditors within
the meaning of this section, unless
the seller or transferrer shall, not
less than seven (7) days previous
to the transfer of the stock of goods
sold or intended to be sold, anu the
payment of the money thereof, l'~use
to he recorded in the office of the
county recorder of the county in
which such seller or transferrer con·
ducts his business, and in the office
of tho county recorder of the cO'Unty
or counties in which !;U<'h goods are
located, a notice of his intention to
make such sale or trnnsfrr, which
notice shall he in writing describing
in ieneral terms the property to be
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tention upon the following portion of § 6343 which provides:

"A receiver may be appointed who shall take charge of all

the assets of such debtor or debtors, including the property so

sold, conveyed, transferred, mortgaged, or assigned, which re-

ceiver shall administer all the assets of the debtor or debtors for

the equal benefit of all the creditors of the debtor or debtors

in proportion to the amount of their respective demands, in-

cluding those which are unmatured.''

The questions propounded are:

"(a) Whether the Bankruptcy Act of the United States, in

force on the dates herein mentioned, operated to suspend section

6343 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, as such section stood

February 2, 1910.

"(b) Whether the Bankruptcy Act operated to suspend the

sections into which section 6343 was divided and numbered,

February 15, 1910, by the General Code of Ohio, to wit, sections

11102, 11103, 11104 and 11105 as such sections existed May 5,

1910.

"(c) If the Bankruptcy Act did not operate to suspend in

their entirety the several sections of the Ohio statutes mentioned

sold and all conditions of such sale

and the parties thereto; excepting,
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however, that no such presumption

shall arise because of the failure to

record notice as above provided in

the case of any sale or transfer made

under the direction or order of a

court of competent jurisdiction, or

by an executor, administrator, guard-

tention upon the following portion of § 6343 which provides:
"A receiver may be appointed who shall take charge of all
the asset.a of such debtor or debtors, including the property so
sold, conveyed, transferred, mortgaged, or assigned, which receiver shall administer all the assets of the debtor or debtors for
the equal benefit of all the creditors of the debtor or debtors
in proportion to the amount of their respecti\'c demands, including those which are unmatured."
The questions propounded are:
"(a) Whether the Bankruptcy Act of the United States, in
force on the dates herein mentioned, operated to suspend section
6343 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, as such section stood
February 2, 1910.
"(b) "'hethcr the Bankruptcy Act operated to suspend the
sections into which section 6343 was divided and numbered,
February 15, 1910, by the General Code of Ohio, to wit, sections
11102, 11103, 11104 ·and 11105 as such sections existed May 5,
1910.
"(c) If the Bankruptcy Act did not operate to suspend in
their entirety the several sections of the Ohio statutes mentioned

ian, receiver, assignee for the bene-

fit of creditors or other officer or

person acting in the regular and

proper discharge of official duty or

in the discharge of any trust im-

posed upon him by law, nor in the

case of any sale or transfer of any

property exempt from execution.

Sec. 6.144. Any creditor or cred-

itors, as to whom any of the acts or

tilings prohibited in the preceding

section are void, whether the claim

of such creditor or creditors has

matured or will thereafter mature,

may commence an action in a court

of competent jurisdiction to have

such acts or things declared void.

And such court shall appoint a trus-

tee or receiver according to the pro-

visions of this chapter, who uI>on be-

ing duly qualified shall proceed by

due course of law to recover posses-

sion of all property so sold, con-

veyed, transferred, mortgaged or as-

signed, and to administer the same

for the equal benefit of all creditors,

as in other cases of assignments to

trustees for the benefit of creditors.

And any assignee as to whom any

thing or act mentioned in the pre-

ceding section shall be void, shall

likewise commence a suit in a court

of competent jurisdiction to recover

possession of all property so sold,

conveyed, transferred, mortgaged or

assigned, and shall administer the

same for the equal benefit of all

creditors as in other cases of assign-

ments to trustees for the benefit of

sold and all conditions of such sale
and the parties thereto; excepting,
however, that no such presumption
shall arise because of the failure to
record notice as above provided in
the case of any sale or transfer made
under the direction or order of a
court of competent jurisdiction, or
by an executor, administrator, guard·
ian, receiver, assignee for the benefit of creditors or other officer or
person acting in the refllllar and
proper disl'hRrge of offi<'ial duty or
in the discharge of any trust im·
posed upon him by law, nor in the
case of nn~· ~nle or transfer of any
propl"rty l"xempt from execution.
Sec. 6:144. Any crl"<litor or cred·
itors, ns to whom any of the acts or
things prohibited in the preceding
s<'ction are void, w~1ether the claim
of such creaitor or creditors has
matured or will thereafter mature,
may l'ommence an action in a court
of competent jurisdiction to have

such acts or things declared void.
And such court shall appoint a trustee or receiver according to the provisions of this chapter, who upon being duly qualified shall proeeed by
due course of law to recover possession of all property so sold, conveyed, transferred, mortgaged or assigned, and to administer the same
for the equal benefit of all creditors,
as in other eases of assignments to
trustees for Uie benefit of creditors.
And any assignee as to whom any
thing or act mentioned in the preceding section shall be void, shall
likewise commence a suit in a ~ourt
of competent jurisdiction to recover
possession of all property so sold,
conveyed, transferred, mortgaged or
assigned, and shall administer the
same for the equal benefit of all
creditors as in other cases of assignments to trustees for the benefit of
creditors. (99 Ohio Laws, 241, 242.)
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in the preceding questions, whether such suspension extended

only to the portions thereof which in terms appropriated, for

the benefit of all the creditors, the property of the debtor not

specifically described in the bill of sale and transfer of account

in dispute."

The Circuit Court of Appeals also sends an opinion in re the

certification aforesaid, in which the court says that it is disposed

to hold that if the provisions of the Ohio statutes were sus-

pended, the appellant is entitled in behalf of Margaret Zengerle

to recover, otherwise the trustee in bankruptcy is entitled to'

hold the balance due from Schuette & Company and the lumber

rejected by them, and administer the same as part of the

estate of the bankrupt for the benefit of its general creditors.

The court states that as between Mrs. Zengerle and the general

creditors of the Georgian Bay Company, there was sufficient

delivery of possession of lumber covered by the bill of sale to

dispense with the necessity of depositing the instrument with

the county recorder. The sale subsequently made to Schuette

& Company, upon the consent of Mrs. Zengerle's trustee, was a

distinct recognition of the intent and effect of the bill of sale, and

the marking of the piles of lumber, and the transfer of account

made two days later was manifestly designed at once to execute

the transaction involved under the bill, and transfer the rights
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thereunder of Mrs. Zengerle, as well as of the Savings Bank,

to the sales' proceeds. The court further says, upon the hy-

pothesis that the state statutes are suspended, that because more

than four months elapsed between the delivery of the bill of

sale, as also of the transfer of account, and the bankruptcy, the

trustee cannot by virtue of the Bankruptcy Act alone question

the validity of either of those instruments. The court adds that

if the state statutes were not suspended, the general creditors

acquired rights to have the instruments in dispute set aside be-

cause, under the facts shown, the company was not able to meet

its debts as they fell due, and so was insolvent; and, further,

the instruments in terms were made to a trustee. The rights

so vested in the creditors being enforceable at any time within

four years under the Ohio law.

The Federal Constitution, Article I, § 8 gives Congress

the power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy

throughout the United States. In view of this grant of authority

to the Congress it has been settled from an early date that state

laws to the extent that they conflict with the laws of Congress,

in the preceding questions, whether such suspension extended
only to the portions thereof which in terms appropriated, for
the benefit of all the creditors, the property of the debtor not
specifically described in the bill of sale and transfer of account
in dispute.''
The Circuit Court of Appeals also sends an opinion in re the
certification aforesaid, in which the court says that it is disposed
to hold that if the provisions of the Ohio statutes were suspended, the appellant is entitled in behalf of Margaret Zengerle
to recover, otherwise the trustee in bankruptcy is entitled to ·
hold the balance due from Schuette & Company and the lumber
rejected by them, and administer the same as part of the
estate of the bankrupt for the benefit of its general creditors.
The court states that as between Mrs. Zengerle and the general
creditors of the Georgian Bay Company, there was sufficient
delivery of possession of lumber covered by the bill of sale to
dispense with the necessity of depositing the instrument with
the county recorder. The sale subsequently made to Schuette
& Company, upon the consent of .l\'lrs. Zengerle 's trustee, was a
distinct recognition of the intent and effect of the bill of sale, and
the marking of the piles of lumber, and the transfer of account
made two days later was manifestly designed at once to execute
the transaction involved under the bill, and transfer the rights
thereunder of l\frs. Zengerle, as well as of the Savings Bank,
to the sales' proceeds. The court further says, upon the hypothesis that the state statutes are suspended, that because more
than four months elapsed between the delivery of the bill of
sale, as also of the transfer of account, and the bankruptcy, the
trustee cannot by virtue of the Bankruptcy Act alone question
the validity of either of those instruments. The court adds that
if the state statutes were not suspended, the general creditors
acquired rights to have the instruments in dispute set aside because, under the facts shown, the company was not able to meet
its debts as they fell due, and so was insolvent; and, further,
the instruments in terms were made to a trustee. The rights
so vested in the creditors being enforceable at any time within
four years under the Ohio law.
The Federal Constitution, Article I, § 8 gives Congress
the power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy
throughout the United States. In view of this grant of authority
to the Congress it has been settled from an early date that state
laws to the extent that they conflict with the laws of Congress,
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enacted under its constitutional authority, on the subject of bank-

ruptcies are suspended. While this is true, state laws are thus

suspended only to the extent of actual conflict with the system

provided by the Bankruptcy Act of Congress. Sturges v. Crown-

inshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213.

Notwithstanding this requirement as to uniformity the bank-

ruptcy acts of Congress may recognize the laws of the State in

certain particulars, although such recognition may lead to dif-

ferent results in different States. For example, the Bankruptcy

Act recognizes and enforces the laws of the States affecting

dower, exemptions, the validity of mortgages, priorities of pay-

ment and the like. Such recognition in the application of state

laws does not affect the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act,

although in these particulars the operation of the Act is not

alike in all the States. Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186

U. S. 181, 188, 189, 190. True it is that general assignments

for the benefit of creditors are acts of bankruptcy, Act of 1898,

§ 3, clause 4, and since the amendment of 1903, 32 Stat.

797, a receivership of an insolvent debtor with a view to dis-

tribution of his property for the benefit of creditors will have

the like effect. 1 Loveland on Bankruptcy (4th Ed.) § 153.

In such cases the bankruptcy proceedings, taken within four
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months, displace those in the state court and terminate the juris-

diction of the latter. Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U. S. 533, 537;

In re Watts & Sacks, 190 U. S. 1, 31. But it does not follow

that state statutes intended to avoid conveyances actually or

constructively fraudulent and thereby to promote the equal dis-

tribution of insolvent estates may not be availed of by the trustee.

Section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act provides:

"The trustee may avoid any transfer by the bankrupt of

his property which any creditor of such bankrupt might have

avoided, and may recover the property so transferred, or its

value, from the person to whom it was transferred, unless he

was a bona fide holder for value prior to the date of the adjudica-

tion. Such property may be recovered or its value collected

from whoever may have received it, except a bona fide holder

for value. For the purpose of such recovery any court of bank-

ruptcy as hereinbefore defined, and any State court which would

have had jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened, shall

have concurrent jurisdiction."

This section as construed by this court gives the trustee in

bankruptcy a right of action to recover property transferred in

enacted under its constitutional authority, on the subject of bankruptcies are suspended. While this is true, state laws are ti: us
suspended only to the extent of actual conflict with the system
provided by the Bankruptcy Act of Congress. Sturges v. Crowni11shield, 4 Wheat. 122; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213.
~otwithstanding this requirement as to uniformity the baukruptcy acts of Congress may recognize the laws of the State in
rL•rtain particulars, although such recognition may lead to <liffcrent results in different States. For example, the Bankruptcy
Act recognizes and enforces the laws of the States affecting
dower, exemptions, the validity of mortgages, priorities of payment and the like. Such recognition in the application of state
laws does not affect the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act,
although in these particulars the operation of the Act is not
alike in all the States. Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186
U. S. 181, 188, 189, 190. True it is that general assignments
for the benefit of creditors are acts of bankruptcy, Act of 1898,
§ 3, clause 4, and since the amendment of 1903, 32 Stat.
797, a receivership of an insolvent debtor with a view to distribution of his property for the benefit of creditors will have
the like effect. 1 Loveland on Bankruptcy (4th Ed.) § 153.
In such cases the bankruptcy proceedings, taken within four
months, displace those in the state court and terminate the jurisdiction of the latter. Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U. S. 533, 537;
In re Watts & Sacks, 190 U. S. 1, 31. But it does not follow
that state statutes intended to avoid conveyances actually or
constructively fraudulent and thereby to promote the equal distribution of insolvent estates may not be availed of by the trustee.
Section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act provides:
''The trustee may avoid any transfer by the bankrupt of
his property which any creditor of such bankrupt might have
avoided, and may recover the property so transferred, or its
value, from the person to whom it was transferred, unless he
was a bona fide holder for value prior to the date of the adjudication. Such property may be recovered or its value collected
from whoever may have received it, except a bona fide holder
for value. For the purpose of such recovery any court of bankruptcy as hereinbefore defined, and any State court which would
have had jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened, shall
have concurrent jurisdiction."
This section as construed by this court gives the trustee in
bankruptcy a right of action to recover property transferred in
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violation of state law. Security Warehousing Co. v. Hand, 206

U. S. 415, 425, 426; Knapp v. Milwaukee Trust Co., 216 U. S.

545, 557.

And a right of action under this subdivision is not subject

to the four months' limitation of other sections (60b, 67e) of

the Bankruptcy Act. Under this subdivision if a creditor could

have avoided a transfer under a state law, a trustee may do the

same. In re Mullen, 101 Fed. 413 (opinion by Judge Lowell);

1 Loveland on Bankruptcy (4th Ed.) 786, 787; Collier on Bank-

ruptcy (11th Ed.) p. 1178, and cases cited in note 439.

Turning now to the sections of the Ohio laws in question—

the right to proceed by course of law to recover particular

property transferred as prohibited in § 6344, and to cause

the same to be administered for the equal benefit of creditors,

as in cases of assignment to trustees for the benefit of creditors,

has long been part of the statutory law of Ohio. The part in

§ 6343 which enables the court to appoint a receiver to take

charge of all the assets of the debtor or debtors, including the

property conveyed, and administer the same for the equal benefit

of creditors, is the new feature of the law.

It is apparent that this section intends to permit the appoint-

ment of a receiver to take charge of all the assets of the debtor

when the provisions of the statute apply as to the debtor and
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his transferee, and the latter is required to know of the fraud-

ulent intent on the part of the debtor.

Creditors are not thereby deprived of rights, but in case of

bankruptcy proceedings within four months of a general assign-

ment for creditors, as was the case here, the property may be

brought into the bankruptcy court, or, as in this case, may be in

its possession and be retained in that court to be administered

for the benefit of general creditors. This state statute is not

opposed to the policy of the bankruptcy law or in contravention

of the rules and principles established by it with a view to the

fair distribution of the assets of the insolvent . It is only state

laws which conflict with the bankruptcy laws of Congress that

are suspended; those which are in aid of the Bankruptcy Act

can stand. Miller v. New Orleans Fertilizer Co., 211 U. S. 496.

This view of the sections in question was taken by the Circuit

Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, in In re Farrell, 176 Fed. 505,

509, 510, wherein in the opinion it was said that the changes

made by the new statutes were in harmony with the policy of

the Bankruptcy Act and in aid of its purposes.

violation of state law. Security Warehousing Co. v. Hand, 206
U. S. 415, 425, 426; Knapp v. .Milwaukee Trust Co., 216 U. S.
545, 557.
And a right of action under this subdivision is not subject
to the four months' limitation of other sections (60b, 67e) of
the Bankruptcy Act. Under this subdivision if a creditor could
have avoided a transfer under a state law, a trustee may do the
same. In re Mullen, 101 Fed. 413 (opinion by Judge Lowell) ;
1 Loveland on Bankruptcy (4th Ed.) 786, 787; Collier on Bankruptcy (11th Ed.) p. 1178, and cases cited in note 439.
Turning now to the sections of the Ohio laws in questionthe right to proceed by course of law to recover particular
property transferred as prohibited in § 6344, and to cause
the same to be administered for the equal benefit of creditors,
as in cases of assignment to trustees for the benefit of creditors,
has long been part of the statutory law of Ohio. The part in
§ 6343 which enables the court to appoint a receiver to take
charge of all the assets of the debtor or debtors, including the
property conveyed, and administer the same for the equal benefit
of creditors, is the new feature of the law.
It is apparent that this section intends to permit the appointment _of a receiver to take charge of all the assets of the debtor
when the provisions of the statute apply as to the debtor and
his transferee, and the latter is required to know of the fraudulent intent on the part of the debtor.
Creditors are not thereby deprived of rights, but in case of
bankruptcy proceedings within four months of a general assignment for creditors, as was the case here, the property may be
brought into the bankruptcy court, or, as in this case, may be in
its possession and be retained in that court to be administered
for the benefit of general creditors. This state statute is not
opposed to the policy of the bankruptcy law or in contravention
of the rules and principles established by it with a view to the
fair distribution of the assets of the insolvent. It is only state
laws which conflict with the bankruptcy laws of Congress that
are suspended; those which are in aid of the Bankruptcy Act
<'an stand. Miller v. New Orleans Fertilizer Co., 211 U. S. 496.
This view of the sections in question was taken by the Circuit
Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, in In re Farrell, 176 Fed. 505,
509, 510, wherein in the opinion it was said that the changes
made by the new statutes were in harmony with the policy of
the Bankruptcy Act and in aid of its purposes.
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There is much discussion in the books as to what constitutes a

bankruptcy act as distinguished from an insolvency law. It is

settled that a State may not pass an insolvency law which pro-

vides for a discharge of the debtor from his obligations, which

shall have the effect of a bankruptcy discharge as to creditors

in other States, and this although no general federal bankruptcy

act is in effect. And while it is not necessary to decide that

there may not be state insolvent laws which are suspended al-

though not providing for a discharge of indebtedness, all the

cases lay stress upon the fact that one of the principal requisites

of a true bankruptcy law is for the benefit of the debtor in that

it discharges his future acquired property from the obligation

of existing debts.

In the case of Mayer v. Hellman, 91 U. S. 496, this court had

before it, while the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 was in force, the

question of the validity of the assignment of an insolvent, in

Ohio, to trustees for the benefit of all his creditors executed six

months before the proceedings in bankruptcy had been taken,

and it was held that the assignment was good and the assignees

in bankruptcy not entitled to the possession of the property.

Mr. Justice Field in delivering the opinion of the court said:

"In the argument of the counsel of the defendant in error,
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the position is taken that the Bankrupt Act suspends the opera-

tion of the act of Ohio regulating the mode of administering as-

signments for the benefit of creditors, treating the latter as an

insolvent law of the State. The answer is, that the statute of

Ohio is not an insolvent law in any proper sense of the term.

It does not compel, or in terms even authorize, assignments: it

assumes that such instruments were conveyances previously

known, and only prescribes a mode by which the trust created

shall be enforced. It provides for the security of the creditors

by exacting a bond from the trustees for the discharge of their

duties; it requires them to file statements showing what they

have done with the property; and affords in various ways the

means of compelling them to carry out the purposes of the con-

veyance. There is nothing in the act resembling an insolvent

law. It does not discharge the insolvent from arrest or imprison-

ment: it leaves his after-acquired property liable to his creditors

precisely as though no assignment had been made. The pro-

visions for enforcing a trust are substantiallyvsuch as a court of

chancery would apply in the absence of any statutory provision.

The assignment in this case must, therefore, be regarded as

There is much discussion in the books as to what constitutes a
bankruptcy act as distinguished from an insolvency law. It is
settled that a State may not pass an insolvency law which provides for a discharge of the debtor from his obligations, which
~hall have the effect of a bankruptcy discharge as to creditors
in other States, and this although no general federal bankruptcy
act is in effect. And while it is not necessary to decide that
there may not be state insolvent laws which are suspended although not providing for a discharge of indebtedness, all the
cases lay stress upon the fact that one of the principal requisites
of a true bankruptcy law is for the benefit of the debtor in that
it discharges his future acquired property from the obligation
of existing debts.
In the case of Mayer v. Hellman, 91 U.S. 496, this court had
before it, while the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 was in force, the
question of the validity of the assignment of an insolvent, in
Ohio, to trustees for the benefit of all his creditors executed six
months before the proceedings in bankruptcy had been taken,
and it was held that the assignment was good and the assignees
in bankruptcy not entitled to the pas.session of the property.
Mr. Justice Field in delivering the opinion of the court said:
"In the argument of the counsel of the defendant in error,
the position is taken that the Bankrupt Act suspends the operation of the act of Ohio regulating the mode of administering assignments for the benefit of creditors, treating the latter as an
insolvent law of the State. The answer is, that the statute of
Ohio is not an insolvent law in any proper sense of the term.
It does not compel, or in terms even authorize, assignments: it
assumes that such instruments were conveyances previously
known, and only prescribes a mode by which the trust created
shall be enforced. It provides for the security of the creditors
by exacting a bond from the trustees for the discharge of their
duties; it requires them to file statements showing what they
have done with the property; and affords in various ways the
means of compelling them to carry out the purposes of the conveyance. There is nothing in the act resembling an insolvent
law. It does not discharge the insolvent from arrest. or imprisonment: it leaves his after-acquired property liable to his creditors
precisely as though no assignment had been made. The provisions for enforcing a trust are substantially ,such as a court of
chancery would apply in the absence of any statutory provision.
The a~ignment in this case -must, therefore, be regarded as
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though the statute of Ohio, to which reference is made, had no

existence. There is an insolvent law in that State; but the as-

signment in question was not made in pursuance of any of its

provisions. The position, therefore, of counsel, that the bank-

rupt law of Congress suspends all proceedings under the In-

solvent Law of the State, has no application."

The federal system of bankruptcy is designed not only to

distribute the property of the debtor, not by law exempted, fairly

and equally among his creditors, but as a main purpose of the

act, intends to aid the unfortunate debtor by giving him a fresh

start in life, free from debts, except of a certain character, after

the property which he owned at the time of bankruptcy has

been administered for the benefit of creditors. Our decisions

lay great stress upon this feature of the law—as one not only

of private but of great public interest in that it secures to the

unfortunate debtor, who surrenders his property for distribu-

tion, a new opportunity in life. Neal v. Clark, 95 U. S. 704, 709;

Traer v. Clews, 115 U. S. 528, 541; Hanover National Bank v.

Moyses, 186 U. S. 181,192; Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U. S. 68, 77;

Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459, 473.

This feature of a bankruptcy law is wholly wanting in the

Ohio statutes under consideration. Indeed, there is not now,
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any more than when Mayer v. Hellman, supra, was decided, any

attempt in the Ohio laws to provide for the discharge of the

debtor from his existing debts.

If the Ohio statutes in the feature now under consideration

be suspended, it would follow that a person in Ohio might suc-

cessfully claim a part of the estate which is being administered

in bankruptcy, although the conveyance under which the prop-

erty is claimed is voidable under the laws of the State where it

was made and the alleged right in the property secured. We

think that Congress in the Bankruptcy Act did not intend any

such result, but meant to permit the trustee in bankruptcy to

have the benefit of state laws of this character which do not

conflict with the aims and purposes of the federal law. And

certainly, in view of the provisions of § 70e of the Bank-

ruptcy Act, Congress did not intend to permit a conveyance

such as is here involved to stand which creditors might attack

and avoid under the state law for the benefit of general creditors

of the estate.

From what we have said it follows that Questions A and B

though the statute of Ohio, to which reference is made, had no
existence. There is &.n insolvent law in that State; but the assignment in question was not made in pursuance of any of its
provisions. The position, therefore, of counsel, that the bankrupt law of Congress suspends all proceedings under the Insolvent Law of the State, has no application.''
The federal system of bankruptcy is designed not only to
distribute the property of the debtor, not by law exempted, fairly
and equally among his creditors, but as a main purpose of the
act, intends to aid the unfortunate debtor by giving him a fresh
start in life, free from debts, except of a certain character, after
the property which he owned at the time of bankruptcy has
been administered for the benefit of creditors. Our decisions
lay great stress upon this feature of the law-as one not only
of private but of great public interest in that it secures to the
unfortunate debtor, who surrenders his property for distribution, a new opportunity in life. Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709;
Traer v. Clews, 115 U. S. 528, 541; Hanover National Bank v.
Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192; Wetmore v. :Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77;
Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459, 473.
This feature of a bankruptcy law is wholly wanting in the
Ohio statutes under consideration. Indeed, there is not now,
any more than when Mayer v. Hellman, supra, was decided, any
attempt in the Ohio laws to provide for the discharge of the
debtor from his existing debts.
If the Ohio statutes in the feature now under consideration
be suspended, it would follow that a person in Ohio might successfully claim a part of the estate which is being administered
in bankruptcy, although the conveyance under which the property is claimed is voidable under the laws of the State where it
was made and the alleged right in the property secured. We
think that Congress in the Bankruptcy Act did not intend any
such result, but meant to permit the trustee in bankruptcy to
have the benefit of state · laws of this character which do not
conflict with the aims and purposes of the federal law. And
certainly, in view of the provisions of § 70e of the Bankruptcy Act, Congress did not intend to permit a conveyance
such as is here involved to stand which creditors might attack
and avoid under the state law for the benefit of general creditors
of the estate.
From what we have said it follows that Questions A and B
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should be answered in the negative, and it is unnecessary to

answer Question C.

So ordered.

DEAN v. DAVIS

242 U. S. 438, 61 L. ed. 419, 37 Sup. Ct . 130

should be answered in the negative, and it is unnecessary to
answer Question C.
So ordered.

(United States Supreme Court. January 8, 1917)

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the court.

The Bankruptcy Act as amended February 5, 1903, provides

DEAN v. DAVIS

in § 60b that if a debtor has, within four months before the

filing of the petition in bankruptcy, made a transfer which the

242 U. S. 438, 61 L. ed. 419, ·37 Sup. Ct. 130

person receiving the same has reason to believe was intended

to give a preference, the transfer shall be voidable, and the

(United States Supreme Court. January 8, 1917)

trustee in bankruptcy may recover the property or its value.

The act also provides in § 67e (30 Stat. 564), that if a debtor,

within four months before the filing of the petition in bank-

ruptcy, makes any transfer "with the intent and purpose on his

part to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors, or any of them,"

it shall be null and void except as to purchasers in good faith

and for a present fair consideration; and that it shall be the

duty of the trustee to recover the same.

R. Crawley Jones was a farmer and owner of a country store.

A bank, having discounted his notes bearing indorsements which

it later concluded had been forged, demanded that Jones take up
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the notes. Fearing arrest, he appealed, through his father to his

brother-in-law, Dean, for a loan of $1,600, promising to secure

it by a mortgage of all his property, which he represented was

worth more than five times that amount. Dean provided the

money, and on September 3, 1909, acting in conjunction with

Jones' father, "took up" the notes. Most of them were not yet

due. A mortgage deed of trust dated September 3 was executed

September 10, and recorded September 11. It covered prac-

tically all of Jones' property, including the stock in trade and

accounts, store furnishings and fixtures, household furniture and

goods, live stock, crops standing and cut, and the farm itself,

the last subject to a prior deed of trust. Four mortgage notes

were given, payable respectively in seven, thirty, sixty, and

ninety days; with a proviso that upon default on any one all

should become payable. The first note—and hence all—were

overdue when the mortgage was recorded. On that day Dean di-

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the court.
The Bankruptcy Act as amended February 5, 1903, provides
in § 60b that if a debtor has, within four months before the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy, made a transfer which the
person receiving the same has reason to believe was intended
to give a preference, the transfer shall be voidable, and the
trustee in bankruptcy may recover the property or its value.
The act also provides in § 67e (30 Stat. 564), that if a debtor,
within four months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, makes any transfer "with the intent and purpose on his
part to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors, or any of them,''
it shall be null and void except as to purchasers in good faith
and for a present fair consideration i and that it shall be the
duty of the trustee to recover the same.
R. Crawley Jones was a farmer and owner of a country store.
A bank, having discounted his notes bearing indorsements which
it later concluded had been forged, demanded that Jones take up
the notes. Fearing arrest, he appealed, through his father to his
brother-in-law, Dean, for a loan of $1,600, promising to secure
it by a mortgage of all his property, which he represented was
worth more than five times that amount. Dean provided the
money, and on September 3, 1909, acting in conjunction with
Jones' father, "took up" the notes. Most of them were not yet
<lue. A mortgage deed of trust dated September 3 was executed
September 10, and recorded September 11. It covered practically all of Jbnes' property, including the stock in trade and
accounts, store furnishings and fixtures, household furniture and
goods, live stock, crops standing and cut, and the farm itst'lf,
the last subject to a prior deed of trust. Four mortgage notes
were given, payab1e respectively in seven, thirty, sixty. and
ninety days; with a proviso that upon default on any one all
c:hould become payable. Thi' first notC'--alld henc~ all-Wf'rP.
overdue whPn the mortgage was recorded. On that day Dean di-
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rected that possession of the property be taken, which was done

on September 13 (the 12th being Sunday). Jones was at the

time deeply insolvent and had many unsecured creditors. Some

of these immediately challenged the validity of the mortgage.

Within a few days an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was

filed and Jones was adjudicated a bankrupt. The mortgaged

property was converted into cash under an agreement with gen-

eral creditors that it should be deposited to await the ultimate

determination of the rights of the parties. It yielded only $1,634

—leaving nothing for the general creditors if the mortgage is

held valid.

Davis, the trustee in bankruptcy, brought a bill in equity to

set aside the mortgage. The District Court granted the relief

prayed for; and its decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of

Appeals. Both courts found the facts to be in substance as above

stated and held the mortgage void under § 67e as having been

made by Jones "with the intent and purpose on his part to

hinder, delay or defraud his creditors," to one not a "pur-

chaser in good faith" within the meaning of the act. The Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals held the mortgage void also as a preference

under § 60b, 212 Fed. 88. The case comes to this court upon

appeal; Dean contending that the mortgage is not invalid under

either § 60b or § 67e.
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The mortgage was not voidable as a preference under § 60b.

Preference implies paying or securing a pre-existing debt of the

person preferred. The mortgage was given to secure Dean for

a substantially contemporary advance. The bank, not Dean, was

preferred. The use of Dean's money to accomplish this purpose

could not convert the transaction into a preferring of Dean, al-

though he knew of the debtor's insolvency. Mere circuity of ar-

rangement will not save a transfer which effects a preference

from being invalid as such. National Bank v. National Herkimer

County Bank, 225 U. S. 178, 184. But a transfer to a third

person is invalid under this section as a preference only where

that person was acting on behalf of the creditor, as in Re Beer-

man, 112 Fed. 663, and Walters v. Zimmerman, 208 Fed. 62, 220

Fed. 805. Here Dean acted on the debtor's behalf in providing

the money and taking up the notes.

But under § 67e the basis of invalidity is much broader. It

covers every transfer made by the bankrupt "within four months

prior to the filing of the petition, with the intent and purpose on

his part to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors, or any of

rected that possession of the property be taken, which was done
on September 13 (the 12th being Sunday). Jones was at the
time deeply insolvent and had many unseL"ured creditors. Some
of these ilillllediately challenged the validity of the mortgage.
Within a few days an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was
filed and Jones was adjudicated a bankrupt. The mortgaged
property was converted into cash under an agreement with general creditors that it should be deposited to await the ultimate
determination of the rights of the parties. It yielded only $1,634
-leaving nothing for the general creditors if the mortgage is
held valid.
Davis, the trustee in bankruptcy, brought a bill in equity to
set aside the mortgage. The District Court granted the relief
prayed for; and its decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals. Both courts found the facts to be in substance as above
stated and held the mortgage void under § 67 e as having bC'en
made by Jones "with the intent and purpose on his part to
hinder, delay or defraud his creditors,'' to one not a '' purchaser in good faith'' within the meaning of the act. The Circuit Court of Appeals held the mortgage void also as a preferenee
under § 60b, 212 Fed. 88. The case comes to this court upon
appeal; Dean contending that the mortgage is not invalid under
either § 60b or § 67e.
The mortgage was not voidable as a preference under § 60b.
Preference implies paying or securing a pre-existing debt of the
person preferred. The mortgage was given to secure Dean for
a substantially contemporary advance. The bank, not Dean, was
preferred. The use of Dean's money to accomplish this purpose
could not convert the transaction into a preferring of Dean, although he knew of the debtor's insolvency. ~lere circuity of arrangement will not save a transfer which effects a preferenre
from being invalid as such. National Bank v. National Herkimer
County Bank, 225 U. S. 178, 184. But a transfer to a third
person is invalid under this section as a preference only where
that person was acting on behalf of the creditor, as in Re Beerman, 112 Fed. 663, and \Valters v. Zimmerman, 208 Fed. 62, 220
Fed. 805. Here Dean acted on the debtor's behalf in providing
the money and taking up the notes.
But under ~ 67e thP basis of invalidity is mueh broader. It
covers every transfer made hy the bankrupt "within four months
prior to the filing of the pC'tition, with the intent and purpO!';C on
bis part to hinder, delay or defraud ·his creditors, or any of
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them" "except as to purchasers in good faith and for a present

Eair consideration.'' As provided in § 67d, only '' liens given

or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of or in fraud

upon this act" are unassailable. A transfer, the intent (or obvi-

ously necessary effect) of which is to deprive creditors of the

benefits sought to be secured by the Bankruptcy Act, "hinders,

delays or defrauds creditors" within the meaning of § 67e. Van

Iderstine v. National Discount Co., 227 U. S. 575, 582, points out

the distinction between the intent to prefer and the intent to

defraud. A transaction may be invalid both as a preference and

as a fraudulent transfer. It may be invalid only as a preference

or only as a fraudulent transfer. Making a mortgage to secure an

advance with which the insolvent debtor intends to pay a pre-

existing debt does not necessarily imply an intent to hinder,

delay, or defraud creditors. The mortgage may be made in the

expectation that thereby the debtor will extricate himself from a

particular difficulty and be enabled to promote the interest of

all other creditors by continuing his business. The lender who

makes an advance for that purpose with full knowledge of the

facts may be acting in perfect "good faith." But where the

advance is made to enable the debtor to make a preferential pay-

ment with bankruptcy in contemplation, the transaction presents

an element upon which fraud may be predicated. The fact that
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the money advanced is actually used to pay a debt does not

necessarily establish good faith. It is a question of fact in each

case what the intent was with which the loan was sought and

made.

We cannot say that the facts found by the District Court and

affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals were not supported by

the evidence, nor that these courts erred in concluding upon this

evidence that the mortgage was made with the purpose and

intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Jones' creditors, and that

Dean was not, as against general creditors, "a purchaser in good

faith." Jones knew that he was insolvent. He knew that he

was making a preferential payment. He must have known that

suspension of his business and bankruptcy would result from

giving and recording a mortgage of all his property to secure

a note which had matured before the mortgage was executed. The

lower courts were justified in concluding that he intended the

necessary consequences of his act; that he willingly sacrificed his

property and his other creditors to avert a threatened criminal

prosecution; and that Dean, who, knowing the facts, co-operated

them" "except as to purchasers in good faith and for a pre.sent
fair consideration.'' As provided in § 67cl, only ''liens given
or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of or in fraud
upon this act'' are unassailable. A transfer, the intent (or obviously necessary effect) of which is to deprive creditors of the
benefits sought to be secured by the Bankruptcy Act, "hinders,
delays or defrauds creditors'' within the meaning of § 67e. Yan
Iderstine v. National Discount Co., 227 U. S. 575, 582, points ou~
the distinction between the intent to prefer and the intent to
defraud. A transaction may be invalid both as a preference and
as a fraudulent transfer. It may be invalid only as a preference
or only as a fraudulent transfer. l\laking a mortgage to secure an
advance with which the insolvent debtor intends to pay a preexisting debt does not necessarily imply an intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud creditors. The mortgage may be made in the
expectation that thereby the debtor will extricate himself from a
particular difficulty and be enabled to promote the interest of
all other creditors by continuing his business. The lender who
makes an advance for that purpose with full knowledge of the
facts may be acting in perfect "good faith." But where the
advance is made t:o enable the debtor to make a preferential payment with bankruptcy in contemplation, the transa<'tion presents
an element upon which fraud may be predicated. The fact that
the money advanced is actually used to pay a debt does not
necessarily establish good faith. It is a question of fact in each
case what the intent was with which the loan was sought and
made.
We cannot say that the facts found by the District Court and
affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals were not supported by
the evidence, nor that these courts erred in conclujiing upon this
evidence that the mortgage was made with the purpose and
intent to binder, delay, or defraud .Jones' creditors, and that
Dean was not, as against general creditors, ''a purchaser in good
faith." Jones knew that he was insolvent. He knew that he
was making a preferential payment. He must have known that
suspension of his business and bankruptcy would result from
giving and recording a mortgage of all his property to secure
a note which had matured before the mortgage was executed. The
lower courts were justified in concluding that he intended the
necessary eonsequenc('s of his act; that he willingly sa,•rificed his
property and his other creditors to avert a threatened criminal
prosecution; and that Dean, who, knowing the facts, co-operated
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in the bankrupt's fraudulent purpose, lacked the saving good

17

faith.

The conclusion reached by the lower courts is supported by

many decisions of the several District Courts and Circuit Courts

of Appeals, which are referred to in the margin.1 It is in har-

mony with both the Van Iderstine Case, and Coder v. Arts, 213

U. S. 223, 244, upon which appellant particularly relies. In

each of these cases this court refused to hold fraudulent in law a

transfer which the Circuit Court of Appeals had found to be in-

nocent in fact. In the Van Iderstine Case, where a pledge was

held valid, the Circuit Court of Appeals had expressly found

that the pledgee was without knowledge of the debtor's fraudu-

lent intent, if such there was. In Coder v. Arts, where a mort-

1—The court here says, in the

margin: "Cases holding that a mort-

gage is a fraudulent conveyance

where taken as security for a loan

which the lender knows is to be used

to prefer favored creditors, in fraud

of the act: Parker v. Sherman, 129

in the bankrupt's fraudulent purpose, lacked the saving good
faith.
The conclusion reached by the lower courts is supported by
many decisions of the several District Courts and Circuit Courts
of Appeals, which are referred to in the margin. 1 It is in harmony with both the Van Iderstine Case, and Coder v. Arts, 213
U. S. 223, 244, upon which appellant particularly relies. In
each of these eases this court refused to hold fraudulent in law a
transfer which the Circuit Oourt of Appeals had found to be innocent in fact. In the Van Iderstine Case, where a pledge was
held valid, the Circuit Court of Appeals had expressly found
that the pledgee was without knowledge of the debtor's fraudulent intent, if such there was. In Coder v. Arts, where a mort-

C. C. A. 437, 212 Fed. 917 (C. C. A.

2d Circuit); Re Soforenko, 210 Fed.

562 (D. C. Mass.); Johnson v. Dis-
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mukes, 122 C. C. A. 552, 204 Fed.

382 (C. C. A. 5th Circuit); Lumpkin

v. Foley, 122 C. C. A. 542, 204 Fed.

372 (C. C. A. 5th Circuit); Re Lyn-

den Mercantile Co., 156 Fed. 713

(D. C. Wash.); Roberts v. Johnson,

81 C. C. A. 47, 151 Fed. 567 (C. C.

A. 4th Circuit); Re Pease, 129 Fed.

446 (D. C. Mich.). See also Walters

v. Zimmerman, s. c. on appeal, 208

Fed. 62 (D. C. Ohio), 220 Fed. 805

(C. C. A. 6th Circuit).

"Cases upholding the mortgage

security because the lender did not

know that the insolvent borrower in-

tended to make improper payments

to favored creditors—thus indicating

that the mortgage would be fraudu-

lent if such additional fact were

shown: Grinstcad v. Union Sav-

ings & Trust Co.. 190 Fed. 546

(C. C. A. 9lh Circuit); Powell v.

Gate City Bank, 178 Fed. 609

(C. C. A. 8th Circuit); In re

Kulberg, 176 Fed. 585 (D. C.

Minn.); Ohio Valley Bank Co. v.

Mack, 163 Fed. 155 (C. C. A. 6th

Circuit); Stedman v. Bank of Mon-

roe, 117 Fed. 237 (C. C. A. 8th Cir-

cuit); In re Soudan Mfg. Co., 113

Fed. 804 (C. C. A. 7th Circuit).

1' In accord with this view are also

the decisions which hold that a gen-

eral assignment for the benefit of

creditors, though without prefer-

ences, is void under § 67e because

its necessary effect is to hinder, de-

lay or defraud creditors in their

rights and remedies under the Bank-

ruptcy Act. In re Gutwillig, 90 Fed.

475, 92 Fed. 337; Davis v. Bohle,

92 Fed. 325; Rumsey & Sikemier Co.

v. Novelty & Machine Mfg. Co., 99

Fed. 699. See Randolph v. Scruggs,

190 U. S. 533, 536; West Co. v. Lea,

174 U. S. 590, 596.

1-The court here says, in the
margin: ''Cases holding that a mortgage is a fraudulent conveyance
where taken as security for a loan
which the lender knows is to be used
to prefer favored creditors, in fraud
of the act: Parker v. Sherman, 129
C. C. A. 437, 212 Fed. 917 (C. C. A.
2d Circuit); Re Soforenko, 210 Fed.
562 (D. C. Mass.); Johnson v. Dismukes, 122 C. C. A. 552, 204 Fed.
382 ( C. C. A. 5th Circuit) ; Lumpkin
v. Foley, 122 C. C. A. 542, 204 Fed.
372 (C. C. A. 5th Circuit); Re Lyn·
den Merrantile Co., 156 Fed. 713
(D. C. Wash.); Roberts v. Johnson,
81 C. C. A. 47, 151 Fed. 567 (C. C.
A. 4th Circuit); Re Pease, 129 Fed.
446 (D. C. .Mieh.). See also Walters
v. Zimmerman, s. c. on appeal, 208
Fed. 62 (D. C. Ohio), 220 Fed. 805
( C. C. A. 6th Cireuit).
''Cases upholding the mortgage
serurity because the lender did not
know that the insolvent borrower intended to make improper payments
to favored crediton1-thns indirating
that the mortgage would be fraudulent if such additiol}lli fact were
shown: Grinstrad v. L"nion Savin~s & Trn~t C-0.. mo Fed. 546
(C. C. A. 91h f'ir"uit): Powell v.
Gat~ City Bank, 178 Fed. 609
(C. C. A. 8th Circuit); In re

Kulberg, 176 Fed. 585 (D. C.
Minn.); Ohio Valley Bank Co. v.
Mack, 16;{ Fed. 155 (C. C. A. 6th
Circuit); Stedman v. Bank of Monroe, 117 Fed. 237 (C. C. A. 8th Cireuit); In re Soudan Mfg. Co., 1};{
Fed. 804 (C. C. A. 7th Circuit).
''In accord with this view are also
the decisions which hold that a general assignment for the benefit of
creditors, though without preferl'nces, is >oid under § 67e because
its necessary effect is to hinder, de·
lay or defraud creditors in their
rights and remedies under the Bankruptry Act. In re Gutwillig, 90 Fed.
475, 92 Fed. 337; Davis v. Bohle,
92 Fed. 325; Rumsey & Sikemier Co.
v. Novl'lty & Machine Mfg. Co., 99
Fed. 699. See Randolph v. Scruggs,
190 U.S. 5:33, 536; West Co. v. Lea,
174 u. s. 590, 596.
''It is difficult to reroncile the
following cases or dicta in them with
the great weight of authority and
the decisions of this court. In re
Baar, 213 Fed. 628 (C. C. A. 2nd
Cirruit): In re Hersey, 171 Fed.
1004 (D. C. Iowa); Sargent v.
Blake, 160 Fed. 57 ( C. C. A. 8th
Circuit); In re Bloch, 142 Fed. 674
(C. C. A. 2nd Cirruit); Githens v.
Shimer, 112 Fed. 505 (D. C. Pa.)."
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gage was held valid, the Circuit Court of Appeals had found

that, in making the mortgage, the debtor has no intent to hinder,

delay, or defraud creditors, and this court said that, "' in view of

the finding of the Circuit Court of Appeals, it may be that [he]

though including in the conveyance a large amount of his prop-

erty, acted in good faith, with a view to preserving his estate and

enabling him to meet his indebtedness." This court, while de-

claring itself bound by the facts so found, was careful to express

its dissent from the view "that the giving of the mortgage and

its effect upon other creditors could not be considered as an

item of evidence in determining the question of fraud.''

Dean contends also that relief should not have been granted un-

der § 67e because the bill was framed under § 60b. The objec-

tion was not taken in the District Court, although the question

of invalidity under § 67e was elaborately discussed on demurrer

to the bill as well as upon final hearing. Twenty-five other errors

were assigned on the appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals.

This objection was not raised then. It was insisted only that the

evidence did not warrant the finding of fraudulent intent. Sec-

tion 60b seems to have been mainly in the mind of the pleader

when the bill of complaint was drafted, but not exclusively, for

it alleges that the plaintiff as trustee was entitled "to recover

property transferred by said bankrupt in fraud of his cred-
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itors." The answer expressly alleges that the mortgage was ac-

cepted "without any intent or purpose of aiding said Jones to

defraud, delay, or hinder his creditors, and not in contempla-

tion of or in fraud of the bankrupt act, or any of its pro-

visions, believing him to be solvent, and that he would continue

his business." The issue of fraudulent transfer was presented

by the pleadings, was fully tried, and was found against the

appellant. No error was committed.

Decree affirmed.

CARET v. DONOHUE

240 U. S. 430, 60 L. ed. 726, 36 Sup. Ct. 386

(United States Supreme Court. March 13, 1916)

Mr. Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was brought by a trustee in bankruptcy to set aside

a transfer made by the bankrupt of certain real estate. Upon

appeal from a decree in favor of the trustee, it was held hv

gage was held valid, the Circuit Court of Appeals had found
that, in making the mortgage, the debtor has no intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud creditors, and this court said that, ·'in view of
the finding of the Circuit Court of Appeals, it may be that [he]
though including in the conveyance a large amount of his property, acted in good faith, with a view to preserving his estate and
enabling him to meet his indebtedness." This court, while declaring itself bound by the facts so found, was careful to express
its dissent from the view "that the giving of the mortgage and
its effect upon other creditors could not be considered as an
item of evidence in determining the question of fraud. ''
Dean contends also that relief should not have been granted under § 67e because the bill was framed under § 60b. The objection was not taken in the District Court, although the question
of invalidity under § 67e was elaborately discussed on demurrer
to the bill as well as upon final hearing. Twenty-five other errors
were assigned on the appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
This objectio~ was not raised then. It was insisted only that the
evidence did not warrant the finding of fraudulent intent. Section 60b seems to have been mainly in the mind of the pleader
when the bill of complaint was drafted, but not exclusively, for
it alleges that the plaintiff as trustee was entitled ''to recover
property transferred by said bankrupt in fraud of his creditors.'' The answer expressly alleges that the mortgage was accepted "without any intent or purpose of aiding said Jones to
defraud, delay, or binder his creditors, and not in contemplation of or in fraud of the bankrupt act, or any of its provisions, believing him to be solvent, and that he would continue
his business.'' The issue of fraudulent transfer was presented
by the pleadings, was fully tried, and was found against the
appellant. No error was committed.
Decree affirmed.

CAREY v. DONOHUE
240 U. S. 430, 60 L. ed. 726, 36 Sup. Ct. 386
(United States Supreme Court. March 13, 1916)
Mr. Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the court.
This suit was brought by a trustee in bankruptcy to set aside
a transfer made by the bankrupt of certain real estate. Upon
ttppeal from a decree in favor of the trustee, it was held bv
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the Circuit Court of Appeals that the case had been tried, and

the decree was based, upon the theory of preference voidable

under the Bankruptcy Act, and for the purpose of appropriate

amendment to conform the bill to the proof, the decree was

reversed and the cause was remanded. 209 Fed. 328. The

amendment was made accordingly, and the decree was re-entered

and affirmed. 213 Fed. 1021.

The petition in involuntary bankruptcy was filed on January

3, 1911, and the adjudication was had on January 24, 1911.

The following facts appear from the findings: On August 6,

1910, John E. Humphreys (the bankrupt) executed and deliv-

ered to Walter J. Carey (the appellant) the deed in question.

It was left for record on November 15, 1910, with the recording

officer of the proper county, and was recorded. Humphreys

was insolvent at the time of the execution of the deed, and Carey

at that time had reasonable cause to believe that such transfer

to him, if made, would effect a preference, being given in pay-

ment of an antecedent debt. On December 31, 1910, Carey

conveyed the property to innocent purchasers, this deed being

left for record on January 3, 1911. It was held that the latter

conveyance placed the property itself beyond the reach of the

court; and judgment was given in favor of the trustee and

against Carey for the value of the property as found by a jury,
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with provision for the payment by the trustee to the wife of

the bankrupt of the estimated value of her inchoate right of

dower.

We are not concerned with the provisions of the Ohio statute

relating to preferences (General Code, §§ 11,104, 11,105),—a

statute which provides a different test of liability from that of

§ 60 of the Federal act pursuant to which the recovery was had.

(209 Fed. 331, 332.) The sole question presented for the con-

sideration of this court is whether the deed executed by the

bankrupt was one which was "required" to be recorded within

the meaning of this section. If it was not, there could be no

recovery of the property under § 60, as the deed was executed

and delivered more than four months before the petition in

bankruptcy was filed. If the deed was required to be recorded

in the sense of the statute, it is clear that the trustee was entitled

to recover, as the recording was within the four months' period

and the other conditions of recovery were satisfied.

The provision for the recording of the deed is found in § 8543

of the General Code of Ohio, which follows the requirement for

the Circuit Court of Appeals that the case bad been tried, and
the decree was based, upon the theory of preference voidable
under the Bankruptcy Act, and for the purpose of appropriate
amendment to conform the bill to the proof, the decree was
reversed and the cause was remanded. 209 Fed. 328. 'l'he
amendment was made accordingly, and the decree was re-entered
and affirmed. 213 Fed. 1021.
The petition in involuntary bankruptcy was filed on January
3, 1911, and the adjudication was had on January 24, 1911.
The following facts appear from the findings: On August 6,
1910, John E. Humphreys (the bankrupt) executed and delivered to Walter J. Carey (the appellant) the deed in question.
It was left for record on November 15, 1910, with the recording
officer of the proper county, and was recorded. Humphreys
wa.~ insolvent at the time of the execution of the deed~ and Carey
at that time had rt'asonable cause to believe that such transfer
to him, if made, would effect a preference, being given in payment of an antecedent debt. On December 31, 1910, Carey
conveyed the property to innocent purchasers, this derd being
left for record on January 3, 1911. It was held that the latter
conveyance placed the property itself beyond the reach of the
court ; and judgment was given in favor of the trustee and
8.2'ainst Carey for the value of the property as found by a jury,
with provision for the payment by the trustee to the wife of
the bankrupt of the estimated value of her inchoate right of
dower.
We are not concerned with the provisions of the Ohio statute ·
relating to preferences (General Code, § § 11,104, 11,105) ,-a
statute which provides a different test of liability from that of
~ 60 of the Federal act pursuant U> which the rccovrry was had.
(209 14,ed. 331, 332.) The sole question presented for the consideration of this court is whether the dt•ed executed by the
bankrupt was one which was "required" to be recorded within
the meaning of this section. If it was not, there could be no
recovery of the property under § 60, as the <leed was executed
and delivered more than four months before thr prtition in
bankruptcy was filed. If the det>d was rertuircd to be recorded
in the sense of the statute, it is clear that the trustee was entitled
to recover, as the recording was within the four months' period
and the other conditions of recovery were satisfiPd.
The provision for the recording of the deed is found in § 8543
of the General Code of Ohio, which follows the requirement for

20 PREREQUISITES TO ADJUDICATION

20

PREREQUISITES TO ADJUDICATION

the recording of mortgages and powers of attorney. The sec-

tion reads:

"Section 8543. All other deeds and instruments of writing

for the conveyance or encumbrance of lands, tenements, or here-

ditaments executed agreeably to the provisions of this chapter,

shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in

which the premises are situated, and until so recorded or filed

for record, they shall be deemed fraudulent, so far as relates

to a subsequent bona fide purchaser having, at the time of the

purchase, no knowledge of the existence of such former deed or

instrument.''

Referring to this section, the Supreme Court of Ohio said in

Dow v. Union Nat. Bank, 87 Oh. St. 173, 181: "This provision

of the statute must be accepted as exclusively defining the con-

sequences which follow a failure to file a deed for record, and

there being mere neglect, unaccompanied by any fraudulent

conduct or representation on the part of the grantee, no right

can accrue to anyone other than such bona fide purchaser."

Accordingly, it was held that the mere failure to record a deed

did not render it invalid as to creditors of the grantor although

they became such on the faith of his representation that he was

still the owner of the property conveyed. This decision applied

the ruling in Wright v. Franklin Bank, 59 Oh. St. 80, 92, 93,
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where it was said: "Lands held by a properly executed but

unrecorded deed are also free from the debts of the grantor,

whether attempted to be reached in an assignment for the bene-

fit of creditors made by him, or upon an attachment, judgment,

or execution against him. The title under such a deed is good

as against everything except a subsequent bona fide purchaser

without notice. • • • Mortgages so executed, whether on an

estate in real property or on only an interest therein, take effect

from the time of the delivery to the recorder, and deeds so

executed, conveying the estate or only an interest therein, that

is, an equity, take effect from delivery, except as against sub-

sequent bona fide purchasers without notice, and as against such

the deed must be also recorded." In the present case, the Court

of Appeals was satisfied that in equity the instrument (which

was absolute in form) should be treated as a mortgage, but the

court did not think this to be important because of the holding

of the Ohio court that an instrument in this form, "unlike a

legal mortgage, operates upon delivery to transfer title and so

is required to be recorded as a deed." 209 Fed. 334, 335;

the recording of mortgages and powers of attorney. The section reads:
' 'Section 8543. All other deeds and instruments of writing
for the conveyance or encumbrance of lands, tenements, or hereditaments executed agreeably to the provisions of this chapter,
shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in
which the premises are situated, and until so recorded or filed
for record, they shall be deemed fraudulent, so far 88 relates
to a subsequent bona fide purchaser having, at the time of the
purchase, no knowledge of the existence of such former deed or
instrument.''
Referring to this section, the Supreme Court of Ohio said in
Dow v. Union Nat. Bank, 87 Oh. St. 173, 181: "This provision
of the statute must be accepted 88 exclusively defining the consequences which follow a failure to file a deed for record, and
there being mere neglect, unaccompanied by any fraudulent
conduct or representation on the part of the grantee, no right
can accrue to anyone other than such bona fide purchaser."
Accordingly, it was held that the mere failure to record a deed
did not render it invalid as to creditors of the grantor although
they became suc.'h on the faith of his representation that he was
still the owner of the property conveyed. This decision applied
the ruling in Wright v. Franklin Bank, 59 Oh. St. 80, 92, 93,
where it was said: "Lands held by a properly executed but
unrecorded deed are also free from the debts of the grantor,
whether attempted to be reached in an assignment for the benefit of creditors made by him, or upon an attachment, judgment,
or execution against him. The title under such a deed is good
as against everything except a subsequent bona fide purchaser
without notice. • • • Mortgages so executed, whether on an
estate in real property or on only an interest therein, take effect
from the time of the delivery to the recorder, and deeds so
executed, conveying the estate or only an interest therein, that
is, an equity, take effect from delivery, except as against subsequent bona fide purchasers without notice, and as against such
the deed must be also recorded.'' In the present case, the Court
of Appeals was satisfied that in equity the instrument (which
was absolute in form) should be treated as a mortgage, but the
eourt did not think this to be important because of the holding
of the Ohio court that an instrument in this form, "unlike a
legal mortgage, operates upon delivery to transfer title and so
is required to be recorded as a deed.'' 209 Fed. 334, 335;
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Kemper v. Campbell, 44 Oh. St. 210, 218; Wright v. Franklin

Bank, 59 Oh. St. 95; Cole v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 15 Ohio

C. C. (N. S.) 315, 347.

Under these decisions, then, we assume that there was no

requirement that this conveyance should be"recorded in order

to give it validity as against any creditor of the bankrupt,

whether a general creditor, or a lien creditor, or a judgment

creditor with execution returned unsatisfied; that is, as against

any class of persons represented by the trustee or with whose

"rights, remedies, and powers" he was to be deemed to be vested.

Bankruptcy Act, § 47a. This fact, the appellant contends, makes

recovery impossible under § 60; while the appellees insist that

the provision in the interest of subsequent bona fide purchasers

constitutes a requirement of recording which entitles a trustee

to recover for the benefit of creditors. With respect to the

construction of the clause in question, there has been diversity

of opinion in the Circuit Courts of Appeals. In the Sixth,

Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, the view has been taken that the

word "required" refers "to the character of the instrument

giving the preference" without regard to the persons in whose

favor the requirement is imposed; that is, if the transfer is re-

quired to be recorded as to anyone, the trustee may recover if
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it has not been recorded more than four months before the filing

of the petition in bankruptcy. See Loeser v. Savings Bank

(C. C. A. Sixth), 148 Fed. 975, 979 (followed by the decision

in the present case); In re Beckhaus (C. C. A. Seventh), 177

Fed. 141 (see In re Sturtevant (C. C. A. Seventh), 188 Fed.

196); First Nat. Bank v. Connett (C. C. A. Eighth), 142

Fed. 33, 36; Mattley v. Giesler (CCA. Eighth), 187 Fed.

970, 971. A different conclusion has been reached in the Second,

Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. See In re Boyd (C. C A. Second),

213 Fed. 774; Meyer Drug Co. v. Pipkin Drug Co. (C C. A.

Fifth), 136 Fed. 396; In re Mcintosh (C. C. A. Ninth), 150

Fed. 546; also In re Hunt (D. C. N. Y.), 139 Fed. 283.

In its original form, § 60 made no reference to record. 30

Stat. 562. The four months ran from the time of the giving of

the preference, and if this period had elapsed when the bank-

ruptcy proceeding was instituted, there could be no recovery

under § 60, whether the transfer had, or had not. been recorded.

See Humphrey v. Tatman, 198 U. S. 91; Rogers v. Page, 140

Fed. 596, 599. But a different rule was established for com-

puting the time within which a petition in bankruptcy might

Kemper v. Campbell, 44 Oh. St. 210, 218; Wright v. Franklin
Bank, 59 Oh. St. 95; Cole v. Merchants :\'at. Bank, 1:> Ohio
C. C. (N. S.) 315, 347.
Under these decisions, then, we assume that there was no
requirement that this conveyance should be ·recorded in order
to give it validity as against any creditor of the bankrupt,
whether a general creditor, or a lien creditor, or a judgment
creditor with execution returned unsatisfied ; that is, as against
any class of persons represented by the trustee or with whose
"rights, remedies, and powers" he was to be deemed to be vested.
Bankruptcy Act, § 47a. This fact, the appellant contends, makes
recovery impo~ible under § 60; while the appellees insist that
the provision in the interest of subsequent bona fide purchasers
constitutes a requirement of recording which entitles a trustee
to recover for the benefit of creditors. With respect to the
construction of the clause in question, there has been diversity
of opinion in the Circuit Courts of Appeals. In the Sixth,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, the view has been ta.ken that the
word "required" refers "to the character of the instrument
giving the preference" without regard to the persons in whose
favor the requirement is imposed; that is, if the transfer is required to be recorded as to anyone, the trustee may recover if
it has not been recorded more than four months before the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy. See Loeser v. Savings Bank
(C. C. A. Sixth), 148 Fed. 975, 979 (followed by the decision
in the present case) ; In re Beckhaus ( C. C. A. Seventh), 177
Fed. 141 (see In re Sturtevant (C. C. A. Seventh), 188 Fed.
196); First Nat. Bank v. Connett (C. C. A. Eighth), 142
Fed. 33, 36; Mattley v. Giesler (C. C. A. Eighth), 187 Fed.
970, 971. A different conclusion has been reached in the Second,
Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. See In re Boyd (C. C. A. Second),
213 Fed. 774; Meyer Drug Co. v. Pipkin Drug Co. (C. C. A.
Fifth), 136 Fed. 396; In re Mcintosh (C. C. A. Ninth), 150
Fed. 546; also In re Hunt (D. C. N. Y.), 139 Fed. 283.
In its original form, § 60 made no reference to record. 30
Stat. 562. The four months ran from the time of the giving of
the preference, and if this period had elapsed when the bankruptcy proceeding was instituted, there could be no recovery
under § 60, whether the transfer had, or had not. been reeorded.
See Humphrey v. Tatman, 198 U. S. 91; Rogers v. Page, 140
Fed. 596, 599. But a different rule was established for computing the time within which a petition in bankruptcy might
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be filed. In § 3b, it was provided that the four months' period

should not expire "until four months after (1) the date of

the recording or registering of the transfer * • • when the

act consists in having made a transfer * * • for the pur-

pose of giving a preference • • * if by law such recording

or registering is required or permitted, or, if it is not, from

the date when the beneficiary takes notorious, exclusive, or con-

tinuous possession of the property unless the petitioning credi-

tors have received actual notice of such transfer." 30 Stat.

546, 547. This distinction between the test of the right to in-

stitute bankruptcy proceedings and the test of the right to re-

cover from one who had received a transfer alleged to be a

preference lay in the terms of the act and could not rightly

be ignored. It was urged that the result was to encourage secret

preferential transactions; but the wisdom of the prescribed con-

dition of recovery from the preferred creditor, and the ad-

visability of conforming the provision of § 60 to that of § 3b

was a matter for legislative, not judicial, consideration. To

secure this conformity, an amendment to § 60 was proposed in

Congress in the year 1903. As passed by the House of Represen-

tatives, it added to § 60a the following clause: '' Where the

preference consists in a transfer, such period of four months

shall not expire until four months after the date of the recording
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or registering of the transfer, if by law such recording or reg-

istering is required or permitted, or if not, from the date when

the beneficiary takes notorious, exclusive, or continuous posses-

sion of the property transferred." Cong. Rec. 57th Cong. 1st

Sess. vol. 35, pt. 7, pp. 6938, 6943. The Senate struck from this

proposed amendment all that follows the words, "if by law such

recording or registering is required," and as thus limited the

amendment was adopted by Congress. Cong. Rec. 57th Cong.

2d Sess. vol. 36, pt. 1, p. 1036; act of Feb. 5, 1903, chap. 487,

32 Stat. 797, 799, 800; In re Hunt, 139 Fed. 286. There is no

hasis for the assumption that the words which the House of

Representatives had desired to add were ultimately deemed to

be surplusage, for these words had an obviously distinct sig-

nificance and they had been included in § 3b, which in this re-

spect remained unchanged. "We cannot but regard the action

of Congress as a deliberate refusal to conform the requirements

of § 60 to those of § 3b, and we are not at liberty to supply

by construction what Congress has clearly shown its intention

to omit. It should also be observed that § 60 was again under

be filed. In § 3b, it was provided that the four months' period
should not expire "until four months after (1) the date of
the recording or registering of the transfer • • • when the
act consists in having made a transfer • • • for the purpose of giving a preference • • • if by law such recording
or registering is required or permitted, or, if it is not, from
the date when the beneficiary takes notorious, exclusive, or continuous possession of the property unless the petitioning creditors have received actual notice of such transfer." 30 Stat.
546, 547. This distinction between the test of the right to institute bankruptcy proceedings and the test of the right to recover from one who had received a transfer alleged to be a
'preference lay in the terms of the act and could n<>t rightly
be ignored. It was urged that the result was to encourage secret
preferential transactions; but the wisdom of the prescribed condition of recovery from the preferred creditor, and the advisability of conforming the provision of § 60 to that of ·§ 3h
was a matter. for legislative, not judicial, consideration. To
secure this oonformity, an amendment to § 60 was proposed in
Congress in the year 1903. As passed by the House of Representatives, it added to § 60a the following clause: ''Where the
preference consists in a transfer, such period of four months
shall not expire until four months after the date of the recording
or registering of the transfer, if by law such recording or registering is required or permitted, or if not, from the date when
the beneficiary takes notorious, exclusive, or continuous possession of the property transferred.'' Cong. Rec. 57th Cong. 1st
Sess. vol. 35, pt. 7, pp. 6938, 6943. The Senate struck from this
proposed amendment all that follows the words, ''if by law such
recording or registering is required,'' and as thus limited the
amendment was adopted by Congress. Cong. Rec. 57th Cong.
2d Sess. vol. 36, pt. 1, p. 1036; act of Feb. 5, 1903, chap. 487,
32 Stat. 797, 799, 800; In re Hunt, 139 Fed. 286. There is no
basis for the assumption that the words which the House of
Representatives bad desired to add were ultimately deemed to
be surplusage, for these words had an obviously distinct significance and they had been included in ~ 3b, which in this respect remained unchanged. We cannot but regard the action
of Congress as a deliberate refusal to conform the requirements
of § 60 to those of § 3b, and we are not at liberty to supply
by construction what Congrcss has clearly shown its intention
to omit. It should also be observed that § 60 was again under
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consideration by Congress in the year 1910, and it was again

amended; but the last sentence of § 60a, as inserted in 1903, was

left unaltered. And the same conditional clause—"if by law

recording or registering thereof is required"—was used in the

amended subdivision b. Whatever argument is made for an ex-

tension of the clause, in order more completely to conform it to

the language of § 3b, we must disregard as addressed to a matter

solely of legislative policy.

As Congress did not undertake in § 60 to hit all preferential

transfers (otherwise valid) merely because they were not dis-

closed, either by record or possession, more than four months

before the bankruptcy proceeding, the inquiry is simply as to

the nature of the requirement of recording to which Congress

referred. The character of the transfer itself, both with respect

to what should constitute a transfer and its preferential effect,

had been carefully defined. It is plain that the words are not

limited to cases where recording is required for the purpose

of giving validity to the transaction as between the parties.

For that purpose, no amendment of the original act was needed,

as in such a case there could be no giving of a preference with-

out recording. But in dealing with a transfer, as defined, which,

though valid as between the parties, was one which was "re-

quired" to be recorded, the reference was necessarily to a require-
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ment in the interest of others who were in the contemplation

of Congress in enacting the provision. The natural, and, we

think, the intended, meaning, was to embrace those cases in

which recording was necessary in order to make the transfer

valid as against those concerned in the distribution of the in-

solvent estate; that is, as against creditors, including those whose

position the trustee was entitled to take. This gives effect to

the amendment and interprets it in consonance with the spirit

and purpose of the Bankruptcy Act. See Senate Report, No.

691, Sixty-first Cong. 2d Sess., p. 8. In the present case, there

was no requirement of recording in favor of creditors, either

general creditors or lien creditors. The requirement of the ap-

plicable law was solely in favor of subsequent bona fide pur-

chasers without notice. These subsequent purchasers are en-

tirely outside of the purview of the Bankruptcy Act. The

proceeding in bankruptcy is not, in any sense, in their interest,

and the trustee does not represent them. We can find no ground

for the conclusion that the clause "if by law recording or reg-

istering thereof is required" had any reference to requirements

consideration by Congress in the year 1910, and it was again
amended; but the last sentence of ~ 60a, as inserted in rnoa, was
lrft unaltered. And the same eonditioual clause-" if by law
recording or registering thereof is required' '-was used in the
amended subdivision b. Whatever argument is ma<le for an extension of the clause, in order more completely to conform it to
the language of § 3b, we must disregard as addressed to a matter
solely of legislative policy.
As Congress did not undertake in § 60 to hit all preferential
transfers (otherwise valid) merely because they were not disclosed, either by record or possession, more than four months
before the bankruptcy proceeding, the inquiry is simply as to
the nature of the requirement of recording to which Congress
referred. The character of the transfer itself, both with respect
to what should constitute a transfer and its preferential effect,
had been carefully defined. Jt is plain that the words are not
limited to cases where recording is required for the purpose
of giving validity to the transaction as between the parties.
For that purpose, no amendment of the original act was needed,
as in such a case there could be no giving of a preference without recording. But in dealing with a transfer, as defined, which,
though valid as between the parties, was one which was ''required'' to be recorded, the reference was necessarily to a requirement in the interest of others who were in the contemplation
of Congress in enacting the provision. The natural, and, we
think, the intended, meaning, was to embrace those eases in
which recording was necessary in order to make the transfer
valid as against those concerned in the distribution of the insolvent estate; that is, as against creditors, including those whose
position the trustee was entitled to take. This gives effect to
the amendment and interprets it in consonance with the spirit
and purpose of the Bankruptcy Act. See Senate Report, No.
691, Sixty-first Cong. 2d Sess., p. 8. In the present case, there
was no requirement of recording in favor of creditors, either
general creditors or lien creditors. The requirement of the applicable law was solely in favor of subsequent bona fide purchasers without notice. These subsequent purchasers are entirely outside of the purview of the Bankruptcy Act. The
proceeding in bankruptcy is not, in any sense, in their interest,
and the trustee does not represent them. We can find no ground
for the conclusion that the clause "if by law recording or registering thereof is required" had any reference to requirements
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in the interest of persons of this description. The limitation

of the provision to those transfers which are "required" to be

recorded under the applicable law is not to be taken to be an

artificial one by which the rights of creditors are made to depend

upon the presence or absence of local restrictions adopted, alio

intuitu., in the interest of others. Rather, as we have said, we

deem the reference to be to requirements of registry or record

which have been established for the protection of creditors,— the

persons interested in the bankrupt estate, and in whose behalf,

or in whose place, the trustee is entitled to act . And where, as

in this case, there is no such requirement, and the transfer was

made more than four months before the filing of the petition in

bankruptcy, there can be no recovery under § 60.

In this view, the decree must be reversed and the cause re-

manded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

MARTIN v. COMMERCIAL NATIONAL BANK

245 U. S. 513, 62 L. ed. 441, 38 Sup. Ct. 176

(United States Supreme Court. January 14, 1918)

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the court.

As security for money presently loaned to him in good faith

by the Commercial National Bank, one Virgin executed and

delivered a mortgage upon his stock of merchandise at Macon,

in the interest of persons of this description. The limitation
of the provision to those transfers which are "required" to be
recorded under the applicable law is not to be taken to be an
artificial one by which the rights of creditors are made to depend
upon the presence or absence of local restrictions adopted, alio
intuitu, in the interest of others. Rather, as we have said, we
deem the reference to be to requirements of registry or record
which have been established for the protection of creditors,- the
persons interested in the bankrupt estate, and in whose behalf,
or in whose place, the trustee is entitled to act. And where, as
in this case, there is no such requirement, and the transfer was
made more than four months before the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy, there can be no recovery under § 60.
In this view, the decree must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-16 12:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4307691
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Georgia, February 16, 1914. It was recorded August 20, 1914,

when the bank knew of his insolvency. The next day involuntary

bankruptcy proceedings were instituted and in due time he was

MARTIN v. COMMERCIAL NATIONAL BANK

adjudged bankrupt and a trustee appointed. Recordation of

the mortgage was not fraudulently delayed and prior thereto

245 U. S. 513, 62 L. ed. 441, 38 Sup. Ct. 176

no other liens were fixed upon the property. Both trustee and

other creditors objected to the bank's claim as one entitled to

(United States Supreme Court. January 14, 1918)

priority "on the ground that the mortgage was recorded within

the four months period preceding bankruptcy, at a time when

the mortgagor was insolvent, and when the mortgagee knew that

he was insolvent, and that the recording of the mortgage would

effect a preference, and that the transfer arising from the re-

cording of the instrument was nonoperative, and that the instru-

ment must be held as not recorded." Their contention here is

thus stated:

"The trustee does n«t say in this case that his lien is older

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the court.
As security for money presently loaned to him in good faith
by the Commercial National Bank, one Virgin executed and
delivered a mortgage upon his stock of merchandise at Macon,
Georgia, February 16, 1914. It was recorded August 20, 1914,
when the bank knew of his insolvency. The next day involuntary
bankruptcy proceedings were instituted and in due time he was
adjudged bankrupt and a trustee appointed. Recordation of
the mortgage was not fraudnlently delayed and prior thereto
no other liens were fixed upon the property. Both trustee and
other creditors objected to the bank's claim as one entitled to
priority "on the ground that the mortgage was recorded within
the four months period preceding bankruptcy, at a time when
the mortgagor was insolvent, and when the mortgagee knew that
he was insolvent, and that the recording of the mortgage would
effect a preference, and that the transfer arising from the recording of the instrument was nono}'erative, and that the instrument must be held as not recorded." Their contention here is
thus stated :
''The trustee does net say in this case that his lien is older
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than the bank's and therefore he comes ahead of the bank, but

he says that the bank's lien is invalid and inoperative, because

recorded while the bankrupt was insolvent, etc., and that, being

a subsequent lienholder, the trustee is in the proper position to

attack the bank's lien. The bank's lien is invalid only by the

positive inhibition of the statute, section 60b. It is for this

reason invalid just as a transfer made (instead of recorded)

within this four months' period is invalid by reason of the in-

hibition of the Bankruptcy Law." "The record of an instru-

ment is required as to any particular person if the instrument

must be recorded to be good against him. If the subsequent

lienor is entitled to priority unless the antecedent mortgage is

recorded, such mortgage is required to be recorded as to him.

The trustee is a subsequent lienor. Unless the mortgage is re-

corded he, the trustee, is entitled to priority. It is therefore

'required' to be recorded as to him."

The referee allowed the claim as preferred and the Circuit

Court of Appeals approved his action. 228 Fed. 651.

* • * Section 3260, Georgia Code of 1910, declares that

"Mortgages not recorded within the time required remain

valid as against the mortgagor, but are postponed to all other

liens created or obtained, or purchases made prior to the actual
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record of the mortgage. If, however, the younger lien is created

by contract, and the party receiving it has notice of the prior

unrecorded mortgage, or the purchaser has the like notice, then

the lien of the older mortgage shall be held good against them.''

Construing this section, in Hawes v. Glover, 126 Ga. 305, 317,

the Supreme Court held: "A mortgage is perfectly valid as

between the parties thereto, though never recorded. Hardaway

v. Semmes, 24 Ga. 305; Gardiner v. Moore, 51 Ga- 268; Myers v.

Picquet, 61 Ga. 260; Civil Code, § 2727 (Park's Ann. Code,

§ 3260). If it is not recorded, or, as in this case, is illegally

recorded, the only effect is to postpone it to purchases made, or

liens procured by contract, without notice of its existence or to

liens obtained by operation of law."

Section 60b, Bankruptcy Act, has been specially considered

by us in two recent cases—Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co.,

239 U. S. 268, and Carey v. Donohue, 240 U. S. 430. In the

first the company installed an ice machine for Grant Brothers at

Horton, Kansas, during February, under a conditional sale con-

tract of earlier date and recorded May 15th following, when

the purchasers were known to be insolvent; July 11th they be-

than the bank's and therefore he comes ahead of the bank, but
he says that the bank's lien is invalid and inoperative, because
recorded while the bankrupt was insolvent, etc., and that, beiug
a subsequent lienholder, the trustee is in the proper position to
attack the bank's lien. The bank's lien is invalid only by the
positive inhibition of the statute, section 60b. It is for this
reason invalid just as a transfer made (instead of recorded)
within this four months' period is invalid by reason of the inhibition of the Bankruptcy Law.'' ''The record of an instrument is required as to any particular person if the instrument
must be recorded to be good against him. If the subsequent
lienor is entitled to priority unless the antecedent mortgage is
recorded, such mortgage is required to be recorded as to him.
The trustee is a subsequent lienor. Unless the mortgage is recorded he, the trustee, is entitled to priority. It is therefore
4
required' to be recorded as t-0 him.''
The referee allowed the claim as preferred and the Circuit
Court of Appeals approved his action. 228 Fed. 651.
• • • Section 3260, Georgia Code of 1910, declares that
""Mortgages not recorded within the time required remain
valid as against the mortgagor, but are postponed to all other
liens created or obtained, or purchases made prior to the actual
record of the mortgage. If, however, the younger lien is created
by contract, and the party receiving it has notice of the prior
unrecorded mortgage, or the purchaser has the like notice, then
the lien of the older mortgage shall be held good against them."
Construing this section, in Hawes v. Glover, 126 Ga. 305, 317,
the Supreme Court held: ''A mortgage is perfectly valid as
between the parties thereto, though never recorded. Hardaway
v. Semmes, 24 Ga. 305 ; Gardiner v. :\Ioore, 51 Ga. 268 ; Myers v.
Picquet, 61 Ga. 260; Civil Code, § 2727 (Park's Ann. Code,
§ 3260). If it is not recorded, or, as in this case, is illegally
recorded, the only effect is to postpone it to purchases made, or
liens procurt>d hy contract, without notice of its existence or to
liens obtained by operation of law."
Section 60b, Bankruptcy Act, has been specially considered
by us in two recent cases-Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co.,
239 U. S. 268, and Carey v. Donohue, 240 U. S. 430. In the
first the C'ompany installed an ice machine for Grant Brothers at
Horton, Kansas, during February, under a conditional sale contract of earlier date and recorded May 15th following, when
the purchasers were known to be insolvent; July 11th they be-
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came bankrupt. Such a contract is valid under the laws of

Kansas as between the parties whether recorded or not, but

void as against a creditor of the vendee who fastens a lien upon

the property by execution, attachment or like process prior to

recording. The vendors demanded the machine. The trustee

maintained § 47a, Bankruptcy Act, gave him the status of

a lienholder prior to recordation and that the contract, having

been put to record within four months, operated as a preference

voidable under § 60b. We held the trustee occupied the

status of a creditor with a lien fixed as of the date when the

bankruptcy proceedings commenced and that he could not assail

the contract under the state law; further, that § 60b refers

to an act whereby the bankrupt surrenders or incumbers his

property for the benefit of a particular creditor, thereby dimin-

ishing the estate which should be applied to all; the contract

in question did not operate as a preferential transfer; the prop-

erty was not the bankrupts'; but the vendor's; the former were

not to become owners until the condition was performed; and

there was no diminution of the estate.

In Carey v. Donohue the trustee sought to set aside a real

estate transfer executed more than four months before bank-

ruptcy, but recorded within that time. Under the Ohio statute
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conveyances of land until filed for record are deemed fraudulent

as to subsequent bona fide purchasers without knowledge, but

recording is not essential to their validity as against any creditor,

whether general creditor, lien creditor, or judgment creditor

with execution returned unsatisfied, that is, as against any class

of persons represented by a trustee in bankruptcy or with whose

rights, remedies, and powers he is deemed to be vested. We

denied the trustee's contention and, among other things, de-

clared: "Required" has regard to persons in whose favor the re-

quirement is imposed. '' Congress did not undertake in § 60 to

hit all preferential transfers (otherwise valid), merely because

they were not disclosed, either by record or possession, more

than four months before the bankruptcy proceedings." "It is

plain that the words are not limited to cases where recording

is required for the purpose of giving validity to the transaction

as between the parties. For that purpose, no amendment of

the original act was needed, as in such a case there could be

no giving of a preference without recording." "In dealing

with a transfer, as defined, which, though valid as between the

parties, was one which was 'required' to be recorded, the refer-

came bankrupt. Such a contract is valid under the laws of
Kansas as between the parties whether recorded or not, but
void as against a creditor of the vendee who fastens a lien upon
the property by execution, attachment or like process prior to
recording. The vendors demanded the machine. The trustee
maintained § 47a, Bankruptcy Act, gave him the status of
a lienholder prior to recordation and that the contract, having
been put to record within four months, operated as a preference
voidable under § 60b. We held the trustee occupied the
status of a creditor with a lien fixed as of the date when the
bankruptcy proceedings commenced and that he could not assail
the contract under the state law; further, that § 60b refers
to an act whereby the bankrupt surrenders or incumbers his
property for the benefit of a particular creditor, thereby diminishing the estate which should be applied to all; the contract
in question did not operate as a preferential transfer; the property was not the bankrupts'; but the vendor's; the former were
not to become owners until the conaition was performed; and
there was no diminution of the estate.
In Carey v. Donohue the trustee sought to set aside a real
estate transfer executed more than four months before bankn1ptcy, but recorded within that time. Under the Ohio statute
conveyances of land until filed for record are deemed fraudulent
as to subsequent bona fide purchasers without knowledge, but
recording is not essential to their validity as against any creditor,
whether general creditor, lien creditor, or judgment creditor
with execution returned unsatisfied, that is, as against any class
of persons represented by a trustee in bimkruptcy or with whose
rights, remedies, and powers he is deemed to be vested. We
denied the trustee's contention and, among other things, declared : ''Required'' bas regard to persons in whose favor the requirement is imposed. ''Congress did not undertake in § 60 to
hit all preferential transfers (otherwise valid), merely because
they were not disclosed, either by record or possession, more
than four months before the bankruptcy proceedings." "It is
plain that the words are not limited to cases where recording
is required for the purpose of giving validity to the transaction
as between the parties. For that purpose, no amendment of
the original act was needed, as in such a case there could be
no giving of a preference without recording." "In dealing
with a transfer, as defined, which, though valid as between the
parties, was one which was 'required' to be recorded, the refer-
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ence was necessarily to a requirement in the interest of others

who were in the contemplation of Congress in enacting the pro-

vision." "The intended meaning was to embrace those cases

in which recording was necessary in order to make the transfer

valid as against those concerned in the distribution of the in-

solvent estate; that is, as against creditors, including those whose

position the trustee was entitled to take."

The word "required" in § 60b refers directly to statutes

in many states relating to recording which through various

forms of expression seek to protect creditors by providing that

their rights shall be superior to transfers while off the record.

Recognizing the beneficial results of these enactments and in-

tending that rights based thereon might be utilized for the ad-

vantage of bankrupt estates, Congress inserted (amendment of

1910) the clause "or of the recording or registering of the

transfer if by law recording or registering thereof is required."

In Carey v. Donohue we pointed out that purchasers are not

of those in whose favor registration is "required," but that the

reference is to persons concerned in the distribution of the

estate, i. e., "creditors including those whose position the trustee

was entitled to take." And we think it properly follows that

before a trustee may avoid a transfer because of the provision
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in question he must in fact represent or be entitled to take the

place of some creditor whose claim actually stood in a superior

position to the challenged transfer while unrecorded and within

the specified period.

The Georgia statute imposes the requirement of registration

only in favor of a creditor who fixes a lien on the property be-

fore recording takes place. Here there is no such person—the

trustee occupies the status of one who acquired a lien after that

event. No one concerned in the distribution of the estate actually

held rights superior to the mortgage while off the record.

The judgment of the court below is correct, and must be

Affirmed.

In re IRISH

228 Fed. 573

(District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania. December 28, 1915)

DICKINSON, District Judge. This case has taken on a very

practical phase and is disposed of with this in view. The real

ence was necessarily to a requirement in the interest of others
who were in the contemplation of Congress in enacting the provision.'' ''The intended meaning was to embrace those cases
in which recording was necessary in order to make the transfer
valid as against those concerned in the distribution of the insolvent estate; that is, as against creditors, including those whose
position the trustee was entitled to take.''
The word ''required'' in § 60b refers directly to statutes
in many states relating to recording which through various
forms of expression seek to protect creditors by providing that
their rights shall be superior to transfers while off the record.
Recognizing the beneficial results of these enactments and intending that rights based thereon might be utilized for the advantage of bankrupt estates, Congress inserted (amendment of
1910) the clause "or of the recording or registering of the
transfer if by law recording or registering thereof is required.''
In Carey v. Donohue we pointed out that purchasers are not
of those in whose favor registration is "required," but that the
reference is to persons concerned in the distribution of the
estate, i. e., ''creditors including those whose position the trustee
was entitled to take." And we think it properly follows that
·before a trustee may avoid a transfer because of the provision
in question he must in fact represent or be entitled to take the
place of some creditor whose claim actually stood in a superior
position to the challenged transfer while unrecorded and within
the specified period.
The Georgia statute imposes the requirement of registration
only in favor of a creditor who fixes a lien on the property before recording takes place. Here there is no such person-the
trustee occupies the status of one who acquired a lien after that
event. No one concerned in the distribution of the estate actually
held rights superior to the mortgage while off the record.
The judgment of the court below is correct, and must be
Affirmed.

In re IRISH
228 Fed. 573
(District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania. December 28, 1915)
DICKINSON, District Judge. This case has taken on a very
practical phase and is disposed of with this in view. The real

28

PREREQUISITES TO ADJUDICATION

28 . PREREQUISITES TO ADJUDICATION

question involved is whether an insolvent, whose sole disclosed

asset is real estate, may confess a judgment to his wife in an

amount fully equal to the value of the real estate, and through

the lien thus acquired absorb all the assets, and by merely with-

holding execution escape bankruptcy proceedings against him.

The petition of creditors as filed avers what was done to have

been the act of bankruptcy set forth in clause (3) of section

3a. It has been authoritatively ruled by the courts of this dis-

trict that the things charged to have been done by the bankrupt

do not constitute the act of bankruptcy set forth in this clause.

This has been since settled for us as the law in Citizens' Banking

Co. v. Ravenna Bank, 234 U. S. 360.

We have in consequence the admission of counsel for petition-

ing creditors that the petition is not self-supporting. This

situation is met by a request to amend, so that the petition may

aver the acts of bankruptcy defined in clauses (1) and (2) of

the same section. It is argued for petitioners that the cause

may proceed to an adjudication on these grounds, if unchal-

lenged by an answer. Apparently counsel for the bankrupt feel

embarrassed in meeting this argument, because the facts upon

which the judgment of the court must proceed do not get upon

the record until the amended petition has been filed. They, in

consequence, adhere to the position that the present petition
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discloses no basis for an adjudication, and the proceedings, be-

cause of this, should be dismissed. To meet this situation we

allow an amendment to the petition to be filed averring any

act of bankruptcy which the petitioners may feel justified in

alleging, provided the amended petition is kept within the gen-

eral scope of the facts set forth in the original petition. Such

amended proceedings will be subject to any motion which the

bankrupt may make, or the bankrupt may make answer thereto,

as if said amended petition had been originally filed.

If such amended petition be not filed in 10 days, an order

dismissing the proceedings may be entered.

In re IRISH

238 Fed. 411

(District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania. December 22, 1916)

DICKINSON, District Judge. Aside from the mere formality

of statement in the petition, the real question involved in this

question involved is whether an insolvent, whose sole disclosed
asset is real estate, may confess a judgment to his wife in a.n
amount fully equal to the value of the real estate, and throu_gh
the lien thus acquired absorb all the assets, and by merely with. holding execution escape bankruptc_y proceedings against him.
The petition of creditors a& filed avers what was done to have
been the act of bankruptcy set forth in clause (3) of section
3a. It has been authoritatively ruled by the courts of this district that the things charged to have been done by the bankrupt
do not constitute the act of bankruptcy set forth in this clause.
This has been since settled for us as the law in Citizens' Banking
Co. v. Ravenna Bank, 234 U. S. 360.
We have in consequence the admission of counsel for petitioning creditors that the petition is not self-supporting. This
situation is met by a request to amend, so that the petition may
aver the acts of bankruptcy defined in clauses (1) and (2) of
the same section. It is argued for petitioners that the cause
may proceed to an adjudication on these grounds, if unchallenged by an answer. Apparently counsel for the bankrupt feel
embarrassed in meeting this argument, because the facts upon
which the judgment of the court must proceed do not get upon
the record until the amended petition has been filed. They, in
consequence, adhere to the position that the present petition
discloses no basis for an adjudication, and the proceedings, because of this, should be dismissed. To meet this situation we
allow an amendment to the petition to- be filed averring any
act of bankn1ptcy which the petitioners may feel justified in
alleging, provided the amended petition is kept within the general scope of the facts Sf't forth in the original petition. Such
amended proceedings will be subject to any motion which the
bankrupt may make, or the bankrupt may make answer thereto,
as if said amended petition had been originally filed.
If such amended petition be not filed in 10 days, an order
dismissing the proceedings may be entered.
In re IRISH

238 Fed. 411
(District Court, E. D. Pennsyh:ania. December 22, 1916)
DICKINSON, District Judge. Aside from the mere. formality
of st11tement in tl1e petition, the real question involved in this
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motion can be most clearly presented in two propositions. One

is whether an insolvent debtor, who is the owner of real estate

which he desires and intends to convey or transfer out of the

reach of creditors, and intends further to defraud creditors or

to prefer one of them, and for the accomplishment of this pur-

pose confesses a judgment for a sum in excess of the value of

the property, execution upon which judgment, however, is with-

held until after four months from the entry of the judgment,

has committed an act of bankruptcy under clauses 1 or 2 of

section 3a. The other proposition is whether such act is a cause

of bankruptcy, if, instead of confessing the judgment, the in-

solvent debtor, for the same purpose and intent as before stated,

is a party to the bringing of an action against himself and the

entry of a like judgment by default.

The substantial question above stated is formally raised by

the petition in this case. It avers an act of bankruptcy in the

language of clause 1 and also in the language of clause 2, but

the positive averments thus made are qualified by the statement

that the conveyance or transfer charged to have been made was

made through the expedient or device of the recovery of a judg-

ment such as outlined above. The real question is, we think,

involved in the first proposition, because we are of opinion that

there is no distinction between the judgments entered in the
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different ways mentioned.

The weight of the argument in favor of the motion to dismiss

is felt in the expression of the thought that Congress has made

a distinction between the confession of a judgment and the con-

veyance or transfer of property similar to that which was rec-

ognized by the courts of Pennsylvania under the acts regulating

assignments for the benefit of creditors. The distinction is

between a conveyance or other transfer through the operation

of which title to property directly passes and the confession

of a judgment through an execution upon which title to property

may indirectly but eventually pass. Based upon this distinction,

the courts of Pennsylvania held that a judgment confessed to

a trustee for creditors was not an assignment for the benefit

of creditors, notwithstanding the fact that the entry of the judg-

ment was immediately followed by the issuing of an execution

through and by which the property of the defendant, real or

personal, was sold and transferred.

The argument has further weight in the attitude of the pro-

fessional mind on the subject of confessed judgments unaccom-

motion can be most clearly presented in two propositions. One
is whether an insolvent debtor, who is the owner of real estate
which he desires and intends to convey or transfer out of the
reach of creditors, and intends further to defraud. creditors or
the accomplishment of this purto prefer one of them, and
pose confesses a judgment for a sum in excess of the value of
the property, execution upon which judgment, however, is withheld until after four months from the entry of the judgment,
has committed an act of bankruptcy under clauses 1 or 2 of
section 3a. The other proposition is whether such act is a cause
of bankruptcy, if, instead of confessing the judgment, the insolvent debtor, for the same purpose and intent as before stated,
is a party to the bringing of an action against himself and the
entry of a like judgment by default.
The substantial question above stated is formally raised by
the petition in this case. It avers an act of bankruptcy in the
language of clause 1 and also in the language of clause 2, but
the positive averments thus made are qualified by the statement
that the conveyance or transfer charged to have been made was
made through the expedient or device of the recovery of a judgment such as outlined above. The real question is, we think,
involved in the first proposition, because we are of opinion that
there is no distinction between the judgments entered in the
different ways mentioned.
The weight of the argument in favor of the motion to dismiss
is felt in the expression of the thought that Congress has made
a distinction between the confession of a judgment and the conveyance or transfer of property similar to that which was recognized by the eourts of Pennsylvania under the acts regulating
assignments for the benefit of creditors. The distinction is
between a conveyance or other transfer through the operation
of whi<'h title to property directly passes and the confession
of a judgment through an exeeution upon which title to property
may indirectly but eventually pass. Based upon this distinction,
the courts of Pennsylvania held that a judgment confessed to
a trustee for creditors was not an assignment for the benefit
of creditors, notwithstanding the fact that the entry of the judgment was immediately followed by the issuing of an execution
through and by which the property of the defendant, real or
personal, was sold and transferred.
'J'he argument has further weight in the attitude of the professional mind on the subject of confessed judgments unaccom-

for
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panied with execution, and in the consideration that the mere

entry of a judgment left creditors free to pursue all lawful

remedies which were theirs. There is also room for the thought

that the bankruptcy laws embodied the policy of Congress not

to force bankruptcy proceedings upon a struggling debtor unless

certain clearly defined causes of bankruptcy existed, and that

the thought of Congress was that it would be unwise to make

the mere entry of a judgment an act of bankruptcy, because

this would hamper needy defendants in getting aid through

whatever credit they still retained.

The weight of the argument addressed to us on the other side

resides in this: If the real intent and purpose of a debtor was

the fraudulent one of withdrawing property from the reach of

his creditors, or the unlawful one of securing payment to one

creditor to the prejudice of others, and the means through and

by which this is sought to be accomplished is, in substance and

reality, a conveyance or transfer of his property, it is an in-

tolerable thought that the law will sanction the accomplishment

of this fraudulent or unlawful purpose out of deference to the

mere form which the transaction may be made to assume. Each

view is presented through arguments of almost equal strength,

and the scales of judgment are left almost on a balance. The

device to which this alleged bankrupt has had resort (if his
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purpose was as averred by the petitioning creditors) is so ancient

and so common that at first blush it seems strange that the

question has not been before raised and decided. Indeed the

very common practice of failing debtors, after they had passed

the verge of insolvency, to save their property to themselves

or members of their families, or to prefer a friendly creditor

through the device of a confessed judgment, has always been

advanced by advocates of a bankrupt law as in itself a sufficient

reason for the enactment of such a law. The change from a

confessed judgment to a recovered judgment is but a step.

The fact that the specific question now raised has never before

been definitely ruled is accounted for, on the one hand, by the

assertion that no creditors before these petitioners have ever

thought the question worth raising, and, on the other, by the

conflicting assertion that no debtor has before thought that such

a device as that here resorted to would be effective. It has, of

course, been frequently ruled that the mere confession of a

judgment without an accompanying execution is not a cause

of bankruptcy within the meaning of clause 3. This is because

panied with execution, and in the consideration that the mere
entry of a judgment left creditors free to' pursue all lawful
remedies which were theirs. There is alBo room for the thought
that the bankruptcy laws embodied the policy of Congress not
to force bankruptcy proceedings upon a struggling debtor unless
certain clearly de.fined causes of bankruptcy existed, and that
the thought of Congress was that it would be unwise to make
the mere entry of a judgment an act of bankruptcy, because
this would hamper needy defendants in getting aid through
whatever credit they still retained.
The weight of the argument addressed to us on the other side
resides in this : If the real intent and purpose of a debtor was
the fraudulent one of withdrawing property from the reach of
his creditors, or the unlawful one of securing payment to one
creditor to the prejudice of others, and the means through and
by which this is sought to be accomplished is, in sU'bstance and
reality, a conveyance or transfer of his property, it is an intolerable thought that the law will 88.Ilction the accomplishment
of this fraudulent or unlawful purpose out of deference to the
mere form which the transaction may be made to assume. Each
view is presented through arguments of almost equal strength,
and the scales of judgment are left almost on a balance. The
device to which this alleged bankrupt has had resort (if his
purpose was as averred by the petitioning creditors) is so ancient
and so common that at first blush it seems strange that the
question has not been before raised and decided. Indeed the
very common practice of failing debtors, after they had passed
the verge of insolvency, to save their property to themselves
or members of their families, or to prefer a friendly creditor
through the device of a confessed judgment, has always been
advanced by advocates of a bankrupt law as in it.self a sufficient
reason for the enactment of such a law. The change from a
confessed judgment to a recovered judgment is but a step.
The fact that the specific question now raised has never before
been definitely ruled is accounted for, on the one-h&nd, by the
assertion that no creditors before the.se petitioners have ever
thought the question worth raising-, and, on the other, by the
conflicting assertion that no debtor has before thought that such
a device as that here reBOrted to would be effective. It has, of
course, been frequently ruled that the mere confession of a
judgment without an accompanying execution is not a cause
of bankruptcy within the meaning of clause 3. This is because
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of the very terms of that clause. It has indeed, with the present

acquiescence of the petitioning creditors, been so ruled in this

very case. In re Irish (D. C.) 228 Fed. 573.

All considerations arising under clause 3 have been laid at

rest for us by the ruling in Citizens' Bank v. Ravenna Bank,

234 U. S. 360, 34 Sup. Ct. 806, 58 L. Ed. 1352, in which the

conflicting views of policy which were settled by Congress are

most clearly set forth. It is manifest, however, that the ruling

in that case was confined to the quoted section of the act, and

leaves untouched (otherwise than by implication) what con-

stitutes a cause of bankruptcy under either clause 1 or clause

2. In order to bring the discussion down to the specific ques-

tion now raised, it may be observed that the acts of Congress

enumerate five distinct separate and different causes of bank-

ruptcy. It may therefore be fairly assumed that Congress had

in mind five different things which an alleged bankrupt might

have done. Those designated as 4 and 5 we may dismiss as not

here involved. The first condemns as a cause of bankruptcy the

actual fraud of an insolvent debtor who attempts to put his

property beyond the reach of his creditors by any conveyance,

transfer, concealment, or removal, or by permitting such con-

cealment or removal by others. The second visits a like con-
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demnation upon the unlawful act of transferring property with

the intent to prefer a creditor, although the debt be an honest

one and there is no fraud in fact. The third condemnation is

aimed at the act (otherwise lawful) of permitting a creditor to

secure a judgment and proceed to a sale, coupled with the further

negative act of not having prevented such creditor from pro-

curing a preference. It will be observed that the thing which

is declared to be a cause of bankruptcy is again one which may

come about, not only without any intent on the part of the

debtor to either commit actual fraud or to permit an unlawful

preference, but may be something which he is powerless to

prevent.

This brings us to the real broad question now presented of

whether there may be another thing done by an insolvent, which

Congress has not made a cause of bankruptcy, or whether this

is included in clauses 1 or 2, to wit, confessing or permitting a

judgment with the actual intent to defraud creditors, or with

the unlawful intent to prefer a creditor through having the

judgment ripen into a transfer of property.

It may be assumed that Congress meant the bankruptcy laws

of the very terms of that clause. It has indeed, with the present
acquiescence of the petitioning creditors, been so ruled in this
very case. In re Irish (D. C.) 228 I•"cd. 573.
All considerations arising under clause 3 have been laid at
rest for us by the ruling in Citizens' Bank v. Ravenna Bank,
234 U. S. 360, 34 Sup. Ct. 806, 58 L. Ed. 1352, in which tbt>
conflicting views of policy which were settled by Congress are
most clearly set forth. It is ma.nifeRt, however, that the ruling
in that case was confined to the quoted section of the act, and
leaves untouched (otherwise than by implication) what constitutes a cause of bankruptcy under either clause 1 or clause
2. In order to bring the discussion down to the specific question now raised, it may be observed that the acts of Congress
enumerate five distinct separate and different causes of bankruptcy. It may therefore be fairly assumed that Congress had
in mind five different things which an alleged bankrupt might
have done. Those designated as 4 and 5 we may dismiss as not
here involved. The first condemns as a cause of bankruptcy the
actual fraud of an insolvent debtor who attempts to put his
property beyond the reach of his creditors by any conveyance,
transfer, concealment, or removal, or by permitting such concealment or removal by others. The second visits a like condemnation upon the unlawful act of transferring property with
the intent to prefer a creditor, although the debt he an honest
one and there is no fraud in fact. The third condemnation is
aimed at the act (otherwise lawful) of permitting a creditor to
secure a judgment and proceed to a sale, coupled with the further
ne.gative act of not having prevented such creditor from procuring a preference. It will be observed that the thing which
is declared to be a cause of bankruptcy is again one which may
come about, not only without any intent on the part of the
debtor to either commit actual fraud or to permit an unlawful
preference, but may be something which he is powerless to
prevent.
This brings us to the real broad question now presented of
whether there may be another thing done by an insolvent, which
Congress has not made a cause of bankruptcy, or whether this
is included in clauses 1 or 2, to wit, confessing or permitting a
judgment with the actual intent to defraud creditors, or with
the unlawful intent to prefer a creditor through having the
judgment ripen into a transfer of propPrty.
It may be assumed that Congress meant the bankruptcy laws
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to embrace all proper causes of bankruptcy, and, further, that

it had in mind the device of entering judgments in order to

defraud creditors or to give a preference, and also the practice

of debtors who were struggling against insolvency to resort to

confessed judgments as an honest means of raising money, as

well as the possibility that a judgment might be entered against

such a debtor by an uneasy creditor.

All these considerations constitute the balancing of advantages

and disadvantages by Congress before declaring its will, to which

reference is made in the opinion in the Ciitzens' Bank v. Ravenna

Dank Case. That of which we are in search is this declared

will. The thought is readily grasped that it was the purpose

of Congress to include all such fraudulent and unlawful judg-

ments in clauses 1 and 2. The thought is as easily grasped that

Congress did not mean to interfere with needy or unfortunate

debtors against whom judgments not followed by executions

might be entered, and that they left this means of avoiding

bankruptcy open to them, notwithstanding the use of such judg-

ments might be abused by debtors actuated by a fraudulent

or unlawful purpose.

A review of the authorities which the industry of counsel has

brought to our attention may not be out of place, even at the

cost of lengthening an already overlong opinion.
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We pass the case of Wilson v. Bank, 84 U. S. (17 Wall.) 473,

21 L. Ed. 723, with the comment that it was ruled upon the

question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding

of unlawful intent in a proceeding to avoid an alleged prefer-

ence. The phrases quoted by counsel for the alleged bankrupt

merely voice the two thoughts that there is nothing wrong in

a debtor not resisting the collection of a just debt, nor can any

inference of fraud be drawn from the mere fact that he inter-

posed no defense to such an action.

Sleek v. Turner, 76 Pa. 142, and Louchheim v. Henzey, 86

Pa. 350, are to the same effect that "mere passive nonresistance

of the defendant to the recovery of a judgment" for an honest

debt will not justify (of itself) an inference of actual fraud

or unlawful intent.

In considering the language of an opinion, we cannot be too

often reminded that it must be read in the light of the subject-

matter to which it relates. Some provisions of the acts of Con-

gress discussed deal with the actual intent and purpose of the

debtor or creditor, others denounce a particular act as unlaw-

to embrace all proper causes of bankruptcy, and, further, that
it had in mind the device of entering judgments in order to
defraud creditors or to give a preference, and also the practice
of debtors who were struggling against insolvency to resort to
confessed judgments as an honest means of raising money, as
well as the possibility that a judgment might be entered against
such a <leLtor by an uneasy creditor.
AI.I these considerations constitute the balancing of advantages
and disadvantages by Congress before declaring its will, to which
reference is made in the opinion in the Ciitzens' Bank v. Ravenna
Dank Case. That of which we are in search is this declared
will. The thought is readily grasped that it was the purpose
of Congress to include all such fraudulent and unlawful judgments in clauses 1 and 2. The thought is as easily grasped that
Congress did not mean to interfere with needy or unfortunate
dl•htors against whom judgments not followed by executions
might be entered, and that they left this means of avoiding
bankruptcy open to them, notwithstanding the use of such judgments might be abused by debtors actuated by a fraudulent
or unlawful purpose.
A review of the authorities which the industry of counsel has
brought to our attention may not be out of place, even at the
cost of lengthening an already overlong opinion.
We pass the case of Wilson v. Bank, 84 U. S. (17 Wall.) 473,
21 L. Ed. 723, with the comment that it was ruled upon the
question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding
of unlawful iutent in a proceeding to avoid an alleged preference. The phrases quoted by counsel for the alleged bankrupt
merely voice the two thoughts that there is nothing wrong in
a debtor not resisting the collection of a just debt, nor can any
inference of fraud be drawn from the mere fact that he interposed no defense to sueh an action.
Sleek v. Turner, 76 Pa. 142, and Louchheim v. Henzey, 86
Pa. 350, are to the same effect that "mere passive nonresistance
of the defendant to the recovery of a judgment'' for an honest
debt will not justify (of itself) an inference of actual fraud
or unlawful intent.
In considering the language of an opinion, we cannot be too
often reminded that it must be read in the light of the subjeetmatter to which it relates. Some provisions of the acts of Congress discussed deal with the actual intent and purpose of the
debtor or creditor, others denounce a particular act as unlaw-
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ful because against the declared policy of the law, irrespective

of the intent of the parties, or the otherwise innocent character

of the act. The importance of this distinction is pointed out in

the majority opinion in Wilson v. Nelson, 183 U. S. 191, 22

Sup. Ct. 74, 46 L. Ed. 147, wherein it is held that intent enters

into clauses 1 and 2, but has no place in clause 3, which deals

wholly with results.

It may be further observed that the broad question with

which we are now dealing does not concern itself with the lexical

meaning of the words employed, because Congress has carefully

defined the sense in which the words are used. Nor is more

than very general aid afforded by adjudged cases dealing with

a different state of facts.

Pirie v. Chicago Co., 182 U. S. 438, 21 Sup. Ct. 906, 45 L.

Ed. 1171, for instance, merely rules that payment of moneys

is a transfer of property within the meaning of the preference

provisions of the act.

In the Nusbaum Case (D. C.) 18 Am. Bankr. Rep. 598, 152

Fed. 835, there was both a judgment and an execution sale.

These were held to be a transfer within the meaning of the act,

and to constitute a cause of bankruptcy under clause 1, and

also clause 2, as well as clause 3, there being also present the
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actual intent to defraud and to prefer.

The Tupper Case (D. C.) 20 Am. Bankr. Rep. 824, 163 Fed.

766, is of value to us in the respect of the expression of the

opinion that the omission of an averment of intent to defraud

prevented the judgment there operating as a cause of bank-

ruptcy under clause 1, and because of the implication that if

such intent had been averred, a cause of bankruptcy would have

been set forth.

In re Truitt (D. C.) 29 Am. Bankr. Rep. 570, 203 Fed. 550,

approaches more closely to a ruling of the question before us.

It rules the confession of a judgment to have been a transfer

of the real estate of the defendant within the meaning of the

bankruptcy law, and the averment of this fact, together with

the averment of an intent to prefer, to have been the setting

forth of a cause of bankruptcy under clause 2. There is involved

as an -essential ingredient the positive act of the debtor in the

procurement of the judgment. The ruling under the facts there

present covers a confessed judgment, but not an adverse one,

and because of some expressions in the opinion carries the im-

ful because against the declared policy of the law, irrespective
of the intent of the parties, or the otherwise innocent character
of the act. The importance of this distinction is pointed out in
the majority opinion in Wilson v. Nelson, 183 U. S. 191, 22
Sup. Ct. 74, 46 L. Ed. 147, wherein it is held that intent enters
into clauses 1 and 2, but has no place in clause 3, which deals
wholly with results.
It may be further observed that the broad question with
which we are now dealing does not concern itself with the lexical
meaning of the words employed, because Congress has carefully
defined the sense in which the words are used. Nor is morC'
than very general aid afforded by adjudged cases dealing with
a different state of facts.
Pirie v. Chicago Co., 182 U. S. 438, 21 Sup. Ct. 906, 45 L.
Ed. 1171, for instance, merely rules that payment of moneys
is a _transfer of property within the meaning of the preference
provisions of the act.
~n the Nusbaum Case (D. C.) 18 Am. Bankr. Rep. 598, 152
Fed. 835, there was both a judgment and an execution sale.
These were held to be a transfer within the meaning of the act,
and to constitute a cause of bankruptcy under clause 1, and
also clause 2, 88 well 88 clause 3, there being also present the
actual intent to defraud and to prefer.
The Tupper Case ( D. C.) 20 Am. Bankr. Rep. 824, 163 Fed.
766, is of value to us in the respect of the expression of the
opinion that the omission of an averment of intent to defraud
prevented the judgment there operating as a cause of bankruptcy under clause 1, and because of the implication that if
such intent had been averred, a cause of bankruptcy would have
been set forth.
In re Truitt (D. C.) 29 Am. Bankr. Rep. 570, 203 Fed. 550,
approaches more closely to a ruling of the question before us.
It rules the confession of a judgment to have been a transfer
of the real estate of the defendant within the meaning of the
bankruptcy law, and the averment of this fact, together with
the averment of an intent to prefer, to have been the setting
forth of a cause of bankruptcy under clause 2. There is involved
as an 'es.c;;ential ingredient the positive act of the debtor in the
procurement of the judgment. The ruling under the facts there
present covers a confessed judgment, but not an adverse om~,
and because of some expressions in the opinion carries the im·
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plication that the ruling would not apply to any other than

confessed judgments.

Another case (without the implication) to the same effect is

supplied by In re Musgrove Mining Co. (D. C.) 37 Am. Bankr.

Rep. 628, 234 Fed. 99. Judgments there had been confessed,

but no executions had issued. It was conceded that no cause of

bankruptcy under clause 3 existed. The judgments, however,

were held to be transfers under clause 2, the averment appear-

ing of an intent to prefer.

The trend of judicial opinion is therefore with the petitioners

upon the main proposition advanced by them that a lien upon

real estate, through which a sale can be effected, is a transfer

within the meaning of clauses 1 and 2. We by no means regard

the question as free from doubt, nor have we found the rea-

soning upon which the rulings were based to be in all respects

convincing. They have, however, been made, and have so far

been uniform. It seems, therefore, to us to be the wiser course

to follow them until some commanding voice directs otherwise.

The ruling now made may properly be said to be an advance

upon those cited, as in a sense it is. The space between the two

classes of cases is, we think, well bridged by the averments of

the petition. The act is directly charged to be the act of the

alleged bankrupt . It is (according to the authorities quoted)
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a transfer. This transfer is averred to have been the act of

the defendant in the judgment. We see in this respect no dif-

ference between the case of one debtor who, in order to defraud

his creditors, appends his name to a judgment note upon which

judgment is entered by the prothonotary and another who, in

furtherance of a like fraudulent purpose, appends his signature

to a plain promissory note, upon which is brought an action

in which judgment is likewise recovered. The acts differ, of

course, in form, but in intent and purpose and final results they

are the same. The intent may be better concealed, and there-

fore more difficult to prove, in the one case than in the other,

but we are dealing now with what the petitioners have averred,

not with what they will be able to prove, and the act here is

averred to have been the affirmative act of the defendant as

positively as it could have been had the judgment been con-

fessed. To hold there is no difference between a judgment and

a transfer, if each was for an unlawful purpose, and yet balk

at ignoring the difference in the mere form of the judgment,

savors too much of straining at gnats while swallowing camels.

The motion to dismiss is denied.

plication that the ruling would not apply to any other than
confessed judgments.
Another case (without the implication) to the same effect is
supplied by In re Musgrove Mining Co. (D. C.) 37 Am. Ban.Irr.
Rep. 628, 234 Fed. 99. Judgments there had been confessed,
but no executions had issued. It was conceded that no cause of
bankruptcy under clause 3 existed. The judgments, however,
were held to be transfers under clause 2, the averment appearing of an intent to prefer.
The trend of judicial opinion is therefore with the petitioners
upon the main proposition advanced by them that a lien upon
real estate, through which a sale can be effected, is a transfer
within the meaning of clauses 1 and 2. We by no means regard
the question as free from doubt, nor have we found the reasoning upon which the rulings were based to be in all respects
convincing. They have, however, been made, and have so far
been uniform. It seems, therefore, to us to be the wiser course
to follow them until some commanding voice directs otherwise.
The ruling now made may properly be said to be an advance
upon those cited, as in a sense it is. The space between the two
classes of case.s is, we think, well bridged by the averments of
the petition. The act is directly charged to be the act of the
alleged bankrupt. It is (according to the authorities quoted)
a transfer. This transfer is averred to have been the act of
the defendant in the judgment. We see in this respect no difference between the case of one debtor who, in order to defraud
his creditors, appends his name to a judgment note upon which
judgment is entered by the prothonotary and another who, in
furtherance of a like fraudulent purpose, appends his signaturt>
to a plain promi~ry note, upon which is brought an action
in which judgment is likewise recovered. The acts differ, of
course, in form, but in intent and purpose and final results they
are the same. The intent may be better concealed, and therefore more difficult to prove, in the one case than in the other,
but we are dealing now with what the petitioners have averred,
not with what they will be able to prove, and the act here is
averred to have been the affirmative act of the defendant as
positively as it could have been had the judgment been confessed. To hold there is no difference betwetm a judgment and
a transfer, if each was for an unlawful purpose, and yet balk
at ignoring the difference in the mere form of the judgment,
savors too much of straining at gnats while swallowing camels.
The motion to dismiss is denied.
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GOLDEN HILL DISTILLING COMPANY v. LOGUE

243 Fed. 342, 156 C. C. A. 122

GOLDEN HILL DISTILLING COMPANY v. LOGUE

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. June 30, 1917)

Shortly before judgment was taken and a levy made, as stated

243 Fed. 342, 156 C. C. A. 122

in the opinion, a receiver was appointed under the mortgage on

the bankrupt's stock and fixtures, and a few days later the re-

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. June 30, 1917)

ceiver was discharged on a motion in support of which affidavits

were introduced tending to show that Hornstein was not insol-

vent, but that his assets were considerably in excess of his

liabilities.

Hornstein conducted a saloon in Cleveland. The Distilling

Company was his chief creditor, having control of a chattel

mortgage which covered all his tangible assets, and having, also,

an unsecured debt of about $1,200, represented by a cognovit

note. Its manager, Bayer, was generally familiar with Horn-

stein's affairs. Hornstein's only asset, not covered by the chattel

mortgage, was his license, which had a transfer value of $2,500.

After certain proceedings, which need not be recounted, the

Distilling Company took judgment on the cognovit note and

caused the tangible property to be seized on the chattel mortgage

and a levy to be made by the sheriff upon Hornstein's interest

in the license. The sheriff thereupon advertised this interest
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for sale. After the notice had been running about two weeks,

Hornstein's wife was appointed his guardian, upon the ground

of his mental incompetency, and she thereupon filed, in the

court where the judgment had been rendered, a motion to set

it aside, and obtained a preliminary injunction against the sale.

Her claim was that the debt had been paid. Upon this claim,

there was a hearing upon the merits. The court decided that

no part of the debt was successfully impeached, and denied

the motion and dissolved the injunction. Thereupon, and on

the same day, the sheriff sold the license to a third person, and

paid over to the Distilling Company the $1,200. On the next

day, a petition in bankruptcy was filed and the remainder of

the license price was eventually turned over by the sheriff to

the trustee in bankruptcy. The trustee filed, in the bankruptcy

court, a petition against the Distilling Company, asking the

recovery of this $1,200 as a preference, and asking, also, a judg-

ment for the value of goods returned by Hornstein to the Dis-

tilling Company shortly before the collapse, alleging that this

Shortly before judgment was taken and a levy made, as stated
in the opinion, a receiver was appointed under the mortgage on
the bankrupt's stock and fixtures, and a few days later the receiver was discharged on a motion in support of which affidavits
were introduced tending to show that Hornstein was not insolvent, but that his assets were considerably in excess of his
liabilities.
Hornstein conducted a saloon in Cleveland. The Distilling
Company was his chief creditor, having control of a chattel
mortgage which covered all his tangible assets, and having, also,
an unsecured debt of about $1,200, represented by a cognovit
note. Its manager, Bayer, was generally familiar with Hornstein 's affairs. Hornstein 's only asset, not covered by the chattel
mortgage, was his license, which had a transfer value of $2,500.
After certain proceedings, which need not be recounted, the
Distilling Company took judgment on the cognovit note and
caused the tangible property to be seized on the chattel mortgage
and a levy to be made by the sheriff upon Hornstein 's interest
in the license. The sheriff th'e reupon advertised this interest
for sale. After the notice had been running about two weeks,
Hornstein 's wife was appointed his guardian, upon the ground
of his mental incompetency, and she thereupon filed, in the
court where the judgment had been rendered, a motion to set
it aside, and obtained a preliminary injunction against the sale.
Her claim was that the debt had been paid. Upon this claim,
there was a hearing upon the merits. The court decided that
no part of the debt was successfully impeached, and denied
the motion and dissolved the injunction. Thereupon, and on
the same day, the sheriff sold the license to a third person, and
paid over to the Distilling Company the $1,200. On the next
day, a petition in bankruptcy was filed and the remainder of
the license price was eventuaJiy turned over by the sheriff to
the trustee in bankruptey. The tn1stee filed, in the bankruptcy
court, a petition against the Distilling Company, asking the
re<'overy of this $1,200 as a preference, and asking, also, a judgment for the value of goods returned by Hornstein to the Distilling Company shortly before the collapse, alleging that this
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return of goods was a preference. Upon the petition, summons

was issued, the Distilling Company answered and the issue was

tried before the District Judge (a jury having been duly waived),

and he made findings of fact and law and entered judgment for

the trustee for both amounts sued for. The Distilling Company

brings error.

DENISON, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

*•••••#*

The Distilling Company next urges that the receipt by a plain-

tiff in execution of the amount of his judgment paid over to

him by the sheriff from the proceeds of an execution sale, does

not constitute a preference which is recoverable under section

return of goods was a preference. Upon the petition, summons
was issued, the Distilling Company answered and the issue was
tried before the District Judge (a jury having been duly waived),
and he made findings of fact and law and entered judgment for
the trustee for both amounts sued for. The Distilling Company
brings error.
DENISON, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

60b. The argument is both that the judgment against Horn-

stein, after the exhaustion of the unsuccessful efforts made in

his behalf, could no longer be said to have been "procured

or suffered" by him, and that it is the intent of the section

to legislate only against unsatisfied judgments without disturb-

ing the status of the creditor who has, by execution sale, real-

ized his judgment before bankruptcy petition filed. These two

matters are sufficiently related to justify considering them to-

gether. We find no authoritative construction of the section

in either particular, and we must determine its intent as best

we may without such aid.
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We find the subject of preference, resulting from legal pro-

ceedings, treated of by more or less similar language in at least

three sections. Section 3, cl. (3), defining acts of bankruptcy,

sections 60a and 60b, defining preferences and the right to re-

cover them, and section 67c, providing for the dissolution of

liens obtained in legal proceedings, all relate to the general

purpose of securing equality among creditors and as against

an effort of a creditor to collect by law on his own account.

All three must be read together, and yet, it is quite impossible

to bring them into detailed harmony. The preference, which

is an act of bankruptcy, is only an execution levy or analogous

lien which has been "suffered or permitted" to come into ex-

istence and which is allowed to continue until five days before

the execution sale (Citizens' Bank v. Ravenna Bank, 234 U. S.

360, 34 Sup. Ct. 806, 58 L. Ed. 1352); the judgments regulated

by section 60 are those which the bankrupt "procured or suf-

fered" to be entered against him; and the liens reached by

section 67c are invalid only if the lien was "sought and per-

mitted" with the intent to work a forbidden preference. In

Wilson v. City Bank, 84 U. S. (17 Wall.) 473, 21 L. Ed. 723,

The Distilling Company·next urges that the receipt by a plaintiff in execution of the amount of his judgment paid over to
him by the sheriff from the .proceeds of an execution sale, does
not constitute a preference which is recoverable under section
60b. The argument is both that the judgment against Hornstein, after the exhaustion of the unsuccessful efforts made in
his behalf, could no longer be said to have been ' ' procured
or suffered'' by him, and that it is the intent of the section
to legislate only against unsatisfied judgments without disturbing the status of the creditor who has, by execution sale, realized his judgment before bankruptcy petition filed. These two
matters are sufficiently related to justify considering them together. We find no authoritative construction of the section
in either particular, and we must determine its intent as best
we may without such aid.
We find the subject of preference, resulting from legal proceedings, treated of by more or less similar language in at least
three sections. Section 3, cl. (3), defining acts of bankruptcy,
sections 60a and 60b, defining preferences and the right to recover them, and section 67c, providing for the dissolution of
liens obtained in legal proceedings, all relate to the general
purpose of securing equality among creditors and as against
an effort of a creditor to collect by law on his own account.
All three must be read together, and yet, it is quite impossible
to bring them into detailed harmony. The preference, which
is an act of bankruptcy, is only an execution levy or analogous
lien which has been "suffered or permitted'' to come into existence and which is allowed to continue until five days before
the execution sale (Citizens' Bank v. Ravenna Bank, 234 U. S.
360, 34 Sup. Ct. 806, 58 L. Ed. 1352); the judgments regulated
by section 60 are those which the bankrupt "procured or suffered'' to be entered against him ; and the liens reached by
section 67c are invalid only if the lien was "sought and permitted" with the intent ro work a forbidden preference. In
Wilson v. City Bank, 84 U. S. (17 Wall.) 473, 21 L. Ed. 723,
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the court had to determine the validity, under the act of 1867

(14 Stat. 517, c. 176), of an execution lien existing in thai

form upon the property of the debtor at the time the petition

in bankruptcy was filed, but it was necessary to consider both

the provisions which defined an act of bankruptcy and those

which permitted the recovery of a preference. The conclusions

of the court were:

"(1) That something more than passive nonresistance of an

insolvent debtor to regular judicial proceedings, in which a

judgment and levy on his property are obtained, when the debt

is due and lie is without just defense to the action, is necessary

to show a preference of a creditor, or a purpose to defeat or

delay the operation of the Bankrupt Act.

"(2) That the fact that the debtor under such circumstances

does not file a petition in bankruptcy is not sufficient evidence

of such preference or of intent to defeat the operation of the act.

"(3) That, although the judgment creditor in such case may

know the insolvent condition of the debtor, his levy and seizure

are not void under the circumstances, nor any violation of the

bankrupt law.

"(4) That a lien thus obtained by him will not be displaced

by subsequent proceedings in bankruptcy against the debtor,
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though within four months of the filing of the petition."

In Wilson v. Nelson, 183 U. S. 191, 22 Sup. Ct. 74, 46 L. Ed.

147, the act of 1898 was involved. The sole question to decide

was whether the judgment shown by that record had been "suf-

fered or permitted" within the meaning of clause (3) of sec-

tion 3. The judgment had been entered and the execution levy

made without the consent or knowledge of the debtor, but by

virtue of a cognovit note. The majority of the court held that

such a judgment was to be deemed "suffered or permitted"

within the meaning of this section; there were four dissenting

judges adopting the contrary view. The opinion of the majority

was based largely, if not essentially, upon the idea that by

changing the language "procured or suffered," found in the

act of 1867, and construed by Wilson v. City Bank, into "suf-

fered or permitted," Congress had indicated its purpose that

the active intent of the debtor to evade the equality of the

Bankruptcy Act should no longer be the criterion, and that,

therefore, the giving or allowing to continue the cognovit note

which put it out of the debtor's power to resist the entry of a

the court had to determine the validity, under the act of 1867
(14 Stat. 517, c. 176), of an execution lien existing in tlrnL
form upon the property of the debtor at the time the pctiti:.:; ,
in bankruptcy was filed, but it was necessary to consider both
the provisions which defined an act of bankruptcy and those
which permitted the recovery of a preference. The conclusions
of the court were:
'' ( 1) That something more than passive nonresistance of an
insolvent debtor to regular judicial proceedings, in which a
judgment and levy on his property are obtained, when the debt
is due and he is without just defense to the action, is necessary
to show a preference of a creditor, or a purpose to defeat or
delay the operation of the Bankrupt Act.
"(2) That the fact that the debtor under such circumstances
does not file a petition in bankruptcy is not sufficient evidence
of such preference or of intent to defeat the operation of the art.
"(3) That, although the judgment creditor in such case may
know the insolvent condition of the debtor, his levy and seizure
are not void under the circumstances, nor any violation of the
bankrupt law.
'' ( 4) That a lien thus obtained by him will not be displaced
by subsequent proceedings in bankruptcy against the debtor,
though within four months of the filing of the petition."
In Wilson v. Nelson, 183 U. S. 191, 22 Sup. Ct. 74, 46 L. "Ed.
147, the act of 1898 was involved. The sole question to decide
was whether the judgment shown by that record had been "suffered or permitted" within the meaning of clause (3) of section 3. The judgment had been entered and the execution levy
made without the consent or knowledge of the debtor, but by
virtue of a cognovit note. The majority of the court held th«~
such a judgment was to be deemed ''suffered or permitted''
within the meaning of this section; there were four dissenting
judges adopting the contrary view. The opinion of the majority
was based largely, if not essentially, upon the idea that by
changing the language ''procured or suffered,'' found in the
act of 1867, and construed by Wilson v. City Bank, into "suffered or permitted," Congress had indicated it~ purpose that
the active intent of the debtor to evade the equality of the
Bankruptcy Act should no longer be the criterion, and that,
therefore, the giving or allowing to continue the rognovit note
which put it out of the debtor's power to resist the entry of a
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judgment when desired, was a sufficient suffering or permitting.1

This decision is of no help in the present case, since section

60 retains the very language "procured or suffered" which was

found in the act of 1867, and which, therefore, considered by

itself, would bring the result of Wilson v. City Bank and not

that of Wilson v. Nelson.

Turning, now, to the other branch of the contention, it must

be conceded that there are, in sections 60a and 60b, no pro-

visions which, in terms, reach the proceeds of a satisfied judg-

ment, and that, since Wilson v. City Bank had ruled that under

the act of 1867 the trustee could not recover such proceeds from

the execution creditor, the clear expression of the contrary intent

ought to be found in the act of 1898 before it should receive

the contrary construction. It may also be said, according to

the rule that things not specifically named in an enumeration

are excluded, that the presence of provisions against the lien

of a judgment and the omission of any mention of its proceeds

raise a measure of presumption that the latter are not intended

to be touched. The Supreme Court held, in Clarke v. Larre-

more, 188 U. S. 486, 490, 23 Sup. Ct. 363, 365 ( 47 L. Ed. 565),

that where the proceeds of the execution sale were in the hands

of the sheriff when the petition in bankruptcy was filed, the

money should go to the trustee and not to the judgment creditor,
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but said:

'' A different question might have arisen if the writ had been

fully executed by payment to the execution creditor. Whether

the bankruptcy proceedings would then so far affect the judg-

ment and execution and that which was done under them as to

justify a recovery by the trustee in bankruptcy from the execu-

tion creditor, is a question not before us, and may depend on

many other considerations."

Several District Court opinions have held that such an execu-

tion judgment lien is not invalidated by section 67f, but have

declined to consider whether the proceeds of the sale could be

recoverable under section 60b.3

1—The court here says, in the

margin: ""Wilson v. Nelson has been

followed, if not extended, in Bradley

Co. v. White (C. C. A. 5) 121 Fed.

779, 58 C. C. A. 55; Bogen v. Prot-

ter (O. C. A. 6) 129 Fed. 533, 64

C. O. A. 63; and Be Bung Co. (C. C.

A. 2) 139 Fed. 526, 71 C. C. A. 342."

2—The court here cites, in the

margin: Be Bailey (D. C.) 144 Fed.

214, 216; Be Besnek (D. C.) 167

Fed. 574; Nelson v. five* Co. (D.

C.) 178 Fed. 136, 140; Be Weitiel

(D. C.) 191 Fed. 463.

judgment when desired, was a sufficient suffering or permitting.1
This decision is of no help in the present case, since section
60 retains the very language ''procured or suffered'' which was
found in the act of 1867, and which, therefore, considered by
itself, would bring the result of Wilson v. City Bank and not
that of Wilson v. Nelson.
Turning, now, to the other branch of the contention, it must
be conceded that there are, in sections 60a and 60b, no provisions which, in terms, reach the proceeds of a satisfied judgment, and that, since Wilson v. City Bank had ruled that under
the act of 1867 the trustee could not recover such proceeds from
the execution creditor, the clear expression of the contrary intent
ought to be found in the act of 1898 before it should receive
the contrary construction. It may also be said, according to
the rule that things not SI_>ecifieally named in an enumeration
are excluded, that the presence of provisions against the lien
of a judgment and the omission of any mention of its proceeds
raise a measure of presumption that the latter are not intended
to be touched. The Supreme Court held, in Clarke v. Larrernore, 188 U. S. 486, 490, 23 Sup. Ct. 363, 365 ( 47 L. Ed. 565),
· that where the proceeds of the execution sale were in the bands
of the sheriff when the petition in bankruptey was filed, the
mo!ley should go to the trustee and not to the judgment creditor,
but said:
''A different question might have arisen if the writ had been
fully executed by payment to the execution creditor. Whether
the bankruptcy proceedings would then so far affect the judgment and execution and that which wu done under them as to
justify a recovery by the trustee in bankruptcy from the execution creditor, is a question not bef()re us, and may depend on
many other considerations. ''
Several District Court opinions have held that such an execution judgment lien is not invalidated by section 67f, but heve
declined to consider whether the proceeds of the sale could be
recoverable under section '60b.•
1-The court here says, in the
margin: "Wilson v. Nelson bas been
followed, if not extended, in Bradlq
Co. v. White (C. C. A. 5) 121 Fed.
779, 58 C. C. A. 55; Bogen v. Prot·
ter (0. C. A. 6) 129 Fed. 533, 64
C. 0. A. 63; and Re Rung Co. (C. C.

A. S) 139 Fed. 526, 11 C. C. A. 349. ''
8-The court here cites, in the
margin: Be Bailey (D. C.) 144 Fed.
214, 216; Be Resnek (D. C.) 167
Fed. 574; Nelson v. Sve.a Co. (D.
C.) 178 Fed. 136, 140; Re Weitsel
(D. C.) 191 Fed. 46.1.
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Can the payment of the proceeds of execution sale be thought

such a "transfer" as is contemplated by the section? The

word "transfer" is given a broad meaning by the statutory

definition. Section 1, cl. 25. A money payment is within this

generality of definition. Pirie v. Chicago Co., 182 U. S. 438,

21 Sup. Ct. 906, 45 L. Ed. 1171. There is surely a transfer

by operation of law; the property goes to the purchaser and

the proceeds to the creditor; yet, there has not been that volun-

tary action naturally implied from the use of the word '' made''

(by the bankrupt).3

It must be confessed that the application of section 60b to

the situation which we have described as arising in this case

is not clear and certain, and we suspect that there can be no

construction of these and the other sections mentioned which

will not develop some inconsistencies and conflicts; but we con-

clude that the key is furnished by the amendment of 1910. Prior

to that time it had been essential, in order to recover a prefer-

ence under this section, to show that the debtor had intended

to accomplish a preference in violation of the act. It was con-

sistent with this theory that collection against him by legal

proceedings was not condemned, unless they were by his pro-

curement, and that a transfer was not voidable unless it had
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been "made" by him. When the amendment of 1910 provided

that the debtor's intent was no longer relevant, but that the

transaction might be avoided if the creditor had reason to be-

lieve that he was thereby getting a larger percentage than other

creditors would receive, it destroyed the reason for longer re-

quiring this voluntary participation by the debtor. The prin-

ciple of the decision found in the majority opinion in Wilson

v. Nelson applies here; and since the intent and purpose of

the debtor are made no longer important, the language used

and that allowed to remain must be construed to effectuate this

result, however far from apt the words may be.

When we consider the three sections first named, as well as

section 67f, we conclude that the general purpose of the act, in

its present form, can only be effectuated, and that inconsisten-

3—The court here says, in the

margin: "Whether the receipt of

money on execution is a transfer

within this section has been consid-

ered in the District Oourt, but not

decided, in a case where there was

no collusion. Be Blair (D. C.) 102

Fed. 987; Re Knickerbocker (D. C)

121 Fed. 1004; Re Bailey (D. C.)

144 Fed. 214, 216; Breyer v. Kick-

lighter (D. C.) 228 Fed. 744, 752;

Grant v. Bank (D. C.) 232 Fed. 201,

217."

Can the payment of the proceeds of execution sale be thought
euch a "transfer" as is contemplated by the section t The
word "transfer" is given a broad meaning by the statutory
definition. Section 1, cl. 25. A money payment is within this
generality of definition. Pirie v. Chicago Co., 182 U. S. 438,
21 Sup. Ct. 906, 45 L. Ed. 1171. There is surely a traasfer
by operation of law; the property goes to the purchaser and
the proceeds to the creditor; yet, there has not been that voluntary action naturally implied from the use of the word ''made''
(by the bankrupt) .s
It must be confessed that the application of section 60b to
the situation which we have described as arising in this case
is not clear and certain, and we suspect that there can be no
construction of these and the other sections mentioned which
will not develop some inconsistencies and conflicts ; but we conclude that the key is furnished by the amendment of 1910. Prior
to that time it had been essenti:al, in order to recover a preference under this section, to show that the debtor had intended
to accomplish a preference in violation of the act. It was consistent with this theory that collection against him by legal
proceedings was not condemned, unless they were by his procurement, and that a. transfer was not voidable unless it had
been ''made'' by him. When the amendment of 1910 provided
that the debtor's intent was no longer relevant, but that the
transaction might be avoided if the creditor had reason to believe that he was thereby getting- a larger percentage than other
creditors would receive, it destroyed the reason for longer requiring this voluntary participation by the debtor. The principle of the decision found in the majority opinion in Wilson
v. Nelson applies here; and since the intent and purpose of
the debtor are made no longer important, the language used
and that allowed to remain must be construed to effectuate this
result, however far from apt the words may be.
When we consider the three sections first named. as well as
section 67f, we conclude that the general purpose of the act, in
its present form, can only be effectuated, and that inconsisten3-Tbe court here says, in the
margin: ''Whether the receipt of
money on e1erution is a tran~fer
within this l!eet;on hM been considered in the District Oourt, hut not
decided, in a case where there was
no collusion. Re Blair (D. C.) 102

Fed. 987: Re Knickerbocker (D. C.)
121 Fed. 1004; Re Bailey (D. C.)
144 F('(l 214. 2Hi; Dreyer v. Kicklighter (D. C.) 228 Fed. 744, 752;
Grant v. Bank (D. C.) 232 Fed. 201,
217."
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cies and uncertainties are best reconciled and clarified, by holding

that the creditor who recovers a judgment, by consent or in

invitum, and by execution sale collects his money within four

months preceding bankruptcy, and with reasonable cause to

believe, etc., receives a voidable preference, which he must repay

to the trustee.

The Distilling Company further contends that its agent,

Bayer, had no sufficient reason to believe that the judgment

or transfer would effect a preference, and this because he had

no such reason to think Hornstein insolvent. The same reason

is alone urged against the recovery for the goods returned on

account. This presents only a question of fact. It is true that

there had been a more or less formal judicial determination

only a few days before that Hornstein was solvent; but this

was, in no sense, res judicata, binding the creditors or the

trustee, and the circumstances point strongly to the conclusion

that Bayer must have reasonably anticipated that the assets

were not enough to pay the debts. A review of the evidence

pro and con would not be of value. It is enough to state our

conclusion.

The judgment must be affirmed.

WILLIAMS v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND
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GUARANTY CO.

236 U. S. 549, 59 L. ed. 713, 35 Sup. Ct. 289

(United States Supreme Court. February 23, 1915)

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the

court:

This cause presents the following question: Does a discharge

in bankruptcy acquit an express obligation of the principal to

indemnify his surety against loss by reason of their joint bond,

cies and uncertainties are best reconciled and clarified, by holding
that the creditor who recovers a judgment, by consent or in
invitum, and by execution sale collects his money within four
months preceding bankruptcy, and with reasonable cause to
believe, etc., receives a voidable preference, which he must repay
to the trustee.
The Distilling Company further contends that its agen~
Bayer, had no sufficient reason to believe that the judgment
or transfer would effect a preference, and this because he had
no such reason to think Hornstein insolvent. The same reason
is alone urged against the recovery for the goods returned on
account. This presents only a question of fact. It is true that
there had been a more or less formal judicial determination
only a few days before that Hornstein was solvent; but this
was, in no sense, res judicata, binding the creditors or the
trustee, and the <:ircumstances point strongly to the conclusion
that Bayer must have reasonably anticipated that the assets
were not enough to pay the debts. A review of the evidence
pro and con would not be of value. It is enough to state our
conclusion.
The judgment must be affirmed.

conditioned to secure his faithful performance of a building con-

tract broken prior to the bankruptcy, when the surety paid the

consequent damage thereafter?

R. P. Williams and J. B. Carr, as partners, entered into a

WILLIAMS v. UNITED ST ATES FIDELITY AND
GUARANTY CO.

contract with certain school trustees—April, 1900—to construct

a building in Florida; and, with defendant in error company

as surety, gave a bond guaranteeing its faithful performance.

236 U. S. 549, 59 L. ed. 713, 35 Sup. Ct. 289

Contemporaneously with the execution of the bond, and as a

condition thereto, the partners made a written application to

(United States Supreme Court.

February 23, 1915)

Mr. Justioe McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the
court:
This cause presents the following question : Does a discharge
in bankruptcy acquit an express obligation of the principal to
indemnify his surety against loss by reason of their joint bond,
conditioned to secure his faithful performance of a building contract hrok<'n prior to the bankruptcy, when the surety paid the
consequent damage thereafter T
R. P. "Williams and J. B. Carr, as partners, entered into a
contract with certain schocl trustees-April, 1900-to construct
a building in Florida ; and, with defendant in error company
ns surety, gave a bond guaranteeing its faithful performance.
Cont.emporaneously with the execution of the bond, and as a
condition thereto, the partners made a written application to
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the company, in which they obligated themselves "to indemnify

the said United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company against

all loss, costs, damages, charges, and expenses whatever, result-

ing from any act, default, or neglect of ours, that said United

States Fidelity & Guaranty Company may sustain or incur by

reason of its having executed said bond or any continuation

thereof."

November 9, 1900, the partners abandoned the contract; the

trustees took possession and completed the structure April 13,

1901, and on May 14 following they made adequate demands

for payment of the amount expended beyond the contract price.

This being refused, they brought suit and recovered a judg-

ment against the company July 1, 1904, which it satisfied Feb-

ruary 20, 1905, by paying $5,475.36.

Voluntary petitions were filed by partnership and members

May 28, 1901, and all were immediately adjudged bankrupt

.

The schedules specified the building contract, its breach and

the bond, and their adequacy is not now questioned. In due time

the school trustees proved their claim and it was allowed. Octo-

ber 5, 1901, the petitioners received their discharges. No divi-

dend was declared, all the assets being required for administra-
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tion expenses.

Defendant in error brought suit in the city court of Atlanta

against the firm and its members—August, 1911,—setting up the

written promise made to it when the bond was executed, and

asking judgment for the amount paid in satisfaction of the

recovery thereon, together with attorneys' fees. The matter was

submitted upon an agreed statement of facts, and judgment went

in favor of the company; this was affirmed by the Court of Ap-

peals of Georgia (11 Ga. App. 635), and the cause is here upon

writ of error.

The state court treated the written contract of indemnity be-

tween the bankrupts and the surety company as the expression

of what would have been implied, and declared: "The bank-

rupts owed the surety nothing at the time the petition in bank-

ruptcy was filed, because the surety had paid nothing for their

benefit, and the relation of debtor and creditor did not exist

between them until after actual payment by the surety. • • •

The surety had no claim against the bankrupts which it could

file in its own name. * * * The liability to the surety by the

bankrupts was altogether contingent and might never have

arisen. Indeed, we hold that at the time the petition in bank-

the company, in which they obligated themselves "to indemnify
the said United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company against
all loss, costs, damages, charges, and expenses whatever, resulting from any act, default, or neglect of ours, that said United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Company may sustain or incur by
reason of it.s having executed said bond or any continuation
thereof.''
November 9, 1900, the partners abandoned the contract; the
trustees took possession and completed the structure April 13,
1901, and on May 14 following they made adequate demands
for payment of the amount expended 'beyond the contract price.
This being refused, they brought suit and recovered a judgment against the company July 1, 1904, which it satisfied February 20, 1905, by paying $5,475.36.
Voluntary petitions were filed by partnership and members
~fay 28, 1901, and all were immediately adjudged bankrupt.
The schedules specified the building contract, it.s breach and
the bond, and their adequacy is not now questioned. In due time
the school trustees proved their claim and it was allowed. October 5, 1901, the petitioners received their discharges. No dividend was declared, all the assets being required for administration expenses.
Defendant in error brought suit in the city court of Atlanta
against the firm and its members-August, 1911,--setting up the
written promise made to it when the bond was executed, and
asking judgment for the amount paid in satisfaction of the
recovery thereon, together with attorneys' fees. The matter was
submitted upon an agreed statement of facts, and judgment went
in favor of the company; this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Georgia (11 Ga. App. 635), and the cause is here upon
writ of error.
The state court treated the written contract of indemnity between the bankrupts and the surety company as the expression
of what would have been implied, and declared: ''The bankrupts owed the surety nothing at the time thP petition in bankruptry was filed, because the surety had paid nothing for their
benefit, and the relation of debtor and creditor did not exist
between them until after actual payment by the surety. • • •
The surety had no claim against the bankrupts which it could
file in its own name. • • • The liability to the surety by the
bankrupts was altogether contingent and might never have
arisen. Indeed, we hold that at the time the petition in bank-
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ruptcy was filed the surety had no claim or debt against the

bankrupt which could have been proved in the bankrupt court

under § 63 of the bankrupt act."

Counsel for the company "contend that the claim at bar was

subject to two contingencies, one of which, to wit, the sustain-

ing or incurring of actual pecuniary loss, resultant to the prin-

cipal's act, had not arisen at the time of the filing of the petition.

Therefore said claim was not an unliquidated claim upon an

express contract absolutely owing at the time. It was a contin-

gent claim, and as such not provable, and therefore not affected

by the bankrupt principal's discharge."

If the doctrine announced by the court below and maintained

here by counsel is correct, a discharge in bankruptcy may have

very small value for the luckless debtor who has faithfully tried

to secure his creditors against loss; and, in effect, a demand

against him may be kept alive indefinitely, according to the inter-

est or caprice of his surety.

It is the purpose of the Bankrupt Act to convert the assets

of the bankrupt into cash for distribution among creditors, and

then to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive

indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free from the obli-

gations and responsibility consequent upon business misfortunes.
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Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U. S. 68, 77; Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U. S.

625, 629; Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459, 473. And noth-

ing is better settled than that statutes should be sensibly con-

strued, with a view to effectuating the legislative intent. Lan

Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U. S. 47, 59; Re Chapman, 166

U. S. 661, 667.

The statute (30 Stat. 544), as amended in 1903 (32 Stat.

797), provides: Sec. 17. "A discharge in bankruptcy shall

release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as

• • • (2) are liabilities for obtaining property by false pre-

tenses or false representations." Sec. 63. "Debts of the bank-

rupt may be proved and allowed against his estate which are

• * * (4) founded upon an open account, or upon a contract,

express or implied; * • • Unliquidated claims against the

bankrupt may, pursuant to application to the court, be liqui-

dated in such manner as it shall direct, and may thereafter be

proved and allowed against his esrtate." Sec. 1. (11) "Debt

shall include any debt, demand, or claim provable in bank-

ruptcy." Sec. 2. Courts of bankruptcy have jurisdiction to

"(6) bring in and substitute additional persons or parties in

ruptcy was filed the surety had no claim or debt against the
bankrupt which could have been proved in the bankrupt court
under § 63 of the bankrupt ·act.''
Counsel for the company ''contend that the claim at bar was
subject to two contingencies, one of which, to wit, the sustaining or incurring of actual pecuniary loss, resultant to the principal 's act, had not arisen at the time of the filing of the petition.
Therefore said claim was not an unliquidated claim upon an
express contract absolutely owing at the time. It was a contingent claim, and as such not provable, and therefore not affected
by the bankrupt principal 's discharge.''
If the doctrine announced by the court below and maintained
here by counsel is correct, a discharge in bankruptcy may have
very small value for the luckless debtor who has faithfully tried
to secure his creditors against loss; and, in effect, a demand
against him may be kept alive indefinitely, according to the interest or caprice of his surety.
It is the purpose of the Bankrupt Act to convert the asset.s
of the bankrupt into cash for distribution among creditors, and
then to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive
indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibility consequent upon business misfortunes.
Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77; Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S.
625, 629; Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459, 473. And nothing is better settled than that statutes should be sensibly construed, with a view to effectuating the legislative intent. Lau
Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U. S. 47, 59; & Chapman, 166
u. s. 661, 667.
The statute (30 Stat. 544), as amended in 1903 (32 Stat.
797), provides: Sec. 17. "A discharge in bankruptcy shall
release a bankrupt from aJl of his provable debts, except such as
• • • (2) are liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses or false representations." Sec. 63. "Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate which are
• • • ( 4) founded upon an open account, or upon a contract,
express or implied; • • • Unliquidated claims against the
bankrupt may, pursuant to application to the court, be liquidated in such manner as it shall direct, and may thereafter be
proved and allowed against his estate." Sec. 1. ( 11) "Debt
shall include any debt, demand, or claim provable in bankruptcy." Sec. 2. Courts of bankruptcy have jurisdiction to
"(6) bring in and substitute additional persons or parties in

CONTINGENT CLAIMS 43

CONTINGENT CLAIMS

proceedings in bankruptcy when necessary for the complete de-

termination of a matter in controversy; • * * (15) make

such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments in ad-

dition to those specifically provided far as may be necessary for

the enforcement of the provisions of this act." Sec. 57i. "When-

ever a creditor whose claim against a baukrupt estate is secured

by the individual undertaking of any person fails to prove such

claim, such person may do so in the creditor's name, and if he

discharge such undertaking in whole or in part, he shall be

subrogated to that extent to the rights of the creditor.'' General

Order XXI—4. "The claims of persons contingently liable for

the bankrupt may be proved in the name of the creditor when

known by the party contingently liable. When the name of the

creditor is unknown, such claim may be proved in the name of

the party contingently liable; but no dividend shall be paid

upon such claim, except upon satisfactory proof that it will

diminish pro tanto the original debt.'' Sec. 16. '' The liability

of a person who is a co-debtor with, er guarantor or in any

manner a surety for a bankrupt, shall not be altered by the dis-

charge of such bankrupt."

Within the intendment of the law provable debts include all

liabilities of the bankrupt founded on contract, express or im-

plied, which, at the time of the bankruptcy, were fixed in amount
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or susceptible of liquidation. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340,

350; Crawford v. Burke, 195 U. S. 176, 187; Grant Shoe Co. v.

Laird, 212 U. S. 445, 448; Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U. S. 625, 631.

It provides complete protection and an ample remedy in behalf

of the surety upon any such obligation. He may pay it off and

be subrogated to the rights of the creditor; if the creditor fails

to present the claim for allowance against the estate, he may

prove it; and in any event he has abundant power, by resort to

the court or otherwise, to require application of its full pro rata

part of the bankrupt's estate to the principal debt. To the ex-

tent of such distribution the obligation of the bankrupt to the

surety will be satisfied. Although, unlike the act of 1867, the

present one contains no express provision permitting proof of

contingent claims, it does in substance afford the surety on a

liability susceptible of liquidation the same relief possible under

the earlier act, i. e., application to the principal debt of all

dividends declared out of the estate (act of 1867, §§ 19. 27, 14

Stat. 517, 525, 529). And as the surety thus either shares or

enjoys an opportunity to share in the principal's estate, we

proceedings in bankruptcy when necessary for the complete determination of a m~tter in controversy ; • • • ( 15) make
such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments in addition to those specifically provided fer as may be necessary fol'
the enforcement of the provisions of this act.'' Sec. 57i. '' Whmever a creditor whose claim against a bankrupt estate is secured
by the individual undertaking of any person fails to prove such
claim, such person may do so in the creditor's name, and if he
discharge such undertaking in whole or in part, he shall be
subrogated to that extent to the rights of the creditor." General
Order XX 1-4. ''The claims of persens contingently liable for
the bankrupt may be proved in the name of the creditor when
known by the party contingently liable. When the name of the
credit.or is unknown, such claim may be proved in the name of
the party contingently liable; but no dividend shall be paid
upon such claim, except upon satisfactery proof that it will
diminish pro tanto the original debt." Sec. 16. "The liability
of a person who is a co-debt.or with, er guarantor or in any
manner a surety for a bankrupt, shall not be altered by the discharge of such bankrupt.''
Within the intendment of the law provable debts include all
liabilities of the bankrupt founded on contract, express or implied, which, at the time of the bankruptcy, were fixed in amount
or susceptible of liquidation. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U. S. 340,
350; Crawford v. Burke, 195 U. S. 176, 187; Grant Shoe Co. v.
Laird, 212 U.S. 445, 448; Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U. S. 625, 631.
It provides complete protection and an ample remedy in behalf
of the surety upon any such obligation. He may pay it off and
be subrogated to the rights of the creditor; if the creditor fails
to present the claim for allowance against the estate, he may
prove it; and in any event he has abundant power, by resort to
the court or otherwise, to require application of its full pro rata
part of the bankrupt's estate to the principal debt. To the extent of such distribution the obligation of the bankrupt to the
surety will be satisfied. Although, unlike the act of 1867, the
present one contains no express provision permitting proof of
contingent claims, it does in substance afford the ~urety on a
liability susceptible of liquidation the same relief possiblr nndi>r
the earlier act, i. e., application to the principal debt of all
dividends declared out of the estate (a<'t of 1867, ~~ 19. 27, 14
Stat. 517, 525, 529). And as the surety thus either shares or
enjoys an opportunity to share in the principal 's estate, we

44

44

AD~UNISTRA TION

ADMINISTRATION

-

think the discharge of the latter acquits the obligation between

them incident to the relationship. Mace v. Wells, 7 How. 272,

276; Fairbanks v. Lambert, 137 Mass. 373, 374; Hayer v. Corn-

stock, 115 Iowa 187, 191; Post v. Losey, 111 Ind. 74, 80; Smith

v. Wheeler, 55 App. Div. 170, 171.

It would be contrary to the basal spirit of the Bankrupt Law

to permit a surety, by simply postponing compliance with his

own promise in respect of a liability until after bankruptcy, to

preserve a right of recovery over against his principal, notwith-

standing the discharge would have extinguished this if the surety

had promptly performed as he agreed. Such an interpretation

would effectually defeat a fundamental purpose of the enact-

ment.

The written indemnity agreement embodied in the bankrupt's

application to the surety company for execution of the bond, 60

far as its terms are important here, but expressed what other-

wise would have been implied from the relationship assumed by

the parties. At the time of the bankruptcy, the obligation under

this agreement was ancillary to a liability arising out of a con-

tract, estimation of which was easy of establishment by proof.

There was no uncertainty which could prevent the surety from
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obtaining all benefits to which it was justly entitled from the

bankrupt estate.

Upon the facts presented we are of opinion that the discharge

pleaded by the plaintiffs in error constituted a good defense, and

the court below erred in holding otherwise. The judgment is

accordingly reversed and the cause remanded for further pro-

ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

CENTRAL TRUST COMPANY v. CHICAGO AUDITORIUM

ASSOCIATION

240 U. S. 581, 60 L. ed. 811, 36 Sup. Ct. 412

(United States Supreme Court. April 3, 1916.)

Mr. Justice PITNEY delivered the opinion of the court:

On July 22, 1911, a creditors' petition in bankruptcy was filed

against the Frank E. Scott Transfer Company, an Illinois cor-

poration, and it was adjudged a bankrupt on August 7. The

act of bankruptcy charged and adjudicated does not appear.

When the proceedings were commenced, the bankrupt held con-

think the discharge of the latter acquits the obligation between
them incident to the relationship. Mace v. Wells, 7 How. 272,
276; ~,air banks v. Lambert, 137 Mass. 373, 374; Hayer v. Comstock, 115 Iowa. 187, 191; Post v. Losey, 111 Ind. 74, 80; Smith
v. Wheeler, 55 App. Div. 170, 171.
It would be contrary to the basal spirit of the Bankrupt Law
to permit a. surety, by simply postponing compliance with his
own promise in respect of a liability until after bai;ikruptcy, to
preserve a right of recovery over against his principal, notwithstanding the discharge would have extinguished this if the surety
had promptly performed as he agreed. Such an interpretation
would effectually defeat a fundamental purpose of the enactment.
The written indemnity agreement embodied in the bankrupt 'a
application to the surety company for execution of the bond, so
far as its terms are important here, but expressed what otherwise would have been implied from the relationship assumed by
the parties. At the time of the bankruptcy, the obligation under
this agreement was ancillary to a liability arising out of a .contract, estimation of which was easy of establishment by proof.
There was no uncertainty which· could prevent the surety from
obtaining all benefits to which it was justly entitled from the
bankrupt estate.
Upon the facts presented we are of opinion that the discharge
pleaded by the plaintiffs in error constituted a good defense, and
the court below erred in holding otherwise. The judgment is
accordingly reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
CENTRAL TRUST COMPANY v. CHICAGO AUDITORIUM
ASSOCIATION
240 U. S. 581, 60 L. ed. 811, 36 Sup. Ct. 412
(United States Supreme Court. April 3, 1916.)

Mr. Justice PITNEY delivered the opinion of the court:
On July 22, 1911, a creditors' petition in bankruptcy was filed
against the Frank E. Scott Transfer Company, an Illinois corporation, and it was adjudged a bankrupt on August 7. The
ar>t of bankruptcy charged and adjudicated does not appear.
'V11en the prooeedings were commenced, the 1'ankrupt held con-
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tract relations with the Chicago Auditorium Association under

a written agreement made between them February 1, 1911, which

had been partially performed. By its terms the Association

granted to the Transfer Company, for a term of five years from

the date of the contract, the baggage and livery privilege of the

Auditorium Hotel, in the city of Chicago; that is to say, the sole

and exclusive right, so far as it was within the legal capacity of

the Association to grant the same, to transfer baggage and carry

passengers to and from the hotel and to furnish livery to its

guests and patrons. For the baggage privilege the Transfer

Company agreed to pay to the Association the sum of $6,000,

in monthly instalments of ,$100 each, and for the livery priv-

ilege the sum of $15,000, in monthly instalments of $250 each,

and also agreed to furnish to the hotel and its guests and patrons

prompt and efficient baggage and livery service at reasonable

rates at all times during the continuance of the privileges. It

was further agreed as follows:

"The party of the first part [Chicago Auditorium Associa-

tion], however, reserves the right, which is an express condition

of the foregoing grants, to cancel and revoke either or both of

said privileges, by giving six months' notice in writing of its

election so to do, whenever the service is not, in the opinion of
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the party of the first part, satisfactory, or in the event of any

change in management of said hotel; and in case of the termina-

tion of either or both of said privileges by exercise of the right

and option reserved by this paragraph, such privilege or priv-

ileges shall cease and determine at the expiration of the six

months' notice aforesaid, and both parties hereto shall in that

case be released from further liability respecting the concession

so canceled and revoked.

"Said rights and concessions shall not be assignable without

the express written consent of the party of the first part, nor

shall the assignment of the same, with such written consent, re-

lieve the party of the-second part [Scott Transfer Company]

from liability on the covenants and agreements of this instru-

ment."

The contract authorized the Association, in the event of de-

fault by the Transfer Company in the payment of any instal-

ment of money due, or in the performance of any other covenant,

if continued for thirty days, to terminate the privileges at its

option, without releasing the Transfer Company from liability

upon its covenants. Should either or both of the privileges be

tract relations with the Chicago Auditorium .Association under
a written agreement made between them l1-,ebruary 1, 1911, which
had been partially performed. By its terms the .Association
granted to the Transfer Company, for a term of five years from
the date of the contract, the baggage and livery privilege of the
Auditorium Hotel, in the city of Chicago; that is to say, the sole
and exclusive right, so far as it was within the legal capacity of
the Association to grant the same, to transfer baggage and carry
passengers to and from the hotel and to furnish livery to its
guests and patrons. For the baggage privilege the Transfer
Company agreed to pay to the Association the sum of $6,000,
in monthly instalments of ,$100 each, and for the livery privilege the sum of $15,000, in monthly instalments of $250 each,
and also agreed to furnish to the hotel and its guests and patrons
prompt and efficient baggage and livery service at reasonable
rates at all times during the continuance of the privileges. It
was further agreed as follows:
''The party of the first part [Chicago Auditorium Association], however, reserves the right, which is an express condition
of the foregoing grants, to cancel and revoke either or both of
said privileges, by giving six months' notice in writing of its
election so to do, whenever the service is not, in the opinion of
the party of the first part, satisfactory, or in the event of any
change in management of said hotel; and in case of the termination of either or both of said privileges by exercise of the right
and option reserved by this paragraph, such privilege or privileges shall cease and determine at the expiration of the six
months' notice aforesaid, and both parties hereto shall in that
case be released from further liability respecting the concession
so canceled and revoked.
"Said rights and concessions shall not be assignable without
the express written consent of the party of the first part, nor
shall the assignment of the same, with such written consent, relieve the party of the· second part fScott Transfer Company]
from liability on the covenants and agreements of this instrument."
The contract authorized the Association, in the event of default by the Transfer Company in the payment of any instalment of money due, or in the performance of any other covenant,
if continued for thirty days, to terminate the privileges at its
option, without releasing the Transfer Company from liability
upon its covenants. Should either or both of the privileges be
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thus terminated before January 31, 1916, the Association was

to be at liberty to sell the privileges, or make a new or different

contract for the remainder of the term, but was not to be

obliged to do this, and the Transfer Company, unless released in

writing, was to remain liable for the entire amount agreed to be

paid by it.

Up to the time of the bankruptcy this contract remained in

force, and neither party had violated any of its covenants. The

trustee in bankruptcy did not elect to assume its performance,

and the Association entered into a contract with other parties

for the performance of the baggage and livery service, and ob-

tained therefrom the sum of $234.69 monthly as compensation

for those privileges. On February 28, 1912, it exhibited its

proof against the bankrupt estate, claiming an indebtedness of

$6,537.94, of which $311.20 had accrued prior to the bankruptcy

proceedings, and the remainder was claimed as unliquidated

damages arising under the contract for alleged breach thereof

on the part of the bankrupt through the bankruptcy proceedings.

Of this amount $691.86 represented the loss incurred during the

first six months of bankruptcy. Objections filed by the trustee

were sustained by the referee, except as to that portion of the

claim which had accrued prior to the bankruptcy proceedings.
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On review, the District Court sustained this decision. On appeal

to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the order of the District Court

was reversed, and the cause remanded with direction to allow

$691.86 upon the claim, and to disallow the remaining portion.

216 Fed. 308.

An appeal to this court by the trustee in bankruptcy was al-

lowed, under § 25b-2 of the Bankruptcy Act (of July 1, 1898,

chap. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 553), upon a certificate by a justice of

this court that the determination of the questions involved was

essential to a uniform construction of the Act throughout the

United States. This is No. 162. Thereafter a cross appeal by the

Auditorium Association was allowed by one of the judges of the

Circuit Court of Appeals. This is No. 174.

*•••**•*

Coming to the merits: It is no longer open to question in this

court that, as a rule, where a party boimd by an executory

contract repudiates his obligations or disables himself from per-

forminir them before the time for performance, the promisee has

the option to treat the contract as ended, so far as further per-

formance is concerned, and maintain an action at once for the

thus terminated before January 31, 1916, the Association was
to be at liberty to sell the privileges, or make a new or different
contract for the remainder of the term, but was not to be
obliged to do this, and the Transfer Company, unless released in
writing, was to remain liable for the entire amount agreed to be
paid by it.
Up to the time of the bankruptcy this contract remained in
force, and neither party had violated any of it.a covenant.a. The
trustee in bankruptcy did not elect to assume its performance,
and the Association entered into a contract with other parties
for the performance of the baggage and livery service, and obtained therefrom the sum of $234.69 monthly as compensation
for those privileges. On February 28, 1912, it exhibited its
proof against the bankrupt estate, claiming an indebtedness of
$6,537.94, of which $311.20 had accrued prior to the bankruptcy
proceedings, and the remainder was claimed as unliquidated
damages arising under the contract for alleged breach thereof
on the part of the bankrupt through the bankruptcy proceedings.
Of this amount $691.86 represented the loss incurred during the
first six .months of bankruptcy. Objections filed by the trustee
were sustained by the referee, except as to that portion of the
claim which had accrued prior to the bankruptcy proceedings.
On review, the District Court sustained this decision. On appeal
to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the order of the District Court
was reversed, and the cause remanded with direction to allow
$691.86 upon the claim, and to disallow the remaining portion.
216 Fed. 308.
An appeal to this court by the trustee in bankruptcy was allowed, under ~ 25b-2 of the Bankruptcy Act (of July 1, 1898,
chap. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 553), upon a certificate by a justice of
this court that the determination of the questions involved was
essf'ntial to a uniform construction of the Act throughout the
United States. This is No. 162. Thereafter a cross appeal by the
Auditorium Association was allowed by one of the judges of the
Circuit Court of Appeals. This is No. 174.
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Coming to the merits: It is no longer open to question in this
court that, as a rule, where a party bound by an executory
contract repudiates his obligations or disables himself from pPrforming- th<'m before the time for performance. tlw promisre has
th e <'ption to trf'at the contract as ended, so far as furth<'r p<•rformance is concerned, and maintain an action at once for the

CONTINGENT CLAIMS 47

CONTINGENT CLAIMS

47

damages occasioned by such anticipatory breach. The rule has

its exceptions, but none that now concerns us. Roehm v. Horst,

178 U. S. 1, 18, 19. And see O'Neill v. Supreme Council, 70

N. J. L. 410, 412. There is no doubt that the same rule must be

applied where a similar repudiation or disablement occurs during

performance. Whether the intervention of bankruptcy consti-

tutes such a breach and gives rise to a claim provable in the

bankruptcy proceedings is a question not covered by any pre-

vious decision of this court, and upon which the other Federal

courts are in conflict. It was, however, held in Lovell v. St.

Louis Life Ins. Co., Ill U. S. 264, 274, where a life insurance

company became insolvent and transferred its assets to another

company, that a policy holder was entitled to regard his con-

tract as terminated and demand whatever damages he had sus-

tained thereby. And see Carr v. Hamilton, 129 U. S. 252, 256.

In support of the provability of the claim in controversy, Ex

parte Pollard, 2 Low. 411, Fed. Cas. No. 11,252; Re Swift (C. C.

A. 1st), 112 Fed. 315, 319, 321; Re Stern (C. C. A. 2d), 116

Fed. 604; R« Pettingill (D. C. Mass.), 137 Fed. 143, 146, 147;

Re Neff (C. Ck A. 6th), 157 Fed. 57, 61, are referred to; and see

Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City R. Co. (C. C. A. 2d),

198 Fed. 721, 736, 744. To the contrary, Re Imperial Brewing

Co. (D. C. Mo.), 143 Fed. 579; Re Inman (D. C. Ga.), 171 Fed.
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185, s. c. 175 Fed. 312; besides which a number of cases arising

out of the relation of landlord and tenant are cited: Re Ells,

98 Fed. 967; Re Pennewell, 55 C. C. A. 571, 119 Fed. 139; Wat-

son v. Merrill, 136 Fed. 359; Re Roth & Appel, 181 Fed. 667;

Colman Co. v. Withoft, 195 Fed. 250. Cases of the latter class_

are distinguishable because of the "diversity betweene duties

which touch the realty, and the meere personalty." Co. Litt.

292, b. § 513.

The contract with which we have to deal was not a contract

of personal service simply, but was of such a nature as evidently

to require a considerable amount of capital, in the shape of

equipment, etc., for its proper performance by the Transfer

Company. The immediate effect of bankruptcy was to strip the

company of its assets, and thus disable it from performing. It

may be conceded that the contract was assignable, and passed to

the trustee under § 70a (30 Stat. 565), to the extent that it had

an option to perform it in the place of the bankrupt (see Spar-

hawk v. Yerkes, 142 U. S. 1, 13; Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson,

142 U. S. 313, 322) ; for although there was a stipulation against

damages occHSioned by such anticipatory breach. '!'he rule has
its exceptions, but none that now concerns us. Roehm v. Horst,
178 U. S. 1, 18, 19. And see O'Neill v. Supreme Council, 70
N. J. L. 410, 412. There is no doubt that the same rule must be
applied where a similar repudiation or disablement occurs during
performance. Whether the intervention of bankruptcy constitutes such a breach and gives rise to a claim provable in the
bankruptcy proceedings is a question not covered by any previous decision of this court, and upon which the other Federal
courts are in conflict. It was, however, held in Lovell v. St.
Louis Life Ins. Co., 111 U. S. 264, 274, where a life insurance
c>ompany became insolvent and transferred its assets to another
company, that a policy holder was entitled to regard his contract as terminated and demand whatever damages he had sustained thereby. And see Carr v. Hamilton, 129 U. S. 252, 256.
In support of the provability of the claim in controversy, Ex
parte Pollard, 2 Low. 411, Fed. Cas. No. 11,252; Re Swift ( C. C.
A. 1st), 112 Fed. 315, 319, 321; Re Stern (C. C. A. 2d), 116
Fed. 604; Re Pettingill (D. C. Mass.), 137 Fed. 143, 146, 147;
Re Neff' (0. °'A. 6th), 157 Fed. 57, 61, are referred to; and see
Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City R. Co. (C. C. A. 2d),
198 Fed. 721, 736, 744. To the contrary, Re Imperial Brewing
Co. (D. C. Mo.), 143 Fed. 579; Re Inman (D. C. Ga.), 171 Fed.
185, s. c. 175 Ped. 312; besides which a number of cases arising
out of the relation of landlord and tenant are cited: Re Ells,
98 Fed. 967; Re Pennewell, 55 C. C. A. 571, 119 Fed. 139; Watson v. Merrill, 136 Fed. 359; Re Roth & Appel, 181 Fed. 667 ;
Colman Co. v. Withoft, 195 Fed. 250. Cases of the latter class
are distinguishable because of the "diversity betweene duties.
which touch the realty, and the meere personalty." Co. Litt.
292, h. § 513.
The contract with which we have to deal was not a contract
of personal service simply, but was of such a nature as evidently
to require a considerable amount of capital, in the shape of
equipment, etc., for. its proper performance by the Tran sfer
Company. The immediate eff't>ct of bankruptcy was to strip the
<'Ompany of its assets, and thus disable it from performing. It
may be conceded that the contract was assignable, and passed to
the trm;tee under § 70a (30 Stat. 565), to the extent that it had
an option to perform it in the place of the bankrupt (see Sparhawk v. Yerkes, 142 U. S. 1, 13; Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson,
142 U.S. 313, 322); for although there was a stipulation against
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assignment without consent of the Auditorium Association, it

may be assumed that this did not prevent an assignment by op-

eration of law. Still, the trustee in bankruptcy did not elect to

assume performance, and so the matter is left as if the law had

conferred no such election.

It is argued that there can be no anticipatory breach of a con-

tract except it result from the voluntary act of one of the parties,

and that the filing of an involuntary petition in bankruptcy, with

adjudication thereon, is but the act of the law resulting from an

adverse proceeding instituted by creditors. This view was taken,

with respect to the effect of a state proceeding restraining a cor-

poration from the further prosecution of its business or the

exercise of its corporate franchises, appointing a receiver, and

dissolving the corporation, in People v. Globe Ins. Co., 91

N. Y. 174, cited with approval in some of the Federal court

decisions above referred to. In that case, it did not appear that

the company was the responsible cause of the action of the State,

so as to make the dissolution its own act; but, irrespective of

this, we cannot accept the reasoning. As was said in Roehm v.

Horst, 178 U. S. 1,19: "The parties to a contract which is wholly

executory have a right to the maintenance of the contractual

relations up to the time for performance, as well as to a per-
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formance of the contract when due." Commercial credits are,

to a large extent, based upon the reasonable expectation that

pending contracts of acknowledged validity will be performed

in due course; and the same principle that entitles the promisee

to continued willingness entitles him to continued ability on the

part of the promisor. In short, it must be deemed an implied

term of every contract that the promisor will not permit himself,

through insolvency or acts of bankruptcy, to be disabled from

making performance; and, in this view, bankruptcy proceedings

are but the natural and legal consequence of something done or

omitted to be done by the bankrupt, in violation of his engage-

ment. It is the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, generally speak-

ing, to permit all creditors to share in the distribution of the

assets of the bankrupt, and to leave the honest debtor thereafter

free from liability upon previous obligations. Williams v.

United States Fidelity Co., 236 U. S. 549, 554. Executory

agreements play so important a part in the commercial world

that it would lead to most unfortunate results if, by interpret-

ing the Act in a narrow sense, persons entitled to performance of

such agreements on the part of bankrupts were excluded from

assignment without consent of the Auditorium Association, it
may he assumed that this did not prevent an assignment by operation of law. Still, the trustee in bankrnptcy did not elect to
assume performance, and so the matter is left as if the law had
conferred no such election.
It is argued that there can be no anticipatory breach of a contract except it result from the voluntary act of one of the parties,
and that the filing of an involuntary petition in bankruptcy, with
adjudication thereon, is but the act of the law resulting from an
adverse proceeding instituted by creditors. This view was taken,
with respect to the effect of a state proceeding restraining a corporation from the further prosecution of its business or the
exercise of its corporate franchises, appointing a receiver, and
dissolving the corporation, in People v. Globe Ins. Co., 91
N. Y. 174, cited with approval in some of the Federal court
decisions above referred to. In that case, it did not appear that
the company was the responsible cause of the action of the State,
so as to make the dissolution its own act; but, irrespective of
this, we cannot aceept the reasoning. AB was SKid in Roehm v.
Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 19 : ''The parties to a contract which is wholly
executory have a right to the maintenance of the contractual
relations up to the time for performance, as well as to a performance of the contract when due." Commercial credits are,
tO a large extent, based upon the reasonable expectation that
pending contracts of acknowledged validity will be performed
in due course; and the same principle that entitles the promisee
to continued willingness entitles him to continued ability on the
part of the promisor. In short, it must be deemed an implied
term of every contract that the promisor will not permit himself,
through insolvency or act.~ of bankruptcy, to be disabled from
making performance; and, in this view, bankruptcy proceedings
are but the natural and legal consequence of something done or
omitted to be done by the bankrupt, in violation of his engagement. It is the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, generally speaking, to permit all creditors to share in the distribution of the
assets of the bankrnpt, and to leave the honest debtor thereafter
free from liability upon previous o~ligations. Williams v.
United States Fidelity Co., 236 U. S. _549, 554. Executory
agreements play so important a part in the commercial world
that it would lead to most unfortunate results if, by interpre~
ing the Act in a narrow sense, persons entitled to performance of
such agreements on the part of bankrupts were excluded from
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participation in bankrupt estates, while the bankrupts theiu

selves, as a necessary corollary, were left still subject to action

for nonperformance in the future, although without the properlv

or credit often necessary to enable them to perform. We con-

clude that proceedings, whether voluntary or involuntary, re-

sulting in an adjudication of bankruptcy, are the equivalent of

an anticipatory breach of an executory agreement within the

doctrine of Roehm v. Horst, supra.

The claim for damages by reason of such a breach is "founded

upon a contract, express or implied," within the meaning of

§ 63a-4, and the damages may be liquidated under § 63b. Grant

Shoe Co. v. Laird, 212 U. S. 445, 448. It is true that in Zavelo

v. Reeves, 227 U. S. 625, 631, we held that the debts provable

under § 63a-4 include only such as existed at the time of the

filing of the petition. But we agree with what was said in Ex

parte Pollard, 2 Low. 411, Fed. Cas. No. 11,252, that it would

be "an unnecessary and false nicety" to hold that because it

was the act of filing the petition that wrought the breach, there-

fore there was no breach at the time of the petition. And as

was also declared in In re Pettingill, 137 Fed. 143, 147: "The

test of provability under the Act of 1898 may be stated thus:

If the bankrupt, at the time of bankruptcy, by disena-
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bling himself from performing the contract in question, and by

repudiating its obligation, could give the proving creditor the

right to maintain at once a suit in which damages could be

assessed at law or in equity, then the creditor can prove in bank-

ruptcy on the ground that bankruptcy is the equivalent of dis-

enablement and repudiation. For the assessment of damages

proceedings may be directed by the court under § 63b (30 Stat.

562)." It was in effect so ruled by this court in Lesser v. Gray,

236 U. S. 70, 75, where it was said: "If, as both the bankruptcy

and state courts concluded, the contract was terminated by the

involuntary bankruptcy proceeding, no legal injury resulted.

If, on the other hand, that view of the law was erroneous, then

there was a breach and defendant Gray became liable for any

resulting damage; but he was released therefrom by his dis-

charge." Of course, he could not be released unless the debt

was provable.

We therefore conclude that the Circuit Court of Appeals was

correct in holding that the intervention of bankruptcy consti-

tuted such a breach of the contract in question as entitled the

Auditorium Association to prove its claim. **•**•

participation in bankrupt estates, while the bankrupts themselves, as a necessary corollary, were left still subject to actiu 1 !
fQr nonperformance in the future, although without the properi.~
or credit often necessary to enable them to perform. We couclude that proceedings, whether voluntary or involuntary, re-\
tmlting in an adjudication of bankruptcy, are the equivalent of
an anticipatory breach of an executory agreement within the
doctrine of Roehm v. Horst, supra.
The claim for damages by reason of such a breach is ''founded
upon a contract, express or implied," within the meaning of
§ 63a-4, and the damages may be liquidated under § 63b. Grant
Shoe Co. v. Laird, 212 U. S. 445, 448. It is true that in Zavelo
v. Reeves, 227 U. S. 625, 631, we held that the debts provable
under § 63a-4 include only such as existed at the time of the
filing of the petition. But we agree with what was said in Ex
pa.rte Pollard, 2 Low. 411, Fed. Cas. No. 11,252, that it would
be ''an unnecessary and false nicety'' to hold that because it
was the act of filing the petition that wrought the breach, therefore there was no breach at the time of the petition. And as
was also declared in In re Pettingill, 137 Fed. 143, 147: "The
test of provability under the Act of 1898 may be stated thus:
If the bankrupt, 'at the time of bankruptcy, by disenabling himself from performing the contract in question, and by
repudiating its obligation, could give the proving creditor the
right t.o maintain at once a suit in which damages could be
assessed at law or in equity, then the creditor can prove in bankruptcy on the ground that bankruptcy is the equivalent of disenablement and repudiation. For the assessment of damages
proceedings may be directed by the court under § 63b (30 Stat.
562).,, n· was in effect so ruled by this court in LP..sser v. Gray,
236 U. S. 70, 75, where it was said: "If, as ·both the bankruptcy
and state courtci concluded, the contract was terminated by the
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding, no legal injury resulted.
If, on the other hand, that view of the law was erroneous, then
there was a breach and defendant Gray became liable for any
resulting damage; but he was released therefrom by his discharge.'' Of course, he could not be released unless the debt
was provable.
We therefore conclude that the Circuit Court of Appeals was
correct in holding that the intervention of bankruptcy constituted such a breach of the contract in question as entitled the
Auditorium AE1Sociation to prove its claim. • • • • • •
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COHEN v. SAMUELS

245 U. S. 50, 62 L. ed. 143, 38 Sup. Ct» 36

(United States Supreme Court. November 5, 1917)

Mr. Justice McKENNA delivered the opinion of the court.

On May 13, 1915, Elias W. Samuels filed a voluntary petition

COHEN v. SAMUELS
246 U. S. 50, 62 L. ed. 143, 38 Sup. Ct. 36

in bankruptcy and was adjudicated a bankrupt. On the same

day Cohen, petitioner herein, was duly elected his trustee. Sam-

(United States Supreme Court. November 5, 1917)

uels at the time of the adjudication held five life insurance pol-

icies in various life insurance companies.

On September 16, 1915, Cohen made motions before the ref-

eree in bankruptcy to require Samuels to deliver to him, Cohen,

the policies or pay to him the cash surrender value of them as

of the date of the adjudication. The motions were denied.

Subsequently Cohen filed petitions to review the rulings of the

referee as to three of the policies, which petitions came on for

hearing before the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York February 14, 1916.

The policies were respectively for the sums of $3,000, $3,000,

and $1,000, and had respectively a cash surrender value of

$193.85, $753, subject to a deduction of a loan of $555 and in-

terest, and $396. The policies were payable to certain relatives

of Samuels as beneficiaries and it was provided in each that
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Samuels reserved the absolute right to change the beneficiary

without the latter's consent.

The District Court affirmed the orders of the referee, following

what the court conceived to be the ruling in In re Hammel & Co.,

221 Fed. 56.

Cohen petitioned the Circuit Court of Appeals to revise the

ruling of the District Court as provided in § 24b of the Bank-

ruptcy Act and for such other and further relief as might be

proper.

The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Dis-

trict Court, one judge dissenting. 237 Fed. 796.

The facts are not in dispute. The policies had a cash surren-

der value at the time Samuels was adjudicated a bankrupt which

the companies were willing to pay to him and in all of them he

had the absolute right to change the beneficiaries.

The question in the ease is the simple one of the construction

of § 70a. By it the trustee of the bankrupt is vested by

operation of law with title to all property of the bankrupt

Mr. Justice .McKENNA delivered the opinion of the court.
On May 13, 1915, Elias W. Samuels filed a voluntary petition
in bankruptcy and was adjudicated a bankrupt. On the same
day Cohen, petitioner herein, was duly elected his trustee. Samuels at the time of the adjudication held five life insurance policies in various life insurance companies.
On September 16, 1915, Cohen made motions before the referee in bankruptcy to require Samuels to deliver to him, Cohen,
the policies or pay to him the cash surrender value of them as
of the date of the adjudication. The motions were denied.
Subsequently Cohen filed petitions to review the rulings of the
referee as to three of the policies, which petitions came on for
hearing before the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York February 14, 1916.
The policies were respectively for the sums of $3,000, $3,000,
and $1,000, and had respectively a cash surrender value of
$193.85, $753, subject to a deduction of a loan of $555 and interest, and $396. The policies were payable to certain relatives
of Samuels as beneficiaries and it was provided in each that
Samuels reserved the absolute right to change the beneficiary
without the latter's consent.
The District Court affirmed the orders of the referee, following
what the court conceived to be the ruling in In re Hammel & Co.,
221Fed.56.
Cohen petitioned the Circuit Court of ~ppeals to revise the
ruling of the District Court as provided in § 24b of the Bankruptcy Act and for such other and further relief as might be
proper.
The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the District Court, one judge di11Benting. 237 Fed. 796.
The facts are not in dispute. The policies had a cash surrender value at the time Samuels was adjudicated a bankrupt which
the companies were willing to pay to him and in all of them he
had the absolute right to change the beneficiaries.
The question in the case is the simple one of the construction
of ~ 70a. By it the trustee of the bankrupt is vested by
operation of law with title to all property of the bankrupt
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which is not exempt; "(3) powers which he might have

exercised for his own benefit, but not those which he might

have exercised for some other person; * * • (5) property

which prior to the filing of his petition he could by any means

have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold

under judicial process against him: Provided, that when any

bankrupt shall have any insurance policy which has a cash sur-

render value payable to himself, his estate, or personal repre-

sentatives, he may, within thirty days after the cash surrender

value has been ascertained and stated to the trustee by the com-

pany issuing the same, pay or secure to the trustee the sum so

ascertained and stated, and continue to hold, own, and carry such

policy free from the claims of the creditors participating in the

distribution of his estate under the bankruptcy proceedings, oth-

erwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as assets. * * •"

Regarding the section in its entirety there would seem to be

no difficulty in its interpretation, but we are admonished by the

decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals and its reasoning and

also by the argument of counsel that there are considerations

which give particular control to the proviso and distinguish be-

tween insurance policies and other property which the bankrupt

can transfer or which can be levied upon and sold under judicial
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process against him (subdivision 5). We have given attention

to those considerations and feel their strength, but they are op-

posed by other considerations. It might indeed be that it would

better fulfill the protection of insurance by considering the pro-

viso alone and literally, regarding the policy at the moment of

adjudication, and, if it be not payable then in words to the bank-

rupt—no matter what rights or powers are reserved by him, no

matter what its pecuniary facility and value is to him—to con-

sider that he has no property in it. But we think such construc-

tion is untenable. The declaration of subdivision 3 is that "pow-

ers which he might have exercised for his own benefit" "shall in

turn be vested" in the trustee, and there is vested in him as

well all property that the bankrupt could transfer or which by

judicial process could be subjected to his debts, and especially as

to insurance policies which have a cash surrender value payable

to himself, his estate or personal representative. It is true the

policies in question here are not so payable, but they can be or

could have been so payable at his own will and by simple dec-

laration. Under such conditions to hold that there was nothing

of property to vest in a trustee would be to make an insurance

which is not exempt; "(3) powers which he might have
exercised for his own benefit, but not those which he might
have exercised for some other person; • • • ( 5) property
which prior to the filing of his petition he could by any means
have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold
under judicial process against him: ·Prot'ided, that when any
bankrupt shall have any insurance policy which has a cash surrender value payable to himself, his estate, or personal representatives, he may, ~thin thirty days after the cash surrender
value has been ascertained and stated to the trustee by the company issuing the same, pay or secure to the trustee the sum so
ascertained and stated, and continue to hold, own, and carry such
policy free from the claims of the creditors participating in the
distribution of his estate under the bankruptcy proceedings, otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as assets. • • • ''
Regarding the section in its entirety there would seem to be
no difficulty in its interpretation, but we are admonished by the
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals and its reasoning and
also by the argument of counsel that there are considerations
which give particular control to the proviso and distinguish between insurance policies and other property which the bankrupt
can transfer or which can be levied upon and sold under judicial
process against him (subdivision 5). We have given attention
to those considerations and feel their strength, but they are opposed by other considerations. It might indeed be that it would
better fulfill the protection of insurance by considering the proviso alone and literally, regarding the policy at the moment of
adjudication, and, if it be not payable then in words to the bank- ·
rupt-no matter what rights or powers are reserved by him, no
matter what its pecuniary facility and value is to him-to consider that he has no property in it. But we think such construction is untenable. The declaration of subdivision 3 is that "powers which he might have exercised for his own benefit" "shall in
tum be vested" in the trustee, and there is vested in him as
well all property that the bankrupt could transfer or which by
judicial process could be subjected to his debts, and especially as
to insurance policies which have a cash surrender value payable
to himself, his estate or personal representative. It is true the
policies in question here are not so payable. but they can be or
<>onld have been so payable at his own wi11 and by simple declaration. Under such conditions to hold that there wa.q nothing
of property to vest in a trustee would be to make an insurance
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policy a shelter for valuable assets and, it might be, a refuge for

fraud. And our conclusions would be the same if we regarded

the proviso alone.

This court has been careful to define the interest of bankrupts

in the insurance policies they may possess. In Hiscock v. Mer-

tens, 205 U. S. 202, we gave a bankrupt the benefit of the re-

demption of a policy from the claims of creditors, though a cash

surrender value was not provided by it but was recognized by the

insurance company. In Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459,

473, we said that it "was the purpose of Congress to pass to the

trustee that sum which was available to the bankrupt at the

time of bankruptcy as a cash asset; otherwise to leave to the

insured the benefit of his life insurance." See also Everett v.

Judson, 228 U. S. 474. Judgment of the Circuit Court of Ap-

peals affirming the order of the District Court is reversed and

the case remanded to the District Court for further proceedings

in accordance with this opinion. Reversed.

AMERICAN TRUST & SAVINGS BANK v. DUNCAN

254 Fed. 780, 166 C. C. A. 226

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. December 16, 1918)

WALKER, Circuit Judge. The appellee, as trustee in bank-

ruptcy of George E. Lum, filed a bill in the Chancery Court of
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Jefferson county, Ala., against the bankrupt and his wife. Carrie

E. Lum, alleging that about nine years prior to the bankruptcy

certain described real estate was conveyed to the bankrupt's wife,

policy a. shelter for valuable assets and, it might be, a refuge for
fraud. And 011r conclusions would be the same if we regarued
the proviso alone.
This court has been careful to define the interest of bankrupts
in the insurance policies they may possess. In Hiscock v. ~ler
tens, 205 U. S. 202, we gave a bankrupt the benefit of the redemption of a policy from the claims of creditors, though a cash
surrender value was not provided by it but was recognized by the
insurance company. In Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459.
473, we saiq that it "was the purpose of Congress to pass to the
trustee that sum which was available to the bankrupt at the
time of bankruptcy as a cash asset; otherwise to leave to the
insured the benefit of his life insurance." See also Everett v.
Judson, 228 U. S. 474. Judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the order of the District Court is reversed and
the case remanded to the District Court for further proceedings
in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed.

part of the purchase money for which and part of the cost of

valuable improvements thereon were paid with the bankrupt's

AMERICAN TRUST & SAVIN GS BANK v. DUNCAN

money, as a mere gift to his wife, while he was indebted to the

American Trust & Savings Bank (hereinafter referred to as the

appellant) in a considerable sum, $1,000 of which remained un-

254 Fed. 780, 166 C. C. A. 226

paid when the bill was filed. The bill prayed that the real estate

mentioned, with the improvements thereon, be subjected to the

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. December 16, 1918)

payment of the debts of the bankrupt, that the real estate and

improvements be sold for that purpose, and the proceeds thereof

be paid to the trustee in bankruptcy, and for general relief.

That suit resulted in the rendition of a judgment or decree of

the Supreme Court of Alabama which adjudged that the real

estate mentioned be subjected to the satisfaction of the claim of

the appellant to the extent of $1,000 and accrued interest, declar-

WALKER, Circuit Judge. The appellee, as trustee in bankruptcy of George E. Lum, filed a bill in the Chancery Court of
Jefferson county, Ala., against the bankrupt and bis wife. Carrie
E. Lum, alleging that about nine years prior to the bankruptcy
certain described real estate was conveyed to the bankrupt's wife,
part of the purchase money for which and part of the cost of
valuable improvements thereon were paid with the bankrupt's
money, as a mere gift to his wife, while he was indebted to the
American Trust & Savings Bank (hereinafter referred to as the
appellant) in a considerable sum, $1,000 of which remained unpaid when th<> bill was filed. The bill prayed that the real estate
m<>ntione<l, with the improvement-; thereon, be subjected to the
payment of the debts of the bankrupt, that the real estate and
improvements be sold for that purpose, and the proceeds thereof
be paid to the trustee in bankrupt<'y, and for general relief.
That suit result.en in the rendition of a judgment or decree of
the Supreme Court of Alabama which adjudged that the real
estate mf'ntioned be subjected to the ~atisfaction of the claim of
the appellant to the extent of $1,000 and accrued interest, declar-
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ing and establishing a lien upon said real estate to said extent,
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and that unless said amount is paid into court within sixty days

said real estate be advertised and sold for the satisfaction of said

indebtedness. Pursuant to that decree the sum of $1,000, with

accrued interest, was paid to the trustee in bankruptcy. There-

after the appellant filed in the bankruptcy proceedings its peti-

tion, alleging the facts above set out, and that the petitioner was

the only creditor of the bankrupt whose debt was in existence

at the time the bankrupt made the alleged gifts to his wife, and

praying that the trustee be ordered and directed to pay over to

the petitioner the said sum of $1,000 and accrued interest, less

the costs and expenses of said suit and of the court in which the

petition was filed. The referee made an order denying the

prayer of the petition, "but without in any manner affect-

ing the proof and allowance of the claim of the said petitioner,

American Trust & Savings Bank, filed and allowed in this pro-

ceeding as an unsecured claim not entitled to preference or

priority of payment." The appellant's petition for the re-

view of the referee's order was dismissed by the District Court.

The appeal is from the decree to that effect.

The right of the trustee to bring and maintain the above-men-

tioned suit existed by virtue of the following provision of the

bankruptcy act:
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"The trustee may avoid any transfer by the bankrupt of his

property which any creditor of such bankrupt might have avoid-

ed, and may recover the property so transferred, or its value,

from the person to whom it was transferred, unless he was a

bona fide holder for value prior to the date of the adjudication.

Such property may be recovered or its value collected from who-

ever may have received it, except a bona fide holder for value.

For the purpose of such recovery any court of bankruptcy as

hereinbefore defined, and any state court which would have had

jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened, shall have con-

current jurisdiction." Bankruptcy Act July 1, 1898, c. 541,

§ 70e, 30 Stat. 565 (Comp. St. § 9654).

The decree rendered enforced the right of the sole remaining

creditor whose debt was in existence at the time the debtor made

the donation of money to his wife, or for her benefit, to have that

money treated as received by the donee in trust for such cred-

itor, and to have the amount of the donation, or so much thereof

as was required to satisfy the demand of such creditor, charged

against the property of the donee in which it was invested. Lock-

ing and establishing a lien upon said real estate to said extent,
and that unless said amount is paid into court within sixty days
said real estate be advertised and sold for the satisfaction of said
indebtedness. Pursuant to that decree the sum of $1,000, with
accrued interest, was paid to the trustee in bankruptcy. Thereafter the appellant filed in the bankruptcy proceedings its petition, alleging the facts above set out, and that the petitioner was
the only creditor of the bankrupt whose debt was in existence
at the time the bankrupt ma.de the alleged gifts to his wife, and
praying that the trustee be ordered and directed to pay over to
the petitioner the said sum of $1,000 and accrued interest, less
the costs and expenses of said suit and of the court in which the
petition was filed. The ·referee made an order denying the
prayer of the petition, ''but without in any manner affecting the proof and allowance of the claim of the said petitioner,
American Trust & Savings Bank, filed and allowed in this proceeding as an unsecured claim not entitled to preference or
priority of payment." The appellant's petition for the review of the referee's order was dismissed by the District Court.
The appeal is from the decree to that effect. .
The right of the trustee to bring and maintain the above-mentioned suit existed by virtue of the following provision of the
bankruptcy act :
''The trustee may avoid any transfer by the bankrupt of his
property which any creditor of such bankrupt might have avoided, and may recover · the property so transferred, or its value,
from the person to whom it was transferred, unless he was a
bona fide holder for value prior to the date of the adjudication.
Such property may be recovered or its value collected from whoever may have received it, except a bona fide holder for value.
For the purpose of such recovery any court of bankruptcy as
hereinbefore defined, and any state court which would have bad
jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened, shall have concurrent jurisdiction." Bankruptcy Act July 1, 1898, c. 541,
§ 70e, 30 Stat. 565 (Comp. St. § 9654).
The decree rendered enforced the right of the sole remaining
creditor whose debt was in existence at the time the debtor made
the donation of money to his wife, or for her benefit, to have that
money treated as received by the donee in tn1st for such creditor, and to have the amount of the donation, or so much thereof
as was required to satisfy the demand of such creditor, charged
against the property of the donee in which it was invested. Lock-
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ard v. Nash, Adm'r, 64 Ala. 385; Cartwright v. West, 185 Ala.

41, 64 South. 293. The questioned transaction was binding as

between the debtor and his donee, the former retaining no right

to the money he gave and acquiring no interest in the property

into which it went, but was voidable as against creditors whose

debts were in existence when the gift was made. An effect of

the statute is to give the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy the right

to assert and enforce the right of such creditors. The appellant's

petition raised the question whether the amount recovered by

the trustee, less costs incurred, belonged to the creditor whose

right was enforced by the decree, or was received and held by

the trustee as part of the bankrupt '& estate for the common ben-

efit of his creditors. Other creditors would be benefited by the

trustee's recovery, though the net amount recovered is applied

on the appellant's demand alone, as a result of such application

is the extinguishment of a claim which, but for such recovery,

would share in the part of the bankrupt's estate which is avail-

able for general distribution among his creditors. Nothing con-

tained in the above-quoted provision of the bankruptcy act for-

bids the application of an amount so recovered by the trustee

to the satisfaction of the one debt of the bankrupt which was in

existence when the transaction brought into question by the
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trustee's suit occurred. That suit being the assertion by the

trustee of a right possessed by only one of the bankrupt's cred-

itors, other creditors have no right to share in the amount so

recovered, unless that right is given by some provision of the

bankruptcy act. In behalf of the appellee it is contended that

the decision in the case of Globe Bank v. Martin, 236 U. S. 288,

35 Sup. Ct. 377, 59 L. Ed. 583, shows that the amount recovered

by the trustee was held by him as a part of the bankrupt's estate

to which the appellant has no prior right.

The fund which was in question in the case just mentioned was

acquired by the trustee in bankruptcy under the following cir-

cumstances: Some time prior to the debtor's bankruptcy, and

while he owed debts to the Globe Bank and others, he made vol-

untary conveyances to his son. Within four months prior to the

bankruptcy, creditors whose debts existed at the time such con-

veyances were made brought suits to subject the conveyed prop-

erty to their demands and had attachments levied on that prop-

erty. After the debtor was adjudged bankrupt, the Bankruptcy

Court entered an order that the attachment lien be preserved

for the benefit of the bankrupt estate, and that the trustee inter-

ard v. Nash, Adm'r, 64 Ala. 385; Cartwright v. West, 185 Ala.
41, 64 South. 293. The questioned transaction was binding as
between the debtor and his donee, the former retaining no right
to the money he gave and acquiring no interest in the property
int.o which it went, but was voidable as against creditors whose
debts were in existence when the gift was made. An effect of
the statute is to give the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy the right
t.o assert and enforce the right of such creditors. The appellant's
petition raised the question whether the amount recovered by
the trustee, less costs incurred, belonged to the creditor whose
right was enforced by the decree, or was received and held by
the trustee as part of the bankrupt's estate for the common benefit of his creditors. Other creditors would be benefited by the
trustee's recovery, though the net amount recovered is applied
on the appellant's demand alone, as a result of such application
is the extinguishment of a claim which, but for such recovery,
would share in the part of the bankrupt's estate which is available for general distribution among his creditors. Nothing contained in the above-quoted provision of the bankruptcy act forbids the application of an amount so recovered by the trustee
to the satisfadion of the one debt of the bankrupt which was in
existence when the transaction brought into question by the
trustee's suit occurred. That suit being the assertion by the
trustee of a right possessed by only one of the bankrupt's creditors, other creditors have no right to share in the amount so
recovered, unless that right is given by some provision of the
bankruptcy act. In behalf of the appellee it is contended that
the decision in the case of Globe Bank v. Martin, 236 U. S. 288.
35 Sup. Ct. 377, 59 L. Ed. 583, shows that the amount recovered
by the trustee was held by him as a part of the bankrupt's estate
to which the appellant has no prior right.
The fund which was in question in the case just mentioned was
acquired by the trustee in bankruptcy under the following circumstances: Some time prior to the debtor's bankruptcy, and
while he owed debts to the Globe Bank and others, he made voluntary conveyances to his son. Within four months prior to the
bankruptcy, ereditors whose debts existed at the time such conveyances were made brought suits to subject the conveyed property to their demands and had attachments levied on that property. After the debtor wa8 adjudged bankrupt, the Bankruptcy
Court entered an order that the attachment lien be preserved
for the benefit of the bankrupt estate, and that the trustee inter-
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vene in the suits in which the attachments issued. This the

trustee did by petition, and it was adjudged that enough of the

attached property be sold to realize the amount of the debts in

existence when the attacked conveyances were made. The trus-

tee received the proceeds of such sale. It was held that the fund

so obtained should be distributed between all the creditors as

a general asset of the bankrupt estate, and not between those

creditors who alone would have shared in the fund, had their

attachment been obtained more than four months prior to the

filing of the petition in bankruptcy. The opinion rendered

makes it plain that the conclusion reached was the result of

applying the provisions of section 67f of the bankruptcy act to

the facts disclosed. In the course of the opinion it was said:

"That section distinctly provides that all levies, judgments,

attachments, or other liens, obtained through legal proceedings

against a person who is insolvent, within four months of the

filing of the petition in bankruptcy, shall be deemed null and

void, and the property affected by the levy, judgment, attach-

ment, or other lien shall be deemed wholly discharged and re-

leased from the same, and shall pass to the trustee as a part of

the estate of the bankrupt, unless the court shall, as was done in

this case, order that the right under the levy, judgment, attach-
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ment or other lien be preserved for the benefit of the estate in

which event the same shall pass to and be preserved by the trus-

tee for the benefit of the estate. Except for the attachments, the

appellant banks had no specific lien upon the estate." Globe

Bank v. Martin, 236 U. S. 288, 298, 35 Sup. Ct. 377, 381 (59 L.

Ed. 583).

The ruling was to the effect that, where a judicial lien ob-

tained against an insolvent debtor within four months prior to

the filing of the petition in bankruptcy against him is preserved

and enforced for the benefit of the estate, as authorized by section

67f of the bankruptcy act, the fund coming into possession of

the trustee as the result of such action belongs to the bankrupt

estate, and not to those creditors only in whose behalf the lien

originally was obtained. That decision was the result of apply-

ing the provision mentioned to a state of facts to which it was

held to be applicable.

Section 70e of the bankruptcy act differs from section 67f of

that act, in that the former does not contain any provision to

the effect that property, or its value, recovered by the trustee in

a suit which that section authorizes him to bring when he elects

vene in the suits in which the attachments issued. This the
trustee did by petition, and it was adjudged that enough of the
attached property be sold to realize the amount of the debts in
existence when the attacked con vcyances were made. 'l'he trustee received the proceeds of such sale. It was held that the fWld
so obtained should be distributed between all the credito~ as
a general asset of the bankrupt estate, and not between those
creditors who alone would have shared in the fund, had their
attachment been obtained more than four months prior to the
tiling of the petition in bankruptcy. The opinion rendered
makes it plain that the conclusion reached was the result of
applying the provisions of section 67f of the bankruptcy act to
the facts disclosed. In the course of the opinion it was said:
''That section distinctly provides that all levies, judgments,
attachments, or other liens, obtained through legal proceedings
against a person who is insolvent, within four months of the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy, shall be deemed null and
void, and the property affected by the levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien shall be deemed wholly discharged and released from the same, and shall pass to the trustee as a part of
the estate of the bankrupt, unless the court shall, as was done in
this case, order that the right under the levy, judgment, attachment or other lien be preserved for the benefit of the estate in
which event the same shall pass to and be preserved by the trustee for the benefit of the estate. Except for the attachments, the
appellant banks had no specific lien upon the estate." Globe
Bank v. Martin, 236 U. S. 288, 298, 35 Sup. Ct. 377, 381 (59 L.
Ed. 583).
The ruling was to the effect that, where a judicial lien obtained against an insolvent debtor within four months prior to
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy against him is preserved
and enforced for the benefit of the estate, as authorized by section
67f of the bankruptcy act, the fund coming into possession of
the trustee as the result of such action belongs to the bankrupt
estate, and not to those creditors only in whose behalf the lien
originally was obtained. That decision was the result of applying the provision mentioned to a state of facts to which it was
held to be applicable.
Section 70e of the bankruptcy act differs from section 67f of
that act, in that the former does not rontain any provision to
the effert that propertf, or its value, recovered by the trustee in
a suit which that section authorizes him to bring when he elects
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to avoid a transfer by the bankrupt of his property which any

creditor of such bankrupt might have avoided, shall "pass to

the trustee as part of the estate of the bankrupt." It may be

that property or its value so recovered by his trustee might have

been made a part of the bankrupt's estate, not subject to any

priority in favor of the creditor or creditors who alone had had

the right to avoid the transfer brought into question. But it is

significant that the statute does not so provide, while it does

provide for the passing to the trustee, as a part of the estate of

the bankrupt, of property, or its value, acquired by him as a

result of the preservation and enforcement of a lien obtained

through legal proceedings against an insolvent within four

months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against

him, without making any exception based upon the circumstance

that the lien so preserved and enforced was obtained by a cred-

itor or creditors who alone had the right to obtain it; the right

being one not possessed by other creditors. The statute gives

notice to any one obtaining a lien by legal proceedings against

an insolvent person that, if the insolvent's bankruptcy occurs

within four months after the lien is obtained, it may be pre-

served and enforced for the benefit of the bankrupt's estate, the

proceeds of such enforcement to pass to the trustee as part of
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the estate of the bankrupt. The provision having this effect

deals with "levies, judgments, attachments, or other liens" ob-

tained through legal proceedings against an insolvent within

four months prior to his bankruptcy, and with property affected

by a lien so obtained. It does not deal with the rights of cred-

itors who have not so obtained a lien.

Under the circumstances disclosed in the instant case the ap-

pellant alone had the right to subject to the satisfaction of its

demand against the bankrupt the property of the bankrupt's

donee in which the sum donated was invested. The appellant

had not obtained any lien through legal proceedings instituted

for the enforcement of such right. There has not been called to

our attention, and we have not discovered, any provision of the

bankruptcy act indicating an intention to treat as a general asset

of the bankrupt's estate an amount recovered by the trustee in

a suit brought by him, as authorized by section 70e of that act,

for the enforcement of the right possessed by a creditor situated

as the appellant was. As above pointed out, it does not follow

from the fact that the trustee was authorized to bring and main-

tain such a suit that the recovery in it is to be distributed be-

to avoid a transfer by the bankrupt of his property which any
creditor of such bankrupt might have avoided, shall "pnss to
the trustee as part of the estate of the bankrupt." It may be
that property or its value so recovered by his trustee might have
been made a part of the bankrupt's estate, not subject to any
priority in favor of the creditor or creditors who alone ha<l had
the right to avoid the transfer brought into question. But it is
significant •hat the statute does not so provide, while it does
provide for the passing to the trustee, as a part of the estate of
the bankrupt, of property, or its value, acquired by him as a
result of the preservation and enforcement of a lien obtained
through legal proceedings against an insolvent within four
months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against
him, without making any exception based upon the circumstance
that the lien so preserved and enforced was obtained by a creditor or creditors who alone had the right to obtain it; the right
being one not possessed by other creditors. The statute gives
notice to any one obtaining a lien by legal proceedings against
an insolvent person that, if the insolvent's bankruptcy occurs
within four months after the lien is obtained, it may be preserved and enforced for the benefit of the bankrupt's estate, the
proceeds of such enforcement to pass to the trustee as part of
the estate of the bankrupt. The provision having this effect
deals with "levies, judgments, attachments, or other liens" obtained through legal proceedings against an insolvent within
four months prior to his bankruptcy, and with property affected
l;y a lien so obtained. It does not deal with the rights of creditors who have not so obtained a lien.
Under the circumstances disclosed in the instant case the appellant alone had the right to subject to the satisfaction of its
c!emand against the bankrupt the property of the bankrupt's
<1onee in which the sum donated was invested. The appellant
had not obtained any lien through legal proceedings instituted
for the enforcement of such right. There has not been called to
our attention, and we have not discovered, any provision of the
bankruptcy act indicating an intention to treat as a general asset
of the bankrupt's estate an amount recovered by the trustee in
a suit brought by him, as authorized by section 70e of that act,
for the enforcement of the right possessed by a creditor situated
as the Hppellant was. As above pointed out, it does not follow
from the> fac>t that the trustee was authorized to bring and maintain such a suit that the recovery in it is to be distributed be-
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tween all the creditors as a general asset of the bankrupt's

estate, as other creditors may be benefited by the recovery—

though it belongs to the one creditor whose right the trustee as-

serted—having the effect of extinguishing a claim against the

general assets of the bankrupt's estate, thereby increasing the

pro rata shares of other creditors in the assets to be distributed

between them.

In view of the differences above pointed out between section

67f and section 70e of the bankruptcy act, and of the absence

of anything indicating that the lawmakers intended that a debt-

or's bankruptcy should have the effect of impairing rights pos-

sessed by one or some only of his creditors who had not, prior to

the bankruptcy, obtained any lien through legal proceedings,

we conclude that the decision last above cited does not foreclose

the question raised by the facts of the instant case; that the pro-

ceeds realized from the suit brought to enforce the demand of

the appellant against property not liable to be subjected to the

demands of any other existing creditor of the bankrupt did not

pass to the trustee as a part of the estate of the bankrupt, though

the recovery was in a suit brought by the trustee under the

authority conferred by section 70e of the bankruptcy act; and

that the appellant was entitled to the net amount of the fund so
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realized.

It follows that the decree appealed from was erroneous. That

decree is reversed.

McINTYRE v. KAVANAUGH

242 U. S. 138, 61 L. ed. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 38

(United States Supreme Court. December 4, 1916)

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the

court:

Plaintiff in error was a member of T. A. Mclntyre & Com-

pany, engaged in business as brokers. During February, 1908,

the partnership received certain stock certificates owned by de-

fendant in error, and undertook to hold them as security for

his indebtedness, amounting to less than one sixth of their market

tween all the creditors as a general asset of the bankrupt's
estate, as other creditors may be benefited by the recoverythough it belongs to the one creditor whose right the trustee asserted-having the effect of extinguishing a claim against the
general assets of the bankrupt's estate, thereby increasing the
pro rata shares of other creditors in the assets to be distributed
between them.
In view of the differences above pointed out between section
67f and section 70e of the bankruptcy act, and of the absence
of anything indicating that the lawmakers intended that a debtor's bankruptcy should have the effect of impairing rights possessed by one or some only of his creditors who had not, prior to
the bankruptcy, obtained any lien through legal proceedings,
we conclude that the decision last above cited does not foreclose
the question raised by the facts of the instant case ; that the proceeds realized from the suit brought to enforce the demand of
the appellant against property not liable to be subjected to the
demands of any other existing creditor of the bankrupt did not
pass to the trustee as a part of the estate of the bankrupt, though
the recovery was in a suit brought by the trustee under the
authority conferred by section 70e of the bankruptcy act; and
that the appellant was entitled to th'e net. amount of the fund so
realized.
It follows that the decree appealed from was erroneous. That
decree is reversed.

value. Within a few weeks, without authority and without his

knowledge, they sold the stocks and appropriated the avails to

their own use. Shortly thereafter both firm and its members

McINTYRE v. KAVANAUGH

were adjudged bankrupts. After his discharge in bankruptcy

242 U. S. 138, 61 L. ed. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 38
(United States Supreme Court.

December 4, 1916)

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the
court:
Plaintiff' in error was a member of T. A. Mcintyre & Company, engaged in business as brokers. During February, 1908,
the partnership received certain stock certificates owned by defendant in error, and undertook to hold them as security for
his indebtedness, amounting to less than one sixth of their market
value. Within a few weeks, without authority and without his
knowledge, they sold the stocks and appropriated the avails to
their own use. Shortly thereafter both firm and its members
were adjudged bankrupts. After his discharge in bankruptcy
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this suit was instituted against plaintiff in error, seeking dam-

ages for the wrongful conversion. He set up his discharge aud

also personal ignorance of and nonparticipation in any tortious

act.

The trial court held the liability was for wilful and malicious

injury to property and expressly excluded from release by § 17

(2), Bankruptcy Act, as amended in 1903, and that the several

partners were liable. A judgment for damages was affirmed by

Appellate Division, 128 App. Div. 722, and Court of Appeals,

210 N. Y. 175.

That partners are individually responsible for torts by a firm

when acting within the general scope of its business, whether

they personally participate therein or not, we regard as entirely

clear. Castle v. Bullard, 23 How. 172; Matter of Peck, 206 N. Y.

55. If, under the circumstances here presented, the firm in-

flicted a wilful and malicious injury to property, of course,

plaintiff in error incurred liability for that character of wrong.

As originally enacted, § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act provided:

"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all

his provable debts, except such as * * * (2) are judg-

ments in actions for frauds, or obtaining property by false pre-

tenses or false representations, or for wilful and malicious in-
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juries to the person or property of another; • • • (4) were

created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalca-

tion while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity."

This was amended by Act February 5, 1903, so as to read:

"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from

all his provable debts, except such as • * • (2) are

liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses or false

representations, or for wilful and malicious injuries to the person

or property of another, or for alimony due or to become due,

or for maintenance or support of wife or child, or for seduction

of an unmarried female, or for criminal conversation; * • •

or (4) were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropria-

tion, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary

capacity."

The trial court found—

That on February 5, 1908, Mclntyre & Company by agree-

ment obtained possession of Kavanaugh's stocks, worth approxi-

mately $25,000. and held them as security for his indebtedness,

amounting to $3,853.32.

"That almost immediately after taking over said stocks by

this suit was instituted against plaintiff in error, seeking damages for the wrongful conversion. He set up his discharge aml
also personal ignorance of and nonparticipation in any tortiou.s
act.
The trial court held the liability was for wilful and malicious
injury to property and expressly excluded from release by § 17
(2), Bankruptcy Act, as amended in 1903, and that the several
partners were liable. A judgment for damages was affirmed by
Appellate Division, 128 App. Div. 722, and Court of Appeals,
210 N. Y. 175.
That partners are individually responsible for torts by a firm
when acting within the general scope of its business, whether
they personally participate therein or not, we regard as entirely
clear. Castle v. Bullard, 23 How. 172; Matter of Peck, 206 N. Y.
55. If, under the circumstances here presented, the firm inflicted a wilful and malicious injury to property, of course,
plaintiff in error incurred liability for that character of wrong.
As originally enacted, § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act provided:
''A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all
his provable debts, except such as • • • (2) are judgments in actions for frauds, or obtaining property by false pretenses or false representations, or for wilful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another; • • • ( 4) were
created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity."
This was amended by Act February 5, 1903, so as to read:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all his provable debts, except such as • • • (2) are
liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses or false
representations, or for wilful and mali('ious injuries to the person
or property of another, or for alimony due or to become due,
or for maintenance or support of wife or child, or for seduction
of an unmarried fem ale, or for criminal conversation ; • • •
or (4) were created by bis fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defsf cation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary
('apacity."
The trial court foundThat on February 5, 1908, .Mcintyre & Company by agreem~nt obtained possesi:iion of Kavanaugh 's stocks, worth approximately $25,000. and held them as security for his indebtedness,
amounting to $3,853.32.
''That e.lmost immediately after taking over said stocks by
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certificates as aforesaid by said firm of T. A. Mclntyre &

Company, composed as aforesaid, and commencing on the very

next day, said firm of T. A. Mclntyre & Company (the above-

named defendants being members thereof), without any notice

to the plaintiff, and without his authority, knowledge, or con-

sent, or demand of any kind upon him, sold and disposed of

the identical certificates of such stock and scrip so turned over

to them as aforesaid, and placed the avails thereof in the bank

account of said firm of T. A. Mclntyre & Company to the credit

of said firm.

"That the various stocks aforesaid had all been disposed of

prior to the 18th day of March, 1908, and that three quarters in

value thereof had been disposed of on or prior to February

14th, 1908, or within nine days after the acquisition of the

possession thereof by defendant's firm as aforesaid.

"That the above-named defendants, together with the other

members of said firm of T. A. Mclntyre & Company, in dis-

posing of said stocks- aforesaid, without notice to or demand

upon the plaintiff, and without his authority, knowledge, or

consent, and in depositing the proceeds and avails thereof in

the bank account to the credit of said firm of T. A. Mclntyre

& Company, committed wilful and malicious injury to the prop-
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erty of the plaintiff.

"That on April 23rd, 1908, the said firm of T. A. Mclntyre &

Company filed a petition in bankruptcy in the United States

District Court for the Southern District of New York, and were

afterwards adjudicated bankrupts.

"That thereafter the plaintiff in this action proved his claim

against the bankrupt estate without waiving any legal rights

in this action or otherwise."

To deprive another of his property forever by deliberately

disposing of it without semblance of authority is certainly an

injury thereto within common acceptation of the words. Bou-

vier's Law Dictionary—"Injury." And this we understand is

not controverted; but the argument is that an examination of our

several Bankruptcy Acts and consideration of purpose and his-

tory of the 1903 amendment will show Congress never intended

the words in question to include conversion. We can find no

sufficient reason for such a narrow construction. And instead

of subserving the fundamental purposes of the statute, it would

rather tend to bring about unfortunate if not irrational results.

"Why, for example, should a bankrupt who had stolen a watch

certificates as aforesaid by said firm of T. A. Mcintyre &
Company, composed as aforesaid, and commencing on the very
next day, said firm of T. A. Mcintyre & Company (the abovenamed defendant.a being members thereof), without any notice
to the plaintiff, and without his authority, knowledge, or consent, or demand of any kind upon him, sold and disposed of
the identical certificates of such stock and scrip so turned over
to them as aforesaid, and placed the avails thereof in the bank
account of said firm of T. A. Mcintyre & Company to the credit
of said firm.
' ' That the various stocks aforesaid had all been disposed of
prior to the 18th day of March, 1908, and that three quarters in
value thereof had been disposed of on or prior to February
14th, 1908, or within nine days after the acquisition of the
possession thereof by defendant's firm as aforesaid.
''That the above-named defendants, together with the other
members of said firm of T. A. Mdntyre & Company, in disposing of said stocks- aforesaid, without notice to or demand
upon the plaintiff, and without his authority, knowledge, or
consent, and in depositing the proceeds and avails thereof in
the bank account to the credit of said firm of T. A. Mcintyre
& Company, committed wilful and malicious injury to the property of the plaintiff.
·'That on April 23rd, 1908, the said firm of T. A. Mcintyre &
Company filed a petition in bankruptcy in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, and were
afterwards adjudicated bankrupts.
''That ther;:.iafter the plaintiff in this action proved his claim
against the bankrupt estate without wa.iving any legal rights
in this action or otherwise.'' ·
To deprive another of his property forever by deliberately
disposing of it without semblance of authority is certainly an
injury thereto within common acceptation of the words. Bouvier's Law Dictionary-" Injury." And this we understand is
not controverted; but the argument is that an examination of our
several Bankruptcy Act.s and consideration of purpose and history of the 1903 amendment will show Congress never intended
the words in question to include conversion. We can find no
sufficient reason for such a narrow construction. And instead
of subserving the fundamental purposes of the statute, it would
rather tend to bring about unfortunate if not irrational results.
Why, for example, should a bankrupt who had stolen a watch
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escape payment of damages, but remain obligated for one mali-

ciously broken? To exclude from discharge the liability arising

from such transactions as those involved in Crawford v. Burke,

195 U. S. 176, and here presented, not improbably was a special

purpose of the amendment.

In Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, 485, 487, we said of

original § 17(2): "In order to come within that meaning as a

judgment for a wilful and malicious injury to person or prop-

erty, it is not necessary that the cause of action be based upon

special malice, so that without it the action could not be main-

tained." And further: "A wilful disregard of what one knows

to be his duty, an act which is against good morals and wrong-

ful in and of itself, and which necessarily causes injury and is

done intentionally, may be said to be done wilfully and mali-

ciously, so as to come within the exception. It is urged that

the malice referred to in the exception is malice towards the

individual personally, such as is meant, for instance, in a statute

for maliciously injuring or destroying property, or for malicious

mischief, where mere intentional injury without special malice

towards the individual has been held by some courts not to be

sufficient. Commonwealth v. Williams, 110 Mass. 401. "We are

not inclined to place such a narrow construction upon the lan-
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guage of the exception. We do not think the language used was

intended to limit the exception in any such way. It was an

honest debtor, and not a malicious wrongdoer, that was to be

discharged."

The circumstances disclosed suffice to show a wilful and ma-

licious injury to property for which plaintiff in error became

and remains liable to respond in damages. The judgment be-

low is affirmed.

1917 AMENDMENT OP THE BANKRUPTCY LAW

The Act op Makch 2,1917, ch. 153 (39 Stat. at L. 999; 1918

Supp. Fed. Stat. Annot. 69) adds to § 17, after the words,

"seduction of an unmarried female," the following: "or for

breach of promise of marriage accompanied by seduction."

escape payment of damages, but remain obligat.ed for one maliciously broken T To exclude from discharge the liability arising
from such transactions as those involved in Crawford v. Burke,
195 U. S. 176, and here presented, not improbably was a special
purpose of the amendment.
In Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, 485, 487, we said of
original § 17 ( 2) : ''In order to come within that meaning as a
judgment for a wilful and malicious injury to person or property, it is not necessary that the cause of action be based upon
special malice, so that without it the action could not be maintained." And further: "A wilful disregard of what one knows
to be his duty, an act which is against good morals and wrongful in and of itself, and which necessarily causes injury and is
done intentionally, may be said to be done wilfully and maliciously, so as to come within the exception. It is urged that
the ~alice referred to in the exception is malice towards the
individual personally, such as is meant, for instance, in a statut.e
for maliciously injuring or destroying property, or for malicious
mischief, where mere intentional injury without special malice
towards the individual has been held by some courts not to be
sufficient. Commonwealth v. Williams, 110 Mass. 401. We are
not inclined to place such a narrow construction upon the language of the exception. We do not think the language used was
intended to limit the exception in any such way. It was an
honest debtor, and not a malicious wrongdoer, that was to be
discharged."
The circumstances disclosed suffice to show a wilful and malicious injury to property for which plaintiff in error became
and remains liable to respond in damages. The judgment below is affirmed.
1917 AMENDMENT OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW
THE ACT OF MARCH 2, 1917, CH. 153 (39 Stat. at L. 999; 1918
Supp. Fed. Stat. Annot. 69) adds to § 17, after the words,
"seduction of an unmarried female," the following: "or for
breach of prcnni.se of marria.ge acccmpanitd by seduction.''
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